RULE 72

SEC. 1

REPUBLIC V. NILLAS

The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a
petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic
of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We
deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.

The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a
Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged
therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered
a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban
Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots,
together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title
to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which
was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both
residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3

Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771
in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her
undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the
other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the
Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years
1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of
the Spouses Abierra.4

In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994.
Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and
continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever
been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the
revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No.
771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, though
it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the
commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941.

No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its
appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to
appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings.5

Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary
evidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a
Decision6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941
Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net

The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action to
revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should
have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of the
LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision7 dated 24 July
2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to
ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of
Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA
to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original records in
the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.

In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the
principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144
of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941
Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish
that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.

The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De
Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the
Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the judgment
sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed.
In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of
Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set
of applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after the
judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in,
it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.

Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite
jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that
"neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case."12

The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13 decided in 1961,
wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the
decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and enforceable." The Court,
through Justice Labrador, explained:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error], except
insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may
not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an
action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact;
in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been
in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the
execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party
is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal. x x x

x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a
decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to
be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of
the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice
the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.14

The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land
registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De
Banuvar, et al.15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of
registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and
laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited
excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v.
Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras17and Manlapas
and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask
for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes.19

Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and
laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases
mentioned earlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later,
namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The
doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling
argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in its present
petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all.
Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for
execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.

We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciated
therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of the Republic.

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or
legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a
parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a
status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further
step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land
registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any
provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil
cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order
to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration
cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:

SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the registration of
title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order
directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The
clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment
and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended,
reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be
prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original
certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The
decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration
Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and
shall be sent, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the
issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing
applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the
Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to
transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof
to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of
registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such
applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is
geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the
imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in
land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From
another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within
the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for
Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of
judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the
judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the
LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established
before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court
that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of
registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant
number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree
of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the
judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches
that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.

What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court
applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case
was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to such
effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general
situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the present case.

The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action for land
registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously
adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a land
registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the
order of cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately
peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of prescription merely
restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription,
followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier.
However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly
more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the
State no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and
not on the applicability of the rules of prescription.

Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relating
to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a
corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on
prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that
since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule
in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.

We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventional
than that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for
registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was the
latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the
other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which
time the property had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the
issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because the
petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing
title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action
for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score.

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons
covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the
petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in
their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the
laches of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect
 their interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other application for
registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5) -year reglementary period.

Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application as
precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution
of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance
of a different final judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded by the legal
protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a
"ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of the
petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by the
judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same
property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that
the final judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design,
has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains
in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued
application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25

We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of
Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice
it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a
general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a
land registration case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much as a newly-
carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious.

Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res
judicata that barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic
submits that said decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued,
which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final decision’s status as res judicata is the impelling
ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a
factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic’s
arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still
susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by
Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay,
following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of
registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the
original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration
albeit still in the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the
trial court and the

Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any
compelling argument to dispute such proof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

REPUBLIC V. CA

In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc,
Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of
September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner’s Report2 and accordingly
declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family
Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years,
the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court’s order by filing
a Notice of Appeal.3

By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served
"as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case
being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.

The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order of disapproval having been denied
by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending
that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a
special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.

By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republic’s petition on procedural and
substantive grounds in this wise:

At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to
its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its
Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal].
Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial court’s] Order dated August 15, 1999, which
declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the
records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance
with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive
issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.

The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death
of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and
the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on
appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal
is 15 days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by
filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a
wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al.
v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999).

Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the
nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a
 declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It
does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any
person.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying
OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its
Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in
accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and
Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.

Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration,
petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.

By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004
Resolution9 requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with
postmaster’s notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules
of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:

RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. – Rules of special proceedings are provided for
in the following:

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

(b) Escheat;

(c) Guardianship and custody of children;

(d) Trustees;

(e) Adoption;

(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;

(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;

(h) Habeas corpus;

 (i) Change of name;

(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;

(l) Constitution of family home;

(m) Declaration of absence and death;

(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. – In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
(Underscoring supplied)

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in
disapproving petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 xxx

By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract
a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following
above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW,
contains the following provision, inter alia:

xxx

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

x x x,

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for
which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a
Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed.

That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

seals the case in petitioner’s favor.

Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner’s
failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court’s order denying its
motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules
of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner,
what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.

As for petitioner’s failure to submit copy of the trial court’s order granting the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court’s observation that petitioner was also assailing it,
petitioner’s 8-page petition10filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order
disapproving the Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.

SO ORDERED.
NATCHER V. CA

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any
of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and
set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario
in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel
TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889.
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,
Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09
February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share
of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was
issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently,
the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with
a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first
lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano
sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 4 was
issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his
six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein
private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of
TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein
private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of
the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial
separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a
contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited
by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of
the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance.
What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the
issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the
facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX
 "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at
law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the
case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings,
which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the
nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first
settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court
 a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject
property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the
proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is
clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a
special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred
in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional
Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the
six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle
that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate
that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 17 (emphasis
supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With
the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and
only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that
the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-
entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of
advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's
estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

HAGANS V. WISLIZENUS
 This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts
alleged in the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a
judge of the Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint
assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and
expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him
to appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for
the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section
57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section
2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.

Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act
No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190
provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the only
provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special
proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.

Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit
in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."

Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by
said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190,
which gives us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an
"action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."

In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature
itself, we are driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special
proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special proceeding."

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal
demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It
is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. (People vs. County
Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106,
110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to
actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest
of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar,
etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)

From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge
of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is
hereby overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the order of the respondent judge appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the
same is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
SEC. 2

HILADO V. CA

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by
his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the
plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of
the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said
petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2
August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the
estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001,
private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for
Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality
of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC
acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set
a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s
estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the
part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground
that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in
the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a
petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners
had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the
defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the
appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact
that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were
still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them
the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the
rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather
various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they
prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate
court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they
prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax
appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the
same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in
the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons
fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule
19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before
us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners
have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of
the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to
the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons
interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of
"any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition
for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have
interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition
for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of
the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset
of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85,
which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s
account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to
the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance
of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all
obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied,
then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to
be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims
against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom,
Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims
to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by
its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was
already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where
they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until
such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with
guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an
action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned
that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold
the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of
the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the
pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator
be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated.
When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the
administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already
entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their
desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings
and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the
court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court
does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of
the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or
authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of
the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the
ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be
determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can
be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-

intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court
have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24

Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests
nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also
"any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-
delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their
favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that
the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings,
but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings,
we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no
other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that
we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is
no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances
their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that
if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court,
then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a
precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a
claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of
cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with
respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for
mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed
access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them.
Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall
be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court
ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate
proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with the
Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion
and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting—
appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto,
et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact
"interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon
them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how
relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and
the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the
estate are preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
"interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances
when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the
time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of
Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to
sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof,
set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said
reliefs.
 Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while
Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1)
year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against
the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in
the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are
protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to
seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent
as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor,
even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the
creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the
general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have
explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested
in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SHEKER V. SHEKER

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for
all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner
filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim
against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-
forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not
filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
 (a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-
forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for
failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to
contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of
docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that
rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court,
pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but
in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions
may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an
obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of
Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against
an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective
money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.
In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent
right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some
question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon
the principal remedy.7(Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a
mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory
pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer
to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate
docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for
settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the
estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de

Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is
not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely
to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service.
Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever,
resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive
pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay
in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and
no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise
of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
with the clause "whenever practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied
by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and
liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not
be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort
and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof
gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s
counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been
allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent
and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not
practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done
personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was
further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held
in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written
explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6
dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on
petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.