VII. Special Civil Actions
Otherwise, he may
A.
VIII. Interpleader
A.
B.
C. When Proper (Section 1)
Petra Carpio Vda. De Camilo, et al. v. Ong Peng Kee and Adelia
Ong, 1961
Short Digest
X built a commercial building on a public foreshore land. X has
been in adverse possession of the foreshore land. Y also built a
commercial building on the public foreshore land adjacent to
that of X. But fire burned down these two commercial buildings.
Sub sequently, Z built his own building encompassing some
portions of X and Y’s lands. As a result, X and Y filed a case for
forcible entry against Z. Z, on the other hand, filed a complaint
for interpleader.
Question: Is interpleader proper?
Answer: NO. An essential requirement of interpleader is that the
person who files as such must have no interest in the subject-
matter of the interpleader or must have an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. (Sec. 1, Rule 14,
ROC).
Z had an interest in the subject matter. His interest was the
prolongation of his occupancy or possession of the portions he
encroached upon. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements
for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist.
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANT, VS. LEE E. WON ALIAS RAMON LEE AND BIENVENIDO
A. TAN, DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES.
G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976
Short Digest
Facts:
Won claims ownership over the memrbership certificate 201 by
virtue of a decision rendered in a civil case to which Wack Wack
was a respondent. Tan also claims ownership over the same
membership certificate 201 by virtue of the assignment made by
Swan, Culbertson, and Fritz. Wack Wack filed an action for
interpleader.
Issue:
Was the remedy of interpleader proper and timely?
Ruling:
NO! A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the
contending claimants to court. He need not await actual
institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be
sued by either of the contending claimants.
be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with
reasonable diligence in view of the environmental
circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too
late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in
favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he
had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse
claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.
In this case, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case
against Wack Wack. Hence, the action for interpleader was filed
inexcusably late.
Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Development Bank
Short Digest
Principle:
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a
person against double vexation in respect of a single liability. It
requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the
stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Through this
remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a
single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without
exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more
than once on a single liability.
Facts:
RCBC was the registered owner of seven Central Bank bills in
which these CB bills were sold to BOC. BOC, in turn, sold these
bills to PDB as evidenced by detached assignment.
PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC treasury bills as evidenced by a
Trading Order and Confirmation of Sale. However, instead of
delivering the treasury bills, PDB delivered the CB bills to BOC.
PDB now assails its claims to BSP. However, it was denied by the
BSP. PDB filed before the RTC two separate petitions for
mandamus, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against
Nuqui, BSP and RCBC. The trial court temporarily enjoined Nuqui
and the BSP from paying the face value of the CB bills on
maturity. PDB also impleaded BOC and All Asia. BOC prayed for
the dismissal of the petition for lack of cause of action since PDB
is no longer the owner of the CB bills. On the other hand, the BSP
asked for an interpleader suit be allowed between and among
the claimants to the subject bills.
PDB and BOC entered into two separate Escrow Agreements in
which the RTC gave its approval.
The RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead. BOC filed its
Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.
However, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion questioning the
RTC’s jurisdiction over the BPC’s additional counterclaims.
The RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, BOC’s counterclaim and
the BSP’s counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader
holding that it has no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Was the trial court correct in dismissing the case?
Ruling:
No.
Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have
properly dismissed the PDB’s petition but on the ground that
mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct
alternative is no longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent
below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining
conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a
counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section 1, Rule 62 of
the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:
SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against
a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter,
or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves.
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a
person against double vexation in respect of a single liability. It
requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the
stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Through this
remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a
single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without
exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more
than once on a single liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, in reality a new action arises, where the claims of
the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the
stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of
initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when
proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on
the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action.
Ocampo vs. Tirona
Quick Digest:
Facts: P purchased a land from Y, heir of the registered owner,
lessor of R. R is a lessee of this property. R is unsure with who to
pay the rental fees to since the ownership of the land is not yet
recorded in the TCT and there were no manifestation of the
change of ownership that binds the lease.
Issue: What is the remedy of Z.
Held: An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does
not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property. The good faith of Tirona is put in question
in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a
stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in
hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before
filing a bill of interpleader.
PASRICHA V. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. G.R. NO. 136409, 14
MARCH 2008
Principle:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double
liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of
one liability.
Quick Digest
FACTS:
Petitioner (Pasricha) and respondent (Don Luis Dison Realty Inc.)
executed two contract of Lease.
Despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to
pay the stipulated rent. Because petitioners still refused to
comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private
respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for
the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but
claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to
receive payment.
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners
alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly
rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy when the
lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right
to collect).
RULING:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect) The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double
liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of
one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners
opted to refrain from making payments.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E. Determination (Section 6)
Maglente v. Baltazar-Padilla
SHORT DIGEST
FACTS:
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) owns a parcel of
land which was leased to petitioner Maglente. In their
leased contract, it provides that if PRC sell the property,
petitioner shall have a right of first refusal. When the
leased contract was about to expire, PRC sent letter
offering to sell the property to petitioner and the latter
respond to the letter, and intimated that she would
exercise her right of first refusal. However, on a later
date, PRC receive an offer from respondent that they
will buy the land. PRC filed an interpleader action with
RTC against the claimants. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner. Respondents have been occupying the said
property. Petitioner then filed for the issuance of writ of
possession. However, respondents objected on the
ground that the trial court’s decision on the
interpleader case merely resolved petitioners’ right to
purchase the leased property but did not declare them
as the owners entitled to possession.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to a writ of possession being
adjudged in the interpleader case as the rightful parties
to purchase the said land?
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of possession.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following
instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2)
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property;
(3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the
mortgagor has possession and no third party has
intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here, petitioners
seek the writ as a consequence of the trial court’s
decision ordering the execution of a contract of
sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie
in such a case.
Petitioners’ argument that the trial court’s writ of
execution in the interpleader case carried with it the
corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A
writ of possession complements the writ of execution
only when the right of possession or ownership has
been validly determined in a case directly relating to
either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve
into that issue.
A.
VIII. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
A.
B.
C. Where to File
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Facts (Short):
❏ RH Law was enacted by Congress.
❏ Fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions-in-intervention, most of
which are praying for injunctive
reliefs, were filed directly with the
Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law.
❏ Respondents argued that the
Petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the
Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction.
Issue: Does the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over the petitions?
Ruling: Yes.
As a rule, the original jurisdiction of Petitions
for Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
rests with the Regional Trial Court as provided
under Section 1 of Rule 63. However, where
the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Supreme Court
may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
Suffice it to state that most of the petitions
are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over the petitions.
Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September
17, 2009 BRAGAT
QUICK DIGEST
MALANA VS TAPPA
G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009
PRINCIPLE: The mandatory provision of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall"
and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00.
FACTS:
Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (―Danao heirs‖)
alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao which they
inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of Danao,
he allowed Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa) to build
on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property.

Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the
said land at any time that Danao and his heirs might need it.
Danao heirs claimed that respondents Benigno Tappa, et al.
continued to occupy the subject property even after
Consuelo‘s death, building their residences thereon using
permanent materials.
Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et al. were claiming
ownership over the subject property. Averring that they
already needed it, Danao heirs demanded that respondents
vacate the same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao
heirs referred their land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that
they owned the subject property and presented documents
ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs
opposed this, saying that the documents were falsified and
highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a
cloud upon the heirs‘ title to the property. Thus, the heirs
filed a case for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages
in the RTC.
ISSUE: Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu
proprio dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? –
No .
Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the
MTC.
RULING: An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation
and determination of the validity of the written instrument and
the judicial declaration of the parties‘ rights or duties
thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63.
Section 1 states that an action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a sale
with a right to repurchase ―may‖ be brought under the RTC.
These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief
because they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas the
Rules of Court uses ―may,‖ the amended Judicial
Reorganization Act uses the word ―shall‖ in determining
jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which
involve title to or possession of real property where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000
(MM).
In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only
P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the MTC, not the RTC.
Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief,
the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.
In the present case, the case for quieting of title was filed
after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refused to
vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had already been
deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy
for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion
publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one
year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. Jurisdiction
over such an action would depend on the value of the
property involved. Given that the property is only at P410.00,
then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to
recover the same.
OFFICE OF THE OMDUSMAN V IBAY
2 SENTENCE RULING:
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is not among
the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
even if only questions of law are involved.
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
OMBUDSMAN (petitioner) conducted an investigation on the
alleged scam on PEA-AMARI. It issued directing MARQUEZ
(respondent) to produce several bank documents for inspection
relative to certain accounts maintained in the said bank.
However, she failed to comply and explained that despite
diligent efforts the bank could not identify the bank accounts.
OMBUDSMAN issued another order to MARQUEZ to produce the
documents requested for “in camera” inspection. Instead of
complying the requested order, MARQUEZ filed petition for
declaratory relief with an application for temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati,
presided by JUDGE IBAY (respondent).
OMBUDSMAN moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for
declaratory relief on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
ISSUE: In what court does petition for declaratory relief be filed?
RULING: The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is not
among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court even if only questions of law are involved.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
A. Requisites

LONG DIGEST
G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008
EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
SHORT DIGEST
Y entered into a contract of lease with X. The contract
of lease contained that the rental rate stipulated is
based on the presetn rate assessment, in case the
assessment is increased, the rent will also be increased.
X later on died and was substituted by Z. Z informed by
that the rental price will be increased. The respondent
refused to pay but instead, continued to pay the
amount stipulated in the contract. Y instituted an action
for declaratory relief for determining the interpretation
of the contract. Respondent alleged that the remedy of
prohibition is not proper because he breached the
contract. Is prohibition the proper remedy?
Yes. The action for declaratory relief filed by the
respondent is proper. Decisional law enumerates the
requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the
terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there
must have been no breach of the documents in
question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must
be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief
is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding. In the case at hand, all are
present.
Edades vs. Edades
One Liner:
Action to determine hereditary rights and established
status of child are not within the purview of relief.
SHORT CASE DIGEST:
A brought an action before the CFI (now RTC) seeking a
declaratory relief judgment on his hereditary rights in
the property of his alleged father and incidentally the
recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of
Emigdio Edades. Is the action of declaratory relief
proper for the determination of hereditary rights and
established status of child?
No. The action of declaratory relief is not proper for the
determination of hereditary rights and established
status of child.
Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper
when any person is interested "under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance" in order to
determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his
rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66).
Moreover, the action should be predicated on the
following conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interest are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be
ripened for judicial determination.
As action seeking to determine his hereditary rights in
the property of his alleged father and incidentally the
recognition of his status as an illegitimate son can not
be maintained as one for declaratory relief because it
neither concerns a deed, will, contract or of her written
instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the
construction or validity of which is involved. Nor is it
predicated on any justifiable controversy, for the
alleged right of inheritance which plaintiff desires to
assert has not yet accrued for the simple reason that his
alleged father has not yet died. And the law is clear that
"the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent" (Article 777, new
Civil Code).
TOLENTINO V. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY
Bar Q:
P, a Filipino CPA, filed an action for declaratory relief
against the Board of Accountancy and X and Y, 2 foreign
nationals also CPA’s practicing the profession under a
trade name. P argues that the provision in the
Philippine Accountancy Law as amended provides
authorizing accountants to practice their profession
under a trade name is unconstitutional on the ground
that it excludes persons engaged in other professions
from adopting or using a trade name, hence, it is a class
legislation. X and Y answered that the plaintiff has no
right or interest adversely affected by the said
Accountancy Law and that he is entitled to the benefits
and may use a trade name or firm name in the practice
of his profession as accountant. Is X and Y correct?
Ans:
(1st paragraph) Yes, X and Y is correct. P has no actual
justiciable controversy.
(2nd paragraph) Requisite facts or conditions for an
Action for Declaratory Relief is lacking.
Requisite facts or conditions for an Action for
Declaratory Relief
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and
 (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.
Justiciability; its requisites. — Except that accomplished
physical wrong need not be alleged in a petition for
declaratory relief, a case of such nature must exhibit all
the usual conditions of an ordinary action.
There must be
(1) real parties in interest
(2) asserting adverse claims and
(3) presenting a ripe issue.
(3rd paragraph) In the case at bar, requisite facts or
conditions for an Action for Declaratory Relief is lacking.
His action for relief was to test the constitutionality of
the Law, according to him it constitutes class legislation
for the Law is exclusive in character which extends
benefits only to those engaged in the profession of
accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory
relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his
rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the
benefit of persons belonging to other professions, who
are not parties to this case. He does not claim having
suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights
or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the
disputed firm name by the defendants. Plaintiff,
therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against
the herein defendants which may give him the right to
secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the
law in question.
th
(4 paragraph) This case, therefore, does not properly
come under rule 66 of the Rules of Court which
authorizes the institution of an action for declaratory
relief.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
VIII. Review of Judgements of COMELEC and COA
A. Scope (Section 1)
Sabdullah T. Macabago v. COMELEC and Jamael Salacop, 2002
Short Digest
X lost to Y in the mayoralty elections. X filed a petition with
COMELEC alleging massive substitution of voters, and rampant
and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures. Based on the
submitted Voters Registration Records (VRRs), COMELEC found
proof of massive fraud in the conduct of elections. COMELEC
ordered a technical examination of the originals copies of the
VRRs and their comparison with the voters’ signatures and
fingerprints. Y filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 before the Supreme Court.
Question: Is Y’s recourse proper?
Answer: YES. Admittedly, as a general rule, an administrative
order of the COMELEC is not a proper subject of a special civil
action for certiorari. But when the COMELEC acts capriciously or
whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party
may seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
Short Digest
Facts:
C won in the election and was proclaimed the Governor of
Cagayan De Oro. B filed a protest alleging vote buying and
violation of election laws. C filed an affirmative defenses that B
did not make the requisite cash deposit. The Comelec First
Division denied the defense of C.
C filed an MR but was later denied by the Comelec First Division.
This prompted C to file a special civil action of certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Can the court take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.
Ruling:
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on
the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of
the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the
Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the
denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the
petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide
the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to
appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the
COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by the
Division upon the merits
B. Who May File
X.B Ibrahim vs. COMELEC
Short Digest
Principle:
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially
provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the
Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the
Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a
copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or
issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further,
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern
the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
Facts:
Ibrahim filed his Certificate of Candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of
Datu Unsay. However, as per COMELEC’s resolution, he was
disqualified as he was not a registered voter. He filed an
opposition but the same was denied. Pending the finality of the
denial of his opposition, the elections continued where he won
as the Vice-Mayor. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
suspended his proclamation.
Ibrahim then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court assailing the respondent COMELEC resolutions. He
contended that MBOC as a ministerial body created merely to
take the return as made from the different voting precincts, add
them up and declare the result. The COMELEC contended that
Ibrahim’s immediate resort to the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 64 is improper.
Issue:
Was the contention of COMELEC correct?
Ruling:
No. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part
substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of
the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to
the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a
copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or
issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further,
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern
the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
Reblora vs. Armed Forces of the Philippines
Quick Digest:
P retired from military service at the age of 59, of which he
served 34 years in the military including 3 yrs of service in DILG.
AFP calculated his retirement benefits excluding the civilian
service. Thus, P filed a petition to COA. COA denies the claim
although admitting that the 3 yrs must be included in the
computation but P should have retired earlier as mandated by
law. P seeks to annul the decision of COA for denying his
retirement benefits discrepancy under Rule 45.
Issue: Is COA’s decision reviewable under Rule 45
Held: No. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by
this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the
present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
X.B. SAHALI V. COMELEC,
G.R. NO. 201796, 15 JANUARY 2013
Quick Digest
FACTS: Jun Lacobo, a defeated candidate in the 2010
governatorial elections for the Province of Bundok Tralala, filed
with the COMELEC an election protest against the duly elected
governor, Elsie Lacsa, and moved for recounting of election
returns. The Comelec first division issued an order granting the
motion and directed its concern officers to conduct the recount.
Elsie Lacsa filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
granting recount to which the Comelec first division denied.
ISSUE:
Can she assail the interlocutory order issued by a division of the
Comelec directly to the Supreme Court via certiorari?
HELD:
No.
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a division
of the Comelec in an election protest may not directly assail the
order to the Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during
the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final
decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not to
interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.
C.
Pates v. COMELEC
SHORT DIGEST
FACTS:
On September 22, 2008, the petitioner received the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of September 18, 2008. So, the last day for filing
of a petition for certiorari was October 20, 2008 – the following
Monday or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The
petitioner filed his petition on October 22, 2008 or two days late;
hence, our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008. The
petitioner asks us in his “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with
Reiteration for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order”
to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition
was seasonably filed under the fresh period rule.
ISSUE:
Should Rule 65 of the Rules of Court be used for review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC?
Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for
certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.
RULING:
No.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt
of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for
a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions
of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause – “except
as hereinafter provided.”
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it
expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for
substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most
patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that
Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a
special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30
days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days
that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the
filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days
that Rule 65 provides).
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional
circumstance or any compelling reason to warrant the non-
application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to
explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to history,
uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should
adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
To us, the petitioner’s omissions are fatal, as his motion does not
provide us any reason specific to his case why we should act as
he advocates.
C. Osmeña vs. Commission on Audit
Facts (Short):
❏ Mayor engaged the services of Company X and
Company Y to construct and renovate the Cebu
City Sports Complex and 20 Change/Extra Work
Orders which were not covered by any
Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior
authorization from the Sanggunian.
❏ COA issued a Decision making Mayor solely liable to the
amounts awarded as damages.
❏ Mayor’s motion for reconsideration which was filed 18
days after the receipt of the COA Decision, was denied.
❏ Since Mayor was in the US for a mandatory medical check-
up, he was only able to file a Rule 64 petition 28 days from
receipt by his Office of the denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration or 12 days from the date he returned
from the US and actually took notice of the Decision.
Issue: Was the petition filed with the reglementary period
provided for under Section 3, Rule 64?
Ruling: Yes.
As a rule, Section 3 provides for a 30-day
period, counted from the notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed, to file the petition for
certiorari. The Rule further states that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
said judgment or final order or resolution
interrupts the 30-day period. However, the
Supreme Court have recognized exceptions to
the Rules but only for the most compelling
reasons where stubborn obedience to the
Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends
of justice.
We find Osmeña's reasons sufficient to justify
a relaxation of the Rules. Although the service
of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was
validly made on June 29, 2009 through the
notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu
City, we consider July 15, 2009 — the date he
reported back to office — as the effective
date when he was actually notified of the
resolution, and the reckoning date of the
period to appeal. If we were to rule
otherwise, we would be denying Osmeña of
his right to appeal the Decision of the COA,
despite the merits of his case.
Thus, the reckoning date to count the
remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition
should be counted from July 15, 2009. The
present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was
filed within the reglementary period.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
IX. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
A.
1. Certiorari
X. MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON
C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287, July 1, 2014
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office the then
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad came up with
a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) to speed up the funding of government
projects. However, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an expose’ claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Renato Corona which was taken from the
DAP. It turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive but some non-Executive
projects were also funded. This prompted Maria
Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of DAP.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
RULING:
 XI.A.1
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. The
present Rules of Court uses two special civil actionsfor
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are
the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65. The sole office of the
writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Although similar to prohibition in that it will
lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some
action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the
cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the
court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy
issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the
court itself. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
Is the petition for certiorari proper regarding the admissibility of
evidence?
RULING:
No.
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the
defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected
only by appeal.
The determination made by the trial court regarding the
admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and
whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a
determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence,
settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural
questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a
trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari .
1. Prohibition
G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January 16, 2004
TERESITA S. DAVID, BENJAMIN S. DAVID,PACIFICO S. DAVID,
NEMESIO S. DAVID, CELINE S. DAVID, CRISTINA S. DAVID,
PAULINA S. DAVID, and LEONIE S. DAVID-DE LEON, Petitioners,
vs.
AGUSTIN RIVERA, Respondent.

TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC. V PNB-REPUBLIC

BANK
QUICK DIGEST:

FACTS:

TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES (petitioner) filed an action for annulment

of contract, mandamus and damages against PNB-REPUBLIC
BANK and SOLID BUILDER’S INCORPORATED (respondents) to
annul the sale of two parcels of land in Tagaytay City and to
compel PNB-REPUBLIC BANK to award the sale to it. TRIPLEX’S
claim was rejected by PNB-REPUBLIC BANK.

TRIPLEX engaged the services of ATTY. ROQUE for its

negotiations concerning the Tagaytay properties and obtained a
legal opinion that the absence of the required Board approval of
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK to SOLID BUOLDERS did not perfect the
contract to sell.

During trial, TRIPLEX called ATTY. ROQUE to testify but

disallowed as it will violate the rule on privileged communication
between the lawyer and the client. TRIPLEX was aggrieved and
filed for petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: