EN BANC other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and
intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL
TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the
RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES
T. SANSON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to
Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data 2)
is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del
Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la
Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed
in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court
of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes
T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the
"private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-
Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga,
Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz,
Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering
about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at
Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were
the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and
carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120
- entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents'
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations
of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior
possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the
intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed
property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision 5 in the
private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry
cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the
Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248
of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown
in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in
question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in
pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said
perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The
foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land
in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit
of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the
perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp.
271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the
plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question
since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on
January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a
portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and
building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to
confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and
Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapanñ o. As a result of their confrontation, the
parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they
agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed
not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident
of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however,
sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some
with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with
nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in
question which incident was promptly reported to the proper
authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p.
12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006,
the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no
settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action
(Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005,
they were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers
of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse
possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is
enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in
1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his
Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual
physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19,
2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of
force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in
the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in
the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants'
claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because
possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly
entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants'
Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations
made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question
that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006
(Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there
(sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements
of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143-
'144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a
group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and
built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said
neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted
the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible
entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006
when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards
posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted
in their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not
noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the
Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures
are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question,
accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be
considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question
prior to April 19, 20066."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC,"
Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge
Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February
2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond.
The writ7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was
actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on
12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed
condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in
an Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order 10 a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, a Petition for Review11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 1
the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of
Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and
for Demolition on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last
29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of
habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of
the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual
positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most
importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed
land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual
allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge
shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in
dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the
defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the
defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire
fence put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders.
Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who
resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL
LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an,
Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing
them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were
reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The
terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN
GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion.
Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of
Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the
use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and
unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents
Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential
with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in
dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced
into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses
who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore
disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise,
the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly
evict the defendants.13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they
maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of
real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved
exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC.
Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision
was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could
not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the
writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content
and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition,
that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out
of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the
Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now
assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body
of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition,
however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us
that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed
orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the
other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the
CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the
assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond
the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of the assailed order or
orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate
of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of
Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO
VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent
photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard
against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of
this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited
by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order
that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the
previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the
assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life
of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore
be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in
the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date
for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly
assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows. 17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been
guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very
least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed
in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did
not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA
would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA
refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a
writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the
petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance 19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION
because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION
OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject
of a PETITION FOR RELIEF , copy of the resolution of the CA is attached
hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but
up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is
attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the
appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners'
intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of
their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the
real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide
the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us
into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court
of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the
present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the
nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the
same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used,
constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis
for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the
fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1,
Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may
have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the
petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties,
involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by
side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any
party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in
an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special
civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful
and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of
the case; it may also constitute direct contempt."20
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 2
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in
violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in
relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five
(5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis
of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a
cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated
- a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section
33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion
interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure
physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is
regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law established no
distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully
detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of
the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery
of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to
when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which
jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts,
depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the
complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
- in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit
must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible
for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain,
the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual
allegations heretofore quoted,23 that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the
petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda,
supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior
possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts
committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19
April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal
acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors -
descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially
corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson
Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed
land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R.
Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security
guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and
shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza,
narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain
Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at
all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to
the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of
the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of
Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn.
The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates
what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that
the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the
forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings
are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown
judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties'
positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a
dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that
was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an
appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without
conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea
for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may
render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of
amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of
the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-
related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek
redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may
lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our
action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling
independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the
ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc
on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point
the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the
remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that
the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the
use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners'
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping;
and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari
and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently
compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the
writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice
to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue
when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present
case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for
rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo
with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 3
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ
of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence
of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however,
to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a
pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the
co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and

how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government

office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by
the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for

so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of
the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the
private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy
of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the

Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining
to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and
likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by
the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged,
much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in
mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the
outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in
order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition

OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.

SO ORDERED.

Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 4

 EN BANC
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review
of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned
Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa)
was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior
Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which
was later on referred to as the Zenñ arosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating
them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the
future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zenñ arosa Commission released
and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to
the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11
and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit
of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zenñ arosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out
the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the
status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated
Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor
and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by
the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April
19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to region,
indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom
these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG,
known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to
wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in
Malacanñ ang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also
asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen
(117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been
dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than
eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbanñ o qualified that said statistics were based
on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the
PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups
and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission
which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide
data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbanñ o stressed that
the Commission’s efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs
because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs
movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto
Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that
their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective
of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on
April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups,
the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared
on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG
on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zenñ arosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her
malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a
PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other
people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance
operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done
to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified
reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless
reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13,
which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit
all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zenñ arosa Commission as
basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from
forwarding to the Zenñ arosa Commission, or to any other government entity,
information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the
court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with
supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July
2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two
criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and
frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in
authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as
NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply
with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the
manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and
how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and
recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files,
registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information.31 They also contended that the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list
of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of
her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold
misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As
she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of
the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further
malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that
information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No.
275, the Zenñ arosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private
armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided
information that made the Zenñ arosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously,
it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that
petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the
ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to
the Zenñ arosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 5
also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information
on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zenñ arosa
Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to
disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a
compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38
raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zenñ arosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present
sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the
Zenñ arosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zenñ arosa
Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct
to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa
failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty
or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on
the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents
were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the
mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due
process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her
must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present
sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to
privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that
seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the
right to privacy vis-aà -vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a
constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this
view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it
is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of
all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect
for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five
members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in
any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender
to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of
privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and
organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases
supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the
right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several
acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a
public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime
the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,
and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize
the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected
from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not
absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by
the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have
held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern
generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that
case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test,
as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to
privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this
case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it
to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with
the assailed legislative investigation.48
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 6
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective,
the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized
that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our
own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European
tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of
personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular
note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be
free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its
national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked
as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was
adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment when
the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of
information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the
Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed,
among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his
personal or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a
security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating
to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity
to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private
life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following
grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the
citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion
in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities.59 The
following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to
a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a
margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the
nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of
the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced
against the seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to
respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national
security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic
authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public
information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the
suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate
interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain
sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to
public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and, apart from
those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a
private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available
to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and
in particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting
national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly,
ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the
above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the
Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person
concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied
in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards
contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of
paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation
available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case
the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of
the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar
fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being
an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of
the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-aà -vis the interest of the
state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides
for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with
the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zenñ arosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use
compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275
likewise authorized the Zenñ arosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP,
and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance
of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b)
maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and
(c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers
and functions accorded to the Zenñ arosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner
Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to
the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Zenñ arosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs
with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of
these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zenñ arosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate,
and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zenñ arosa Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1
Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which
was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure
that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in
place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and
accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make
any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific
stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of
investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue
encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in
existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution
these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 7
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities
empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from
intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities."67

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any
event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and
her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted
against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As
public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to
a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag
City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 8

 EN BANC
G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT
OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN.
AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT.
ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA,
PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A
CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A
CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY
GOMEZ, Respondents.
For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated September 26,
2010 filed by petitioner Francis Saez of our Resolution2 dated August 31, 2010
denying the Petition for Review3 he filed on July 21, 2008.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it
does not find cogent grounds to warrant setting aside our decision.
Antecedent Facts
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary
protection order, inspection of place and production of documents.5 In the petition,
he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be
placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to
cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for
his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of
amparo commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision.The case before the CA
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.
In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of
Captains Lawrence Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The
respondents also alleged that the names and descriptions of "Capt. Alcaydo," "a
certain First Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny," and "Joel" were insufficient to
properly identify some of the persons sought to be included as among the
respondents in the petition.
On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon),
Capt. Jacob Thaddeus Obligado, Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C.
Quintana, Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil submitted their affidavits.
The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to
determine specific acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or
security.
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed
that he was always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan
Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store.
Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed
him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental.
"Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by
the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after
having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of
Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.
CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA
On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial
grounds the reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA ratiocinated:
There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy
Osio’s presence at their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was
filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing there to constitute violation or threat to violate
petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. This Court cannot just grant the privilege
of the writs without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s entitlement
thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere
speculation or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not
intend it to be so when the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were
adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the privilege of the writs herein
prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available to address the
specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.
xxxx
Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the
supposed threat or violation of petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is
committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances attendant to said
supposed violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life, liberty or security to
warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.
xxxx
A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with
the aforestated requirements of Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the
pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific
definiteness as to how petitioner’s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be
violated. He did not include any allegation as to what recourses he availed of to
obtain the alleged documents from respondents. Neither did petitioner allege what
specific documents he prays for and from whom or [sic] from what particular office
of the government he prays to obtain them. The petition prays "to order respondents
to produce any documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on
the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports."
xxxx
Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC and Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his
entitlement to the privilege of the writs applied for, the exigency thereof was
negated by his own admission that nothing happened between him and Joel after
July 21, 2007. The filing of the petition appears to have been precipitated by his fear
that something might happen to him, not because of any apparent violation or
visible threat to violate his right to life, liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact,
unable to establish likewise who among the respondents committed specific acts
defined under the rules on both writs to constitute violation or threat to violate
petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to privacy thereof.
xxxx
x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:
"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. x x x."
xxxx
IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.8
On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision
with the following issues submitted for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION AND DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING FROM
THE PETITIONER IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE LATTER’S
EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PETITIONER THE
FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE LIST, THREATS AND
VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY WERE ACTUALLY
COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.9
Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010
On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10 denying the petition for
review for the following reasons, viz:
A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the
petition was bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of
respondents violated or threatened petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His
claim that he was incommunicado lacks credibility as he was given a cellular phone
and allowed to go back to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that
petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that his right to life, liberty and
security were violated, or how his right to privacy was threatened by respondents.
He did not specify the particular documents to be secured, their location or what
particular government office had custody thereof, and who has possession or control
of the same. He merely prayed that the respondents be ordered "to produce any
documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of
FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports."
Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet,
he had specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in
the Order of Battle and promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate
and become a military asset. However, despite questions propounded by the CA
Associate Justices during the hearing, he still failed to enlighten the appellate court
as to what actually transpired to enable said court to determine whether his right to
life, liberty or security had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out
the unsubstantiated claims of petitioner which justified the appellate court’s
dismissal of the petition.
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 9
As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-
respondent, we find the same also to be without merit. The Court has already made
it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that the President, during his or her tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the
President be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
the President to fully attend to the performance of official duties and functions.11
(Citation omitted)
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12
Petitioner’s Arguments
Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by
the respondents’ own admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were
threatened. Military personnel, whom the petitioner had named and described,
knew where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a military
asset, but under duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to
the CPP and including him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that the
foregoing circumstances were not denied by the respondents.
The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered
incommunicado as he was even provided with a cellular phone. The petitioner
argues that the phone was only given to him for the purpose of communicating with
the respondents matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal
organizations.
The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13 which pronounced
that "in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is
actually the ‘freedom from threat’".14 According to the petitioner, his freedom from
fear was undoubtedly violated, hence, to him pertains a cause of action. Anent the
quantum of proof required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere
substantial evidence is sufficient. The petition "is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings".15
Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of
proof than what the rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the
respondents’ evidence.
The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief
Justice Reynato Puno who expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by
any citizen against any governmental agency or register to find out what information
is held about his or her person." The person can likewise "request the rectification or
even the destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her." In the
petitioner’s case, he specifically sought the production of the order of battle, which
allegedly included his name, and other records which supposedly contain erroneous
data relative to his involvement with the CPP.
OSG’s Comment
In the respondents’ comment16 filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the
petitioner advances no cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s
Resolution dated August 31, 2010.
The Court’s Disquisition
While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court
nevertheless finds ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.
The petition conforms to the
requirements of the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
Section 517 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 618 of
A.M. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the said
petitions should contain.
In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege
of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner
made specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and those of the
respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are allegedly
violative of his rights and the participation of some of the respondents in their
commission. As to the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to
the filing of the petition, it was explained that the petitioner expected no relief from
the military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for assistance
from a human rights organization, then a direct resort to the court. Anent the
documents sought to be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court
finds the requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The documents subject of
the petition include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the CPP and
those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making references to
him. Although the exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not
identified, this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises only when
the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was
not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights.19 Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules
on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their
absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition
should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.
From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules. However,
they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept "hook, line and sinker", so
to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the
petition is a different matter altogether.
No substantial evidence exists to
prove the petitioner’s claims
The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the evidentiary difficulties
attendant to the filing of a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data, not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence, indicia, and
presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with
the admissible evidence adduced.20
With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did not commit a
reversible error in declaring that no substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of
the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence
on record and finds no reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs
prayed for.
In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the
petitioner if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim
cannot establish with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored. The
encounter happened once and the petitioner, in his pleadings, nowhere stated that
subsequent to the time he was asked about his involvement with ANAKPAWIS, he
still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance operations on him. He alleged that he was
brought to the camp of the 204th Infantry Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but
was sent home at 5:00 p.m. The petitioner and the respondents have conflicting
claims about what transpired thereafter. The petitioner insisted that he was brought
against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under the latter’s
control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who
voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former
still doubted his motives and affiliations.
Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual
findings made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition for
the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant
case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden
of proof imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be
overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations against a
person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate
the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless
constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from
threat".21
It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the
surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly
anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his
inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities
made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military
asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the
writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats
allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent
and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to a petition for the
issuance of the writs. Unlike, however, the unique nature of cases involving enforced
disappearances or extra-judicial killings that calls for flexibility in considering the
gamut of evidence presented by the parties, this case sets a different scenario and a
significant portion of the petitioner’s testimony could have been easily corroborated.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay22 dated March 5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet dated
December 9, 200723 executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s
Rights-Southern Tagalog (KARAPATAN-ST), the petitioner stated that when he was
invited and interrogated at the military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, he
brought with him his uncle Norberto Roxas, Barangay Captain Mario Ilagan and two
of his bodyguards, and Edwardo Estabillo – five witnesses who can attest and easily
corroborate his statement – but curiously, the petitioner did not present any piece of
evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, to buttress such claim nor did he
give any reason for their non-presentation.This could have made a difference in light
of the denials made by the respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.
The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is
another allegation by the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence
adduced. The Court notes that such allegation was categorically denied by
respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008,
stated that he "does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the CPP."24
This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the petitioner identified as the one who told
him that he was included in the order of battle.25 The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter)
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 10
Division of the Philippine Army also conducted an investigation pursuant to the
directive of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Esperon,26 and it was shown that the persons
identified by the petitioners who allegedly committed the acts complained of were
not connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.27
Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed.
From the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time
he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST, there was no restraint upon the
petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances. And
while he may have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence at the pier, there was no claim
by the petitioner that he was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding
any vehicle that may transport him back home. The petitioner also admitted that he
had a mobile phone; hence, he had unhampered access to communication and can
readily seek assistance from non-governmental organizations and even government
agencies.
The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a
military informant and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to
be one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay28 executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio
admitted that he actually knew the petitioner way back in 1998 when they were still
students. He also stated that when he saw the petitioner again in 2007, the latter
manifested his intention to become a military informant in exchange for financial
and other forms of assistance.
The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a
certain "Joel", e.g., the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle
pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances. Such allegation by the
petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere impression that the
petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The
petitioner even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a
conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether
he was still connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything"
and no other incident occurred between them since then.29 There is clearly nothing
on record which shows that "Joel" committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead
to the conclusion arrived at by the petitioner, especially since the alleged acts
committed by "Joel" are susceptible of different interpretations.
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support
his claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality
accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is
dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of
substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence."30
The President cannot be
automatically dropped as a
respondent pursuant to the doctrine
of command responsibility
In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,31 the Court stated:
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as
commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to
be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily
possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international
tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may
nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a
more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226,
otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command
Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in
the
Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under
E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall
be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by
others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take
preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is
presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of
jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his
area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are
involved.
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that
as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to
effectively command, control and discipline the military. (Citations omitted)
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s
rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that
he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the
violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in
conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules.1âwphi1
The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only
in concurrence with the president’s incumbency.32
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-
sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.33 Courts look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34
The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial
evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts
or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case,
the petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party respondent without
any attempt at all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the
alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or
demand for any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus,
while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish
accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of
command responsibility.
Compliance with technical rules of
procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy
Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the
writs of amparo and habeas data was the defective verification which was attached
to the petition. In Tagitis,35 supporting affidavits required under Section 5(c) of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition and it was
ruled that the defect was fully cured when the petitioner and the witness personally
testified to prove the truth of their allegations in the hearings held before the CA. In
the instant case, the defective verification was not the sole reason for the CA’s denial
of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Nonetheless,
it must be stressed that although rules of procedure play an important rule in
effectively administering justice, primacy should not be accorded to them especially
in the instant case where there was at least substantial compliance with the
requirements and where petitioner himself testified in the hearings to attest to the
veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.
To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified
to prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the
defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification
attached to the petition was deemed cured.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is
DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 11
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is
an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which
dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were,
during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for
a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3
profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at
STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC
posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the
photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada
(Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include:
(a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and
(b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students
claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified
students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s
Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the
identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity;
contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body
exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr.
Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that
during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials
present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap),
Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the
following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M.
Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City
against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded
Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia,
joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-
38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in
issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students
from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following
considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were
taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the
occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at
"Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought
to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily,
respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy
has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders.
Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and
were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their
rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to
the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the
interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s
privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b)
respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored,
reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation
of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order
dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein
respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together with the
supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz:
(a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are
engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas
data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas
data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been
uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their
privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through
legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s
policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 12
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas
datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy,
however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s
right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact,
defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment
of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the
case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social
network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among
millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created
by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible
trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is
there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely
for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the
petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely:
the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default
of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule
preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining
that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy.
The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not
being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while
valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the
idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or
storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his
or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or
storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
"engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial
and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach
of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is
data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the
writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of
rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right
which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to
Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks
and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow
of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a
reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding
privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN
users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as
wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same
vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26
promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account
the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose
credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond
appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent
with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of
the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an
expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging
in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the
same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to
stay connected to other members of the same or different social media platform
through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the
services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of
personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 13
each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––
from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on
whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts.
Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of
various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to
stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and
to share and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another
user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their
accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the
other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships
with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook
was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a
user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy
settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it
makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the
user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact
with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well
as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as
the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that
user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is
not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users
are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to
their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the
intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize
in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational
privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a
photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy
level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it,
said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to
limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only
strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very
intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or
her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other
words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were
kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the
issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were
uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized
access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts,
downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this
was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39
Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their
profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who
are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing
said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it
was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of
them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me
some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that
these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x
x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook
accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their
Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They
even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not
confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key
reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves
their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five
of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were
able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that
her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s
students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in
reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent
any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the
right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is
most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas
here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that
would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital
images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of
privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are
total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50
others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being
visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can
share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook
friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not
Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at
"Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 14
B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively
expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity
towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it
encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs
have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization
of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at
"Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private,"
contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the
perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed
the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They
did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to
have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons
if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to
use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes
in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because
Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy
rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the
court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents SO ORDERED.

reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to
respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the
trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount
to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise,
the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible
only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs
subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot
now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs
in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the
particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This
means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers
ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55
It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social
networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been
the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go
too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct
themselves sensibly in a public forum.57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may
be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations
have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber
citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the
children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58
Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as
well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in
view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents
in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to
limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students
to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs,
whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta
showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever
they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious
enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how
much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers
ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information
online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online,
the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and
more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them
can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed
access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity

Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 15

 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP
No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of
respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested
for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that
his digital camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the
latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from
the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video
and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. 5 During the confrontation,
Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked
away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty,
security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a
writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data10
dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce
Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video
and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days
from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the
memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred
that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against
Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003
and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only
happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her
condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of
Ilagan.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to
turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further
reproducing the same.14
The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that
her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the
NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to
suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use
of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not
enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is
only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before
other tribunals.15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals,17 which
is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination
of data about oneself.”18
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for
the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that
the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy
is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that
there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the
petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 20
In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While
Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the
records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving
testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed
by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee
actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order
to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the
only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the
same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring
absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED
Spec Pro | Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data | Full text | 16