The Turn to Experience in Contemporary Theology

David S. Koonce, L.C., S.T.D.

Required course in dogmatic theology, Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum
Academic Year 2013-2014, second semester

LECTURE 4. EXPERIENCE BETWEEN SCHOLASTICISM

AND THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

March 26, 2014

1. The developments of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries

Although Abelard suffered personal defeat in his lifetime, his ideas were widely
influential not only at the theological but also at the cultural level. By denying the reality of
the Platonic universals, Abelard’s philosophy sparked a cultural discovery of the value of the
individual in all aspects of life: society, ethics, and even religion.1 “The individualization of
religion does not, in this period, yet entail its ‘subjectification’. The object of the experience
is still the treasury of experiences of Scripture and authorities which is shared by the entire
Christian community.”2 Even Abelard’s inveterate foe Bernard contributes to this process of
individualization, since for Bernard, the soul’s union with God does not involve an
absorption into the divine being; rather, the individual remains himself in a relationship with
a personal God.3 After the conflict between Abelard and Bernard, theology splits into two
currents that become increasingly radicalized. In the universities, Aristotle is rediscovered,
along with the dialectical thought of Augustine, and the result is a rational theology which
esteems rigorous logic over the testimony of an hic et nunc experience of God. As a reaction
to the cool, austere reasoning of scholasticism, certain currents of spirituality defend the
importance of affectivity and the immediacy of religious experience and the encounter with
God.4 How these two currents conceived the relationship between theology and experience is
what now remains to be seen.

2. Scholasticism and its foremost representative, St. Thomas Aquinas

Geybels gives little attention to the development of the notion of ‘experience’ in

scholasticism, for reasons already stated in the introduction of this thesis. Geybels generally
holds that scholasticism banished experience from theological method, but it seems more
accurate to say that scholasticism represents a different paradigm in its approach to

1
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 235-238, cf. C. MORRIS, The Discovery of the
Individual (1050-1200), Church History Outlines, London 1972, 139-158.
2
H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 238.
3
cf. Ibid., 238-239.
4
See above, Introduction (3); see also Ibid., 13.
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experience.5 Indeed, for the scholastics in general, and for St. Thomas in particular, the mode
of experience shifts from the inner, affective experience described by Bernard, to the plane of
sensory perception of the external world. Consequently, the scholastics begin to consider
systematically the sacraments as the pre-eminent place for encountering God’s mercy.6

St. Thomas’s use of the Latin terms experientia, experimentum, experimentalis and
experior is not insignificant, as a glance at the Index Thomisticus easily verifies. The noun
experientia, in all of its declensions, appears 226 times, the adjective experimentalis is used
39 times, the noun experimentum is found 307 times, while the verb experior is employed
240 times.7 It should be noted however, that these terms occur predominantly in the
‘objections’ that cite other thinker’s views, but seldom appear in Thomas’s own responses or
even in the replies to the objections.8 Thus, “it is fair to conclude that the term in its several
senses plays a restricted, though indispensable, role in his thought.”9

Nevertheless, when Thomas does use the terms of experience, he does so in a way that is
recognizably dependent on Aristotle, including the three senses identified by Kenneth L.
Schmitz—the sapiential, the evidential, and the probative. The greatest difference, though,
lies in the appearance of these terms in contexts that would have surprised the Greek
philosopher. In the Summa Theologiae, for instance, the three terms appear in passages that
are predominantly religious and practical, in articles regarding virtues, grace, prophecy, and
similar matters. When the terms do appear in articles concerning knowledge, St. Thomas
often uses them by way of contrast with other modes of knowing, such as the purely
intellectual and intuitive mode of angels and demons, or with the infused knowledge given to
Adam. Thomas uses the terms most in his discussion of experiential knowledge in Christ.10

Despite the differences of context, the basic notion of experience retains an Aristotelian
structure.11 First of all, experience is a sensory mode of knowing, apprehending singulars and
particular situations.12 Experience is acquired over time, and hence is discursive as well as
cumulative, being built up from perceptions and memories.13 Experience brings the knower
close to concrete situations, making them accessible in a direct and seemingly immediate

5
Even Geybels, despite a notable bias against the scholastics, sometimes attributes to them a hint
of experiential flavor, as when he says, “In this period of the ‘rediscovery’ of Augustine’s dialectics
and of Aristotle’s metaphysics theology is interpreted as an intellectual pursuit. The quest now is for a
logical understanding of the mysteries of faith, not in order to dissolve them but to uplift the soul,
stimulate contemplation, and increase the love for God.” Ibid., 443.
6
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 443.
7
cf. R. BUSA (ed.), Index Thomisticus: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Operum Omnium Indices et
Concordantiae, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 1974, 767-775.
8
cf. K.L. SCHMITZ, “St. Thomas and the Appeal to Experience”, 5.
9
Ibid., 5.
10
cf. Ibid., 5.
11
The analysis in the remainder of this paragraph is heavily indebted to cf. K.L. SCHMITZ, “St.
Thomas and the Appeal to Experience”, 5-6.
12
ST I-II, 15, 1c; II-II, 95, 5; I, 54, 5, obj. 2 & c; I, 117, 1c.
13
ST I, 58, 3, obj. 3 & ad 3; II-II, 47, 16, obj. 2; I, 64, 1, obj.5 & ad 5; I, 89, 3 sed contra; II-II, 47,
14 ad 3; II-II, 47, 15, sed contra; II-II, 49, 1c.
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manner, providing intimacy with the facts.14 Although in one sense, experience possesses a
two-way interiority, penetrating not only the facts but the knower as well, in another sense,
experience seems to come from outside, and for this reason Thomas accepts Bonaventure’s
designation of it as ‘acquired knowledge’.15 As ‘acquired knowledge’, what is distinctive and
most attractive about experience is its manner of acquisition, for it is the path upon which
human knowers develop their initial discoveries.16

The distinctive force of experience lies primarily in its sapiential meaning; the
accumulation of perceptions through memory thereby strengthens and reinforces a specific
skill or behavior, and thus gives experience a certain authority in the practical order.17 For
this reason, it merits the name ‘practical wisdom’.18 Experience, though, is not without risk,
since it may lead to misguided curiosity, and the desire for it may lead to the violation of
moral boundaries through ungoverned concupiscence.19 Finally, certain experiences may
produce an adverse effect upon the knower, contributing to a loss of hope, of courage, or of
other positive virtues.20

Regarding the probative sense of experience, certain passages in St. Thomas admit that
experience can be a kind of proof in the practical order through trial, test, or experiment—
though not in the modern, technical sense.21 One lives through experiences by suffering or
undergoing them.22 Schmitz holds that in the writings of St. Thomas, this practical, probative
sense of experience and experiment provides a ground for a more theoretical probative
meaning, along with the evidential, which starts with proof in the mode of recurring
manifestation.23 The evidential sense of experience appears where experience is part of the
process of conceptualization, which Schmitz understands to be not merely the formation of
abstract concepts, but rather the whole range of the intellectual life of the human person in
community and in the world.24

14
ST I-II, 112, 5c; II-II, 47, 3, ad 3; I, 79, 4c; I, 76, 1c; I, 81, 3c; I, 84, 7. See also Suppl. 84, 2, ad
2.
15
ST III, 9, 4c & ad 1; I, 94, 3, obj 1 & ad 3; II-II, 172, 1c; I, 102, 1, ad 4; II-II, 145, 1, ad 2; I, 94,
3, obj. 1 & ad 3; See also Suppl. 54, 3, sed contra 1.
16
ST I, 85, 7 sed contra; I-II, 98, 6c; I, 65, 1 obj. 2; II-II, 10, 7c.
17
ST II-II, 123, 1 obj. 2 & ad 2; I-II, 97, 2 obj. 3; II-II, 60, 3; I, 102, 3c; II-II, 145, 1, ad 2; II-II,
172, 1c.
18
ST II-II, 49, 3; II-II, 60, 3c; II-II, 181, 2, ad 2.
19
ST I-II, 89, 3, obj. 2 & ad 2.
20
ST I-II, 40, 5.
21
ST II-II, 97, 2c; I, 114, 2c & ad 2; II-II, 97, 1; III, 41, 1 obj 1; II-II, 117, 4 ad. 1.
22
ST I-II, 45, 5c; II-II, 13, 4, obj. 1; II-II, 77, 1, ad 2; II-II, 150, 2, ad 1.
23
cf. K.L. SCHMITZ, “St. Thomas and the Appeal to Experience”, 6. Schmitz cites in support of
this affirmation, the following passages: ST III, 12, articles 1-3; I-II, 34, 1c; I, 68, 2, obj 2; I, 69, 1, ad
2; I, 89, 1c; I-II, 66, 2, obj.3; I-II, 77, 2; I-II, 105, 1 obj. 3; II-II, 35, 1 obj. 4; I, 88, 1c; II-II, 95, 6 obj.
3; II-II, 96, 3, obj. 2.
24
Schmitz’s remarks about conceptualization are worth mentioning in passing, for they identify
conceptualization as an important theme to consider when examining the structure of experience. This
indeed will be one of the major themes that Van Roo addresses, though his approach differs from that
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What, then, is the relationship between experience and theology for Thomas Aquinas?
Thomas, in his theology, is not so much a witness of personal experience as a theoretician of
experience.

In sum, then, experience for Thomas consists in the accumulative immediacy of past particular
situations, gathered up over time into the familiarity of memory, brought into the immediate
present, and further ordered to practical wisdom and/or theoretical conceptualization.25

Thus, for Thomas, experience is primarily concerned with cognitive functions, and
specifically to an order of knowledge that is different from that of faith, the root of theology;
consequently experience can play only a limited part in theological argumentation.

3. Spirituality and Mysticism

Scholasticism was not the only player in the field of theology at this time. In continuity
with Bernard’s critique of dialectical scholasticism, the revival movement known as the
devotio moderna aspired to develop a theology capable of justifying the practice of prayer.
Within this movement, Geert Grote (1340-1384) merits attention for defining mysticism as
cognitio Dei experimentalis. For Grote, mystical union with God is the fruit of faith
enlightening experience in the tradition of Bernard, but it should not be confused with
affective sentimentality. Thanks to the devotio moderna, the practice of prayer is intensified
to such an extent that by the sixteenth century ‘inner life’ becomes synonymous with
‘prayer’, and is characterized by a familiar interaction with God (familiaritas cum Deo,
conversari cum Deo).26

The tension between intellectual and experiential knowledge in the late middle ages can
be illustrated by the critique of John Ruusbroec (1293-1381) launched by Jean Gerson (1363-
1429). Ruusbroec, a mystic himself, was concerned about certain radical and even pantheistic
tendencies among popular spiritual writers of his day, and therefore he set about writing a
series of popular tracts and pamphlets on the spiritual life. Precise and cautious in describing
the mystical experience of God, Ruusbroec boldly confronted those who confused the
immediate experience of God with the experience of existential unity with men. For
Ruusbroec, the experience of God was a relational experience of love, of encountering the
Other, which could never be identified with the solipsistic experience of oneself. Still, like
other spiritual writers, Ruusbroec emphasizes the immediate contact between God and man,
which does not result in a unity of fusion, but of communion. By all appearance, Ruusbroec

of Schmitz: “By conceptualization…I mean the process and activity of rendering experience into
intelligible values by means of concepts, judgments, and argument (in ways that attempt to be
relatively free of myth and imagery). And this is the nub of my proposal: The study of St. Thomas
permits us to reflect upon the difference between the pre-modern and the modern understanding of
experience, because it raises the question of the status of conceptualization and its relation to
experience.” Ibid., 7.
25
K.L. SCHMITZ, “St. Thomas and the Appeal to Experience”, 6.
26
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 238-239.
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stands in continuity with traditional Catholic mysticism. Yet, Jean Gerson will raise doubts
about his orthodoxy for reasons that are very illuminating.27

Jean Gerson lived in first person the dramatic separation of scholastic and mystical
theology. Although an accomplished scholastic himself, who rose to become chancellor of
the University of Paris in 1395, he preferred mystical theology to scholasticism, and his most
important work was De theologia mystica. His own fascination with religious experience can
be attributed to his intense contacts with the devotio moderna in Bruge between 1397 and
1401.28 In his De mystica theologia, Gerson acknowledges mystical experience while at the
same time raises two methodological considerations regarding the reading of mystical texts.
First, Gerson gives greater weight to the deductive method, in which statements about God
must be derived from first principles, than to the inductive method in which knowledge of
God is derived from experience. Even so, Gerson considers that a mystic’s words about God
are not irrational, since in the mystical experience reason is not disabled. (It is worth noting
that two centuries before Gerson, the introduction of the deductive method was the novelty,
whereas in Gerson’s time it has become commonplace). As a second difficulty, Gerson notes
that reading about an experience does not necessarily give the reader access to the experience
itself, though he may gain some insights by reading the mystical works.29 Gerson finds
Ruusbroec’s writing troubling, not least because some of Ruusbroec’s disciples consider their
master’s writings to be divinely inspired. More pointedly, though, Gerson considers that
Ruusbroec’s careful language is not careful enough when describing the union between God
and man. Gerson’s metaphysics has no room for Ruusboec’s metaphors.30

Ultimately, Gerson’s difficulties with Ruusbroec personify the uneasy relationship

between mystical experience and mystical theology, on the one hand, and metaphysical
speculation and scholastic theology on the other. Although Gerson was religious enough to
believe that mystical experiences were possible and even desirable, he retained allegiance to
the demands of his academic profession, and he used theology as a check on the often
unrestrained enthusiasm of the mystical writers.31

The controversy between Ruusbroec and Gerson reveals ever more clearly the
incommensurability of two systems of thought—mysticism on the one hand and
scholasticism on the other. Mysticism adhered to the metaphysical framework of Neo-
Platonism, which because of its participative structure could envisage an immediate
experience of God, whereas scholasticism, insofar as it assimilated Aristotelian metaphysics,
could defend more readily God’s transcendence but was more measured in approaching
God’s immanence.32

27
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 265-268.
28
cf. Ibid., 265-266.
29
cf. Ibid., 268-269.
30
cf. Ibid., 269.
31
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 270.
32
cf. Ibid., 443.
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To summarize the developments thus far, it can be said that in the late Middle Ages,
‘experience’ came to be identified with ‘mystical experience’, a direct contact with God. The
record of such experiences, though, needed to be informed by the sources of Christian
tradition, now interpreted with the rigorous methods of scholastic theology. The relationship
between theology and experience at this stage of thought is asymmetric: theology must
inform experience, but there is little room for mystical experience to inform theology.33

4. Martin Luther and the beginning of the modern paradigm

The partition of theology during the late Middle Ages into an affective, mystical branch
on the one hand, and a dialectical scholastic branch on the other forms the proper backdrop
for assessing Martin Luther’s approach to the relationship between experience and theology.
While serving as sub-prior in Wittenburg in 1512, Luther was appointed professor in Bible
studies at the university. There he came into closer contact with the thought of Gabriel Biel
(c. 1420-1495), which was marked by adherence to nominalism, aversion for Aristotle and
scholasticism, interest in the devotio moderna, and insistence upon revelation as the only
reliable source of knowledge. Along with the devotio moderna, Luther admired the tradition
of German mysticism, especially Johannes Tauler (1300-1361) and his reduction ad nihil of
man before God.34

Luther, like Cassian and Bernard before him, is interested in safeguarding the
experiential aspect Christian life, and he considers the existential commitment to Christianity
as crucial to theology. Nevertheless, the gap between scholastic and mysticial theology,
which Bernard had perceived only as a possible threat to be avoided, in Luther’s time was a
fact that had come to pass. Luther saw in the concept of experience an opportunity to close
that gap.35

Luther is strongly dependent on Bernard for the development of his views on religious
experience. Precisely as with Bernard, religious experience plays an important part in the
interpretation of Scripture, since the deeper meaning of Scripture is only accessible to
experienced believers. Through his experiences, inseparable from human existence, of sin,
suffering, and death, a believer can acquire knowledge of God and Christ. Hence Luther’s oft-
quoted dictum: “Sola autem experientia facit theologum”.36

Nevertheless, in a paradox typical of Martin Luther, a believer can only acquire

knowledge of God through experience, yet religious experience is not a source of knowledge

33
cf. Ibid., 270.
34
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 279.
35
cf. Ibid., 443-444.
36
Ibid., 444.
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of God.37 “On the contrary: existential experience which is not informed (given forma) by the
sources of Christian faith is given a wholly negative qualification.”38

In comparison with Bernard, Luther’s view of human existence is decidedly pessimistic,

and his own concept of religious experience is grounded in negative experiences, such as the
acute consciousness of sin and the obsessive fear for his own salvation. Negative experiences
occupy the most prominent place in Luther’s thought, and when he speaks of his own
experiences, he usually mentions temptations and his resistance to them.39 One may agree
with Geybels that perhaps for this very reason Luther sees experience as a way to knowledge
of God, but in itself it is not knowledge of God.40 Nevertheless, “by focussing theological
interest on what it meant to live by faith, Luther created a theology of experience that
foreshadowed the modern view of theology as an anthropocentric study of a theocentric
phenomenon.”41

After Luther, Protestant theology underwent a bifurcation similar to the one that Catholic
theology had suffered in the late Middle Ages. Some tendencies of Protestant thought
attempted to rationalize theology still further, while other tendencies directed their attention
to the experiential dimension of faith. The gap which Luther tried to bridge was simply
reduplicated in the parallel universe of Protestant theology.42

5. Melchior Cano and the De locis theologicis

Whereas Martin Luther sought to bridge the gap between theology and experience, the
work of another theologian later in the 16th Century ensured that the gap would remain a
fixture of theological method in the Catholic world.

Melchior Cano (1509-1562), a Dominican scholar and a student of Francisco de Victoria

(1492-1546), attended the sessions of the Council of Trent in 1551 and 1552 in the capacity
of ‘Imperial theologian’. Cano was no stranger to spiritual theology, penning a treatise on
spirituality, De la vitoria de si mismo, which to some degree reflected the influence of St.
Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises upon the whole of Spanish spirituality.43 Yet, Cano is most
famous for his treatise on theological method, the De locis theologicis, which represents the
summit and standard of theological methodology for the ‘second scholasticism’, fully in

37
cf. Ibid., 444.
38
Ibid., 444.
39
See for instance, WA 30/2,672.37. Negative experiences mark the way for Luther, and are the
teachers of theology: “Quae faciant theologum: 1. gratia spiritus, 2. tentatio, 3, experientia, 4. occasio,
5. sedula lectio, 6. bonarum artium cognitio” (WATr 3,312.11). cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei
Experimentalis, 279, n.10.
40
cf. Ibid., 444.
41
B.A. GERRISH, Continuing the Reformation: Essays on Modern Religious Thought, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1993, 56.
42
cf. H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 444.
43
cf. H.S. LUCAS, “Survival of the Catholic Faith in the Sixteenth Century”, The Catholic
Historical Review 29/1 (Apr 1943), 34.
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continuity with the doctrine and method of the former scholastics, but imbued with the new
spirit of humanism and its sensitivity to elegance of style.44 Cano’s treatise offered a
theological ideal grounded in the panoramic breadth of attention to a considerable number of
theological sources.45

Even so, the De locis theologicis creates certain problems, not least of which is the very
notion of locus. The term is translated and interpreted in various manners. George Tavard
paraphrases the expression de locis theologicis as “the levels of theological argumentation.”46
Justo L. González translates the title De locis theologicis as “On theological themes”.47 Jared
Wicks explains the loci as “the documentary fields in which the theologian discovers
evidence in favor of doctrines to be articulated or in rebuttal of doctrines rejected as
heterodox.”48 Cano himself borrowed an explanation from Cicero’s De oratore, calling the
loci ‘domiciles’ of all of the elements of theological argumentation.49 This variety of ways of
seeing the loci illustrates that the notion is not quite as clear as Cano might have hoped.

Cano’s treatise is essentially an account of the sources from which a Catholic theologian
draws his material and of the rules governing each locus, “showing how to derive specific
testimonies to God’s revealed truth in the matter appropriate to the locus.”50 Cano
distinguishes ten loci, subdivided into the following groups. A first group contains those loci
which are proper to the theology because they constitute revelation, namely (1) Scripture and
(2) Tradition.51 A second group consists in those loci which are proper to theology because
they contain the interpretation of revelation; these are (3) the Catholic Church, (4) Councils,
(5) The Church of Rome (meaning, the Pope), (6) the Fathers, and (7) the older Scholastics.
The final group consists in those loci which are not proper to theology, but pertain to
theology from without, as loci theologici alieni vel adscriptitii; these include (8) ratio
humana, which for Cano means human knowledge, or common human wisdom, which could
be extended to experience in its sapiential sense; (9) the authority of the philosophers,

44
cf. J.L. GONZÁLEZ, A History of Christian Thought, III. From the Protestant Reformation to the
Twentieth Century, Abingdon Press, Nashville 1987, 214.
45
cf. J. WICKS, Doing Theology, Paulist Press, New York 2009, 12-13.
46
G. TAVARD, “Scripture and Tradition: Sources or Source?”, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1/3
(1964), 452.
47
cf. J.L. GONZÁLEZ, A History of Christian Thought, III., 214. This translation of loci theologici
would be more fitting for the Protestant tradition of loci stemming from Philipp Melancthon (1497-
1560); it does not seem apt to describe Cano’s theory of the loci. For a a brief but thorough treatment
of the notion of locus theologicus in Melancthon, see: U.G. LEINSLE, Introduction to Scholastic
Theology, 260-264. See also: W. KERN - F.-J. NIEMANN, Gnoseologia teologica, Giornale di teologia
151, Queriniana, Brescia 1984, 46.
48
J. WICKS, “Loci Theologici”, in R. LATOURELLE - R. FISICHELLA (eds.), Dictionary of
Fundamental Theology, 606.
49
cf. J. WICKS, Doing Theology, 15.
50
J. WICKS, “Loci Theologici”, 606.
51
For a discussion of how the theory of the two sources of Revelation may have derived from
Cano’s treatment of these first two loci, see: G. TAVARD, “Scripture and Tradition: Sources or
Source?”, 456. Tavard’s thesis in the article is that the notion of two sources (fontes) of revelation
stems from a confused assimilation of the word fons to the concept of locus theologicus.
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principally Aristotle, and (10) historia humana, meaning human history or universal
history.52 With these last three loci, Cano recognizes that even non-theological disciplines,
such as the human, natural, and social sciences, have theological import, and therefore
theology ought to integrate the results of these sciences with its own properly theological
argumentation.53

For Cano, therefore, ‘experience’ as such does not figure among the loci theologici—
except, perhaps, insofar as it may be included in ratio humana or historia humana—but
neither is it considered an important prerequisite for the theologian. When Cano examines the
qualities that the aspiring theologian needs, he considers erudition and solid argumentation to
be of first importance, while he numbers among the secondary qualities of the theologian first
elegance of style and then a solid life of virtue.54

Even so, Jared Wicks argues that Cano’s presentation of the sources of theology retains
its relevance for two principal reasons. First, his account is a salutary warning against
prematurely narrowing the search for meaning to the preemptive certitude of actual
experience or of well-worn ‘proof texts’ drawn from Scripture or even from the Magisterium,
for no single source holds a monopoly as a witness to Christian truth. Second, Cano’s system
of numerous loci points to the breadth of witnesses to revealed truth speaking “in many and
various ways” (Heb 1:1); the Christian theologian must seek, therefore, to find the harmony
in the symphony of voices.55 By recognizing the value of all ten of these sources for theology,
Cano reaffirms and strengthens the scholastic tradition of citing authorities and showing their
agreement, while limiting the free play of natural reason and logic.56 Furthermore, his treatise
firmly anchored Catholic theology in the material principle of authority as that which is
normative to discern the value of a doctrine. “It is by seeking for its source and asking the
question ‘Who teaches this?’ that Cano assigns each teaching or theory its place in the range
of Christian doctrines, and its degree of certainty.”57

In a theological framework such as Cano’s, ‘experience’ becomes a highly ambiguous

theological concept. Can it be a source for theology? If a source—a locus—is a documentary
field, then ‘experience’ as such is clearly disqualified. Though it is often said ‘experience
teaches such and such’, ‘experience’ is not a subject of authority in the same way as the

52
cf. W. KERN - F.-J. NIEMANN, Gnoseologia teologica, 47.
53
cf. Ibid., 48.
54
cf. E. MARCOTTE, La nature de la Théolgie d'après Melchior Cano, Universitas Catholica
Ottaviensis, Ottawa 1949, 166-173, cf. M. CANO, De locis theologicis XII, 10, § 2-4; XII, 2, § 1-4;
XIII, 10, § 8-9 in cf. J.H. SERRY (ed.), Melchioris Cani episcopi Canariensis ex Ordine
Praedicatorum Opera, Marin, Paris 1760.
55
cf. J. WICKS, Doing Theology, 16.
56
cf. J.L. GONZÁLEZ, A History of Christian Thought, III., 214. If this is so, then Cano should be
situated within the long line of reflection on the proper use of the auctoritates, though he may be
closer in practice to the earlier dialecticians, who emphasized the formal rules of argumentation, than
the later Scholastics, from Anselm to Aquinas, for whom metaphysics, not logic, was the key to
reaching understanding.
57
G. TAVARD, “'Hierarchia Veritatum': A Preliminary Investigation”, Theological Studies 32 (June
1971), 286. See also W. KERN - F.-J. NIEMANN, Gnoseologia teologica, 46-47.
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Church’s Magisterium, whether expressed in councils or by the pope, can be, nor can
‘experience’ have the same weight as a theological opinion of the Fathers or of the older
Scholastics. If the weight of a theological argument is determined by asking “who teaches
this?”, then the answer ‘experience’ raises even more questions than it settles.

10