1. ALPHA INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., petitioner, vs. ARSENIA SONIA CASTOR, respondent.

Facts: Arsenia Castor entered into a contract of insurance, involving her motor vehicle. The contract of
insurance obligates Alpha Insurance to pay Castor, ₱630,000.00 in case of loss or damage to said vehicle
during the period covered, which is from February 26, 2007 to February 26, 2008. Apparently, the motor
vehicle was lost on April 2007 because the respondent’s driver upon being asked by Castor to bring the
said vehicle to a nearby auto-shop for tune-up, did not return the same. Resultantly, respondent
promptly reported the incident to the police and concomitantly notified petitioner of the said loss and
demanded payment of the insurance proceeds in the total sum of ₱630,000.00, to no avail. The
petitioner contends that the loss of the motor vehicle is not covered by the insurance as stated in the
Exceptions, Sec III of the said insurance contract, “where any malicious damage caused by the Insured,
any member of his family or by "A PERSON IN THE INSURED’S SERVICE.”

Issue: WON the loss of the vehicle is excluded under the insurance policy

Ruling: No. Theft perpetrated by a driver of the insured is not an exception to the coverage from the
insurance policy subject of this case. This is evident from the very provision of Section III – "Loss or
Damage." The insurance company, subject to the limits of liability, is obligated to indemnify the insured
against theft. Said provision does not qualify as to who would commit the theft. Second, adverse to
petitioner’s claim, the words "loss" and "damage" mean different things in common ordinary usage. The
word "loss" refers to the act or fact of losing, or failure to keep possession, while the word "damage"
means deterioration or injury to property. If the intention of the defendant-appellant was to include the
term "loss" within the term "damage" then logic dictates that it should have used the term "damage"
alone in the entire policy or otherwise included a clear definition of the said term as part of the
provisions of the said insurance contract. True, it is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that
the terms of a contract are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the
parties thereto have used. Lastly, a contract of insurance is a contract of adhesion. So, when the terms
of the insurance contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to
preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation.

2. VIOLETA R. LALICAN, petitioner, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, AS
REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT VICENTE R. AVILON

Facts: Violeta Lalican the wife of the deceased Eulogio filed a Complaint for Death Benefit against Insular
Life. Eulogio, during his lifetime, entered a contract of life insurance with the respondent but has later
failed to pay the premiums. Hence, his first contract has already lapsed. He then filed an Application for
Reinstatement with Insular Life, through Malaluan, on 26 May 1998, constitutes an admission that Policy
No. 9011992 had lapsed by then. Insular Life did not act on Eulogio’s first Application for Reinstatement,
since the amount Eulogio simultaneously deposited was sufficient to cover only the P8,062.00 overdue
premium for 24 January 1998, but not the P322.48 overdue interests thereon. On 17 September 1998,
Eulogio submitted a second Application for Reinstatement to Insular Life, again through Malaluan,
depositing at the same time P17,500.00, to cover payment for the overdue interest on the premium for
24 January 1998, and the premiums that had also become due on 24 April 1998 and 24 July 1998. On the
very same day, Eulogio passed away.
Issue: WON Eulogio was able to reinstate the lapsed insurance policy on his life before his death for his
wife to ask for the death benefits

Ruling: No. To reinstate a policy means to restore the same to premium-paying status after it has been
permitted to lapse. Eulogio’s death, just hours after filing his Application for Reinstatement and
depositing his payment for overdue premiums and interests with Malaluan, does not constitute a special
circumstance that can persuade the Court to already consider Policy No. 9011992 reinstated. Said
circumstance cannot override the clear and express provisions of the Policy Contract and Application for
Reinstatement, and operate to remove the prerogative of Insular Life thereunder to approve or
disapprove the Application for Reinstatement. The Court agrees with the RTC that the conditions for
reinstatement under the Policy Contract and Application for Reinstatement were written in clear and
simple language, which could not admit of any meaning or interpretation other than those that they so
obviously embody. A construction in favor of the insured is not called for, as there is no ambiguity in the
said provisions in the first place. The words thereof are clear, unequivocal, and simple enough so as to
preclude any mistake in the appreciation of the same.

3. Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Philippine American Life Insurance Corp. (2008)

G.R. No. 166245 April 9, 2008

Lessons Applicable: Exception to Perfection (Insurance)

FACTS: December 10, 1980: Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into an
agreement denominated as Creditor Group Life Policy No. P-19202 with Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation (Eternal) Under the policy (renewable annually), the clients of Eternal who purchased burial
lots from it on installment basis would be insured by Philamlife amount of insurance coverage depended
upon the existing balance Eternal complied by submitting a letter dated December 29, 1982, a list of
insurable balances of its lot buyers for October 1982 which includes John Chuang which was stamped as
received by Philam Life August 2, 1984, Chuang died with a balance of 100,000 php April 25, 1986:
Philamlife had not furnished Eternal with any reply on its insurance claim so its demanded its claim
According to Philam Life, since the application was submitted only on November 15, 1984, after his
death, Mr. John Uy Chuang was not covered under the Policy since his application was not approved.
Moreover, the acceptance of the premiums are only in trust for and not a sign of approval.

RTC: favored Eternal

CA: Reversed RTC

ISSUE: W/N Philam's inaction or non-approval meant the perfection of the insurance contract.

HELD: YES. CA reversed construed in favor of the insured and in favor of the effectivity of the insurance
contract Upon a party’s purchase of a memorial lot on installment from Eternal, an insurance contract
covering the lot purchaser is created and the same is effective, valid, and binding until terminated by
Philamlife by disapproving the insurance application Moreover, the mere inaction of the insurer on the
insurance application must not work to prejudice the insured The termination of the insurance contract
by the insurer must be explicit and unambiguous.
 4. New Life v CA G.R. No. 94071 March 31, 1992

Facts: Julian Sy, owner of New Life, insured his building in 3 different insurance agencies for 350,000,
1,000,000, and 200,000. When his building and the goods inside burned down, he claimed for insurance
indemnities, but these were rejected by the three companies for violation of policy conditions. Sy filed
for 3 different suits in the trial court, where he won all suits against the insurance companies. The court
of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Did the petitioner violate conditions 3 and 27 of the three insurance policies, thereby foreiting
collection of indemnities?

Held: Yes.

Ratio: Condition 3. The insured shall give notice to the Company of any insurance or insurances already
effected, or which may subsequently be effected, covering any of the property or properties consisting
of stocks in trade, goods in process and/or inventories only hereby insured, and unless such notice be
given and the particulars of such insurance or insurances be stated therein or endorsed on this policy
pursuant to Section 50 of the Insurance Code, by or on behalf of the Company before the occurrence of
any loss or damage, all benefits under this policy shall be deemed forfeited, provided however, that this
condition shall not apply when the total insurance or insurances in force at the time of loss or damage
not more than P200,000.00. Sy never disclosed co-insurance in the contracts he entered into with the
three corporations. The insured is specifically required to disclose the insurance that he had contracted
with other companies. Sy also contended that the insurance agents knew of the co-insurance. However,
the theory of imputed knowledge, that the knowledge of the agent is presumed to be known by the
principal, is not enough. When the words of the document are readily understandable by an ordinary
reader, there is no need for construction anymore. The conformity of the insured to the terms of the
policy is implied with his failure to disagree with the terms of the contract. Since Sy, was a businessman,
it was incumbent upon him to read the contracts. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap- The
obvious purpose of the aforesaid requirement in the policy is to prevent over-insurance and thus avert
the perpetration of fraud. The public, as well as the insurer, is interested in preventing the situation in
which a fire would be profitable to the insured. “Also, policy condition 15 was used. It stated: 15.. . . if
any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, . . . all benefits under this Policy shall be
forfeited . . .” As for condition number 27, the stipulation read: 27. Action or suit clause. — If a claim be
made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced either in the Insurance Commission or any
court of competent jurisdiction of notice of such rejection, or in case of arbitration taking place as
provided herein, within twelve (12) months after due notice of the award made by the arbitrator or
arbitrators or umpire, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and
shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder. This is regarding Sy’s claim for one of the companies.
Recovery was filed in court by petitioners only on January 31, 1984, or after more than one (1) year had
elapsed from petitioners' receipt of the insurers' letter of denial on November 29, 1982. This made it
void.

5. First Quezon City Insurance Co. v CA

Facts: One Jose del Rosario was injured while boarding a bus owned by DMTC in the Manila
International Airport. He was hospitalized for forty days. He filed suit against the bus company and the
court granted him of over 100,000 pesos in damages. The appellate court reduced damages to 55,090
pesos. The insurance company’s liability was limited to 12,000. The amount for insurance was made Php
50,000 in the appellate court’s decision. First Quezon City, the insurer of DTMC, filed a motion for
reconsideration to limit the damages back to 12,000 pesos, the amount stipulated in the contract. This
was denied hence this petition for review.

Issue: WON the amount of the insurance company’s liability can be limited to Php 12,000?

Held: Yes. The insurance policy clearly placed the maximum limit of the petitioner's liability for damages
arising from death or bodily injury at P 12,000.00 per passenger and its maximum liability per accident at
(P50,000.00. Since only one passenger was injured in the accident, the insurer's liability for the damages
suffered by said passenger is pegged to the amount of P12,000.00 only. What does the limit of
P50,000.00 per accident mean? It means that the insurer's maximum liability for any single accident will
not exceed P50,000.00 regardless of the number of passengers killed or injured therein. For example, if
ten (10) passengers had been injured by the operation of the insured bus, the insurer's liability for the
accident would not be P120,000.00 (at the rate of P12,000.00 per passenger) but would be limited to
only P50,000.00 for the entire accident, as provided in the insurance contract.

6. Gulf Resorts Inc. v. Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. (2005)

G.R. No. 156167 May 16, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Stipulations Cannot Be Segregated (Insurance)
FACTS: Gulf Resorts, Inc at Agoo, La Union was insured with American Home Assurance Company which
includes loss or damage to shock to any of the property insured by this Policy occasioned by or through
or in consequence of earthquake July 16, 1990: an earthquake struck Central Luzon and Northern Luzon
so the properties and 2 swimming pools in its Agoo Playa Resort were damaged August 23, 1990: Gulf's
claim was denied on the ground that its insurance policy only afforded earthquake shock coverage to
the two swimming pools of the resort Petitioner contends that pursuant to this rider, no qualifications
were placed on the scope of the earthquake shock coverage. Thus, the policy extended earthquake
shock coverage to all of the insured properties.

RTC: Favored American Home - endorsement rider means that only the two swimming pools were
insured against earthquake shock

CA: affirmed RTC

ISSUE: W/N Gulf can claim for its properties aside from the 2 swimming pools

HELD: YES. Affirmed. It is basic that all the provisions of the insurance policy should be examined and
interpreted in consonance with each other. All its parts are reflective of the true intent of the parties.
Insurance Code Section 2(1) contract of insurance as an agreement whereby one undertakes for a
consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or
contingent event An insurance premium is the consideration paid an insurer for undertaking to
indemnify the insured against a specified peril. In the subject policy, no premium payments were made
with regard to earthquake shock coverage, except on the two swimming pools.
 7. SOUTH PACHEM DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs. COURT OFAPPEALS AND MAKATI COMMERCIAL
ESTATE ASSOCIATION, INC.,

G.R. No. 126260. December 16, 2004.

FACTS:

Private respondent Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (formerly Ayala Commercial Estate
Association) is an association of all real estate owners. petitioner South Pachem Development, Inc.
purchased from Ayala Corporation two adjoining parcels of land. Petitioner challenges the validity of the
stipulation in the deed which states that the buyer of a property shall pay the association dues for a
period of 47 years commencing from the date of purchase. It maintains that the period of 47 years
constitutes a perpetual restriction on its right to enjoy and dispose of the property. Petitioner also
assails the validity of the deed, which in the event of a breach of any of the special conditions, private
respondent shall have the right to rescind the sale without the necessity of giving notice to the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether the contract of sale was validly binding to petitioner?

HELD:

In the case at bar, the stipulations were plain and unambiguous which leave no room for interpretation.
petitioner is precluded from denying the validity of the transaction it had earlier freely and voluntarily
entered into with private respondent. It shall not be allowed to disavow or repudiate a valid agreement
since the presumption is that all the terms therein were brought to its knowledge and becomes the law
between the parties and each one is bound to comply therewith.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one where one of the parties imposes a ready-made form of
contract which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party
prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his
"adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to
bargain on equal footing. These types of contracts have nonetheless been declared as binding as
ordinary contracts and should there be any ambiguity in a contract of adhesion, such ambiguity is to be
construed against the party who prepared it. If, however, the stipulations are not obscure, but are clear
and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held
controlling.

8. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., vs. MASAGANA TELAMART, INC.,

G.R. No. 137172. April 4, 2001.

FACTS:

respondent [MASAGANA TELAMART] obtained from defendant [UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE] five (5)
insurance policies with effectivity term until May 1992. On June 1992, the subject properties were razed
by fire. On July 1992, plaintiff tendered manager’s check for renewal premium payments which was
accepted by defendant. Immediately thereafter, Masagana made a formal demand for indemnification
of the insured properties but respondent denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether the policies had been renewed by an implied credit arrangement on a later date after the
occurrence of the (fire) risk?

RULING:

In the instant case, it would be unjust and inequitable if recovery on the policy would not be permitted
against petitioner. Certainly, basic principles of equity and fairness would not allow the insurer to
continue collecting and accepting the premiums and later deny liability where an insurer had
consistently granted a 60- to 90-day credit term for the payment of premiums despite its full awareness
of the prohibition under sec 77, and the assured had relied in good faith on such practice, estoppel bars
it from taking refuge under said section. Moreover, the agreement is not against the law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The agreement binds the parties.

9. Fortune Medicare vs Amorin

Facts: David Robert U. Amorin was a cardholder/member of Fortune Medicare, Inc., a corporation
engaged in providing health maintenance services to its members. While on vacation in Honolulu,
Hawaii, (U.S.A.), Amorin underwent an emergency surgery, specifically appendectomy, at the St. Francis
Medical Center, causing him to incur professional and hospitalization expenses of US$7,242.35 and
US$1,777.79, respectively. He attempted to recover from Fortune Care the full amount thereof upon his
return to Manila, but the company merely approved a reimbursement of ₱12,151.36, an amount that
was based on the average cost of appendectomy, net of medicare deduction, if the procedure were
performed in an accredited hospital in Metro Manila.5 Amorin received under protest the approved
amount, but asked for its adjustment to cover the total amount of professional fees which he had paid,
and eighty percent (80%) of the approved standard charges based on "American standard", considering
that the emergency procedure occurred in the U.S.A. He cited the provisions of the contract. Fortune
denied Amorin’s request, so Amorin filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages with the RTC.
Fortune Care argued that the Health Care Contract did not cover hospitalization costs and professional
fees incurred in foreign countries, as the contract’s operation was confined to Philippine territory.8
Further, it argued that its liability to Amorin was extinguished upon the latter’s acceptance from the
company of the amount of ₱12,151.36. RTC dismissed the complaint of Amorin. Taking the contract as a
whole, the Court is convinced that the parties intended to use the Philippine standard as basis. Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordering the ordering Fortune Medicare, Inc. to
reimburse [Amorin] 80% of the total amount of the actual hospitalization expenses of $7,242.35 and
professional fee of $1,777.79 paid by him to St. Francis Medical Center pursuant to Section 3, Article V
of the Corporate Health Care Program Contract, or their peso equivalent at the time the amounts
became due, less the [P]12,151.36 already paid by Fortunecare. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari(rule45)
Issues: Whether or not a member of a health care provider can recover to the extent agreed in the
contract. Does the phrase standard charges refer to Philippine standard charges or the standard charges
in the country where the emergency confinement occurred

Ruling: 1.Yes. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court said that for purposes of determining the liability of
a health care provider to its members, jurisprudence holds that a health care agreement is in the nature
of nonlife insurance, which is primarily a contract of indemnity. Once the member incurs hospital,
medical or any other expense arising from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingent, the health
care provider must pay for the same to the extent agreed upon under the contract.

2.The phrase refers to standard charges in the country where the emergency confinement occurred.
Being a contract of adhesion, the terms of an insurance contract are to be construed strictly against the
party which prepared the contract—the insurer. This is equally applicable to Health Care Agreements.
The phraseology used in medical or hospital service contracts, such as “standard charges,” must be
liberally construed in favor of the subscriber, and if doubtful or reasonably susceptible of two
interpretations, the construction conferring coverage is to be adopted, and exclusionary clauses of
doubtful import should be strictly construed against the provider.

10. BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE INC. VS. NEOMI AND DANILO OLIVARES

FACTS: Neomi Olivares contracted Blue Cross for a health care insurance or program. In their contract it
enumerated diseases that when such occured withing the period of one year from the availment of the
said program, it will be considered as a pre-existing condition hence it is exempt to the said coverage.
Neomi upon payment of the said membership and other fees (after 38 days) was hospitalized due to a
heart attack / stroke wherein she accrued hospital bills amounting to a roughly P34,000. Blue Cross then
refused to pay alleging that the said illness or stoke occured because of a pre-existing condition hence it
is not covered by the health care program. Neomi together with her husband Danilo was forced to make
payments thereof and upon a final demand they filed a collection suit against the Blue Cross before the
MeTC. However MeTC dismissed the case contemding that the best person who can determine the
condition of Neomi is none other than her physician and neomi prevented it by alleging the privileged
communication between the doctor and his patient. However, upon appeal MeTC ‘s decision was
reversed by the RTC and such(RTC decision) was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE: Who has the burden of proof? The PETITIONER. Was the Health care program an example of an
Insurance Contract?

WON the petitioner was able to prove that Neomi’s stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and
therefore was excluded in the coverage of the health care program.

RULING: The Petitioner has a burden of proof and the said health care program was indeed an insurance
contract. Lastly, the petitioner wasn’t able to prove that Neomi’s stroke was brought about by a pre-
existing condition. It is an established rule that when the terms contains limitations or liability they
should be construed strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of which
must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. This
doctrine is equally applicable to health care agreements. In this case, petitioner failed to prove Neomi’s
straoke was caused by a pre existing condition. Therefore it cannot be deemed to be excluded in the
health care coverage.
 11. PHIL HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS VS. CIR

FACTS: Phil Health Care Providers is a domestic corporation wherein individuals enrolled in the health
care program pay an annual membership fee and are entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and
curative medical services provideed by it duly licensed physicians, specialists and other professional
technical staff participating in the group practice health delivery system at a hospital or clinic owned,
operated or accredited by it. Sometime on anuary 2000, CIR sent a formal demand letter and the
corresponding assessment notices demanding for payment deficiency taxes(both in VAT and DST)
including surcharges and interest. Petitioner opposed the said letter but there was no action taken by
the CIR on the protest made by petitioner. Petioners then filed a petition for review before the CTA
which partially granted the case (dropped the DST claims) CIR appealed said decision to CA, ca however
reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON Phil Health Care Providers’ programs are in truth and in fact an insurance business and
liable to DSTs.

RULING: Yes, PHCP are engaged in insurance business. Its Health Care Agreement is not a contract for
the provision of medical services.—Contrary to petitioner’s claim, its health care agreement is not a
contract for the provision of medical services. Petitioner does not actually provide medical or hospital
services but merely arranges for the same and pays for them up to the stipulated maximum amount of
coverage. It is also incorrect to say that the health care agreement is not based on loss or damage
because, under the said agreement, petitioner assumes the liability and indemnifies its member for
hospital, medical and related expenses (such as professional fees of physicians). The term “loss or
damage” is broad enough to cover the monetary expense or liability a member will incur in case of
illness or injury.

12. Gaisano vs North america

Intercapitol Marketing Corporation (IMC) is the maker of Wrangler Blue Jeans. while Levi Strauss (Phils.)
Inc. (LSPI) is the local distributor of products bearing trademarks owned by Levi Strauss & Co IMC and LSPI
separately obtained from Insurance Company of North America fire insurance policies for their book debt
endorsements related to their ready-made clothing materials which have been sold or delivered to various
customers and dealers of the Insured anywhere in the Philippines which are unpaid 45 days after the time
of the loss. Gaisano Superstore Complex in Cagayan de Oro City, owned by Gaisano Cagayan, Inc.,
containing the ready-made clothing materials sold and delivered by IMC and LSPI was consumed by fire.
Insurance Company of North America filed a complaint for damages against Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. alleges
that IMC and LSPI filed their claims under their respective fire insurance policies which it paid thus it was
subrogated to their rights.

RTC: IMC and LSPI retained ownership of the delivered goods until fully paid, it must bear the loss (res
perit domino)

CA: Reversed - sales invoices is an exception under Article 1504 (1) of the Civil Code to res perit domino

ISSUE: WoN Insurance Company of North America can claim against Gaisano Cagayan for the debt that
was insured
HELD: YES. Tje insurance policy is clear that the subject of the insurance is the book debts and NOT goods
sold and delivered to the customers and dealers of the insured. ART. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the
goods remain at the seller's risk until the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the
ownership therein is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk whether actual delivery has
been made or not, except that: (1) Where delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or to a bailee
for the buyer, in pursuance of the contract and the ownership in the goods has been retained by the seller
merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract, the goods are at the
buyer's risk from the time of such delivery; IMC and LSPI did not lose complete interest over the goods.
They have an insurable interest until full payment of the value of the delivered goods. Unlike the civil law
concept of res perit domino, where ownership is the basis for consideration of who bears the risk of loss,
in property insurance, one's interest is not determined by concept of title, but whether insured has
substantial economic interest in the property Section 13 of our Insurance Code defines insurable interest
as "every interest in property, whether real or personal, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect
thereof, of such nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured." Parenthetically,
under Section 14 of the same Code, an insurable interest in property may consist in: (a) an existing
interest; (b) an inchoate interest founded on existing interest; or (c) an expectancy, coupled with an
existing interest in that out of which the expectancy arises. Anyone has an insurable interest in property
who derives a benefit from its existence or would suffer loss from its destruction. it is sufficient that the
insured is so situated with reference to the property that he would be liable to loss should it be injured or
destroyed by the peril against which it is insured an insurable interest in property does not necessarily
imply a property interest in, or a lien upon, or possession of, the subject matter of the insurance, and
neither the title nor a beneficial interest is requisite to the existence of such an interest insurance in this
case is not for loss of goods by fire but for petitioner's accounts with IMC and LSPI that remained unpaid
45 days after the fire - obligation is pecuniary in nature obligor should be held exempt from liability when
the loss occurs thru a fortuitous event only holds true when the obligation consists in the delivery of a
determinate thing and there is no stipulation holding him liable even in case of fortuitous event Article
1263 of the Civil Code in an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the
same kind does not extinguish the obligation (Genus nunquan perit) The subrogation receipt, by itself, is
sufficient to establish not only the relationship of respondent as insurer and IMC as the insured, but also
the amount paid to settle the insurance claim Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and
he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or
breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured
against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract.