EN BANC

June 30, 1987

G.R. No. L-53373

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of
the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo
in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment
the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the
information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor,
Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of
the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment
was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court. 3

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the
Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment
that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be
given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court
of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case
until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review. 7

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig,

Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April
10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private
prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24,
1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting

fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the
Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for
dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued
for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer
can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the

innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the
Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as
without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for

December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.

SO ORDERED. 11

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of
the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October
25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of
said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February
19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused
whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside,
respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to
proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case,
declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect,
ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the
obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without
giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to
the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice.
In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the
petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent
through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to
the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of
February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this
case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the
Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by

complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason
for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting
officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority
but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed
within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not
to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the
evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima faciecase. 22

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal

determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even
permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding
originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any
power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain
period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and
control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal
of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts
that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case
and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show
either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established
beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a
writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the
Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation
or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal
or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.

The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority
to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial
court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or
was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused. 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of

determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution
of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it
proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court
for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The
only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due
process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to
a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice
whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that
the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to
dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will
there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the
case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be
expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior
order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all

know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court
to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused
should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under
such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the
case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to
continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information

is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the

Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee C.J., took no part.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127058. August 31, 2000]

CRISTINA C. QUINSAY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon.

ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN, CESAR M. QUINSAY, respondents.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on December 18,

1968. They have eight (8) children. During their cohabitation, the spouses
accumulated conjugal assets worth millions of pesos.Way back in 1994,
after the parties had separated in fact, private respondent filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. At the pre-trial, the court granted the spouses a 6-month cooling
off period and within thirty (30) days to arrive at an agreement for the
dissolution of their conjugal regime. Pursuant to the trial courts order, the
parties entered into an "Agreement for the Dissolution of the Conjugal
Partnership and Separation of Property," which, after hearing, was
approved by the trial court on September 30, 1994. However, on January
31, 1995, petitioner filed an omnibus motion including a motion to amend
the said agreement for the inclusion of other conjugal properties, which
were allegedly concealed fraudulently by private respondent.
On May 31, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for annulment of the trial court's order approving their agreement
on the same ground of alleged fraudulent concealment by private
respondent and his misrepresentation of the value of the conjugal
assets. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of forum-
shopping. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA several motions including
Motion to Admit Amended Petition, Motion for Reconsideration,
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Petition which were all denied by the appellate court. In
denying these motions the CA said that it failed to see any extrinsic fraud
that private respondent allegedly concealed the true worth of the family
business (Success Unlimited Enterprise). Hence, this petition to determine
whether the assailed CA decision is in accordance, with law and the
evidence on record.
The petition bears no merit.
With petitioner's "Motion to Amend Agreement dated July 27, 1994 by
Inclusion of Other Conjugal Properties" dated 31 January 1995 filed before
the trial court, and her petition before the CA for "annulment of the Order
and prohibition against the order of the trial court" which approved the
same agreement, it is clear that there is forum-shopping. The petition filed
before the CA was not an appeal from the order of the trial court approving
the agreement, nor a special civil action assailing the same trial court's
order. On the contrary, the CA case was filed during the pendency of her
motion before the trial court. It should be noted that the latter motion and
the petition before the CA pertains to the same subject - amendment of the
compromise agreement to include what are alleged to be fraudulently
concealed properties, and for declaration of the correct valuations of the
said properties. It appears that the said motion has not yet been resolved
by the trial court when the CA petition was filed.
Forum-shopping concurs not only when a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis
pendentia are present.[1] The filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment amounts to forum-
shopping.[2] Only when the successive filing of suits as part of an appeal, or
a special civil action, will there be no forum-shopping[3] because the party
no longer availed of different fora but, rather, sought a review of a lower
tribunal's decision or order. The termination of the case before a lower
court and its elevation for review to a higher court does not constitute
forum-shopping for the latter is a recognized remedy under our procedural
rules.
In filing two separate suits, petitioner sought to obtain the same relief in
two "friendly" courts, with the end in view of resolving the same
issue.[4] Though the case at bar may not be considered under the kind of
forum-shopping that will amount to res judicata, the same nonetheless falls
under lids pendentia. For litis pendentia to be a ground for dismissal of an
action, three elements must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity, with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other. All the three requisites are present herein. The
parties are the same; the relief sought in the motion before the trial court
and in the petition in the Court of Appeals are the same, that is, inclusion of
alleged fraudulently concealed properties; and, both are premised on the
same facts which seek an alteration of the terms of the compromise
agreement. The judgment of either court will constitute a bar to the other. It
has been held that where a litigant sues the same party against whom the
same action, or actions, for the alleged violation of the same right, and the
enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense
of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other; and a final judgment in
one would constitute res judicata and thus, would cause the dismissal of
the rest.[5]
With respect to the extrinsic fraud which allegedly concurred when
private respondent duped petitioner into signing the compromise
agreement, the same involves factual matters and should be properly
ascertained in a proceeding for determination of facts. It has been
consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. [6] No
definitive finding can be made on such matters there being no sufficient
evidence on record before the courts to rule on the matter. In order to
support the finding of fraud which is a factual issue, it is necessary that the
same be supported by evidence properly admitted in accordance with the
rules and determined in the first level of judicial proceedings. Besides, if
this Court would resolve what petitioner would put as an issue on
concealed properties, it would be pre-judging the motion pending before
the trial court and render the latter proceeding moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016

GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
October 10, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated January 30, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968, which affirmed the denial of
petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).

The Facts

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City
(OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya4 or Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal6 or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013
charging petitioner of such crime.

On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information
against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the
same before the RTC. In support of her motion, petitioner pointed out that
the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant City
Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while
the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval
from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De
La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in
filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in
the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz
and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As
such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured.7

In its Comment and Opposition,8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review
prosecutor, SACP Hirang, was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant
to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.9 Further, it maintained that the Pabatid
Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in
the Certification in the Information itself.10
The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to

quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification attached to the Pabatid
Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among
others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.12

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied in an

Order14 dated July 10, 2013. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to
the CA via a petition for certiorari.15

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It
held that pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071,17 otherwise known as the
"Prosecution Service Act of 2010," as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No.
32, the City Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang to approve the
issuance of, inter alia,resolutions finding probable cause and the filing of
Informations before the courts. As such, SACP Hirang may, on behalf of
the City Prosecutor, approve the Pasiya which found probable cause to
indict petitioner of violation of Section 10 of RA 7610.18

Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the

Pabatid Sakdal clearly indicated that the same was filed after the requisite
preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority or approval of
the City Prosecutor. In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification
enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's
performance of official functions, in the absence of convincing evidence to
the contrary.19

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but was denied in a

Resolution21 dated January 30, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
petitioner's motion to quash.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written
authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts, viz.:
SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in
the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act
on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating

prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of
the provincial or city prosecutoror chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts

without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized
officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal
pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an

Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same
constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.23
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to
quash on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate
its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section
9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b)
the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the
RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor.

The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA

10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to "[investigate
and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused,"24 he may
indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary
in the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed
that it is under the auspice of this provision that the City Prosecutor of
Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs
or review prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order,
issuance, other action, and any information recommended by any
prosecutor for approval,"25 without necessarily diminishing the City
Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases.26 By virtue of the
foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang,
Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for the OCP-
Makati.27

In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict

petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of
one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang,
as evidenced by his signature therein.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or

Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was
approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-
Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a
Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others,
that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na angpaghahain ng sakdal
na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng
Panlunsod na Taga-Usig"28 - which translates to "and that the filing of the
Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor."

In the cases of People v. Garfin,29Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v.

Paqueo31 the Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications,
uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations were
defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either
lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior
written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof
that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing
that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so
by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief
or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would
indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the approval of either the City
Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order
No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how
ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya approved by designated
review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid
Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the
OCP-Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according

the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La
Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing
that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or
(b) did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before
filing the Information before the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's

motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an
incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had
no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the
orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be
followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the
Government."32

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10,

2014 and the Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay
is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez,

JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153176. March 29, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA
B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of
the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J:
For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - -
whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor should be dismissed after the accused has entered his plea
under the information.
Petitioner comes before us with a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeking to declare as null and void the Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February 26, 2002[1] and April 3,
2002[2] which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs.
Serafin Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of
Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No.
8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act, in an information which
reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as proprietor
of Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St.,
Peafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to
Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga,
Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse
and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the
amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS
(P6,533.00), Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums for
the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty
per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed
as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the
above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS
and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO
State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases
in Region V[3]
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo
SJ. Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been
conducted by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law
and under oath as officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the offense has been committed, that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior authority
and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor.[4]
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City
presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September
24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and
the case was set for pre-trial.[5] Three days thereafter, the accused filed a
motion to dismiss[6] on the ground that the information was filed without the
prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.[7]
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an
opposition,[8] against which the accused filed a rejoinder.[9] The People filed
a reply to the rejoinder[10] on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the
reply[11] was filed by the accused on January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court
believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in
accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it
has not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver
to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions
of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
(People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of
authority of the officer who filed the information and on jurisdiction at the
same time, pertinent portions run as follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to
quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the
information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the
pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line
of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Now, the objection to the respondents actuations
goes to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed
by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction
on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in
the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to
assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS
cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of
Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given to other than the City
Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be devoid of merit. The
Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter ego of the Secretary of Justice
but a mere subordinate official and if ever the former files cases, it is by
virtue of a delegated authority by the Secretary of Justice. Potestas
delegada non potesta delegare (sic) what has been delegated cannot be
redelegated.
In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated
June 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan
addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V
directing them to inhibit and to append the following NOTATION after the
certification in the Information for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this
case and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region V is
authorized to dispose of the case without my approval in view of the
request for inhibition of the SSS Regional Manager as granted by the
Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in
the Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City appended the above-
quoted notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is
only for the conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of
cases after they are filed. The Court, however, believes that the filing of this
Information must be in conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 4 of Rule 112.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court
hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[12]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a
special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle
SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file
the information involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior
approval from the city prosecutor. [13] Letters of commendation from Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo[14] and Secretary Hernando Perez[15] were
offered as proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentinos authority to file
the information was recognized. In response, the defense pointed out in its
opposition that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing,
hence it is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper. [16]
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order
which reads:
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V, and
it appearing that the same has failed to comply with the requirement of
notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the
same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor
Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner
attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge, viz:[18]
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT
THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE
PROSECUTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE WORD MAY IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE
RULES OF COURT IS NOT MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN INHIBITION OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON
THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN
INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING
AN INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING
OFFICER TO FILE THE INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment[19] in
compliance with this Courts Resolution dated September 23, 2002.[20] It
opines that the dismissal of the information is mandated under Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Private respondent contends that:[21] 1) the instant petition was filed out of
time; 2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the
information; and 3) the City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit himself
from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the
motion for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it was filed
eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the
first questioned order. Respondent has overlooked that the 15th day after
March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioners last day to file the motion for
reconsideration was on the next working day after Good Friday, April 1.[22]
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of
paper, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll the
running of the reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously
assumes that the present case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. As
stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that (a) pro forma
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary
period of appeal. (emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no
application in the case at bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not
the receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En
Banc Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60)- day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order
dated February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002.[23] A motion for
reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 2002[24] which was dismissed for
lack of notice of hearing in an Order dated April 3, 2002.[25] This second
questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11, 2002.[26] A motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari was filed on
April 18, 2002.[27] A motion for leave to file and admit the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May 29, 2002.[28] Having been
filed within the reglementary period, petitioners motion for leave to file the
instant petition was granted in this Courts Resolution dated July 15,
2002.[29]
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and
approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is
necessary in filing the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or
provincial prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended that the
Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial
prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases.[30] Petitioner cites the letter
of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional
Director in Naga City dated June 6, 1997[31]and copies of Regional Orders
No. 97-024-A[32] and 2001-033[33] dated July 14, 1997 and September 28,
2001, respectively, showing the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino
as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner relies
on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[34] and Sanchez v.
Demetriou, et al.[35] to prop up its contention that given the designation of
State Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the
filing and prosecution of the information in the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a
Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State
Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control of
the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and
rules and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and
city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised
within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and
city fiscals within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be
necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate personnel within the
jurisdiction of the regional office.
2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other
prosecuting officers within his region and submit his recommendation
thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit
the appropriate recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided,
that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing of
charges, he may render a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of
the region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary of
Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases
supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such
agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; or require
the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with
policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as
may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including
rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and
to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not
increase or add to them.[36] This is distinguished from the power of
supervision and control which includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.[37]
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of
administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power
to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain
cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive
of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is
questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those
cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the
Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law.
Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor granted the
power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an
information without the prior written authority or approval of the city or
provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275 provides the
manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service
require the creation of positions of additional counsel to assist
provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of
Special Counsels may be created by any province or city, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable
against provincial or city funds. The Secretary of Justice shall appoint
said Special Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city
fiscal and regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent
or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be
allowed not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the lowest
rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned.
(emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,[38] Defining the authority, duties and
responsibilities of regional state prosecutors, then Acting Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state
prosecutors (which included Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for
Region V) to, among others, (i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, specific criminal cases filed within
the region. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the
Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate
and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare
reading of the alleged letter of commendation by then Secretary Hernando
Perez would show that it does not amount to a directive or even a
recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez
commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan in
successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his authority to
prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State Prosecutors
attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all
important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel.[39] Thus, Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of
the law.
Petitioner argues that the word may is permissive. Hence, there are cases
when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance.
This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word may is mandatory
or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that
the use of the permissive word may should be read together with the other
provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately
preceding the quoted provision shows that the word may is mandatory. It
states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating
prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days
from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such
action. (emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or
chief state prosecutor should have been obtained, we shall now resolve the
more important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city,
provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect
in the information that is waived if not raised as an objection before
arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that
demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to
paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior
authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that
may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the
respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based on this
ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v. Ibaez, et al.[40] where we
held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to
quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the
informations. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the
pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of
Rule 117), and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Now, the
objection to the respondents actuations goes to the very foundation
of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the
information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.[41] (emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the
part of the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while
jurisdiction over the case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches
upon the filing of the complaint or information.[42] Hence, while a court may
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it
does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is
invoked with the filing of the information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional
requirement upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been ruled
that in the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the
criminal offense.[43] In our jurisdiction, we have similarly held that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two
or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of
procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment
such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such
choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is
filed with the court having jurisdiction over the crime, and said court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, from which
time the right and power of the court to try the accused
attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to exercise that
choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or subscribe
to the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of
the Rules of Court. [44] (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that
case, Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation in the
Office of the Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as
special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases involving city
government officials or employees. Pursuant to his appointment, Atty.
Subido filed an information against Pedro Villa for falsification of a payroll.
Atty. Subidos authority to file the information was challenged on the ground
that he was disqualified for appointment under Section 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice
may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same
authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor
General.[45]
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld
in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al.,
vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in those cases, the
appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or
offices under the Department of Justice, and were rightly considered
subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of
section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions.
Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the Department of
Interior, more particularly in the City Mayors office. For this reason, he
belongs to the class of persons disqualified for appointment to the post of
special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be
either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so manifest
from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as
to preclude construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the
appointment or designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the
Secretary of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power of
supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside the
Department of Justice would owe obedience to, and be subject to orders
by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests.
Referring particularly to the case at hand for illustration, Attorney Subido
could be recalled or his time and attention be required elsewhere by the
Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor while he was discharging his duties
as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop
such recall or interference. An eventuality or state of affairs so undesirable,
not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the administration
of justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where
the person who filed the information is disqualified from being a special
prosecutor under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, but has been extended to various cases where the information
was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,[46]the Court held that it is a fundamental principle
that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to
file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by amendment. In that
case, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
conducted an investigation and filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft
and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash the information on the
ground that the crime charged did not constitute a Marcos crony related
crime over which the PCGG had authority to investigate and file an
information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was
not among those which PCGG was authorized to investigate under
Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then President Corazon Aquino and ruled
that the information was null and void. Of similar import is Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.[47] where we ruled that the information having been
filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally
flawed. We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form,
but a defect that could not be cured.
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[48] we also reiterated the Villa
ruling. The accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles
City where the headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City. We invalidated the information filed by the City Prosecutor
because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the offense was committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction was only in Angeles
City. We held that an information, when required by law to be filed by a
public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[49] Otherwise, the
court does not acquire jurisdiction.[50] It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The
accuseds plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to
the said information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions
relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding.
An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing
it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.[51]
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information
contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under which Villa was
decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on
the matter.[52]
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the
defendant fails to move to quash the complaint or information before he
pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are
grounds for a motion to quash except (1) when the complaint or
information does not charge an offense or (2) the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. (emphasis ours) Among the enumerated grounds
for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the same Rule was (t)hat the fiscal
has no authority to file the information. With only the above two exceptions
provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made the Villa
ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information,
jurisdiction is not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured
by silence or waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes
introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on unauthorized
filing of information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules.[53]
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the
officer who filed the information was also a ground for a motion to quash
under these rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds
for a motion to quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but enumerated the
following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged or the person of the accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; and (d) the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers to
jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case as
in Villa where the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of
authority of the officer who filed the information. Still, despite the
enumeration, the Court continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the
afore-cited Cruz and Cudia cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the filing officer as
among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds.
Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions
from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under the regime of the
2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above-
cited Romualdez case. With the enumeration of the four exceptions, which
was almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules
did not intend to abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the
enumerated exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so
under the enumerated exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the
Rationale of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes
of the Meeting of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court
evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of
Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for
SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or
city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was
filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the
information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the
respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
respondent courts orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 3, 2002 are
AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized officer.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez. Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.