IPC

PROJECT

(MONSOON SEMESTER)
“Conspiracy as a continuing Offence”

SUBMITTED BY:
SAINA S. MOHAPATRA
ID: 216040
SECTION: A
SECOND YEAR.
 1) INTRODUCTION

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, defines Criminal Conspiracy as an agreement between one or more
people to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act through legal means. 1 The
explanation of this section talks about agreement to commit civil wrongs are designated to be
2
criminal conspiracy as soon as an overt act is done in pursuance of the same. In the year
1913, criminal conspiracy has been declared to be a substantive offence vide the amendment
in sync with the common law principles.3 The implications of this is that the agreement itself
is an offence. The sharing of Mens Rea and the formation of the agreement constitutes the
4
Actus Reus of conspiracy. Proper caution must be taken by the court to distinguish it with
mere knowledge or even discussion of the plan as the latter isn’t enough to prove a
conspiracy. 5 In Major RG Barsay , while discussing the ingredients of criminal conspiracy it
was said that it is not necessary that all parties should agree to do a single illegal act, it may
comprise of a series of acts committed in furtherance to achieve the ultimate object of the
6
conspiracy. Since conspiracy is generally hatched in secrecy, the acts or conduct of the
parties must be taken into account so as to establish a clear nexus between their conduct and
the alleged common design , if any. 7

In the given paper, the author will analyse the offence of conspiracy as a continuing offence.
The offence of conspiracy is a continuing offence as it continues to subsist and encompasses
all the offences committed in furtherance of the common design till the agreement is
8
frustrated, achieved or terminated. . It entails a principle-agent relationship where a co-
conspirator can be held liable for the offences of his counterpart if the offence was committed

1
§ 120 (A ) , The Indian Penal Code, 1860
2
§120 ( Explanation )The Indian Penal Code, 1860
3
RA NELSON, INDIAN PENAL CODE ( Edited S K Sarvaria) (2008, 10th Edition)
4
Mulchy v/s R , (1868) LR HL 306
5
K.R Purushottam v/s Kerala , Appeal (crl.) 495 of 2004 , P4
6
Major EG Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762, (Per Subba Rao J )
7
Id .,
8
Ajay Aggarwal v Union of India & Ors, 1993 AIR 1637
in furtherance of the conspiracy9 . This concept of agency can also be found in §10 of the
Indian Evidence Act which states that when there is a reasonable ground to believe that two
or more people are involved in a conspiracy , then things said or done by one of the alleged
conspirator in reference to their common intention can be used as a relevant fact in
establishing the conspiracy between them.10

The reason why it is important to classify a certain conduct as falling within the realm of a
single conspiracy or if it qualifies as a separate act in itself is because it would be prejudicial
to convict a person for a crime he hasn’t committed. In the course of the paper, the author
tries to take into account the various factors that are considered by courts of law in
determining the scope [Both Temporal and Material] of criminal conspiracy.

2) SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

The author has identified the following issues that are closely attached to the concept of
conspiracy as a continuing offence. The objective of the author is to address the following
issues under conspiracy

A) To what extent can a particular offence be classified under “series of acts” committed
in furtherance of a single conspiracy ?

B) A person cannot be held liable for the acts committed after the object of the
conspiracy has been achieved .What are the relevant factors used to determine the
scope object of a conspiracy from given set of facts

9
State of Tamil Nadu v Nalini & Ors , 1999 Indlaw SC 810
10
§10 , The Indian Evidence , 1872
 3) DISCUSSION AND DEBATES

Mere Knowledge and Discussion is not conspiracy

The K.R Purushottam Case citing the American Jurisprudence states that the sine qua non for
constituting the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement and not the accomplishment
11
of the object of the whole scheme. However in real life cases, the agreement is very
difficult to deduce from a given set of facts as conspirators don’t come together and explicitly
form an agreement to take part in the offence. It is generally a scheme or adjustment ,
between a number of people , can be either express or implied.12 As per Quadri J in CBI/SIT
v/s Nalini and Ors , a necessary distinction between intention and mere knowledge or
discussion is required in case of formation of the illegal agreement in conspiracy. Mere
13
knowledge or discussion is not enough to infer common intention This case be explained
by the following hypothetical situation :

Facts : A and B are sitting and planning to murder C in a restaurant. Z, a waiter over hears
the conversation .

Conclusion : The waiter cannot be called a conspirator in this case just on the basis of mere
knowledge since he never agreed to murder C . If Z is charged for conspiracy, it would be
taking it too far.

However, in certain situations knowledge can be used to infer intent. This depends on the
nature of crimes involved, the means adopted and the position of parties in the whole scheme
of things. In State of Maharashtra v Som Nath Thapa , the question before the court was
whether knowledge of the objective is enough to make one person responsible for criminal
conspiracy? Learned lawyer Shri Ram Jethmalani’s argument was that sometimes intent
could be referred from knowledge , especially when there exists no legal use of the goods and
services exist. 14 In United States v Falcone sellers of large quantities of sugaryeast and canes
were acquitted from participation in the conspiracy to sell illegal quantities of sugar

11
Supra, Note 5
12
Id
13
CBI.SIT v Nalini and Ors (Per Quadri, ¶677) as cited in K.R Purushottam v State of Kerala , Appeal (crl.) 495
of 2004 , P4
14
State of Maharashtra v Som Nath Thapa, 1996 SCC (4) 659
enterprise because without actually knowing the object of the transaction, the whole sellers
couldn’t possibly foresee if the large quantity of sugar can be used in an illegal way.15T

This case can be distinguished with the help of the following hypothetical example :

Facts : A , a physician is co-accused along with a B, whole-seller of drugs in conspiracy to

distribute illegal quantities of drugs. Both are convicted of the conspiracy . Why?

Conclusion: Large quantity of drugs are inherently put to illegal use. By selling large
quantity of drugs to the physician even after having the constructive knowledge of its
possible illegal uses , one can infer his intent of furthering, promoting and cooperating in the
conspiracy.

Drawing the Line between a single and multiple conspiracy

As stated in the introduction, conspiracy can consist of a series of acts , whether incidental or
planned. Therefore it is not necessary that all conspirators should participate from the start of
the conspiracy. The moment one of them forms a requisite intention to pursue the goals of the
agreement , he/she becomes a conspirator and will be held liable for all offences which has a
nexus to the object of conspiracy even if they haven’t taken active participation in the
commission of those offences.16 Thus it is important to do a case by case analysis of what are
factors used to determine the connecting acts of a single conspiracy as the prosecutor faces a
dilemma when , in a complicated investigation he must choose between indictment for a
single, all-encompassing conspiracy or for separate unrelated conspiracies.17

American Jurisprudence on Conspiracy :

The American Jurisprudence has plethora of cases each showcasing single conspiracy cases
and multiple conspiracy cases. In the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judgement in United
States v Palermo, the court stated that

“The government is not free to arbitrarily decide whether there is an agreement or several . if
the agreement.. contemplates the bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue
without the continuous cooperation , it is a perversion of natural thought and of natural

15
United States v Falcone , 311 US 205 as cited in State of Maharashtra v Som Nath Thapa, 1996 SCC (4) 659
16
State of Tamil Nadu v Nalini & Ors , 1999 Indlaw SC 810
17
R. Benjamin Cohen, The Single versus Multiple Conspiracy Problem, 2 Crim. Just. Q. 111, 122 (1974)
language to call such continuous cooperation a cinematographic series of distinct
conspiracies , rather than to call it a single one “ 18 Therefor the test used in this case looked
for how the series of connected acts contributed bit by bit to the whole act of conspiracy and
one cannot be isolated from the other. In this case the defendants were charged for conspiracy
for exhorting money from the builders and in doing so interfering with the inter-state
shipments of construction materials. In that case , there was an overall agreement to extort
money from Riley. Therefore each building project in which money was exhorted from Riley
didn’t constitute a separate conspiracy as in the initial agreement , extortion of money as the
objective was made clear between them. Therefore these series of acts will come under a
single agreement of conspiracy.

This case can be distinguished from the case of United States v Varelli where all the
defendants were indicted and tried together for the offence of conspiracy to commit .
However a closer look at the facts reveal that : A group of conspirators Schang , Crovedi,
Rossi , Nielsen and Mendola were first involved in stealing a polaroid shipment from a
trailer. This shipment was later sold it to Saletko. The second events are regarding stealing of
a load of Silver on an Interstate Systems truck parked in Interstate Yard. In this event, not
everyone from the polaroid venture wasn’t involved. This stolen silver was later sold to
Varelli who was in an intention to sell it further to make profits. The government contends
that all the defendants are liable for a single conspiracy to hijack interstate shipments of
merchandise, carry it away and distribute it. However it was held in the case that the polaroid
hijacking and silver hijacking both are part of different conspiracies.

The court while explaining why it wouldn’t fall under an all-encompassing single conspiracy
because only 3 of them ( Namely Schang, Bambulas, Nielsen and Boscarino) were the
common nucleus of the separate conspiracies. It is here that discussions were given
significance. While Schang, Nielsen, Bambulas , Boscarnio and Borsellino were involved in
the discussions about hijacking of silver equipment , there is no evidence of any discussion as
to other possible hijackings. The hijacking of Polaroid equipment didn’t find its origin in any
of these discussions. The conspirators in the Polaroid hijacking never contemplated to be a
part of other hijacking ventures. The polaroid hijacking thus represented a single transaction

18
United States v Palmero , MANU/FEVT/0174/1969
with a single purpose . Therefore even though the nature of both the events are same, this is
insufficient to conclude an overall conspiracy. 19

The above case can be compared with Kotteakos v United States where various defendants
were separately involved with a common conspirator to obtain fraudulent loans from an
agency of US . In this case all of them cannot be tied together under the charge of a single
conspiracy because each involvement was independent of the other, having no connection or
overall purpose. Each act is complete in itself and isn’t directed towards achieving a common
goal which is the essence of a single continuous conspiracy. 20

In United States v Rich, the court was of the view that conspiracy and the facts relevant to its
establishment must be viewed against a background of the type of crime involved.21 This case
gives a formula of “totality of circumstances” of distinguishing it with cases of multiple
conspiracies.22 In this case Rich was convicted for conspiracy along with 4 others for
conspiracy to break the state’s Narcotic Laws. The appellant, Rich used precedents of cases
such as Koteakos and Falcone to establish that he had no intention to be a participant in the
chain and was a mere retailer. However the court followed a different procedure in this case
as cases where defendants are engaged in disseminating narcotics should be dealt with
23
differently from cases where people are desiring to fraudulently obtain loan guarantees .
Here the court convicted Rich because he not only knew he was a part of the chain but was
acquainted with a substantial number of other participants. He dealt with these purchasers
regularly which shows that he had a substantial role to play in distribution of narcotics which
was the overall object of the conspiracy. Therefore it would be a “legal travesty” to
characterize this course of conduct as composed of a series of isolated transactions without
having any purpose. 24

Indian Jurisprudence

One of the famous Indian cases on Criminal Conspiracy is State of Tamil Nadu ( Through
CBI) v Nalini & 25 Ors which was about the infamous assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a

19
Id
20
Kotteakos v United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)
21
United States v Rich , No 56, Docket 24570, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
22
Supra Note 15
23
United States v Rich , No 56, Docket 24570, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. ( With Respect
to Count 14)
24
Id
 25
human bomb. To achieve this, a conspiracy was entered into in Sri Lanka by members of
LTTE where Prabhakaran was alleged to be their supreme leader. 41 people were allegedly
involved in this act but the designated court could only charge 26 of them with death sentence
for conspiring to murder Rajiv Gandhi and causing terrorist activities under the relevant
sections of TADA. The prosecution in this case had alleged the following illegal acts to be
the object of the alleged conspirators of LTTE . They were – To infiltrate into India in an
unauthorized manner guised as Refugees, to carry out illegal wireless communication with
LTTE leaders in Sri Lanka and to use unauthorized arms , ammunition and explosives to
assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and cause terrorist activities in Tamil Nadu. And in pursuance of
the above mentioned illegal activities, to cause disappearance of evidence and to screen one
another from being caught. The prosecutor alleged that all these activities would come under
a continuous conspiracy.

However Justice Wadhwa was of the opinion that it would be prejudicial to hold all 26 of
them liable for murder and terrorist activities without considering the question as to whether
all of them had the common intention to achieve the above stated objects? Another question
that arose for consideration was regarding the determination of object of the conspiracy ? The
court came to the conclusion that the object of the conspiracy was completed with the murder
of Rajiv Gandhi and that they had no further motive to cause terrorist activities suable under
TADA. To attract the provisions of TADA, specific intent is required and such provisions
would not be attracted when creation of terror and panic are mere consequences of the main
object. The object of the conspiracy was the result of personal animosity of some head
members of LTTE with Rajiv Gandhi and the intention was not to overawe the government .
In the course of the judgement, Wadhwa J acquitted many members who were not directly
linked with the object of the conspiracy and thus there was lack of common intention to
achieve the killing of Gandhi. Members who were not having the exact knowledge of the
object to kill Rajiv Gandhi but anyway accompanied other members in infiltrating and
renting houses for the purpose of finding jobs or getting medical treatment were acquitted.
One such member was Kanasabapathy (A-7) who was a Sri Lankan Tamil and a LTTE
helper. She was assigned the work of gathering intelligence on the operations and movements
of Sri Lankan Army in Delhi. She was accompanied by Athirai (A-8) so that she could help
her get an accommodation in Delhi without attracting suspicion. Even though such an activity
was illegal, there was nothing to show that A-7 and A-8 are linked with the object of the

25
State of Tamil Nadu v Nalini & Ors , 1999 Indlaw SC 810 , Page 3
conspiracy. They neither had knowledge nor the common intention required to be convicted
under the conspiracy to commit murder of Rajiv Gandhi.26 Another class of offenders who
were acquitted even though they had complete knowledge about the object of the conspiracy
were those who helped others abscond and hide away from prosecution. Since the object of
the conspiracy ended after the assassination, the common intention ceased to exist. And
according to §10 of the Evidence act the relationship between conspirators also cease to exist
and their statements and activities cannot be used to adduce joint criminal enterprise to the
whole group. Therefore A-23 to A-26 were not part of the single conspiracy as they came
into the picture only after the object of the conspiracy was achieved. 27

Similarly in the case of Mohd. Khalid v State of West Bengal, the case of the prosecution was
that the accused persons were involved in illegal manufacturing/ possession of explosives in
28
order to terrorize people living in Bow Bazar and its adjacent areas. That this conspiracy
was pursued in furtherance of a common intention to cause communal disharmony amongst
the members of Hindu and Muslim communities. Large scale murder was committed even
though they fully knew that illegal manufacture of bombs by explosive substances is the most
probable outcome of the venture.. Therefore the accused were charged under §3 and §5 of the
Explosive Act as well as provision of TADA were applied on the premise that the preparation
of bombs indicated a common design to strike terror in the minds of people and create
communal disharmony. One of the issues that came up in the court was with regard to §10 of
the Indian Evidence Act. The issue was : Whether the confessions of the accused was made
during the subsistence of the conspiracy so as to apply §10 of the evidence act? It was held
that prosecution didn’t have any evidence to show that the co-accused was continuing to be in
the conspiracy after the arrest and therefor the evidence was not adduced under §10.

Series of acts that denotes a common design to commit rape and murder was clearly
established in the case of Mukesh and Ors v/s State for NCT of Delhi and Ors ( The Nirbhaya
Delhi Rape Case).29 According to the facts of this case, accused along with a juvenile picked
up a 23 Year Old woman along with her male friend in a bus and committed heinous offences
such as rape and unnatural sexual acts with her, beat them up and threw them out the bus. The
chain of events described by the prosecutrix in her dying declaration reveal a criminal

26
Id, Page 149
27
Id, Page 140
28
Mohd. Khalid v State of West Bengal, Appeal (crl.) 1114 of 2001
29
Mukesh and Ors v/s State for NCT of Delhi and Ors .Criminal Appeal Nos. 607-608 OF 2017 (arising out of
S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 3119-3120 of 2014)
conspiracy. As soon as both of them entered the bus , the conductor ( also an accused) started
hurling abuse at them . Soon after she and her friend were held forcefully by them. The
prosecutrix was raped by all of them one by one Along with this, there was insertion of rods
through her vagina. This entire act was committed inside a running bus . So in order to keep
the bus moving, the accused use to drive the bus turn wise so that each of them will get a
chance to rape. The court , taking into account the evidence and the dying declaration
established a chain of events that was successful in establishing a common intent of the
accused to commit rape and murder of prosecutrix. Therefore the conduct of the accused in
committing sexual offences inside a moving bus and thereafter throwing her out of the bus
30
was enough to charge all of them under §120-B of the IPC.

A series of acts are said to be connected when the acts are done in accordance with a division
of labour ie one act in the series completes the other. There cannot be conspiracy within a
conspiracy as those sub-agreements fall within the ambit of a single on-going continuous
conspiracy. Those sub-agreements may be entered into by different people, even unknown to
each other and adopt different means but each agreement aims to achieve a single goal
weaving the whole scheme of sub-agreements into one conspiracy spread over a period of
31
time. A separate conspiracy consist of a separate end altogether , the existence of which
can be isolated from each other. However series of connected acts in a single-overall
conspiracy can’t be divorced from each other as the commission of one act is important in
achieving the final step.

Determination of Object of a conspiracy – Reasonable and Probable Consequences of an

Act

A person will be held responsible for all the natural and probable consequences the acts
committed during the subsistence of the conspiratorial agreement irrespective of whether he
has done the final physical act of the crime or not..32 This form of liability is known as the

30
Id
31
R. Benjamin Cohen, The Single versus Multiple Conspiracy Problem, 2 Crim. Just. Q. 111, 122 (1974)
32
United states v Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). as cited in Michael Manning, A Common Law Crime
Analysis of Pinkerton V. United States: Sixty Years of Impermissible Judicially-Created Criminal Liability, 67
Mont. L. Rev. (2006), Available at (htp://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/4) , Last Visited August 19
2017
Pinkerton Liability where conspiracy is basically a partnership in crime ie a criminal venture
where each partner acts for another so long as acts are done in pursuance of the partnership (
33
Here the objective of conspiracy). This proposition can be explained with the help of a
hypothetical situation

Facts : Three people conspire to rob a bank. On the day of execution of the plan, two of them
guard the gates while one of them goes inside the bank to rob. In this process he commits
murder of two security guards.

Issue : Will all three of them be liable for murder even though the common intention was
only to rob the bank?

Answer : Anything done “furtherance” of a common intention binds all the conspirators
under a joint criminal liability. Murder falls under an act “in furtherance” of their common
intention rob and was a reasonable and probable consequences of an act to rob a bank.
Therefore it doesn’t matter if the conspirators never agreed to commit murder but they ought
to know that murder or offences such as grievous hurt are natural recourses that one might
take to commit an illegal act such as looting a bank.

However the application of the above concept is generally restricted in cases where the act
collateral to the main requires specific intent or was no-where linked to the main objective of
the conspiracy. For instance : If one of the robbers had committed rape instead of murder,
then all would not be liable under common intention because rape will not fall under the
category of offences which are done “in furtherance” of robbery. Rape requires specific intent
and doesn’t qualify as an act which is required to commit robbery. Similarly, in Nalini, the
court restricted the object of the conspiracy only to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and not
causing terrorist and disruptive activities because the provisions under TADA require a
34
specific motive for qualifying as an terrorist act. Even though the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi created a situation of panic and terror in the minds of people and it was a natural
consequences of the act, provisions of TADA were not attracted because the facts of the case
indicated that the final objective of the conspirators was only to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and
not to overawe the government. Even though it can possibly be deduced that terror in the
minds of people was a possible consequences of the act however that will not make the

33
Id
34
Supra, Note , P120
conspirators terrorists. There exists a difference between causing terror in the minds of people
and being terrorists under the ambit of TADA. Therefore when there exists acts such as rape
which requires specific intent or acts which are within the ambit of a special legislation
having a specific policy reason, the concept of joint liability is very strictly applied.

CRITICISM
The Crime of Conspiracy finds its place in the modern criminal law because in the eyes of
law , when there is a combination of criminal purpose , the strength and resources of many is
35
more dangerous in comparison to just one individual committing the same crime. Justice
Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States talked about the difficulties of a crime , as vague and
complex as conspiracy which was the ability to bring under it as many accused- small or big
as it could.36 This tendency is seen as a disadvantage for the defendant as courts , in order to
37
charge a person of substantive offences, is using the charge of conspiracy A charge of
conspiracy allows the court to invoke several substantive offences, bringing together accused
from different walks of life who may have not known each other just on the basis of heresay
statements.38 Instead of independently addressing the offences in light of various interest and
policies, a single charge of conspiracy is enough to charge a particular person of all such
substantive offences irrespective of his contribution to the chain.39In Anderson v Superior
court , the facts of the case was that a doctor referred some pregnant women for abortion to
an abortionist who later shared her fees with her doctor. However on the basis of one such
act, the court had held that the doctor and the abortionist are “partners” in crime and have
entered into a general conspiracy to conduct abortions.40 As a result of this charge, the
abortionist was held liable for many abortions which she wasn’t even involved in.41 A
commentary in the Model Penal code on the case of People v Luciano states that if thousands
of people are held accountable for an offence irrespective of their contribution to the whole
42
scheme, then law would lose all sense of proportion. In this case there was prosecution of

35
Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1137, 1188 (1973)
36
Krulewitch v. United States, 69 S.Ct. 716 , ( Per Jackson J , ¶445-¶457)
37
Id
38
Supra, Note 23
39
Id .,
40
Alta Anderson, v. The Superior Court of Alameda County, 78 Cal.App.2d 22, 177 P.2d 315.
41
Id.
42
MODEL PENAL CODE ,§ 2.04, Comment at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) Cited in Footnote 45 in Phillip E.
Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1137, 1188 (1973),
several defendants for violating laws relating to prostitution of women even though
43
individually they would have been liable for lesser offences The defendants were not
aware of Luciano as the head of the illegal prostitution . However they were held liable for 60
counts which consisted of all the individual prostitution cases. The liability was correct with
respect to the defendants who controlled , commanded and aided the commission of these
acts in pursuance of the big illegal venture. However the question arises that whether it is
justified to extend the same liability to each and every person involved irrespective of their
position or influence ?Mere financial contribution shouldn’t be the criteria to apply criminal
culpability.44

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION

In light of the above discussion, it is suggested by the author that while charging an accused
of an all-encompassing single and continuous criminal conspiracy factors such the position of
the person in the chain and the degree of influence he exercises should be taken into account.
It will be highly unjust and disproportionate if the same charge of conspiracy is used to
charge the head of a criminal enterprise and the driver he has hired to take him to various
places where he commits the crime. Even if intent to gain profit can be attributed to the
driver, but this intent cannot be extended to the illegal acts committed by the enterprise.
Secondly, the initial act of the accused alleged in a conspiracy should be checked. If the
accused is a retailer in drug business, he cannot plead ignorance of the drug enterprise he
contributed to when he is caught. However in this particular instance, the frequency of him
selling large quantity of drugs to people directly involved in the chain should also be
consider. This will strengthen the connectivity of his illegal acts of retailing in drugs to the
larger narcotics business run by major offenders.

Finally , in the paper the author with respect to the first research question establishes that in
case of deciding whether a particular act falls under a series of act or not, one must look for
links between the acts . Acts in pursuant to a common design cannot generally be divorced
and each one of them is important in contributing to the main object. However in case of a
separate conspiracy , the act in itself is complete and has its own objective. It doesn’t in any

43
People v Luciano, 14 N.E 2.d 277 NY 248 , Court of Appeals of New York, April 12, 1938
44
Supra,
way has a nexus with the main objective. The “totality in circumstances” test helps one
determine the singularity of a conspiracy keeping in mind the nature of agreement formed
initially and nature of offence.

With respect to the second question, the author establishes that joint criminal liability in
criminal conspiracy will only be applied for consequences that were envisaged during the
agreement or for consequences which could be the natural and probable consequences of the
act. However this rule doesn’t apply in cases of acts which require specific intent and which
could never have been reasonably imagined to be a consequence of achieving the objective.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Statutes

The Indian Evidence , 1872 ....................................................................................................... 2

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 ..................................................................................................... 1
U.S cases

Alta Anderson, v. The Superior Court of Alameda County, 78 Cal.App.2d 22, 177 P.2d 315.
.............................................................................................................................................. 11
Krulewitch v. United States, 69 S.Ct. 716 ............................................................................... 11
People v Luciano, 14 N.E 2.d 277 NY 248 , Court of Appeals of New York, April 12, 1938
.............................................................................................................................................. 12
United States v Falcone , 311 US 205 ....................................................................................... 4
United States v Palmero , MANU/FEVT/0174/1969 ................................................................ 5
United states v Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). ....................................................................... 9
United States v Rich , No 56, Docket 24570, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit6
Indian Cases

Ajay Aggarwal v Union of India & Ors, 1993 AIR 1637 .......................................................... 1
Major EG Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762 .................................................... 1
Mohd. Khalid v State of West Bengal, Appeal (crl.) 1114 of 2001 ......................................... 8
Mukesh and Ors v/s State for NCT of Delhi and Ors .Criminal Appeal Nos. 607-608 OF 2017
(arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 3119-3120 of 2014) ................................................... 8
State of Maharashtra v Som Nath Thapa, 1996 SCC (4) 659 .................................................... 4
State of Tamil Nadu v Nalini & Ors , 1999 Indlaw SC 810 ...................................................... 2
Common Law Cases

Mulchy v/s R , (1868) LR HL 306 ............................................................................................. 1

Books

RA NELSON, INDIAN PENAL CODE ( Edited S K Sarvaria) (2008, 10th Edition) ....................... 1
Journal Articles

Michael Manning, A Common Law Crime Analysis of Pinkerton V. United States: Sixty Years
of Impermissible Judicially-Created Criminal Liability, 67 Mont. L. Rev. (2006),
Available at (htp://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/4) , Last Visited August 19 ..... 9
Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1137, 1188
(1973) ................................................................................................................................... 11
R. Benjamin Cohen, The Single versus Multiple Conspiracy Problem, 2 Crim. Just. Q. 111,
122 (1974) .............................................................................................................................. 9