LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS G.R. No.

170464
and JEWELRY CORPORATION
and LAMBERT LIM,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,  and
PEREZ, JJ.

HELEN BINAMIRA, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 12, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------
--x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is fundamental that an employer is liable for illegal dismissal when it terminates the
services of the employee without just or authorized cause and without due process of law.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2] dated August 4, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 00010, which reversed and set aside
the Resolutions dated July 30, 2003[3] and May 31, 2004[4] issued by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000454-00 (RAB VII-01-0003-
99-B).

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Lambert Lim (Lim) is a Malaysian national operating various businesses in

Cebu and Bohol one of which is Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation. Lim is
married to Rhodora Binamira, daughter of Atty. Boler Binamira, Sr., (Atty. Binamira),
who is also the counsel and father-in-law of respondent Helen Binamira (Helen).
Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation Tagbilaran Branch hired Helen as an
appraiser in July 1995 and designated her as Vault Custodian in 1996.

On September 14, 1998, Helen received a letter[5] from Lim terminating her
employment effective that same day. Lim cited business losses necessitating
retrenchment as the reason for the termination.

Helen thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners docketed as NLRC
RAB-VII CASE NO. 01-0003-99-B.[6] In her Position Paper[7] Helen alleged that she was
dismissed without cause and the benefit of due process. She claimed that she was a mere
casualty of the war of attrition between Lim and the Binamira family. Moreover, she
claimed that there was no proof that the company was suffering from business losses.

In their Position Paper,[8] petitioners asserted that they had no choice but to
retrench respondent due to economic reverses. The corporation suffered a marked decline
in profits as well as substantial and persistent increase in losses. In its Statement of
Income and Expenses, its gross income for 1998 dropped from P1million
to P665,000.00.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On November 26, 1999, Labor Arbiter Geoffrey P. Villahermosa rendered a

Decision[9] which held that Helen was not illegally dismissed but was validly retrenched.
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered judgment

is hereby rendered declaring the respondent not guilty of illegally terminating
the complainant but is however directed to pay the complainant her
retrenchment benefit in the amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P7,500.00), considering that she was receiving a monthly salary of P5,000.00
and rendered service for three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Ruling of the NLRC

 On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
observed that for retrenchment to be valid, a written notice shall be given to the employee
and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the
intended date thereof. Since none was given in this case, then the retrenchment of Helen
was not valid. The dispositive portion of the Decision[11] reads:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the decision of the Labor

Arbiter dated 26 November 1999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
respondents are ordered to reinstate complainant Helen Binamira to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the time
of her dismissal up to the promulgation of this decision.

Other claims are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[13] On July 30, 2003, the NLRC set
aside its Decision dated September 27, 2002 and entered a new one, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of November [sic] 27, 2002 is hereby

SET ASIDE and a New One Entered declaring as valid the redundancy of the
position of the complainant. Accordingly respondent is hereby ordered to pay
the complainant her redundancy pay of one month for every year of service
and in lieu of notice, she should also be paid one (1) month salary as
indemnity.

SO ORDERED.[14]

In arriving at this conclusion, the NLRC opined that what was actually
implemented by the petitioners was not retrenchment due to serious business losses but
termination due to redundancy. The NLRC observed that the Tagbilaran operations was
overstaffed thus necessitating the termination of some employees. Moreover, the
redundancy program was not properly implemented because no written notices were
furnished the employee and the DOLE one month before the intended date of
termination.
 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Helen was denied by the NLRC through
its Resolution[15] dated May 31, 2004.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On petition for certiorari,[16] the CA found that both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC failed to consider substantial evidence showing that the exercise of management
prerogative, in this instance, was done in bad faith and in violation of the employees right
to due process. The CA ruled that there was no redundancy because the position of vault
custodian is a requisite, necessary and desirable position in the pawnshop business. There
was likewise no retrenchment because none of the conditions for retrenchment is present
in this case.

On August 4, 2005, the CA issued its Decision which provides:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated July 30, 2003 and May 31,
2004 issued by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No.
V-000454-00 (RAB VII-01-0003-99-B), is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

A new Decision is hereby entered declaring the dismissal of petitioner,

Helen B. Binamira, as illegal and directing the private respondents, Lamberts
Pawnbroker and Jewelry Corporation and Lambert Lim, jointly and solidarily,
to pay to the petitioner, the following monetary awards:

1. Backwages from the date of her illegal suspension and dismissal

until she is reinstated;

2. Considering that reinstatement is not feasible in view of the

strained relations between the employer and the employee, separation pay is
hereby decreed at the rate of one (1) months pay for every year of service;

3. Moral damages in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos

(P25,000.00);

4. Exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand

Pesos (P25,000.00);OO
 5. Attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to Ten Percent (10%) of
the monetary awards herein above enumerated; and

6. Costs.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the CA through its
Resolution[18] dated November 7, 2005.

Issues

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I.
Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing, through the extra-ordinary remedy
of certiorari, the findings of facts of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
the dismissal of respondent was with valid and legal basis.

II.
Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing, through the extra-ordinary remedy
of certiorari, the unanimous findings of fact of both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC that the dismissal of respondent was not attended by bad faith or fraud.

III.
Whether the CA erred in reversing, through the extra-ordinary remedy of
certiorari, the findings of facts of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based
merely on the allegations and evidences made and submitted by the former
counsel, adviser and business partner of petitioners.[19]

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners assail the propriety of the reversal by the CA of the factual findings of both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners posit
that a writ of certiorari is proper only to correct errors of jurisdiction or when there is
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
labor tribunals. They asserted that where the issue or question involved affects the
wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.

Petitioners further contend that the CA erred in ruling that the dismissal was not valid and
that it was done in bad faith.

Respondents Arguments

On the other hand, Helen avers that the contradictory findings of fact of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC justifies the CA to review the findings of fact of the labor
tribunals. She further submits that both labor tribunals failed to consider substantial
evidence showing that petitioners exercise of management prerogative was done in utter
bad faith and in violation of her right to due process.
Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The CA correctly reviewed the factual findings

of the labor tribunals.

As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved
is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing
factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are
constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support
those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare
or incomplete facts appearing on record,[20] as in the present case.

We find that the CA rightfully reviewed the correctness of the labor tribunals factual
findings not only because of the foregoing inadequacies, but also because the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiter came up with conflicting findings. The Labor Arbiter found that Helens
dismissal was valid on account of retrenchment due to economic reverses. On the other
hand, the NLRC originally ruled that Helens dismissal was illegal as none of the
requisites of a valid retrenchment was present. However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC changed its posture and ruled that the dismissal was valid on
the ground of redundancy due to over-hiring. Considering the diverse findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, it behooved upon the CA in the exercise of
itscertiorari jurisdiction to determine which findings are more in conformity with the
evidentiary facts.

There was no valid dismissal based on

retrenchment.

Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through

no fault of and without prejudice to the employees. It is resorted to during periods of
business recession, industrial depression, seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned
by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant to a new production
program, or automation.[21] It is a management prerogative resorted to avoid or minimize
business losses, and is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code, which reads:

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.- The

employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to x x x
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the
establishment x x x by serving a written notice on the worker and the DOLE at
least one month before the intended date thereof. x x x In case of retrenchment
to prevent losses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay
or at least one-half month for every year of service whichever is higher. x x x
(Emphasis ours)

To effect a valid retrenchment, the following elements must be present: (1) the
retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if
already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious and real, or only if
expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the
employer; (2) the employer serves written notice both to the employee/s concerned and
the DOLE at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment; (3) the employer
pays the retrenched employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code; (4)
the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and (5) the employer uses
fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched or retained.[22]

The losses must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence. The normal method
of discharging this is by the submission of financial statements duly audited by
independent external auditors. In this case, however, the Statement of Income and
Expenses[23] for the year 1997-1998 submitted by the petitioners was prepared only
on January 12, 1999. Thus, it is highly improbable that the management already knew
on September 14, 1998, the date of Helens retrenchment, that they would be incurring
substantial losses.

At any rate, we perused over the financial statements submitted by petitioners and we
find no evidence at all that the company was suffering from business losses. In fact, in
their Position Paper, petitioners merely alleged a sharp drop in its income in 1998
from P1million to only P665,000.00. This is not the business losses contemplated by the
Labor Code that would justify a valid retrenchment. A mere decline in gross income
cannot in any manner be considered as serious business losses. It should be substantial,
sustained and real.

To make matters worse, there was also no showing that petitioners adopted other cost-
saving measures before resorting to retrenchment. They also did not use any fair and
reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched. Finally, no written notices
were served on the employee and the DOLE prior to the implementation of the
retrenchment. Helen received her notice only on September 14, 1998, the day when her
termination would supposedly take effect. This is in clear violation of the Labor Code
provision which requires notice at least one month prior to the intended date of
termination.

There was no valid dismissal based on

redundancy.

Redundancy, on the other hand, exists when the service capability of the workforce is in
excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise. A redundant
position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as over hiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously
manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a service activity previously undertaken
by the business. Under these conditions, the employer has no legal obligation to keep in
its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.[24]

For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply
with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the
DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of termination of employment; (2)
payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service;
(3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.[25]

In this case, there is no proof that the essential requisites for a valid redundancy program
as a ground for the termination of the employment of respondent are present. There was
no showing that the function of respondent is superfluous or that the business was
suffering from a serious downturn that would warrant redundancy considering that such
serious business downturn was the ground cited by petitioners in the termination letter
sent to respondent.[26]

In fine, Helens dismissal is illegal for lack of just or authorized cause and failure to
observe due process of law.

Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry

Corporation is solely liable for the illegal
dismissal of respondent.

As a general rule, only the employer-corporation, partnership or association or any other

entity, and not its officers, which may be held liable for illegal dismissal of employees or
for other wrongful acts. This is as it should be because a corporation is a juridical entity
with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in
general, from the people comprising it.[27] A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act
only through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the
directors and officers acts as corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct
responsibility of the corporation they represent.[28] It is settled that in the absence of
malice and bad faith, a stockholder or an officer of a corporation cannot be made
personally liable for corporate liabilities. [29] They are only solidarily liable with the
corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with malice
or bad faith. In Philippine American Life and General Insurance v. Gramaje,[30] bad faith
is defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose. It implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

In the present case, malice or bad faith on the part of Lim as a corporate officer was not
sufficiently proven to justify a ruling holding him solidarily liable with the
corporation. The lack of authorized or just cause to terminate ones employment and the
failure to observe due process do not ipso facto mean that the corporate officer acted with
malice or bad faith. There must be independent proof of malice or bad faith which is
lacking in the present case.

There is no violation of attorney-client

relationship.

We find no merit in petitioners assertion that Atty. Binamira gravely breached and
abused the rule on privileged communication under the Rules of Court and the Code of
Professional Responsibility of Lawyers when he represented Helen in the present
case. Notably, this issue was never raised before the labor tribunals and was raised for the
first time only on appeal.Moreover, records show that although petitioners previously
employed Atty. Binamira to manage several businesses, there is no showing that they
likewise engaged his professional services as a lawyer. Likewise, at the time the instant
complaint was filed, Atty. Binamira was no longer under the employ of petitioners.

Respondent is entitled to the following relief

under the law.

An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority

rights and other privileges and to this full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to her
other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time the compensation
was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer
feasible, separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or one month salary for
every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six months being
considered as one whole year, should be awarded to respondent.
In this case, Helen is entitled to her full backwages from the time she was illegally
dismissed on September 14, 1998. Considering the strained relations between the parties,
reinstatement is no longer feasible. Consequently, Helen is also entitled to receive
separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service.

A dismissal may be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to
entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary
damages cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his
employee without authorized cause and due process.[31]
Considering that there is no clear and convincing evidence showing that the termination
of Helens services had been carried out in an arbitrary, capricious and malicious manner,
the award of moral and exemplary damages is not warranted.

Consequently, the moral and exemplary damages awarded by the CA are hereby deleted.

However, the award of attorneys fee is warranted pursuant to Article 111 of the
Labor Code. Ten (10%) percent of the total award is usually the reasonable amount of
attorneys fees awarded. It is settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and,
thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorneys fees is legally
and morally justifiable.[32]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 00010 dated August 4, 2005 finding the
dismissal of respondent Helen B. Binamira as illegal is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS that respondent is entitled to receive full backwages from the time
she was illegally dismissed on September 14, 1998 as well as to separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. The amounts
awarded as moral damages and exemplary damages are deleted for lack of basis. Finally,
only petitioner Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation is found liable for the
illegal dismissal of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Digest in scribd A.M. NO. P-08-2590

Present:

JULIE ANN C. DELA CUEVA,

Complainant, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:

July 5, 2010

SELIMA B. OMAGA,

Court Stenographer I,

MTC-Calauan, Laguna,

Respondent.

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a sworn Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated June

15, 2007 filed by Julie Ann dela Cueva charging respondent Selima B. Omaga,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Calauan, Laguna, with Immorality.

Complainant Julie Ann C. dela Cueva is the legal wife of P/Supt. Nestor dela
Cueva.[2] They were married on July 29, 1984, and the union bore three
children. Due to the philandering ways of her husband, the couple separated
on November 30, 1994.[3] Thereafter, the complainant cohabited with two different
men in succession (1) William Castillo with whom she had three children: Jessica,
born on February 24, 1998; William Paolo, born on March 6, 2000; and Frenz
William, born on August 8, 2002; and (2) Justiniano Montillano with whom she
had one child, Justin Jan, born on March 31, 2006.[4]

On May 31, 2007, P/Supt. Nestor dela Cueva filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage alleging as ground his own psychological incapacity. [5] This
angered and prompted his wife, the complainant, to file a criminal complaint
against him for bigamy and concubinage. Her complaint alleged that he and
respondent, Selima B. Omaga, got married and were living together as husband
and wife despite the subsistence of his marriage with her (the complainant).[6] The
criminal charges were dismissed by the provincial prosecutor in a resolution
dated August 24, 2007.[7]
 Complainant dela Cueva also filed an administrative complaint against both
her husband and the respondent.[8] In her defense, respondent averred that she first
met P/Supt. dela Cueva in 1995 when he was assigned by the Philippine National
Police as Chief of Police in Calauan, Laguna. Their relationship started on March
8, 1995 and continued until she received notice of the bigamy and concubinage
case filed against him.[9] It was only then that she discovered that he was
married.[10] She bore P/Supt. dela Cueva three children: John Emmanuel, born on
December 27, 1996; Patrick Josef, born on May 1, 1998; and Patricia May, born on
May 18, 2000.[11] Respondent further asserted that despite having had three
children with P/Supt. dela Cueva, they did not live together in one house but rather,
he would just visit her in her house from time to time.[12]

On October 23, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended

that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that
respondent be in the meantime suspended for a period six (6) months and one (1)
day, without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act would be
dealt with more severely.[13]

As recommended, the Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular

administrative matter in a Resolution dated December 15, 2008.[14] In another
Resolution dated June 10, 2009, the Office of the Court Administrator was directed
to assign a Regional Trial Court judge in Laguna for investigation, report and
recommendation.[15] On September 17, 2009, Judge Agripino G. Morga of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City, Laguna, was designated to be the
investigating judge.

During the hearing of the case before the investigating judge on October 8,
2009, the complainant manifested that she was withdrawing her complaint after
learning that respondent and her husband never lived together as husband and
wife.[16] Complainant confessed that she was prompted to file the complaint simply
because her husband had filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.[17]

In his Report and Recommendation dated December 10, 2009, Judge Morga
recommended that the respondent be absolved from any administrative liability
taking into consideration the following circumstances: (1) respondent and P/Supt.
dela Cueva began their relationship after he was already separated in fact from
complainant; (2) complainant is no longer interested in pursuing the case as she
realized that filing it was a mistake since respondent and her husband never lived
together as husband and wife; (3) there is no evidence to contradict respondents
claim that during their relationship she did not know dela Cueva was married and
that they did not cohabit in one house; (4) respondents performance as court
stenographer was not adversely affected by her situation; and (5) respondent has
properly reared her children and conducted herself in public appropriately. [18] He
further stated that:

All told, the totality of the above circumstances necessitates

a review on the findings of the Honorable Court and the Court
Administrator to impose a six-month suspension. While it cannot
be disputed that respondent entered into an illicit relationship,
the same to the mind of this Investigator was not so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[19]

The sole issue before this Court is whether or not respondent is guilty of
immoral conduct.
At the outset, it should be stressed that complainants change of heart in deciding
not to pursue the case against respondent is of no moment as it has no controlling
significance in this administrative case. The long standing policy is:

Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or

pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own,
condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound
by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its
disciplinary power x x x Desistance cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against the
respondent. To be sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct
and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary. And the
program and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of
justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by
private arrangements between the parties.[20]

This is so because the issue in administrative cases is not whether the

complainant has a cause of action against the respondent but, rather, whether the
employee against whom the complaint is filed has breached the norms and
standards of service in the judiciary.[21] As such, this Court, having disciplinary
authority over employees of the lower courts, has the power and duty to pursue this
administrative matter regardless of complainants desistance.

The Court now determines whether or not respondent is indeed guilty of

immoral conduct.

Well-established is the principle that public office is a public trust.[22] No

less than the Constitution requires that: Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.[23] In relation thereto, this Court has held that:
 x x x. This constitutional mandate should always be in the
minds of all public servants to guide them in their actions during
their entire tenure in the government service. The good of the
service and the degree of morality which every official and
employee in the public service must observe, if respect and
confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the
enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his
part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while holding
office should be left without proper and commensurate sanction,
all attendant circumstances taken into account.[24]

Employees of the judiciary, however, are subject to a higher standard than

most other civil servants. It has been written that a place in the judiciary demands
upright men and women who must carry on with dignity and be ever conscious of
the impression that they could create by the way they conduct themselves. [25] In the
case of Acebedo v. Arquero,[26] this Court ruled that:

Although every office in the government service is a public

trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness
and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. That is
why this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of
morality and decency expected of those in the service of the
judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention their behavior, is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility,
characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so
as to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the
judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to
their behavior outside the court as private individuals. There is no
dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their
private morals.[27]
 These exacting standards of morality and decency are required of employees
of the judiciary in order to preserve the faith of the people in the courts as
dispensers of justice.[28] Our reminder, through the words of Justice Muoz-Palma,
must be taken to heart:

x x x. The image of the court of justice is necessarily

mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of
its personnel - hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of
each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and
standing as a true temple of justice.[29]

This was further emphasized by the Court in Ratti v. Mendoza-de Castro:[30]

It must be stressed that every employee of the judiciary

should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like
any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but
in her personal and private dealings with other people. In order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice, court
personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct.

Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six
months and one day to one year for the first offense.[31]
 Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but
also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.[32]

There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not
only a violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary but
is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court
abhors and is, thus, punishable.

Respondent claims, however, that she had no knowledge that P/Supt. dela
Cueva was married and that she ended their relationship as soon as she was made
aware of his true civil status. If her contention were true, this would serve to
exculpate her from the accusation of immorality.

The Court finds respondents assertion to be plausible. It should be noted that

the complainant did not refute her defense that she did not learn of P/Supt. dela
Cuevas marital status until complainant filed a complaint against them. Indeed,
there is no concrete evidence on record to show that respondent knew of his
married state at the time their relationship started.

The idea, however, that the respondent never had the slightest notion that
P/Supt. dela Cueva was married and that she did not cohabit with him despite
having three children may be quite a stretch of the imagination. It is fairly
inconceivable for a woman to have had a relationship with a married man for more
than a decade without even a tinge of suspicion that he might have been lying
about his true civil status. But then again, there is nothing on record which can
refute respondents allegation. In view of the lack of proof showing that respondent
willingly entered into an immoral sexual liaison with a married man, she cannot be
held liable for immoral and disgraceful conduct.

It is a well-settled rule that administrative penalties must be supported by

substantial evidence for the imposition thereof.[33] This is in keeping with the
constitutional imperative that a person is entitled to due process of law. The Court
will exercise its disciplinary authority over respondent only if the case against her
is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[34] In this case, the
Court finds the evidence against respondent insufficient to warrant the imposition
of an administrative penalty.

We are, thus, guided by the disquisition of the Court in the case

of Concerned Employee v. Mayor.[35] In said case, a court stenographer had sexual
relations with a married man. She alleged that she did not know that her lover was
married when they commenced their relationship. The Court acknowledged the
validity of such a defense:

The legal effect of such ignorance deserves due consideration, if

only for intellectual clarity. The act of having sexual relations with
a married person, or of married persons having sexual relations
outside their marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
conduct because such manifests deliberate disregard by the actor
of the marital vows protected by the Constitution and our laws.
The perversion is especially egregious if committed by judicial
personnel, those persons specifically tasked with the
administration of justice and the laws of the land. However, the
malevolent intent that normally characterizes the act is not present
when the employee is unaware that his/her sexual partner is actually
married. This lack of awareness may extenuate the cause for the
penalty, as it did in the aforementioned Ui case.[36] (emphasis
supplied)
 In the cited case of Ui v. Bonifacio,[37] the respondent was a female lawyer
who had a relationship with, and actually married, a man whose earlier marriage
was still subsisting. She asserted, however, that as soon as she learned that he was
married, she left him and ended their association. The Court found that she did not
deserve administrative punishment:

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion

that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.

We have held that a member of the Bar and officer of the

court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards. Respondent's act of immediately distancing
herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies
just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession.Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to
do.[38] (emphases supplied)
 On a final note, the Court would like to point out that, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence, it would be insensitive to condemn the respondent for
simply being an unmarried mother of three. There has been no showing that she
has lived her life in a scandalous and disgraceful manner which, by any means, has
affected her standing in the community.[39] To speculate that she did so would be
tantamount to committing a discrimination against a solo parent,[40] which is
prohibited under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8972, the Solo Parents Welfare Act
of 2000, to wit:

Section 7. Work Discrimination No employer shall discriminate

against any solo parent employee with respect to terms and conditions
of employment on account of his/her status.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against

respondent Selima B. Omaga is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Digest in scribd

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin
P. Alcid, Jr. for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for gross misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.

The antecedent facts follow:

Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn
Garin (the spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment,
the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for
breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent
as counsel.

Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of
complainant’s payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent
advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses.
Respondent charged P30,000 as attorney’s fees and P10,000 as filing fees.
Complainant turned over the relevant documents to respondent and paid the fees in
tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor
Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent
attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the
hearing, complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee.
Henceforth, complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent
events and transactions that transpired.

Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told
him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno
to expedite a favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial
reservations, he later acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos
Primero I for P950 and delivered it to respondent’s office.

Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case
against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for
reconsideration was "needed to have [the resolution] reversed."2 Respondent then
prepared the motion and promised complainant that he would fix the problem. On
February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit. Respondent then told
complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and presented
the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the
refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional P10,000 to
respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the
complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case.
Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any update thereafter.

Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up

the status of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that
in one instance he was able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not
progressing because the spouses could not be located. In the same meeting,
respondent asked complainant to determine the whereabouts of the spouses.
Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but because
respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a letter
regarding the possible location of the spouses.

Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters
conveying his disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the
documents in respondent’s possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the
radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga" to solve his predicament. Following the
advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC). Complainant
learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6,
20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was
only P2,440 and not P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same
radio program also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s
problem. The letter, like all of complainant’s previous letters, was unheeded.

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that
respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be
imposed.

Respondent harps a different tale.

In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed
for lack of merit. He denied charging complainant P10,000 as filing fees for the estafa
case and claimed that he charged and received only P2,000. He also countered that the
payment of P30,000 made by the complainant was his acceptance fee for both the
estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise denied the following other allegations of
complainant: that he assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he
asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that he
promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged P5,000, as
filing fee for the civil case.

Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed
to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money
and the documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating
with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and
times that he would be attending his daily court hearings.

The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant
and his counsel attended.5The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006.
The parties were directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days,6 to which
complainant and respondent complied.7

On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for
lack of factual and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as
complainant’s counsel when he filed the criminal case before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before the RTC of Caloocan City. He
averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases as his job was to
ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to
guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for
the client. He continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a
bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled P20,000.
Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he had
allegedly collected exceeded P30,000 – the amount being claimed by complainant from
the spouses.

In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for
negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:

In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a
sore thumb rendering them difficult to escape notice.

One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract
for repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission
emanates from a contract, oral or written, the consequent result is a breach of the
contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for damages. As correctly pointed out
by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent is purely civil in nature
because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent (spouses
Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the contract.

xxxx

Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after
the dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City where the actual damages claimed isP36,000.00.

It is also basic that the civil complaint for P36,000.00 should have been filed with the
MTC [which] has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains
in filing an action is the proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed.
In June 2002 when the civil complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has
already expanded such that the jurisdictional amount of the RTC is
already P400,000.00.

xxxx

Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the
letters marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all received by
complainant’s secretary, except for Exhibit "H" which was received by Atty. Asong, not
to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent by "Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant
were not reciprocated by the respondent with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore
them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the complainant and return the
money and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but omitted to
communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place for the meeting. This
failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was done in bad faith on
the part of respondent.10

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
646, adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The
Resolution11 reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of
suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009,
respondent filed a "Motion to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave
of Office."13 Respondent asserted that the failure to inform complainant of the status of
the cases should not be attributed to him alone. He stressed that complainant had
always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in the afternoon at
his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office in
Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed lapses which would amount to
negligence in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and
without malice or bad faith. He also stressed that this was his first infraction.

In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011,
respondent filed a second Motion for Reconsideration15 which was no longer acted upon
due to the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16,
2011.16

On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned
Notices of Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14,
2011, it issued another Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of
Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration
dated August 15, 2011.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence
under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a
modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of
the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard
of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.19

The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and
the following provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

a)

Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client;

b)

Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body;

c)
Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from his client;

d)

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him;

e)

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

f)

Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and

g)

Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. 20

A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent
violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under
Canon 18 to "serve his client with competence and diligence" when respondent filed a
criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a
civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was
dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for
specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an
alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the
Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to
only P36,000. As correctly stated in the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April
15, 1994[,] vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil
cases where the amount of demand does not exceedP200,000.00 exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and
after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted
to P400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21

The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in
the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and
could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role
as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his
previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious,
diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently
filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a basic
jurisdictional error.

That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly
negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he
filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s
cause despite repeated follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of
incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with
complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt
to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program in a
radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his
attention.

Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A
client pays his lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case
a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’ He must
constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client’s cause."22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client
of the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto.
He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be
queries or requests for information from the client.

In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the
status of the cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse
proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself
admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office many times. Yet,
despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by complainant, respondent
neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his
client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.

Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but
an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be
undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his
person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration
of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only
satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the
interests of the client and the pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to
perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s
Oath.

All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the
complainant who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence 23 the
allegations in the complaint. In the instant case, complainant was only able to prove
respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate
his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of Carlos
Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get a favorable decision. Similarly,
complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed violated Rule
16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required
filing fees.

As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s
Oath, we find the same to constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. –

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving
the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a
MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of
gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath. This Court hereby
imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling
the cases of his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be
disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY

ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND
KAREN OROLA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR
RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against

respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn

Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are
the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio
Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw virtualaw library

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar

Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of
the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio.3cralaw virtualaw
library

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial

Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding
No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M.
Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel,
Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr.
(Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other
heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as
collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and
in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate.
In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of
Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead,
sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC
granted in an Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order).
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of
Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved
for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.6cralaw virtualaw library

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant

disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to
represent conflicting interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e),
Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon
him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that
while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same was
obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his
appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord, respondent
failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not
able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules.10cralaw
virtualaw library

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending

that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs
of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the
Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio
were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only
accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as
their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14,
2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge.12 In
fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as
no further communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he
consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same
case.13 He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio
had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed
to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.14 Finally, he
clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged
between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6,
2007.16 In support of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of
Maricar17and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his
consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted

by IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he
never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to
obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20cralaw virtualaw
library

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no
violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves
admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential information from his
former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the
course of his previous employment.”21 Considering that it was respondent's
first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of
disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be
severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22cralaw virtualaw library

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated
December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension
from the practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No.

XX-2013-1725 dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of

representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03
of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three
(3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY
IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from
representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy
and good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept
of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance
of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment
with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty
to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled
for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding
that respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held
administratively liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for
Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special
Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having
committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent
proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement
as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very
interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the
above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to

him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on
conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same
case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one
party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s previous
appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid
rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if
the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests.31cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was

more of a mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a
settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact,
even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule
15.04,32Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the
written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator
or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this
respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make
a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the
Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express
written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed
out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any
of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s violation of the
aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner

was increased from severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However,
the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation
showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it
contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically
mandates that “[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based.”34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change in the
recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end,
the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of
the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the
requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts
and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to what is required of
courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a
penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35cralaw
virtualaw library

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate
taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent is a first
time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely
accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis to temporarily represent her
only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer’s
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no
knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar
whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance
as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in
good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against
them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment,
hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent
engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,36 the Court
similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three months to the counsel therein who represented parties
whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby

held GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months, withWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Hornilla vs. Salunat

Hornilla vs. Salunat

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Hornilla filed a complaint against Atty. Salunat with

the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for unethical
practice regardingconflict of interests. Said counsel is a
member of the ASSA Law Office and acted as the lawyer
for the Philippine Public School Teacher’s Association.

In a squabble between the PPSTA and some of its board

members pending SEC resolution for unlawful spending
and undervalued sale of real properties, Atty. Salunat
appeared as counsel for said board members.
Respondent says he only appeared in behalf of ASSA
since he was a partner. Moreover, he only filed
a Manifestation for extreme urgency.

Issue: Whether or not Salunat is guilty of unethical

behavior as a member of the IBP.

Held: Yes. Respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found

GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is
ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents

inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed
or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection.Another testof the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

Where corporate directors have committed a breach of

trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence,
and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to
remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of
himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the
corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done
directly to the corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders. This is what is known as a derivative suit,
and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the
corporation is the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only
nominal party. The corporation should be included as a
party in the suit.

In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No.
05-97-5657, entitled Philippine Public School Teachers
Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the
Philippine Public School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al.,
was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors.
Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he
is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of
PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the
respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflictof interest when he
represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.

Nakpil vs Valdes [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

16OCT
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him.
They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it
back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he used to
purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.

The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil
died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the
Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the complainant.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.

RATIO:
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same
time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of
the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.

[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be
doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these
two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were
valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there
is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty
to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
 Hilado vs David
84 Phil 569 – Legal Ethics – Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship
In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled
against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented
by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he
thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no
material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story,
Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned
with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned,
Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty.
Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind
the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated
that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the
letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a
letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was
already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty.
Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said
case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s
consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he
is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or
advocating his client’s cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations
against the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was
only signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real
author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed
his entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time is not
a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on
previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional
confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.

[A.M. No. 5925. March 11, 2003]

RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN T. QUIOCHO, respondent.

Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under
her name of the title over a property previously owned by her sister. Complainant was able to
pay respondent for legal fees.
Respondent failed. Complainant demanded that respondent refund to her the legal fees and
return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him. However, respondent failed to comply
with said demands.

Held: SUSPENDED for 1 year; repetition of violation will be dealt severely. PAY the
complainant.

Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it
that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him.

A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his
possession. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation
of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

“The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney
an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly,
with the interest of his client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the
exacting standard expected of him.”
Facts: Ben Nicolas submitted a letter-complaint with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines against Atty. Macario
Arquillo for deceit,malpractice,gross misconduct and
violation of his oath as Atty by representing conflicting
interest.

It is alleged that in a case before the NLRC Atty Arquillo

represented both complainants & defendants.He is
represented 7 complainants & also represented 1 of the
respondents/ defendants, Jose Castroin the same
consolidated case.

Commissioner Dennis Funa found Atty. Arquillo guilty &

recommended suspension for 6 months. The Board of
Governors of IBP modified the suspension to 2 years.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Arquillo is guilty to warrant the
suspension

Held: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility

requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness & loyalty in
all their dealings with their clients. Corollary to his
duty,they should not represent conflicting interests, except
with all the concerned client’s written consent, given after
a full disclosure of facts.

When a lawyer represents 2 or more opposing parties,

there is a conflict of interests , the existence of which
determined by 3 separate tests: (1) when, in
representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight
for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it
for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the
newretainer will require an attorney to perform an act that
may injuriously that affect the client or, when called upon
in a new relation, to use against the first one any
knowledge acquired through their professional connection;
or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty.

In this case, Atty. Arquillo represented both parties. He

even filed a motion to dismiss in behalf of 1 respondent,
Jose Castro and drafted a position paper in behalf of 7
complainants. His acts cannot be justified even by the fact
that Jose Castro was absolved from the complaints. It
cannot be denied that he represented 2 opposing parties.

An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a

hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a
lawyer’s representation of both sides of an issue is highly
improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter,
however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when
the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.

Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas (292 SCRA 306)

Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he inherited was one in
which he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from presiding
on that case was because it was only after the belated transcription of the stenographic notes
that he remembered that he handled that case. He also says that the counsels did not object
and he never held “full-blown” hearings anyway.

Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases where
they acted as counsel without the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict of
interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no
part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should
administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only cover hearings but
all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which Judge Rojas did make.