A.C. No.

439 April 12, 1961 sympathize with him, to dispute now the sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a
matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a closed chapter insofar as this
LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner, proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we are concerned is that he was
vs. found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As
QUINCIANO VAILOCES, respondent. this Court well said:

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar.
It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary public, Vailoces,
on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be
the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her
surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently the probate court, finding that the will
was a forgery, rendered decision denying probate to the will. This decision e final. On
the basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of public document was filed
against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental where after trial, they were found guilty and convicted On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to Vailocess but
modified it with record to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document defined
and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and as sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate Penalty ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayoras maximum, with the
accessories of the law, finest and costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces
began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party
instituted the present disbarment proceedings.
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered
against him in the criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient
and inconclusive evidence, the charge being merely motivated by sheer
vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein complainant, and that to give
course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy. He
pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only
has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold
the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
protect the administration of justice. (In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against
Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957).
The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime which
resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of
Bais, Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is
untenable, for such defense can only be availed of when he is placed in the
predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein, within
the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The disbarment of an
attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne
and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its purpose is "to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence" (In repose confidence"(In reMcDougall, 3 Phil. 77).
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to this
effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys

Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section,
includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. 1 Among the
examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime
of seduction and the crime of concubinage.2 The crime of which respondent was
convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act
is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime involves
moral turpitude. Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and
swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes
of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S.,
1206).

It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under
Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on his part, much as we
[CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSENDO MENESES
III, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was initiated
by a complaint-affidavit[1] filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
the Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. Herein
complainant charges respondent Meneses with the following offenses, viz.: (1)
malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) dereliction of
duty, by violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his clients
interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his
continued failure to account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid
to a certain complainant for the amicable settlement of a pending case. [2]
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a
group of companies which includes Pan Asia International Commodities, Inc., through
its Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of
respondent Atty. Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled
various cases and was properly compensated by his client in accordance with their
retainer agreement.[3] One of the litigations handled by him was the case of People
vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa, pending before Branch 134,
Regional Trial Court of Makati. On December 24. 1993, respondent received the sum
of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said case, to be given to therein
offended party, a certain Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement and
with the understanding that a motion to dismiss the case would be filed by respondent
Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client the
receipt acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A verification made with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or any pleading
in connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable settlement was
not finalized and concluded. Despite repeated demands in writing or by telephone for
an explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents pertaining to the
aforementioned case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of herein
complainant.
The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for
investigation. Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit his answer to the
complaint pursuant to Section 5, rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[4] Two
successive ex parte motions for extension of time to file an answer were filed by
respondent and granted by the Commission.[5] On November 14, 1994, respondent
filed a motion to dismiss,[6] instead of an answer.
In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality to sue
him for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. because his legal
services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.; that Navarro
had not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case nor had
been authorized by its board of directors to file this disbarment case against
respondent; that the retainer agreement between him and Frankwell Management
and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of December 31, 1993 according to the
verbal advice of its Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the case of Arthur
Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement, and Bretaa was not an employee of
Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him as its legal counsel;
and that the settlement of said case cannot be concluded because the same was
archived and accused Bretaa is presently out of the country.
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, [7] stresses that
respondent Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to
account for the amount of P 50,000.00 entrusted to him; that the respondents
arguments in his motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission; and
that he was fully aware of the interrelationship of the two corporations and always
coordinated his legal work with Estrellita Valdez.
On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez resolved to
deny said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to file his
answer.[8] On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he was adopting
the allegations in his motion to dismiss his answer.[9] When the case was set for
hearing on February 9, 1995, respondent failed to attend despite due notice. He
thereafter moved to postpone and reset the hearing of the case several times
allegedly due to problems with his health.
On the scheduled hearing on June 15, 1995, respondent again failed to attend. The
commissioner accordingly received an ex parte the testimony of complainants sole
witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary evidence. [10] Thereafter,
complainant rested its case. Respondent filed a so-called Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Recall Complainants Witness for Cross-
Examination[11] which was granted by the Commission.[12] Estrellita Valdez was
directed by the Commission to appear on the scheduled hearing for cross-
examination.
Several postponement and resetting of hearings were later requested and granted by
the Commission. When the case was set for hearing for the last time on May 31,
1996, respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated
warnings. Consequently, the Commission considered him to have waived his right to
present evidence in his defense and declared the case submitted for resolution. [13]
On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, submitted its Report and Recommendation [14] to
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Commission
ruled that the refusal and/or failure of respondent to account for the sum
of P50,000.00 he received from complainant for the settlement of the aforestated
case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur Bretaa proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that
he misappropriated the same, hence he deserved to be penalized.
The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from the
practice of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to return
the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with such
requirement would result in his disbarment.[15] The Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in its
Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated July 26, 1997.[16]
On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this case
through the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12 (b) of
Rule 139-B.[17] It appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of said
resolution, with the investigating commissioners report and recommendation annexed
thereto.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that respondent Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him
and which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated
demands therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness for
the confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing such lack of personal honesty or
of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment.[18]
Respondent Meneses misconduct constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer
which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice.He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely holding in trust the
money he received from his client to used as consideration for amicable settlement of
a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did no materialize, he was
necessarily under obligation to immediate return the money, as there is no showing
that he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity
and good faith on his part is exacted.[19]
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is
unavailing. Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for
the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified
complainant of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from
the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and
the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence
submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain
its resolution and recommended sanctions.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may
wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment[20] subject however,
to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [21] Once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. [22] Respondent
Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case
and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients request for
information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client by deliberately
disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its
right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case.
On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the letter of
Atty. Augusto G. Navarro, dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that although a
copy of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally delivered to
respondents address and received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he had failed to
restitute the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant within the 15-day period provided
therein. Neither has he filed with this Court any pleading or written indication of his
having returned said amount to complainant. In line with the resolution in this case,
his disbarment is consequently warranted and exigent.
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive
portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he
received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n his DISBARMENT.[23]
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or
disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to
complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended,
subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal
cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in
the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, [24] not can such
penalty be subject to a condition.[25] There is no reason why such legal principles in
penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case,
also involve punitive sanctions.
Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only possible
and equivalent rule is in malversation cases holding that the restitution of the
peculated funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was immediately and
voluntarily made before the case was instituted.[26] The evidently is not the situation
here. Also the implementation of the penalty provided in the resolution will involve a
cumbersome process since, in order to arrive at the final action to be taken by this
Court, it will have to wait for a verified report on whether or not respondent complied
with the condition subsequent.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to respondents personal records in this Court and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with all courts in the county.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]
IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A.
RAYOS, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene
Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in
Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness
set up for members of the bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was
then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for
safekeeping.Respondent told her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they
will be excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be
precluded from inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits
with the Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where
he was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the
other heirs of her husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent
deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in
trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit
was May 22, 1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return
the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit
for another month and promised to return the whole amount including interest on
June 25, 1985. Respondent, however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only
return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's
proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of
agreement stating:
"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to
(respondent) the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P588,000.00) which sum of money was withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine
National Bank on said date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of
(complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby
agree on the following terms for the purpose of disposing of the above sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum
of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated
check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid
postdated checks fall due, the same should be backed up with sufficient funds on a
best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges
the same as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the former when able or
at his option.(Complainant) however assures (respondent) that she will not institute
any collection suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit the same by
way of testamentary succession to her heirs, neither are (respondent's) heirs liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their
previous cordial filial relationship."[2]
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to
complainant the following checks:
1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored
due to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check
because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only guaranteed
that the checks shall be "backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This
prompted the other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the
brewing dispute between the two. They begged respondent to pay his obligation to
complainant. Heeding their plea, respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with
two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and another for P35,200.00. Complainant was
able to encash the first check but not the second because it was dishonored by the
drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No. 487975 and UCPB Check No.
487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent
and a corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable
settlement. To pay his debt, respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars
and cash amounting to P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she
needed cash to provide for her daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against
complainant. It appears that respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of
land owned by complainant that she had promised to sell them the land and that she
had authorized him to negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance
payment for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then prepared a special power
of attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the land and asked complainant to sign
it. Complainant, however, refused to sign because she did not intend to make
respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent for
estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her
promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of
Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special
Proceedings No. 5544 for the settlement of the estate of complainant's husband,
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. [4] Respondent filed
the pleading although he was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code" for allegedly making untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent
on two grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud complainant,
and (2) that respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited four causes of action: (1) assisting
client to commit tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of
the law; and (4) subornation of perjury.[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on
June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also recommended
the dismissal of the complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-
96-22 stating:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above
entitled case, hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation therein to be supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint against
Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]
On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to
Administrative Case No. 2884.[9] The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied
the motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension
for Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the
complaint for disbarment.[11]
We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:
"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause."
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as
an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her
money, and later refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked
deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to
compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed,
respondent's deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal
profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing
in the profession.[12]
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended
by the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent's
privilege to practice law not only for two years, but for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. [13] This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is
not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[14] Hence, if the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case, it has
been sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision

be attached to respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the
IBP and all our courts.

SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
Complainant,
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a
crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default,
and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the
basis of the Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBDdirected him to file
his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the
latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his
disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home
after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along
Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that
the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at
[the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his
door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who
looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by
now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow
when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time,
got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and
turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his
revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver
was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on
the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he
was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by
the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the
accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by
Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant
in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and
brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery
on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he
had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr.
Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18,
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on
several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the]
court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime,
but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on
the following facts:
1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter,
driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went
back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that
he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a
lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to
be no longer possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent
has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated
homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his
crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for
homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that
case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of
the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The
Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer
made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the
Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of
aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating
and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the
victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to
the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately
swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had
stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay
the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were
not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances
clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when
the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under
the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the
skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position
to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the
unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the
handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he
betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never
to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual,
more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not
the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy
of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts.
We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic
sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years [21] since he was
ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains
adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and
intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has
taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still,
Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully
restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. [22] Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally
unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from
that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser
character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that
of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. [24] every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous
behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.[25] But when this effort
failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainants family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other
persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but
also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has
fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to
remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness,
treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined
[Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the
complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained
were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people
who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the
contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the incident particularly when
he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x. [28]
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is

more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Hence, lawyers must not
mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a
noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law
and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal
a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice

by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable
and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile
confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish
the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that
munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his
[A.C. No. 2597. March 12, 1998]
GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S.
GONZALES, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NROMERO, J.:
A complaint for disbarment was filed with this Court on October 25, 1983, by Glorito
V. Maturan against his counsel, Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales, charging him with
immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts. The respondent filed his comment thereto
on February 6, 1984. On November 11, 1997, or after thirteen (13) years, the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines submitted their report and
recommendation on the instant case.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan
(herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases
against squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City,
as well as criminal cases against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again in
connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales, prepared and
notarized said Special Power of Attorney.
Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several
squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot was registered in the
name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for
reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2067.
As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil
Case No. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On
February 18, 1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through
respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983.
In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise
agreement, which was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983.
On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending,
and without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of
Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, an action to annul the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The action was predicated on the lack of authority
on the part of petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such
authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case No. 2067. On August 24, 1983,
respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., also filed Special Civil Case No.
161 for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction, with damages, against
petitioner.
Aggrieved by respondents acceptance of professional employment from their
adversary in Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that privileged matters relating to the
land in question had been transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case 1783-
11, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for immoral,
unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.
Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having committed any
malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client.
Respondent declared that he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a
writ of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between
himself and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos
was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client relationship between them.
Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for
him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his childrens sustenance.
The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his report
dated August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests
and recommended that he be suspended for three (3) years. The Board of Governors
of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating
commissioner but recommended that the suspension be reduced from three (3) years
to one (1) year.
This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as
counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a
lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for
a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.[1] That the
representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the
part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all
the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of
the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred
and guarded with care.No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the
clients secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[2]
This Court finds respondents actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provide in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon,
a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
Moreover, respondents justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the
fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is
not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a
case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be
permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.
As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three years to
one year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases decided by the
Supreme Court, the penalty of two or three years suspension has been imposed
where respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De
Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr.,[3]the respondent, who appeared for complainant in a case
for revival of judgment, even though he had been the counsel of the adverse party in
the case sought to be revived, was suspended for a period of two years. In Bautista
vs. Barrios,[4] a suspension of two years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who
had drafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but who appeared for the other party
therein, when the same was sought to be enforced by petitioner. In PNB vs.
Cedo,[5] the Court even suspended the respondent therein for three years, but only
because respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also deliberately
intended to attract clients with interests adverse to his former employer. Finally,
in Natan vs. Capule,[6] respondent was suspended for two years after he accepted
professional employment in the very case in which his former client was the adverse
party.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend
respondent for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 6160 March 30, 2006
NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre
with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting
interests.
Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping
for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and
jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of
Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that
he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that
unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder
victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against
them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial
confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being
charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being
detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in
drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of
kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents
about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his
constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.
Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial
confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was
convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in
executing the extrajudicial confession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.2 On August 16, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the
period of suspension to two years.
In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to
prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent
admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was
able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two
accused, he was also representing the interest of the victim’s family. This was
declared by the victim’s daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of
the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of
Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers. She even
admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and
Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services
to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the two
accused’s victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent purposely offered to
help the accused in order to further his other clients’ interest. The respondent failed to
deny these facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the
ample opportunity given him.
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from
representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing
precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the written consent of
both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent
should be sanctioned.
We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.3
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.4
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.5
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services
to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in
executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to
act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being
convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their confession.
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the
accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the
family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the
murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of
their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal
offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the
victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have
exercised his better judgment before conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did
not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even
assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.
Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, disbarment as sought by the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that
a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is
SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4943. January 26, 2001]
DIANA D. DE GUZMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOURDES I. DE
DIOS, respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a complaint[1] for disbarment against Atty. Lourdes
I. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the code of
Professional Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests, and of Article 1491
Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation.
In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in order to
form a corporation, which would engage in hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo
City.
On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. De Dios, complainant
registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.[2] Complainant paid on respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00.
On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant to pay her unpaid
subscribed shares of stock amounting to two million two hundred and thirty five
thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or before December 30, 1997.
On January 29, 1998,[3] complainant received notice of the public auction sale of
her delinquent shares and a copy of a board resolution dated January 6, 1998
authorizing such sale.[4] Complainant soon learned that her shares had been acquired
by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted
complainant from the corporation completely. While respondent rose to be president
of the corporation, complainant lost all her lifes savings invested therein.
Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. De Dios and believed
that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with the management of
the corporation.
Complainant pointed out that respondent appeared as her counsel and signed
pleadings in a case where complainant was one of the parties.[5] Respondent,
however, explained that she only appeared because the property involved belonged
to SBHI. Respondent alleged that complainant misunderstood the role of respondent
as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. Respondent manifested that her
appearance as counsel for complainant Diana de Guzman was to protect the rights
and interest of SBHI since the latter was real owner of the land in controversy.
Respondent further said that the land on which the resort was established
belonged to the Japanese incorporators, not to complainant. The relationship of the
complainant and the Japanese investors turned sour because complainant
misappropriated the funds and property of the corporation. To save the corporation
from bankruptcy, respondent advised all concerned stockholders that it was proper to
call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the delinquent
shares. These lead to the auction of the unpaid shares of complainant and hence, the
ouster of complainant from the corporation.
Meantime, Mr. Del Rosario transferred one hundred (100) shares to respondent
in payment of legal services as evidenced by a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of
corporate Shares of Stock.
On October 22, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
resolution[6] finding that the acts of respondent were not motivated by ill will as she
acts in the best interest of her client, SBHI.The IBP found that complainant failed to
present convincing proof of her attorney-client relationship with respondent other than
the pleadings respondent filed in the trial court where complainant was one of the
parties.
We disagree.
We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts presented before us that
created doubt on the propriety of the declaration of delinquent shares and subsequent
sale of complainants entire subscription. Complainant subscribed to 29,800 shares
equivalent to two million nine hundred and eighty thousand pesos
(P2,980,000.00). She was the majority stockholder. Out of the subscribed shares, she
paid up seven hundred forty-five thousand pesos (P745,000.00) during the stage of
incorporation.
How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount she
had invested in it is beyond us. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was
valid, what happened to her original shares? This, at least, should have been
explained.
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her
and complainant. The claim has no merit. It was complainant who retained
respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.
There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and
respondent. Indeed, the board of directors nowe included respondent as the
president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes
Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director.[7] The present situation shows
a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent.
Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[8]
We said:
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the
obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all
classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and
engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession. [9]
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [10]
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to
its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her
knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation
thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, [11] or other disciplinary action.[12] The
acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a
lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios remiss in
her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from
the practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will
be dealth with more severely.
Let a copy ofthis decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as
an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 1526. January 31, 2005
NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S.
HERNANDEZ, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint[1] for disbarment against Atty.
Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both
parties are from Zamboanga City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano
S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded
payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her
properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against
her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear,
embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles
covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to
enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in
his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on
condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in
Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell
due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale
involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner
of all the lots belonging to complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her
lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her
land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions.
In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his
comment on the complaint.
Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending before the then Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 [2] for recovery of ownership
and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him involving
the subject lots.
On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondents motion
and requiring him to submit his answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in
the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to
various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions,
he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his
family. His children used to call her Lola due to her frequent visits to his residence. He
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the
OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the
testimonies of complainants witnesses and the submission of its report and
recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A.
Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as
follows:
A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties
showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the
respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of
the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas
Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5,
1974.
It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the
documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the
complainant from her creditors which ended up in respondents name like in the deed
of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots
1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on
September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by
Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the
cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the
Tomas Claudio properties.
The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his
having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and
liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay
complainants accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation
aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client
relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.
It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the
complainant on how he paid complainants creditors without selling her properties.
Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then
later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainants properties in
utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent
concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties.
As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty
as complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants
properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered
member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the
approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors.
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-
39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in
the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was
increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, we have to
modify its recommended penalty.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of
ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides:
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainants
lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a
grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies
a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. [3] Such conduct on the part of
respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal
profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[4]
Canon 17 of the same Code states:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and
confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted
to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds
thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust
and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent
his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP
Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to
the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her
creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have
earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent.
Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainants
counsel.Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal
profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand
for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at
all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[5] and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.[6] Membership in
the legal profession is a privilege.[7] And whenever it is made to appear that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its
officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.[8] Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member
of the Bar, but also the legal profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability
to protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence
and candor not only protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice and
does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the legal profession.[9]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may
be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.[10]
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[11] we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he
deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused
to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III,[12] we disbarred a
member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he received
from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson,[13] we expelled from the
brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through
deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort,[14] an attorney was stripped of
his license to practice law for misappropriating his clients money.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes
advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own
benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and
consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve
the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and
is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7418 October 9, 2007
ANDREA BALCE CELAJE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO C. SORIANO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Santiago C. Soriano
(respondent) for gross misconduct.
In the Complaint dated June 1, 2005 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Andrea Balce Celaje (complainant) alleged that respondent asked for money to
be put up as an injunction bond, which complainant found out later, however, to be
unnecessary as the application for the writ was denied by the trial court. Respondent
also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to spend for or to be given to
the judge handling their case, Judge Milagros Quijano, of the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga City, Branch 36. When complainant approached Judge Quijano and asked
whether what respondent was saying was true, Judge Quijano outrightly denied the
allegations and advised her to file an administrative case against respondent. 1
In his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that the same
were merely concocted by complainant to destroy his character. He also contended
that it was complainant who boasted that she is a professional fixer in administrative
agencies as well as in the judiciary; and that complainant promised to pay him large
amounts of attorney's fees which complainant however did not keep. 2
Both parties appeared in the Mandatory Conference and Hearing on January 18,
2006. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. 3
In the Report and Recommendation dated January 24, 2006, IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa found respondent guilty of Gross
Misconduct in his relations with his client and recommended that respondent be
suspended for three years from the practice of law.4
In the Report, Commissioner Funa found that:
During the hearing conducted, Complainant alleged that she has remitted to
Respondent, on various dates, amounts of money totaling to more or
less P270,000.00.
According to Complainant the amounts given in several instances were all
undocumented and not acknowledged in writing.
However, for the alleged amount of P14,000.00 intended for an injunction
bond, some documents in writing were made.
xxxx
While the amounts remitted by Complainant to Respondent were never
acknowledged in writing and were not documented, due credence must be
given to Complainant's allegations especially over the amount of P14,800.00
intended for the injunction. Indeed, there is no ill-motive at all on the part
of Complainant to fabricate charges against Respondent. Unfortunately,
none of the P270,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent was ever
documented and therefore accuracy of the amounts could not be established
and substantiated.
What has been documented only pertains to the unpaid P5,800.00 intended
for the injunction bond. However, it has been established that indeed an
accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been remitted by Respondent to
Valentina Ramos and only the unpaid P5,800.00 remains unaccounted
for by the Respondent.
During the hearing conducted, Complainant reiterated her accusations
against the Respondent and expressed that she has been aggrieved and
misled by Respondent. According to Complainant, this was made possible
because she was not aware of or knowledgeable on legal matters and
practices. Respondent has only offered denials to the charges. However,
the circumstances gives credibility to herein Complainant in the absence of
any evil motive on her part.
Accordingly, Respondent is clearly guilty of misappropriating his client's
funds in the amount of P5,800.00. While other amounts may have been
misappropriated, Complainant alleges P270,000.00, the exactness of the
amounts could not be established.
Respondent is also guilty of deceiving his client and abusing his client's
confidence in requesting for several amounts of money on the pretense
that he had to spend for and pay the trial judge.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the unaccounted
for amount of Five Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P5,800.00) to
Complainant, submitting a Compliance Report thereon.5
On September 8, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and Approve, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A-; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
 misappropriating his client's funds, Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise
Ordered to immediately deliver that unaccounted amount of P5,800.00 to
complainant.6
The IBP transmitted the Notice of Resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors
as well as the records of the case, pursuant to Rule 139-B.7 Then in compliance with
the Court's Resolution dated February 20, 2007, the IBP through Director for
Discipline Rogelio Vinluan informed the Court that per records of the IBP, no Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by either party.
The Court agrees with the IBP Resolution.
In Small v. Banares18 the respondent was suspended for two years for violating
Canon 16 of the CPR, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount
of P80,000.00 was given him by his client, and for failing to return the said amount
upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case, the
Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension
to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is found GUILTY of violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from
notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16 thereof, Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his clients through Andrea Balce Celaje,
mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that within 30 days from notice, the amount of P5,800.00. Respondent is directed to
may come into his possession. He shall account for all money or property collected or submit to the Court proof of payment within fifteen days from payment of the full
received from his client8 and shall deliver the funds and property of his client when amount.
due or upon demand.9
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of
As found by Commissioner Funa, it was established that respondent could not the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
account for P5,800.00 which was part of the sum given by complainant to him for the guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's record in this Court.
purpose of filing an injunctive bond. Respondent admitted having received from
complainant P17,800.00 on April 19, 2002 for the preliminary injunction 10 and SO ORDERED
admitted to having a balance of P9,000.00 in his promissory note to the Manila
Insurance Co., Inc. dated April 23, 2002, which was reduced to P5,800.00 by reason
of an additional payment of P4,000.00,11 leaving an amount of P5,800.00
unaccounted for. The affidavit of the insurance agent, Valentina Ramos, dated
December 8, 2005 also states that even up to said date, respondent had not yet paid
the balance of P5,800.00.12

Respondent's failure to return the money to complainant upon demand gave rise to
the presumption that he misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.13 It is a gross violation of general
morality and of professional ethics and impairs public confidence in the legal
profession which deserves punishment.14

As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing
that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.15

The Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar who are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession. Indeed, membership in the legal profession is a privilege. 16 The
attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature. As such, it requires utmost
good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer. 17
REYNARIA BARCENAS,Complainant, A.C. No. 8159
(formerly CBD 05-14
Promulgated:
April 23, 2010
- versus -
ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case
No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio
(San Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter
was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his
deceased father as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria,
Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment
receipt[2] dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would
deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same. [3]
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in
cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas
pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the
amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty.
Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte
na? Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money
in court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs.
In his letters dated August 18, 2004[4] and August 25, 2004,[5] Atty. Atty.
Alvero admitted the receipt of the P300,000.00 and promised to return the
money. The pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as follows:
Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang
perang tinanggap ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at pilit kong
kinukuha kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa akin
na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng gayong
halaga. Pero tiniyak sa akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay
ibibigay sa akin.
Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng
karagdagang halaga upang maisauli ko ang
buong P300,000.00. Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang
nagbigay sa akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng kaunting
panahon upang malikom ko ang pera na ipinagkatiwala mo sa
akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x x[6]
Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang
aking ipinagbibili ng Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili
gusto lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa Cavinti. Kung ok na
sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran.
Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at
isang P258,000.00 na utang ng taga-Liliw ay darating sa akin
ngayong umaga bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng
pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo ngayong
hapon.
xxxx
Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati
anak ko ay tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting
panahon pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang
problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka na.[7]
However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands,
Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be
disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession.
On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer
to the complaint.[8]
In compliance, in his Answer[9] dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that
he did not know Barcenas prior to the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know
that San Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know
Barcenas only when the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 from the amount
entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio who entrusted to respondent. At that time, Atty.
Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it might
jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he
received an amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, though he claimed that said
money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance action.[10]
Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him
and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He
further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in
fact, manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client
relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant
complaint be dismissed.
On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory
conference.[11]
Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit[12] dated September 19, 2005, San
Antonio narrated that he indeed sought Atty. Alveros professional services concerning
an agricultural land dispute. He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him believe that he
needed to provide an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the
same would be deposited in court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: Hindi
pwedeng hindi kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung
sakaling ipatubos ay nasa korte na ang pera. Believing that it was the truth, San
Antonio was forced to borrow money from Barcenas in the amount of P300,000.00.
Subsequently, San Antoniogave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition to the
professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment receipt. [13]
San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas allegation that they tried to
borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found
out that the latter lost a big amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty.
Alvero declined and stated, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte
na. Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty. Alvero lied to them since the money was
never deposited in court but was instead used for his personal needs. For several
times, Atty. Alvero promised to return the money to them, but consistently failed to do
so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alveros letters dated August 18, 2004 [14] and
August 25, 2004[15]showing the latters promises to return the amount of P300,000.00.
During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus,
he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the mandatory conference.
In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended
that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for
gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account for and
return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The
pertinent portion thereof reads:
The record does not show and no evidence was
presented by respondent to prove that the amount of P300,000
which was entrusted to him was already returned to
complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by way of justifying his
non-return of the money, respondent claims in his Answer that
the P300,000 was the source of the principal cause of action of the
petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case
No. R-0403-0011-04 as shown by a copy of the Amended Petition,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 1 and made an integral
part hereof.
A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated
October 31, 2004 and filed on November 3, 2004, will show that the
Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that he be allowed to
cultivate the land after the P300,000 is consigned by Petitioner to
the Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of
the instant complaint, no such deposit or consignment took
place and no evidence was presented that respondent
deposited the amount in court.
The fact is respondent promised to return the amount
(Annex B and C of the Complaint), but he failed to do so. The
failure therefore of respondent to account for and return the
amount of P300,000 entrusted or given to him by his client
constitute gross misconduct and would subject him to
disciplinary action under the Code.[16]
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification as to penalty the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to
account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.
The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular
administrative complaint against Atty. Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that
this Court issue an extended resolution for the final disposition of the case.
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02
and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16.
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property
of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a
lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to
the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount
of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court.
However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no evidence that he had
indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any
evidence that he had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio.

From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client
relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was
spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. [17] These, Atty.
Alvero failed to do.
Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds
and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver
the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant
case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite
complainants repeated demands.[18]
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-
client relationship between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-
client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be
removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him.[19]
possess good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the
responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege
to practice law.[23]
WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008
of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which found respondent Atty. Anorlito
A.Alvero GUILTY of gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for
a period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when
due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of
integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It
gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this
act constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.[20] They constitute gross misconduct and gross
unethical behavior for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without
authority to do so.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Small v. Banares,[21] the respondent was suspended for two years for violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a
case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for failing
to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are
attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on
respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.
As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is
granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard
of honesty and fair dealing.[22] For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO A.
CARDEO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AZCUNA, J.:
For resolution is an administrative case against Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo for
malpractice and neglect of duty, stemming from his alleged neglect or deliberate
mishandling of a case involving herein petitioner, resulting to the latters prejudice.
After receipt of the complaint and the corresponding comment thereto, this Court, on
October 17, 1990, referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 6, 1998, this Court received a Manifestation from the IBP Investigating
Commissioner Victoria Gonzales de los Reyes stating that when the case was
referred to the IBP, the same was initially handled by Commissioner George Briones.
In view of the fact that the case had only been recently re-assigned to her, she
needed time within which to investigate as well as prepare the required report and
recommendation.
Thereafter, on March 13, 2001, Commissioner de los Reyes submitted her Report
and Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. In turn, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XIV-2001-187, dated April 29, 2001, remanding the
Report and Recommendation to the Investigating Commissioner, requiring the latter
to make the recommendation clearer and review the report.
Upon review of the records, the Investigating Commissioner affirmed her findings and
maintained her recommendation. In turn, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
said report, with a modification of the recommended penalty of three months
suspension, to a penalty of six months suspension, from the practice of law.
The records show the following antecedent facts:
Complainant Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., an American citizen from Kodiak, Alaska,
USA, filed an action before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), to recover
title and possession of a parcel of land against the spouses Juanito Maybituin and
Rosario Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos. The case was dismissed by the trial court,
which declared the defendants the true and lawful owners of their respective portions
of the land in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), 3rd Civil Cases Division, in AC-G.R. CV No.
68459, modified[1] the decision of the trial court, stating:
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby modified by ruling that the respective Torrens
Titles in the names of the defendants spouses Maybituin and Fernando Ramos are
maintained at this stage but without prejudice on the part of the plaintiff to institute an
action for reconveyance thereof after determining his rightful share from the estate of
his late father.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The CA judgment was not appealed and, thereafter, it was duly entered.
On February 16, 1985, Anderson, Jr., through his counsel Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman,
filed an Amended Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan,
Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Civil Case No. 0110-B, entitled Rasmus Anderson, Jr.,
Plaintiff v. Spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, et al., Defendants. [3]
It was at this stage of the proceedings when Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman died.
Anderson, Jr. was now without a counsel to represent him. Upon referral by a friend,
Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of herein respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo.
On July 19, 1990, Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., filed an administrative complaint[4] before
this Court wherein he alleged that respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo caused the
loss or the adverse ruling against him in the aforementioned case before the RTC,
Civil Case No. 0110-B. Specifically, complainant alleged the following:
1.) That when the respondents in the civil case filed a Demurrer to Evidence, Atty.
Cardeo did not file an opposition thereto and did not appear at the formal hearing set
for the purpose of considering the merits of the demurrer. Thus, in addition to finding
merit in the demurrer, the trial court, noting the non-appearance of Atty. Cardeo,
assumed that even he, the plaintiffs counsel, appeared convinced that there was
merit, validity and reasonableness in the demurrer filed;
2.) That after the trial court issued an Order finding the respondents demurrer to
evidence meritorious, Atty. Cardeo did not even file a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof, which in turn caused the same order to become final and executory;
3.) That even prior to the above events and in view of what the complainant perceived
to be respondent lawyers loss of interest in the case, complainant verbally told Atty.
Cardeo to withdraw as his counsel. However, Atty. Cardeo allegedly insisted on
continuing to represent the complainant as the case was already in its closing stage.
Complainant concludes that Atty. Cardeo abused his clients trust and confidence and
violated his oath as a lawyer in failing to defend his clients cause to the very end.
Complainant prays that Atty. Cardeo be disbarred.
When asked to comment, Atty. Cardeo replied:
1.) That complainant was being ungrateful to him. In the first place, he was only
asked by a good friend of the complainant Anderson, Jr., to step into the shoes of the
latters deceased counsel. He accommodated the request and took the case, even
without personally meeting the complainant, as the latter was residing in the United
States;
2.) That as a client, complainant Anderson, Jr., did not give him full cooperation.
Although voluminous records were turned over to him, they were in disarray. Atty.
Cardeo alleges that when he began representing the complainant in court, he had to
proceed and appear with only half the information[] and background[] of the case, and
not knowing the person he was representing. He allegedly did his best to familiarize
himself with the case, although there were several questions left unanswered by the
complainants good friend;
3.) That their first meeting happened at the time he was about to present their last
witness. At that time, Anderson, Jr.s deposition had already been taken by his former
counsel, now deceased. Atty. Cardeo then asked Anderson, Jr., about the regularity
of the taking of said deposition, and the latter assured him that his former counsel had
exhaustively examined him and that said deposition had been regularly taken;
4.) That the same was the first and only occasion when he personally met
complainant. At no time during said meeting did complainant ask him to withdraw
from the case;
5.) That from the records he had on hand, and based on the reputation of
complainants deceased counsel, Atty. Cardeo saw no need to present complainant
again to testify in court. This was also in view of the fact that complainant was then in
a hurry to leave the country, and also because of complainants assurances that the
deposition previously made would suffice;
6.) That it was a big surprise for him later to discover that the taking of the deposition
was irregular as it was done without the presence of counsels and parties, and
without the proper notices. This led the other party to file a demurrer to evidence;
7.) That the biggest blow and surprise to him was when he was approached by good
friends of the complainant and these friends told him that they have good access and
have made arrangements with the Presiding Judge. He was asked by these friends to
prepare the motion for reconsideration, which he obligingly did and thereafter he gave
said motion to these friends, for them to file. However, these friends did not furnish or
return a copy of said motion for his files and reference;
8.) That true to his oath as a lawyer, Atty. Cardeo considers the representations of the
complainants good friends to be in bad taste; that he could not join complainants
good friends in their plans to corrupt the judge; that he considers this course of action
of these friends of the complainant to imply that he is no longer needed as a lawyer
and that they have made their own ways;
9.) That because of these actions of the friends of the complainant which respondent
considers contrary to his duty as an officer of the court, and also against the respect
due to the courts, respondent asked to be relieved of his duties as counsel but said
request was refused.
Thus, respondent Atty. Cardeo concluded that complainant cannot accuse him of
deliberately causing their defeat in the case when he, Atty. Cardeo, did his best with
such little information, support and cooperation given by the complainant and the
latters friends. It was in fact complainant and his friends who chose to take another
path to deal with the case. Complainant, he claims, erroneously thinks that a lawyer
must do everything, even crooked or illegal acts, in order to win a case. Atty. Cardeo
then asserted that he has to uphold his oath as a lawyer and so he refused when
complainants friends proposed to employ acts to corrupt the judge or proceed with
the case in dubious ways.
In the aforesaid Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Victoria G. de los
Reyes, it was found:
After having considered the position taken by each party in the instant case, this
Commission has arrived at a conclusion that there is apparent lack of interest on the
part of the Complainant to further pursue his case. The complainant could have
appeared personally and present his evidence or could have his deposition taken to
support the allegations contained in his complaint. What he did was just to send a
representative by the name of Bienvenido Maregmen. Clearly, this is not sufficient to
show the needed enthusiasm and interest to support his accusations against the
respondent.
We sustain the respondent in his position that he should be given the opportunity to
confront the complainant and cross-examine him. Here, the complainant failed to
appear despite the several settings of hearings in this case. Based on this alone, this
Commission could have recommended the dismissal of the instant complaint for
failure of the complainant to substantiate his charges against the respondent.
However, the respondent has indubitably failed to perform an obligation which he
owed to his client, the herein complainant. The respondent himself categorically
stated in his Comment filed with the Honorable Supreme Court on October 2, 1990
that he prepared a Motion for Reconsideration in the case entitled Rasmus Anderson
v. Juanito Maybituin, et al., Civil Case No. 0110-B, then pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Branch 67-Binangonan. But that certain good friends of the
complainant made representations to him that they already made arrangements with
the presiding judge who they claimed had already been bought. Respondent allowed
these persons to take over in the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and did not
even bother to check with the Court if the same has been filed or not.
Clearly, the respondent was guilty of neglect of duty and this is a violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Ethics, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence; particularly, Rule 18.03 thereof which states
that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. He likewise breached his duty to the
Honorable Supreme Court to report corrupt judges for appropriate disciplinary action
with the aim of improving the quality of justice and in helping restore the peoples faith
in our judicial system.[5]
As aforestated, the IBP Board of Governors thereafter issued Resolution XVI-2004-68
dated February 27, 2004, which x x x ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner x x x, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, with modification, and considering respondents violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility x x x recommended that Atty.
Reynaldo Cardeo be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that
he be warned that a graver penalty would be imposed should he commit the same
offense in future.
This Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of
Governors.
It is undisputed that Atty. Cardeo was engaged by the complainant as counsel. By
accepting the case, respondent should have known the attendant responsibilities that
came with the lawyer-client relationship.
These imperatives were pointedly explained in Parias v. Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto:[6]
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client.
When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he
possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The
lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the
case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in
the pursuit or defense of the case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees
to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in
this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as
much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients' interests will suffer. It is
not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter. He
must also give adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling
his cases. A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the
licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage [his] cases.
The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family.[7]
Thus, respondents defenses that the complainant was uncooperative as a client, that
the voluminous records turned over to him were in disarray, and that the complainant
did not disclose to him certain particulars of the case, are all unavailing.
First, it was incumbent upon Atty. Cardeo to insist on his clients participation in the
proceedings in the case. While the complainant shares the responsibility for the lack
of communication between lawyer and client, Atty. Cardeo should not have depended
entirely on the information his client gave or the time his client wished to give them.
As a lawyer representing the cause of his client, he should have taken more control
over the handling of the case. Knowing that his client was based in the United States
should, with more reason, have moved him to secure all the legal means available to
him either to continue representing his client effectively or to make the necessary
manifestation in court, with the clients conformity, that he was withdrawing as counsel
of record. That his client did not agree to terminate his services is a mere allegation
that has not been substantiated.
Thus, in view of the fact that he remained counsel of record for the complainant, it
was highly irregular for him to entrust the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to
other people who did not lawfully appear interested in the subject litigation.
In the same case of Paguinto, citing Gamalinda v. Alcantara,[8] this Court stated:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He shall serve his client with competence and diligence,
and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him
to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to
present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. An
attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until
his effective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter
of the litigation. During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and
such ordinary care as his client's interests may require. [9]
The Court therein declared that a lawyers failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the
Code. It added that the said rule is clear in its mandate that a lawyer should not
undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to render, nor should a lawyer handle
any legal matter without adequate preparation. A lawyer has the duty to prepare for
trial with diligence and deliberate speed and he should not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, for his negligence shall render him liable. [10]
From the records it is evident that Atty. Cardeo has fallen short of the professional
standards this Court has set for members of the Bar. A lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects
him to disciplinary action. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the
Bar always to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. [11]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo is hereby found guilty of
violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his lawyer's oath.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice
and is WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent as a member of
the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in
the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of
the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be
an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a
fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the
other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August
2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. [3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest
of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
policy and public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one
(1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. [7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which
was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No.
157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest
whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10]Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the
other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is
a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and
law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [13] The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. [14] The duty to public service and to
the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He
himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he
pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months
later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue
of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a
self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, [19] he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it
would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. [20] Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields
of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data,
are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. [21]Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or
standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is
found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4914. March 3, 2004]
SPOUSES JENELINE DONATO and MARIO DONATO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR., respondent.
DECISION
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Jeneline and Mario Donato
against Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.
The complaint alleges that on July 22, 1994, complainant spouses and respondent
Atty. Asuncion, Sr. executed a Contract to Sell wherein the latter conveyed to the
former his parcel of land with an area of 10,776 square meters (or 1.0776 hectare)
situated at San Miguel, Pangasinan covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-12256. The
parties agreed that the purchase price is in the amount of P187,500.00 payable by
installments.
On December 20, 1994, after the complainants had paid the last installment, the
parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. This document was prepared by
respondent wherein he made it appear that the consideration is only P50,000.00 in
order to reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax.
More than two years later, or on January 10, 1997, the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, an action for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. U-
6293. Among the parcels of land being expropriated was the lot purchased by
complainants for which NAPOCOR was willing to pay P3,000,000.00.
Respondent then offered his legal services to complainants and demanded 12% of
whatever amount they will receive from NAPOCOR.
When respondent learned that complainants intended to hire the services of another
lawyer, he threatened them by filing with the RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan
Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument. In his complaint, he alleged that
the contract executed by the parties is not a deed of sale but an equitable mortgage
because the price of the lot (P50,000.00) stated in the contract is unusually
inadequate compared to NAPOCORs offer of P3,000,000.00.
The complaint further alleges that in filing Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of
instrument, respondent has dragged them to useless and expensive litigation. His act
is contrary to law and morality which warrants his disbarment.
In his comment on the instant administrative complaint, respondent claimed that
complainants violated the rule on forum shopping. According to him, the issue raised
in this administrative complaint and in complainants answer to his complaint in Civil
Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument is the same, i.e., the legality and
morality of the filing of this civil case.
In a Resolution dated February 7, 1998, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 3, 2003, Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala, IBP Hearing Commissioner, made the following findings:
After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence presented, we find
respondent to have committed gross misconduct. In the Civil Case No. U-6352 before
the RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta City, for Reformation of Instrument, respondent was
not telling the truth when he alleged under paragraph 6 That although the document
is captioned Deed of Absolute Sale, the true intention of the parties is not expressed
by reason of mistake on the part of the person who drafted the document, because
the instrument should be equitable mortgage x x x. Between the complainants and
the respondent, it is the latter who knows about the law, be it the difference between
a Deed of Absolute Sale and an Equitable Mortgage. And because he is the lawyer
and he has a law office together with his son, it is presumed that he was the one who
prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the consideration indicated was
only P50,000.00. We believed complainants that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
prepared by respondent to lessen the amount of capital gain tax. Respondent cannot
deny that he was the one who prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale as shown by his
letters to Myrna Tugawin (sister of Jeneline Donato) dated 31 August 1994, 1
September 1994 and 20 December 1994. After the lapse of several years,
respondent filed the complaint for Reformation of Instrument because he realized that
the price paid to him by complainants was unusually inadequate in view of the fact
that the same land was being purchased by NAPOCOR for P3,000,000.00.
The contention of respondent that this administrative complaint is a violation of the
rule on forum shopping is without merit. There is forum shopping when as a result of
an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another (First Phil International Bank vs. CA, 252 SCRA 259),
or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition
(Chemphil Export & Improt Corp. vs. CA, 251 SCRA 257).
and recommended that complainant be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) year.
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-345, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report of Commissioner Maala with the recommendation that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only six (6) months.
We sustain the finding of the Hearing Commissioner that respondent was not telling
the truth when he alleged in his complaint for reformation of instrument that the
intention of the parties is not expressed therein; that what they intended to execute
was a deed of equitable mortgage, not a deed of absolute sale; and that the mistake
was committed by the person who drafted the instrument.
We observe that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties
on December 14, 1994. However, respondent filed Civil Case No. U-6352 for
reformation of instrument only on April 23, 1997, or after two years, four months and
nine days. Why did it take him more than two years to realize that the previous
contract did not express the true intention of the parties?The reason for this delay can
be gleaned from the allegations in his complaint in Civil Case No. U-6352 for
reformation of instrument. He alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale should have
been an equitable mortgage since the consideration stated therein is
only P50,000.00, while the NAPOCOR has agreed to purchase the lot
for P3,000,000.00. It is thus clear that it was only when he knew that the value of the
lot suddenly increased by leaps and bounds that he thought of filing the complaint for
reformation of instrument.
At this point, it bears stressing that respondent does not dispute complainants
contention that they paid him P187,500.00, not P50,000.00. As earlier mentioned,
complainants explained that the latter price was specified in the deed of absolute sale
in order to reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax.
We likewise sustain the finding of Commissioner Maala that the Deed of Absolute
Sale was prepared by respondent himself, as shown by his letters to Myrna Tugawin,
sister of complainant Jeneline Donato. In his letter dated August 31, 1994,
respondent informed Myrna that a Deed of Sale will be executed by us (referring to
him and the complainants). In his letter of September 1, 1994, respondent asked
Myrna to bring P50,000.00 on September 3, 1994 for the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale. And in his letter dated December 20, 1994, respondent requested
Myrna to bring complainants balance on December 22, 1994. If it were true that the
contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage, why did he prepare a different
one a Deed of Absolute Sale?
We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [1] Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
x x x.
In SPO2 Jose B. Yap vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,[2] we explained the concept
of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the
part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is
generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term,
however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
In committing such gross misconduct, respondent violated his solemn oath as a
lawyer imposing upon himself the following duties, thus:
I, ______________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.
By filing the unfounded complaint for reformation of instrument to obtain financial
gain, respondent did not only abuse and misuse the judicial processes, but likewise
harassed the complainants and forced them to litigate unnecessarily. Indeed, his act
was intended to advance his own interest at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, a manifestation of flaw in his character as a lawyer.
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.[3] We
have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members
of the Bar.[4] We expect them at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession[5] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.[6]
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is
an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege.[7] We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for gross
misconduct.
Incidentally, respondents defense of forum shopping is utterly bereft of merit. Suffice
it to state that complainants did not institute two actions grounded on the same cause
of action on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon
them.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR. is found GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as
a member of the Bar; and be furnished the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10207 July 21, 2015
RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361
ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO"
DECISION
This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Barrozo
(respondent) is taken up by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power to discipline
members of the bar under Section 11 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Factual Antecedent
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 222which were assigned to respondent as Assistant
Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to Valeriano, respondent
told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for ₱20,000.00.
hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the matter.
The Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), who, after being told of respondents’ demand, immediately
planned an entrapment operation. During the operation conducted of February 15,
2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents receiving the amount of
₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.
As a result, a case for direct bribery3 under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code was filed against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City. The case, however, was later on indorsed to the Sandiganbayan as respondent
was occupying a position with a salary grade 27 or higher.
After finding the existence of all the elements4 of the crime, the Sandiganbayan, in a
Decision5 dated March 17, 2011, found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
direct bribery and sentence him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional maximum, as minimum, to nine
(9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of ₱60,000.00. in addition, it imposed upon him the penalty of
special temporary disqualification.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 (MR) but was denied in a
Resolution7 dated September 28, 2011.
Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 8 before this Court but
was denied in a Resolution9dated December 14, 2011 on the ground that the Petition
failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in
its challenged issuances as to warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. Respondent thrice move for reconsideration. 10 the first two MRs
were denied,11 while the third one was ordered expunged from the records. 12
Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment13 was issued stating that the Court’s Resolution
of denial had already become final and executor on August 16, 2012.
In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter 14 dated in
August 14, 2013 from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating that its client in Hong Kong
received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for
long service payment from the employers of domestic helper Anita G. Calub who
passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said
person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it if
respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.
Prompted by Wat & Co.’s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) whether respondent is still connected thereat. 15 in reply, the DOJ informed
OBC that respondent had already resigned from his position effective May 3, 2005.16
On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed
convicted of direct bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to
rule on his disbarment.
In view of the foregoing and considering that respondent’s conviction is a ground for
disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
the Court through a Resolution17 dated December 11, 2013 required respondent to
comment on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
In his Comment18 respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can
engage in the practice of law despite his conviction. He then argued that he did not
engage in the practice of law as his act of signing the claim letter does not constitute
such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any monetary consideration, but
out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no payment
involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the
claimants. This therefore negates practice of the law on his part.
Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up
with its February 20, 2015 Report and Recommendation 19 recommending the
disbarment of respondent.
Our Ruling
The court adopts the OBC’s recommendation.
It must first be clarified that the issue in this case is not what respondent essentially
argued about in his Comment, i.e., whether his act of signing the claim letter
constitutes practice of law. As aptly stated by the OBC in its recommendation and
viewed from proper perspective the real issue here is whether respondent should be
suspended or disbarred by reason of his conviction of the crime of direct bribery.
Hence, the Court finds respondent’s comment to be totally without merit as he veered
away, whether wittingly or unwittingly, from the crux of the controversy in this case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. And with the finality of respondent’s conviction for direct bribery, the next
question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves
moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same
must have been "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [it must
involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."20
In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa,21 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same
question posed in this case, viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a will disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority [to do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Xxxx
[T]he crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,22 we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution
of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen
and society in general. Also the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office
and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary o the accepted rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. 23
Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a
ground for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney.
The Court is mindful that a lawyer’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
does not automatically call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment
since it may, in its discretion, choose to impose the less severe penalty of
suspension. As held, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.24 here, however, the circumstances surrounding the case constrain the
Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the OBC.
It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime respondent was an
assistant public Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of extorting
money from a party to a case handled by him does not only violate the requirement
that cases must be decided based on the merits of the parties respective evidence
but also lessens the people’s confidence in the rule of law. Indeed
Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.1âwphi1 Lawyers in
public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice, 25
Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as
a government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his
qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office as an attorney.
As a final note, it is well to state that:
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable
and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the public at large] may repose
confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs
that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid [the] profession of
odious members.26
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is herby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of the Decision be
attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE D.
CORDOVA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty.
Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a
verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and
submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of
her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality
and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in
default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her
evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25
January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and
second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant
failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission
that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989,
the Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before
it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to
file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission,
the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding
respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the
future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate
family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino
Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was
herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and
wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely
Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado
funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at
the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and
brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon
returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine,
that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their
conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita
Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him.
Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The
Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate
family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,
stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We
also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the
continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment.
" 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as
essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the
respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old
teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the
marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his
own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of

the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to
have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a
son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with
another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt
on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent
took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along
his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is
charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2 and
7.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
Complainant’s wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for
the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the
purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of
respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal
Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted
verbatim:
x xxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano,
Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs.
Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the
abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his family, and those
other families mentioned above are respective owners of the residential houses
adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-
Dulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its
adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly the
imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a
regular and with standard height building and not a high rise one but an inspection of
the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation already occupies
portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigned’s residential house in particular,
which readily poses danger to their residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and
for the protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately
requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your earliest opportune
time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is
the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4),
Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if
there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under
construction with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the
National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your compliance with the
provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-
compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code
by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided in
Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x xx x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)
By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit
because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondent’s
marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondent’s marriage with Carolina Agaton
being still subsisting.5
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit 6 he filed
against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3
(e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
and Section 4 (a) and (c)8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees).9
By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005, 10 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the
dismissal of the complaint in light of the following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the
application of his wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial
building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in
favor of Imelda’s relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other
reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing
the construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily
answered all the charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear,
convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension of
respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a
clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the
presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint
against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs.
Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x xx x.11 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,12 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review13 filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a
second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with
Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal
Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wife’s application for building permit, in
violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29, 200515 Joint Resolution of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainant’s complaint for
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent
portion of which joint resolution reads:
x xx A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein
respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an
opposition for the issuance of complainant’s building permit, but rather to redress a
wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the
construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after
conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code
for constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainant’s wife
Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther
[that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia
applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is
being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal
Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent
was engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being employed in
the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned
has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent
to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of herein
complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints against the
respondent.16(Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges
of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal
Officer to advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
As for respondent’s September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he
opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainant’s
wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the National Building Code,
on top of expressing his concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties,
health and safety" occasioned by the construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on
September 28, 2004,17 whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly
written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building
Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist
Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to
instate proper legal action against you."18
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005 19 from the Office of the Municipal
Engineer showed, complainant’s wife eventually withdrew the application as she had
not yet secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the
barangay where the building was to be constructed.
Respecting complainant’s charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private
practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position
coterminous to that of the appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent
proffered proof that his private practice is not prohibited. 20
It is, however, with respect to respondent’s admitted contracting of a second marriage
while his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County,
Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken
effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that
the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. 23 For while Article
256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application,
there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community."24 Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.25
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz, 26 this Court declared
that the therein respondent’s act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he was
suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances were
considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of
almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife,
whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child; imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
wife; diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the susceptible to committing mistakes.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. 27 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the
In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with
benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable more severely.
provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when
allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted, until his Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an
absentee even during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda
Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact elected him and served
as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free
legal aid cases.

Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the
time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his
residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may
not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage
while the first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.28

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides:

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in

continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect
on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he
came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does
not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."

Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:29

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries
with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is