Reformers or Bullies:

the role of the Baath Regime in the Politics of Iraq

from 1968 to 2003

Presented by:

VALDEZ, IAN ALFONS S.

INTRODUCTION

The Ba’ath Party was made famous in the West by the late

Iraqi dictator and one-time ally of the United States Saddam

Hussein[1]. It is largely regarded in the West as something to be

associated with the most “evil of evils” since the 1991 Gulf War.

As NATO/GCC backed mercenaries and ultra-conservative

Islamic militias battle the Government of Bashar al-Assad in

Syria, the Ba’ath Party is once more a phrase that is popping up

in the Western mainstream media, mentioned in the kind of tones

one would associate with when referring to Nazi Germany. But what

exactly is the Ba’ath Party? How did it start? What does it

actually stand for? And why are Western media consumers nagged

into blind opposition against it by their leaders and the

mainstream media?

In a distinct but related effort, the government sponsored

the ubiquitous promotion (and eventual containment) of Shi’a

Twelver religious expression in public as a way to strengthen

ties with Iran and to promote pluralist conceptions of Islam

within Syria that could simultaneously challenge the hegemony of

Sunni portrayals. In one dramatic example, the reenactment of the

Taz’iyeh rituals commemorating the battle of Karbala were

permitted to be performed in the courtyard of the (Sunni) Umayyad

Mosque in Damascus. When sectarian tensions between Sunnis and

Shi’is in Iraq escalated in the mid 2000s, the Syrian government

reversed its policy of promoting Shi’a representations and,

instead, sought to contain them.

 The Ba’ath party offers the unique case of being the only

Pan-Arab political party (if we make an exception in the very

original case of the Syrian Popular Party – Translator’s note:

Better known as the SSNP today) to have tried to elaborate a

truly “national-revolutionary” doctrine with a certain degree of

coherence, thanks to the political and historical analyses of its

founder and leader, Michel Aflaq (a Greek-Orthodox Syrian),

firstly in numerous articles disseminated, and above all, in the

complete volume “Fi sabîl al-Ba’as,” published in Damascus in

1959, at the time of the Syrian-Egyptian Union, within the United

Arab Republic.

There Aflaq analyses his nationalism and its opposition to

Marxist philosophy.

“The Arab Nation has an independent history from the history

of the West and Europe; the theories and organizational forms

coming from Western civilization and born from the conditions

proper to the West do not correspond to the needs of the Arab

milieu and do not encounter a favorable welcome there.

The future of the Ba’ath party in Syria is questionable

given its strong association with the Assads and its evolution

away from many of its core principles and values.

 The research is entitled Reformers or Bullies: the role of

the Baath Regime in the Politics of Iraq from 1968 to 2003 will

tackle

Background

The Ba’ath Party began in Syria in April 1947, formed by the

merging of Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar’s Arab Ba’ath

Movement and Zaki al-Arsuzi’s Arab Ba’ath. The newly formed

Party’s objectives were secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab

unification, as well as freedom from Western influence.[2] To

that end, the Party was influential in securing independence for

Syria from France, and took control of the country in 1963,

holding it ever since. However, all was not plain sailing for the

Party in the early days, with bitter in-fighting between

progressive elements and those of a more nationalist flavour.

Eventually, the nationalists won control, bringing the al-Assads

to power.

In July 1968, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, predecessor to Saddam

Hussein, led the Ba’ath Party to victory in a bloodless coup in

Iraq. The Party ruled Iraq until Hussein’s overthrow by the

United States and its Coalition of the Willing in 2003 under the

pretext that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 2001

attacks on the US, that he had weapons of mass destruction, that

he was ready to use them and could do so in forty five minutes,

and various other excuses that, at best, have turned out to be

outright lies.

After Hussein’s regime was toppled by the Coalition, the

Ba’ath Party was outlawed in Iraq, an act which some suggest

helped fuel Sunni elements of the insurgency that followed.

And now, it seems, decision-makers in the West have decided

that it is the turn of Syria’s Ba’athists to fall. While many

could look at Iraq and say with great confidence that Iraq was a

resource grab targeting Iraq’s oil, as well as a money making

exercise for mercenary companies, arms manufacturers, mega-

corporations like Halliburton and its subsidiaries, and the

banking cartels, Syria is different. Syria produces oil, yes, but

nowhere near the scale that Iraq does.

Syria’s closeness with Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah will

obviously stand out as a reason why the US, Israel, the EU, and

the GCC want Assad’s government gone. But factoring in the Ba’ath

Party’s three objectives of secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab

unification, we see more ideological reasons, as well as the

motivation for the militias operating under the Al Qaeda and

Muslim Brotherhood umbrellas.

 Starting with pan-Arab unification, one is reminded of the

line “united we stand, divided we fall”. A united Arab people is

an idea that is utterly intolerable to the colonialists of the

West, who rely on division and playing indigenous peoples off

against each other to get their way in the region, allowing the

blood to flow while they go about their business.

A fine example of this can be found in the incident in 2005,

when heavily armed British SAS soldiers were captured in Basra,

Iraq, after shooting at police officers while dressed as locals.

[3] It appears that the British were hoping to provoke a response

from locals who would blame their particular demographic’s main

‘rival’ demographic and seek revenge. And with the West’s

propensity for false flag attacks, one may well ask just how many

of the countless bombings, shootings, and similar atrocities that

the Iraqi populace suffered – and are still suffering today –

were in fact the responsibility of covert Western agents playing

the divide and conquer game.

Socialism is obviously not something the West’s capitalist

masters will tolerate. Great effort has been made to nullify the

threat that ‘socialism’ poses to the current paradigm in the

West, as we can see with centre-left mainstream parties in

Britain, France and so on becoming centre-left in name only,

their policies and actions undermining their marketing. Grass

roots left-wing political organisations are largely marginalised

in the national political discourses of the major powers of NATO.

Western media outlets tailored to consumers of a conservative

bent spend a lot of time and effort scaremongering over

socialism.

Leftist, socialist, communist, Maoist, Marxist, Leninist,

and so on are phrases that are used to induce negative responses

and as shortcuts to winning public debates by conservatives,

regardless of the differences in actual meaning between the

terms. Many conservatives in the West, particularly in the United

States, equate the word socialism with the spectre of the Soviet

Union, its mere utterance enough to cause many over a certain age

flashbacks of the Cold War.

And then there is secularism, an idea abhorrent to Saudi

Arabia and the US client-emirates, as well as the ultra-

conservative Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who

dominate the rebel movement in Syria.[4] Saudi Arabia is one of

the foremost exporters of radical Islamic ideology in the world,

and has a human rights record that makes medieval Europe look

positively progressive in nature.

Meanwhile, Western leaders are happy for ignorance to

flourish at home, and with many media consumers in the NATO bloc
mistakenly assuming that all Arabs are Muslim, it may come as a

surprise to many that among the founders of the Ba’ath party,

Michel Aflaq was actually Greek Orthodox Christian, while al-

Bitar was Sunni Muslim, and al-Arsuzi was an Alawite. This same

ignorance is what allows Israel to portray its systematic

violence against the Palestinians as defending Judaism against

Islam to Western audiences. You will rarely hear about secular

and Christian Palestinians, and even less the Druze, from the

mainstream media.

As it has often been said, it does not serve the governments

of the West to have an informed public who may actually question

the official narrative that they are fed by the vast

propaganda/infotainment machine of the US and Europe if they knew

a little more about the history and the motivations behind world

events.

And while the primary motivation behind the attempt to

topple the Ba’ath Party in Syria may be for the strategic benefit

of the Israelis and the US in their quest against Iran, there are

other motivating factors that should not be ignored, for they

help us to see a more complete picture.

Rationale
 The organizational structure of the Ba'ath Party was created

at the 2nd National Congress by amending the party's Internal

Regulations (An-Nidhāmu-d-Dākhilī), which was approved at the

party's 1st National Congress in 1947. The organizational

structure ran from top to bottom, and members were forbidden to

initiate contacts between groups on the same level of the

organisation—all contacts had to pass through a higher command

level.

“Every nation … possesses an essential motive force … at the

time of Islam’s appearance this motive force was religion. In

effect, only religion was capable of revealing the latent forces

of the Arabs, of realizing their unity … Today … the prime motive

force of the Arabs is nationalism … The Arabs are crippled in

regards to their freedom, their sovereignty, and their unity,

thus they can understand the language of nationalism…”

The Ba’ath party, while recognizing the positive role of

Islamic religion in the awareness of Arab unity (under the form

of the Ummah, the community of believers), is thus a secular

nationalist party.

But the Ba’ath party also presents itself as a socialist

party:
 “The socialism of the Ba’ath is in perfect agreement with

the vibrant society of the Arab Nation.

It limits itself to organizing the economy for the purpose

of redistributing the wealth of the Arab world, laying the

foundations of an economy that guarantees justice and equality

between citizens and promoting a revolution in production and the

means of production.

Current State of Research in the Field

This study aims to determine Reformers or Bullies: the role

of the Baath Regime in the Politics of Iraq from 1968 to 2003.

During nearly five decades in power, Syria's Baath Party has

evolved from an Arab nationalist movement into a vast

organisation that has infiltrated every aspect of public life.

When Hafez al-Assad seized power in a coup in 1970, the party

became a vital tool to instil loyalty, as well as help control

the government and military alongside the pervasive security

services.

Synthesis of the Art

The foundation of the Ba’ath movement and subsequent

political party begins with the perceived state of affairs in

post-World War I, particularly in Syria. The Ba’ath

(Resurrection) movement was initially led by Michel ‘Aflaq, an

Orthodox Christian and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim;

both were Syrians from bourgeois Damascus families (1397,

Devlin). Their principles were unity, freedom and later

socialism, which shaped Ba’ath political dynamics once it

achieved party status. While ‘Aflaq believed that the Ba’ath

movement’s central purpose was to educate, Bitar believed that a

political organization was necessary “for the ideas of the group

to be truly influential” (1398, Devlin). The principles of the

Ba’ath Party arise from the socio-economic and political context

of the 1920s. An understanding of how the (Sunni/Alawite) leaders

of Iraq and Syria would use the Party for their rise to power

requires an understanding of the principles that ‘Aflaq and Bitar

instituted in the founding congress of the Ba’ath Party, which

took place on April 4-6, 1947 and the subsequent merger with the

Arab Socialism Party of al-Hawrani in 1953. In addition, to

better understand how Ba’athism came to be an empty rhetorical

shell for authoritarian manipulation in the two Ba’ath regimes,

one must first understand the ideology that it put forth.

A vision of pan-Arabism had been growing in the school

systems of Syria and Iraq in the interwar years (1397, Devlin).

Pan-Arabism was defined as the call for unity between persons who

speak Arabic (154, Pfaff). In the 1920s and 1930s, “Arabism came
to be defined by language rather than geography” (1397, Devlin),

this altered the conceptualization of political interests beyond

regionalism. Moving against the arbitrary states installed by

western powers, pan-Arabism was a new way of looking at an old

historical fact; the fact of Arab oneness. Ba’athism was the

first political ideology with pan-Arabism as the primary goal,

and had a “leading role in spreading the doctrine of unity in the

1950s” (1399, Devlin). The founding Ba’athist Michel ‘Aflaq

stated in his treaties On the Way of Resurrection:

Thus the founding manifesto of Ba’athism (drafted by Aflaq)

declared in 1944:

“We are not against the Soviet Union; we make a very clear

distinction between the USSR and the local Syrian Communist

Party. The Arabs see no reason to oppose a great state like the

Soviet Union, that since its formation, has shown sympathy for

countries that fight for their independence. Our goal is to

establish amicable relations with the Soviet Union by the means

of official and inter-governmental treaties and not by the

intermediary of the local Communist party. The triumphs of

Communism here are due to a weakness of spirit. But a well

informed Arab cannot be a Communist without abandoning his

Arabism, the two are incompatible; Communism is foreign to that

which is Arab. It will be the greatest danger to Arab nationalism

if the latter is incapable of giving a systematic definition of

its goals.”

From this time, the Ba’ath party lucidly judged that

Communism would develop in Arab lands by playing the card of

chauvinism and anti-imperialism; in this lens, if Arab

nationalism was not ideologically structured, it would be

literally absorbed by Communism. Hence the efforts of Aflaq to

give his party a coherent ideological apparatus capable of being

a response to the Marxist challenge. To achieve this, the

Ba’athist action in favor of “Arab socialism” was conceived in

order to pull the rug out from under the feet of Marxist

propagandists. But this “Arab socialism” (common to all

unification movements elsewhere) had no common point with

Marxist-Leninism. It is a simple projection of nationalism, a

means of making this nationalism realizable, as Aflaq explicitly

recognizes:

“Arab nationalists understand that socialism is the surest

means of realizing the rebirth of their nationalism and their

nation because they know that today’s Arab fight rests on all

Arabs and if they are divided into masters and slaves, their

participation together in this combat is not possible.

 Said otherwise, we think that the Arabs can only realize

their rebirth if they are convinced that their nationalism means

justice, equality, and dignified life in society.”

This “Arab socialism” only attracts the classical Marxist

response: “Petit-bourgeois populism!” “Social fascist demagogy!”

In any case, Ba’athist socialism is identical to the

socialism of all the Fascist type movements and Aflaq limits

himself to distinguishing himself from the Western Fascist

thinkers (despite his hostility to “ideologies foreign to the

Arab world” which he mostly did to fend off Communism), while

refusing the Marxist divides of the class struggle.

Historical Overview of Ba’athism

The Ba’ath party constituted in Syria in 1944, before

spreading to many Arab countries; thus it must be studied country

by country (or rather, according to Ba’athist terminology, region

by region).

Ba’athist cells, most often clandestine, exist in a certain

number of other Arab countries. A Ba’athist group was dismantled

in Tunisia by the police in 1970. The Ba’athists were very active

in Jordan, even on the parliamentary level, before their

elimination by the royal government. However, they pursue

clandestine action there. There also exist small clandestine

groups in Egypt.

In Lebanon, in 1958, during the civil war, the Ba’ath played

an important role under the direction of Abdel Medjid Rafi, who

sought to constitute a revolutionary government against the legal

government many times. However the audience of the party was

limited, though, it succeeded in obtaining a representative in

the last elections, favorable to the Iraqi branch of the Lebanese

Ba’ath, which had also broken into rival factions.

To this day there are no formations in the Palestinian

Resistance that are not divided by this rivalry, for either one

there are at least:

-The Sai’qa, the second most important formation in the

Palestinian Liberation Organization (after Fatah), under the

complete control of the Ba’athists in Damascus. Until Assad’s

seizure of power, the Sai’qa constituted essential military

support for the left wing of the Syrian Ba’ath Party.

-The Arab Liberation Front was created by Baghdad to counter

the Sai’qa and prove Baghdad’s interest in the Palestinian

struggle. Its importance remains very limited, but we can believe

that it may rapidly increase its number of effective members,

because of its decidedly oppositional positions to the

negotiation processes underway. The Front has already obtained

the support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

of Doctor Habash.

In examining former Baathists' possible roles in the Islamic

State, it is important to consider the nature of the Arab

Socialist Baath Party and its rule in Iraq, which lasted from

1968 until 2003. First of all, the Baath Party was a Pan-Arab

socialist party that sought to unite the entire Arab world under

Baathist rule. The Baath Party was also a revolutionary party

that believed in armed uprising. It is no mistake that the Baath

parties in Iraq and Syria came to power via coups d'etat. The

Baath Party in Iraq established an oppressive, totalitarian

police state that was rife with informants and fostered intense

fear in the population. Iraq became a socialist police state not

unlike Communist East Germany or Enver Hoxha's Albania.

When Saddam came to power in 1979, he led a Stalinesque

purge to consolidate his control over the Iraqi Baath Party and

Iraq. He would not tolerate any dissent and famously killed

untold thousands of his own people in his quest to exert total

control over the country. Iraq's Baathism morphed from a Pan-Arab

revolutionary socialist movement to a personality cult centered

on Saddam — what many authors refer to as "Saddamism." The

formation of the Fedayeen Saddam — literally "those who are

willing to die for Saddam," a force of some 30,000 men who had

pledged to lay down their lives for their leader — reflected this

cult of personality.

Rather than attempt to unite politically with other

countries like Syria to form a Pan-Arab Baathist state, Saddam

instead opted to expand his Saddamist state by invading first

Iran and later Kuwait. Both of these ventures brought disaster

upon Iraq and the Iraqi people. Uprisings by Iraq's Shiite

majority and Kurdish minority were put down with extreme force.

Syria's Baathist government strongly opposed these expansionist

ambitions; the Syrians even participated in the international

coalition behind Operation Desert Storm, the operation to

liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces.

As Communist Party membership was in totalitarian East

Germany, Maoist China or the Soviet Union, Baath Party membership

in Iraq was important for anyone hoping to hold any type of

government office, operate a business or otherwise get ahead.

Iraqi Baathism was not a winsome, attractive ideology; instead,

it was brutally forced upon the Iraqi people. Although there

certainly were some true believers, most Baath Party members

joined the party for pragmatic purposes. To quote one of my Iraqi

colleagues, "Most Iraqis were forced to join the Baath Party, but

not all of them were Saddamists." Many of the people currently

discussing whether many Islamic State leaders are true believers

and are using the jihadist ideology as a screen for their

Baathism don't seem to be asking themselves if these leaders

could have been Islamists who previously hid behind a screen of

Baathism.

In the run-up to the Gulf War, Saddam attempted to play the

Pan-Arab card to rally the Arab world behind him, and he failed

miserably. In fact, many Arab countries joined the U.S.-led

coalition against Iraq. In the wake of the Gulf War, Saddam

changed his ideological tactics and increasingly emphasized

Islam. He did this not only symbolically and rhetorically, but

also practically, by giving Salafist preachers more leeway. This

increase of religiosity within the state opened the door for

Salafist-minded Iraqis to operate within the state as

"Baathists."

It has been 12 years since the U.S. invasion of Iraq forced

Saddam and his cronies from power. Saddam is dead, and his cult

of personality is long gone. Not even the most fervent Baathist

can have any hope of re-establishing the old Saddamist order.

Islamic State Leadership - It is obviously impossible to

read the minds of the Islamic State's leaders to determine

exactly how fervently they believe in the group's ideology. There

are, nevertheless, some observable behaviors that can help in

assessing their ideological commitment.

One indicator of the leaders' ideological frame of mind is

their indefatigable persistence in their offensive operations

despite casualties. Like pit bull terriers, once they get their

teeth into something they simply will not let go. This was

clearly reflected in their dogged insistence on taking the Syrian

city of Kobani. Even though the city is a non-critical location

on the battlefield, the Islamic State would not relent in its

attempts to take Kobani and repeatedly poured reinforcements of

men and weapons into the meat grinder the city became. This

seemed to indicate that the group's leaders truly believed that

they are inexorable and divinely blessed. The Kobani decision

showed no signs that the group's leaders were making pragmatic

decisions based solely on military considerations.

The Islamic State's leaders also have not been pragmatic in

using policies of severe sectarianism and takfirism (the doctrine

of deeming other Muslims as apostates and therefore acceptable

targets for attacks) to pick fights with every ethnic and

religious group the Islamic State has encountered. This stands in

stark contrast with al Qaeda's philosophy of only attacking other

groups if al Qaeda is attacked first and of focusing on one enemy

at a time. The Islamic State has declared war on the world and
has not shied away from attacking anyone (with the possible

exception of the understanding the group seems have reached with

Syrian President Bashar al Assad's government and the group's

decision not to provoke Turkey until Islamic State supply routes

were threatened). This often results in the group having to fight

on multiple fronts at once.

In much the same way, the group's leaders have not been very

sensible when it comes to making external enemies. While already

engaged in brutal warfare on multiple fronts in Iraq and Syria,

the Islamic State intentionally provoked the United States and

other foreign countries to enter into the fray. Drawing the

United States and other "crusader" countries into the conflict

does help the Islamic State ideologically, but the group was not

having any problems in recruiting foreign fighters prior to these

outside powers' entering the fight. A more practical approach

would have been to take care of local business before provoking

external enemies.

The Islamic State promotes an apocalyptic, millenarian

ideology that claims the group will suffer heavy losses until a

small core of true believers, led by the Prophet Isa (which is

Arabic for Jesus), defeat the "crusader" forces led by the

Antichrist in a final battle at Dabiq in Syria. After the victory

at Dabiq, the true believers will be able to extend their Islamic

State to conquer the Earth. Provoking the Americans and other

foreign forces to attack them would seem to indicate that the

Islamic State's leaders not only promote this ideology but also

believe it to be true and act accordingly. This is not to say

that there are no opportunists among the Islamic State leadership

and members — just that the group's leaders appear to be acting

as if they are true believers rather than cynical manipulators.

Speaking of Dabiq (which is also the name of the Islamic

State's English-language magazine), the town lies inside the safe

zone that the Turks are seeking to establish in northern Syria.

It will be very interesting to watch how the Islamic State

leaders respond to efforts to push their forces out of the town.

Dabiq occupies a prominent place in Islamic State eschatology,

and it will be important to see how much effort the group makes

to maintain control of it. The town of Dabiq has no real tactical

significance, and if the Islamic State takes actions to protect

the town despite its tactical irrelevance, it will be another

sign that the group's leaders are believers and not cynical

Baathists using ideology to manipulate their followers.

Problem in the Field

 Given the related studies already conducted, the general

problem is: Baath Regime in the Politics of Iraq are they

Reformers or Bullies?

Gap to be bridged

The only Arab nationalist party worthy of this name remains

the Ba’ath, various movements of the Nasserist type were

incapable of bringing about the creation of an ideological and

political force in Arab countries. So Ba’athism must be studied

as the singular representative of Arab unionist ideology, an

organized party not limited to a simple movement of opinion

Studies about the Baath party are cited and stated, though

there are issued that need to be explored in case of its

influences or whether they are reformers or bullies. The

authority for the practice is based upon a social contract that

delineates professional rights and responsibilities as well as

mechanisms for public accountability. In Iraq, Baath party is

defined and governed by law, and entrance to the party is

regulated at the national or state level.

Objective of the Study

Political parties such as Baath continue to face challenging

ethical issues in political practice and this will only increase

in time. This study will determine the extent of influence of the

core principle of ethics, which is beneficence, on how the

government has become under Baath Regime. The organizational

structure of the Ba'ath Party was created at the 2nd National

Congress by amending the party's Internal Regulations (An-

Nidhāmu-d-Dākhilī), which was approved at the party's 1st

National Congress in 1947. The organizational structure ran from

top to bottom, and members were forbidden to initiate contacts

between groups on the same level of the organisation—all contacts

had to pass through a higher command level.

Key References

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/08/18/1029114048796.html

http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/baath-party.html

http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-uncover-operation-in-basra-

agents-provocateurs/990

http://www.globalresearch.ca/unmasking-the-muslim-brotherhood-

syria-egypt-and-beyond/5315406

Richard Edwards, “Baathism,” The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli

Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer

Tucker (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008), pp. 184-185.

Paulo Pinto, “’Oh Syria, God Protects You’: Islam as Cultural

Idiom under Bashar al-Assad, Middle East Critique, Vol. 20, No. 2

(2011), pp. 189-205.

Andrew Lee Butters, “Clerical Era: Syria gets Religion,” The New

Republic (October 2, 2006), pp. 16-18.

Theory

Theory of Albert Bandura: Self Efficacy for Agentic Positive

Psychology: Bandura presents his views on positive psychology in,

“An Agentic Perspective on Positive Psychology” (Bandura, 2008),

a chapter from a larger collection of writings on the field.

In this research he expresses his view of agentic positive

psychology. He emphasizes human capacity rather than human

failings and dysfunction.

Bandura explains how self-efficacy can be influenced and

developed, and how it positively effects all facets of human

experience.

Throughout his writing, Bandura critiques the predominantly

negative, pathology-focused views in the discipline of

psychology, contrasting it to positive psychology’s pro self-

efficacy approach. He also addresses the “pathology of optimism”,

which will be explained below, as compared to realism when

effectively approaching life events.

The result of this chapter is an inspirational and

encouraging push to continue pursuing research into human agency,

self-efficacy and positive psychology perspectives as a whole.

 According to Albert Bandura, self-efficacy is not a trait

that some have and others don’t (or somewhere in-between).

Instead he proposes that anyone, regardless of their past or

current environment, has the ability to exercise and strengthen

their self-efficacy.

Albert bandura’s Self-Efficacy just shows how Baath Party

can cope up with their current environment regardless of their

past – as members of Baath Party. Members posses skills and

determination in being an efficient worker even if its beyond

their practiced skills.

Most members of the Baath Party are self-enhancing

individual, they can greatly influence their country in this

attitude, and they have a self-sustaining optimistic view of

life, no matter what are the circumstances are. This theory

serve these members of the Baath Party’s motivation to know more

about their opportunities in the country.

Self-efficacy also means in the value of motivation that

influence an outcome. members of the Baath Party said represents

the largest portion of Iraq. It is said that members of the

Baath Party in every setting have always positive opportunity to

make an impact on the profession even if it means outside the

country.
Conceptual Framework

The system approach (Input-Process-Output System) was used

in describing the conceptual framework of the study.

INPUT

PROCESS

OUTPUT
METHODS

Research Design

This study determined Reformers or Bullies: the role of the

Baath Regime in the Politics of Iraq from 1968 to 2003 A

descriptive cross-sectional research methodology was used for

this study.

Who? What? Where? When? How? Why?

This study’s procedures included the following:

1. The respondents were political science and law

students, those aged 37 years old and below, by the

date of research conduction.

2. The respondents must be presently enrolled under

political science and law course based by the date

of data collection.
3. The main tool used in this study was a researcher-

made questionnaire which has been pre-coded and pre-

tested. Part 1 of the questionnaire included the

respondents’ socio-demographic profile. Part 2 or

the main questions contained a set of common

 situations in Iraq and the practice of Baath party,

answerable through a 5-point likert scale on how the

principle of beneficence influences their decision-

making strategies for each item presented.

Materials, Interventions, Outcome Measures

The main tool used in this study was a researcher-made

questionnaire. The study is limited to a questionnaire with 10

figures to measure Reformers or Bullies: the role of the Baath

Regime in the Politics of Iraq from 1968 to 2003.

The number of items in the questionnaires were developed by

the researcher and varied from students under political science

and law courses.

Statistical Analysis, Sample Size Calculations

The study population was composed of chosen political

science and law students. Approximately 40 have participated in

the questionnaire that is distributed by the researcher. the

response rate is 42%, representing 9.8% of the population and the

data analyzed from 40 law students 65%.

 The method of collecting data used was the normative survey.

Normative survey differs from descriptive studies because the

target is not only to gather facts but also to point out in which

respects the object of the study can be improved. This is

concerned with looking into the commonality of some elements.

Since the present research is a status study, the normative

survey was the most appropriate method to use in gathering data.

The instrument used to collect data was the questionnaire.

This was used because it gathers data faster than any other

method. Besides, the respondents were mostly professional, they

are presumed to be literate. They could read and answer the

questionnaires with ease.

After reading and studying samples of questionnaire from

related studies, the researchers prepared our own questionnaires.

We also have consulted some knowledgeable people about how to

prepare one. The researchers saw to it that there were enough

items to collect data to cover all aspects of the problem and to

answer all the specific questions that are related to the study.

The copies of the questionnaire were then distributed

personally the researcher to the respondents and the same were

gathered and collected after the survey has been conducted.

The following statistics are used:

Percentage - This was used to find out part of relation of the

score of one respondent to the whole group.

Ranking - This showed how the scores of a respondents to the

group

Mean - This was used to get a representative score of the group.

Frequency - This is used to determine the number of responses as

perceived by the respondents or the different categories included

in the study.

% = f / n x 100

Where: % - percentage

f – frequency of response

n – total # respondents which is equivalent to 100

Ethical Considerations

Ethical approval and permissions to use instruments and

conduct the study were obtained according to required procedures.

Data were rendered anonymous to protect the respondents’

confidentiality. Completing the questionnaire was interpreted as

consent to participate.
Data Gathering Tools and Techniques

The researcher first look for different information

regarding Baath Regime. Then listed important data about the

topic. After gathering information, data gathered are divided in

different section and topics that should be included in this

research study.

Tools of Analysis

Data gathered from the answered questionnaires were checked,

classified, tabulated and analyzed according to the research

design described in this chapter using Microsoft Excel and

prepared for final presentation.