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Liberalism and World Politics

Author(s): Michael W. Doyle


Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169
Published by: American Political Science Association
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AND
LIBERALISM
WORLDPOLITICS
MICHAEL W. DOYLE
JohnsHopkins University

Buildingon a growing literaturein internationalpoliticalscience,I


reexaminethe traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for
individuallibertyexercise"restraint" and "peacefulintentions"in theirforeignpolicy. I
look at threedistincttheoreticaltraditionsof liberalism,attributableto three theorists:
Schumpeter,a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often
invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republicanwhose glory is an imperialismwe often
practice;and Kant, a liberalrepublicanwhose theory of internationalismbest accounts
for what we are. Despite the contradictionsof liberalpacifismand liberalimperialism,I
find, with Kantand other democraticrepublicans,that liberalismdoes leave a coherent
legacy on foreignaffairs.Liberalstates are different.Theyare indeedpeaceful. Theyare
also prone to make war. Liberalstates have createda separatepeace, as Kant argued
they would, and have also discoveredliberalreasonsfor aggression,as he feared they
might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal
imperialism,and Kant'sinternationalismare not arbitrary.They are rooted in differing
conceptionsof the citizen and the state.

Promoting freedom elect theirgovernments,wars become im-


will produce peace, we have often been possible. Furthermore,citizensappreciate
told. In a speechbeforethe BritishParlia- that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed
ment in June of 1982, PresidentReagan only under.conditionsof peace. Thus the
proclaimedthat governmentsfounded on very existenceof liberalstates, such as the
a respect for individual liberty exercise U.S., Japan, and our European allies,
"restraint"and "peaceful intentions" in makes for peace.
theirforeignpolicy. He then announceda Buildingon a growing literaturein in-
"crusadefor freedom"and a "campaign ternationalpolitical science, I reexamine
for democratic development" (Reagan, the liberal claim President Reagan re-
June9, 1982). iterated for us. I look at three distinct
In making these claims the president theoretical traditions of liberalism, at-
joined a long list of liberal theorists(and tributableto three theorists:Schumpeter,
propagandists)and echoed an old argu- a brilliant explicator of the liberal
ment: the aggressive instincts of pacifism the presidentinvoked; Machia-
authoritarianleadersand totalitarianrul- velli, a classicalrepublicanwhose glory is
ing parties make for war. Liberalstates, an imperialism we often practice; and
founded on such individual rights as Kant.
equality before the law, free speech and Despite the contradictions of liberal
other civil liberties,privateproperty,and pacifism and liberal imperialism,I find,
elected representationare fundamentally with Kant and other liberal republicans,
against war this argumentasserts. When that liberalism does leave a coherent
the citizens who bear the burdensof war legacy on foreignaffairs.Liberalstatesare

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW


VOL. 80 NO. 4 DECEMBER, 1986
American Political Science Review Vol. 80

different. They are indeed peaceful, yet (Schumpeter,1955, p. 6). Excludingim-


they are also prone to make war, as the perialismsthat were mere "catchwords"
U.S. and our "freedomfighters"are now and those that were "object-ful"(e.g.,
doing, not so covertly, againstNicaragua. defensiveimperialism),he tracesthe roots
Liberal states have created a separate of objectlessimperialismto threesources,
peace, as Kant argued they would, and each an atavism. Modern imperialism,
have also discovered liberal reasons for according to Schumpeter,resulted from
aggression,as he fearedthey might. I con- the combinedimpactof a "warmachine,"
clude by arguing that the differences warlike instincts, and export
among liberal pacifism, liberal im- monopolism.
perialism, and Kant's liberal interna- Once necessary,the war machinelater
tionalismare not arbitrarybut rooted in developeda life of its own and took con-
differing conceptions of the citizen and trol of a state's foreign policy: "Created
the state. by the wars that requiredit, the machine
now created the wars it required"
LiberalPacifism (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 25). Thus,
Schumpetertells us that the army of an-
There is no canonical description of cient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos
liberalism. What we tend to call liberal out of Egypt, took over the state and pur-
resemblesa family portrait of principles sued militaristic imperialism. Like the
and institutions, recognizableby certain later armies of the courts of absolutist
characteristics-for example, individual Europe, it fought wars for the sake of
freedom, political participation, private glory and booty, for the sake of warriors
property, and equality of opportunity- and monarchs-wars gratia warriors.
that most liberal states share, although A warlikedisposition,elsewherecalled
none has perfected them all. Joseph "instinctual elements of bloody
Schumpeterclearlyfits within this family primitivism,"is the naturalideology of a
when he considers the internationalef- war machine.It also existsindependently;
fects of capitalismand democracy. the Persians,says Schumpeter(1955, pp.
Schumpeter's "Sociology of Im- 25-32), were a warrior nation from the
perialisms,"published in 1919, made a outset.
coherent and sustained argument con- Under modern capitalism, export
cerning the pacifying (in the sense of monopolists, the third source of modem
nonaggressive)effects of liberal institu- imperialism,push for imperialistexpan-
tions and principles (Schumpeter,1955; sion as a way to expand their closed
see also Doyle, 1986, pp. 155-59). Unlike markets. The absolute monarchieswere
some of the earlierliberal theoristswho the last clear-cut imperialisms.
focused on a single featuresuch as trade Nineteenth-centuryimperialismsmerely
(Montesquieu,1949, vol. 1, bk. 20, chap. representthe vestiges of the imperialisms
1) or failed to examine critically the created by Louis XIV and Catherinethe
arguments they were advancing, Great. Thus, the export monopolists are
Schumpeter saw the interaction of an atavism of the absolute monarchies,
capitalismand democracyas the founda- for they dependcompletelyon the tariffs
tion of liberalpacifism, and he tested his imposed by the monarchs and their
arguments in a sociology of historical militaristic successors for revenue
imperialisms. (Schumpeter,1955, p. 82-83). Without
He definesimperialismas "anobjectless tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated
disposition on the part of a state by foreign competition.
to unlimited forcible expansion" Modem (nineteenth century) imperi-

1152
1986 Liberalismand World Politics

alism, therefore,rests on an atavisticwar Schumpeter's explanation for liberal


machine, militaristic attitudes left over pacifismis quite simple: Only war profi-
from the days of monarchicalwars, and teers and military aristocratsgain from
export monopolism, which is nothing wars. No democracy would pursue a
more than the economic residue of minority interest and tolerate the high
monarchicalfinance. In the modern era, costs of imperialism. When free trade
imperialistsgratify theirprivateinterests. prevails, "no class" gains from forcible
From the national perspective, their im- expansionbecause
perialisticwars are objectless.
Schumpeter's theme now emerges. foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as
accessibleto each nation as thoughthey were in
Capitalismand democracyare forces for its own territory.Wherethe culturalbackward-
peace. Indeed,they are antitheticalto im- ness of a region makes normaleconomicinter-
perialism. For Schumpeter, the further course dependenton colonization it does not
development of capitalism and democ- matter, assuming free trade, which of the
"civilized"nationsundertakesthe taskof coloni-
racy means that imperialismwill inev- zation. (Schumpeter,1955, pp. 75-76)
itably disappear. He maintains that
capitalismproducesan unwarlikedisposi- Schumpeter'sargumentsare difficultto
tion; its populace is "democratized,in- evaluate. In partial tests of quasi-
dividualized, rationalized"(Schumpeter, Schumpeterian propositions, Michael
1955, p. 68). The people's energies are Haas (1974, pp. 464-65) discovered a
daily absorbed in production. The cluster that associates democracy,
disciplines of industry and the market development, and sustained moderniza-
train people in "economic rationalism"; tion with peaceful conditions. However,
the instability of industrial life M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have
necessitates calculation. Capitalism also discovered that there is no clearly
"individualizes"; "subjective oppor- negative correlationbetween democracy
tunities"replace the "immutablefactors" and war in the period 1816-1965-the
of traditional, hierarchicalsociety. Ra- period that would be central to
tional individuals demand democratic Schumpeter's argument (see also
governance. Wilkenfeld,1968, Wright, 1942, p. 841).
Democratic capitalismleads to peace. Later in his career, in Capitalism,
As evidence, Schumpeter claims that Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter,
throughout the capitalist world an op- (1950, pp. 127-28) acknowledged that
position has arisen to "war, expansion, "almost purely bourgeois common-
cabinet diplomacy"; that contemporary wealths were often aggressive when it
capitalism is associated with peace par- seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the
ties; and that the industrial worker of Venetiancommonwealths."Yet he stuck
capitalismis "vigorouslyanti-imperialist." to his pacifistic guns, restating the view
In addition,he points out that the capital- that capitalist democracy "steadily tells
ist worldhas developedmeansof prevent- ... against the use of militaryforce and
ing war, such as the HagueCourtand that for peacefularrangements,even when the
the least feudal, most capitalistsociety- balanceof pecuniaryadvantageis clearly
the United States-has demonstratedthe on the side of war which, undermodem
least imperialistictendencies(Schumpeter circumstances,is not in generalvery like-
1955, pp. 95-96). An exampleof the lack ly" (Schumpeter,1950, p. 128).1A recent
of imperialistictendencies in the U.S., study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of "liber-
Schumpeter thought, was our leaving tarianism"and internationalviolence is
over half of Mexico unconqueredin the the closest test Schumpeterianpacifism
war of 1846-48. has received."Free"states (thoseenjoying

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

political and economic freedom) were that ruling makes no difference.He also
shown to have considerablyless conflict presumesthat no one is preparedto take
at or above the level of economic sanc- those measures(suchas stirringup foreign
tions than "nonfree" states. The free quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling
states, the partlyfree states (includingthe coalition) that enhance one's political
democratic socialist countries such as power, despite deterimental effects on
Sweden), and the nonfree states ac- mass welfare. Third, like domestic
countedfor 24%, 26%, and 61%, respec- politics, world politics are homogenized.
tively, of the international violence Materially monistic and democratically
duringthe period examined. capitalist, all states evolve toward free
These effects are impressive but not trade and liberty together. Countriesdif-
conclusive for the Schumpeterianthesis. ferently constituted seem to disappear
The data are limited, in this test, to the from Schumpeter'sanalysis. "Civilized"
period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for ex- nations govern "culturally backward"
ample, the Russo-AfghanWar, the Viet- regions. These assumptions are not shared
namese invasion of Cambodia, China's by Machiavelli'stheory of liberalism.
invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania'sin-
vasion of Ugandabut justmissesthe U.S.,
quasi-covert intervention in Angola Liberal Imperialism
(1975) and our not so covert war against
Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it Machiavelli argues, not only that
excludes the cold war period, with its republicsare not pacifistic, but that they
numerous interventions, and the long are the best form of state for imperial
history of colonial wars (the Boer War, expansion. Establishinga republicfit for
the Spanish-AmericanWar, the Mexican imperialexpansionis, moreover, the best
Intervention, etc.) that marked the way to guaranteethe survival of a state.
history of liberal, including democratic Machiavelli's republic is a classical
capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan, mixed republic. It is not a democracy-
1984; Weede, 1984). which he thought would quickly degen-
The discrepancybetween the warlike erateinto a tyranny-but is characterized
history of liberalstates and Schumpeter's by social equality, popular liberty, and
pacifisticexpectationshighlightsthreeex- politicalparticipation(Machiavelli,1950,
treme assumptions. First, his "material- bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung,
istic monism" leaves little room for 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock,
noneconomic objectives, whether es- 1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner,1981, chap. 3).
poused by states or individuals. Neither The consulsserveas "kings,"the senateas
glory, nor prestige, nor ideological an aristocracymanagingthe state, and the
justification,nor the purepower of ruling people in the assembly as the source of
shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals strength.
leave little room for positive-sum gains, Liberty results from "disunion"-the
such as the comparative advantages of competition and necessity for com-
trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is promise required by the division of
true for his states. The political life of powers among senate, consuls, and
individualsseems to have been homogen- tribunes (the last representingthe com-
ized at the same time as the individuals mon people). Libertyalso resultsfrom the
were "rationalized,individualized, and popularveto. The powerful few threaten
democratized."Citizens-capitalists and the rest with tyranny, Machiavellisays,
workers, rural and urban-seek material becausethey seek to dominate.The mass
welfare. Schumpeterseems to presume demandsnot to be dominated, and their

1154
1986 Liberalismand World Politics

veto thus preserves the liberties of the either case, we want more for ourselves
state (Machiavelli,1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. and our states than just materialwelfare
122). However, since the people and the (materialistic monism). Because other
rulershave differentsocial characters,the states with similar aims thereby threaten
people need to be "managed"by the few us, we prepare ourselves for expansion.
to avoid having their recklessnessover- Becauseour fellow citizens threatenus if
turn or their fecklessness undermine we do not allow them either to satisfy
the ability of the state to expand their ambitionor to releasetheirpolitical
(Machiavelli,1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. energies through imperialexpansion, we
249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls expand.
plan expansion, consult oracles, and There is considerable historical
employ religion to manage the resources evidence for liberal imperialism.
that the energy of the people supplies. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and
Strength,and then imperialexpansion, Thucydides'Athens both were imperial
results from the way liberty encourages republics in the Machiavellian sense
increasedpopulationand property,which (Thucydides,1954, bk. 6). The historical
grow when the citizens know their lives recordof numerousU.S. interventionsin
and goods are secure from arbitrary the postwarperiodsupportsMachiavelli's
seizure. Free citizens equip large armies argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4;
and provide soldierswho fight for public Barnet, 1968, chap. 11), but the current
glory and the commongood becausethese record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is,
are, in fact, theirown (Machiavelli,1950, calls some of his insightsinto question.To
bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the extent that the modern populace ac-
the honor of having your state expand, tually controls (and thus unbalances)the
Machiavelliadvises, you should organize mixed republic, its diffidence may out-
it as a free and popular republic like weigh elite ("senatorial")aggressiveness.
Rome, rather than as an aristocratic We can conclude either that (1) liberal
republiclike Spartaor Venice. Expansion pacifismhas at least taken over with the
thus calls for a free republic. further development of capitalist
"Necessity"-political survival-calls democracy, as Schumpeterpredicted it
for expansion. If a stable aristocratic would or that (2) the mixed record of
republicis forced by foreign conflict "to liberalism-pacifism and imperialism-
extend her territory, in such a case we indicates that some liberal states are
shall see her foundations give way and Schumpeteriandemocracieswhile others
herselfquicklybroughtto ruin";if, on the are Machiavellian republics. Before we
other hand, domestic security prevails, accept either conclusion, however, we
"thecontinuedtranquilitywould enervate must considera third apparentregularity
her, or provoke internal dimensions, of modernworld politics.
which together, or either of them
separately, will apt to prove her ruin"
(Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. LiberalInternationalism
129). Machiavellithereforebelieves it is
necessary to take the constitution of Modern liberalismcarrieswith it two
Rome, rather than that of Sparta or legacies. They do not affect liberalstates
Venice, as our model. separately,accordingto whetherthey are
Hence, this belief leads to liberal im- pacifistic or imperialistic, but simul-
perialism. We are lovers of glory, taneously.
Machiavelliannounces. We seek to rule The firstof theselegaciesis the pacifica-
or, at least, to avoid being oppressed.In tion of foreign relations among liberal

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

states.2Duringthe nineteenthcentury,the to the quarrels with our allies that be-


United States and Great Britainengaged deviled the Carter and Reagan adminis-
in nearly continual strife; however, after trations. It also offers the promise of a
the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual continuing peace among liberal states,
representationas the formalsourceof the and as the number of liberal states in-
sovereignty of the British parliament, creases, it announces the possibility of
Britain and the United States negotiated global peace this side of the grave or
their disputes. They negotiated despite, world conquest.
for example,Britishgrievancesduringthe Of course, the probability of the out-
Civil War againstthe North'sblockadeof break of war in any given year between
the South, with which Britainhad close any two given states is low. The occur-
economic ties. Despite severe Anglo- rence of a war between any two adjacent
Frenchcolonialrivalry,liberalFranceand states, consideredover a long period of
liberal Britainformed an entente against time, would be more probable. The ap-
illiberal Germany before World War I. parent absence of war between liberal
And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for
memberof the Triple Alliance with Ger- almost 200 years thus may have sig-
many and Austria, chose not to fulfill its nificance. Similarclaims cannot be made
obligations under that treaty to support for feudal, fascist, communist, au-
its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alli- thoritarian,or totalitarianforms of rule
ance with Britainand France,which pre- (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for plural-
ventedit fromhavingto fightotherliberal istic or merely similar societies. More
states and then declaredwar on Germany significantperhapsis that when states are
and Austria. Despite generations of forced to decide on which side of an im-
Anglo-American tension and Britain's pendingworld war they will fight, liberal
wartime restrictionson American trade states all wind up on the same side de-
with Germany, the United States leaned spite the complexityof the paths that take
toward Britainand Francefrom 1914 to them there. These characteristicsdo not
1917 beforeenteringWorldWarI on their prove that the peace among liberals is
side. statisticallysignificantnor that liberalism
Beginningin the eighteenthcenturyand is the sole valid explanation for the
slowly growing since then, a zone of peace.3They do suggest that we consider
peace, which Kant called the "pacific the possibility that liberals have indeed
federation"or "pacificunion," has begun established a separate peace-but only
to be establishedamong liberal societies. among themselves.
Morethan40 liberalstatescurrentlymake Liberalismalso carrieswith it a second
up the union. Most are in Europe and legacy: international "imprudence"
North America,but they can be found on (Hume, 1963, pp. 346-47). Peaceful
every continent, as Appendix1 indicates. restraintonly seems to work in liberals'
Here the predictionsof liberalpacifists relationswith otherliberals.Liberalstates
(and President Reagan) are borne out: have fought numerous wars with non-
liberal states do exercise peaceful liberal states. (For a list of international
restraint, and a separate peace exists wars since 1816 see Appendix2.)
among them. This separate peace pro- Many of these wars have been defen-
vides a solid foundation for the United sive and thus prudent by necessity.
States' crucial alliances with the liberal Liberal states have been attacked and
powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty threatenedby nonliberal states that do
Organizationand our Japanesealliance. not exerciseany special restraintin their
This foundationappearsto be impervious dealings with the liberal states.

1156
1986 Liberalismand World Politics

Authoritarianrulers both stimulate and of peacefulrivalry among capitalists,but


respond to an internationalpolitical en- only liberal capitalists maintain peace.
vironmentin which conflicts of prestige, Leninistsexpect liberal capitalists to be
interest,and purefearof what otherstates aggressive toward nonliberal states, but
might do all lead states toward war. War they also (and especially)expect them to
and conquesthave thus characterizedthe be imperialistic toward fellow liberal
careersof many authoritarianrulers and capitalists.
ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Kant's theory of liberal interna-
Napoleon to Mussolini'sfascists, Hitler's tionalism helps us understandthese two
Nazis, and Stalin'scommunists. legacies. The importance of Immanuel
Yet we cannotsimplyblamewarfareon Kant as a theorist of internationalethics
the authoritarians or totalitarians, as has been well appreciated (Armstrong,
many of our more enthusiasticpoliticians 1931; Friedrich,1948; Gallie, 1978, chap.
would have us do.4Most wars ariseout of 1; Galston, 1975; Hassner,1972; Hinsley,
calculations and miscalculations of in- 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann,-1965; Waltz,
terest, misunderstandings,and mutual 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has
suspicions, such as those that char- an importantanalyticaltheory of interna-
acterized the origins of World War I. tionalpolitics. PerpetualPeace, writtenin
However, aggressionby the liberal state 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93-130), helps us
has also characterizeda large numberof understandthe interactivenatureof inter-
wars. Both Franceand Britainfought ex- national relations. Kant tries to teach us
pansionist colonial wars throughout the methodologically that we can study
nineteenth century. The United States neitherthe systemicrelationsof statesnor
fought a similar war with Mexico from the varietiesof state behaviorin isolation
1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation from each other. Substantively,he antic-
against the American Indians, and in- ipates for us the ever-wideningpacifica-
tervened militarily against sovereign tion of a liberal pacific union, explains
states many times before and afterWorld this pacification, and at the same time
War II. Liberal states invade weak suggestswhy liberalstates are not pacific
nonliberal states and display striking in their relations with nonliberal states.
distrust in dealings with powerful Kant argues that perpetualpeace will be
nonliberalstates (Doyle, 1983b). guaranteedby the ever-wideningaccept-
Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist ance of three"definitivearticles"of peace.
theory accounts well for these two When all nations have accepted the
legacies. While they can account for definitive articles in a metaphorical
aspects of certainperiodsof international "treaty"of perpetualpeace he asks them
stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151-54; to sign, perpetualpeace will have been
Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the established.
balanceof power nor the logic of interna- The FirstDefinitiveArticlerequiresthe
tional hegemony explains the separate civil constitution of the state to be
peace maintainedfor more than 150 years republican.By republicanKant means a
among states sharingone particularform political society that has solved the prob-
of governance-liberal principlesand in- lem of combining moral autonomy, in-
stitutions. Balance-of-powertheory ex- dividualism,and social order. A private
pects-indeed is premisedupon-flexible property and market-orientedeconomy
arrangementsof geostrategicrivalry that partially addressed that dilemma in the
includepreventivewar. Hegemonieswax private sphere. The public, or political,
and wane, but the liberal peace holds. sphere was more troubling. His answer
Marxist"ultra-imperialists" expecta form was a republic that preserved juridical

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

freedom-the legal equality of citizens as spreadfurtherand furtherby a seriesof alliances


subjects-on the basis of a representative of this kind. (Kant,PP p. 104)
governmentwith a separationof powers. The pacific union is not a single peace
Juridicalfreedomis preservedbecausethe treaty ending one war, a world state, nor
morally autonomous individual is by a state of nations. Kant finds the first in-
means of representationa self-legislator sufficient. The second and third are im-
making laws that apply to all citizens possible or potentially tyrannical. Na-
equally, including himself or herself. tional sovereignty precludes reliable
Tyranny is avoided because the in- subservienceto a state of nations;a world
dividual is subjectto laws he or she does state destroysthe civic freedomon which
not also administer(Kant, PP, pp. 99- the developmentof humancapacitiesrests
102; Riley, 1985, chap. 5).5 (Kant, UH, p. 50). Although Kant ob-
Liberal republics will progressively liquely refers to various classical
establish peace among themselves by interstate confederations and modem
means of the pacific federation,or union diplomatic congresses, he develops no
(foedus pacificum), described in Kant's systematicorganizationalembodimentof
Second Definitive Article. The pacific this treaty and presumablydoes not find
union will establishpeacewithin a federa- institutionalization necessary (Riley,
tion of free states and securely maintain 1983, chap. 5; Schwarz,1962, p. 77). He
the rightsof each state. The world will not appears to have in mind a mutual non-
have achieved the "perpetualpeace"that aggression pact, perhaps a collective
providesthe ultimateguarantorof repub- securityagreement,and the cosmopolitan
lican freedomuntil "a late stage and after law set forth in the Third Definitive
many unsuccessfulattempts"(Kant, UH, Article.7
p. 47). At that time, all nations will have The ThirdDefinitiveArticleestablishes
learnedthe lessons of peace throughright a cosmopolitanlaw to operatein conjunc-
conceptions of the appropriateconstitu- tion with the pacific union. The cosmo-
tion, great and sad experience,and good politan law "shallbe limitedto conditions
will. Only then will individuals enjoy of universalhospitality."In this Kantcalls
perfect republican rights or the full for the recognitionof the "rightof a for-
guaranteeof a global and just peace. In eigner not to be treated with hostility
the meantime, the "pacificfederation"of when he arrives on someone else's terri-
liberalrepublics-"an enduringand grad- tory."This "doesnot extendbeyond those
ually expandingfederationlikely to pre- conditions which make it possible for
vent war"-brings within it more and them [foreigners]to attemptto enter into
more republics-despite republican col- relations [commerce]with the native in-
lapses,backsliding,and disastrouswars- habitants"(Kant,PP, p. 106). Hospitality
creatingan ever-expandingseparatepeace does not requireextending to foreigners
(Kant,PP, p. 105).6 Kantemphasizesthat either the right to citizenshipor the right
to settlement, unless the foreign visitors
it can be shown that this idea of federalism, ex- would perish if they were expelled. For-
tending gradually to encompass all states and eign conquest and plunder also find no
thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable
and has objective reality. For if by good fortune justificationunder this right. Hospitality
one powerful and enlightened nation can form a does appearto includethe right of access
republic (which is by nature inclined to seek and the obligation of maintaining the
peace), this will provide a focal point for federal opportunity for citizens to exchange
association among other states. These will join
up with the first one, thus securing the freedom
goods and ideas without imposing the
of each state in accordance with the idea of inter- obligationto trade (a voluntaryact in all
national right, and the whole will gradually cases underliberalconstitutions).

1158
1986 Liberalismand World Politics

Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epi- we now come to the essential question regarding
stemology, a conditionfor ethicalaction, the prospect of perpetual peace. What does
and, most importantly,an explanationof nature do in relation to the end which man's own
reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does
how the "mechanicalprocess of nature nature help to promote his moral purpose? And
visibly exhibitsthe purposiveplan of pro- how does nature guarantee that what man ought
ducingconcordamong men, even against to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not
their will and indeed by means of their do) will in fact be done through nature's compul-
very discord" (Kant, PP, p. 108; UH, pp. sion, without prejudice to the free agency of
man? . . . This does not mean that nature im-
44-45). Understandinghistoryrequiresan poses on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be
epistemologicalfoundation,for without a imposed by practical reason. On the contrary,
teleology, such as the promise of per- nature does it herself, whether we are willing or
petual peace, the complexity of history not: facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt.
(PP, p. 112)
would overwhelm human understanding
(Kant, UH, pp. 51-53). Perpetualpeace, The guaranteethus rests,Kantargues,not
however, is not merely a heuristicdevice on the probablebehaviorof moralangels,
with which to interpret history. It is but on that of "devils, so long as they
guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First possess understanding"(PP, p. 112). In
Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the explainingthe sourcesof each of the three
Guaranteeof PerpetualPeace"),to result definitivearticles of the perpetualpeace,
from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, Kant then tells us how we (as free and in-
failing that, from a hiddenplan.8Peaceis telligent devils) could be motivated by
an ethical duty because it is only under fear, force, and calculatedadvantage to
conditionsof peace that all men can treat undertakea course of action whose out-
each other as ends, ratherthan means to come we could reasonably anticipateto
an end (Kant, UH, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, be perpetualpeace. Yet while it is possible
chap. 3). In orderfor this duty to be prac- to conceive of the Kantianroad to peace
tical, Kantneeds, of course, to show that in these terms, Kant himself recognizes
peace is in fact possible. The widespread and argues that social evolution also
sentiment of approbation that he saw makes the conditions of moral behavior
arousedby the early successof the French less onerous and hence more likely (CF,
revolutionariesshowed him that we can pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In
indeed be moved by ethical sentiments tracing the effects of both political and
with a cosmopolitanreach(Kant,CF, pp. moral development,he builds an account
181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This of why liberal states do maintain peace
does not mean, however, that perpetual among themselvesand of how it will (by
peace is certain("prophesiable"). Eventhe implication, has) come about that the
scientificallyregularcourse of the planets pacific union will expand. He also ex-
could be changed by a wayward comet plains how these republicswould engage
striking them out of orbit. Human in wars with nonrepublicsand therefore
freedomrequiresthat we allow for much sufferthe "sadexperience"of wars that an
greaterreversalsin the course of history. ethical policy might have avoided.
We must, in fact, anticipatethe possibility The first source of the three definitive
of backsliding and destructive wars- articles derives from a political evolu-
though thesewill serve to educatenations tion-from a constitutionallaw. Nature
to the importanceof peace (Kant,UH, pp. (providence)has seen to it that humanbe-
47-48). ings can live in all the regionswhere they
In the end, however, our guaranteeof have been drivento settleby wars. (Kant,
perpetualpeace does not rest on ethical who once taught geography, reports on
conduct. As Kant emphasizes, the Lapps,the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.)

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

"Asocialsociability"draws men together threat of new wars. But under a constitution


to fulfill needs for security and material where the subject is not a citizen, and which is
therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing
welfare as it drives them into conflicts in the world to go to war. For the head of state is
over the distributionand control of social not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state,
products (Kant, UH, p. 44-45; PP, pp. and war will not force him to make the slightest
110-11). This violent natural evolution sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure
palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can
tends towards the liberal peace because thus decide on war, without any significant
"asocial sociability" inevitably leads reason, as a kind of amusement, and uncon-
toward republicangovernments, and re- cernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are
publicangovernmentsare a source of the always ready for such pruposes) to justify the
liberalpeace. war for the sake of propriety. (Kant, PP, p. 100)
Republicanrepresentationand separa- Yet these domestic republicanrestraints
tion of powers are producedbecausethey do not end war. If they did, liberalstates
are the means by which the state is would not be warlike, which is far from
"organizedwell" to preparefor and meet the case. They do introduce republican
foreign threats(by unity) and to tame the caution-Kant's "hesitation"-in place of
ambitions of selfish and aggressive in- monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are
dividuals (by authority derived from only fought for popular,liberalpurposes.
representation,by general laws, and by The historicalliberallegacy is laden with
nondespotic administration)(Kant, PP, popularwars fought to promotefreedom,
pp. 112-13). Statesthat are not organized to protectprivateproperty,or to support
in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus en- liberal allies against nonliberal enemies.
courage commerce and private property Kant'sposition is ambiguous.He regards
in orderto increasenationalwealth. They these wars as unjustand warnsliberalsof
cede rights of representationto their sub- their susceptibilityto them (Kant, PP, p.
jects in order to strengthentheir political 106). At the same time, Kant arguesthat
support or to obtain willing grantsof tax each nation "can and ought to" demand
revenue (Hassner,1972, pp. 583-86). that its neighboringnations enterinto the
Kant shows how republics,once estab- pacificunion of liberalstates (PP, p. 102).
lished, lead to peaceful relations. he Thus to see how the pacific union re-
arguesthat once the aggressiveinterestsof moves the occasionof wars amongliberal
absolutist monarchiesare tamed and the states and not wars between liberal and
habit of respect for individual rights nonliberal states, we need to shift our
engrained by republican government, attentionfrom constitutionallaw to inter-
wars would appear as the disasterto the national law, Kant'ssecond source.
people's welfare that he and the other Complementing the constitutional
liberals thought them to be. The funda- guarantee of caution, internationallaw
mental reason is this: adds a second source for the definitive
If, as is inevitabilitythe case underthis constitu- articles: a guarantee of respect. The
tion, the consent of the citizens is requiredto separationof nations that asocial socia-
decidewhetheror not war shouldbe declared,it bility encourages is reinforced by the
is very naturalthat they will have a greathesita- development of separate languages and
tion in embarkingon so dangerousan enterprise.
Forthis would meancallingdown on themselves religions. Thesefurtherguaranteea world
all the miseriesof war, suchas doing the fighting of separatestates-an essentialcondition
themselves,supplyingthe costs of the war from needed to avoid a "global, soul-less
their own resources,painfullymakinggood the despotism."Yet, at the same time, they
ensuingdevastation,and, as the crowningevil,
having to take upon themselves a burden of
also morally integrateliberal states: "as
debtswhich will embitterpeace itself and which culture grows and men gradually move
can neverbe paid off on accountof the constant ,towards greater agreement over their-

1160
1986 Liberalism and World Politics

principles, they lead to mutual under- cooperative international division of


standing and peace" (Kant, PP, p. 114). labor and free trade according to com-
As republicsemerge(the first source)and parativeadvantage.Eacheconomy is said
as cultureprogresses,an understandingof to be better off than it would have been
the legitimaterights of all citizens and of under autarky;each thus acquiresan in-
all republics comes into play; and this, centive to avoid policies that would lead
now that caution characterizespolicy, the other to break these economic ties.
sets up the moral foundations for the Becausekeepingopen marketsrests upon
liberal peace. Correspondingly,interna- the assumptionthat the next set of trans-
tional law highlights the importance of actions will also be determinedby prices
Kantian publicity. Domestically, pub- rather than coercion, a sense of mutual
licity helps ensure that the officials of security is vital to avoid security-
republics act according to the principles motivatedsearchesfor economicautarky.
they professto hold just and accordingto Thus, avoiding a challenge to another
the interestsof the electors they claim to liberal state's security or even enhancing
represent.Internationally,freespeechand each other'ssecurityby means of alliance
the effective communicationof accurate naturally follows economic interde-
conceptionsof the political life of foreign pendence.
peoples is essential to establishing and A further cosmopolitan source of lib-
preserving the understandingon which eral peace is the internationalmarket's
the guaranteeof respectdepends.Domes- removal of difficult decisions of produc-
tically just republics,which rest on con- tion and distribution from the direct
sent, then presumeforeign republicsalso sphereof state policy. A foreignstate thus
to be consensual, just, and therefore does not appear directly responsiblefor
deservingof accommodation.The experi- theseoutcomes,and statescan standaside
ence of cooperation helps engenderfur- from, and to some degree above, these
ther cooperativebehavior when the con- contentiousmarketrivalriesand be ready
sequencesof state policy are unclearbut to step in to resolve crises. The inter-
(potentially) mutually beneficial. At the dependenceof commerceand the interna-
same time, liberal states assume that tional contacts of state officials help
nonliberal states, which do not rest on create crosscuttingtransnationalties that
free consent, are not just. Because serve as lobbies for mutual accommoda-
nonliberalgovernmentsare in a state of tion. According to modern liberal
aggression with their own people, their scholars, international financiers and
foreign relations become for liberal transnationaland transgovernmentalor-
governments deeply suspect. In short, ganizations create interests in favor of
fellow liberalsbenefitfrom a presumption accommodation.Moreover, their variety
of amity; nonliberals suffer from a has ensured that no single conflict sours
presumption of enmity. Both presump- an entire relationship by setting off a
tions may be accurate; each, however, spiralof reciprocatedretaliation(Brzezin-
may also be self-confirming. ski and Huntington,1963, chap. 9; Keo-
Lastly, cosmopolitanlaw adds material hane and Nye, 1977, chap. 7; Neustadt,
incentives to moral commitments. The 1970; Polanyi, 1944, chaps. 1-2). Con-
cosmopolitanright to hospitalitypermits versely, a sense of suspicion, such as that
the "spiritof commerce"sooneror laterto characterizingrelations between liberal
take hold of every nation, thus impelling and nonliberalgovernments,can lead to
statesto promotepeaceand to try to avert restrictionson the range of contacts be-
war. Liberaleconomic theory holds that tween societies, and this can increasethe
these cosmopolitan ties derive from a prospect that a single conflict will deter-

1161
American Political Science Review Vol. 80

mine an entire relationship. Kant'scitizens, too, are diversein their


No single constitutional,international, goals and individualizedand rationalized,
or cosmopolitansourceis alone sufficient, but most importantly,they are capableof
but together (and only together) they appreciatingthe moral equality of all in-
plausibly connect the characteristicsof dividualsand of treatingotherindividuals
liberal polities and economies with sus- as endsratherthanas means.The Kantian
tainedliberalpeace. Alliancesfoundedon state thus is governedpublicly according
mutual strategic interest among liberal to law, as a republic. Kant'sis the state
and nonliberalstates have been broken; that solves the problem of governing in-
economic ties between liberal and non- dividualizedequals, whetherthey are the
liberalstates have proven fragile;but the "rationaldevils" he says we often find
political bonds of liberalrightsand inter- ourselves to be or the ethical agents we
ests have proven a remarkablyfirm foun- can and should become. Republicstell us
dation for mutual nonaggression. A that
separatepeace exists among liberalstates. in order to organizea group of rationalbeings
In theirrelationswith nonliberalstates, who togetherrequireuniversallaws for theirsur-
however, liberal states have not escaped vival, but of whom each separateindividualis
from the insecuritycausedby anarchyin secretly inclined to exempt himself from them,
the world politicalsystem consideredas a the constitutionmust be so designed so that,
whole. Moreover, the very constitutional although the citizensare opposedto one another
in their private attitudes,these opposing views
restraint, international respect for in- may inhibitone anotherin such a way that the
dividual rights, and shared commercial publicconductof the citizenswill be the sameas
intereststhat establishgroundsfor peace if they did not have such evil attitudes. (Kant,
among liberalstates establishgroundsfor PP, p. 113)
additional conflict in relations between Unlike Machiavelli's republics, Kant's
liberaland nonliberalsocieties. republicsare capable of achieving peace
among themselves because they exercise
Conclusion democratic cautionand are capableof ap-
preciating the international rights of
Kant's liberal internationalism, foreign republics. These international
Machiavelli's liberal imperialism, and rights of republics derive from the
Schumpeter'sliberalpacifismrest on fun- representation of foreign individuals,
damentallydifferentviews of the nature who are our moralequals.UnlikeSchum-
of the human being, the state, and inter- peter's capitalist democracies, Kant's
national relations.9Schumpeter'shumans republics-including our own-remain in
are rationalized, individualized, and a state of war with nonrepublics.Liberal
democratized. They are also homoge- republicssee themselvesas threatenedby
nized, pursuingmaterialinterests"monis- aggressionfrom nonrepublicsthat are not
tically." Because their material interests constrained by representation. Even
lie in peaceful trade, they and the demo- though wars often cost more than the
cratic state that these fellow citizenscon- economic return they generate, liberal
trol are pacifistic. Machiavelli'scitizens republicsalso are preparedto protectand
are splendidly diverse in their goals but promote-sometimes forcibly-democ-
fundamentallyunequal in them as well, racy, private property, and the rights of
seeking to rule or fearing being domi- individuals overseas against nonrepub-
nated. Extendingthe rule of the dominant lics, which, because they do not authen-
elite or avoiding the political collapse of tically representthe rights of individuals,
their state, each calls for imperial have no rights to noninterference.These
expansion. wars may liberate oppressed individuals

1162
1986 Liberalismand World Politics

overseas; they also can generate enor- troducingsteadierstrategiccalculationsof


mous suffering. the national interestin the long run and
Preserving the legacy of the liberal more flexible responsesto changesin the
peace without succumbingto the legacy internationalpolitical environment.Con-
of liberalimprudenceis both a moral and straining the indiscriminatemeddling of
a strategicchallenge.The bipolarstability our foreign interventions calls for a
of the internationalsystem, and the near deeperappreciationof the "particularism
certaintyof mutual devastationresulting of history, culture, and membership"
from a nuclear war between the super- (Walzer, 1983, p. 5), but both the im-
powers, have created a "crystal ball provementin strategyand the constraint
effect" that has helped to constrain the on interventionseem, in turn, to require
tendency toward miscalculationpresent an executivefreedfrom the restraintsof a
at the outbreak of so many wars in the representativelegislaturein the manage-
past (Carnesale,Doty, Hoffmann, Hun- ment of foreign policy and a political
tington, Nye, and Sagan, 1983, p. 44; cultureindifferentto the universalrights
Waltz, 1964). However, this "nuclear of individuals.These conditions, in their
peace"appearsto be limitedto the super- turn, could break the chain of constitu-
powers. It has not curbedmilitary inter- tional guarantees, the respect for rep-
ventionsin the ThirdWorld.Moreover,it resentativegovernment, and the web of
is subjectto a desperatetechnologicalrace transnationalcontact that have sustained
designedto overcome its constraintsand the pacific union of liberalstates.
to crisesthat have pushedeven the super- Perpetualpeace, Kant says, is the end
powers to the brink of war. We must still point of the hard journey his republics
reckonwith the war fevers and moods of will take. The promiseof perpetualpeace,
appeasementthat have almost alternately the violent lessons of war, and the ex-
swept liberaldemocracies. perienceof a partialpeaceareproof of the
Yet restraining liberal imprudence, need for and the possibility of world
whetheraggressiveor passive, may not be peace. They are also the grounds for
possible without threatening liberal moral citizens and statesmen to assume
pacification. Improving the strategic the duty of strivingfor peace.
acumenof our foreignpolicy calls for in-

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

Appendix 1. Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union, 1700-1982

Period Period Period


18th Century 1900-1945(cont.) 1945- (cont.)
Swiss Cantonsa Italy, -1922 Costa Rica, -1948; 1953-
FrenchRepublic,1790-1795 Belgium,-1940 Iceland,1944-
UnitedStates,a1776- Netherlands,-1940 France,1945-
Total = 3 Argentina,-1943 Denmark,1945
France,-1940 Norway, 1945
1800-1850 Chile, -1924, 1932- Austria,1945-
Swiss Confederation Australia,1901 Brazil,1945-1954;1955-1964
UnitedStates Norway, 1905-1940 Belgium,1946-
France,1830-1849 New Zealand,1907- Luxemburg,1946-
Belgium,1830- Colombia,1910-1949 Netherlands,1946-
GreatBritain,1832- Denmark,1914-1940 Italy, 1946-
Netherlands,1848- Poland, 1917-1935 Philippines,1946-1972
Piedmont,1848- Latvia,1922-1934 India, 1947-1975, 1977-
Denmark,1849- Germany,1918-1932 Sri Lanka,1948-1961;1963-1971;
Total = 8 Austria,1918-1934 1978-
Estonia,1919-1934 Ecuador,1948-1963;1979-
1850-1900 Finland,1919- Israel,1949-
Switzerland Uruguay,1919- West Germany,1949-
UnitedStates Costa Rica, 1919- Greece,1950-1967;1975-
Belgium Czechoslovakia,1920-1939 Peru, 1950-1962;1963-1968;1980-
GreatBritain Ireland,1920- El Salvador,1950-1961
Netherlands Mexico, 1928- Turkey,1950-1960;1966-1971
Piedmont,-1861 Lebanon,1944- Japan,1951-
Italy, 1861- Total = 29 Bolivia, 1956-1969;1982-
Denmark,-1866 Colombia,1958-
Sweden,1864- 1945- Venezuela,1959-
Greece,1864- Switzerland Nigeria,1961-1964;1979-1984
Canada,1867- UnitedStates Jamaica,1962-
France,1871- GreatBritain Trinidadand Tobago, 1962-
Argentina,1880- Sweden Senegal,1963-
Chile, 1891- Canada Malaysia,1963-
Total = 13 Australia Botswana,1966-
New Zealand Singapore,1965-
1900-1945 Finland Portugal,1976-
Switzerland Ireland Spain, 1978-
UnitedStates Mexico DominicanRepublic,1978-
GreatBritain Uruguay,-1973 Honduras,1981-
Sweden Chile, -1973 PapuaNew Guinea,1982-
Canada Lebanon,-1975 Total = 50
Greece,-1911; 1928-1936

Note: I have drawn up this approximatelist of "LiberalRegimes"accordingto the four institutionsKant


describedas essential:marketand privatepropertyeconomies;politiesthat are externallysovereign;citizens
who possessjuridicalrights;and "republican" (whetherrepublicanor parliamentarymonarchy),representa-
tive government.Thislatterincludestherequirementthatthelegislativebranchhavean effectiverole in public
policy and be formallyand competitively(eitherinter-or intra-party)elected.Furthermore, I have takeninto
accountwhethermale suffrageis wide (i.e., 30%) or, as Kant (MM, p. 139) would have had it, open by
"achievement"to inhabitantsof the national or metropolitanterritory(e.g., to poll-tax payers or house-
holders).This list of liberalregimesis thus more inclusivethan a list of democraticregimes,or polyarchies
(Powell, 1982, p. 5). Other conditionstaken into accounthere are that female suffrageis grantedwithin a
generationof its being demandedby an extensivefemalesuffragemovementand that representativegovern-
mentis internallysovereign(e.g., including,and especiallyover militaryand foreignaffairs)as well as stable
(in existencefor at least threeyears).Sourcesfor thesedataareBanksandOverstreet(1983),Gastil(1985),The
EuropaYearbook,1985 (1985), Langer(1968), U.K. Foreignand CommonwealthOffice (1980), and U.S.

1164
1986 Liberalism and World Politics

Department of State (1981). Finally, these lists exclude ancient and medieval "republics,"since none appears to
fit Kant's commitment to liberal individualism (Holmes, 1979).
aThere are domestic variations within these liberal regimes: Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the
United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout.
bSelected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all states
categorized as "free"by Gastil and those "partly free" (four-fifths or more free) states with a more pronounced
capitalist orientation.

Appendix2. InternationalWars Listed Chronologically

British-Maharattan (1817-1818) Pacific(1879-1883)


Greek(1821-1828) British-Zulu(1879)
Franco-Spanish (1823) Franco-Indochinese (1882-1884)
FirstAnglo-Burmese(1823-1826) Mahdist(1882-1885)
Javanese(1825-1830) Sino-French(1884-1885)
Russo-Persian(1826-1828) CentralAmerican(1885)
Russo-Turkish(1828-1829) Serbo-Bulgarian (1885)
FirstPolish (1831) Sino-Japanese(1894-1895)
FirstSyrian(1831-1832) Franco-Madagascan (1894-1895)
Texas (1835-1836) Cuban(1895-1898)
FirstBritish-Afghan(1838-1842) Italo-Ethipian(1895-1896)
SecondSyrian(1839-1940) FirstPhilippine(1896-1898)
Franco-Algerian (1839-1847) Greco-Turkish(1897)
Peruvian-Bolivian (1841) Spanish-American (1898)
FirstBritish-Sikh(1845-1846) SecondPhlippine(1899-1902)
Mexican-American (1846-1848) Boer (1899-1902)
Austro-Sardinian (1848-1849) BoxerRebellion(1900)
FirstSchleswig-Holstein (1848-1849) Ilinden(1903)
Hungarian(1848-1849) Russo-Japanese (1904-1905)
Second British-Sikh(1848-1849) CentralAmerican(1906)
RomanRepublic(1849) CentralAmerican(1907)
La Plata (1851-1852) Spanish-Moroccan (1909-1910)
FirstTurco-Montenegran (1852-1853) Italo-Turkish(1911-1912)
Crimean(1853-1856) FirstBalkan(1912-1913)
Anglo-Persian(1856-1857) SecondBalkan(1913)
Sepoy (1857-1859) WorldWar I (1914-1918)
SecondTurco-Montenegran (1858-1859) RussianNationalities(1917-1921)
ItalianUnification(1859) Russo-Polish(1919-1920)
Spanish-Moroccan(1859-1860) Hungarian-Allies (1919)
Italo-Roman(1860) Greco-Turkish(1919-1922)
Italo-Sicilian(1860-1861) Riffian(1921-1926)
Franco-Mexican (1862-1867) Druze (1925-1927)
Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863) Sino-Soviet(1929)
SecondPolish (1863-1864) Manchurian(1931-1933)
Spanish-SantoDominican(1863-1865) Chaco (1932-1935)
SecondSchleswig-Holstein(1864) Italo-Ethiopian(1935-1936)
Lopez(1864-1870) Sino-Japanese(1937-1941)
Spanish-Chilean(1865-1866) Russo-Hungarian (1956)
Seven Weeks(1866) Sinai (1956)
Ten Years(1868-1878) Tibetan(1956-1959)
Franco-Prussian (1870-1871) Sino-Indian(1962)
Dutch-Achinese(1873-1878) Vietnamese(1965-1975)
Balkan(1875-1877) SecondKashmir(1965)
Russo-Turkish(1877-1878) Six Day (1967)
Bosnian(1878) Israeli-Egyptian(1969-1970)
Second British-Afghan(1878-1880) Football(1969)

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

Changkufeng(1938) Bangladesh(1971)
Nomohan(1939) Philippine-MNLF(1972-)
World War II (1939-1945) Yom Kippur (1973)
Russo-Finnish(1939-1940) Turco-Cypriot(1974)
Franco-Thai(1940-1941) (1974-)
Ethiopian-Eritrean
Indonesian(1945-1946) Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975-)
Indochinese (1945-1954) Timor (1975-)
Madagascan (1947-1948) Saharan (1975-)
First Kashmir (1947-1949) Ogaden (1976-)
Palestine (1948-1949) Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978-1979)
Hyderabad(1948) Sino-Vietnamese(1979)
Korean (1950-1953) Russo-Afghan (1979-)
Algerian (1954-1962) Iran-Iraqi (1980-)

Note: This tableis takenfromMelvinSmallandJ. David Singer(1982,pp. 79-80). Thisis a partiallist of inter-
nationalwars foughtbetween1816and 1980. In AppendicesA and B, Smalland Singeridentifya total of 575
wars duringthis period, but approximately159 of them appearto be largelydomestic,or civil wars.
This list excludescovert interventions,some of which have been directedby liberalregimesagainstother
liberalregimes-for example,the UnitedStates'effortto destabilizethe ChileanelectionandAllende'sgovern-
ment. Nonetheless,it is significantthat such interventionsare not pursuedpubliclyas acknowledgedpolicy.
The covert destabilizationcampaignagainst Chile is recountedby the Senate Select Committeeto Study
GovernmentalOperationswith Respectto IntelligenceActivities(1975, CovertAction in Chile, 1963-73).
Followingthe argumentof this article,this list also excludescivil wars. Civil wars differfrominternational
wars, not in the ferocityof combat, but in the issues that engenderthem. Two nations that could abide one
anotheras independentneighborsseparatedby a bordermightwell be the fiercestof enemiesif forcedto live
togetherin one state, jointlydecidinghow to raiseand spendtaxes, chooseleaders,and legislatefundamental
questionsof value. Notwithstandingthesedifferences,no civil wars that I recallupset the argumentof liberal
pacification.

Notes

I would like to thank Marshall Cohen, Amy Gut- foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democ-
mann, Ferdinand Hermens, Bonnie Honig, Paschalis racies to maintain peace among themselves, and he
Kitromilides, Klaus Knorr, Diana Meyers, Kenneth made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-
Oye, Jerome Schneewind, and Richard Ullman for Kantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies
their helpful suggestions. One version of this paper of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand
was presented at the American Section of the Inter- Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implica-
national Society for Social and Legal Philosophy, tions of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp.
Notre Dame, Indiana, November 2-4, 1984, and will 55-58) performed a quantitative study of this
appear in Realism and Morality, edited by Kenneth phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J.
Kipnis and Diana Meyers. Another version was pre- Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarian-
sented on March 19, 1986, to the Avoiding Nuclear ism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the
War Project, Center for Science and International postwar period that drew on an unpublished study
Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of Govern- (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his Under-
ment, Harvard University. This essay draws on standing Conflict and War (1979, p. 386). I use the
research assisted by a MacArthur Fellowship in term liberal in a wider, Kantian sense in my discus-
International Security awarded by the Social Science sion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I
Research Council. survey the period from 1790 to the present and find
1. He notes that testing this proposition is likely no war among liberal states.
to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical 3. Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the
analysis." However, the bourgeois attitude toward significance of the distribution of alliance partners in
the military, the spirit and manner by which bour- World War I. He found that the possibility that the
geois societies wage war, and the readiness with actual distribution of alliance partners could have
which they submit to military rule during a pro- occurred by chance was less than 1% (Babst, 1972,
longed war are "conclusive in themselves" (Schum- p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an
peter, 1950, p. 129). equal possibility that any two nations could have
2. Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90-92) seems to gone to war with each other, and this is a strong
have been the first to point out (in contemporary assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion

1166
1986 Liberalismand World Politics

of the issue of statisticalsignificanceas it appliesto empirically merely a "pious hope" (MM, pp.
his libertarianthesis. 164-75)-though even here he finds that the pacific
4. Thereare seriousstudiesshowingthatMarxist union is not "impracticable" (MM, p. 171). In the
regimes have higher military spending per capita Universal History (UH), Kant writes as if the brute
than non-Marxistregimes (Payne, n.d.), but this force of physical nature drives men toward in-
should not be interpretedas a sign of the inherent evitable peace. Yovel (1980, pp. 168 ff.) argues that
aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian from a post-critical (post-Critique of Judgment)
governmentsor of the inherentand global peaceful- perspective, Perpetual Peace reconciles the two
ness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in par- views of history. "Nature" is human-created nature
ticular, representa minority in the currentinter- (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "a
nationalsystem;they arestrategicallyencircled,and prior of the a posterior'-a critical perspective that
due to theirlack of domesticlegitimacy,they might then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic pat-
be said to "suffer"the twin burden of needing terns in history. Law and the "political technology"
defensesagainstboth externaland internalenemies. of republican constitutionalism are separate from
Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) ethical development, but both interdependently lead
militarydictatorships,due to theirdomesticfragili- to perpetual peace-the first through force, fear, and
ty, have little incentiveto engagein foreignmilitary self-interest; the second through progressive
adventures.Accordingto WalterClemens(1982,pp. enlightenment-and both together lead to perpetual
117-18), the United States intervenedin the Third peace through the widening of the circumstances in
World more than twice as often duringthe period which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and
1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-79. smaller burdens.
Relatedly,Posen and VanEvera(1980,p. 105; 1983, 9. For a comparative discussion of the political
pp. 86-89) found that the UnitedStatesdevotedone foundations of Kant's ideas, see Shklar (1984, pp.
quarterand the Soviet Union one tenth of their 232-38).
defensebudgetsto forcesdesignedfor ThirdWorld
interventions(whererespondingto perceivedthreats
would presumablyhave a less thanpurelydefensive References
character).
5. All citations from Kant are from Kant's Andreski, Stanislav. 1980. On the Peaceful Dis-
Political Writings(Kant, 1970), the H. B. Nisbet position of Military Dictatorships. Journal of
translationedited by Hans Reiss. The works dis- Strategic Studies, 3:3-10.
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28:197-204.
PP PerpetualPeace (1795) Aron, Raymond. 1966. Peace and War: A Theory of
UH The Idea for a UniversalHistorywith a International Relations. Richard Howard and
CosmopolitanPurpose(1784) Annette Baker Fox, trans. Garden City, NY:
CF The Contestof Faculties(1798) Doubleday.
MM The Metaphysicsof Morals(1797) Aron, Raymond. 1974. The Imperial Republic.
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MichaelDoyle is AssistantProfessorof Political Science,JohnsHopkinsUniversity,


Baltimore,MD 21218.

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