G.R. Nos.

114841-42 August 23, 1995

ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO, HEIRS OF CRISTETA CASTILLO and CORNELIO CASTILLO,
respondents. REGALADO, J.:

Assailed in this appeal by certiorari is the judgment 1 of respondent appellate court rendered in CA-G.R CV Nos.
29976-77, which affirmed with modifications the judgment of the trial court by increasing the award of damages
to herein private respondents. While the increased awards could arguably have been justified, it was the
inaction of private respondents that now militate against the same.

Sometime in 1982, petitioner company commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the
Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating dredging operations at the Batangas Bay in an area adjacent to
the real property of private respondents.

As an offshoot of said dredging operations, an action for damages against herein petitioner Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. was filed by Carlito D. Castillo which was docketed as Civil Case No. 10276, and
another action by Cristeta Castillo for herself and as guardian of Cornelio Castillo, docketed as Civil Case No.
10696.

On August 19, 1985, the above-mentioned cases were consolidated, as the plaintiffs therein intended to present
common evidence against defendant, by reason of the virtual identity of the issues involved in both cases.

Private respondents alleged that during the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard, petitioner's
personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to private respondents
without their consent. These heavy equipment damaged big portions of private respondents' property which
were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying any rent therefor, nor does it appear
from the records that such use of their land was with the former's conformity.

Private respondents further alleged that as a result of the dredging operation of petitioner company, the
sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Consequently, the said property which
used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production and each averaging an annual net harvest of
75 cavans, could no longer be planted with palay as the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable
for agriculture

Petitioner company denied all the allegations of private respondents and contended that its personnel and
equipment had neither intruded upon nor occupied any portion of private respondents' landholdings. The
alleged sea silt with water, according to petitioner was due to the flood brought by the heavy rains when
typhoon "Ruping" hit and lashed the province of Batangas in 1982.4

On September 6, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision with this fallo:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant:

1) To pay Carlito Castillo the sum of P65,240.00 plus legal interest from the time of the filing of his
complaint;
2) To pay the heirs of Cristeta Castillo the sum of P32,630.00 plus legal interest from the time of the
filing of her complaint;
3) To pay Cornelio Castillo the sum of P47,490.00 with legal interest from the time of the filing of his
complaint;
4) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
5) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as attorney's fees;
6) To pay the costs of suit.

Dissatisfied with said judgment, petitioner company appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 29, 1994,
respondent court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with the following modifications:

Ordering defendant-appellant to pay:

 1. Carlito Castillo the following amounts:

a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P56,290.00 with legal interest from the time of the
finality of this decision until the same shall have been fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of this suit.

2. Cornelio Castillo the following sums:

a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P255,401.25 with legal interest from the time of the
finality of this decision up to the time the amount is fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of this suit;

3. Cristeta Castillo the following amount(s):

a) Compensatory damages of P249,815.62 with legal interest from the time this decision
becomes final until the amount is fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of suit.6

Petitioner company is now before us, arguing for nullification or, at least, partial modification of respondent
court's judgment on the bases of the following assignment of errors:

I: That the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals exercised its judicial power and discretion in a most
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner by awarding against the petitioner, unconscionable,
unreasonable and excessive damages clearly not warranted under Articles 20 and 2176 of the Civil
Code.
II That grave and patent abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial power constitute a ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari . . .
III That the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals violated Article 2177 of the Civil Code which states
that: "the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" when it
condemned the petitioner as a result of its dredging operations, to pay private respondents not only the
expected total amount of profits the latter would have derived from the expected sale of their palay
harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the
basis of P5.00 per square meter of their said entire landholdings.7

RULING

The evidence on record indubitably support the findings of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner
company is liable for the destruction of the property of herein private respondents and consequently entitle the
latter to an award of the damages prayed for. Such conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts are
entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons, none of
which, however, obtain in the case at bar. The fact that the appellate court adopted the findings of the trial
court, as in this case, makes the same binding upon the Supreme Court, for the factual findings of said appellate
court are generally binding on the latter. For that matter the findings of the Court of Appeals by itself, and which
are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.8

Hence, on this aspect of its recourse, petitioner cannot expect a reversal since it is a basic rule that only
questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in cases thus brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the
errors of law imputed to it.9 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again.
Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring
a showing that the factual findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme
Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.10
However, this Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in increasing
the amount of damages awarded to private respondents by the court a quo.

Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the judgment of the trial court
by increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondents who, in the first place, did not
interpose an appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication made by the lower court. As to them, the judgment of the court below may be said to have
attained finality.

The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed cannot obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the lower court. The
appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to
uphold the decision that is being disputed. He can assign errors on appeal if such are required to strengthen the
views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court
solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of modifying the judgment
in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.11

WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED with regard to the
amount of damages awarded to private respondents and the awards of the trial court on this matter are hereby
reinstated for that purpose. In all other respects, the decision of respondent court is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO, HEIRS OF CRISTETA CASTILLO and CORNELIO CASTILLO,
respondents. R E S O L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our judgment promulgated in this case on August 23, 1995,
contending that (1) private respondents are permitted thereunder to recover damages twice for the same
act or omission, and (2) the interests adjudged on the awarded damages should be reckoned from the date of
finality of our aforesaid judgment rendered herein.

RULING

We reject the first submission. It is theorized by petitioner that our affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court, which granted damages for both the "damage proper to the land" and "rentals for the same
property," runs afoul of the proscription in Article 2177 of the Civil Code against double recovery of
damages for the same act.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that private respondents, as plaintiffs in the actions filed in the court
below, specifically alleged that as a result of petitioner's dredging operations the soil of the former's
property "became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture." They further averred that
petitioner's heavy equipment "used to utilize (private respondents') land as a depot or parking lot of these
equipment(t) without paying any rent therefor.

Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the nature and
cause of the twin items of damages sustained by private respondents, thus:

The main reason why (private respondents') properties were damaged, as found by the trial court, was due
to the dredging operations undertaken by (petitioner) on the area, which findings are supported by the
testimony of Carlito Castillo, testifying in Civil Case No. 10276, and Teodora Dimaculangan, in Civil Case No.
 10696. . . . Neither has (petitioner) asseverated against (private respondents') submission that their
properties were used by (petitioner) as a dump site for its equipment and trucks, and proof are the
photographs of their properties showing tracks left by truck tires on their properties. (Parenthetical
indication of the parties concerned are made for easy reference.)

It is, therefore, clearly apparent that petitioner was guilty of two culpable transgressions on the
property rights of private respondents, that is,

1. for the ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of their property and, further,
2. for the unauthorized use of said property as a dump rile or depot or petitioner's heavy
equipment and trucks. Consequently, albeit with differing amounts, both courts correctly
awarded damages both for the destruction of the land and for the unpaid rentals, or more
correctly denominated, for the reasonable value of its use and occupation of the premises.
There is consequently no merit in said objection of petitioner.

The second proposition of petitioner is better taken, in light of the reconciliation and clarification
undertaken by the Court of the heretofore imprecise and varying pronouncements on the imposition of interest
in judgments for a sum of money.

In the recent case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,3 Court adopted interpretative rules
on the matter of the imposable interest and the accrual thereof. The rules pertinent to the interest involved in
the case at bar are hereunder briefed as applied to the controversy on the computation and the reckoning date
thereof.4

4 The trial court ruled that the legal interest should be imposed "from the time of the filing of (the) complaint,"
while respondent Court of Appeals held that the same should be computed "from the time of the finality of (its)
decision until the same shall have been fully paid."

When an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, interest on the amount of the
damages awarded may be imposed at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims unless the same can be established with reasonable certainty. Since the pleadings of herein
private respondents in the trial court did not spell out said amounts with certitude, the legal interest thereon
shall run only from the promulgation of judgment of said court, it being at that stage that the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained.

The actual base for the computation of such legal interest, however, shall be the amount as finally adjudged by
this Court. Furthermore, when our judgment herein becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall
be twelve percent (12%) from such finality until the satisfaction of the total judgment account, the interim
period being effectively equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

ACCORDINGLY, and by way of clarification, the judgment rendered by this Court in the instant case shall be
understood to mean that the legal interest to be paid by petitioner is six percent (6%) of the amount due
computed from September 6, 1990 when judgment was rendered by the trial court. Additionally, interest of
twelve percent (12%) shall be imposed on such total amount due upon finality of the judgment of the Court
herein until the full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.