Critical Theory, the Culture Industry and High Art

If high art is to be understood in regard to Frankfurt School ‘Critical Theory’ as

proposed by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, it may be seen to have, for the

most part, dissolved into the popular culture over the past 40 years. Adorno and

Horkheimer argue that the modern capitalist social structure of western society has

given birth to a ‘culture industry’, wherein popular culture is created through the

capitalist need to mass-produce and commodify cultural goods. The works of this

culture industry stand in necessary opposition to the high arts. Over the past 40 years,

the focus of the visual arts has shifted away from the aesthetic and onto characteristics

that may be seen as belonging to the culture industry. Specifically, the visual arts have

come to embody two such elements. Firstly, they have begun to concern themselves

with conceptual subject matter rather than aesthetic problems of form. Secondly, they

have begun to appeal to basic, instant pleasures in an attempt to penetrate the mass

market. Such elements are apparent in the works of several key artists who may be

seen to have changed the trajectory of the high arts since 1970.

In ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ (1947), Adorno and Horkheimer argue that

modern popular culture is a product of capitalism’s comodification of cultural goods,

and stands in direct contrast to high art. High art is necessarily autonomous, and

therefore characterised by purposelessness. The only way high art can maintain its

existence is by denying the consumer society in which it exists. Works of high art

must therefore disassociate itself from any social purpose by concerning themselves

with the aesthetic alone. However, high art remains constantly under threat from the

encroachment of mass culture. They claim that, “Culture now impresses the same
stamp on everything. Films, radios and magazines make a system which is uniform as

a whole and in every part,” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1947, 122). This uniformity

occurs as a result of reducing art to industrially produced works whose value is

determined by the degree to which they fulfil the desires of the masses. Further to

this, Adorno and Horkheimer argue of the culture industry that,

“No independent thinking must be expected from the audience, the product

prescribes every reaction…Any logical connection calling for mental effort is

painstakingly avoided. As far as possible, developments must follow from the

immediately preceding situation and never from the idea as a whole.” (Adorno

& Horkheimer, 1947, 137).

Thus, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, products of popular culture inherently

discourage serious reflection on the part of the audience. Rather, they resort to base

pleasures in order to entertain and pacify the masses. They argue that, “Fun is a

medicinal bath. The pleasure industry never fails to prescribe it. It makes laughter the

instrument of fraud practiced on happiness,” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1947, 140).

Works of popular culture therefore concern themselves with provoking instant

pleasure and gratification. Art must retain its critical power, however it cannot do this

by simply articulating critiques, as it would therefore lose autonomy. In order to

remain free from the culture industry, art must refuse to concern itself with social

concepts. Thus, there are two ways art may fall into the realm of the culture industry.

Firstly, it may concern itself with the needs of the masses, appealing to instant

pleasures rather than promoting serious reflection. Secondly, it may lose absolute

autonomy by attempting to serve a cultural purpose by embodying social concepts.

Duchamp’s ready-mades may be seen as some of the earliest examples of high

art breaking into the culture industry. By departing from aesthetics and problems of

form, and rather focusing on the concept behind the work, art loses its autonomy and

fails to offer any true alternative to present existence. However, with the rise of

postmodernism in recent times art has begun to dissolve absolutely into the culture

industry. “This work does not bracket art for formal or perceptual experiment but

rather seeks out its affiliations with other practices (in the culture industry and

elsewhere),” (Foster, 1985, in Harrison and Wood [Eds.], 1992, 1066). Although such

art has been prominent from the 1960’s, a more recent example is the work of Joseph

Kosuth. Often cited as one of the leading exponents of conceptual art, Kosuth’s work

towards the end of the 1960’s incorporated conceptual philosophic ideas.

Furthermore, Kosuth has written on the function of art as the expression of ideas

(Kosuth, 1969). This understanding of art is embodied in his work ‘One and Three

Chairs’ (1965). The work was composed of a visual representation of a chair, a verbal

description of a chair, and a physical chair itself. The purpose of this work is to

actively pose a philosophic question to the spectator about how we receive concepts

through different representations (Bowman, 1985). In this work, Kosuth stimulates

rational reflection, but not of the kind that Adorno and Horkheimer promote. In

referencing non-aesthetic rational concepts rather than traditional aesthetics, Kosuth’s

work fails to become autonomous and therefore fails to offer aesthetic ‘truth’.

Another notable example of art aligning itself with the expression of concepts

rather than the aesthetic is the work of Hans Haacke. In his piece ‘MoMA Poll’

(1970), Haacke invited spectators to become part of the artwork by completing a

survey and placing it in one of two transparent boxes corresponding to their answer to

a political question. In this work, Haacke dispenses with the aesthetic absolutely, with
the work existing as the embodiment of a socio-political concept. As Hobbes

identifies of Haacke’s work,

“...the spiritual in aestheticism is left alone, indeed it is safe-guarded even

more, while elaborate posturings and internal inconsistencies of the art world

are taken to task, unemotionally examined, and, for the first time, realistically

set down in factual, succinct graphs.” (Hobbes, 1977, 180).

In ‘MoMA Poll’ Haacke completely departs from the notion of autonomous art.

Although it encourages rational reflection, the work exists only in regard to its social

context and absolutely refuses the aesthetic. This stands in contrast to Adorno and

Horkheimer’s notion of high art, and necessarily dissolves into the culture industry

that it relies upon for existence rather than striving for the sublime.

As a more recent example, the work of Gerhard Richter also embodies social

concepts rather than aspiring towards the aesthetic. In his collection of works

‘October 18, 1977’ (1988), Richter recreates photographs of captured members of a

violent German left-wing protest group (The Red Army Faction) by painting them,

and then blurring the pictures. Richter represents history by effectively breaking the

social taboo surrounding the subject of the Baader-Meinhoff suicide of 1977

(Buchloh, 1989). In this way, he uses his work to challenge accepted social views of

history. His work therefore loses its autonomy, thus dissolving into the culture

industry. However, in another way, Richter may be seen to challenge the role of the

artist as a social and historical commentator. With the blur, he references the history

of history-painting itself, as a practice that retreated with the introduction of

photography, with this retreat eventually leading to the modernist notion of aesthetics

and autonomy (Buchloh, 1989). Richter seems to be suggesting here that painting is,
indeed, inadequate for the representation of history. It is not the artist’s place to

represent social ‘truths’ in the modern age, and the artist cannot offer any true insight

into history. In this way, Richter may be seen as criticising art that concerns itself

with social statements and concepts, although paradoxically engaging in the same

practice he appears to discourage. Even so, Richter’s works fail to exist autonomously

and so become a part of the culture industry,

Recently, several artists have gone beyond merely rejecting the autonomy of

art and have actively embraced characteristics of the culture industry in an attempt to

appeal to the mass market. Perhaps the best examples of art appealing to the popular

culture in this way come from the so-called ‘Young British Artists’ of the 1990’s.

Indeed, Julian Stallabrass (1999) identifies this movement as having finally dissolved

the barriers between elitist art and mass culture through its extensive media coverage.

Stallabrass characterises the YBA movement by its determination to present work in

a, “visually accessible and spectacular form,” (Stallabrass, 1999, 4), coupled with its

“eschewal of all ideology, its principal rejection of all principal, [and] its strong

inclination to make no comment,” (Stallabrass, 1999, 128). The art of the YBA

movement therefore placed little emphasis on ideological purpose and reflection,

rather focussing on the accessibility of the work to the mass culture. It cannot,

therefore, be seen as high art if viewed through a filter of Frankfurt School critical

theory. These characteristics can be seen in ‘A Thousand Years’ (1990) by Damien

Hirst, a leading exponent in the movement. ‘A Thousand Years’ features a display of

a full lifecycle, with maggots and flies feeding on a rotting cows head inside a glass

case. The work is about mortality, and is blatantly literal. Rather than representing the

themes that he confronts, Hirst simply actualises them within the gallery. “The
allegory collapses into the literal…whatever empowering ‘truth’ this art could speak

to us is overwhelmed by the cynically barbarous gesture of actualising real suffering,”

(Ray, 2004, 129). The work thus denies the audience any chance for serious reflection

or thought. It is what it presents itself as, without hiding anything behind it or leaving

space for individual interpretation. In doing so, it seeks only to amaze by resorting to

the techniques of the culture industry.

“In Hirst’s piece…all reflective links to daily practice are suppressed. In it, it

functions just like any piece of popular entertainment. The choice posed,

between fascination and a moralising indignation, is a false one, for it ends in

indifference just the same: when the spectator finally gets bored, he or she

moves on, nothing more.” (Ray, 2004, 131).

Hirst’s work does not require anything on the audience except interest, appealing to

an instinct of barbarism and sadism in an attempt to entertain. It therefore functions in

the same manner as works of the culture industry.

The work of artist Jeff Koons functions in a similar way. Koons has stated that

his goal is to become, “as big an art star as possible,” and that he believes the art

world must, “use every means necessary to seduce and manipulate the audience,”

(Mamiya, 1992, 167). The motivation behind Koons’ art is therefore the attempt the

appeal to the mass market by resorting to the techniques of popular culture. In

particular, his work ‘Puppy’ (1992) may be seen as bearing the hallmarks of the

culture industry. The work is a 12-metre tall sculpture of a West Highland Terrier

puppy constructed from steel and covered entirely in flowers, and has been described

by critics as undeniably ‘kitsch’ (Mamiva, 1992). Kitsch is used, in this sense, with

regard to its definition by Clement Greenberg. Greenberg (1939) defined kitsch as the
inferior cultural works produced from an emerging mass culture in modern society

and assigned to it specific attributes.

“Kitsch is mechanical and operates by formulas. Kitsch is vicarious

experience and faked sensations Kitsch changes according to style, but

remains always the same. Kitsch is the epitome of all that is spurious in the

life of our times. Kitsch pretends to demand nothing of its customers except

their money – not even their time.” (Greenberg, 1939 in O’Brian ed., 1986,

10).

Although Greenberg’s definition of kitsch was compiled prior to Adorno and

Horkheimer’s classification of the culture industry, one central principal remains the

same: that products of mass culture are defined by their refusal to inspire serious

rational reflection or offer anything of true aesthetic value. Koons’ ‘Puppy’ is nothing

more than a dazzling spectacle inspiring fleeting joy. The spectator enjoys the work

without having any rational insight into it, just as products of the culture industry

appeal to basic instinct rather than true, informed aesthetic appreciation. Furthermore,

Koons pulls the subject (a puppy) and materials (flowers) directly from the values of

mass culture. The work is a, “large scale presentation of dime-store memorabilia,”

(Mamiya, 1992, 163). Koons simply reconstructs a popular image in a basely-pleasing

way and leaves no room for individual reflection or interpretation. This stands in

contrast to high art which, through its manipulation of form and the true aesthetic,

“engage with essences and metaphysics and, conservative in their compliance with

the institution of art, depend on it to validate their illusionism and mystification.”

(Batchelor & Freedman, 1997, 54). By departing with form and the aesthetic, and

focusing on elements of the culture industry in order to appeal to a mass audience,

artists such a Hirst and Koons have effectively resorted to base sensations, pacifying
their audience and sharply opposing high art.

Over the past 40 years, there has been a strong inclination in art to reject the

aesthetic and ideas of form and beauty. Instead, the focus has been on the

representation of philosophical ideas and the pushing of conceptual boundaries. In

taking this path, art has refused to remain autonomous and, according to Adorno and

Horkheimer’s critical theory, dissolved into the culture industry. The line between

high art and popular culture is now significantly blurred. Furthermore, many artists

have embraced the culture industry, creating works that embody and utilise the

techniques of popular culture in an attempt to simultaneously appeal to and pacify the

masses.

References
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Batchelor, D. & Freedman, C. “Living in a Material World.” Frieze 35 (1997): 52 –

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Bowman, R. “Words and Images: A Persistent Paradox.” Art Journal 45.4 (1985):

335-343.

Buchloh, B. “A Note on Gerhard Richter’s October 18, 1977.” October 48 (1989): 89

– 110.

Forster, H. “Subversive Signs.” Art in Theory: 1900-1990. Eds. Charles Harrison &

Paul Wood. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 1065-1066.

Greenberg, C. “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays

and Criticism. Ed. John O’Brian. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

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Hobbes, R. “MoMA Poll.” Art Journal 36.2 (1977): 180-186.

Kosuth, J. “Art After Philosophy.” Studio International 178 (1969): 134-137.

Mamiya, C. Pop Art and Consumer Culture. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992.

Ray, G. “Little Glass House of Horrors: High Art Lite, The Culture Industry and

Damien Hirst.” Third Text 18.2 (2004): 119-133.

Stallabrass, J. High Art Lite: British Art in the 1990s. London: Verso, 1999.