Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 1 of 18
FIRST DIVISION Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on the merits as to
[G.R. No. 92625 : December 26, 1990.]
192 SCRA 768
JOSE ORDA and IMELDA LOZADA, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and GIL GALANG Respondents.
Digested by: Lorvie Jun Vermon
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
Originally, private respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus with
the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City to regain custody of his
minor daughter, Joyce, who continued staying with her maternal
grandparents, petitioners herein, her mother being already deceased
at the initiation of the action. The case was eventually dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction because petitioners, as defendants therein, had
moved to Bataan and any writ of habeas corpus to be issued by the
trial court may not be enforced against them.
Subsequently, private respondent, on the basis of his being the sole
surviving parent of his daughter, filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the respondent Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
13912-SP, an original action to compel petitioners to produce the
body of minor Joyce Orda Galang and explain the basis of their
custody. Petitioners herein filed their Opposition/Answer alleging
that private respondent abandoned his wife and child, had no source
of livelihood and therefore could not support his daughter, they
prayed that care and custody of the child be awarded them.
On 13 April 1988, respondent court issued its assailed decision, as
follows:
The conflicting thesis (sic), however, of petitioner [private
respondent herein] and respondents [petitioners herein]
require a full-blown trial of the facts alleged by the parties.
This could be shown by the initial discussions aforestated.
In conformity with the foregoing decision the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City, the Hon. Napoleon R. Flojo presiding, before which
private respondent filed his first action, ordered the reinstatement of
Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87) and scheduled the case for trial
on the merits. Upon examination of the records of said case,
petitioners noted that only the order of dismissal of the same was in
the expediente of the case. They brought this matter to the attention
of the trial court which then issued an order dated 27 January 1989
directing the Chief, Archives Section of the Court of Appeals "to
transmit to this Court the original record of case AC-G.R. No. SP-
13912 (sic) immediately upon receipt of this Order."
In reply, the respondent Court of Appeals advised the trial court that
no records can be remanded because no expediente from the lower
court was ever elevated.
The Court of Appeals resolved this motion on 6 June 1989 as follows:
At the outset, it is necessary to point out that this Court entertained
this petition for Habeas Corpus in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction over such case. Said petition is in no way connected with
the one dismissed by the lower court in SP-719 (87).
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the Decision dated April 13,
1988 is hereby further clarified to read thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby
decides to REFER this case to the regional Trial Court,
which of the parties are legally entitled to the custody of
the child, Joyce Orda Galang. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE
PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO REPRODUCE ALL THE
PLEADINGS THEY FILED IN AC (sic) G.R. SP NO. 13912
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, UPON THE RECEIPT
OF WHICH, SHALL ASSIGN THE CASE A NEW NUMBER
WITHOUT REQUIRING [private respondent] TO PAY THE
DOCKETING FEE."
SO ORDERED.
Essentially, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals has no power
to issue the decision remanding the proceedings to the trial court
and the two subsequent resolutions clarifying the same.
ISSUE:
The question presented in this case is whether or not the Court of
Appeals may refer a petition for habeas corpus originally filed with it
to the Regional Trial Court for a full-blown trial due to conflicting
facts presented by the parties.
RULING:
There is merit in the contentions of petitioners.
Attention is also directed to the fact that the foregoing provision is
silent as to whether or not the hearing may be delegated, unlike that
of the provision on annulment of judgments, Section 1(c)(3) of the
same Rule, where, on motion of the parties, referral of any of the
issues to a Commissioner is allowed in accordance with Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals was in error in
ordering the remand and later on the referral of the original petition
for habeas corpus filed with it to the Regional Trial Court. What
respondent court should have done was to conduct the reception of
evidence and pass upon the merits of the conflicting allegations of
the parties insofar as the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
concerned.
While We agree with the conclusion reached by respondent court
that the case requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should
be done in the context of the special proceedings for custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and not a remand or
referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with
the respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in this
action is the place where the petitioner therein resides. Petitioners'
third assigned error is disposed of accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals
are SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the petition
for habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing by private
respondent of the appropriate special proceedings to gain custody of
his minor child. Let copies of this decision be furnished all Members
of the respondent Court of Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)

[G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004]
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
(detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO
DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE
DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
Digested by: Lorvie Jun Vermon
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de
Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-
fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis
for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second,
that petitioner be granted a new trial.[1] These reliefs are sought on
the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after
performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly
collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the
rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the
Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa,[2] we found petitioner guilty of the
rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity. Petitioner is currently
serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. As
summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza
charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information
dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. Dr. Rosaline
Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight
months pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the
5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to
a baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza. [5] The trial court
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim
in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to
support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. [7]
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are
once more faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villas guilt or
innocence.
Thus, petitioners brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct
of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity
of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. [12] This relief
was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001. On March
16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be
conducted.[13] The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated November 20, 2001.[14] Hence, the Decision became final and
executory on January 16, 2002.[15]
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having
been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a
grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza,
to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. [16] Leahlyn readily
agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the
petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as Container A.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary
report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 2 of 18
could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested,
due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples,
including Leahlyns.[19] Hence, in the instant petition for habeas
corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT
PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA;
HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS
SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND
MUST BE SET ASIDE.[20]
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered
subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the
paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this
issue is crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on
the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since this paternity is
now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must
be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ
of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The
ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to
allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered
evidence.
ISSUE:
This Court is thus tasked to determine the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already
convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory
judgment.
RULING:
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a
haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial
of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has been
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
has been withheld from the person entitled thereto. [22] Issuance of
the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty.
In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,[23] we stated that
[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. [24]
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore,
is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process,
the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle,
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a
judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having
duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a
post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of
Appeals,[25] we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)

(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void
as to such excess.[26]
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to
assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a
legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner
alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence
of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an
excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in
order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with
finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas
corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the
effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be
corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner
prescribed by law.[31] In the past, this Court has disallowed the review
of a courts appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ. [32]A
survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in
general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which
furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only
under extraordinary circumstances. [33] We have been categorical in
our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used
as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ
of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a
judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If,
for instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of
a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an
individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but
of People v. de Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged
by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis
on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as
this Court sympathizes with petitioners plea, a careful scrutiny of the
records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the
petitioner was unduly deprived.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 3 of 18
records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds
therefor. For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation
of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to
reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case,
not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the
petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the
scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas
corpus must, therefore, fail.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of
purportedly newly-discovered evidence, i.e., the DNA test
subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the
child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and
entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002.
Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the
statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered evidence.
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific
evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not
convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of
Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with
Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases.
[57]
The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of
rape.[58] Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove
to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although
petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of
paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction
was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the
victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on
appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
for habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs. SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal,

the petitioners counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador,
suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel,
giving the sole explanation that he was leaving for the United States
for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his
favor.[48] In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an
impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this withdrawal
in a handwritten Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition
of Counsels Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court received
by this Court on September 14, 1999. [49] Petitioner alleged that his
counsels withdrawal is an untimely and heartbreaking event,
considering that he had placed all [his] trust and confidence on [his
counsels] unquestionable integrity and dignity.[50]

While we are sympathetic to petitioners plight, we do not,

however, find that there was such negligence committed by his
earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right.
There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were tainted with
any other jurisdictional defect.

In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the

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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004]
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M.
TRIBIANA, respondent.
Digested by: Lorvie Jun Vermon
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived
together since 1996 but formalized their union only on 28 October
1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home
with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since
deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one
(1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza
was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin
moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition
failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made
before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins
motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a
compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy
of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May
1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss
and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother,
Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion
for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July
1998. The appellate court also denied Edwins motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition
for habeas corpus that the parties exerted prior efforts to reach a
compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petitions
dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[4] Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family
Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable
condition precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the
case must be dismissed.
The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that
the Certification to File Action attached by Lourdes to her opposition
clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise
but failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added
that under Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code,
conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not required in
petitions for habeas corpus.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 4 of 18
The Issue
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD
HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit. This rule shall not apply to cases
which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Edwins arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes
failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before
filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action
dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the
Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established
that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their
efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite
the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even
dispute.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition
precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. [6] Such defect does not place
the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve. If a party fails
to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed
waived.[7] Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right
without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive
pleading.[8] A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. [9] More
importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition
precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the
cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in
cases where the defect consists of the failure to state compliance
with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the
amendment of the complaint. [10] Courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to
present the real controversies between the parties. [11]
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare
and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to
resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child.
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of
tender age full protection. [12] This rule has sound statutory basis in
Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. In this case, the child
(Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from
the mother.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding in two instances.
The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either through
illegal confinement or through detention. The second instance is
when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to
such custody. The most common case falling under the second
instance involves children who are taken away from a parent by
another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under
this category.
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)
 Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 5 of 18
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the
LGC does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is
deprived of personal liberty. In such a case, Section 412 expressly
authorizes the parties to go directly to court without need of any
conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty
warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. [13] Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions
on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions
for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.

The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a

prolonged contest on technicalities. This is precisely what has
happened in this case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint of
the slightest abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court of Appeals.
A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer
expediency of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on
scant allegations of grave abuse. More importantly, any matter
involving the custody of a child of tender age deserves immediate
resolution to protect the childs welfare.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.

We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July
1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch
in resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending before it. This
decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.

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QCase #4
Malaluan vs. CA
G.R. No. 104879; 06 May 1994;
232 SCRA 249
Digested by: Roita Amon Valles
REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another
primaeimpressionis case through the present petition wherein the
parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following..
Issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an
application for a search warrant in connection with an offense
committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue
the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's
supposed territorial jurisdiction.
Facts: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of
Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant
was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms,
explosive materials and subversive documents were seized and taken
during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for Consolidation,
Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence. However, the RTC denied the quashal of the
search warrant and the validity of which warrant was upheld
invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which
provides that search warrants can be served not only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the
judicial region of the issuing court. Is the RTC correct?
Ruling: NO. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a
criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the
assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search
warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the
offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary
jurisdiction. Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as
an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before
the court.
A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ
of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature,
and made necessary because of a public necessity. A judicial process
is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing
issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant
is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to
an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not
a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary,
expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on
its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is
provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although
within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for
execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said
warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable
indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 6 of 18
The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of
jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal
property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall
have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An
application for a search warrant may be filed with another
court only under extreme and compelling circumstances
that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the
latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification
offered for not filing the same in the court with primary
jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a
motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper
recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known
shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant; Otherwise they shall be
deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed
in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party
may move in the court where the criminal case is pending
for the suppression as evidence of the personal property
seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for
said purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to
quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence
are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent
or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to
suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in
the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies
the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise
prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal
property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is
pending, with the necessary safeguards and
documentation therefore.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the
same criminal offense is charged in different informations
or complaints and filed in two or more courts with
concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action.
Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have
been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested
with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is DENIED.
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)
 Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 7 of 18
Case #5
In re: Azucena Garcia
G.R. No. 141443. August 30, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Digested by: Roita Amon Valles

Facts:
Garcia was charged with three counts of falsification of
public documents in three separate criminal informations. The first
was for falsification of technical description of land and other two
being for falsification of Declarations of Real Property. In its decision,
the trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, CA and SC affirmed
Garcia’s conviction and entry of judgment was made.

In the instant petition, Garcia questions the validity of the

judgment rendered in the criminal case. She contends that where
the proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional
rights of the accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby
warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas
corpus.

Issue: WON the writ of habeas corpus can be availed of.

Ruling: No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s
detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.
However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not issue where
the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order.

In the case at bar, therefore, Garcia can no longer seek relief via a
petition for habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment
of the crime of falsification of public document and use thereof. Said
judgment is already final and executory.

UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)


Case #6
Moncupa vs Enrile
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986
Digested by: Roita Amon Valles
Principle- Special Proceedings –
Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not render the
petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic.
Facts:
Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation
that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from
detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be
deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no
longer under the respondent’s custody. Petitioner argues that his
temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and
academic because attached to the petitioner's temporary release are
restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the
condition that petitioner gets the approval of
respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior
approval of respondents is also required in case
petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition
that he should not "participate in any interview
conducted by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press release or
information that is inimical to the interest of national
security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or
their representatives.
These restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute
an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom. The petitioner
stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry
from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the
conditions imposed by the respondents."
Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot
and academic in view of the detained person’s release with
restrictions.
Ruling: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained
person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the
involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be
illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the
detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of
the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into
by the writ of habeas corpus. Temporary release of detainee from
detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for
writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a
person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. The person concerned or those applying in his behalf may
still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 8 of 18
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Digested by: Cherry Tempongko
MALCOLM, J.:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of
years in the city of Manila, closed.
At about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to
orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of
the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings,
and apparently were under the impression that they were being
taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They
had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and
had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The
women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco
Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and
Rafael Castillo.
The governor and the hacenderoYñigo, who appear as parties in
the case, had no previous notification that the women were
prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
 The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
The application set forth the salient factsand alleged that the
women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties.
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the
action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for
Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody
or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond
the boundaries of the city of Manila.
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the
170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the
haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that
these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent.
The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that
directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales,
governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein
named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2,
1918.
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)

On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the
persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in
court by the respondents.
It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come
back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the
police and the secret service to appear before the court.
The fiscal appeared and offered certain affidavits showing that the
women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not
wish to return to Manila.
Respondent Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to
fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had
never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the
Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed
contracts as laborers.
Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of
the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible
for him to obey the mandate.
The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918,
promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents
had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed
that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the
court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on
January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the
clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents
should demonstrate some other legal motives that made
compliance impossible.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before
the Court the women who had returned to the city through their
own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by
the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns,
once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account
for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus.
Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to
submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief
of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for
the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila,
in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al
memorandum de losrecurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
ISSUE:
WONthe Mayor and the Chief of Police has authority to deport,
under duress the saidwomenof ill-refute from Manila to another
distant locality within the Philippine Islands.
HELD: NO
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression?
The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal
action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any
further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the
writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 9 of 18
It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary
expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this
is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in
the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made
returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court
rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the
Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women
had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On
the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney,
were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated
in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might
still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken
cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The
failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to
grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of
the writ.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila
by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of
freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going
when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began
in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to
Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey
the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom
the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of
Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same
means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and
to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who
has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great
writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the
defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to
the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied
with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of
habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the
contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The respondents did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose
behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right
to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)

affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with
their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the
signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could
have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in
the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second
hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would
have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of
contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the
order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far
from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat
similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas
corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra,
the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said:
"We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his
own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he
was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do
much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the
child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and
that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not
show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by
the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public
gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another
chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN
Digested by: Cherry Tempongko
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 10 of 18
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R.
Madriñan were married on July 7, 1993. They resided in San
Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick,
born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996;
Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on
December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left
their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao
City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things
up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the
matter to the LupongTagapamayapa in their barangay but this too
proved futile.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip
and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that
petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay
and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and
deprived them of their mother’s care.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September
17, 2002. They initially agreed that petitioner would return the
custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however,
had a change of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum,
alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their three
sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late
at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her
time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home
on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that
it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict.
 Court of Appeals rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to
take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213
of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of
Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With
respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled
that his custody should be determined by the proper family court
in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the
case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus.
HELD: YES
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
UM_Special Proceedings (Class 2017-2018)

x xx x xx x xx
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
x xx x xx x xx
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs
of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot
be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA
8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony
with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas
corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004)
in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with
the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
x xx x xx x xx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be
made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the
region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
G.R. No. L-16779 March 30, 1921
LEE YICK HON, petitioner-appellee vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Digested by: Cherry Tempongko
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 11 of 18
STREET, J.:
On July 23, 1920, Lee Yick Hon filed a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus in the CFI of Manila, alleging he had lately arrived
from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the
Philippine Islands, but was prevented from so doing by the Insular
Collector of Customs, who detained him for deportation.
The presiding judge in Sala IV of said court cited the collector to
appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus
should not be issued as prayed.
The citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house
arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of
Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at
noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design the
Insular Collector failed to countermand the order for his
embarkation on that boat.
The result was that Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three
hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation
to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding.
Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against the
Insular Collector.
Insular Collector of Customs appealed the action of the CFI of
Manila in imposing upon him a fine of P50 for an alleged
contempt of court.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI erred in imposing a fine against the Insular Collector of
Customs for deporting Lee Yick Hon.
HELD: YES
We are of the opinion that the action of the lower court in imposing
fine on the appellant cannot be sustained; and the judgment must
accordingly be reversed.
In this case before us, if it be asked what lawful writ, process, order,
judgment or command of the court or judge below was disobeyed or
resisted by the appellant, the answer must be: None whatever. The
citation that was served upon the appellant required him to appear
at a stated time in the Court of First Instance of Manila and show
cause if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not
issue.
At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order
to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector
of Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the peremptory writ of habeas
corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to have the
body of the detained person before the court at a time and place
9therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas
corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
appropriate forms are supplied in section 534 of said Code and in
section 82 of General Orders, No. 58. The order served in the case
before us was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent
to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be
granted. The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this
character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has, as all
legal practitioners are aware, become common in our courts; and
upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has must be
commend it, in cases where the necessity for the immediate
issuance of the peremptory writ is not manifest. Nevertheless, in a
case like that now before us, it is necessary to take account of the
difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of
habeas corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the
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 Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 12 of 18
actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that
the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing Lee Yick
Hon to be deported.

Of course if the judge issuing the citation had his attention directed
to the fact that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon was imminent, and
there had been any reason to fear that the Collector of Customs
might proceed with his deportation notwithstanding the service of
the bare citation, his Honor could have penned a few additional
words, adding to the citation an admonition to the effect that the
petitioner should not be deported until his application for the writ of
habeas corpus should be heard. If a temporary restraining order of
that kind had been issued, it would no doubt have been respected.

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[G.R. No. 137571. September 21, 2000]
TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, vs. RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ,
Commissioner of Immigration; and the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Digested by: Christine Faith Sabella
The Facts
After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore,
petitioner, a Taiwanese citizen,[3] arrived in this country. 10 days after
he was arrested by several policemen, who subsequently turned him
over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Thereafter,
BID Board of Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a
tampered passport earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities,
ordered his summary deportation.
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas
Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. After
respondents filed a Return of Writ controverting his claim, the trial
court issued a Decision granting his Petition and ordering his release
from custody.
Respondents then filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the
Honorable Court in the above-stated case.
Petitioner filed an Opposition, claiming that the Notice had been
filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in
habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court.
Although respondents alleged that they had received the said Order
on February 15, 1999, petitioner contended that they had in fact
received it on February 11, 1999, as evidenced by the receipt of the
service thereof and by the Sheriffs Return.
RTC rejected petitioners contention and granted due course to the
Notice of Appeal.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 13 of 18
deemed repealed and discarded. [10] The omission shows the
intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this case, [11]
to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced
in the revised statute or code.[12]
Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a
habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions [13]
and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day
reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is
hereby immediately LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of law,

Issue:

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: [8]

(a)What is the applicable reglementary period for filing an appeal in
habeas corpus cases?

Ruling:

Main issue: Reglementary Period for AppealingHabeas Corpus Cases

Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because
respondents filed it only five days after they had received the Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. He argues that the
reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in
Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which reads as
follows:
SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in
habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of
court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the
person making it appeals therefrom.

The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision

was omitted from and thereby repealed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, which completely replaced Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled rule G.R. No. 167570
of statutory construction is that provisions of an old law that were JIMMY T. GO,Petitioner,- versus -
not reproduced in the revision thereof covering the same subject are

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LUIS T. RAMOS,Respondent.
x----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171946
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY. FAISAL
HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their capacity as
Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,Petitioners,
- versus -
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO,Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Digested by: Christine Faith Sabella
Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu,
the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with
G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution [8] dated February 26, 2007.
Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavitfor
deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportationagainst Jimmy T. Go alleging that the
latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is Chinese. Luis
argued thatJimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming
managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of
falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure
a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations averring that the complaint for
deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed
to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy
maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien,
and insisted that he is a natural-born FilipinoJimmy added that he
had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. [13] He denied that his
father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging
that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in
the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and
raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and
Tagalog.
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is
FChinese, he maintained that it may be attributed to the employees
of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have relied on his
Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry.
In a resolution, the Associate Commissioner dismissed the complaint
for deportation against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla
affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation.
On March 8, 2001,[18] the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed
said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship
was made out of time.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against
Jimmy, charging him of violating the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940.
Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionwith
application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City,
challenging the jurisdiction of the Board of Commissioners (Board) to
continue with the deportation proceedings.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 14 of 18
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision [ordering the
apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and
that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen.
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed a supplemental
petition for certiorari and prohibitionbefore the trial court and
reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs which was denied.
The Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the
apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas
corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his
provisional release on bail.
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision denying their motion
for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court for passing upon their citizenship.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petitionIt did not find merit in
their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only
before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither
the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were
born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino
citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they
enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority
and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in
the process, determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of
jus soli was never extended to the Philippines; hence, could not be
made a ground to ones claim of Philippine citizenship and found that
Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable
period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by
the appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the trial
court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal bases
warranting the deportation proceeding in order to determine
whether the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that
due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the
Board, contrary to the claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration and
was denied.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal the Bureau of Immigration
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation
to carry out theDecision. This resulted in the apprehension and
detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention
Center, pending his deportation to China.
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for
habeas corpus[36] before the RTC of Pasig City assailing his
apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal
and his release on recognizance.
The trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of
habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release
once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau.
Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also
denied.
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 Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 15 of 18
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
and prohibition before the appellate court. The Court of Appeals mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time
granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the of the filing of the application.
issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court.
Issue: Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed. question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
Ruling: and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had
by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for been charged before any court. The term court in this context
its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized
lawful ground for Jimmys apprehension and continued detention. to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of
They urge that the decision of the Board that ordered Jimmys the Bureau of Immigration.Likewise, the cancellation of his bail
deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision before the Office of detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to
the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial
was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas
ground that sanctions Jimmys apprehension and detention. corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this
the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the
Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This
exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments
the order of deportation had already been issued by the advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
Board.Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. SO ORDERED.
Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the
applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the
case with Jimmy.] Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus
case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being
detained.
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and
adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal
considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty.
He maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its
object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found
illegal, to order the release of the detainee.As in his petition in G.R.
No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the
Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that he
should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court
where he can prove his citizenship.
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find
the petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.

We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of

certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an
appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available
for the correction of the error.
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the
remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48- G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR
that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner,
re-evaluated. vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special DECISION
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. VELASCO, JR., J.:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement
or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. Digested by: Christine Faith Sabella
What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as
of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas Nature of the Case
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by

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Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with prayer for injunctive relief seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
The Facts
Respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan
a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus which demanded the
immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma.
Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court respondent's
biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return
to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent indicated
that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be
served with summons and other court processes.
The next dayRTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering
petitioner to bring the child to court but despite diligent efforts and
several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally
serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the
writ. Instead, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at
petitioner’s Caloocan residence while the Petitioner filed a Petition
for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTCQuezon
City.Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss andRTC-Quezon City
granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the guardianship case
due to the pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before RTC-
Caloocan.4
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas
corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial
court. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias
writ upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor
which the Sheriff served petitioner the Order as well as the Alias
Writ during the preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.
Petitioner prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the
habeas corpus petition,claiming, among others, that she was not
personally served with summons and jurisdiction over her and
Criselda’sperson was not acquired by the RTCCaloocan.
RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus
motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, 9 where the Court held that a
writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring
immediate proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by
service of said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent, as petitioner herein.
Moreover, personal servicedoes not necessarily require that service
be made exclusively at petitioner’s given address, for service may be
made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she
was handed a copy of the court process in person by anyone
authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve
petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan
validly acquired jurisdiction over her person.Ma. Hazelina Tujan-
Militante is hereby directed to appear and bring Criselda Martinez
Cada before this Court.
Issue: whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the
habeascorpus petition filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo
it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
and the person of Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of
the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was
served a copy thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
9
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. 20 As provided:
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 16 of 18
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for
a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall beenforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the
absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court shall refer the case tothe Family
Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in
places where there are no Family Courts.The writ issued by the
Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial
region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be
made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within
the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody
of minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the
writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial
region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore
be filed withany of the proper RTCs within the judicial region
where enforcement thereof is sought.
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states:
Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen Regional
Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the
municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros,
Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing
of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a
family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the
writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial
Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family
court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both
belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-
Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether
petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view
of the above rule.
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was
improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of summons, to
begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in
Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by
service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent.22
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In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang
Salibo, Datukan Malang Salibo vs. Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex
Digested by: Grecel Paclipan
Facts:
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan
Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. He
returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009. On August 3,
2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station
in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, who was
one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre.
Salibo presented himself before the police to clear his name and
explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not
have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre
because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. The police officers
initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him. However, the
police officers apprehended Salibo and detained him at Datu Hofer
Police Station for about 3 days. He was then transferred to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City where
he was detained for another 10 days, and was finally transferred to
the Quezon City Jail Annex, where he is currently detained.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 17 of 18
Called the “great writ of liberty”, the writ of habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Under Rule 102 Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.
In the case at bar, the police officers had no probable
cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a
petition for habeas corpus may be issued. Contrary to what
respondent insists, petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion
to Quash Information since none of the grounds for filing a Motion
to Quash Information apply to him. Even if Petitioner Salibo filed a
Motion to Quash, the defect could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information from Butukan S. Malang to Datukan
Malang Salibo will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case. Hence, urgency dictates that we resolve this petition in
favor of petitioner given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan
S. Malang.

On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the CA an Finally, in ordering petitioner Salibo’s release, we are
Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a
detention and deprivation of his liberty. The CA issued a Writ of citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty
Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice without due process of law and the government that has all the
Executive Judge of the RTC, Pasig City. The CA ordered the Warden manpower and the resources at its command to properly indict a
of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ. The Return citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.
was finally heard on October 1, 2010. The trial court ruled that
Salibo was not Butukan S. Malang and further ruled that he was not
restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court. Thus, in the
Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo’s
petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from
detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed and set aside

the trial court’s decision and dismissed Salibo’s Petition for Habeas
Corpus. Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA
denied. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

1. W/N the RTC’s Decision is appealable to the CA; and

2. W/N Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for

Habeas Corpus.

Held:

Yes, Respondent Warden correctly appealed before the CA.

An application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus may be made through a
petition filed before the SC or any of its members, the CA or any of
its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its
presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ
is then conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court
apart from that which issued the writ, and the decision on the
petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.

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 Rule 102 Habeas Corpus_Case Digest 18 of 18
Ruben E. Tiu vs. Hon. Natividad G. Dizon

Digested by: Grecel Paclipan

Facts:

On June 16, 2000, petitioner and two others were found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC of Makati City, Branch
143, of selling, delivering, and giving away to a poseur-buyer 1,977
grams of shabu, a regulated drug, without authority of law or
corresponding license therefore. Consequently, they were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua and to pay a
fine of Php 10,000,000.00 each. Their conviction, which was
affirmed by the Court in a Decision dated March 10, 2004, became
final and executor on July 29, 2004.

On March 24, 2009, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP)

recommended the grant of executive clemency to petitioner, among
others. On June 3, 2010, acting on said recommendation, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted him “conditional pardon
without parole conditions”, but was nonetheless still subject to the
conditions indicated in the individual pardon papers. It turned out,
however, that no such papers were issued in petitioner’s favor. In
the meantime, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III signed into
law RA 10592, which, subject to its provisions, would substantially
increase the Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) of qualified
inmates. Thus, on July 27, 2013, petitioner’s carpeta was returned
to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for the re-
computation of his time served. On July 7, 2014, petitioner filed the
instant Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus, insisting on the efficacy
and enforceability of his conditional pardon without parole
conditions, which allegedly necessitates his release from prison.

Issue:

W/N a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of

petitioner.

Held:

No, a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued in favor

of petitioner.

The object of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the

legality of the detention, and if the detention is found to be illegal, to
require the release of the detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the
writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ
issought is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record. The writ is denied if the petitioner fails to show
facts that he is entitled thereto ex meritojusticias.

In the case at bar, petitioner is serving sentence by virtue

of a final judgment convicting him of the offense of selling and
delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659. He failed to show, however, that his further
incarceration is no longer lawful and that he is entitled to relief
under a writ of habeas corpus. There being no unlawful restraint on
petitioner’s liberty, no relief under a writ of habeas corpus can be
granted to him.

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