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Culture Documents
Julia Vassilieva
through’. For the first time, Russian art displayed irony without bitterness towards the
Soviet past, engaging in a playful manipulation of both the content and forms of the
previous period. In the novels and short stories of Pelevin and Sorokin, the
mechanisms of Soviet power were not only exposed, but also ridiculed; not from a
position of an already defeated and overpowered-by–the-system underdog (typical for
Russian artists of the Soviet era) but from the position of an equal. For the first time,
people were able to laugh at their past – demonstrating the liberating effect of laugher
as a catalyst for historical change, and proving once again Bakhtin’s insight on this
issue.
Such was the situation in the ‘90s, when the newly established freedom of
speech was tested to its limit in Russia . However, this was paralleled by an almost
complete evaporation of law and order in the country; a general anarchy that became
the most visible characteristic of the Elstin era. It should be kept in mind that, as well
as establishing free-market economy and experimenting with other Western-style
institutions, the decade led the majority of Russian people to levels of poverty without
precedent even in the Soviet era; educational, medical and housing systems were
generally dismantled, and the hidden effects of those deprivations in human lives
reached an estimated ten million. The words democracy and reform became
synonymous with thievery, gangsterism and oligarchy. Significantly, such disillusion
was achieved in less than ten years – a record revolutionary burnout that would be the
envy of any anti-Bolshevik, as political analyst Nina Khrushcheva remarked. (2) It
was out of these circumstances that nostalgia for the Soviet era emerged, coupled with
longing for a stronger power – thus facilitating Putin’s ascent to the position of
President. This marked a definitive turn back towards at least partial re-installment of
a Soviet-type system. Pelevin captured the essence of the time aptly in the title of his
2003 novel Dialectic of the Transition Period (From Out-of-Nowhere and Going-
Nowhere).
This was accompanied by a strong impulse to reclaim the past from
iconoclastic attacks of the previous decade and rehabilitate Soviet culture – at least
symbolically. From toppling down Soviet monuments people went on to their
glorification. Vera Muchina’s sculptures started to become integrated with images of
glamour and the power of New Russians’ style. Pictures in the socialist-realist manner
became prized possessions and preferred décor in the offices of politicians and
businessmen. Films such as Pavel Chuchrai’s A Driver for Vera (2004) and Stanislav
Govoruchin’s Not by Bread Alone (2005), both of which were enthusiastically
received by the audience and acclaimed by the critics, captured this mood particularly
well. They delivered a new view of the Soviet system – though not unproblematic, at
least overwhelmingly ‘ours’– and they tried to depict the Soviet officials not as
soulless parts of the machine, but real human beings with feelings, problems and
ethical dilemmas. Negative moments in the functioning of the Soviet state were not
attributed to the system as such, but conceptualised as bad deeds of individuals, all the
while putting strong emphasis on the powerful, protective and fair empire – something
to be proud of. There has been a strong drive to rehabilitate the ‘common people’,
their naïve enthusiasm, their idealistic belief system, their aspirations and hopes.
Some parallels can be established with recent developments in German cinema –
particularly those films that deal with the legacy of Eastern Germany, such as
Wolfgang Becker’s Good-bye Lenin! (2003) and Florian Henckel von
Donnersmarck’s The Lives of Others (2006).
The theme of space exploration or Cosmos (as it was called in Russia) has
emerged as a powerful nostalgic presence in recent Russian cinema. Aleksei Uchitel’s
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recorded’, and then goes on to articulate one of the major assumptions of the
documentary mode: ‘And if it is recorded – it means that it really happened’ (Все что
было - должно быть снято, а если снято – то значит было). Every piece of this
‘film-footage’ comes with its made-up history: a skilful imitation of defects or (on the
contrary) their absence suggests how each was shot and where it was stored. (4) Apart
from archival surveillance footage, documents and alleged official newsreels of the
time, the director interviews some survivors and sends expeditions to the places
associated with the launch and landing of the space-ship, from Crimea to Chile.
Finally, there is a team of experts from one of Moscow ’s academic Physics
Institutes examining the drawings of the original spacecraft, even building and testing
a model. While the interviews and the scientists at work are shot in the neutral,
contemporary manner of impersonal journalism, Fedorchenko, in creating his pseudo-
archival materials, meticulously reproduces the norms of officious film-journals of the
‘30s: shots of the official parade are different from those of a sports parade; the
political leadership is filmed in one way, ordinary citizens in another. This is all
accompanied by narration constructed exclusively in the artificial language of
contrived Soviet clichés. Naturally, the footage is in black and white—which seems to
carry more authority and authenticity.
The tone of the film is absolutely serious, the general mood nostalgic. In
Fedorchenko’s words: ‘The element of irony is very small, perhaps about five
percent’. (5) The film succeeds alarmingly well in creating a glorified and
romanticised image of the epoch and its dominant aesthetic. There is a powerful
empire in the background; it looks after its sons and daughters well. Even surveillance
is depicted as something acceptable: the citizens are constantly watched, but they are
watched like little children by their caring mother who is only concerned for their
wellbeing. The people are happy, enthusiastic, hardworking, prepared to sacrifice their
lives for their country and the common good. Occasionally they can be locked up in a
psychiatric hospital, where they will be treated – but only for their own good, for they
will get better.
This naively optimistic picture of Soviet reality created by Fedorchenko –
bordering on idiocy – is much scarier than Orwell’s 1984, Kafka’s The Trial and
Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading combined because, unlike in those works, the
moment of reflexivity, criticism or resistance to the oppressing power machine is
completely removed. It is a Foucauldian nightmare: society has moved to the stage of
internalised control, where human beings begin to function as their own guardians,
actively engaging in operations to forge themselves into ‘docile bodies’. Fedorchenko
spends a fair share of his footage presenting exactly the type of operations which
Foucault described so meticulously: as Soviet ideology always argued, the collective
overrides the individual in Soviet society. Consequently, people are presented mainly
as members of various groups. They are not separate persons but scientists and
engineers, sportsmen and sportswomen, children in the kindergarten and nurses who
care for them. In the context of selecting potential astronauts for the space program,
the screening procedures include the measurement of heights, weights, strength,
endurance. Medical tests are shown in detail. Dozens of people of both sexes pass
before the viewers’ eyes on the screen, being gradually undressed, measured,
classified and dismissed. The process of de-individuation is meticulously depicted –
but it is accepted by its participants without question, even enthusiastically. As the
only surviving astronaut recalls later on: ‘Chances of survival were small, very small,
but we were not afraid’.
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the greater will be the degree of truth’. If Pelevin’s account was aimed at exposing the
illusory nature of Soviet reality and discrediting the macabre mechanisms of
producing the collective consciousness of the Soviet people, Fedorchenko’s aim is
exactly the opposite: he passionately defends and glorifies illusions.
As in the previous stage of Russian postmodernism, First on the Moon re-uses
and re-cycles tropes, themes and clichés of socialist realism. This time, however, they
are not transformed into objects of semiotic play, not used as a means of pastiche or
allusion – rather, it is direct repetition. And to paraphrase Linda Hutcheon, (7) it is not
a repetition that includes difference: in Fedorchenko’s narrative structure, there is no
double-voicing signalling the difference between the parodic and the discourse which
is parodied. The film is astonishingly flat, mimicking so successfully the documentary
mode that it was awarded first prize at the 20065 Venice Film Festival in the
documentary genre! The question to ask is whether this reflects genuine confusion
over genre boundaries and definitions – prompting a deserved homage to the craft of
the DOP Anatolii Lesnikov and set designer Nikolai Pavlov – or whether it reveals the
complete loss of critical distance in the director’s appropriation of methods and (more
worryingly) in taking the ideological position of the past that these methods served to
articulate.
The use of the mock-documentary format requires special consideration since,
although (as in any work of art) form is not separable from content, here form is the
film’s main performative medium. If, in the West, mock-documentary takes a critical
stance towards documentary truth-claims, in Russia the situation is further
complicated by the fact that such documentary claims have already been seriously
compromised (if not totally dismantled) by the seventy-odd years of the use of
documentary and journalism for the purpose of Soviet propaganda. Individual
attempts to use mass media to tell the truth have persisted throughout Soviet history,
ensuring that the nation’s ethical value-system endured and the moral health of the
nation survived. However, those heroic individual efforts could not alter the dominant
way that the Soviet propaganda machine operated. Official Soviet documentary,
particularly of the period Fedorchenko has re-created so lovingly, contained not a
single speck of truth: while optimistic happy crowds were marching on the Red square
in the footage of film-journals, much larger and sadder crowds were marching
towards Siberian prison/death camps; while on the screens of cinemas across the
country lines of combines were harvesting wheat, millions were dying from
government-staged starvation in Ukraine and Kazakhstan; while news reports were
celebrating Soviet achievements in art and science, the best of Russian intelligentsia
were persecuted, tortured and killed. In a way, documentary in the Soviet Union has
always been mock-documentary. Consequently, in Russia the use of mock-
documentary responds to a questioning previously undertaken, making a paradoxical
argument in favour of rather than against the fully constructed or artificial
representation of reality. While the director claims that his intention was to pay tribute
to real people, the only thing that his film pays tribute to is the mesmerising power of
illusions.
The years over which Fedorchenko chose to position his narrative deliberately
test the re-interpretation of history to its limits. The years 1937 and 1938 mark the
darkest period in Soviet history, becoming synonymous with Stalin’s terror itself. To
present, in 2005, a glamorous and romantic image of those particular years goes far
beyond an amusing spoof, or simply a provocative statement – rather, it seems
designed to promote amnesia and repression, hardly the most constructive ways of
dealing with a traumatic past. However, perhaps the underlying intention of the film
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can be better linked with a different symptomatology: false memory syndrome, which
has become a much more popular diagnostic category in psychology over the last two
decades. Its increasing explanatory power is closely linked with the constructivist
perspective gaining prominence in social science: false memory syndrome
demonstrates not only that it is impossible to distinguish between ‘real’ memories and
artificially (albeit unconsciously constructed) ones, but also, more importantly, that
perhaps the very distinction is unnecessary. As Jung noted more than a century ago,
psychological reality knows no lies. For all intents and purposes, false memories can
work just as well as real ones.
First on the Moon responds quite accurately to this need to be reassured – a
need which is acutely felt by a substantial segment of the Russian population. It
articulates a nostalgia for a past which, after the turmoil of perestroika, has become
idealised. It also corresponds to the growing centralisation of power and curtailing of
freedom of speech in Russia under Putin. Not only its content matter, but also the
carefully recreated Soviet aesthetic, serves this purpose particularly well. As Jean-
François Lyotard noted in The Postmodern Explained: ‘“correct images”, “correct”
narratives – the correct forms that the party solicits, selects and distributes – must
procure a public that will desire them as the appropriate medicine for the depression
and anxiety it feels’. (8) On one level, the film’s message can be read as a verdict on
the period of postmodern experimentation, as well as a revision of Soviet history –
both of which seem to be over.
However, the uneasy and disturbing feeling that film produces stems not only
from its open and passionate desire to re-instate the old Soviet ideology. The mock-
documentary format allows Fedorchenko to take a postmodern insight about the
constructed and relativistic character of the world fully on board, in accordance with
the famous dialectical law of cyclical development advocated by classical Marxism
and Leninism. The film does not simply pursue a polemic about Soviet history on
objective grounds – it is not arguing about access to reality and its accurate
representation. The power of the film’s statement comes from its skilful adoption of
the postmodern paradigm, since effectively it is saying that, in this fully constructed
world, we are free to choose a version of the past and the present to live by. This
makes the fact that Fedorchenko willingly advocates the most monstrous version of
the totalitarian regime doubly scary. The much-celebrated sensitivity to difference
turns against its postmodern founding fathers’ aspirations here, demonstrating how
easily postmodern means and devices can be adopted to deliver the most suffocating
ideological message. Reflecting on another Russian director, Andrei Tarkovsky,
Ingmar Bergman once said: ‘When film is not a document, it is dream’. First on the
Moon has a quality of a nightmare – a nightmare which, one hopes, will never be
repeated.
References
1. Jane Roscoe and Craig Hight, Faking It: Mock-Documentary and the Subversion of
Actuality ( Manchester University Press, 2001).
2. Nina Khrushcheva, ‘Money and Wealth in Russia : Politics and Perceptions’,
International Affairs Working Paper 2006-06 (April 2006); text no longer on-line.
3. P. Weil and A. Genis, The 1960s: The World of the Soviet People (Moscow: Novoe
Literaturnoe Obosrenie, 1996).
4. Oleg Kovalov, ‘Aleksei Fedorchenko: First on the Moon’, KinoKultura, no. 11
(2006).<http://www.kinokultura.com/2006/11r-firstmoon1.shtml>.
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© Julia Vassilieva and Rouge October 2008. Cannot be reprinted without permission
of the author and editors.