Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 8

Administrative due process.

Ang Tibay v Court of Industrial Relations

69 Phil 635

Principle: The Court enumerated the requisites of administrative due process.


Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay
off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.


Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.


Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
Guzman vs. National University

G.R. No. L-68288

Principle: Students do not shed their constitutionally protected rights of free expression at the
school gates.


Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for
extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction"
dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due process due to the fact that they
were active participants in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first
semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged
exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic
showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have
“failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”


WON the petitioners were denied due process.


Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that
they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted
without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts
showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a
civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-
enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published
rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that “no penalty shall be
imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the manual and/or in the school rules
and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.

There are standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and
these are, that:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against

(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.


G.R. No. 125735, August 26, 1999

Principle: There was a violation of administrative due process where the teacher was dismissed
by the university without having been given full opportunity to confront the “witnesses” against

Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a schoolteacher in the Elementary Department of private
respondent Ateneo de Davao University (hereafter ATENEO) since 1974 assigned to teach
Reading, Mathematics, Language and Pilipino in the Grade VI class, while ATENEO is an
educational institution, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal address at Jacinto St., Davao City.
Sometime in 1991 Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo Grade School Headmaster, sent a letter dated 11
April 1991 informing petitioner Lorlene A. Gonzales of the complaints of two (2) parents for
alleged use of corporal punishment on her students. Petitioner claimed that she was not informed
of the identity of the parents who allegedly complained of the corporal punishment she
purportedly inflicted in school-year 1990-1991. She likewise claimed that she was not
confronted about it by private respondent ATENEO in 1991 and that it was only two (2) years
after the complaints were made that she discovered, through her students and their parents, that
ATENEO was soliciting complainants to lodge written complaints against her.

After trial, found her dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis and ordered ATENEO to award
petitioner separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay. In her decision, the Executive Labor
Arbiter opined that although petitioner was afforded procedural due process respondent
institution failed to establish substantial evidence as to the guilt of the complainant of the offense


Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining as valid and legal the
dismissal of petitioner by private respondent ATENEO.


This is not harping at technicalities as wrongfully pointed out by the NLRC but a serious
violation of petitioner's statutory and constitutional right to due process that ultimately vitiated
the investigation.
The NLRC, appears to have skirted several important issues raised by petitioner foremost of
which is the absence of due process. Upon being notified of her termination, she has the right to
demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin
requirements of procedural and substantial due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the
employee to defend herself either personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know
the nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against
her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based on established facts and on a
sound legal foundation.
People v. Cayat
68 Phil 12

Principle: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the law prohibiting members of non-
Christian tribes from drinking foreign liquor, on the ground that their low degree of culture and
unfamiliarity with the drink rendered them more susceptible to its effect.


Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-
Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having
acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native
wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-
Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink
any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the
passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an
improper exercise of police power.


Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of the due process.


It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage,”
as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. “The term
‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and
more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities.” (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora,
supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is
designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all
members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a
certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against
the equality of its application.