CASES immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF SIN
(LEONARDO-DE CASTRO)
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs
of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a
parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan. On August 26, 1991, they respondent
heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint
against Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) for
recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration
of ownership with damages claiming that the latter
usurped their rights over the property.
ANCF countered that the subject land was the
subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating the area of said property
as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF.
The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not
susceptible of private ownership.
The respondents presented evidence that they
inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother who
acquired it by virtue of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a
potion thereof was occupied by ANCF and converted into
a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs
asserted that they were previously in possession of the
disputed land in the concept of an owner. To prove
possession, respondents presented several tax
declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to
the disputed property by virtue of their and their
predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be
respected and protected.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the respondents
amounts to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Held:
No. At the outset, it must be noted that
respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act
or the Property Registration Decree. Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree provide the requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors–in–
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied
in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land
or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain
is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents
which have the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents
failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by
their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential and
could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to
prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject
property.
1
 2. REPUBLIC VS REMNAN ENTERPRISES,
INC (REYES, J)
Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an
application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title
over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila,
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters
and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
The RTC found the application for registration sufficient
in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May
30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in
the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a
conspicuous places.
On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor.
Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its
comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for
registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its
Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s
witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of
land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella
Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties
were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime,
who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the
said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since
1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of
land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate
the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent
in 1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject
properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia,
presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and
Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the
subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the
subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17,
2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain
For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s
application for registration should be denied since the
subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that
pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands
which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr.
Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject
properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig,
which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by
the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast
in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area
verification of the subject properties on September 25,
2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of
the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes,
who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey
of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of
the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties,
contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m.
Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068
has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the
elevation of Lot No.3077 ranges from 12.60m to 14.80 m.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Further, the RTC
posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not
always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject
properties may have already changed since 1966 when the
supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map
used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC
likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in
measuring the elevations of the subject properties.
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject
properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that
the same could not be considered part of the bed of
Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas
that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the
2
average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence,
the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are
adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form
part of its bed and not those that are already far from it,
which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC
pointed out that the subject properties are more than a
kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that
they are dry and waterless even when the waters of
Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the
subject properties?
HELD: NO
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the
lower courts, which this Court, generally may not
disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless
there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject
properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
however, does not necessarily mean that they already
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent
to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that
the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that
the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part
of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds
that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to
registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable."
The respondent filed its application for registration of title
to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To
prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent
presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting
that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project
No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623,
approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the
respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of
the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court
clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by
the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration
must 2) prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of public domain
as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records.
In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to
reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did
not present evidence that the land she applied for has been
classified as alienable or disposable land of the public
domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information
regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to
establish the status of the land by any certification from
3
the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be
said that she complied with all requisites for registration
of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the
respondent in support of its application for registration are
thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are
indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.It is still imperative for the respondent to
present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower
courts erred in granting the application for registration in
spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s
ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting
that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land
and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall
have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that
its application for registration of title was filed and was
granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of
its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for
registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the
Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements
in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not
antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary
that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes
part of that law from the date it was originally passed,
since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not
amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely
of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds
that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject properties since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of the subject properties
since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of
Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving
assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject
properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of
the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena,
the respondent failed to present any other evidence to
prove the character of the possession and occupation by it
and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must
be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the
application. Applicants for land registration cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of
law rather than factual evidence of possession.Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops
on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow
that the subject properties have been possessed and
occupied by them in the manner contemplated by
law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual
cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation
required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the state. The possession of public land, however long the
period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the
subject properties presented by the respondent were only
for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite
its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as
1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only
in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
4
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership." That the subject properties were declared for
taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year.
WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration
is denied.
3. LOZADA VS BRACEWELL (PERLAS-
BERNABE)
Case law instructs that for “as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the (Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering it
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land which was
granted by the RTC of Makati City acting as a land
registration court. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the
LRA issued a Decree in the name of petitioner, who later
obtained an OCT.
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of
the aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr.
(Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529, otherwise known as the “Property
Registration Decree,” before the RTC of Las Piñas City
claiming that a portion of such land was his as absolute
owner and possessor and us fraudulently included in the
Decree.
He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed
the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners,
and left him totally ignorant of the registration
proceedings involving said lots. Instead of impleading
him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria
Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although she had already
died by that time.
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree and OCT in bad
faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of
the case and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his
heirs.
The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for
deliberately preventing respondents from participating
and objecting to his application for registration when the
documentary evidence showed that, as early as 1962,
Bracewell had been paying taxes for the subject lot; and
that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the owner thereof
in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965,
as well as in the City Assessor’s Office.
Petitioner argues that the Las Piñas City-RTC had no
jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should
be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the
decision and ordered the issuance of the decree (Makati
City)
The CA held that, since the petition for review was filed
within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned
decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in
Las Piñas City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction
over the petition for review of decree, which was issued
as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati
City.
HELD:
Under the “Land Registration Act,” which was the law in
force at the time of the commencement by both parties of
their respective registration proceedings — jurisdiction
over all applications for registration of title was conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the
respective provinces in which the land sought to be
registered is situated.
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[39]
otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980,” was enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981,
authorizing the creation of RTCs in different judicial
regions, including the RTC of Las Piñas City as part of
the National Capital Judicial Region. As pointed out by
the court, the RTC of Las Piñas City was established “in
or about 1994.” Understandably, in February 1998,
Bracewell sought the review of the Decree before the Las
Piñas City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this
case is situated in Las Piñas City.
It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage
of PD 1529, the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated.
5
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not
be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date
of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree
of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
As such, case law instructs that for “as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
4. VALIAO VS REPUBLIC (PERALTA)
Nature: Rule 45 - Petition for review on certiorari.
Facts:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico,
Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio
Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of
land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and
Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the
application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied
for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res
judicata has set in to bar the application for registration;
and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if
any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945
or prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of public domain belonging to the Republic,
which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the
present action is barred by a previous final judgment in a
cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and
involving the same parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors'
Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners
alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947,
upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio),
who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao,
pursuant to a Deed of Sale[5] dated May 19, 1916 entirely
handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the
land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in
1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the
concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants
as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when
oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed
them of their property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against
Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the
subject property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under
the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
RTC Decision: Granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property.
6
Thus private oppositors and the Republic appeal with the
CA. CA Decision: Reversed the trial court's findings
and DECLARE the subject parcel of land to be
inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the
public domain.
Accordingto CA, the classification of lands of the public
domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and in the absence of such
classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the
same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which
ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA
held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars
a subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that
the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the
public domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier
Issues:
1. WON the subject lot is alienable and disposable
land of public domain.
2. WON the claim of prescription by the applicant
will lie on the subject lot.
3. WON the CA’s decision constitutes res judicata
as far as this application is concerned.
4. WON the alleged possession of the applicants
through predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to
sustain their claim for prescription.
Held:
1. NO. The subject lot is not alienable and
disposable land of public domain.
Sec 14(par 1) of PD 1529 requires the petitioners to prove
that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. These the petitioners must prove by no less than
clear, positive and convincing evidence.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such evidence was offered by the
petitioners to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to
prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as
still inalienable public domain.
2. NO. The claim of prescription by the applicant
will not lie on the subject lot.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property
of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying
for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
3. NO. The judgment does not constitute res
judicata that bars a subsequent action for land
registration.
7
In this case, was cited the case of Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that a judicial
declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same
land, provided he thereafter complies with the
provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, and as long as said public lands
remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not
only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land
is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
4. NO. The alleged possession of the applicants
through predecessors-in-interest is not
sufficient to sustain their claim for
prescription.
The petitioners’ possession of the land in question from
1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same
with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best,
petitioners can only prove possession since said
date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12,
1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other
evidence. The disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for
registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
Supreme Court Ruling: Denied the Petition.
5. HERMOSO VS COURT OF APPEALS
(NACHURA)
Facts
The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan,
Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned
by Petra Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio Francia.
The lots comprises an area of 2.5 and 1.5850 hectares,
respectively, and forms part of a larger parcel of land with
an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr.,
Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed
Francia.[3]
Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have
been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415
as tenants thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of
the said lots under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On
July 4, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued an order granting the petition.
Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration
and reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR
affirmed with modification the earlier order, and disposed
of the case.
In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and
425-BUL-92. The cases delved on whether both petitioner
and Banag are tenants of respondents in the subject
landholding. On June 3, 1996, the DARAB rendered a
Decision[7] upholding the tenancy relationship of
petitioner and Banag with the respondents. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. A petition for review on certiorari was filed
before the CA. However, the petition was denied on
technical grounds in a Resolution[8] dated October 9,
1996. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the
same was likewise denied in a Resolution[9] dated
December 27, 1996. The case was eventually elevated to
this Court in G.R. No. 127668. On March 12, 1997, the
Court denied the petition for lack of verification,[10] and
subsequently, also denied the motion for reconsideration
in a Resolution[11] dated July 14, 1997.
Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR,
an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
emancipation patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR
granted the motion.[12] On March 21, 1997, respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that the
lands involved have been approved for conversion to
urban purposes in an Order[13] dated June 5, 1973 issued
8
by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels
of land.[14] On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an
Order[15] affirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the
motion for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of
Banag. On March 30, 1998, respondents filed a notice of
appeal and correspondingly filed their appeal
memorandum.[16] On April 21, 2003, the Office of the
President through the Deputy Executive Secretary
rendered a Decision[17] denying respondents appeal
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They maintained that
P.D. No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land
pursuant to the June 5, 1973 Order of the DAR Secretary
reclassifying the lands and declaring the same as suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes. Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands as
early as October 14, 1978.
On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision,[19] the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision
of the Office of the President is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new decision is
hereby rendered dismissing the Petition for Coverage
under P.D. No. 27 filed by respondents [now herein
petitioner].
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January
19, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed
Resolution[21] denying the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by
P.D. No. 27.
Held
We resolve to deny the petition.
Section 3, Article XII[22] of the Constitution mandates that
alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two
types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of
the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural
lands of the public domain may further be classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
This further classification of agricultural lands is referred
to as secondary classification.[23]
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a
number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect
on June 15, 1988, explicitly provides:
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five
(5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the
land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due
notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws,
may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the
land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary
shall have fully paid his obligation.
On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991[24] states:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands.
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance
passed by the sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when
the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes, as determined by
the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following
percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent
component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class
municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
9
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five
percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven
(R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands into
other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said
Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires
and upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality
to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with
existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in
the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where the approval by a national agency is required
for reclassification, such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and
complete application for reclassification within three (3)
months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as
approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as
repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative
enactments, there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, which was approved on
August 8, 1963, Section 36 of which reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding;
Exceptions.Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender, of the land, agricultural lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned
and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more that five
hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced
notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That
should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply
with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any
of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused
by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm
practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the
fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of
the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event,
the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession,
although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding
in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-
seven.
The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled
to the issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No.
27. The said decree promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, on October 21, 1972, is entitled,
DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS
10
FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS THEREFOR.
However, the law specifically applied to tenant-farmers
of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn under a system of share tenancy or lease tenancy,
whether classified as landed estate or not.
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come
within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to
determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of
R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural
activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such
farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of
land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No.
27. This considering that the subject lots were reclassified
by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way
before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under
P.D. No. 27. The pertinent portions of the June 5, 1973
Order[25] read:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as
amended, the said requests of the petitioners were referred
to the National Planning Commission as well as to the
Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Valenzuela, Bulacan for
proper investigation.
The National Planning Commission in compliance
therewith after due investigation and physical survey of
the subject areas, favorably recommended the suitability
of the same to residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes.
Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela,
Bulacan after due investigation thereof found the parcels
of land subject hereof highly suitable for conversion into
urban purposes in view of his findings and verification of
the location, facilities necessary for urban development
and also, the low agricultural income thereof
(unirrigated), of the said land. The Team Leader
concerned in his recommendation submitted to this Office
made mentioned (sic) that in his declaration of the
suitability of the subject properties for urban purposes, he
believes that the conformity of the tenants consisting of
eleven (11) tenants are no longer needed so long as the
petitioners are willing to pay the disturbance
compensation as provided for by law. The petitioners
manifested to the Team Leader concerned their
willingness to pay each and every tenant the disturbance
compensation according to law. To show further their
sincerity to comply with the provisions of the law on
disturbance compensation, and to show that their
(petitioners) purpose of the instant request is not to evade
the provisions of Decree 27, they stated in their letter-
request that they will not eject any tenants therefrom, nor
dispossessed (sic) them of their landholdings until after
they are fully and justly paid the disturbance
compensation according to law.
The subject parcels of land are not included in the land
transfer operation according to the teams report.
It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the
report of the National Planning Commission submitted to
this Office, it appears that the subject properties are
strategically located in the urban center of the town
of Meycauayan wherein there are already existing
developed and occupied residential subdivisions and even
low cost housing projects subsidized by funds from
government financial institution. Likewise, there are also
industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the
National Planning Commissions report.
In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of
land subject hereof to be suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes as found
and recommended by the National Planning Commission
and the Agrarian Reform Team concerned, and
considering further that the said parcels of land by reason
of their location and the existence of developed and
occupied residential subdivisions and industrial
establishments in the immediate vicinity maybe
considered as one of the possible areas to be reserved for
urban development as contemplated in the Letter of
Instruction No. 46 of the President, and considering
finally, that the right of the agricultural tenants therein
will be fully compensated and there will be no ejectment
of tenants until after full payment thereof, as manifested
by the petitioners, the instant requests of the petitioners
should be, as hereby it is, given due course and the parcels
11
of land subject thereof are hereby declared suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic
Act 3844, as amended.
It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants
and/or lessees shall be ejected from or dispossessed of
their landholdings by virtue of this Order not until after
they are duly and justly paid the disturbance
compensation according to law, the amount of which
maybe determined and fixed by the proper court in the
absence of any mutual agreement thereto by and between
the agricultural lessees and the owner-petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the
emancipation patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is the
fact that respondents were not able to realize the actual
conversion of the land into residential purposes. To
bolster his claim, petitioner relies on Section 36 (1) of
R.A. No. 3844, viz.:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue
in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned
and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five
hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced
notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out
such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that
he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right
to demand possession of the land and recover damages
for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions.
xxxx[27]
However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already
been amended by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September
10, 1971. Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended,
now reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue
in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head
upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years;
xxxx[28]
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the
landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural
land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period
was deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law,
the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the
conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural
purpose within a certain period was deleted.[29] The
remedy left available to the tenant is to claim disturbance
compensation.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian
Reform[30], the Court held that lands not devoted to
agricultural activity and those that were previously
converted to non-agricultural uses are outside the
coverage of the CARL, viz.:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the
CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL
shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is
referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
12
this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do
not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots
were intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in
question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing
subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be
gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even
instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing
with such development. The enormity of the resources
needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its
completion but this does not detract from the fact that
these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit
of the CARL. [31]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
October 15, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 19,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
77546 are hereby affirmed. The case is remanded to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan for
the proper computation of the disturbance compensation
of petitioner.
6. PALANCA VS REPUBLIC (AZCUNA)
Facts
The antecedent facts[3] are as follows:
On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca,
(petitioners herein), filed an application to bring the
pieces of land they allegedly owned under the operation
of the Land Registration Act. These are: a two hundred
thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty (239,980)
square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Panlaitan,
Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as
shown on plan Psu-04-000074, and a one hundred
seventy-six thousand five hundred eighty-eight (176,588)
square meter land in Barrio of Panlaitan (Island
of Capari), Municipality of New Busuanga, Province of
Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000073. They
acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro
S. Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land
openly and continuously in the concept of an owner since
1934, or 39 years before the filing of said application, and
planted on said lands about 1,200 coconut trees on each
land, declared the same for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes thereof. The first parcel of land is presently
occupied by Lopez, Libarra, an encargado of herein
(petitioners), while the second is occupied by
(petitioner) Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil Case No. 573
entitled Heirs of Pedro Palanca, Plaintiffs, vs.
Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant, for Recovery of
Possession of a Parcel of Land the Court of First Instance
of Palawan rendered a decision on March 4, 1970,
declaring (petitioners), the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as
the rightful possessors of the land
at Talampulan Island, Bario of Panlaitan, Municipality
of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, covered by Psu-04-
000074, including the two (2) hectare portion occupied
and claimed by Alfonso Guillamac.
It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements as to
notices, as prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496, namely
publication in the Official Gazette, were complied with.
During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions
to the application were made by the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan purportedly for and in behalf of the Bureau of
Forest Development, the Bureau of Lands, and the
Department of Agrarian Reform, some inhabitants of the
subject properties and a businessman by the name of
Alfonso Guillamac. The Provincial Fiscal stated that the
lands subject of the application had no clearance from the
Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof may still be
part of the timberland block and/or public forest under the
administration of the Bureau of Forestry and had not been
certified as being alienable and disposable by the Bureau
of Lands. He therefore requested that the resolution on the
application be stayed pending the examination and
issuance of the required clearance by the Bureau of Forest
Development.[4] After the lapse of three years from the
date of the initial hearing, however, no valid and formal
opposition was filed by any of the oppositors in the form
and manner required by law.[5] Neither did the Provincial
Fiscal present witnesses from the relevant government
bureaus and agencies to support his contention that the
subject lands had not yet been cleared for public
disposition.
On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and
technical description of the land, a survey certificate
approved by the Bureau of Lands and also tax declarations
showing that they have consistently paid the realty taxes
accruing on the property. Petitioners likewise presented
six witnesses in support of their application,
namely Constantino Palanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel,
13
Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero
and Augustin Timbancaya.
Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel
testified that: (1) they were heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca;
(2) they, together with their other siblings, were
applicants for the registration of two parcels of land
located in Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3) their
father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the
subject properties by continuous, public and notorious
possession; (4) their father built a house on each parcel of
land and planted coconut trees; (5) since their fathers
death, they have continued their possession over the
lands in the concept of owners and adverse to all
claimants; and (6) the properties have been declared for
taxation purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously
paid for over forty (40) years.[6]
Lopez Libarra and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they
knew the late Pedro S. Palanca and worked for the latter
as an overseer and a capataz respectively in the
cultivation of the subject properties.
After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision
on December 15, 1977 declaring petitioners as the owners
in fee simple of the two parcels of land in question.
Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4295
was issued in the name of petitioners.
On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years,
respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA
a petition[10] for annulment of judgment, cancellation of
the decree of registration and title, and reversion.
Respondent sought to annul the December 15,
1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that the decision was
null and void because the two lands in question were
unclassified public forest land and, as such, were not
capable of private appropriation. In support of this
proposition, respondent presented Land Classification
Map No. 839, Project 2-A dated December 9, 1929
showing that the subject properties were unclassified
lands as of that date as well as a certification dated
November 24, 2000 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office stating that
the islands of Talampulan and Capar(i) Island located in
the municipality of Busuanga, Palawan are within the
unclassified public forest. Respondent likewise drew
attention to Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued
on July 2, 1967 which classified
the Province of Palawan as a National Game Refuge and
Bird Sanctuary and the small islands off Palawan as
national reserves closed to exploitation and settlement
under the administration of the Parks and Wildlife Office,
subject only to existing private rights.[11] In view of the
fact that the properties were never classified as alienable
and disposable, respondent argued that the CFI did not
have jurisdiction to make a disposition of the same.
On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Palawan,
Branch II, dated December 15, 1977, in Land Registration
Case No. N-21, LRC Record No. N-44308 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Decree No. N-
172081 and the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. 4295 issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro
S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-
10398, T-10399, T-10410 and T-10884 and all
subsequent TCTs issued thereafter are also
declared NULL and VOID. Private respondents Heirs of
Pedro S. Palanca are DIRECTED to surrender said
transfer certificates of title to public respondent Register
of Deeds of Palawan; and the latter is also DIRECTED to
cause the cancellation thereof.
HELD
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court
finds that respondent met the required burden of proof.
Consequently, the CA did not err in granting respondents
petition to annul the decision of the land registration
court. This petition for review, therefore, lacks merit.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which
petitioners anchor their claim states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: x x x
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
14
or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of
two things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is
public agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking
registration must have possessed and occupied the same
for at least thirty years prior to the filing of the
application. That the petitioners, through Pedro
S. Palanca, have been in possession of the properties since
1934 is not disputed. What is in doubt is the compliance
with the first requisite.
To reiterate, the validity of the CFI decision was
impugned on the basis of the courts lack of jurisdiction. If
the properties were alienable public lands, then the CFI,
acting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction over
them and could validly confirm petitioners imperfect title.
Otherwise, if the properties were indeed public forests,
then the CA was correct in declaring that the land
registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and, as a result, its decision
decreeing the registration of the properties in favor of
petitioners would be null and void.
The reason for this is the fact that public forests are
inalienable public lands. The possession of public forests
on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert
the same into private property.[20] Possession in such an
event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could never
ripen into ownership.[21] It bears stressing that unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[22]
In the present case, Land Classification Map No. 839,
Project 2-A[23] indicated that
the Talampulan and Capari Islands on which the
properties were located were unclassified public lands as
of December 9, 1929. It was by virtue of Executive
Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 that these
islands were subsequently classified as national reserves.
Based on these, it becomes evident that the subject
properties have never been released for public disposition.
Obviously, from the time that petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest were occupying the properties in
1934 until the time that an application for registration was
filed in 1973, these properties remained as inalienable
public lands.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the
fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same
result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.[24] When the
property is still unclassified, whatever possession
applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot
ripen into private ownership.[25] This is because, pursuant
to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.[26] Thus, the
Court has emphasized the need to show in registration
proceedings that the government, through a positive act,
has declassified inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.[27]
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of
Lands[28] and Ankron v. Government[29] is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted
by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under
which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.
As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the
properties is sought under Commonwealth Act No.
141. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide as follows:
Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
15
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act.
Based on the foregoing, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Clearly, the courts no longer have the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.[30]
To the Courts mind, petitioners have failed to present
incontrovertible proof that the lands they claimed had
previously been classified as alienable. The bare
allegation of Alfonso Lucero that a certification had been
issued releasing the properties for agricultural purposes is
not sufficient to prove this fact. The best evidence would
be the document itself which, however, was not produced
in this case. It was error for the land registration court to
have taken Mr. Luceros testimony at face value, absent
any other evidence to conclusively prove that the land had
been released for public disposition.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners
contention that the State has the burden to prove that the
land which it avers to be of public domain is really of such
nature applies only in instances where the applicant has
been in possession of the property since time immemorial.
When referring to this type of possession, it means
possession of which no person living has seen the
beginning and the existence of which such person has
learned from the latters elders.[31] Immemorial possession
justifies the presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that it had been private property
even before the Spanish conquest.[32] The possession of
petitioners in this case does not fall under the above-
named exception as their possession, by their own
admission, only commenced sometime in 1934.
To reiterate, where there is a showing that lots sought to
be registered are part of the public domain, the applicant
for land registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 must secure a certification from the
government that the lands claimed to have been possessed
by the applicant as owner for more than 30 years are
alienable and disposable.[33] Petitioners failure to do so in
this case, when taken with the evidence adduced by
respondent showing that the lands in question indeed
remain part of the public domain and form part of the
national reserves, confirms that the CFI never acquired
jurisdiction to order the registration of such lands in favor
of petitioners, and certainly justifies their reversion to the
State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. No costs.
7. SEC OF DENR VS YAP (REYES)
Facts
568 SCRA 164 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds –
Land Classifications – Boracay Cases – Positive Act by
the Government in Reclassifying Lands
These are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief
to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes for the land they’ve
been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
landof the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as “public forest,” which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap
et al. The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May
2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for
a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline
16
of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay
landowners in Boracay filed with the Supreme Court (SC)
an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that
the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights”
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG
argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of
the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority
to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for Yap et al
and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire
title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et
al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no
such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented. The records
are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Private
claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is
plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,
mere possession by private individuals of lands creates
the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141.
Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied
lands under the said law. There are two requisites for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The
SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the
name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of
recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and
occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested
right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island
for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested
right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of
private claimants do not automatically give them a vested
right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
17
for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The
SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law
and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible
to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their
occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
8. CRUZ VS SEC OF DENR (PER CURIAM)
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the
validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights
Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After
deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed
and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral
domains may include natural resources – somehow
against the regalian doctrine.
ANOTHER:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this
suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.[1] In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement
its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment
to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality
of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for
lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the
view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted
in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed
of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups
of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion
for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending
the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is
an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that
the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon,
et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution
and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus
be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter,
the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
18
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides
that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within
ancestral domains are private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which
defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years;
and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the
IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and
which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination. They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents
power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58,
59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
19
desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
comply with his duty of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the
Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan
filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice
Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and
should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b),
8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate
opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition
is DISMISSED.
9. REPUBLIC VS AGUNOY (GARCIA)
10. REPUBLIC VS NAGUIAT (GARCIA)
Facts
“unclassified lands cannot be acquired by adverse
possession/occupation; occupation in the concept of an
owner however long cannot ripen into private ownership
and be registered as a title.”
Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of
land contending she is the owner of the said land which
she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn
acquired the same from persons who have been in
possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic
filed in opposition that said lands belong to the public
domain and not subject to private appropriation.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land
belonging to public domain may be appropriated as
private property.
Ruling:
For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private
appropriation, it requires an express and positive act of the
government that it will become a part of alienable and
disposable agricultural lands of public domain.
Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into
private ownership and be registered to as a title.
11. LIGON VS COURT OF APPEALS
(BELLOSILLO)
Facts
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial
20
Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of
respondent Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to
surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of title
in her possession.
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK)
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint[1] for specific performance with damages
against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP)
docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK
alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed
of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels
of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon
City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The
parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall
undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the
property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of
the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed
that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation
of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay
damages to INK.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated
the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase price
and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and
revoked.
On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the ground that there was actually no genuine
issue as to any material fact.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial
judgment, and on 7 October 1991 an amended partial
judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except
the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case
praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties as
mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates
to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the
registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK
alleged that the document could not be registered because
of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the
certificates of title despite repeated requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition
to the motion on the ground that the IDP was not served
copy of the motion, and the ownership of the INK over
the property was still in issue since rescission was sought
by the IDP as a counterclaim. She prayed that the motion
be denied, but should it be granted, the Register of Deeds
be directed after registration to deliver the owner's
duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental
Opposition questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
because the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party to the
main case.
On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of
INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the
owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520
(176616) in open court for the registration of the Absolute
Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the
mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new
transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK.[2]
On 6 April 1992, on motion of Ligon, the trial court
reconsidered its order directing her to deliver the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals seeking the annulment of the two (2)
orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of
the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court
erred: (a) in ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner;
(b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as they
violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of
action and forum-shopping; (c) in holding that INK is the
owner of the property and entitled to registration of its
ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior
right to the possession of the owner's copies of the
certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to
the issuance by the trial court of the order of 2 March
1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for
intervention informing said court that the sale of the
properties was not executed by it but was made possible
by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void. The
trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over the
incident properly belonged to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith,
21
IDP brought the matter before the SEC which later
declared that the sale of the properties was void. Thus,
IDP banks on this favorable decision in similarly seeking
the nullification of the questioned orders of the trial court.
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument
shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the
owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with
such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of
the court for cause shown. In case the person in
possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new
certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529
clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. -
Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title
pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the
title of the registered owner against his consent or where
a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of
the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file
a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the
Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the
registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a
new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If
the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not
amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason
the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same
as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu
thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate.
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, the former law, Act
No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law had
established that summary reliefs such as an action to
compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and
granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land
registration court if there was unanimity among the
parties or there was no adverse claim or serious objection
on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case
became contentious and controversial it should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the
incident properly belonged.[4]
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No 1529, it is now provided that
"Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear
and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions." The above provision has
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts
the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.[5]
The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-
6937 before the trial court was for specific performance
with damages based on a document of sale. Such action
was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.[6] When IDP, the defendant in the trial court,
did not question the genuineness and validity of said deed
of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary
judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought
by INK was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an
order from the same court to compel the holder of the
duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the
Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale
subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary
incident to the main case. When the sale of the property
was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant
was directed to comply with its terms and conditions, the
right of INK to have the same registered with the Register
of Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy
its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the
court to direct the surrender of the certificates of
title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, they may therefore take cognizance of this
case pursuant to such jurisdiction.[7]Even while Sec. 107
of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by
one who wants to compel another to surrender the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds, this does not
preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident
22
therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the
subject certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately
connected with the subject matter of the principal
action.[8]This principle is based on expediency and in
accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage
lien of petitioner appears in the certificates of title Nos.
26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court
directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register
of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can
be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and
interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated
on the previous certificates of title which subsists should
be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer
certificates of title. This is true even in the case of a real
estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil
Code it directly and immediately subjects the property
upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be,
to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it
was constituted. It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem - a lien on the property
whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a
change in ownership; in short, the personality of the
owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers
must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be
with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such
mortgage until discharged follows the property.[9] It is
clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by
the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to
her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a new
action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the
motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations
where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end
should be avoided. Courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The rules are intended to insure
the orderly conduct of litigations because of the higher
objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties'
substantive rights.[10]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
12. INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO
SAN PEDRO VS COURT OF APPEALS
(HERMOSISIMA)
FACTS: The case involves two petitions which were
consolidated by the court in its decision.
1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of
Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for recovery of real
property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction against private defendants
Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the
subject estate by employing fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation.
RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the
defendants are already the registered owners covered by
the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the
alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. The Spanish Title also
stated that the estate shall be excluded from the coverage
of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff
Intestate to pay each defendant the amount of 5,000 and
atty fees.
Motion for Recon was denied. Petitioner filed an
appeal, CA dismissed.
2. GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for
letter of administration over the intestate to be appointed
as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri
appointed San Pedro as administrator and the court issued
letter of administration in his favor upon posting a bond
of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention
and opposition to the petition, claiming that the Titulo de
Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of
ownership in court and it is invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but
the Republic‘s opposition to the petition for letter of
administration was dismissed. Republic filed for MR.
The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void
and excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.
23
ISSUES: petition for letter of administration closed and terminated.
The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of possession
1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse
or ownership and ordered to vacate.
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling
the issue of ownership of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136?
2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in
excluding from the inventory of the estate all lands
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the ground
that it is null and void?
RATIO:
1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court
functioning as probate court. The jurisdiction of the
Probate Court is not limited to the determination of who
the heirs are and what shares are due them. Their main
function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the
deceased so as to rule on whether the inventory of the
estate properly included them for distribution of the net
assets estate to lawful heirs.
2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it
declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void,
consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title
from the inventory of the estate.
Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish
Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
Titles should cause their lands to be registered under Land
Registration Act within 6 months from date of effectivity
or until August 16, 1976.
In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to
show that Titulo de Propriedad No.4136 was brought
underthe operation of PD 892. No cert of title shown.
Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is
inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private
ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo
was not registered under Land Registration Act, said
Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants
Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter
enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity.
Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original
Titulo nor a genuine copy thereof (only an alleged
illegible copy was presented). Even the secondary
evidence presented was also not admissible.
RULING: The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and
no rights can be derived therefrom. All lands covered by
said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the estate. The

24
 CHAPTER 2 CASES
The Land Registration Commission and its Registries
of Deeds
1) ABRIGO V. DE VERA, JUNE 21, 2004
(Panganiban, J.)
 FACTS
GloriaVillafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan
to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The
house and lot was covered by a tax declaration.
Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go,
Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land
involved. The said free patent was later on cancelled by a
TCT.
Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the
Spouses Abrigo.
Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera.
De Vera registered the sale and as a consequence a TCT
was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages
against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC. Spouses Abrigo
filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents,
injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and
damages Villafania. The parties submitted a Motion for
Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant (RTC)
case that neither of them can physically take possession
of the property in question until the instant case is
terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed. The
RTC rendered judgment approving the Compromise
Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision,
Villafania was given one year from the date of the
Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot,
and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in
favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid
and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the
premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed to
buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the
lot in their name The RTC rendered the assailed Decision
awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as
damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay
[petitioners and private respondent] damages and
attorney’s fees. Not contented with the assailed Decision,
both parties [appealed to the CA].
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could
not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal
of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania had
already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar
and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was
deemed void.The CA also dismissed the appeal of
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis
to award them moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. On reconsideration found Respondent De
Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on
the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.
 ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and
respondent has a better right to the property
 RULING
The present case involves what in legal contemplation
was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed
property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from whom
petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a
second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent
de Vera. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on
double sale thus:
“Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
25
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in
good faith, if it should be movable property.
“Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
“Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.”
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with
respect to lands registered under the Torrens system. In
the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent
registered the sale of the property. Since neither
petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the
Torrens system, they registered their respective sales
under Act 3344 For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system because, during the
sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of
title (TCT) covering the property. Soriano v. Heirs of
Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper
registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in
dispute in the present case was already registered under
the Torrens system, petitioners’ registration of the sale
under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article
1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v.
Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the right of a party
who had registered the sale of land under the Property
Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had
registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344.
In that case, the “priority in time” principle was not
applied, because the land was already covered by the
Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered
under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the
registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the
Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be
upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
2) GUARANTEED HOMES V. VALDEZ (Tinga, J.)
 FACTS
CA reversed the order of RTC-Olongapo, which granted
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Guaranteed
Homes.
Respondents, descendants of Pablo Pascua, filed a
complaint seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land in
Cabitaugan, Subic Zambales and covered by OCT No.
404 in the name of Pablo. They are praying for damages.
From the annexes attached in the complaint, it was
ascertained that the OCT contained several annotations
which showed that the property had been sold by Pablo to
Alejandria Marquinez and Resituto Morales.
Also attached in the complaint, and averred by the
respondents:
o Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and
Confirmation of Sales executed by Cipriano
Pascua, Sr., declaring himself as the only heir of
Pablo and confirming the sales made by Pablo to
spouses Rodolfo;
o TCT Nos. T-8241 – issued in the name of Cipriano
without cancellation of OCT No. 404 & not signed
by Register of Deeds;
o TCT No. T-8242 – issued in the name of
spouses Rodolfo, which canceled T-8241;
26
 o TCT No. T-10863 – issued in the name of
petitioner when spouses Rodolfo sold the
property to petitioner, which canceled T-8242;
o Deed of Sale with Mortgage between spouses
Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo and
Guaranteed Homes;
Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano filed a petition with
RTC-Olongapo for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate of OCT No. 404, which was denied. The trial
court held that petitioner was already the owner of the
subject property, noting that the failure to annotate the
subsequent property to it at the back of said OCT did not
affect its title to the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds:
o Action is barred by the Statute of Limitations
(since more than 28 years have passed since the
issuance from T-10863 to the filing of the
complaint);
o No cause of action, since petitioner is an
innocent purchaser for value relying on the
clean title of spouses Rodolfo.
RTC granted the motion.
CA reversed and held that the respondents’ complaint for
quieting of title had not yet prescribed.
Hence, the petition.
 ISSUE: Whether petitioner is an innocent purchaser
for value, i.e. there is no need to go beyond the
registered title of spouses Rodolfo.
 RULING
Yes (there is no need for petitioner to go beyond the clean
title presented to them).
Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.
The Court held that it is basic that a person dealing with
registered property need not go beyond, but only has to
rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since “the
act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned,” it follows
that where there is nothing in the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is
not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto.
In the present case, it is enough that petitioner examined
the latest certificate of title issued in the name of spouses
Rodolfo. The petitioner as purchaser is not bound by the
original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the
person from whom he had purchased the property.
Furthermore, registration in the public registry is
considered a notice to the whole world. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.
3) BARANDA V. GUSTILO (Gutierrez, Jr., J.)
 FACTS
A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by
original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of
the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and
27
Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao).
Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the
said land. However during the trial, it was found that the
transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title
was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting
Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order
declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same
and issued new certificate of titles in the name of
petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case
pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens
was annotated in the new certificate of title.
This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge
Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting
Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
 ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register
of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens
in a Torrens certificate of title?
 RULING
Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis
pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency
of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is
ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states
that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites
for registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith
deny registration thereof and in form the presentor or such
denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore,
and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.”
On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance
of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to
him for registration or where any party in interest does not
agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the
Register of Deeds.”
4) DE LEON V. DE LEON (Velasco, Jr., J.)
 FACTS
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.
On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon.
They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22,
1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT
was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of
Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold
28
the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa.
The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and
signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed
of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance
suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the
lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold
to them was his exclusive property because he was still
single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further
alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between
Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that
the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio
and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
 ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has
purchased on installment before the marriage
although some installments were paid during the
marriage would be considered conjugal property
 RULING
Petitioners assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot
from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the
land was Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal,
even though some installments were paid and the title was
issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. In support of
their position, petitioners cite Lorenzo v. Nicolas
and Alvarez v. Espiritu.
We disagree.
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing
provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise,
it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during
the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in
which the properties were acquired does not appear, the
presumption will still apply, and the properties will still
be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC
lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional
Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage
of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional
sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both
types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the
vendors obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the
happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full
payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as
if the conditional obligation had never existed. In other
words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the
seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of
the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes
upon delivery of the thing sold.
Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The
conditional contract to sell executed by and between
Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that
ownership over and title to the property will vest on
Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale
which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full
purchase price.
29
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to
Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on
June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made
more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on
April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership
to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence. There must be clear
evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
Petitioners argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacios
exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his
name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property in
the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the property
was acquired.
Also, it cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil
Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband
alienating or encumbering any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. To a
specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the
husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the
wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not valid or if done, is void
ab initio (absent any showing that the latter is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes).
The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact
that sale is in contravention of the mandatory
requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of
the Code requires the consent of the wife before the
husband may alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision
are void except when the law itself authorized their
validity.
Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12,
1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the
PHHC lot is void.
5) ALFONSO V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(Carpio Morales, J.) – Full text*
6) NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK V. CA
(Corona, J.)
 FACTS
On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered
to sell to private respondent-spouses Alfredo and
Annabelle Lumo, a house and lot measuring 340 square
meters located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de
Oro City.
Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents
made inquiries at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City where the property is located and
the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendors
title. They found out that the property was mortgaged
for P8,000 to a certain Mrs. Galupo and that the owners
copy of the Certificate of Title to said property was in her
possession.
Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to
redeem the property from Galupo at their expense, giving
the amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that purpose.
30
On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of
Galupo was annotated on TCT No. T-41499 which
covered the subject property.
In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the release
of Galupos adverse claim, private respondents and
Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of absolute
sale. The subject property was allegedly sold
for P125,000 but the deed of sale reflected the amount of
only P30,000 which was the amount private respondents
were ready to pay at the time of the execution of said deed,
the balance payable by installment.
On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered
and inscribed on TCT No. T-41499 and, on even date,
TCT No. T-50134 was issued in favor of private
respondents.
After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested
the issuance of a new tax declaration certificate in their
names. However, they were surprised to learn from the
City Assessors Office that the property was also declared
for tax purposes in the name of petitioner Naawan
Community Rural Bank Inc. Records in the City
Assessors Office revealed that, for the lot covered by TCT
No. T-50134, Alfredo Lumos T/D # 83324 bore the
note: This lot is also declared in the name of Naawan
Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D # 71210.
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas
obtained a P15,000 loan from petitioner Bank using the
subject property as security. At the time said contract of
mortgage was entered into, the subject property was then
an unregistered parcel of residential land, tax-declared in
the name of a certain Sergio A. Balibay while the
residential one-storey house was tax-declared in the
name of Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Comayas to borrow money and use the subject lot as
security. But the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the
Special Power of Attorney were recorded in the
registration book of the Province of Misamis Oriental, not
in the registration book of Cagayan de Oro City. It
appears that, when the registration was made, there was
only one Register of Deeds for the entire province of
Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de Oro City. It was
only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds for
Cagayan de Oro City was established separately from the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Misamis Oriental.
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage
was foreclosed and the subject property sold at a public
auction to the mortgagee Naawan Community Rural Bank
as the highest bidder in the amount
of P16,031.35. Thereafter, the sheriffs certificate of sale
was issued and registered under Act 3344 in the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Misamis Oriental.
On April 17, 1984, the subject property was registered in
original proceedings under the Land Registration Act.
Title was entered in the registration book of the Register
of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City as Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-820, pursuant to Decree No. N-189413.
On July 23, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
41499 in the name of Guillermo P. Comayas was entered
in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for
redemption of the foreclosed subject property lapsed and
the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro City issued
and delivered to petitioner bank the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance. This time, the deed was registered under Act
3344 and recorded in the registration book of the Register
of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
31
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax
declaration for the subject house and lot.
Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for
ejectment against Comayas before the MTCC which
decided in its favor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision dated
April 13, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of execution of its
judgment. The MTCC, being the court of origin, promptly
issued said writ.
However, when the writ was served, the property was no
longer occupied by Comayas but herein private
respondents, the spouses Lumo who had, as earlier
mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988
Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their
home, private respondents filed an action for quieting of
title which was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-138. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
declaring private respondents as purchasers for value and
in good faith, and consequently declaring them as the
absolute owners and possessors of the subject house and
lot.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn
affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
 ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the sheriff’s Deed of Final
Conveyance was duly executed and registered in
the register of deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on
December 2, 1986;
2. Whether or not registration of sheriff’s Deed of
Final Conveyance in the proper Registry of Deeds
could be effective as against spouses Lumo.
 RULING
Both parties cite Article 1544 of the Civil Code which
governs the double sale of immovable property.
Article 1544 provides:
x x x. Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of the
sheriffs deed of final conveyance in the day book under
Act 3344 should prevail over the later registration of
private respondents deed of absolute sale under Act 496,
as amended by the Property Registration Decree, PD
1529.
This contention has no leg to stand on. It has been held
that, where a person claims to have superior proprietary
rights over another on the ground that he derived his title
from a sheriffs sale registered in the Registry of Property,
Article 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil Code will
apply only if said execution sale of real estate is registered
under Act 496.
Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when
it was acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a final deed
of conveyance. On the other hand, when private
respondents purchased the same property, it was already
covered by the Torrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs.
Fule where the Court ruled that the registration of an
instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of
Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person
who may subsequently deal with the same property.
32
However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at
the time of the execution and delivery of the sheriffs deed
of final conveyance on September 5, 1986, the disputed
property was already covered by the Land Registration
Act and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820 pursuant
to Decree No. N189413 was likewise already entered in
the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
De Oro City as of April 17, 1984.
Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was
already under the operation of the Torrens System. Under
the said system, registration is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the
effect of relieving the land of all claims except those noted
thereon. Accordingly, private respondents, in dealing
with the subject registered land, were not required by law
to go beyond the register to determine the legal condition
of the property. They were only charged with notice of
such burdens on the property as were noted on the register
or the certificate of title. To have required them to do
more would have been to defeat the primary object of the
Torrens System which is to make the Torrens Title
indefeasible and valid against the whole world.
Private respondents posit that, even assuming that the
sheriffs deed of final conveyance in favor of petitioner
bank was duly recorded in the day book of the Register of
Deeds under Act 3344, ownership of the subject real
property would still be theirs as purchasers in good faith
because they registered the sale first under the Property
Registration Decree.
The rights created by the above-stated statute of course do
not and cannot accrue under an inscription in bad
faith. Mere registration of title in case of double sale is not
enough; good faith must concur with the registration.
Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration of
the sheriffs deed of final conveyance on December 2,
1986 amounted to constructive notice to private
respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought the
subject property on May 17, 1988, they were deemed to
have purchased the said property with the knowledge that
it was already registered in the name of petitioner bank.
Thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether or not
private respondents could be considered as buyers in good
faith.
The priority in time principle being invoked by petitioner
bank is misplaced because its registration referred to land
not within the Torrens System but under Act 3344. On the
other hand, when private respondents bought the subject
property, the same was already registered under the
Torrens System. It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction
that persons dealing with registered land have the legal
right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title
and to dispense with the need to inquire further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry.
Did private respondents exercise the required diligence in
ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the subject
property so as to be considered as innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith?
We answer in the affirmative.
Before private respondents bought the subject property
from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made with the
Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding the
status of the vendors title. No liens or encumbrances were
found to have been annotated on the certificate of
title. Neither were private respondents aware of any
adverse claim or lien on the property other than the
33
adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to whom
Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject
property. But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo
was eventually settled and the adverse claim previously
annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the
necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to
go beyond the certificate of title.Otherwise, the efficacy
and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Title
would be rendered futile and nugatory.

Considering therefore that private respondents exercised

the diligence required by law in ascertaining the legal
status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over the
subject property and found no flaws therein, they should
be considered as innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith.

Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate court

upholding private respondents Alfredo and Annabelle
Lumo as the true and rightful owners of the disputed
property is affirmed.

Petition is hereby DENIED.

34