On October 12, 2015 two events took place in Tunisia.

The first was the much-heralded and

well-deserved Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet—composed
of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade,
and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League, and the Tunisian Order of
Lawyers. The prize was given for the Quartet’s help in establishing a political process when the
country “was on the brink of civil war.” The announcement sent a message not just to Tunisia:
“this year’s prize will contribute toward safeguarding democracy in Tunisia and be an inspiration
to all those who seek to promote peace and democracy in the Middle East, North Africa, and the
rest of the world.” Justifiably proud, Tunisians celebrated, but many also soberly noted that
much work, especially on the social and economic front, remains.

The second event that took place on that day was the death of a young Tunisian street vendor
who died in a hospital in Sfax. He had set himself on fire after the contraband cigarettes he was
trying to sell were seized. The event immediately brought to mind the self-immolation in
December 2010 of the young university graduate Mohamed Bouazizi, who made a living selling
fruit. He killed himself in protest against police harassment—a tragedy that galvanized the
Tunisian people and led eventually to the end of the Ben Ali regime and to revolts elsewhere in
the Arab world.

The more recent tragic death of a young Tunisian in a politically very different country
underlined the country’s economic and social challenges.

The economy is struggling. Real GDP grew at 2.3 percent in 2014, after 2.4 percent in 2013 and
is estimated at 1 percent for 2015. Unemployment is at 15.2 percent, above the pre-revolution
level of 13 percent. Setbacks in mining, parts of agriculture, and tourism—reeling from terrorist
attacks—are expected to adversely affect living conditions in rural areas, where poverty is
concentrated, and in pockets of urban poverty where employment prospects are deteriorating.
Youth unemployment stands at 40 percent, and especially glaring is the unemployment rate of
Tunisian university graduates; it takes an average of six years for a university graduate in Tunisia
to find a stable job and by age 35 half of all university graduates in the country are still
unemployed. In the meantime Tunisia’s 800,000 public sector employees received a $47 dollar
raise last April with a $25 increase set for January 2016, and with public sector wages at 13.5
percent of GDP—one of the highest rates in the world—the whole proposition is clearly
unsustainable.

The implicit social contract that governed Ben Ali’s Tunisia was, broadly speaking, one where
the state promised employment for many, social services, a path to the middle class via education
and the enforced stability of an autocracy, all with the understanding that citizens would stay
away from meaningful political participation. The Quartet’s prize celebrated the demise of the
political side of the old social contract. The revolution also highlighted the crony-infused
economy of the period as regional disparities, high unemployment (including for the educated), a
huge public sector wage bill, and corruption made clear the contract’s unsustainability. The focus
now needs to be on developing a modern economy led by the private sector with a level playing
field for all—an economy inclusive in its reach to Tunisians in all regions.
The good news is that the process that the Quartet started foresaw a platform to advance on the
social and economic front: the National Council of Social Dialogue, a tripartite entity designed to
bring together the government, labor in the form of the UGTT, and the private sector via UTICA.
The cabinet approved the draft law on the Council in June 2015. The actual membership may or
may not be increased; that very political decision and a date for the meeting have yet to be
decided.

Not surprisingly, labor represented by the UGTT and UTICA’s businessmen have very different
views on the future of the Tunisian economy, while the coalition government is preoccupied with
security concerns and wary of significant reforms at a time of perceived fragility.

Yet one could also argue that the raucousness of a new democracy with its demonstrations, sharp
rhetoric, and inefficient bargains also points to resilience that only an open democratic system
can bring. After all, this is probably the single most legitimate and representative government in
Tunisia’s history. It is no longer the hard but eventually brittle state that existed five years ago. It
is messy indeed at times, as all democracies are, but ultimately responsive and inclusive. Foreign
support is critical and despite global shortfalls and donor fatigue, much more focus on Tunisia is
needed, especially at a time when billions are going to regimes that have made less progress
towards openness and pluralism.

The reality is that a transition period beckons and the focus should be on lessening the potential
negative impacts of the transition, especially on the poor. The OECD, among others, warns
against using public sector jobs for social appeasement, but calls for an unemployment insurance
system, extending and better targeting cash transfer programs for a basic safety net, public works
programs, etc. Tunisia does not lack for competent bureaucrats, unionists, and business people,
and these and other ideas from within the country and abroad will inform Tunisians as they use
the Social Dialogue platform and others to create an economy commensurate with their
democratic polity. Business as usual should not be the response of the international community.