PP vs ILIGAN -
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
PP vs MANANQUIL -
BATACLAN vs MEDINA
FACTS:
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by
Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus
was driving fast and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be
overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free
themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called
the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them.
The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that
gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which
engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also
found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was
their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was
caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he
was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such
negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the
would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to
respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area
which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting.
Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and
the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
People vs Acuram READ FULL
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS Y MATIC v. PEOPLE, GR No. 180219, 2011-11-23
Facts:
Jose Sevillo... testified that on July 5, 1995 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
he together with Eduardo... and Ernesto... were infront of his house... repairing
his tricycle when he noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed
by and stopped. The latter alighted at about three (3) meters away from him,
walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a... revolver, and poked the
same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto.
The appellant again fired his gun three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the
right portion of his back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground with his
face... down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back
(patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his
neighbors brought the victims to the hospital.
On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that
his enemy had been Eduardo, not victim Ernesto... that Eduardo... had hit him
with a monkey wrench, but he... had parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had
then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he had
notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus struggled with
Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit
Ernesto... during their struggling with each other; that the revolver had again
fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then seized the revolver and shot
Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people had
started swarming around.
On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness
Jose Sevilla, found Talampas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
Issues:
that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
accidental death.
Ruling:
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the
victim. Here... it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only against
Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target... of Talampas'
attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In
reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression
against Talampas.
Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as
a defense.
Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,[10]... the legal provision pertinent to
accident, contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the... act of doing
something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the
process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in
the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.[11]
Indeed, accident... is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and
although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds
of humanly foreseeable consequences.[12]
In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the... wrong done.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas' assault was Eduardo, not
Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of
Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas' felonious deadly
assault against Eduardo. Talampas' poor aim... amounted to aberratio ictus, or
mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal
responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa,
es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause... of the
evil caused).[13]
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[14]... criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16,
2007 finding VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide
Principles:
Talampas' poor aim... amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a
circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor
mitigated his criminal liability.
People vs Guillen
FACTS:
Julio Guillen y Corpus, brought two hand grenades to a populated meeting held
by theLiberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo. President Roxas gave a
speech of the advantages of the parity rights in the meeting. Upon the close of
the speech, defendant threw one of the said grenades toward the platform, but
the presence of mind of General Castaneda, who kicked the grenade and threw
his body over that of the President’s, saved the latter’s life. However, the
grenade still seriously injured SimeonVarela who died on the following day as
a result of mortal wounds caused by the grenade fragments, as well as Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carillo and Emilio Maglalang. Guillen testifying in his
own behalf said that although it was not his mainintention to kill those
surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to
attain his main purpose of killing the President. The defendant was charged by
the CFI (see decision below), to which the counsel of the defendant submitted
contentions of error, including: (1) in finding the appellant guilty of the murder
of Simeon Varela, (2) in finding the appellant guilty of the complex crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder (that of the said other victims and the
President).DECISION
–
COURT OF ORIGIN CFI rendered the defendant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder of Simeon Valera and multiple frustrated murders
of the said victims including thePresident.ISSUEW/N a mistake in the blow,
inflicted with malice, exempts one from criminal liabilityDECISION
–
APPELLATE COURTThe Court, writing
per curiam, AFFIRMED the decision of the CFI, stating that thefacts do not
support the contention of counsel that the appellant is guilty only of homicide
through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of
less physical injuries in regard to other said victims. In throwing said hand
grenade atthe President with the intention of killing him, the Court stated that
the appellant actedwith malice, and was therefore liable for all consequences
of his wrongful act, for in accordance with Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability
is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which hei ntended. The act cannot be classified as
criminal negligence because such requires that the injury incurred be
unintentional as the incident of an act performed without malice
(People v Sara, 55 Phil 939).
The Court finds that a deliberate intent to doan unlawful act is inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence.
A mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence
(People v Gona, 54 Phil 605).
People vs Brobst -
People vs Albuquerque ———
People vs Gona
FACTS: (Pantukan, Davao, 1928) During a family reunion of the Mansacas, a
quarrel took place between Dunca and the defendant Gona. Dunca and his son
eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one Award. Gona
also left to follow them, but in the darkness of the evening and in his intoxicated
condition, Gona mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal
wound with a bolo. Gona was charged for homicide before the CFI Davao.
However, his attorney argues that he had no intention to kill the deceased and
committed the crime by mistake, thus, he should have been found guilty of
homicide through negligence only and not of the graver crime of intentional
homicide.
ISSUE: WON the mistake of killing another person than the one intended
relieves Gona from the graver crime of intentional homicide.
HELD: No. In this case of United States vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), the court
said: Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan
instead of Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which inflicted
upon the latter, in no way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act.
That he made a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is proved
that he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal
responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in
killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating circumstances.
Guillermo Wacoy v. People READ FULL
United States v. Valdez READ FULL
PP VS PAGE
FACTS:
William Page and his friend since boyhood, Crisanto Camposano held up a
jeep. Page sat in front of the jeepney holding a balisong, while Camposano
seated himself at the back, with a revolving. Veronica Balacapo, one of the
passengers of the jeepney at the back, jumped out of the vehicle during the
course of the holdup. She was subsequently brought to a hospital by a good
samaritan but she was declared to be dead upon arrival. The trial court herein
convicted Camposano and Page of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Camposano died while he was being apprehended for a different crime. Page
insists that he cannot be made liable for Balacapo‟s death because he had
nothing to do with it. He reiterated that he was at the front of the jeepney while
Camposano was the one threatening Balacapo at the back of the jeepney.
ISSUE: WON Page is guilty of the crime herein of robbery with homicide acting
as a co-conspirator with Camposano.
RULING: Yes. William Page is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide
acting as a co-conspirator with Camposano. The Court held as a rule that “if a
man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger, which
causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself,
the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries
(People vs. Toling, L27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17,33)”. If the victim
herein jumped out of the jeepney, it must have been because she was in mortal
dread that Camposano would shoot her. Of course, it was Camposano who
directly brought about Balacapo‟s death. Whether Balacapo jumped from the
jeepney or whether Camposano kicked and pushed her and her sister out of
the jeepney, Camposano‟s culpability for that flagitious deed cannot be
disputed. However, there was not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to
commit robbery existed between Page and Camposano. Their behavior inside
the jeepney disclosed a synchronization of their actions, evincing a prior concert
and plan to commit robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons.
Page should answer for all the consequences of the conspiracy, including the
homicide which was intertwined with the robbery committed by his conspirator.
The homicide was committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.
Generally, when robbery with homicide has been proven, all those who had
taken part in the robbery are guilty of the special complex crime unless it
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. The same rule is
followed in Spanish jurisprudence. Of course, Page did not kill the victim. But
under the rules of conspiracy, he is deemed to be a co-principal in the robbery
with homicide.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
People v. Balmores -
Intod vs CA -
JACINTO vs PEOPLE
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega
Foam, a post dated checked worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases
from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was deposited to the
account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca,
another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of
Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check
deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to
tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the
dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against
the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven
(11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible
Crime.
RULING: YES. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft
only. ,
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be
an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent;
and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking
the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have
received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was
only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
Rivera vs People of the Philippines
FACTS:
As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused
Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for
support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of
words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his three-
year-old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together with his
brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael Rivera, emerged from their house and
ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And
as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the
parietal area. Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house only when the
policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital.
The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the
victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. The trial
court found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was
made by the accused, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder and imposed an
indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was intent to kill.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from
frustrated to attempted murder.
3) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly
applied.
4) Whether or not the correct penalty was imposed.
HELD:
1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim,
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. In the present case, Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with
fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though
the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death, intent to kill was presumed.
2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt
when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely
superficial and could not have produced his death, it does not negate criminal
liability of the accused for attempted murder. The intent to kill was already
presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact, victim could have
been killed had the police not promptly intervened.
3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which
gives no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present
case, the accused attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as
he was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent
peril to his life. He was overwhelmed with the assault of the accused and had
no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.
4) No. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
accused were guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced
by two degrees, in accordance to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
under Article 61 (2), in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty should be prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance
in the commission of the crime other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision
correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the accused were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum,
to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum.
US vs EDUAVE -
People vs Listerio
Facts: Culled from the eyewitness account of Marlon Araque, he discloses that
around 5:00 p.m. of August 14, 1991, he and his brother Jeonito were in Purok
4, Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money from a certain Tino. Having
failed to collect anything from Tino, they then turned back. On their way back
while they were passing Tramo near Tino’s place, a group composed of Agapito
Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and
Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead pipes and
bladed weapons. His brother, Jeonito, was stabbed from behind and sustained
three stab wounds causing him to fall down. Marlon was hit on the head with
lead pipes and momentarily lost consciousness. When he regained his sense,
he saw that his bro Jeonito was already dead. Their assailants then fled after
the incident. Marlon, who sustained injuries in the arm and back, was thereafter
brought to a hospital for treatment. Accused’s version: he was in the store of
Nimfa Agustin having a little fun with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao
drinking beer. At around 2:00 o’clock he went to his house and slept. He was
awaken by the two and told him there was a quarrel near the railroad track. He
was invited by the two policemen for questioning with his co-accused Samson
dela Torre, and was implicated in the sinumpaang salaysay of Marlon for the
death of Jeonito Araque and the frustrated murder of Marlon Araque. He
professed his innocence and insisted that Marlon’s testimony is insufficient to
convict him of the crimes charged. Trial Court rendered judgment only against stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost
accused Agapito Listerio because his co-accused Samson dela Torre escaped consciousness and fell, Marlon’s attackers apparently thought he was already
during the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and he was not tried in dead and fled.
absentia. Their other co-accuseds have remained at large. The trial court
convicted the accused for the crime of Murder and Attempted Homicide only on
the basis of Dr. Manimtim’s testimony that none of the wounds sustained by
Marlon Araque were fatal.

ISSUES: (1) WON the accused should be charged with Attempted Murder for
the reason that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon were fatal.

RULING: (1) The reasoning of the lower court is flawed because it is not the
gravity of the wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony is attempted
or frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in the commission of an
offense has been passed. By subjective phase is meant “that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission
of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward, the
phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of
the offender over which he has control – that period between the point where
he begins and the point where he voluntarily desists. If between these two
points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an
attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is
frustrated.” It must be remembered that a felony is frustrated when: 1.] the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony; 2.] the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator’s will. On the other hand, in an attempted felony:
1.] the offender commits overt acts to commence the perpetration of the crime;
2.] he is not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony; and
3.] his failure to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance. It bears stressing that intent
to kill determines whether the infliction of injuries should be punished as
attempted or frustrated murder, homicide, parricide or consummated physical
injuries. Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts which at the time of their
execution are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by
adequate means. Suffice it to state that the intent to kill of the malefactors herein
who were armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly be doubted
given the prevailing facts of the case. It also cannot be denied that the crime is
a frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering that after being