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Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A.

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JUDICIAL POWER defendant in his answer or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise, jurisdiction - On Oct 4, Mla Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct. 9, a
would be dependent on his whims. motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground
Reasoning. The allegations in petitioner’s complaint show that the action that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION is one for recovery of possession, not one which involves an agrarian ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was
dispute. situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac,
PRESCRIBED JURISDICTION i.e. OVER -Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines "agrarian dispute" over as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due
which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as: consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground
SUBJECT MATTER, BY LAW (d) any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, presented by the plaintiff.
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
SINDICO V DIAZ including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation ISSUE/S
440 SCRA 50 of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to 1. WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements including any condemnation of real estate located in another province
CARPIO-MORALES; October 1, 2004 controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and 2. WON Sec. 3771 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258 are
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction
NATURE farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of Iloilo disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, HELD
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. 1.YES
FACTS -Since petitioners’ action is one for recovery of possession and Ratio Sections 55 and 562 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission
-Virgilio Sindico, is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which he let does not involve an agrarian dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with
the spouses Eulalio and Concordia Sombrea cultivate, without him sharing it. respect to real estate in the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not
in the produce, as his "assistance in the education of his cousins" made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The
including defendant Felipe Sombrea Disposition Petition is granted.
-After the death of the Eulalio Sombrea, Felipe continued to cultivate the 1
SEC. 377. Venue of actions . Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a
lot partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real estate, or
-On June 20, 1993, Sindico requested Felipe’s wife for the return of the JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to
possession of the lot but the latter requested time to advise her husband VENUE establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the condemnation of
real estate for public use, shall be brought in the province were the lands, or some part
-Repeated demands for the return of the possession of the lot remained thereof, is situated; actions against executors, administrators, and guardians touching the
unheeded, forcing Sindico to file a civil case before the RTC against the performance of their official duties, and actions for account and settlement by them, and
spouses Sombrea for Accion Reivindicatoria with Preliminary Mandatory MANILA RAILROAD V ATTY. GENERAL actions for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and
Injunction 20 PHIL 523 distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in
which the will was admitted to probate, or letters of administration were granted, or the
-The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC has no MORELAND; December 11, 1911 guardian was appointed. And all actions not herein otherwise provided for may be brought
jurisdiction over their person and that as the subject matter of the case is in any province where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be
an agricultural land which is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian NATURE found, or in any province where the plaintiff, except in cases were other special provision is
Reform Program (CARP) of the government, the case is within the Appeal from CFI Tarlac’s judgment dismissing the action before it on made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB in accordance with Section 50 Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the
motion of the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to
of Republic Act 6657 (THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM the subject matter property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the
LAW OF 1988) province where the property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated
-The plaintiff filed an Opposition alleging that the case does not involve an FACTS or is found: Provided, that in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate,
agrarian dispute, there being no tenancy relationship or leasehold when the service upon the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance
- On Dec 1907, Mla Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for the with law, the action must be brought in the province where the land lies. And in all cases
agreement with the defendants. condemnation of 69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This is for process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending, to be
-The RTC of Iloilo granted the Motion to Dismiss construction of a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in Tarlac," as enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of the
-As their Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court, the authorized by law. court. The failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering
plaintiffs, herein petitioners, lodged the present Petition for Review on his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the
- Before beginning the action, Mla Railroad had caused to be made a place or tribunal in which the action is brought, except in the actions referred to in the first
Certiorari thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax sixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, and actions against executors,
where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they administrators, and guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies.
ISSUE belonged. As a result of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in
WON the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) question were located in Tarlac.
2
SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance . The jurisdiction of Courts of
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar - After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff, pursuant to law First Instance shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction . Courts of First Instance shall have original
and pending final determination of the action, took possession of and jurisdiction:
HELD occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting 2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any
No. the same in operation. interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of
Ratio. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is
allegations of the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas set up by the by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.
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jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that father, Subing Chua, in 1952 and from that date he has assumed
a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under *DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE ownership thereof, taken possession of the land and paid the
certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province - The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once corresponding taxes yearly; that from 1952-1958, Abbain has been his
or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of tenant and the two divided the fruits or copra harvested therefrom on 50-
the province to which it may at the time be assigned. the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter of method, 50basis; that in 1957, Abbain by means of force, strategy and stealth
of convenience to the parties litigant. If their interests are best subserved unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after Chua have
JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF by bringing in the Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his failure to
- Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte, there is no controlling reason why give chua’s share of the several harvests.
directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be such a course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law, LC: JOP Managula rendered judgment directing Abbain to vacate the
sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the entirely within the control of either party. The plaintiff's interests select the premises and place Chua in possession of the plantation, with costs. This
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it venue. If such selection is not in accordance with section 377, the judgment was predicated upon the findings that sometime before WWII,
loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses defendant may make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225 to Subing Chua the
jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose changed to meet the requirements of the law. coconut plantation; that after the sale, Abbain became the tenant of Chua,
jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered - Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently,
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son, Tongham Chua, and
an important distinction between person and subject matter are both defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the tenant on the
conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants land.
jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by - Abbain filed a petition in the CFI of Sulu against Tongham Chua and
when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one Judge Managula, seeking relief from the judgment of the JOTP Court
none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his anr/or annulment of its decision with preliminary injunction. He averred
the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting that the JOTP Court did not have jurisdiction over the civil case and
consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be that said case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR).
consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that CFI of Sulu: petition dismissed without cause
prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached. opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for -“petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant
the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and relationship between the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of
2. NO are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly the CAR, and that upon the allegations of the complaint, the case is
Ratio Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking "clearly one of ejectment."
prohibition provided therein is clearly directed against the one who begins that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to
the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, remove it.
ISSUE
has nothing to do with it either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is
WON the JOTP Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by Chua
done does the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is Disposition The judgment must be REVERSED and the case
concerned. The prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but REMANDED to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action
HELD
on the rights of the plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the court according to law.
NO
and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not
Ratio. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be
to jurisdiction but to trial. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right,
said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, JURISDITION VOID sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. And in
probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a
Gomez vs. Concepcion, this Court quoted with approval the following
convenient trial.
ABBAIN V. CHUA from Freeman on Judgments: "A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF 22 SCRA 748 Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
- That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. Sanchez; February 26, 1968 worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it
That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course of practice -
and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it
that is, by the process of the court - but also by consent expressly given,
NATURE may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of
is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning
Direct appeal to the SC its authority finds himself without title and without redress."
the action. The defendants are now in this court asking that the action be
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for
not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the
FACTS relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is
jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose
- March 12, 1958: Tongham Chua commenced suit for forcible entry and vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even when no appeal
of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff in any
illegal detainer against Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace (JOP) has been taken."
position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the
Court of Bongao, Sulu. Chua's averred that he is the owner of a 4-hectare Reasoning. The provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 1199 (approved August 30,
allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now
land together with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees located 1954), known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, read:
asserts.
in Maraning, Bongao, Sulu; that this land was donated to him by his
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"SEC. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. — All cases involving the judgment. Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed, appellant HELD
dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party and/or the could bring, as he brought, such an action. More, he also sought to enjoin 1. YES
settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of enforcement of that judgment. In varying language, the Court has Ratio. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without departments enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of
this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be a dead limb on the judicial the state in whose territory its office is located.
as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tree, which should be lopped of' or wholly disregarded as the Reasoning. One of the basic immunities of an international organization
tenancy relations anddisputes." circumstances require. is immunity from local jurisdiction (immune from legal writs and processes
Sec. 7, RA 1267, creating the First Court of Agrarian Relations, effective issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found) that the subjection
June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic Act 1409 which took effect on Disposition The decision of the JOTP Court of Sulu is annulled. of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
September 9, 1955,provides: convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. — The Court shall have original and operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, organization. Such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf
involving all those relationships established by law which determine the General rule: of its member-states.
varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
where one of the parties works the land." 2. NO
- Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 — long after RA’s 1199,
SEAFDEC V NLRC (LAZAGA) Ratio. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our statute books. Chua's complaint 206 SCRA 283 none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there
positively averred that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis NOCON, February 14, 1994 is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule
of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is
non-compliance of our agreement of his giving my share of the several NATURE null and void.
harvests he made." The JOTP Court itself found that Abbain continued to Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC -The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
be the tenant of Chua after the latter became owner of the plantation proceedings, even on appeal.
which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Abbain FACTS -The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel
refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest." -SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the
- If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. Private Respondent Exception:
at all, it is that the JOTP Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at Lazaga was hired as a Research Associate and eventually became the
the outset, the complaint should have been rejected. Failing in this, the Head of External Affairs Office of SEAFDEC-AQD. However, he was
case should have been dismissed during the course of the trial, when it terminated allegedly due to financial constraints being experienced by SOLIVEN vs FASTFORMS PHILS.
became all the more evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. SEAFEC-AQD. He was supposed to receive separation benefits but 440 SCRA 389
The judge had no power to determine the case. Because Chua's suit
comes within the coverage of Sec. 21, R.A. 1199 - that "cases involving
SEAFDEC-AQD failed to pay private respondent his separation pay so Sandoval-Gutierrez, October 18, 2004
Lazaga filed a complaint for non-payment of separation benefits, plus
the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder," shall be under the moral damages and attorney’s fees with the NLRC. NATURE
"original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter -In their ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM, SEAFDEC alleged that NLRC -petition for review on certiorari
be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and has no jurisdiction over the case because: (1) It is an international
disputes", and the broad sweep of Section 7, RA 1267, which lodged with organization; (2) Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper FACTS
the CAR "original and exclusive jurisdiction . . . to consider, investigate, departments for property or money accountability before any claim for -Petitioner Marie Antoinette Soliven filed a complaint for P195,155 as
decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes separation pay will be paid (and clearances has not been paid) actual damages with P200k as moral damages, P100k as exemplary
involving all those relationships established by law which determine the COUNTERCLAIM: Lazaga had property accountability and outstanding damages and P100k as attorney’s fees against respondent Fastform
varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD amounting to P27, 532.11 and that Lazaga Phils., with the Makati RTC. It alleged that respondent, through its
where one of the parties works the land." was not entitled to the accrued sick leave benefits due to his failure to president Dr. Escobar, obtained a loan from petitioner (P170k) payable
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the CAR over cases avail of the same during his employment within 21 days with 3% interest. On the same day, respondent issued a
of this nature. Such exclusive authority is not divested by a mere -LA: for Lazaga postdated check for P170k + P5k int. 3 weeks later, Escobar advised
averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts ownership over the -NLRC: affirmed LA, deleted attorney’s fees and actual damages petitioner not to deposit the check as the account from where it was drawn
land, "since the law does not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the CAR, -SEAFDEC-AQD filed MFR, denied had insufficient funds and instead proposed that the P175k be rolled-over
"cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him for
with 5% monthly interest, to which the latter agreed. Respondent issued
cultivation by the landlord." ISSUES several checks as payment for interests for 5 months but thereafter
The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null 1. WON SEAFEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international refused to pay its principal obligation despite petitioner’s repeated
and void. character demands.
The judgment of the JOTP Court is not merely a voidable 2. WON SEAFDEC-AQD is estopped from claiming that the court had no -In its counterclaim, respondent denied obtaining the loan and that it did
judgment. It is void on its face. It may be attacked directly or jurisdiction not authorize Escobar to secure said loan or issue checks as payment for
collaterally . Here, the attack is direct. Abbain sought to annul the
interests. After a trial on the merits, the court ordered respondent to pay
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the amount of the loan plus interest and attorneys fees, but moral and NATURE
exemplary damages as well as the counterclaim were dismissed. Petition for certiorari Disposition. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
-Respondent filed a MFR questioning the court’s jurisdiction alleging that
since the principal demand (P195,155) did not exceed P200k, the FACTS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
complaint should have been filed with the MTC, pursuant to RA 7691. The - July 1979 – Private respondent Laurente (former sale supervisor of
TC denied the MFR since the totality of the claim exceeded 200k and petitioner corporation) was notified and advised of his immediate
PERSON
since respondent was estopped from questioning jurisdiction. On appeal, termination for gross neglect of duty and/or dishonesty Of the plaintif
the CA reversed the TC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and - August 1979 - Laurente instituted a civil action for damages against
that respondent may assail jurisdiction of the TC anytime even for the first SFSC and Siao, its manager MANILA RAILROAD V ATTY. GENERAL
time on appeal. Petitioner filed an MFR which was denied by the CA, - Laurente filed a complaint for illegal dismissal (labor case).
hence this petition. - January 1980 - Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on Civil Case,
(page 1)
FACTS
claiming that the jurisdiction should be vested with the NLRC.
-Manila Railroad filed an action for condemnation proceedings in CFI of
ISSUE (Members of religious group) - February 5, 1980 - it was found that the termination of the complainant
Tarlac when they knew that the lands concerned are found in Nueva Ecija.
WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case was for a just and valid cause
Now they are assailing the jurisdiction of CFI Tarlac.
- February 28, 1980 – The court in Civil Case deferred the determination
HELD of the motion to dismiss until after trial.
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON Of the plaintiff:
NO. - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus,
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply
Ratio. While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule this petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. Since respondent actively
sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the TC and even ISSUE
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
sought affirmative relief, it is estopped from challenging the TC’s WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it
loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses
jurisdiction, especially since an adverse judgment had been rendered. A deferred the determination or resolution of the motion to dismiss
jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief questioning the jurisdiction of the court over claims for damages.
jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course,
repudiate that same jurisdiction. HELD
an important distinction between person and subject matter are both
Reasoning. Section 3 of RA 7691 provides that where the amount of the NO.
conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the
demand in the complaint instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed Ratio "(t)he rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or
P200k, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, atty’s fees, exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which
litigation expenses and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of
vested in the Metropolitan Trial court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to
the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the
Circuit Trial Court. the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of
-Administrative Circular 09-94 specifies guidelines in the implementation effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by
of RA 7691. Par 2 of the Circular provides that the term “damages of enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no
consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be
whatever kind” applies only to cases where damages are merely a retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to
prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.
consequence of the main action. In the instant case, the main cause of the enactment of the statute." (Bengzon v. Inciong)
- That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable.
action is the collection of the debt amounting to P195k. The damages Reasoning
That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course of practice -
being claimed are merely incidental and are thus not included in a. Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 9 of
that is, by the process of the court - but also by consent expressly given,
determining the jurisdictional amount. Republic Act No. 6715 clearly provides that the labor arbiter shall
is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
the action. The defendants are now in this court asking that the action be
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the
an employer-employee relationship. However, when the civil case
jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose
for damages was instituted in 1979, the applicable law then was
ONCE ATTACHED, JURISDICTION NOT of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff in any
Article 217 (a) (3) of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential
OUSTED BY SUBSEQUENT STATUTE Decree No. 1367 (May 1, 1978) which provides that Labor Arbiters
position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the
UNLESS SO PROVIDED allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now
shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages.
asserts.
b. To require the private respondent to file a single suit combining his
SOUTHERN FOOD SALES CORPORATION vs. actions for illegal dismissal and damages in the NLRC would be to
sanction the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect Of the defendant
SALAS on March 21, 1989, where the same law does not expressly so 1. by service of summons
206 SCRA 333 provide, or does not intend to operate as to actions pending before 2. by voluntary appearance
MEDIALDEA; Feb 18, 1992 its enactment, hence prejudicial to the orderly administration of
justice.
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BOTICANO V CHU, JR set aside. The decision of the CFI (now RTC) is reinstated. circumstances, the Tolentinos are estopped the very authority they
invoked. And even assuming that estoppel lies, we cannot set aside the
148 SCRA 541 principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not originally a
PARAS; March 16, 1987 3. by voluntary submission party to a case may be acquired, upon proper conditions, thru the
voluntary appearance of the person before the court. By coming
NATURE forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on compromise
Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside CA ruling RODRIGUEZ VS ALIKPALA and by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case
of denying MFR. 57 SCRA 455 together with the Robellados, the Tolentinos effectively submitted
CASTRO; June 25, 1974 themselves to the jurisdiction of the City Court.
FACTS -Jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be acquired by the court upon filing
- Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck which is used of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants
NATURE
in hauling logs for a fee. It was hit at the rear by another Bedford truck can be acquired by the court upon service of valid summons and upon
Petition for certiorari
owned by Manuel Chu and driven by Jaime Sigua while loaded with logs voluntary appearance/submission of a person in court.
and parked properly by the driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the
FACTS
national highway.
-Petitioner Rodriguez filed a case for recovery of the sum of P5,320.00
- Chu acknowledged ownership and agreed to shoulder the expenses of
plus interest, attorney’s fees and cost against Sps. Robellado. ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
the repair, but failed to comply with the agreement. Boticano filed a
complaint at the CFI at Cabanatuan against Chu and Sigua. Summons
-A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and served to Fe Robellado RES
at their store in Divisoria. Sps Robellado pleaded to the Rodriguez for time
were issued but one was returned unserved for Sigua wile the other
before the attachment to be effectively enforced. Rodriguez agreed to the
served thru Chu’s wife. EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILINO v. PALANCA
suspension of the judgment on the condition that Fe Robellado’s parents,
- Boticano moved to dismiss the case against Sigua and to declare Chu in
default. The Court granted the motions and adduced from evidence that
the now respondents, Federico & Felisa Tolentino, to bind themselves 37 Phil. 921
jointly and severally with the Robellados, to pay the entire obligation STREET; March 26, 1918
Chu is responsible for the fault and negligence of the driver under Art
subject of the suit. Felisa Tolentino, being present, immediately agreed to
2180 CC.
this proposal. FACTS
- Chu filed with the TC a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for
-A compromise agreement was then entered to by the parties. The - A mortgage was executed by Palanca, as security for a debt owing to
extension of time to file record on appeal. Court granted the motions.
Rebellados subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the him to the bank. After the execution of this instrument, Palanca returned to
- Boticano filed a MTD the appeal and for execution, but the appeal was
compromise agreement, thus prompting petitioner Rodriguez to request China where he died.
still approved. The case was brought to the CA. CA set aside the TC
the City Court for a writ of execution on the properties of the Robellados - As Palanca was a nonresident, it was necessary for the bank to give
decision for being null and void.
and also of the Tolentinos. The request was granted by the City Court. The notice to him by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil
- Boticano filed an MFR with the CA to which CA denied.
Tolentinos brought an action for certiorari with the Court of First Instance Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the
of Manila. The CFI rendered judgment excluding the Tolentinos from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of
ISSUE/S
effects of the writ of execution. Thus this appeal. Manila.
1. WON the question of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant cannot be raised for the first time on appeal - The order of the court was entered directing that publication should be
ISSUE made in a newspaper, the court directed that the clerk of the court should
2. WON CA erred in holding that Chu did not voluntarily submit himself to
WON the CFI erred in excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons
the jurisdiction of the TC despite his voluntary appearance
of execution. and complaint directed to Palanca at his last place of residence.
HELD - The cause proceeded in the CFI and Palanca not having appeared,
HELD judgment was taken against him by default. It was ordered that Palanca
1. NO
YES should deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the
Ratio The defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the
-The contention of the CFI that the dispositive portion of the judgment of satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of failure to
commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of
the City Court does not explicitly enjoin the Tolentinos to pay jointly and satisfy the judgment, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila
process may be waived for failure to make seasonal objections.
severally with the Rebellados the amount due to the plaintiff, and that the should be exposed to public sale.
Reasoning The circumstances appear to show that there was waiver by
City Court never acquired jurisdiction over Tolentinos and therefore cannot - Payment was never made and the court ordered the sale of the property.
the defendant to allege such defect when he failed to raise the question in
be bound by the judgment rendered by said court, is erroneous. The property was brought in by the bank.
the CFI and at the first opportunity.
-The dispositive portion of the judgment of the City Court approving the - About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made
compromise and enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties is by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
2. YES, he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction.
adequate for the purpose of execution. Judgment on a compromise need defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
Ratio Under Sec 23, Rule 14 ROC, the defendant’s voluntary appearance
not specifically name a person to be subject of execution thereof in order.
in court shall be equivalent to service. It has been held by the court that
obvious avoidance of repetition.
the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance by the
-On lack of jurisdiction of the court over the Tolentinos : the ISSUE
appearance of the defendant.
Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement
Disposition The assailed decision and resolution of CA are reversed and
which became the basis of judgment of the City Court. Under the
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Avena
1. WON the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void admonished by his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as they are non-
because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. residents. They further alleged that earnest efforts toward a compromise
over the subject of the action. - This mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that have not been made as required in the Civil Code in suits between
2. WON the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The idea upon which members of the same family, The motion was denied by Judge Ferandos
as to amount to a denial of due process of law. the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification and he ruled that the respondents were properly summoned.
which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always - The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by Ferandos
RULING assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and indicating in the order that the action of Quemada was for the recovery of
1. NO. he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with real property and real rights. The respondents were instructed to file their
- The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation answer.
rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an and sale. - De Midgely filed this action with the Supreme Court.
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The - Failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is
expression, "action in rem' is, in its narrow application, used only with not such as irregularity as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and ISSUE/S
reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the WON Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying De
property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and Midgely’s motion to dismissed based on the lack of jurisdiction over her
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi in rem differs from the this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. person.
true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is
named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his Separate Opinion HELD
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All MALCOLM; dissent NO. The fact that she alleged as a ground for dismissal the lack of
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the - The fundamental idea of due process of law is that no man shall be earnest effort to compromise is deemed as abandonment of her special
property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity of appearance and as voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.
form of remedy, are in general way thus designated. The judgment being heard in his defense. Ratio. When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to
entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. - "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only in the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
- Several principles: (1) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate it want of vitality is a dead separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If the motion
the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted do exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against the the defendant." Reasoning. Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De
property itself. Midgely, her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s
- In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction
for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where
DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS
as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with
an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is 64 SCRA 23 the requirement of due process. Quasi in rem is an action between
a necessary precursor of the order of sale. It is clearly intended merely as AQUINO, May 13, 1975 parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed
compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained by the parties or of some interest therein.
and that the defendant shall be required to pay it. As further evidence of NATURE - The SC cited the Perkins case as a precedent. In that case, it ruled that
this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a Original Actions. Certiorari and contempt. in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not
personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be essential. The service of summons by publication is required merely to
rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied FACTS satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The judgment of the
to the mortgage debt (sec. 260) - Quemada, allegedly the illegitimate son of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., was court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes
- Whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of appointed as special administrator of the latter’s estate by the CFI of of the nature of judgment in rem. The judgment is confined to the res
the CFI to mail the proper papers to the defendant in China, such Cebu. As such, he filed a complaint against his half siblings, the spouses (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non
irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval, and Sofia Midgely, who were resident. It should be noted that the civil case filed by Quemada is related
for in our opinion that jurisdiction rests upon a basis much more secure all at that time citizens of Spain and residing in that country. The suit also to a testamentary proceeding as it was filed for the purpose of recovering
than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a named Atlas Mining as co-respondent. The suit was to settle the question the properties which in the understanding of Quemada, belonged to the
resident of a foreign country. of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as estate of the Late Pastor, Sr. and which were held by De Midgely and her
Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro brother.
2. NO. Pastor, Sr.
- In a foreclosure case, some notification of the proceedings to the - Quemada, on his own, caused extraterritorial service of summons to be Disposition. Petition is dismissed
nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine
made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons
the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition through registered mail upon De Midgely and Pastor, Jr. at their respective
thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is addresses in Alicante and Barcelona.
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
known. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be - Both De Midgely and Pastor entered a special appearance and filed a ISSUES
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 7

Avena
beyond the scope of the pleadings. Moreover, the right of a party to against the accused, the appearance of the OSG in the PI would be in
recover depends, not on the prayer, but on the scope of the pleadings, the conflict with its role as the appellate counsel for the People of the Phils
SPS GONZAGA V CA (SPS ABAGAT) issues made and the law. (counsel at the first instance is the provincial/ state prosecutor).
SCRA Reasoning - in the action for damages, the OSG likewise acted as counsel for
CALLEJO SR; October 18, 2004 - Sps Gonzaga failed to file any pleading against Sps Gregorio for the Chavez, who was then the SolGen and counsel for PCGG, the agency
enforcement of the deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute responsible for the investigation of graft and corrupt practices of the
NATURE sale, and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by them. The Marcoses. The OSG filed for extension of time to file required pleading,
Petition for the Review of the Decision and resolution of CA petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against and afterwards filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of Chavez. Petitioner
the intervenors, Sps Gregorio, and appended thereto their third-party Co objected to appearance of OSG as counsel, contending that he is
FACTS complaint for indemnity for any judgment that may be rendered by the suing Chavez in his personal capacity.
- October 22, 1991 > Sps Abagat filed complaint against Sps Gonzaga for court against them and in favor of the respondents. However, Sps - OSG manifested that it is authorized to represent Chavez or any public
recovery of possession of land in Baclaran, Parañaque issued in their Gonzaga did not include in their prayer that judgment be rendered against official even if the said official is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to
names, as owners. Sps Abagat alleged in their complaint that they were the third-party defendants to refund the P90,000.00 paid by them to the the unconditional provisions of PD478 which defines the functions of
the owners of a small hut (barong-barong) constructed on the lot, which Sps Gregorio. Sps Gonzaga failed to assail the trial court’s order of denial OSG, as well as EO300 which made OSG an independent agency under
was then owned by the government in the appellate court. Even after the trial court had granted leave to the the Office of the President
- February 22, 1961 > Abagat filed an application for sales patent over the Sps Gregorio to intervene as parties-defendants and the latter filed their - RTC denied the petition, thus allowing the appearance of OSG as
land Answer-in-Intervention, Sps Gonzaga failed to file a cross-claim against counsel. It also denied the MFR. Thus, this petition for review
- January 26, 1973 > hut was gutted by fire and after that, Sps Gregorio the intervenors for specific performance for the refund of the P90,000.00
built a two-storey house on the property without their consent. Sps Abagat they had received from the petitioners under their deed of conditional sale, ISSUE/S
filed a complaint for ejectment against Sps Gregorio but complaint was the deed of final and absolute sale and the memorandum of agreement 1. WON the OSG has authority to appear for (a) a certain gov’t official in
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because in their answer to the complaint, and pay filing and docket fees therefor. the PI of their case before the Ombudsman and (b) the SolGen in a suit
the Sps Gregorio claimed ownership over the house for damages arising from a crime
- Sps Gregorio sold house to Sps Gonzaga for P100,000 under a deed of Disposition Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. CA decision and
conditional sale, in which Sps Gregorio undertook to secure an award of resolution are AFFIRMED. HELD
the land by the government in favor of Sps Gonzaga. In an MOA, Sps 1. NO
Gregorio indicated that if they would not secure such, they would return Ratio The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at ANY
P90,000 as payment for the house stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony
- January 2, 1986 > Bureau of Lands granted the application of Abagat for
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OF (applies to all public officials and employees in the executive, legislative
a sales patent over the property. TCT No. 128186 was issued by the COURTS and judicial branches).
Register of Deeds in his name. Sps Abagat demanded that Sps Gonzaga A. SUPREME COURT Reasoning PD47811 defines the duties and functions of OSG:
vacate the property, but latter refused Question of law SEC1. The OSG shall represent the Gov’t of the Phils, its agencies and
- September 29, 1992 > Sps Abagat filed a motion for leave to file a third- instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
party complaint against the Sps Gregorio. TC no longer resolved the investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. x x x
motion for leave to file a third-party complaint URBANO V CHAVEZ - the OSG submits that since there is no qualification, it can represent any
- Trial Court > October 10, 1994, in favor of Sps Abagat 183 SCRA 347 public official without any qualification or distinction in any litigation.
- CA > December 19, 1997, affirmed the decision of the trial court on. On GANCAYCO; March 19, 1990 - Same argument seems to apply to a similar provision in the Rev Admin
the plea of Sps Gonzaga that the TC should have ordered the Sps Code (Sec. 1661: As principal law officer of the Gov’t, the SolGen shall
Gregorio to refund to them the P90,000.00 the latter had received as NATURE have the authority to act for and represent the Gov’t , its officers and
payment for the house, CA ruled that a separate complaint should have Petition to review decision of RTC Pasig agents in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the
been filed against the Sps Gregorio, instead of appealing the decision of services of a lawyer). In Anti-Graft League v Ortega, SC interpreted Sec.
the TC. FACTS 1661 to embrace PI. However, should an info be filed after, then OSG can
- there are 2 cases involved here: a criminal action for violation of the Anti- no longer act as counsel. The rationale given was that public officials are
ISSUE Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) and an civil action for damages subjected to numerous suits, and threats of criminal prosecution could
WON RTC and CA erred in not ordering Sps Gregorio to refund to them arising from a felony (defamation through a published interview whereby stay the hand of the public official. OSG provides assurance against
the P90,000 they had paid for the house and which the latter promised to Chavez imputed that Nemesio Co was a close associate (crony?) of timidity in that they will be duly represented by counsel in the PI.
do so under their Memorandum of Agreement Marcos), both against Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (among others) - However, the court declared this ruling abandoned in this case. The
- in the criminal case (filed in the Office of the Ombudsman), the Office of anomaly in this ruling becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment
HELD the SolGen (OSG) entered its appearance for Chavez and the other of conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. The
NO accused (DILG Sec and 2 sectoral reps) as far as the Prelim Investigation OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People, is expected to take a stand
Ratio The rule is that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with is concerned. Urbano et. al. filed a special civil action for prohibition in the against the accused. More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a
and limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto. A trial SC to enjoin the SolGen and his associates from acting as counsel for clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical
court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief to a party Chavez in the PI. The contention is in the event that an information is filed considerations, where the OSG, as counsel for the public official, defends
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 8

Avena
the latter in the PI, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the 2. WON the MC had jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the original other and that it was Tan who was solely responsible to Zhandong for the
People, represents the prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. complaint payment of the goods.
This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed
by the law. It is a situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court. HELD ISSUE
- another reason why the OSG can’t represent an accused in a crim case: 1. NO. 1. WON Josefa is liable to Zhandong for the payment of the merchandise
the State can speak and act only by law, whatever it says or does is Reasoning. After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte before the CA,
lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the state. As namely 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the HELD
such, a public official who is sued criminally is actually sued in his judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of 1. NO
personal capacity inasmuch as his principal (the State) can never the the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI, the SC held that Reasoning. Evidence indicate that Tan bought the hardboards from
author of a wrongful act. The same applies to a suit for damages arising the same are purely legal in nature. Since appellate jurisdiction over cases Zhandong and, in turn, sold them to petitioner. However, both the trial
from a felony, where the public official is held accountable for his act; the involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in the SC by Sec. 17 court and the Court of Appeals ignored this glaring reality and instead held
state is not liable. of the Judiciary Act (RA 296), it is apparent that the decision under review that petitioner purchased the boards directly from respondent.
** Re: Question of Law (copied verbatim. This is all that is mentioned) rendered by the CA without jurisdiction should be set aside. General Rule : Only questions of law may be entertained by the
-both issues raise pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no 2. NO. Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari
evidentiary matters to be evaluated by this Court. Moreover, if the only Reasoning. Where a subdivision owner seeks not just to eject the lot Exceptions:
issue is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in consonance buyer who defaulted in his payments but also prays that the residential (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
with law and jurisprudence, then the issue is a pure question of law building constructed by the buyer be forfeited in plaintiff's favor, jurisdiction (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(Torres v Yu). Thus, the Court resolved to consolidate both Petitions and over the case belongs to the CFI not the MC in an ejectment case. The (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
to treat them as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law in issues raised before the inferior court did not only involved the possession (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. of the lot but also rights and obligations of the parties to the residential (5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
Disposition Petition is granted. building which under Art. 45 of the CC is real property. Aslo, plaintiff's (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
claim to the bldg raises question of ownership. are based;
ORTIGAS V. CA -A CFI cannot assume jurisdiction in a case appealed to it under SECII (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of
Rule 40 where one of the parties objected to its jurisdiction. Since the evidence on record;
106 SCRA 121 original case was decided by the MC without jurisdiction over the subject (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
ABAD SANTOS, 1981 matter thereof, the CFI should have dismissed the cases when it was court;
brought before it on appeal. (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
NATURE undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
Petition for review of the decision of the CA Disposition. Without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper conclusion;
action in the proper court, the decisions of the CA, CFI and MC of San (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the
FACTS Juan Rizal are set aside. case;
-In 1974, Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
Maximo Belmonte in the Municipal Court of San Juan Rizal, praying that
judgment be rendered 1.) ordering the defendant his successors-in- JOSEFA V ZHANDONG Disposition Petition is granted.
interest to vacate and surrender the lot to plaintiff; 2.) declaring the GR 150903
residential building constructed on the lot by defendant as forfeited in SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; December 8, 2003
favor of plaintiff; 3.0 condeming defendant to pay monthly rent of 5,000
from July 18, 1971 up to the time he vacates, together with attorney's fees NATURE Change of venue
and exemplary damages. The Ruled in favor of plaintiff and granted the Petition for review on certiorari
relieves prayed for.
-Belmonte filed a motion to dismiss in the Cfi based on lack of jurisdiction
PEOPLE v. MAYOR PABLO SOLA
FACTS
on the part of the MC. CFI denied motion and affirmed in totot the MC Tan represented himself to be the owner of hardboards and sold them to
103 SCRA 393 (1981)
judgment. The said court also issued a writ of execution. Belmonte filed a Josefa. Josefa paid all his obligations to Tan. The hardboards apparently FERNANDO, C.J.
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminsry injunction in the CA, belonged to Zhandong. When Tan failed to pay Zhandong, it sent a
assiling the 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the demand letter for the payment of the hardboards to both Tan and Josefa. NATURE
judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of Trial Court ruled in favor of Zhandong Petition for certiorari3
the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI. The Ca ruled in The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision.
favor of Belmonte, holding that the MC has no jurisdiction. Hence the Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 3 The one who filed this appeal which partakes of a nature of certiorari are private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio
present petition. Petitioner ascribes to the CA the error in affirming the ruling of the trial Espiritu. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors is that they are instituting the action `subject to the control and
court that Josefa is liabe to Zhandong despite “THE MOUNTAIN OF supervision of the Fiscal. (CJ Fernando’s prefatory statement states that the two have no legal standing to raise this petition.
ISSUES EVIDENCE” showing that they had no business transaction with each Since Sol Gen Mendoza never bothered to question their legal standing, the Court contented itself with the fact that the Solicitor
1. WON the CA has appellate jurisdiction over this case
General has authority to raise this petition in behalf of the People of the Philippines)
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Avena
(B) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.
FACTS Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by We are to keep the balance true."
-September 15, 1980: acting on the evidence presented by the Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge -the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
CFI of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions
the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be
accused MAYOR Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to characterized as searching. The fact did not cure an infirmity of a
Negros Occidental. Himamaylan; and jurisdictional character.
-September 16, 1980: armed with warrant, elements of the 332nd (C) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit. The
PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." miscarriage of justice."
Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo THUS, THE ISSUE OF A CHANGE OF VENUE HAS BECOME MOOT -People v. Gutierrez, J.B.L. Reyes: "…to compel the prosecution to
Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. AND ACADEMIC. proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to
-September 23 and October 1, 1980: the PC provincial commander of -The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and
Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established.
the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question -The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in
Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their
unknown names. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision. lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may
cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. ISSUE either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
-However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the Whether or not the bail bonds of respondents should be cancelled -there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the
to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, HELD effect it has on the witnesses who will testify.
Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this YES. -The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in
right and have since been released from detention. Ratio. There being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of
-In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a venue,
the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of
Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya
Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to
are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been Reasoning. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court
released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution. That is to disregard the of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is
made on the families of the witnesses." The facts alleged argue strongly -Justice Capistrano: "The question presented before us is, whether the directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with
for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the
of the bail bonds. affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is
-March 15, 1981: this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a immediately executory. No costs.
Resolved to: (A) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve
order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special
B. COURT OF APPEALS
Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused (2) the petition for a change civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
of justice; granting bail should be considered void on that ground." ST MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS NLRC
-J. Cardozo: "THE LAW, AS WE HAVE SEEN, IS SEDULOUS IN
MAINTAINING FOR A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH CRIME
G.R. No. 130866
WHATEVER FORMS OF PROCEDURE ARE OF THE ESSENCE OF AN REGALADO; Sept 16, 1998
The Solicitor General adopted a two-pronged thrusts in this petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND. PRIVILEGES SO FUNDAMENTAL AS TO
Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases
BE INHERENT IN EVERY CONCEPT OF A FAIR TRIAL THAT COULD NATURE
mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE THOUGHT OF REASONABLE MEN WILL BE
justice."
KEPT INVIOLATE AND INVIOLABLE, HOWEVER CRUSHING MAY BE Petition for certiorari which stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal
THE PRESSURE OF INCRIMINATING PROOF. BUT JUSTICE, THOUGH filed by herein private respondent before the NLRC
DUE TO THE ACCUSED, IS DUE TO THE ACCUSER ALSO. The
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FACTS Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
- . Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that
JOSE B. FERNANDEZ, VS CA, JUDGE TEOFILO
Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling
However, there was no contract of employment executed between him within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with GUADIZ, JR., PRODUCERS BANK OF THE
and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases PHILIPPINES and PRODUCERS PROPERTIES, INC.
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be 208 SCRA 652
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
DAVIDE; May 8, 1992
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by
(BIR). Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
NATURE
its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor
The common origin of these cases is Producers Bank of the Philippines
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
and Producers Properties, Inc. vs CB, Jose B. Fernandez. Jr. and the
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor
Monetary Board filed before the Makati RTC.
asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the
- the consolidation of the 2 cases was ordered:
an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that
FIRST CASE- a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and the
of Amelita in overseeing the business. matter.
resolution of the CA. The impugned decision upheld the Order of
- In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then -Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were
respondent Judge Guadiz granting the motion for issuance of a writ of
took over the management of the business. She then discovered that of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an
preliminary injunction enjoining CB, Fernandez and the Monetary Board
there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would
from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions No. 649 and No. 751, or
although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and
from taking the threatened appropriate alternative action and the Order in
Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the
the same case denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and vacate said
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the aggrieved party on this reasoning: i.e., , to allow these cases to be
injunction. The challenged resolution, on the other hand, denied
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to
petitioners' MFR.
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which
SECOND CASE- a petition for review directed principally against the
- Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly
decision of the CA dismissing the petition therein filed and sustained the
rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and affirmed, modified or reversed.
various Orders of the respondent Judge, but directed the plaintiffs therein
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate -Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the
to amend the amended complaint by stating in its prayer the specific
proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not
amount of damages which Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP)
denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will
claims to have sustained as a result of losses of operation and the
merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be
conservator's bank frauds and abuses; the Clerk of Court was also
abuse of discretion. dismissed outright by minute resolutions.
ordered to determine the amount of filing fees which should be paid by the
-While the SC does not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on
plaintiffs within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
ISSUE the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score it adds the further
WON the SC should entertain the present petition observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated
FACTS
to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained
- Petitioners claim that during the regular examination of the PBP, CB
HELD to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous
examiners stumbled upon some highly questionable loans which had
NO (should be remanded to CA) factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
been extended by the PBP management to several entities. Upon further
Ratio. All references in the amended Sec 9 of BP No. 129 to supposed purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and
examination, it was discovered that these loans, totalling approximately
appeals from the NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
P300 million, were "fictitious" as they were extended, without collateral, to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. Said loans were
such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the CA in strict -This case therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that the Supreme Court
deemed to be anomalous particularly because the total paid-in capital of
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
PBP at that time was only P 140.544 million. This means that the entire
forum for the relief desired. obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
paid-in capital of the bank, together with some P160 million of depositors'
Reasoning. It will be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the
money, was utilized by PBP management to fund these unsecured loans.
now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
- at the height of the controversy surrounding the discovery of the
final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial
anomalous loans, several blind items about a family-owned bank in
agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among Disposition. The instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and
Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in
others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of
major newspapers. These news items triggered a bank-run in PBP which
in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views
resulted in continuous over-drawings on the bank's demand deposit
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
account with the CB. On the basis of the report submitted by the
contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie
Supervision and Examination Sector, Department I of the CB, the
from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally C. RTC Monetary Board (MB placed PBP under conservatorship.
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of
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- PBP nonetheless requested that the same be lifted by the CB. - The case was raffled to Branch 147 of Makati RTC court which was then respondent bank petitioners' governmental acts that were specifically
Consequently, the MB directed the principal stockholders of PBP to presided over by respondent Judge. designed and executed to devise a scheme that would irreparably divest
increase its capital accounts by such an amount that would be necessary - respondent Judge issued a TRO; Subsequently, he issued an Order from the stockholders of the respondent bank control of the same."
for the elimination of PBP's negative net worth. enjoining defendant-petitioners or any of their agents from implementing On the issue of the non-payment of the correct docket fees, the said court,
- CB senior deputy Governor Gabriel Singson informed PBP that the CB Monetary Board Resolutions Nos. 649 and 751 or from taking the in ruling that the correct amount was paid, said that "the instant case is
would be willing to lift the conservatorship under the following conditions: threatened "appropriate alternative action" including exclusion of plaintiff incapable of pecuniary estimation because the value of the losses
(a) PBP's unsecured overdraft with the Central Bank will be converted into bank from settlement of clearing balances at the Central Bank clearing incurred by the respondent bank cannot be calibrated nor pinned down to
an emergency loan, to be secured by sufficient collateral house or any other action that will disturb the status quo or the viability of a specific amount in view of the damage that may be caused by the
(b) A comptroller for PBP and any number of bank examiners deemed plaintiff bank during the pendency of this case conditioned upon the appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in the
necessary to oversee PBP's operations shall be designated by the CB, posting of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00. community."
under terms of reference to be determined by the Governor; - PBP filed the Amended Complaint impleading PPI as an additional - petitioners filed with this Court the instant petition for review. It is alleged
(c) A letter from the Management of PBP authorizing the CB to plaintiff. No new allegations or causes of action for said plaintiff were therein that the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in:
automatically return clearing items that would result in an overdraft in its made. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (1) Ignoring petitioners' contention that since PBP did not pay the correct
CB account shall be submitted to the CB. - the respondent Judge handed down an Order denying the motion to filing fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case; hence,
- the MB approved the consolidation of PBP's other unsecured obligations dismiss on the following grounds: (a) the amended complaint alleges pursuant to Manchester Development Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
to the CB with its overdraft and authorizing the conversion thereof into an ultimate facts showing that plaintiff has a right and that such a right has al., the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on
emergency loan. The same resolution authorized the CB Governor to lift been violated by defendant; the questioned MB Resolutions were issued the part of the court;
the conservatorship and return PBP's management to its principal arbitrarily and with bad faith, "being a part of a scheme to divest plaintiff's (2) . . . ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the conservatorship as a
stockholders upon completion of the documentation and full present stockholders of their control of PBP and to award the same to the basis for determining the existence of a cause of action since the
collateralization of the emergency loan, but directed PBP to pay the PDIC or its unknown transferees"; and the averments of legality or amended complaint does not seek the annulment or lifting of the
emergency loan in 5 equal annual installments, with interest and penalty illegality of the conservatorship are relevant to the cause of action since conservatorship;
rates at MRR 180 days plus 48% per annum, and liquidated damages of the complaint seeks the lifting of the conservatorship; (b) While it is true (3) . . . not holding that the amended complaint should have been
5% for delayed payments. that under Section 28-A of the Central Bank Act the conservator takes dismissed because it was filed in the name of PBP without the authority of
- PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB. Although said proposal over the management of a bank, the Board of Directors of such bank is its conservator; and
was explored and discussed, no program acceptable to both the CB and not prohibited from filing a suit to lift the conservatorship and from (4) . . . not setting aside the Order of the trial court granting the issuance
PPI was arrived at because of disagreements on certain matters such as questioning the validity of both the conservator's fraudulent acts and of a writ of preliminary injunction which unlawfully restrained the CB from
interest rates, penalties and liquidated damages. No other rehabilitation abuses and its principal's (MB) arbitrary action; besides, PPI is now a exercising its mandated responsibilities and effectively compelled it to
program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years; as a result thereof, its party-plaintiff in the action; and (c) plaintiffs have paid the correct filing allow the PBP to continue incurring overdrafts with it.
overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate. Consequently, per fees since "the value of the case cannot be estimated." - private respondents argue that the Manchester rule is not applicable in
Resolution No. 649, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in FIRST CASE the case at bar because what is primarily sought for herein is a writ of
principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. - Unable to accept the above Order, CB and Fernandez filed with injunction and not an award for damages; it is further alleged that an order
- There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed respondent CA a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul denying a motion to dismiss is neither appealable nor be made the proper
rehabilitation plan, the MB issued Resolution No. 751 on 7 August 1987 the Orders of the respondent Judge, restrain the implementation of the subject of a petition for certiorari absent a clear showing of lack of
instructing CB management to advise the bank that: same and nullify the writ of preliminary injunction. They contend therein jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
a. The CB conservatorship over PBP may be lifted only after PBP shall that: 1. The trial court's injunctive order and writ are anomalous and illegal SECOND CASE
have identified the new group of stockholders who will put in new capital in because they are directed against CB acts and measures which constitute - Pursuant to the powers and authority conferred upon her by the Central
PBP and after the Monetary Board shall have considered such new no invasion of plaintiff's rights; and 2. The complaint filed was, on its face, Bank, Atty. Leonida Tansinsin-Encarnacion, in her capacity as
stockholders as acceptable; and dismissible: (a) for failure to state a cause of action, (b) for being conservator, instituted reforms aimed at making PBP more viable. With
b. The stockholders of PBP have to decide whether or not to accept the unauthorized by the party in whose name it purports to have been filed, this purpose in mind, she started reorganizing the bank's personnel and
terms of the rehabilitation plan as provided under Resolution and (c) for failure of the purported plaintiff to pay the required filing fees. committees.
No. 649 within one week from receipt of notice hereof and if such terms - CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the CB's sudden - In order to prevent her from continuing with the reorganization, PBP filed
are not acceptable to them, the Central Bank will take appropriate and untimely announcement of the conservatorship over PBP eroded the an Omnibus Motion asking the trial court for an order:
alternative action on the matter; . . . confidence which the banking public had hitherto reposed on the bank (a) reinstating PBP officers to their original positions and restoring the
- the PBP, without responding to the communications of the CB, filed a and resulted in the bank-run; it then concluded that when the CB bank's standing committees to their respective compositions prior to said
complaint against the CB, the MB and CB Governor Jose B. Fernandez, "peremptorily and illtimely announced" the conservatorship, PBP was not reorganization; (b) enjoining the lease of any portion of the bank's space
Jr. The complaint, alleged that the conservatorship was unwarranted, ill- given an opportunity to be heard since the CB arbitrarily brushed aside in Producers Bank Centre building to third parties and the relocation of
motivated, illegal, utterly unnecessary and unjustified; that the administrative due process notwithstanding PBP's having sufficiently departments/offices of PBP as was contemplated; and (c) to hold, after an
appointment of the conservator was arbitrary; that herein petitioners acted established its inherent corporate right to autonomously perform its opportunity to be heard is given her, said conservator in contempt of court
in bad faith; that the CB-designated conservators committed bank frauds banking activities without undue governmental interference that would in for disobedience of and resistance to the writ of injunction. An opposition
and abuses; that the CB is guilty of promissory estoppel; and that by effect divest its stockholders of their control over the operations of the to the contempt charge was later filed by said petitioner.
reason of the conservatorship, it suffered losses. It prayed for a judicial bank." It further held that the challenged resolutions of the MB are not just - respondent Judge issued an Order (a) requiring conservator Tansinsin-
review of the MB Resolutions and the issuance of a TRO. advisory in character "because the same sought to impose upon the Encarnacion to reinstate PBP officers to their original positions prior to the
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reorganization of the bank's personnel and restore PBP's standing the case of Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. to the effect that applying the the bulk of its petition to detailed events, occurrences and transactions in
committees to their original compositions, and (b) restraining her from doctrine initiated in the case of Manchester, together with said subsequent support thereof and patiently enumerated the losses it sustained and
leasing out to third parties any portion of PBP's space in the Producers thereto (sic), plaintiffs in the original case should be given a reasonable suffered.
Bank Centre building. time to amend their complaint, more particularly, to state in their prayer in - These are the very damages referred to in the prayer:
- A second Order directed Tansinsin-Encarnacion to publish the financial the amended complaint the specific amount of damages . . ." “to fully repair the damages inflicted on PBP consisting of losses of
statement of PBP - On the orders of contempt and the reasons therefor, respondent Court operation and the conservators' bank frauds and abuses”
- On several occasions thereafter, conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion merely stated: but not specified therein. To this Court's mind, this was done to evade the
caused the publication of PBP's financial statement as required by . . . Generally, when the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and payment of the corresponding filing fees which, as computed by petitioner
regulations, without, however, carrying the items enumerated by the trial of the person, decisions upon or questions pertinent to the cause are on the basis alone of the specified losses of P108,479,771.00, would
court as "suspense accounts." Consequently, contempt charges were filed decisions within its jurisdiction, and however, irregular or erroneous they amount to about P 437,000.00. The PBP then clearly acted with manifest
against her, of which she was found guilty. Tansinsin-Encarnacion filed a may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. bad faith in resorting to the foregoing clever strategy to avoid paying the
petition for certiorari against respondent Judge, Henry L. Co and the law - Finally, on the administrative liability of the respondent Judge and the correct filing fees. The pronouncements in the Manchester case should
firm of Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista. She prays therein for lawyers, the respondent Court declared the claim to be without merit. thus be reiterated:
judgment declaring respondent judge to be without jurisdiction to entertain The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
both the complaint and amended complaint; declaring null and void all his ISSUE frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this
orders, specially the contempt orders; and finding respondent Judge and WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
respondent lawyers guilty of violating their respective oaths of office. amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing the Civil Case on the although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
- In her Memorandum submitted to the CA, Tansinsin-Encarnacion alleged ground of non-payment of the correct amount of docket fee in violation of complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
that: (1) respondent Judge has no jurisdiction because the filing of the the rule enunciated in Manchester Development Corp. vs. Court of payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
case was not authorized by the petitioner or the conservator in violation of Appeals, et al. assessment of the filing fee. . . .
Section 28-A of R.A. No. 265, as amended, it was filed after the ten (10) - The respondent Court itself, confronted by the same issue, but perhaps
day period prescribed by Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended, and HELD unaware of its earlier Resolution, ruled that PBP and PPI are liable for the
the correct docket fees were not paid; (2) respondent Judge illegally Ratio The action must be dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs therein to filing fees on the claim for damages.
ordered her to return to PPI the administration of the bank's three (3) pay the correct docket fees, pursuant to Manchester. The said case was - respondent Court applied the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office and
properties, contrary to his own writ of preliminary injunction and earlier decided by this Court on 7 May 1987, exactly 3 months and 20 days Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. which were, by then, already overturned
order to make the bank viable, and to publish the alleged "suspense before the filing of the original complaint and 5 months and 18 days before by Manchester. Even granting for the sake of argument that Sun
accounts" contrary to Section 28-A of R.A. No. 265, as amended, the writ the filing of the Amended Complaint. It was ruled therein that: Insurance and Pilipinas Shell may apply in this case, the Court
of preliminary injunction and her constitutional right to silence; (3) The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the categorically stated:
respondent Judge erred in declaring her in contempt of court payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
notwithstanding his lack of jurisdiction over the case and failure to set any complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
date for the hearing and reception of evidence, in violation of her right to the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
due process of law; and (4) respondents Judge and lawyers are amounts sought in the amended pleading. filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
administratively liable for their grossly illegal actuations and for depriving Reasoning The respondent Judge, in ruling that PBP and PPI had paid docket fee, the court may allow the payment of the fee within a
the Government of at least P13.2 million in filing fees. the correct docket fee of P102.00, said that "the value of the case cannot reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
- In disposing of the issues raised, respondent Court merely adopted with be estimated" since what is sought is an injunction against the reglementary period.
approval the ruling of the respondent Judge on the question of jurisdiction, enforcement of the challenged resolutions of the MB; in short, the claim - The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within
sustaining the respondent Judge's ruling. As to the filing of the complaint for damages is merely incidental. Upon the other hand, respondent Court, which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the
after the lapse of the 10-day period provided for in Section 29 of R.A. No. in its Resolution, ruled that the case is "incapable of pecuniary estimation" docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period.
265, it ruled that the Section does not apply because the complaint because the value of the losses incurred by the PBP "cannot be calibrated - There can be no question that in the instant case, PBP's claims for
essentially seeks to compel the conservator to perform his duties and nor pinned down to a specific amount in view of the damage that may be damages arise out of an injury to its rights. Pursuant to Article 1146 of the
refers to circumstances and incidents which transpired after said 10-day caused by the appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in Civil Code, the action therefor must be initiated within 4 years from the
period. the community." time the cause of action accrued. Since the damages arose out of the
- On the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct filing fees, Both conclusions are unfounded and are the result of a misapprehension alleged unwarranted, ill-motivated, illegal, unnecessary and unjustified
to which an exception was made in the dispositive portion, the respondent of the allegations and causes of action in both the complaint and conservatorship, the cause of action, if any, first accrued in 1984 and
Court found the same to be "partly" meritorious. It agreed with petitioner amended complaint. continued until 1987, when the original complaint was filed. There is no
that while the other losses and damages sought to be recovered are - While PBP cleverly worded its complaint to make it appear as one showing that PBP paid the correct filing fee for the claim within the
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the damages inflicted on PBP due to principally for injunction, deliberately omitting the claim for damages as a prescribed period. Hence, nothing can save the case from being
losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds and abuses were in specific cause of action, a careful examination thereof bears that the dismissed.
fact pegged at P108,479,771.00 in paragraph 26 of the amended same is in reality an action for damages arising out of the alleged
complaint. This specific amount, however, should have been stated in the "unwarranted, ill-motivated and illegal conservatorship," or a DISPOSITION
prayer of the complaint. It also held that the Manchester case "has been conservatorship which "was utterly unnecessary and unjustified," and the PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are GRANTED. The decision
legally construed in the subsequent case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd. and "arbitrary" appointment of a conservator. Thus, as stated earlier, it devoted and resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
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Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case. All proceedings undertaken and all pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to be consigned determines the second, that the maritime contract binding the parties was breached by
orders issued by respondent Judge are hereby SET ASIDE for being null jurisdiction of the court. the carrier because through his fault and that of his agents and
and void. - In the case at bar. the amount consigned being P5,625.00, the representatives the cargo became a total loss.
respondent metropolitan trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
same in accordance with Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129. Disposition Reversed.
ASCUE v CA (ANTONIO) Disposition Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
GR No. 84330 BAITO V SARMIENTO
Padilla; May 8, 1991 109 Phil. 148
NEGRE v CABAHUG SHIPPING PADILLA; APR 25, 1960
NATURE
16 SCRA 655
Petition for review on certiorari
DIZON; April 29, 1966 NATURE
Appeal from CFI Samar
FACTS
- Private respondents Ramon Antonio, Salvador Salenga and Ulipia NATURE
Appeal FACTS
Fernandez (lessees) filed a complaint with the MetroTC alleging that
-Lucina Baito filed action for support against her husband Anatalio
petitioner Ascue (lessor) refused to collect their rentals. Hence, they
FACTS Sarmiento.
sought consignation of the payments with the MetroTC.
- On August 14, 1961, Negre (appellant) filed his complaint against -CFI Samar dismissed her complaint on the ground that it has no
- Ascue filed a motion to dismiss complaint on the ground that it is the
Cabahug Shipping & Co (appellee), a common carrier engaged in the jurisdiction, the amount demanded as support being only P720
RTC not MTC which has jurisdiction over consignation cases, the subject
matter of litigation being incapable of pecuniary estimation. The MetroTC business of transporting persons and goods for a price within Philippine
waters, to recover the sum of P3,774.90, representing the value of a cargo ISSUE
denied Ascue’s motion to dismiss and held that the inferior court had
of dried fish belonging to him which was loaded on the latter's vessel, and WON the CFI has jurisdiction over an action for support if the amount
jurisdiction since the consigned amount was P5,625 (well below 20K).
which was totally destroyed on board thereof, before it could be claimed or demanded as support is only P720, or not more than P2,000
- Ascue later appealed to the RTC but the same dismissed the appeal for
transported to its place of destination, due to the gross negligence of the (now P5,000)
being premature. Ascue brought the case to the SC on direct appeal but
the case was referred back to the CA. The CA then dismissed the petition officers and members of the crew of said vessel
- As Cabahug’s answer admitted liability for the loss of said cargo, but HELD
and ruled that the jurisdiction of a court in consignation cases depends on
only up to the amount of P3,733,78, appellant moved for a judgment on Ratio. An action for support does not only involve the determination of the
the amount consigned, consignation being merely a form of payment and
the pleadings. In replying thereto, however, appellee moved to dismiss the amount to be given as support, but also the relation of the parties, the
the opposite of a demand by a creditor for payment.
case on the ground that the amount of the claim did not fall within the right to support created by the relation, the needs of the claimant, the
jurisdiction of the court. Resolving this motion, the court dismissed the financial resources of the person from whom support is sought, all of
ISSUE
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the right of appellant which are not capable of pecuniary estimation.
WON the CA erred in holding that consignation cases fall within the
to file the same with the corresponding municipal court. Reasoning. An action for support falls within the original jurisdiction of
jurisdiction of the MetroTC and that the amount consigned determines
- Appellant maintains in this appeal that his action is one in admiralty and Courts of First Instance under section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296, as
said jurisdiction
maritime jurisdiction, which, pursuant to the provisions of Section 44 of the amended by Republic Act No. 2613.
HELD Judiciary Act, as amended, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the courts of first instance, irrespective of the amount or the value of the Disposition The order appealed from is set aside and the case is
No.
goods involved. remanded
Ratio In valid consignation cases, where the thing sought to be deposited
is a sum of money, the amount of debt due is determinable, hence, the
subject matter is capable of pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to ISSUE/S D. METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL,
be consigned then determines the jurisdiction of the court. WON the case falls within the jurisdiction of CFI (RTC) MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Reasoning petitioner is of the belief that it is the RTC, not the MTC, Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil
which has jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as the subject matter of HELD
litigation (the amount to be consigned) is incapable of pecuniary YES and estate settlement
estimation. This is wrong. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing Ratio. It has been held that, to give admiralty jurisdiction over a contract, proceedings/over provisional
due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot the same must relate to the trade and business of the sea Admiralty remedies
accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior jurisdiction, it has also been held, extends to all maritime torts.
tender of payment. Two of the requisites of it valid consignation are (1) Reasoning. The action was based upon an oral contract for the
that there is a debt due. and (2) the amount is placed it the disposal of the transportation of goods by water. Exclusive original jurisdiction in
court. Thus, where no debt is due and owing, consignation is not proper. -Moreover, the allegations of the complaint clearly show: first, that the forcible entry and unlawful detainer
In a valid consignation where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of contract entered into between the parties had already been partially cases
money, the amount of the debt due is determinable. Clearly, the subject performed with the loading of the goods subject-matter thereof on board
matter (i.e., the amount due) in consignation cases is capable of appellee's vessel and the acceptance thereof by said appellee, and
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 14

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LIM V CA (PIZARRO) Summary Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied, a motion FACTS
to dismiss being one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under - Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, denominated
00 SCRA 00 Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure. "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the RTC of
GANCAYCO; March 18, 1991 With regard to the issue of jurisdiction: Mandaue City
- LKT, Inc. argued that when the amount of damages claimed is not - The complaint alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of
NATURE specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over the case would fall land in Liloan, Cebu. The land was previously owned by the spouses
Petition to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals under the RTC as the failure to so allege would characterize the subject Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho.
matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. - Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal
FACTS - In Singson vs. Aragon, the SC held that exemplary damages must be heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had
- Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. owns a building in Manila. One of the rooms in the specified and if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it, if together remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document
building (Room 301) is occupied by Reginaldo Lim, an MTC judge. with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
- The original occupant of Room 103 was Lim Eng Piao, the father of exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000). CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION"
Reginaldo. When Lim Eng Piao died, the occupancy was continued by - By virtue of this deed, respondents divided the property among
Reginaldo. Eventually, Reginaldo was able to acquire a house and lot in ISSUE themselves to the exclusion of petitioners.
Quezon City but he still used the room where he kept his books, WON the action for specific performance in this case falls under the - The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and
documents, appliances and other important belongings. jurisdiction of the RTC an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
- September 1987 – LKT, Inc. changed the lock of the main door of the - Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
building which was commonly used by all the occupants of the building. HELD lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the action is one for re-
- September 30, 1987 – Reginaldo was unable to enter the building NO partition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the
because he did not have a key to the new lock. He was unable to get his Ratio In Vichanco vs. Laurilla, it was held that what confers jurisdiction on complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
law books for a case he was working on so he had to purchase new ones the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the MCTC of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu
which cost him P1,235.00. amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of - Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the
- October 1, 1987 - He requested for a new key from the OIC of the the action because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main complaint is for the annulment of a document denominated as
buiding but his request was not complied with. action. "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
- October 2, 1987 – Reginaldo instituted a civil case against Rafael Lim Reasoning PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of
and Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The - The suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the RTC
complaint was denominated as an action for damages with injunction but of Court. It was through stealth that LKT, Inc. prevented Reginaldo from - The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.
was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. using the room. - A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners
- October 23, 1987 – Another complaint was instituted in the MTC which - Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part - Respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
had the same allegations. Reginaldo alleges that he has a clear and thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper - Respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for
unmistakable right to the use of said room, entitling him to the writ of inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding reconsideration.
preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to provide him the possession from him. - Hence, this petition
appropriate key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages in - This relief is available to a landlord, vendor and vendee and also to a
the amount of P1,253.00, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit. tenant or lessee or any other person against whom the possession of any ISSUE
- November 2, 1987 - A temporary restraining order was issued by land or building, or a part of it, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the civil case.
respondent judge pending trial on the merits, commanding LKT, Inc. to unlawfully deprived possession within 1 year after such unlawful
deliver the appropriate keys to Reginaldo and to allow him to enter the deprivation or withholding possession. HELD
premises and Room 301 of the building. - November 3, 1987 – LKT, Inc. Disposition Petition is denied. No costs. YES.
instituted the instant petition. Ratio Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill: In determining whether an action is
- The Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by
Exclusive original jurisdiction Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
respondent judge and from further taking cognizance of said civil case. principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
With regard to the issue of possession: Force was used by LKT, Inc. in civil actions involving title to sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
in depriving Reginaldo of physical possession of the room when the main or possession of real property and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
door’s lock was changed without the knowledge and consent of instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
Reginaldo. RUSSELL V VESTIL basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
- The issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership.
304 SCRA 738
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
- The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of KAPUNAN; March 17, 1999 where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
the title to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance Examples of
be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. NATURE
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific
- Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Petition for Certiorari
performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of
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judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a -Yu Sio Liong filed MTD on the ground that, the subject of the litigation -The [Municipal Trial] Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific
deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for being specific performance, the same lay within the exclusive jurisdiction performance of a contract, although the damages alleged for its breach, if
rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance. of the CFI. MTC upheld Yu Sio Liong and dismissed the complaint. permitted, are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary -CFI affirmed the order of dismissal with costs, saying: “Manufacturer’s -Cruz vs. Tan (87 Phil. 627) is inapplicable. In said case, the plaintiff had
estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the Distributors's action before the MTC was one for specific performance… made an alternative prayer: specific performance or payment of the sum
MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property Whether refusal to accept delivery of said plastifilms was justified or not is of P644.31. The alternative prayer meant that the payment of the latter
involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if not capable of pecuniary estimation and was, therefore, not cognizable by sum was a pecuniary estimation of the specific performance sought, since
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the the Municipal Court." it would equally satisfy the claims of the plaintiffs. In the present case, the
case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under -Manufacturer’s Distributors contend that the subject of the litigation payment in money is not an alternative equivalent, but a consequence or
Sec. 19(2). were the 100,000 plastifilm bags, contracted for by Yu Sio Liong at a total result of the specific performance, and hence can not constitute a
Reasoning The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment price of P3,376.00, and, therefore, it was susceptible of pecuniary pecuniary estimation thereof.
of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED estimation. Disposition CFI order affirmed.
OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main
purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the ISSUE CRUZ V TAN
document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only WON the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and is therefore not
87 SCRA 627
heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and within the jurisdiction of MTC
divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who JUGO; November 27, 1950
also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the HELD
complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental YES. NATURE
to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document -There is no controversy, as to the contractual price for the plastifilm bags; Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with
above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute is whether or not Yu Sio Liong was justified in its refusal to injunction.
a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the accept the delivery of the bags. This matter plainly is not capable of
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether pecuniary estimation, and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the FACTS
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. MTC. - August 3, 1949: respondent Telesfora Yambao filed a complaint against
Disposition The petition was GRANTED. -Speaking of the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace and the petitioner Manuel Cruz, praying that the latter be ordered to finish the
Municipal Courts, the Judiciary Act, as amended, in its sec88, after construction of a house mentioned in the complaint, or to pay her the sum
E. SPECIAL RULES conferring original jurisdiction in Justice of the Peace and Municipal of P644.31.
Courts over cases where the value of the subject matter or amount of the - Within ten days from the receipt of the summons, the petitioner filed a
demand does not exceed P5,000.00, provides nevertheless in its par2 motion for a bill of particulars, which was denied by the court.
MANUFACTURER'S DISTRIBUTORS, INC., V that "The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace and judge of a municipal - September 19, 1949: petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
YU SIU LIONG court shall not extend to civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not ground that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit
11 SCRA 680 capable of pecuniary estimation, except in forcible entry and detainer —the demand contained in the prayer is only for P644.31, which falls
cases; nor to those which involve the legality of any tax, impost or under the Justice of the Peace or the Judge of the Municipal Court. The
REYES, JBL; April 29 1966 assessment; nor to actions involving admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; nor motion to dismiss was denied by the court, and trial for the merits was
to matters of probate, the appointments of trustees or receiver; nor to also set.
NATURE actions for annulment of marriages; . . ." Jurisdiction over the classes of - Order setting the case for trial on October 10, 1949 was received by
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI Manila sustaining and cases thus excluded is conferred on the CFI (Judiciary Act, sec44). petitioner’s counsel on October 12 (two days after). Since the parties did
affirming an order of the MTC Manila dismissing the original complaint for -That Manufacturer’s Distributors's complaint also sought the payment by not appear at the trial, the court dismissed the case for lack of interest of
want of jurisdiction. Yu Sio Liong of P3,376.00 plus interest and attorney's fees, does not give the parties on October 10, 1949.
a pecuniary estimation to the litigation, for the payment of such amounts - October 12, 1949: respondent Yambao filed a motion praying that the
FACTS can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific performance trial of the case be set for November 14, 1949. The motion was heard on
-Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. had filed action in MTC Manila, Branch primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be but an incident October 15, 1949, but as the petitioner’s counsel received notice of the
III, seeking to compel Yu Siu Liong to accept delivery of 74,500 pieces of or consequence of Yu Sio Liong's liability for specific performance. If no said motion on Oct. 15, he could not appear in the said hearing.
plastifilm bags, balance of 100,000 pieces ordered by said Yu Sio Liong such liability is judicially declared, the payment cannot be awarded.
and supplied by the Manufacturer’s Distributors; to pay P3,376.00, the Hence, the amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of ISSUE
value of the 100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags ordered by him, plus 12% litigation. 1. WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case.
interest per annum thereon until fully paid; and to pay the amount of -Subject matter over which jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent,
P844.00, for and as stipulated attorney's fees. Manuufacturer’s has reference, not to the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a HELD
Distributors also prayed for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and particular case, but to the class of cases, the purported subject of NO
equitable in the premises. litigation, the nature of the action and of the relief sought. Ratio The jurisdiction of the respective courts is determined by the value
of the demand and not the value of the transaction out of which the
demand arose.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 16

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Reasoning jurisdiction. Lapitan appealed directly to this Court, arguing (1) that against de la Cruz was dismissed w/o prejudice.
- The case comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and (2) that as he - Respondents file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction since the
court or justice of the peace court. claimed moral and exemplary damages, besides the price of P3,735.00, petitioner only prays for P1520. It therefore comes under the jurisdiction of
Judiciary Act of 1948 P4,000.00 actual damages, and P1,000.00 attorneys' fees, the value of the original jurisdiction of the municipal court. Also, since the petitioner
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction.—CFI shall have original jurisdiction: his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court. prays for foreclosure of chattel in Bulacan, it should have been filed there
(c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value where the deed of chattel mortgage is located. The CFI dismissed the
of the property in controversy, amounts to more than two thousand ISSUE case. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
pesos. WON CFI had jurisdiction
SEC. 86. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of municipal ISSUE/S
courts of chartered cities.— HELD 1. WON the city court has jurisdiction
(b) Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their respective YES.
municipalities, and not exclusively cognizable by the CFI. Ratio. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which HELD
SEC. 88. Original Jurisdiction in civil cases.— is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion 1. YES.
Xxx exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject- of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it Ratio Although the purpose of the action is to recover an amount plus
matter or amount of the demand does not exceed two thousand is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered interest which comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the
pesos, exclusive of interest and costs. capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the Peace Court, yet when said action involves foreclosure of chattel
- The alternative prayer for specific performance is also of the same value, municipal courts or in the CFI would depend on the amount of the claim. mortgage covering properties valued at more than P10,000, the action
for the alternative prayers would not have been made in the complaint if However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to should be instituted before the CFI.
one was more valuable than the other; the specific performance recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to,
alternatively prayed for is capable of pecuniary estimation at P644.31. or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the Reasoning In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is
defendant perform his part of the contract and in actions for support, or for P1520 plus interest and costs, and chattel mortgage of properties valued
DISPOSITION annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has at P15340. It is therefore within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
Judge of CFI is declared without jurisdiction to try the case, and is ordered considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
to stop further proceedings by dismissing the case. not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Disposition Petition granted
theCFI. Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly
pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by the CFI. And no cogent
LAPITAN V SCANDIA reason appears why an action for rescission should be differently treated.
24 SCRA 477 We, therefore, rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission of 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
REYES, J.B.L., July 31, 1968 contracts are not capable of pecuniary estimation. SCOPE AND CONSTRUCTION
UNIFORM PROCEDURE
FACTS THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V
- Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of
ACTIONS
TUTAAN NATURE
the CFI of Cebu, dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his complaint for
rescission and damages against appellees Scandia, Inc., of Manila and 73 SCRA 189 Real/personal/mixed
General Engineering Co. of Cebu. Plaintiff avers that on April 17, 1963 he CONCEPCION; September 30, 1976
purchased from Scandia, Inc., one ABC Diesel Engine; that he bought the
engine for running a rice and corn mill; that defendants had warranted and NATURE
HERNANDEZ V. RURAL BANK OF LUCENA
assured him that all spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their Petition for certiorari 81 SCRA 75
stores, enabling him to avoid loss due to long periods of waiting, and that AQUINO, 10 Jan. 1978
defendants would replace any part of the engine that might break within FACTS
12 months after delivery. - A complaint was filed before the CFI of Rizal against private respondents FACTS
- The cam rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and Guillermo delos Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo for the recovery of the sum -This case is about the propriety of a separate action to compel a
workmanship and it stopped functioning; the sellers were unable to send a of P1520 plus interest and the sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount distressed rural bank, which is under judicial liquidation, to accept a check
replacement until August 29, 1963; barely six days after replacement the due as attorney’s fees, and in default of payment thereof, to order the in payment of a mortgage debt.
new part broke again due to faulty casting and poor material, so Lapitan foreclosure of the chattel mortgage (worth P15,340) executed by the said -Spouses Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from
notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of sale; he respondents. Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000 secured by a mortgage
sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay. party defendants since they were co-makers of the promissory note. on their two lots situated in Cubao, Quezon City. Three months after that
- Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the - Private respondents, in their answer claims that the loaned sued upon is loan was obtained, the Lucena bank became a distressed bank.
total amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive only one of five loans secured by them from the petitioner wherein they -Before the expiration of the one year term of the loan, or on August 22,
jurisdiction of the municipal court, under RA 3828, amending the Judiciary were charged usurious interest. They claim that the balance due is only 1961, Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan by
Act by increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases P1260. means of a check for P6,000 which was drawn against the bank by a
involving P10,000.00 or less. The CFI dismissed the action for lack of - For failure to plead, Emperado was declared in default while the case depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to Hernandez.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 17

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As the bank's executive vice-president was not available, the payment requested that his mortgage be cancelled. The Associate Superintendent Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City where the mortgaged lots
was not consummated. At the time that the check was issued, the San of Banks in his answer returned the check to Hernandez and informed him are situated.
Pablo Colleges had a deposit in the Lucena bank amounting to that, according to the Lucena bank's executive vice-president, the check 2. WON Lucena bank had not lost its juridical personality after it was
P11,890.16. Instead of withdrawing P6,000 from that deposit, the San could not be applied to the payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank placed under liquidation thus making it not fall under the jurisdiction of the
Pablo Colleges chose to issue a check for that amount to Hernandez. He was already closed when he received the check. Moreover, the check was liquidation court
sent to the bank by registered mail a photostat of the check and a letter drawn against the current deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the
inquiring whether the bank would honor the check and when he could go Lucena bank which was in the process of liquidation. Hernandez was HELD
personally to the bank for that purpose. That letter was received by the advised to settle his account by paying cash or by means of a check 1. No it is a personal action.
bank. The executive vice-president wrote to Hernandez and informed him drawn against a bank other than the Lucena bank. Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting
that the check could not be honored for the time being because of -Disregarding that suggestion, Hernandez announced to the Associate title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of,
adverse events that had disrupted the bank's operations. What the vice- Superintendent of Banks in his letter that he was going to deposit the said or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and
president meant was that by reason of the letter of the Central Bank check in the Court of First Instance of Lipa City on or before December tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies"
Governor dated June 16, 1961 the operations of the Lucena bank were 26, 1963. Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate
suspended. The vice-president explained that because there was a run on -Instead of filing a consignation complaint. Hernandez enclosed the check mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real
the bank its assets were exhausted, and so the check sent by Hernandez, with his letter to the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the
which check was drawn against the Lucena bank, could not be accepted. City. Hernandez wrote a letter dated January 11, 1964 informing the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the
The vice-president said that when Hernandez presented the check, the Associate Superintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. mortgage.
Lucena bank was no longer in a position to honor withdrawals and that Copies of that letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo That action, which is not expressly included in the enumeration
had Hernandez paid cash, his payment would have been accepted. To Colleges. found in section 2(a) of Rule 4, does not involve the title to the
honor the check would have been tantamount to allowing a depositor (San - Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at mortgage lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The
Pablo Colleges) to make a withdrawal but the Lucena bank could not Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. Plaintiffs' title is not
entertain withdrawals without the consent of the Central Bank examiners. liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check and to in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots.
Payment by check was a disbursement. execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez Hence, the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the
Apparently, the vice-president did not take the trouble of asking the spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10,000 and defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
Central Bank examiners whether the payment by check made by attorney's fees of P3,000. plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec.
Hernandez could be accepted. Hernandez himself who should have - Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss. It contended that there was 2[b], Rule 4).
known that the bank was a distressed bank which had suspended improper venue because, as the action allegedly involved title to real The plaintiffs in their brief confound a real action with an action in rem and
operations and which was under the supervision of Central Bank property, it should have been instituted in Quezon City where the a personal action with an action in personam. They argue that their action
examiners, did not bother to take up his problem with the said examiners. encumbered lots are situated. It further contended that since the Lucena is not an action in rem and, therefore, it could be brought in a place other
-Hernandez again asked the bank when he could deliver the check. The bank is under liquidation and is in the hands of a receiver, its properties than the place where the mortgaged lots are located.
executive vice-president told Hernandez that the bank could not yet honor and assets are in custodia legis and may, therefore, be reached only by A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal
the check because it had not resumed its banking operations; that it was motion or petition in Civil Case No. 50019 of the Court of First Instance of action is not the same as an action in personam.
awaiting the outcome of a case filed by the bank against the Central Bank; Manila. The motion was denied. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
that it might reopen in January, 1962, and that, anyway, the loan would not -Counsel for the Lucena bank on January 30, 1967 offered to compromise property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of
be due until March 21, 1962. the case by stipulating that the Central Bank would apply the check in damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
Hernandez sent another letter and enclosed the original check (duly question to the mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is
endorsed) with his letter to the bank sent by registered mail and special of the San Pablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
delivery. Letter was returned to Hernandez because the bank's manager check of P6,000 and that, by virtue of that compromise, the complaint and possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
was allegedly in Manila. Undeterred, Hernandez again mailed the check to counterclaim would be dismissed.That conditional and equivocal mortgage on, real property.
the bank with the request that his mortgage be cancelled. compromise offer fizzled out because the lawyers of Hernandez and the An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis
-Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Lucena bank. To implement Central Bank did not assent to it. of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against
the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidation of the Lucena -Lower court ordered the Lucena bank or the Central Bank, as liquidator, the thing itself, instead of against the person (1 C. J. S. 943-4),
bank, the Central Bank, pursuant to section 29 of its charter and on the to accept and honor the check, to cancel the mortgage, and to pay the Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action, in
assumption that the Lucena bank was insolvent, filed with the Court of Hernandez spouse P25,000 as moral damages (not P10,000 as prayed personam and not necessarily an action in rem. In this case, the
First Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27, 1962 for assistance for in the complaint) plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were residents of San
and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank. Court of First -The Lucena bank, the Central Bank and its employee, the receiver, Juan, Batangas, which in their brief they characterize as their
Instance of Manila issued an order directing the Lucena bank to turn over appealed to the SC. legal residence and which appears to be their domicile of origin.
its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative. On the other hand, it is indicated in the promissory note and mortgage
-Among the accounts receivable of the Lucena bank inventoried by the ISSUE/S signed by them and in the Torrens title covering the mortgaged lots that
Central Bank's representative was the account of Hernandez. In a letter 1. WON the action of the Hernandez spouses to compel them to honor the their residence is at 11 Chicago Street, Cubao, Quezon City, which
dated October 29, 1963 Hernandez informed the Central Bank that he had check in question and to cancel the mortgage on their two lots is a real apparently is the place where the said lots are located. The plaintiffs did
sent to the Lucena bank on April 25, 1962 the check for P6,000. He again action affecting title to real property which should have been filed in the
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not testify during the trial, So, they have no testimony in the records as to The fact that the insolvent bank is forbidden to do business, that -in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not
their actual residence. its assets are turned over to the Superintendent of Banks, as a essential. The service of summons by publication is required merely to
We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action receiver, for conversion into cash, and that its liquidation is satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The judgment of the
because the venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The undertaken with judicial intervention means that, as far as lawful court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes
term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual and practicable, all claims against the insolvent bank should be of the nature of judgment in rem. The judgment is confined to the res
residence or the place of abode and not necessarily to the legal filed in the liquidation proceeding. (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non
residence or domicile (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against resident.
Sarmiento, L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128). (Of the insolvent bank. The lawmaking body contemplated that for
course, the actual residence may also in some cases be the legal convenience only one court, if possible should pass upon the claims
residence or domicile.). against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the
San Juan, Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs have their Superintendent of Banks and control his operations.
domicile or legal residence but there is no question that 11 Chicago In the course of the liquidation, contentious cases might arise wherein a
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
Street, Cubao, Quezon City is their place of abode or the place where full-dress hearing would be required and legal issues would have to be
they actually reside. So, the action in this case, which is a personal action resolved. Hence, it would be necessary in justice to all concerned that a CB V. CA
to compel the defendants to honor the check in question and to cancel the Court of First Instance should assist and supervise the liquidation and (supra)
mortgage, should have been filed in Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended should act as umpire and arbitrator in the allowance and disallowance of FACTS
to use their residence as the basis for their choice of venue. claims. Consolidated cases. Issue was regarding the payment of the correct
The Central Bank points out that the redemption action of the Hernandez The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to docket fee.
spouses would ultimately affect the funds and property of the Lucena establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the
Bank. Hence, the liquidation court is the competent tribunal to pass upon bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid RULING ON COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
the issue as to whether the Hernandez spouses could validly pay their injustice and arbitrariness. -It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
mortgage debt by means of the check of the San Pablo Colleges. but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
DispositioN. WHEREFORE, the trial court judgment is reversed and set jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
2. No. The liquidation court or the Manila court has exclusive jurisdiction to aside. The case is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
entertain the claim of the Hernandez spouses. Hernandez spouses to take up with the liquidation court the settlement of docket fee, the court may allow the payment of the fee within a
At the time the Hernandez spouses filed in 1964 their consignation their mortgage obligation. Costs against the plaintiffs appellees. SO reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
complaint the Lucena bank was already under liquidation. The Manila ORDERED. reglementary period.
court in its order of March 28, 1963 had ordered the officers of the Lucena - The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within
bank to turn over to the Central Bank or to the receiver, the
In personam/ in rem/ quasi in rem which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the
Superintendent of Banks, all of its assets, properties and papers. Among docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period.
the assets turned over to the receiver was the outstanding or unpaid
account of the Hernandez spouses which appears in the inventory as: DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS
"393. Hernandez, Francisco S., 11 Chicago St., Cubao, Q. C. (SUPRA) GO V TONG
And among the papers or obligations turned over to the receiver was G.R. No. 151942.
Ledger No. 056 evidencing the deposit of the San Pablo Colleges in the FACTS PANGANIBAN; November 27, 2003
Lucena bank in the sum of P11,890.16, against which the check for Half-brother appointed as administrator, caused the extraterritorial service
P6,000 was drawn. It was that check which the Hernandez spouses had of summons to half siblings living in Spain to settle the question of NATURE
issued to pay their mortgage debt to the Lucena bank. ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Petition for review on Certiorari
Under section 29 of the Central Bank Act, Republic Act No. 265, when the Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro
Monetary Board, upon information submitted by the Superintendent of Pastor, Sr. De Midgely and Pastor both filed a motion to dismiss on the FACTS
Banks, finds a bank to be insolvent, it shall forbid the bank to do business ground of lack of jurisdiction BUT further alleged that earnest efforts - Petitioner Juana Go purchased a cashier’s check of P500K from the Far
and it shall take care of its assets according to law. towards a compromise have not been made East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), private respondent Tong. On
In that case, if the Monetary Board finds out that the insolvent bank Go’s instruction, the cashier’s check bore the words ‘Final
cannot resume business with safety to its creditors, it shall through the ON ACTIONS IN REM Payment/Quitclaim’ after the name of payee Tong allegedly to insure that
Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance, praying for Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely, her Tong would honor his commitment that he would no longer ask for further
the assistance and super vision of the court in the liquidation of the bank's motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against payments for his interest in the ‘informal business partnership’ which he
affairs. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Banks, upon order of the her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person and she had earlier dissolved. Tong deposited it with the words ‘Final
Monetary Board and under the supervision of the court, shall convert to of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of Payment/Quitclaim’ already erased, hence, it was not honored.
money the bank's assets. "Sabido es que uno de los deberes primordiales summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the - Tong’s lawyer requested that the check be replaced with another payable
de un depositario es hacerse cargo inmediatamente de todo el activo y requirement of due process. Quasi in rem is an action between parties to ‘Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim’ with same amount, the bank
pasivo de un banco" (Luy Lam & Co. vs. Mercantile Bank of China, 71 where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the charges to be paid by his client-Tong, which was denied by FEBTC. So,
Phil. 573, 576). parties or of some interest therein. Tong filed complaint against FEBTC and Go at RTC Manila. FEBTC and
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Go answered that erasure was intentional, which justified the dishonor HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR that the payment of filing fees cannot be made dependent on the result of
and refusal to replace check. the action taken.
G.R. No. 140954
- Case pending, Go’s son, George, filed a criminal complaint against Tong - On January 21, 1999, the trial court ordered the complaint to be
falsification of the check. The criminal complaint was dismissed. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 12, 2005 expunged from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings
- Tong filed ‘Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and to taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees.
Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint’ which Supplemental NATURE - On January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency docket fee, private
Complaint alleged that Sps. Go’s ‘used’ their son to file the criminal Petition for certiorari and prohibition respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the case.
complaint against him which caused damages, hence, the prayer for an Petitioners opposed the reinstatement but on March 22, 1999, the trial
increase in the amount of MD and ED sought to be recovered from P2.5M FACTS court issued the first assailed Order reinstating the case.
to P55M and praying for the award of AD of P58K. RTC granted the - Private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed - On July 14, 1999, petitioners manifested that the trial court having
motion and admitted the Supplemental Complaint. Balane own a 1,399- square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo expunged the complaint and nullified all court proceedings, there is no
- Go filed a Manifestation of Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714. Sometime in March valid case and the complaint should not be admitted for failure to pay the
Court P500K representing the amount of the check, ‘subject to the 1980, they allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said property for correct docket fees; that there should be no case to be reinstated and no
condition that it shall remain deposited until the disposition of the case.’ a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light case to proceed as there is no complaint filed.
MFRs of FEBTC and Go were denied. materials at a nominal annual rental of P100.00 only, considering the - After the submission of private respondents’ opposition and petitioners’
- One of the defenses of FEBTC and Go: Tong cannot prosecute his close relations of the parties. After the expiration of the ten-year period, rejoinder, the trial court issued the second assailed Order on August 13,
Supplemental Complaint, and the same should be dismissed, unless the they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the 1999, essentially denying petitioners’ manifestation/rejoinder. The trial
corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims of P55M house constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed court held that the issues raised in such manifestation/rejoinder are
are paid for. ownership of the entire property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale practically the same as those raised in the amended motion to expunge
- On Feb. 5, 1999, RTC, acting on the verbal motion of Tong’s counsel, dated July 2, 1980, executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge which had already been passed upon in the Order dated January 21,
allowed the release of petitioners’ P500K deposit to Tong. Later, RTC, in and conformity of private respondents. 1999. Moreover, the trial court observed that the Order dated March 22,
the interest of justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved - Accordingly, private respondents filed a complaint for “Recovery of 1999 which reinstated the case was not objected to by petitioners within
(the Court considers the business climate and the peso crunch prevailing), Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages” the reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for
allowed Tong to first deposit P25K on or before Dec.15, 1999 and P20K against Bertuldo. reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.
every month thereafter until the full amount of docket fees is paid, and - Trial ensued but on June 24, 1998, Bertuldo died without completing his - On August 25, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the
“only then shall the deposits be considered as payment of docket fees.” evidence. Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as same was denied by the trial court in its third assailed Order dated
FEBTC and Go filed MFR but was denied. Hence, this case. his services were terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. October 15, 1999. Hence, this petition.
Veronico G. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel for
ISSUE Bertuldo. ISSUE
WON respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing private respondent to - On September 22, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the WON grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in
pay the docket fee on a staggered basis. complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees
ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the
HELD amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and HELD
NO that under Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, NO
Ratio Docket fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. It was further - The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is
pleadings. However, for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the Order dated
judge, staggered payment thereof within a reasonable period may be since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for March 22, 1999 which they never sought reconsideration of, in due time,
allowed. Unless grave abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the discretion recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction. despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999. Instead, petitioners went
of the trial judge in granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed. - Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the
Reasoning An action commences from the filing of the original complaint grounds: (a) said motion was filed more than seven years from the latter was denied, or after more than three months have passed, did they
and the payment of the prescribed docket fees. However, where the filing institution of the case; (b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied with Section raise the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in the
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that the death of the first place because the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so, having
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no original defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can already ruled that the complaint shall be expunged.
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. (Sun have legal personality to represent a litigant and the motion to expunge - After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative
Insurance Office Ltd. V Asuncion) In other words, while the payment of the does not mention of any specific party whom he is representing [this was relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private
prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment later on complied with by Atty. Petalcorin]; (c) collectible fees due the court respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from
at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, can be charged as lien on the judgment; and (d) considering the lapse of challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of
as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or time, the motion is merely a dilatory scheme employed by petitioners. a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same
reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a - In their Rejoinder, petitioners manifested that the lapse of time does not case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. vest the court with jurisdiction over the case due to failure to pay the litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. correct docket fees. As to the contention that deficiency in payment of - It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental
docket fees can be made as a lien on the judgment, petitioners argued matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
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proceedings. It is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else objection. of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared Emma his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor
to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case. The Imperial winner of the first place students" thus made, by instituting the civil case in the Court of First
remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith to Instance of Cotabato, against the committee members along with the
certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an ISSUE District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner WON the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of SANTIAGOs alleged that: (1) Plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago,
authorized by law. Only when the court issued such order without or in judges of an oratorical competition Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of HELD place, which is disputed; (2) That the teachers of the school had been
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be No. made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of
considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. Such Reasoning.. The Court held: “We observe that in assuming jurisdiction Student for Honor", whoserave abuse of official discretion is the subject of
special circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case. over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District
- Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; (3) That Teodoro
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not general jurisdiction. Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner
the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; (4) That Santiago, Jr.
prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or had been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited,
paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and
government, the Manchester rule does not apply. Under the peculiar unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became
circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the complaint was just judges the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead
and proper considering that the cause of action of private respondents, Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are Medina obtained over the other pupil; (5) That the committee referred to in
being a real action, prescribes in thirty years, and private respondents did instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all
not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee but malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers
simply contend that they could not be faulted for inadequate assessment action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to
because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V
They were in good faith and simply relied on the assessment of the clerk and VI; (6) That there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be
of court. Disposition. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse
- While the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation, the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat; (7) That there
which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent
trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a SANTIAGO V BAUTISTA teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating
lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; (8) That the
32 SCRA 188
Court of the trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and
and assess and collect the additional fees. BARREDO : MARCH 30, 1970 replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust
and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the
NATURE disputed selection of honor pupils they made; (9) That petitioner
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District
CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 for certiorari, Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the
FELIPE V LEUTERIO injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint therein states no buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher
91 Phil 482 cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy
the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal. under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered
Bengzon; May 30, 1952
mental and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00; and (10) The
FACTS petitioners prayed to the Court to set aside the final list of honor students
NATURE -Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the Sero in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari Elementary School in Cotabato City. 1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent
-When the school year was about to end the "Committee On The Rating teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said
FACTS: Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines' Sur, first honor was school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965.
given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to class. The above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged LC: denied injunction
Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of first instance of Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as third honor. The school's graduation exercises -As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School
that province to reverse the award, alleging that one of the judges had were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same
fallen into error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with protested list of honor students.
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The Court then required the respondents to answer the petition within 10 G.R. L-3756 Ratio If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations, must arise from
days but respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead on the any of the four sources of obligations, namley, law, contract or
LABRADOR; June 30, 1952
grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish Civil
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court Code.)
NATURE
had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner. Reasoning Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all,
Action to recover piece of property
The motion to dismiss was granted. because it entered the premises and occupied it with the
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for permission of the entity which had the legal control and
FACTS
the reconsideration thereof, but the same was dismissed. administration thereof, the Alien Property Administration. Neither
- The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose name the title was registered
Petitioners appealed was there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of
before the war. During the Japanese occupation, the land was acquired by
contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and
a Japanese corporation, Taiwan Tekkosho, for the sum of P140,000, and
ISSUE/S the Taiwan Tekkosho, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its
thereupon title thereto issued in its name. After liberation, the Alien
WON the said committee of teachers does falls within the category of the permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the
Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession,
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said
control, and custody thereof under section 12 of the Trading with the
Rule 65 Taiwan Tekkosho. The Alien Property Administration had the
Enemy Act, for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national. During
control and administration of the property not as successor to the
the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export
HELD: interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but
Management Company under a custodianship agreement with United
1. NO (therefore, no cause of action exists) by express provision of law. Neither is it a trustee of the former
States Alien Property Custodian, and when it vacated the property it was
Reasoning. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of then
occupied by the defendant herein. The defendant was authorized to repair
against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' A Government of the United States, in its own right, to the exclusion
the warehouse on the land, and actually spent thereon the repairs the
judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. From
sum of P26,898.27.
exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the
- Plaintiff brought an action in court to annul the sale of property of Taiwan
action of the court. In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be late of judgment on February 28, 1948, Alien Property
Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The case did not come for trial
invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee
because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is claimed by
there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or of the Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it
plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void
property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner.
because it was executed under threats, duress, and intimidation, and it
for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations; (2) Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien
was agreed that the title issued in the name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be
the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the
cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued.
have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but to the United States
- The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August,
decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end; Government.
1946, the date when the defendant began to occupy the premises, to the
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the Disposition Wherefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, which
date it vacated it.
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not sentences defendant-appellant to pay rentals from August, 1946, to
belong to the legislative or executive department. February 28, 1949, is hereby reversed. In all other respects the judgment
ISSUE/S
- It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee.
1. WON defendant is liable for rent of the said period
on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this
case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO V BARRIOS
HELD
performance of its assigned task. Before a tribunal board, or officer may
1. No 79 PHIL 666
exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which FERIA; December 3, 1947
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed NATURE
with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent judge
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. denying the motion to dismiss the complaint of respondents
- There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for FACTS
purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the - respondents filed a complaint seeking to recover amounts of money due
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically to them from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war.
vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. - the ground of the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners is that the
complaint of the respondents does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
Dispositive. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against cause of action, because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the
appellant. payment of the defendants’ debts until after the termination or legal
cessation of the moratorium provided in EO No. 32: Enforcement of
payment of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations payable
SAGRADA V NATIONAL COCONUT CORP.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 22

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within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations, November 1997, reiterated its demand that every delay in the shipment of able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on the date
entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation, the two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter will cause substantial losses agreed upon by them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order
that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is in its operations and requested for the early work out and the immediate six days prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold
temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth shipment of the frequency converter to avoid further loss to the company; petitioner liable for damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its
Government. However, on 9 November 1997, DANFOSS, informed the other MINCI obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible
through fax transmission, copy furnished plaintiff CCC, that the reason for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order even before the
ISSUE/S why DANFOSS has delivery problems was that some of the supplied agreed delivery date?
1. WON complain of the respondents states facts sufficient to constitute a components for the new VLT 5000 series did not meet the agreed quality -Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
cause of action standard. That means that their factory was canvassing for another Procedure provides that:
supplier. And at that moment, there was no clear message when normal Section 1. Grounds – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
HELD production will resume. complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
1. NO -Due to this information received, CCC surmised that defendants MINCI on any of the following grounds:
Ratio. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of and DANFOSS could not be able to deliver the two (2) unit Frequency xxx xxx xxx
the legal rights of another, and its essential elements are: 1. legal right of Converter within the maximum period of ten (10) weeks period from the (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
plaintiff, 2. correlative obligation of the defendant, and 3. act or omission opening of the Letter of Credit, as one of the conditions in the Purchase -ON CAUSE OF ACTION: A cause of action is defined under Section 2,
of defendant in violation of said legal right. Order. Thereafter, no definite commitment was received by plaintiff CCC Rule 2 of the same Rules
Reasoning. In this case, there was no omission on the part of the from defendants MINCI and DANFOSS for the delivery of the two unit Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. – A cause of action is the act or omission
defendant in vilation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be paid, because Frequency Converter. by which a party violates a right of another.***
EO No. 32 said debts are not yet payable or their payment cannot be -By reason of the delay to deliver, CCC informed MINCI in a letter dated - It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, which is still in force. 13 November 1997, of the plaintiff’s intention to cancel the said order. As defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff.
***BUT (not related to topic Cause of Action): even if the complaint of a consequence thereof, CCC has suffered an actual substantial
the plaintiffs respondents states no cause of action, the SC holds that the production losses in the amount P8,064,000.00 due to the time lost and - Disposition . WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The
facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present delay in the delivery of the said two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter. assailed decision of the CA dated February 11, 2000 and its resolution
case do NOT entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. Because judge HAD Likewise, plaintiff CCC was compelled to look for another supplier. dated June 7, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case pending
jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in - On February 17, 1999, DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, is hereby DISMISSED.
denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. This Court, in actions of complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action.
certiorari, can only determine WON the court acted without or in excess of - The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss in its order[4] dated May MISJOINDER
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. So… disposition: 28, 1999.
Disposition Petition is denied. - Danfoss filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but it was denied.
On appeal to the CA, the latter also denied Danfoss’ petition for lack of UNION GLASS V SEC (Hofileña)
DANFOSS V. CONTINENTAL CEMENT merit. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, 126 SCRA 32
hence, this appeal. ESCOLIN; November 28, 1983
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 143788 ISSUE NATURE
CORONA; SEPT. 9 2005 WON the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of petitioner’s Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul and set aside the
motion to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
NATURE state a cause of action.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules FACTS
on Civil Procedure of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its HELD - Carolina Hofileña is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass Manufacturing
resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. YES. Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica
Ratio. In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of mines and the manufacture of glass and glassware. Since 1967, Pioneer
FACTS action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from the Development
- On November 5, 1998, respondent Continental Cement Corporation the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute Bank of the Philippines [DBP], and also from other local and foreign
(CCC) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court sources which DBP guaranteed. The proceeds were used in the
Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the RTC of can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the construction of a glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, and the operation of
QC, Branch 80, alleging that: complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically seven silica mining claims owned by the corporation.
(1) CCC purchased from MINCI two Danfoss Brand Frequency admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. - As security, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its assets to the
Converter/Inverter for use in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant. The said Reasoning. After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s DBP in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its corporate
purchase is covered by a Purchase Order which indicated the delivery complaint for damages against petitioner, we rule that the same failed to officers over their personal assets. Through the conversion into equity of
date to be within eight (8) to ten (10) weeks from the opening of the letter state a cause of action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, the accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans DBP was able to
of credit. CCC executed and opened a letter of credit under in favor of petitioner had not violated any right of respondent from which a cause of gain control of the outstanding shares of common stocks of Pioneer
DANFOSS INDUSTRIES PTE. LTD; (2) CCC through a letter dated 7 action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be
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Glass, and to get three regular seats in the corporation's board of judgment is rendered in SEC Case No. 2035, annulling the dacion en - Judge Mendoza dismissed the case and denied admission of the
directors. Pago executed in favor of the DBP. Amended Complaint. MFR was likewise denied
- When Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it NOTE: The jurisdiction of the SEC is delineated, by Sec 5 of PD 902-A:
could no longer meet its financial obligations with DBP, it entered into a SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative function of the ISSUES
dacion en pago agreement with the latter, whereby all its assets Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and WON the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
mortgaged to DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under dismissed the case and refused to admit the Amended Complaint
corporation's obligations in the total amount of P59 million. Part of the existing laws and devices, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
assets transferred to the DBP was the glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, to hear and decide cases involving: HELD
which DBP leased and subsequently sold to Union Glass and Container a) Devices and schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of YES
Corporation. directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud Ratio A defect in the designation of the parties may be summarily
- Hofileña filed a complaint before the SEC against the DBP, Union Glass and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the corrected at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused
and Pioneer Glass. Hofileña prayed that the dacion en pago be declared public and/or the stockholders partners, members of associations or thereby to the adverse party. (Sec. 4, Rule 10, Revised Rules of Court)
null and void and the assets of the Pioneer Glass taken over by DBP organizations registered with the Commission; Reasoning
particularly the glass plant be returned. b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, - The complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of
- Of the five causes of action pleaded, only the first cause of action between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegations in the body of the com.
concerned Union Glass as transferee and possessor of the glass plant. or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they plaint would show that the suit is brought by such person AS proprietor or
Union Glass moved for dismissal of the case on the ground that the SEC are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit. corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns Hardware". The descriptive words "doing business as Juasing Hardware' "
Respondent Hofileña filed her opposition to said motion, to which Union their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; may be added in the title of the case, as is customarily done.
Glass filed a rejoinder. c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, - Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court , Sec. 1. Who may be parties.-Only
- SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio Reyes granted the MTD for lack of officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in
jurisdiction. However, upon a MFR, he reversed his original order. Unable Disposition Petition GRANTED. Questioned orders of SEC, set aside. a civil action
to secure a reconsideration of the Order as well as to have the same - Petitioner is definitely not a natural person; nor is it a juridical person as
reviewed by the Commission En Banc, Union Glass filed this petition in defined in the New Civil Code of the Philippines. 4 The law does not vest
PARTIES
the SC. juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to
Who may be parties file or defend an action in court.
ISSUE - However, the defect of the complaint is merely formal, not substantial.
1. WON the SEC has jurisdiction over the case and not the regular courts JUASING HARDWARE V MENDOZA Substitution of the party plaintiff would not constitute a change in the
Identity of the parties.
HELD
115 SCRA 783 - The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to
1. NO. GUERRERO; July 30, 1982 avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that t he real controversies between
Ratio In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the the parties are presented and the case decided on the merits without
controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: [a] between NATURE unnecessary delay. This rule applies with more reason and with greater
the corporation, partnership or association and the public; [b] between the Special Civil Action for certiorari force when the amendment sought to be made refers to a mere matter of
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, form and no substantial rights are prejudiced.
members, or officers; [c] between the corporation, partnership or FACTS Dispositive Petition is GRANTED.
association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to - Juasing Hardware, alleging to be a single proprietorship duly organized
operate is concerned; and [d] among the stockholders, partners or and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines and SEPARATE OPINION
associates themselves. represented by its manager Ong Bon Yong, filed a complaint for the
Reasoning While the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla.
proceedings before the SEC, allows the joinder of causes of action in one - In her Answer, defendant stated that she "has no knowledge about AQUINO [concurring]
complaint, such procedure however is subject to the rules regarding plaintiff's legal personality and capacity to sue as alleged in the - It should appear in the amended complaint (a copy which was not
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Since Union Glass has no intra- complaint." attached to the petition) that the plaintiff is Ong Hua or Huat, doing
corporate relationship with Hofileña, it cannot be joined as party-defendant - After plaintiff had completed the presentation of its evidence and rested
in said case as to do so would violate the rule on jurisdiction. Hofileña's its case, defendant filed a Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to
complaint against Union Glass for cancellation of the sale of the glass Evidence) based on plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue. Defendant 4 Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
plant should therefore be brought separately before the regular court. contended that Juasing Hardware is a single proprietorship, not a (1) The State and its political subdivisions;
- Such action, if instituted, shall be suspended to await the final outcome corporation or a partnership duly registered in accordance with law, and (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as
of the SEC case, for the issue of the validity of the dacion en pago posed therefore is not a juridical person with legal capacity to bring an action in they have been constituted according to law;
in the SEC case is a prejudicial question, the resolution of which is a court. Plaintiff filed an Opposition and moved for the admission of an (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the action against Union Glass. Amended Complaint. separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Thus, Hofileña's complaint against the latter can only prosper if final
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business under the tradename, Juasing Hardware, and in the body of the Priscilla Manio and husband as defendants. However, the lot is owned by the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a
complaint the personal circumstances of Ong Hua should be stated. Aristotle, their son. Priscilla had no interest on the lot and can have no poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets
interest in the judgment of the TC. Failure to implead Aristotle Manio subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance,
renders the proceedings in the specific performance case null and void. hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.
Parties in interest
2. YES. - Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that
Ratio the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the
CARILLO, GUYOT, SENOY, RISONAR, GONZALES A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically
V. CA (DABON AND DABON) What is essential is that he can prove that the judgment was obtained by qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence, this petition.
fraud and he would be adversely affected thereby. - After the oral arguments of the parties, the application for preliminary
GR No. 121165 Reasoning injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks was DENIED on
QUISUMBING; September 26, 2006 Although the Dabons are not parties to the specific performance case, any the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a
finding of extrinsic fraud would adversely affect their ownership and could restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.
NATURE be basis of annulment of judgment. In this case, Gonzales knew of the - The sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
Review on certiorari of decision of Court of Appeals sale of lot by Aristotle Manio to the Dabons yet Gonzales did not include $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
the Dabons in her petition. This is extrinsic fraud. - On motion of petitioners, 12 more were joined as additional petitioners
FACTS and Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary,
- Gonzales filed complaint (action for specific performance) against Manio Disposition Petition is denied. the incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas
sps, seeking execution of deed of sale of property she bought fr Priscilla were impleaded as additional respondents.
Manio. Gonzales said she pd downpayment to Priscilla because she had DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL,
an SPA from her son Aristotle, the owner of the land. ISSUE:
- TC ruled in favor of Gonzales. Gonzales deposited balance w/ the court ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, et al. v. PCGG, EXEC. WON the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to
and filed motion for execution, w/c was w/drawn bec decision wasn’t SEC. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR. & PCGG exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
served on defendants. Sheriff finally served a copy at an ungodly hour of CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS
12 mn. 225 SCRA 568 HELD: NO. The paintings and silverware, which were taken from
- TC’s decision became final and executory. Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to
BELLOSILLO/ August 24, 1993
- The Dabons, claiming to have bought the land fr Aristotle, filed before the the Central Bank Museum (the ownership of these paintings legally
CA a petition for annulment of judgment and orders of the TC. They belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof.)
NATURE: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with
alleged that the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons - The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to
as the real parties in interest. CA issued resolution restraining TC from however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from
implementing its decision. Hence, this petition by Gonzales. paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying
proceeding with the scheduled auction sale by Christie’s (of NY) of the Old
Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
ISSUE/S compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the
Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the
1. WON there was basis to annul the decision of the TC. government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and
custody of the Central Bank.
2. WON the Dabons can seek annulment of the TC judgment their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties -
FACTS: the true owners thereof -whose authority to recover emanates from their
HELD proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution.
- Pres. Aquino, through Exec. Sec. Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman
1. YES. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that
Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing the auction sale of
Ratio the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not
82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang
An action should be brought against the real party in interest. The real possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
party in interest is the one who would be benefited or injured by the unauthorized disposition.
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit.
- According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale
Reasoning REASONING:
at public auction the 82 Old Masters Paintings then found at the
- Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge), Guyot (Clerk of - Dumlao v. Comelec: The rule is settled that no question involving the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in 71
Court), Senoy (Deputy Sheriff), Risonar (Registrar of Deeds), and constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such
Gonzales. Carillo, Guyot, Senoy and Risonar are not interested parties decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted
because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs sought. Only for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.
Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case. party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question
- PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote Pres. Aquino
- Gonzales insists that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity ; and, that the decision
defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of
TC’s judgment bec they’re not parties to the specific performance case. on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
COAudit Chairman Domingo (that the authority of former PCGG Chairman
But the Dabons insist that they are parties in interest bec they are buyers, determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two
Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful
owners and possessors of the contested land. (2) requisites.
legality;
- The specific performance case brought by Gonzales to the TC named
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- SC: we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot -Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for prohibition and mandamus
action. (Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R. No. L-29341) defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against
- This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, which is DISMISSED . him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest OPOSA V FACTORAN in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall of the land.
224 SCRA 792
be joined as plaintiffs. -Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
- The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is DAVIDE JR; JULY 30, 1993 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal NATURE gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained Special civil action for certiorari of the dismissal order of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is joined the latter in this case.
being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest FACTS
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed ISSUE
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest (House before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court WON Civil Case No. 90-777 is a class suit
International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-75287) now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by HELD
- Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the YES. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
third and related party. non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
- Tañada v. Tuvera : There are certain instances however when this Court concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
(Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works) when a taxpayer questions the Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to
funds. taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the the former.
-AS regards Mandamus: it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use -This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission : a writ of mandamus may be issued and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
-In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally generations yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and rendered: as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is ". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus. acting in his behalf to — indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
-As regards Taxpayer’s Suit: Neither can this petition be allowed as a (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. renewing or approving new timber license agreements." resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
- A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory the premises." Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the -The original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
of a taxpayer. political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
- -Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving branches of Government. In their Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners generations to come.
public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable Dispositive Petition granted. Challenged order set aside.
paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
sources and not with public money.
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KINDS OF PARTIES Palanca, 37 Phil. 921). Reason of public policy which favors the stability of action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is
judicial decisions are (sic) mute in the presence of fraud which the law possible
Compulsory joinder of indispensable abhors (Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25). Reasoning Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-
parties Reasoning Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Its exercise must strictly delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an
comply with the legal requisites; otherwise, a challenge on the ground of indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages
ARCELONA V. CA (FARNACIO) lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. Such jurisdiction normally against Mrs. Cerezo. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
refers to jurisdiction over the subject. liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on
G.R. No. 102900 the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire
PANGANIBAN; Oct. 2, 1997 2. YES. obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in
Ratio Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
NATURE encompassed within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the
Petition for review them must be impleaded. parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party
Reasoning As held by the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction
FACTS action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from
-Olanday, et al. (petitioners) are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond undivided interest in any given tract of land, a judgment in favor of the Mrs. Cerezo alone.
which they inherited from their deceased parents. defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not
-A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property Disposition PETITION DENIED.
Tandoc and Olanday, et al. might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there
-Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as might be co-owners of the title asserted against him. The purpose of this
caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond. provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits by requiring the person
-After the termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) asserting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co- Permissive Joinder
surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position,
al. so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in
-Three days thereafter, Farnacio instituted Civil Case for "peaceful one litigation.
FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS
possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion 144 SCRA 377
for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al., before Disposition PETITION GRANTED. FERIA; September 24,1986
Respondent Regional Trial Court. The case was intended to maintain
private respondent as tenant of the fishpond. CEREZO V. TUAZON NATURE
-RTC ruled in favor of Farnacio Appeal by certiorari from the order of the RTC of Baguio
-IAC affirmed with slight modification G.R. No. 141538
-SC sustained IAC CARPIO; March 23, 2004 FACTS
-Petitioners filed with CA a petition for annulment of the aforesaid -Petitioner Remedio Flores filed a complaint with the RTC of Baguio: his
judgment. CA said to implead RTC NATURE first cause of action was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
-Dissatisfied, petitioners lodged this petition for review Petition for review on certiorari refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from
ISSUES FACTS August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against
1. WON a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of -Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or over the person of with a tricycle. P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
indispensable parties) and denial of due process, aside from extrinsic -tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
fraud? as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. -On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion
2. WON all the co-owners pro-indiviso of a real property indispensable Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda"). to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
parties? -Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section
since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda, an indispensable party. 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original
HELD Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand
1. YES. pesos (P20,000.00).
Ratio. Under the present procedure, aside from the reliefs provided in ISSUE -It was further averred in said motion that although another person,
these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means 1. WON Fronda is an indispensable party Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of
whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the HELD respondent.
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, 1. NO. -At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion
or (b) it has been obtained by fraud.' (I Moran's Rules of Court 1950 Ed., Ratio COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
p. 697, citing Anuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Banco Español-Filipino v. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s jurisdiction.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 27

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-RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each - It was alleged that they committed libel by the publication of the article
-Petitioner appealed by certiorari to the SC separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.” As worded, the former "An Island of Fear" in the Feb 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly
rule applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. news magazine Newsweek. It supposedly portrayed their island as a
ISSUE However, it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties place dominated by big landowners who not only exploited the
WON the application of the totality rule in Sec 33(1) 5 of BP 129 and defendant. impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers, but also brutalized and
Section 116 of the interim rules is subject to permissive joinder of parties -Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases killed them.
under Sec 67 of Rule 3 where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action - Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole,
against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted
HELD where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case following more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the - They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and
the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and
11 of the Interim Rules. the two or more defendants should arise out of the same corrective damages as the court may determine.
-Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the former rule transaction or series of transactions and there should be a - NEWSWEEK filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that ---
under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule (1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and
follows: Where there are several claims or causes of action between the 3. (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a
same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand -In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and,
shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action , irrespective as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test . Needless to - NO CAUSE OF ACTION because no allegation that anything contained
transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate in the article regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one
complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test, and argues that with the complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been
deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to -In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be
clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific,
all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the individual group member's reputation.
of action arose out of the same or different transactions. Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it
-This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the ISSUE
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate 1. WON respondents failed to state a cause of action
more separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction . 2. WON this case is a class suit
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of Disposition
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different The order appealed from is affirmed. HELD
transactions. 1. YES
-There is a difference between the former and present rules in cases Class suit Ratio Defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person
where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be
defendant joined in a single complaint. shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the personality of
-Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes of action joined in a
NEWSWEEK V IAC (NFSPI et. al.) the individual defamed. It is evident that the larger the collectivity, the
142 SCRA 171 more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory
5 FERIA; May 30, 1986 remarks apply to him.
Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the NATURE 2. NO
same or different transactions. ... Special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction Ratio It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
(Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.) or where the
6
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the FACTS representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, - Petitioner, NEWSWEEK, Inc. seeks to annul the decision of the IAC indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned vs. Polistico). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a
by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof
sustaining the Order of the CFI Bacolod City. CFI denied Newsweek’s
must be specifically alleged. Motion to Dismiss complaint for libel. (Question as to whether the printed separate and distinct reputation in the community . They do not have a
article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence.) common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
7 - Initial complaint: Private respondents, incorporated associations of CLASS SUIT
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect
to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members - Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or and several individual sugar planters, filed in their own behalf and/or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class , or
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as
as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non- sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
aconnection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 28

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prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest, the individual impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim
can bring the action separately, if need be. members of the association being the ones who have possessory rights denial of due process.
over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have There is, however, merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that the
Disposition The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed already expired. petition should be construed as a suit brought by the homeowners
and the complaint in Civil Case No. 15812 of the CFI Negros Occidental is - Upon appeal, the CA annulled and set aside the order of the trial court association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. 3,
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. and remanded the case for further proceedings. A writ of preliminary Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
injunction was issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be
evicting the members of Rivera Village Association from their respective prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v lots in the Rivera Village. The CA ruled that the case can be construed as fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees. The homeowners and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may
ASSOCIATION,INC . association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
00 SCRA 00 instituted the suit for the benefit of its members. It does not claim to have or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seek the name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
Tinga, September 30, 2005 registration of the titles to the land in its name. without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
- MIAA argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with belonging to the principal.
NATURE the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the homeowners It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the MIAA assailing the Decision association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the Board name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action is allowed to be
of the CA which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction Resolution presented by respondent shows that it was only the board of prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity,
restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from directors of the association, as distinguished from the members thereof, the beneficiary must be included in the title of the case and shall be
their dwellings. which authorized respondent to act as its representative in the suit. deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries
shall, likewise, be included in the complaint.
FACTS ISSUE Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts
-The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the WON the petition filed by respondent with the trial court states a cause of showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a
administration, operation, management, control, maintenance and action against petitioner/ WON respondent has personality to sue party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in
development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the NAIA. The the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the
CAA entered into individual lease contracts with its employees for the HELD plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must
lease of portions of a 4-hectare lot situated in Rivera Village, Barangay YES be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or
199 and 200 in Pasay City. The leases were for a 25-year period to The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the
commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20 per annum as prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is
rental. party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is
- Thereafter, EO 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903), creating the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A case is dismissible for lack of not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court
MIAA, transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in- does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that
latter with the power to administer and operate the MIA. interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
- MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the
payments from the lessees. As a result, respondent homeowners association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr., upon homeowners association, through its President, is suing in a
association, purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file "All necessary representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution
the subject property to its members, invoking the provisions of PD 1517 or action to the Court of Justice and other related acts necessary to have our attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual members of
the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016. The MIAA denied the request, Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the members of the the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-
claiming that the subject property is included in its Conceptual Association." interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect
Development Plan intended for airport-related activities. Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec. 12, can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to
- Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the requisites therefor not being present in disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments
the issuance of a preliminary injunction against MIAA and the National the case, notably because the petition does not allege the existence and of the petition accordingly.
Housing Authority (NHA) with the RTC of Pasay. The petition sought to prove the requisites of a class suit, i.e., that the subject matter of the Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or
restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to protect against
insofar as Rivera Village is concerned and to compel MIAA to segregate the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have
Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual Development Plan and the court, and because it was brought only by one party. the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration
the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the property in In Board of Optometry v. Colet, it was held that courts must exercise of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively
favor of the members of the homeowners association. utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the construed, and its application should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all
- After the preliminary, the RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. As
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary correctly noted by the CA, the dismissal of this case based on the lack of
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The trial court held, among others, would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of
that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as respondent multiple suits by the individual members of the association.
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Disposition claim damages for his son were transferable. Severo had transferred his further prayed for P1800 per annum until the final termination of the case
The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED rights as plaintiff to Wenceslao Haloc but after the assignment the case for the fruits of said property and in the case that the instrument be
and SET ASIDE. The civil case in the RTC of Pasay City is ordered continued in Severo's name and there was no immediate and formal deemed a true pacto de retro sale, that petitioner be ordered to execute a
DISMISSED. substitution of party plaintiff. This is but a formality, however, and the fact deed of resale in favor of respondents in accordance with A1606CC.
remains that, after the assignment, the substantial plaintiff and real party -Counsel for Goyala filed a manifestation informing the TC that the named
in interest became Haloc, with Severo as a sort of trustee of whatever defendant, Antonina, had died, prompting the TC to issue an order
DEL CASTILLO VS. JAYMALIN, ET AL. fruits the litigation would bring. requiring counsel for the plaintiff to submit an amended Complaint
112 SCRA 629 substituting Antonina with one of her successors in interest as party
MELENCIO-HERRERA, March 17, 1982 2. YES defendants. Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
Reasoning. Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code. Failure to exercise that notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant’s receipt of a
NATURE extraordinary care for the safety of its passengers even after being copy of the said TC order, said appellant failed and neglected to submit
Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI which dismiss the case for apprised of the fact that the victim was a deaf-mute. Should have been the amended complaint required of him. Appellant opposed the motion but
Damages due to the death of plaintiff remanded to CA for determination of amount of damages but due to the TC dismissed the complaint.
pendency of case for 13 years + put an end to controversy, Court imposed -Appellee filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said
FACTS P12,000 for death of victim, plus P2,000 atty’s fees appellee’s counterclaim, which was granted by the TC, which further
1960: Deaf-mute Mario del Castillo fell upon alighting the bus of the required Goyala to submit his evidence before the Clerk of Court. TC
respondents and died. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby rendered favorable judgment on appellee’s counterclaim, declaring the
1962: Action for recovery of damages was filed by Severo del Castillo, the reversed, and defendants hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable mortgage and ordering Gojo to
father of the victim, against the driver, conductor, and the owner Wenceslao Haloc, the amount of P12,000.00 as damages for death, receive the P810 and to restore possession to the defendants and
companies. without interest, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees. No costs. SO allowing them to redeem the same.
1966: Severo died. Counsel for Motion for Annulment Proceedings after ORDERED. -Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal
having learned that plaintiff Severo already died without resting his case. involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC.
Court ordered plaintiff’s counsel to verify existence of heirs willing to be GOJO V GOYALA
substituted as parties-plaintiffs. Allegedly, a “Deed of Assignment” was ISSUES
35 SCRA 557
executed by Severo in favor of his son-in-law Wenceslao Haloc of all his Parties: Re contractual money claims / Dismissal by claimant /
rights in the proceedings in 1960 so plaintiff filed a Motion to Admit Barredo, J.: Oct. 30, 1970 Compulsory counterclaim/ Answer: Defenses
Amended Complaint, substituting Wenceslao as party-plaintiff. Amended WON TC erred in declaring plaintiff in default with respect to defendant’s
Complaint was admitted by the court. NATURE counterclaim
CFI: dismissed original and amended complaints due to the death of Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon
Severo. Wenceslao had no personality to continue the case, not being a HELD
heir of Severo. FACTS YES. The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to
-Appellee Segundo Goyala, with his now deceased wife Antonina sold to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said
ISSUE Gojo a 2.5 hectare parcel of agricultural land for P750 by a “Deed of Pacto counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which
1. WON the complaint should be dismissed due to the death of the de Retro Sale”, the repurchase to be made within one year, as stated in does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies
plaintiff, even if he had already assigned his rights before he died the deed. The deed also indicates that the vendee paid another P100 in its material allegations. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses
2. WON damages should have been awarded addition to the purchase price. 10 years after the execution of said not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default,
document, Gojo filed a case with the CFI against Goyala by way of a principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed
HELD petition for consolidation of ownership of said land. Gojo alleged that the automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint.
1. NO period for repurchasing had expired and ownership had become -While it is true that under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be
Ratio. Where an assignable right has been transferred before action consolidated in him and that for purposes of recording the consolidation in dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an
brought, the proceeding ought to be instituted in the name of the the Registry of Property, it was necessary that a judicial order be issued to order of the court, said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a
assignee; and where an assignment is effected pendente lite, it is proper that effect. void one, as in this case. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3, the death of the
to have the assignee substituted for the original plaintiff. If such -Goyala filed an answer to the petition, alleging that they had obtained a defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for
substitution should not be effected and the transfer of the right of action cash loan of P810 from Gojo payable w/in one year w/o interest and that recovery, but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is entered.
should not be brought to the attention of the court, the original plaintiff, if to guarantee payment, Goyala executed a mortgage in favor of the Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the
successful in the litigation, would hold the fruits of the action as a sort of petitioner on the parcel of land in question. Hence, although the deed was manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate
trustee for the use and benefit of his assignee. executed in the form of a pacto de retro sale, the true intention of the of a deceased person. In Barrameda vs Barbara, the SC held that an
Reasoning. This is not a case where the provisions of Section 17, Rule 3 parties was for it to be a mere mortgage to secure payment. Goyala order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as
of the Rules of Court on "death of a party" are applicable. Rather, it is a further claimed that he and his wife attempted to pay the debt but directed by Sec. 17, Rule 3 (Sec. 16, new law), is void and imposes upon
situation where plaintiff, while alive, had assigned his rights to another, in petitioner refused to receive the sum and cancel the mortgage. By way of the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing
which case, the proper procedure would have been for the transferee to counterclaim, Goyala prayed that petitioner receive the P810 and that the the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. It
have been substituted for the transferor as plaintiff. The rights of Severo to document of mortgage be declared so, and not a pacto de retro sale. He was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 30

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proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without Customs, respectively, with offices in the City of Manila) filed a civil action
such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking to recover from the herein HELD
amounts to lack of jurisdiction. petitioner damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of 1. No. The proper venue is the CFI of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in its issue of 18 August 1967, of an essay, Ratio: Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
entitled "Corruption in Asia", wherein the defendants allegedly impute to Republic Act No. 4363, actions for damages by public officials for libelous
VENUE plaintiffs the commission of the crimes of graft and corruption and publications against them can only be filed in the courts of first instance of
nepotism. the city or province where the offended functionary held office at the time
- Petitioner Time, Inc., is an American corporation with principal offices at of the commission of the offense, in case the libelous article was first
PEOPLE v. MAYOR PABLO SOLA Rockefeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a printed or published outside the Philippines.
(page 8) weekly news magazine. Reasoning:
a. (Intent of the law) The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-
PROCEDURE resident defendant is not inconvenienced by an out-of-town suit is
FACTS - Villegas and Enrile filed a Motion for leave to take the depositions "of irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent
-Bodies found in Mayor Sola’s hacienda. Information filed against Mayor,
Mr. Anthony Gonzales, Time-life International", and "Mr. Cesar B. upon convenience or inconvenience to a party; and moreover, venue was
Chief of Police and other accused. Accused were granted bail. Witnesses
Enriquez, Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd.", in connection with the activities fixed under Republic Act No. 4363, pursuant to the basic policy of the law
fear for their lives because the trial was to be held near the town where
and operations in the Philippines of the petitioner. It was granted by that is, as previously stated, to protect the interest of the public service
the accused were powerful. Also, the witnesses had been receiving
Judge Reyes and he also issued a writ of attachment on the real and when the offended party is a public officer, by minimizing as much as
threats on their lives. Relevance: Change in venue
personal estate of Time, Inc. possible any interference with the discharge of his duties.
- Time Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction b. (Textual and strict interpretation of the law) The rule is that where a
ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit. The
and improper venue, relying upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363 statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the
Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a (According to this law, 'The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written remedy is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular
miscarriage of justice." defamations. . .where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided.
-People v. Gutierrez, J.B.L. Reyes: "…TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No 4363 should be deemed
TO PROCEED TO TRIAL IN A LOCALITY WHERE ITS WITNESSES filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public
mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue
WILL NOT BE AT LIBERTY TO REVEAL WHAT THEY KNOW IS TO
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court should be waived by the defendant, which was not the case here.
MAKE A MOCKERY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, AND TO BETRAY
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the 2. Yes.
THE VERY PURPOSE FOR WHICH COURTS HAVE BEEN
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published). Ratio: The action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a
ESTABLISHED."
- Respondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for
-The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in
until after trial of the case on the merits, the court having considered that improper venue, is in excess of jurisdiction and correctible by writ of
this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their
the grounds relied upon in the motion do not appear to be indubitable. prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate Court, even before trial
lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
- Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment; The respondent on the merits is had.
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may
judge issued an order re affirming the previous order of deferment for the Reasoning
either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act No. 4363, amending It would be useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court
-there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions against had no jurisdiction.
individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the
non-resident defendants, and because questions involving harrasments
effect it has on the witnesses who will testify.
and inconvenience, as well as disruption of public service do not appear DISPOSITION
-The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in
indubitable . . ." The writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of First Instance of
mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue
- Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Subject Rizal is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case
of the petition: The orders for the taking of the said depositions, for No. 10403; and its orders issued in connection therewith are hereby
TIME, INC. vs. REYES deferring determination of the motion to dismiss, and for re affirming the annulled and set aside. Respondent court is further commanded to desist
39 SCRA 303 deferment, and the writ of attachment are sought to be annulled in the from further proceedings in Civil Case No. 10403 aforesaid.
REYES, J.B.L.; May 31, 1971 petition.) The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Supreme Court
is made permanent.
ISSUES
NATURE
1. Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the PILIPINO TELEPHONE V TECSON
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take
certain orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued 00 SCRA 00
cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an allegedly libelous
and to prohibit the said court from further proceeding with the said civil
publication, considering that the action was instituted by public officers VITUGJ; May 7, 2004
case.
whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication;
2. If it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of NATURE
FACTS Special civil action of certiorari
jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari
- Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile (Mayor of Manila and
or prohibition; and
Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently Acting Commissioner of
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 31

Avena
FACTS A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted,
- On various dates in 1996, Delfino C. Tecson applied for six (6) cellular obliged to comply fully and not selectively with its terms. A contract of peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26,
phone subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino Telephone Corporation adhesion is no exception. 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeeded any better.
(PILTEL), which applications were each approved and covered, by six What was so categorically therein set forth as to such parcel
mobiline service agreements. Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. of land being a part of a public forest, although thereafter released by the
- On 05 April 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Iligan City, Lanao Del Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes,
Norte, a complaint against petitioner for a "Sum of Money and Damages." is conclusive and binding. It would clearly appear that Santiago could not
PLEADINGS
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of in truth show that there was such an open, uninterrupted, peaceful and
improper venue, citing a common provision in the mobiline service In General: Manner of making adverse possession in the concept of owner
agreements to the effect that - allegations in pleadings It is a familiar doctrine," according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Joe's Radio
"Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or Actionable document & Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 5 "that an admission made in
indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila. Subscriber hereby and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary
expressly waives any other venues."
SANTIAGO VS DE LOS SANTOS thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
- In an order, the RTC denied petitioner's MTD and required it to file an 61 SCRA 146 interposed by the party or not ... ." 6 Even if there had been a full hearing
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. FERNANDO; November 22, 1974 on the case, therefore, the result would not have been any different. There
- PILTEL filed a MFR, through registered mail, of the order of the trial was no choice then for the lower court except to dismiss the complaint.
court. In its subsequent order, TC denied the MFR. FACTS The present counsel of Santiago tries to extricate himself
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Santiago applied for registration of a parcel of land located in San Mateo, from a predicament of his own making by arguing that the motion to
Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. Rizal. The application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of dismiss of Pacita de los Santos is not entitled to recognition as there was
- CA saw no merit in the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the Forestry and by Mrs. Pacita V. de los Santos on the ground that the a general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the
TC. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but the appellate court denied property applied for is part of the public domain. Subsequently, motions Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her and that she has no interest to
the motion. to dismiss the application were filed by the oppositor Pacita V. de los oppose the application although admittedly there was a claim on her part
Santos and the Director of Forestry which motions are principally based under a pasture lease agreement in her favor. But in the motion to
ISSUE/S on the allegation that the property applied for is a portion of the public dismiss of de los Santos, it was alleged that the son of Santiago, Juanito
WON parties may stipulate on the venue of any litigation between them domain which was leased to Mrs. Pacita de los Santos under Pasture was one time the lessee of the timber area sought to be registered by
Lease Agreement No. 1305. Santiago. There was no denial of such allegation. It is quite obvious then
HELD The motion to dismiss was granted based on the documents attached to that the facts, no less than the law, call for precisely the conclusion
YES their motion by Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, now an Associate Justice of reached by the then Judge Muñoz Palma.
Ratio Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows this Court, dismissed the suit. In this appeal, Santiago seeks for the "Rules of pleading are intended to secure a method by which the issues
the parties to agree and stipulate in writing, before the filing of an action, decision to be reversed. His new counsel, the firm of Luna and Manalo, is may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already
on the exclusive venue of any litigation between them. Such an thorough and comprehensive. clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should
agreement would be valid and binding provided that the stipulation on the not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case be
chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it is expressed in ISSUE decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on
writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the filing of WON the order of the lower court should be reversed. procedural points. Technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice
the suit. Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." 13 Well could
Reasoning. The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the "Mobile HELD Justice Cardozo observe: "A system of procedure is perverted from its
Service Agreement," a standard contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to NO. proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the
its subscribers, apparently accepted and signed by respondent. The Even the most cursory reading of the order of dismissal can lead to no warrant of clear
added stipulation that the subscriber "expressly waives any other venue" other conclusion except that it should be affirmed. Notwithstanding the necessity."
should indicate, clearly enough, the intent of the parties to consider the vigor with which the appeal is being prosecuted by new counsel, it cannot
venue stipulation as being preclusive in character. suffice for a reversal. The infirmity of the case is incurable. Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 17, 1961 of
The appellate court, however, would appear to anchor its decision on the The pleading left no choice to the then Judge Muñoz Palma except to the then Judge Muñoz Palma is affirmed. Costs against appellant Luis R.
thesis that the subscription agreement, being a mere contract of adhesion, dismiss the case, which wrote: “... the portion of the said parcel of land Santiago
does not bind respondent on the venue stipulation. But such an subject of this registration which was claimed as part of the public forest
agreement is not per se inefficacious. The rule instead is that, should has already been released by the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and
there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such ambiguities are to be Natural Resources for agricultural purposes as evidenced by its order
construed against the party that prepared it. If, however, the stipulations dated August 10, 1961.” Attached to such pleading were the documents,
are not obscure, but are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the which, in the language of the then Judge Palma, "show that the land The Claim
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling. object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain. Former Counterclaim/cross-claim after
counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such answer
an admission. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 32

Avena
NAMARCO v. FEDERACION that the present claim is not necessarily connected with the transaction or may obtain the court's permission to include it in a supplemental pleading
occurrence that is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 42684, as the same under Rule 15(d)."
49 SCRA 238 evidence would not support or refute both. - A counterclaim may be asserted under Rule 13(e) only by leave of court,
ANTONIO; January 31, 1972 - The FEDERATION filed a rejoinder reiterating that the requirements on which usually will be granted in order to enable the parties to litigate all the
the rule of compulsory counterclaim are present; that the first requirement claims that they have against each other at one time thereby avoiding
NATURE that the counterclaim arises out of or is necessarily connected with the multiple actions. However, Rule 13,(e) is permissive in character. An after-
Appeal by defendantfrom a decision of the Court of First Instance ordering contract of sale subject-matter of NAMARCO's cause of action is evident acquired counterclaim, even if it arises out of the transaction or
said defendant to pay the plaintiff from the face of the complaint itself. occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, need
- LC issued an order holding "in abeyance" action on the motion to not be pleaded supplementally; the after-acquired claim is not considered
FACTS dismiss till after the trial on the merits. a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) and a failure to interpose it
- NAMARCO is a GOCC organized and existing under and by virtue of RA - FEDERATION filed its answer to the NAMARCO's complaint admitting will not bar its assertion a later suit.
1345. FEDERATION is a non-stock corporation duly organized and some material averments of the complaint, specifically denying other - The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filling the answer,
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. allegations and consistently with its position averred as affirmative though not at the commencement of the action for under Section 3 of the
- They entered into a Contract of Sale which says that the Management of defense that NAMARCO's failure to assert its claim against the former Rule 10, the counterclaim or cross-claim which a party may aver in
NAMARCO was authorized to import items worth $2,001,031. FEDERATION before judgment in Civil Case No. 42684 on October 15, his answer must be one which he may have "at the time" against the
FEDERATION deposited P200,000 as partial payment and the balance 1960 constituted a bar to the institution of the present action. By way of posing party. That phrase can only have reference to the time of the
shall be paid on cash basis upon delivery of the duly indorsed negotiable counterclaim, the FEDERATION sought P50,000.00 as attorney's fees answer. Certainly a premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the
shipping document covering the same and and other expenses of litigation, as well as P17,000.00 as damages for answer. This construction is not only explicit from the language of the
- To insure payment, the NAMARCO accepted three domestic letters of improper issuance of a writ of attachment which writ, evidently had been aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the aforecited sections
credit for the account of the FEDERATION. issued earlier by the court. of Rule 10, with section 4 of the same rule which provides that "a
- The FEDERATION and some of its members filed a complaint against - NAMARCO filed an answer to the FEDERATION'S counterclaim counterclaim . . . which either matured or was acquired by a party after
the NAMARCO for specific performance and damages, alleging that after specifically denying the material averments thereof and maintaining that serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented
the NAMARCO had delivered a great portion of the goods listed in the the present action is not barred by Civil Case No. 42684. as a counterclaim . . . by supplemental pleading before judgment."
Contract of Sale, it refused to deliver the other goods mentioned in the - Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of
said contract. ISSUE or is necessarily connected with transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff's
- CFI ordered the NAMARCO to specifically perform its obligation in the WON this action of NAMARCO for the collection of the payment of the suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer
Contract of Sale, by delivering to the FEDERATION the undelivered merchandise delivered to, but not yet paid by, the FEDERATION, is is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation.
goods. already barred as a consequence of the failure of NAMARCO to set it up However such claim may with the court's permission be included in the
- SC: The Contract of Sale was valid." as a counterclaim in the previous case, (Civil Case No. 42684). same case by way of supplemental pleading before judgment under
- NAMARCO: FEDERATION'S act or omission in refusing to satisfy the Section 4 of former Rule 10 of the Rules (now Sec. 9 Rule 6). And the
former's valid, just and demandable claim has compelled it to file the HELD same may be allowed unless the case has progressed so far that it may
instant action; and praying that the FEDERATION be ordered to pay the - A counterclaim has been held to be compulsory if there is a logical be inconvenient or confusing to allow the additional claim to be pleaded.
NAMARCO the costs of merchandise plus damages. relationship between it and the main claim. - We therefore rule that NAMARCO's present action, is not barred by its
- FEDERATION moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the - But even assuming for the nonce that NAMARCO's present claim is failure to assert it as a counterclaim the previous case.
cause of action alleged therein is barred forever, pursuant to section 6 of logically related to the claim of the FEDERATION in the previous case,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. In support thereof, the FEDERATION NAMARCO's claim having accrued or matured after the service of its BARREDO, dissenting:
alleged it filed a case for specific performance to enforce compliance with answer in the earlier case is in the nature of an after-acquired - Namarco's present claim arise out of or was necessarily connected with
the contract of sale; that said contract is also the basis NAMARCO's counterclaim which under the rules is not barred even if it is not set up in the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the
present complaint; that when NAMARCO filed its answer to the complaint, the previous case as a counterclaim. An after-acquired counterclaim, is Federation's action in Civil Case No 42684 within the contemplation of the
it did not set up any counterclaim therein; that the CFI promulgated the one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that a counterclaim is rule on compulsory counterclaims.
decision in said case ordering, among others, the NAMARCO to compulsory and must be asserted if it arises out of the same transaction - It was the element of time herein involved that somehow induced me at
specifically perform its obligation under the contract of sale by delivering as the opposing party's claim. the beginning to be inclined, albeit reluctantly, to sustain Namarco's
to the FEDERATION the goods subject-matter of the contract as are - The party need not assert a counterclaim that has not matured at the position in this appeal. At the precise time that Namarco filed its answer in
involved in the complaint. time he serves his pleading. This is derived from the language in the rule Civil Case No. 42684, it was not yet certain that the Federation would not
- NAMARCO opposed the motion to dismiss contending that its claim for limiting its application to claims the pleader has 'at the time of serving the pay or that payment of its sight drafts would not be effected by the bank.
the recovery of the cost of merchandise delivered to the FEDERATION is pleading.' A counterclaim acquired by defendant after he has answered In other words, from that point of view, Namarco's cause of action had not
not necessarily connected for specific performance and, therefore, does will not be considered compulsory, even if it arises out of the same yet matured then. It is also clear, however, that said cause of action
not fall under the category of compulsory counterclaim; that NAMARCO's transaction as does plaintiff's claim. Similarly, a counterclaim acquired by accrued before judgment was rendered by the trial court.
failure to set it up as a counterclaim in its answer does not constitute res plaintiff after he has replied to a counterclaim by defendant is not - Under Section 4 of Rule 10 of the old rules, now Section 9 of Rule 6, a
judicata; that the deliveries of the merchandise were effected through the compulsory under Rule 13(a). However, if a party should acquire a counterclaim which either matured or was acquired by a defendant after
fault or negligence of one of its personnel, Juan T. Arive, who was matured counterclaim after he has pleaded, Rule 13(e) provides that he serving his answer may be set up in a supplemental pleading later before
administratively charged therefor, found guilty and accordingly dismissed.; judgment. Since this may be done or not in the case of counterclaims not
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 33

Avena
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, the question that arises (mortgage). Due to non-payment the property was foreclosed and sold to merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. Hence petitioner’s cause
is, must it have to be done in the case of counterclaims that do arise from respondents as highest bidders. The deed of sale has been filed with the of action for legal redemption as embodied in the supplemental complaint
the same transaction or occurrence, such that if not interposed, they must Register of Deed and the respondents obtained n their name a tax stems directly from and is an extension of her rights as co-owner of the
be deemed barred? declaration over the property. property subject of the complaint. Also as petitioner correctly pointed out,
- I agree that the Court rule for the present that for a counterclaim to be - Petitioner subsequently filed with the same RTC a Motion to Admit even if the trial court decides in her favor, the redemption period would
considered as barred, under the above provisions, the cause of action Supplemental Complaint to invoke her right to exercise legal redemption have lapsed already and would not form part of the decision since it is not
thereof must have already accrued at the time the answer is filed by the over the property. This supplemental motion was denied by the RTC on prayed for, much less alleged in the original complaint. In such a case, the
defendant, although I, for one, would prefer supplemental counterclaims, December 28, 2000. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and respondents could oppose the exercise since it would not have been
the defendant should just the same be compelled to allege it in such a Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The CA included in the decision over the original complaint.
supplemental pleading in those cases where his claim accrues before trial dismissed the petition on the ground that the cause of action in the 2. Yes. The petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping
has began or at the latest, before the defendant has started presenting his Supplemental complaint is entirely different from the original complaint, consists of filling multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
evidence. Otherwise stated, my position is that the claim of Namarco in that the said complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies, and that, at cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, the the purpose of
this case did arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the any rate, in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner obtaining a favorably judgment. There is forum shopping where there
subject matter of the Federation's anterior action, but inasmuch as, on the can still the same. Petitioner filed this Petition for review on certiorari exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
hypothesis that the contract were binding, the formers' cause of action under Rule 45 with the SC. interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
could not have been considered as already matured when it filed its - With regard the original action, the RTC dismissed the case upon motion for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) the identity of the two
answer, there would have been no need for it to file this counterclaim. of the respondents on the ground of failure to prosecute. Apparently, the preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
- The whole trouble with Namarco's pose in this a appeal lies, however, in petitioner had asked for postponements opening the door for a claim by case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
the fact that in its answer to the Federation's complaint, it pleaded the the respondents of non-suit. (This is where it becomes more interesting) judicata. The decision of the RTC is dismissing the case is a final order
defense of illegality or nullity of the contract. From that point of view, it was Petitioner filed two appeals with the CA. Both appeals raised essentially and the proper remedy against such final order is appeal and not
immaterial to Namarco's recovery of the purchase price of goods it had the same issues. One of the appeals an ordinary appeal and the other is a certiorari. As a general rule, a writ of certiorari sill not issue where the
already delivered under the contract that there was in said contract any Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed four months after the first. The remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of
term for the payment thereof. As far as Namarco was concerned, those CA ruled in favor of the petitioner under the ordinary appeal but a motion appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65
goods had been delivered illegally and should have been immediately for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and the CA has yet to are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. hence the
returned unless their value had been paid for, (Article 1412 (2), Civil Code) rule on this reconsideration motion. The other appeal was dismissed on special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be a substitute for an
or Namarco was in pari delicto (Article 1411, id). Such being the case, it is the ground that judgment of the RTC can only be appealed via an ordinary appeal where the latter remedy is available. This is a firm judicial policy.
quite evident that when Namarco filed its answer to the Federation's appeal and not by certiorari. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45
action, its cause of action for the recovery of the price of the delivered with the SC. Disposition
goods was already existing and could have been the subject of a Petition for the non-suit is denied. Petition for the admission of the
counterclaim. This means that as of the time Namarco filed its answer ISSUE/S supplemental order is granted. The trial court is directed to admit said
contesting the legality or validity of the contract, it was incumbent upon it 1. WON the denial of the Motion to admit supplemental Complaint is valid complaint.
to then and there seek recovery of whatever it had delivered thereunder. 2. WON the dismissal of the petition for certiorari with regard the original
action is proper Third Party Complaint, etc.
Amended and Supplemental
HELD
pleadings 1. No. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to
REPUBLIC V CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE
bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists COMPANY
YOUNG VS SPOUSES SY side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplement. 26 SCRA 741
GR No. 157745 Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is CASTRO; October 26, 1968
to stand and that the issues jpined with the original pleading remained an
AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ, September 26, 2006 issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its NATURE
usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind
NATURE
of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy FACTS
Consolidated petitions for review on Certiorari
referred to in the original complaint. In this case, the consolidation of the - October 23, 1959 > Republic of the Philippines filed suit against the
title over the property in the name of the respondent, Manuel Sy, and the Central Surety & Insurance Company and Mangoba, manager of the bond
FACTS
issue as to whether it precluded petitioner as alleged co-owner from department stating that Po Kee Kam who was the subject of deportation
- Petitioner filed a complaint for nullification of Second Supplemental
exercising the right of legal redemption, are new matters that occurred proceedings in whom the bond was made in favor of, did not appear in
Extra-judicial settlement, mortgage, foreclosure sale, and tax declaration
after the filing of the original complaint. The relief prayd for in the such proceedings despite notice to the Surety. This constituted a violation
against respondents on May 20, 2000. The complained alleged that the
Supplemental complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legal of the conditions of the bond causing the forfeiture of the bond made by
questioned partition which was executed by her mother was
redemption accorded to co-owners of property, is germane to and the Surety in favor of the government. Republic claims P5,000 (amount
unenforceable since at the time of the execution the petitioner was only 15
intertwined with the cause of action in the Complaint for the nullification. of bond) and P1,000 (atty’s fees)
years old and that no court approval was secured. Her mother obtained a
The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is
loan from the spouses respondents and used the property as security
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 34

Avena
- July 5, 1963 > Surety filed its answer: (1) that its bond cannot be made decided after the effectivity of Republic Act 3828, because the rule is - Asian contruction leased from Monark Equipment several pieces of
liable beyond the amount of P5,000; (2) that it is not liable for attorney's firmly entrenched in our law that jurisdiction once acquired continues until equipment which it failed to pay for, despite demands. Monark then filed in
fees in the absence of any stipulation to that effect; (3) that the court has the case is finally terminated the RTC an action to recover a sum of money amounting to P5 million
no jurisdiction over the case as the amount involved is only P5,000; and 2. YES plus 12% interest. Asian filed a motion to file and admit answer with 3 rd
(4) that the Republic has no cause of action. - It is true that the third-party complaint was filed after the effectivity date party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corp. Asian, although admitting
- July 30, 1963 > Surety filed a third-party complaint, with leave of court, of RA3828. It is likewise true that the demand therein made does not the its indebtedness to Monark, claimed that it used the leased equipment
against Po Kee Kam and Tony Go alleging that for consideration of the exceed P10,000, and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the Court to perform services in favor of Becthel, which in turn failed to pay Asian for
bond, the third-party defendants, executed an indemnity agreement in of First Instance if it were an independent action. But the third-party the same. Asian claims that it needs to implead Becthel for “contribution,
favor of the Surety to indemnify it for damage, loss, expenses etc and that complaint is an ancillary suit which depends on the jurisdiction of the court indemnity, subrogation, or other reliefs to off-set or to pay the amount of
in the event judgment is rendered against it, the third party defendants be over the main action. Since the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over money” claimed by Monark. Monark in turn filed a motion for summary
ordered to reimburse the complaint, it necessarily follows that it likewise had jurisdiction over judgment, contending that there were no genuine issues raised.
- September 7, 1963 > the third-party defendants answer: defense that the the third-party complaint which is but an incident thereof. This must be so - RTC: Motion of Asian for leave to file a 3 rd part complaint was denied, but
case is premature as the main case has not yet been terminated. because jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters motion of Monark for summary judgment granted (RTC considered this as
- December 2, 1963 > upon verbal motion of the third party defendants, arising therefrom and connected therewith. A contrary rule would result in motion for judgment on the pleadings). Judgment ordered Asian to pay
the trial court dismissed the third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction "split jurisdiction" which is not favored, and in multiplicity of suits, a Monark P5 million plus interest
that the third-party complaint was filed after the passage of RA 3828 situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. - Asian appealed to CA. CA affirmed, sustaining the disallowance of the 3 rd
conferring original jurisdiction on the Municipal Court in civil cases -
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., et al. vs. CIR, et al: The third-party party complaint on the ground that the transaction between the said
involving not more than P10,000.00, and that the third-party complaint complaint is but a continuation of the main action, its purpose being parties did not arise out of the same transaction on which Monark’s claim
refers to a claim of only P6,000.00 merely to seek "contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in was based. MFR was also denied.
- December 3, 1963 > TC ordered surety to pay the Republic P5,000, with respect of his opponent's claim." (Rule 6, See. 12.) The aim is to avoid the
interest actions which should be tried together to save the time and cost of a ISSUE/S
- CA: Surety interposed its appeal from the order dismissing its third-party reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistent results from identical or 1. WON a 3rd-party complaint is proper
complaint and from the decision ordering it to pay the Republic the similar evidence, and to do away with the serious handicap to a defendant 2. WON judgment on the pleadings is proper
amount of P5,000, contending that the trial court erred in (1) not declaring of a time difference between a judgment against him and a judgment in
itself without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, and (2) his favor against the third party defendant. Petitioners urge that a rule HELD
dismissing the third-party complaint. But it certified the case to SC similar to the rule on counterclaim be adopted. But a third-party complaint 1. NO
pursuant to Sec 2 Article VIII of the Constitution and Sec 17(3) of RA 296 cannot be likened to a counterclaim which must be within the jurisdiction Ratio Section 11, Rule 6 provides: “3rd (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. – A
where jurisdiction of TC is in issue of the court trying the main case, because unlike a third-party complaint, a 3rd (fourth, etc.) – party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
counterclaim "need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
ISSUES opposing party, but may claim itself exceeding in amount or different in the 3rd (fourth, etc.) – party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
1. WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the main kind from that sought in the opposing party's claim" (Rule 6, Sec. 6). A subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.”
action third-party complaint may likewise be likened to a cross claim under Rule Reasoning Purpose of the rule: permit a defendant to assert an
2. WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the third-party complaint 9, section 5. ... The principle is at once apparent, namely, that where an independent claim against a 3rd-party which he, otherwise, would assert in
action is ancillary to a main action over which a court has jurisdiction, no another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. This is a rule of
HELD independent jurisdiction is needed to enable the court to take cognizance procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it
1. YES of the ancillary action. abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right to
- Even though the total amount involved is only P6,000 (P5,000 under the Disposition the order dated December 2, 1963 dismissing the third-party file a 3rd-party complaint against a 3rd-party rests in the discretion of the
bond and P1,000 as attorney's fees) and a court of first instance is vested complaint is set aside; the decision dated December 3, 1963 is modified in trial court. The 3rd-party complaint is actually independent of, separate
with jurisdiction only over cases in which the demand, exclusive of the sense that the third-party defendants are hereby ordered to pay to the and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not for the rule,
interest, or the value of the property in controversy, exceeds P10,000, Surety whatever sums the latter will pay to the Republic by virtue of the it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint.
pursuant to section 44 of Republic Act 296, as amended by Republic Act judgment appealed from. - Prerequisite to the exercise of right: some substantive basis for a 3rd-
3828 which took effect on June 22, 1963, the present action having been party claim is found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,
filed on June 20, 1963 (two days before the effectivity of Republic Act subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. Bringing of a 3rd-party
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V CA (MONARK
3828 which broadened the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts to defendant is proper if he would be liable to plaintiff, defendant or both for
include cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of EQUIPMENT) all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although
the property in controversy, does not exceed P10,000) it is cannot be 00 SCRA 00 the 3rd-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction.
argued that the court's jurisdiction over the case was lost on June 22, CALLEJO; May 17, 2005 - The defendant may implead another as 3rd-party defendant (a) on an
1963, when Republic Act 3828 took effect, and therefore the case should allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution,
have been remanded to the municipal court. NATURE indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct
- It is not disputed that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject- Petition for review on certiorari decision of CA liability of the 3rd-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the
matter on June 20, 1963 when the complaint was filed with it. It is of no 3rd-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.
moment that summons was served and that the case was heard and FACTS
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- There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in 22 SCRA 996 Reasoning The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred,
his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the when applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount
BENGZON, March 13, 1968
defendant against the 3rd-party defendant. involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this Court had
- Capayas v. CFI: Court made out the ff tests: (1) whether it arises out of already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes we would come to the absurd situation
NATURE
the same transaction on which the plaintiff’s claim is based; or whether the where a claim must be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on decision of CFI of
3rd-party claim, although arising out of another or different contract or from taking cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction. Besides, the
Agusan dismissing the complaint of Calo
transaction, is connected with the plaintiff’s claim; (2) whether the 3rd-party reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies in
defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part one sitting only, does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of
FACTS
of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the 3rd-party the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the defendant cannot
-Sometime on May 7, 1959, plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from
defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction; and (3) whether the obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to
defendant-appellee Ajax International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire
3rd-party defendant may assert any defenses which the 3rd-party plaintiff prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the
rope at P2.85 per foot. The transaction was evidenced by Charge Order
has or may have to the plaintiff’s claim. court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an
No. 37071, for P3,420.00. According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope
- 3rd-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply
was delivered to Butuan City, the same was found short of 300 ft. Plaintiff
recovery against the 3rd-party defendant; sufficient that pleadings show dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit.
then wrote two letters to defendant asking for either completion of delivery
possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the 3rd-party Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining
or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope.
complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the 3rd-party balance of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all
-On November 20, 1961, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. IV-
complaint must be examined. A 3rd-party complaint must allege facts related controversies.
93062 was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides
which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution,
who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from
indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the 3rd-party defendant. Disposition Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory
defendant Ajax International, Inc. Charge Order No. 37071 was among
- In this case, the claims of Monark against Asian arose out of the counterclaim in Civil Case No. VI-93062, it need not be filed there. The
those included in the assigned account. Subsequently, a judgment by
contracts of lease and sale; such transactions are different and separate pendency then of said civil case could not be pleaded in abatement of
default was entered, and a writ of execution issued, against plaintiff Calo.
from those between Becthel and Asian where the equipment leased from Civil Case No. 860. Consequently, the lower court erred in dismissing
-On January 23, 1962, plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos
Monark was used by the petitioner. There is no showing in the proposed plaintiff's complaint.
Calo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against
3rd-party complaint that Becthel knew or approved the use of the leased
defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect complete delivery of
equipment by Asian for the said project GOJO V GOYALA
Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855.00 and
- fact that Asian used the equipment it leased from Monark in connection Page 26
(2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages
with its project with Becthel does not provide a substantive basis for the NATURE
and expenses of litigation.2 The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
filing of a 3rd-party complaint against the latter. There is no causal Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon
860.
connection between the claim of Monark, and the failure of Becthel to pay
-Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil
the balance of its account to Asian after the completion of the project. FACTS
Case 860 on the ground, inter alia, that the subject thereof was involved
and intimately related to that in Civil Case No. IV-93062 of the Municipal -allegedly a pacto de retro sale (the other party alleged it was a
2. YES mortgage), Gojo the buyer alleged that the period for redemption has
Court of Manila. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed the
Ratio Section 1, Rule 34: “Judgment on the pleadings . – Where an already lapsed so he filed a petition for consolidation of ownership.
case. Plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration and new trial. When
answer fails to tender an issue, or, otherwise, admits the material -Goyala’s, the buyers who were alleging that they had obtained a cash
this failed, she instituted the present appeal.
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of loan from Gojo and the land allegedly sold to Gojo was only a security to
-The dismissal of Civil Case No. 860 by the court a quo because of the
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for the loan, and that they tried to pay their debt to Gojo but Gojo refused.
pendency of Civil Case No. IV-93062 in the municipal court of Manila is
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the Goyala’s filed a counterclaim for Gojo to receive the amount due, for the
predicated on the supposition that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.” document to be declared a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale, for
counter-claim that should be filed in the latter case. There is no question
Reasoning The denial of the petitioner’s motion with leave to file a third- P1800 per annum for the fruits of said property and that, if ever the
that it arises out of the same transaction which is the basis of the
party complaint against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file a document be deemed a pacto de retro sale, for Gojo to be ordered to
complaint in Civil Case No. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of
separate complaint against the latter. execute a deed of resale in favor of the Goyalas.
third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could not acquire
- Considering that the petitioner admitted its liability for the principal claim -Goyala’s spouse died, TC ordered Gojo to amend the Complaint to
jurisdiction.
of the respondent in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint, the trial court substitute the spouse with one of her successors in interest as party.
did not err in rendering judgment on the pleadings against it. Notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after receipt of copy of TC order,
ISSUE
Disposition Petition is denied. Gojo allegedly failed to submit the amended complaint so Goyala filed a
WON plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in
the earlier case motion to dismiss the petition. TC dismissed complaint, Gojo was also
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM/CROSS- declared in default in re Goyala’s counterclaim. TC ruled in favor of
HELD Goyala.
CLAIM -Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal
No. Plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. IV-
93062 for the simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC.
CALO appellant, vs.AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INC, jurisdiction of the municipal court.
defendant-appellee ON COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
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The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him or in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil
in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private
within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an denied a motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. citizens alike.
independent answer as the complaint already denies its material Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims
2. No. Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for
allegations. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive
damages against the Solicitor General.
answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, Order No. 1.
-The charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32
principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the
of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with
automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint. resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim.
-While it is true that under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be of jurisdiction.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that
dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an Petitioner’s claim
damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action
order of the court, said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a -no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor
filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a
void one, as in this case. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3, the death of the General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the
compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by
defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for case of Borja v. Borja,8
the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In
recovery, but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is entered. - since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the
the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not
Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases
against the party plaintiff itself.
manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a
-To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his
of a deceased person. In Barrameda vs Barbara, the SC held that an counterclaim in the same case.
clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or
order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as
complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.
directed by Sec. 17, Rule 3 (Sec. 16, new law), is void and imposes upon ISSUES
-The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As
the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing 1.WON Chavez (SolGEn)is immune from suit
counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in
the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. It 2.WON it is proper to implead Chavez (as SolGen) petitioner as additional
controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high
was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile
officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous
proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without
desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General
such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules,
HELD cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of
amounts to lack of jurisdiction.
1.No. national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel
Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and
for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to
Barred if not set up where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under prosecuting.
CHAVEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-
G.R. No. 91391 taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result
in the charges being automatically dropped. LUALHATI A. COJUANGCO vs. PURIFICACION
GUTIERREZ, JR; January 24, 1991
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non- VILLEGAS
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other 184 SCRA 374
FACTS official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
- July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad
FERNAN,
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es)
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing NATURE
Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition raises the ultimate issue
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question of whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case
reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in may be stayed by a co-equal court in order that the right of indemnification
-After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure and retention of an alleged builder in good faith may not be rendered
answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. meaningless or illusory in an independent civil action for specific
On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution performance.
which deferred The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim 8
The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make
against the Plaintiff government until after trialRespondent Enrile then him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold FACTS
requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his Petitioner Lualhati Aldaba Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan
professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation of
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment another ? such as trustees ? in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Cojuangco, the registered owner of the disputed parcel of residential land
suit" against him. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is
merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the
containing an area of 585 square meters and situated at San Agustin,
The motion praying for leave to implead additional parties(Chavez et al) to counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as Malolos, Bulacan. Many years back (about sixty years, according to the
we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the action,
his counterclaim was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, without even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp. 924-925) municipal trial court) the parents of private respondent Purificacion
prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually Villegas, with the acquiescence of Don Juan Cojuangco, constructed a
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 37

Avena
residential house and later a structure housing a bakery on the aforesaid which had earlier issued the writ of demolition, was raffled to another and conditions existing at the time the judgment was rendered and not to
lot. It was understood that they could remain on the land with his Malolos branch of the Bulacan Trial Court, specifically Branch XVII which those which supervened before the second suit.
blessings and without paying rentals on condition that they would vacate issued on the same day, September 16, 1986, a temporary restraining -The argument is untenable. In her pleadings, Villegas repeatedly
the premises when needed by the owner. order enjoining Cojuangco and particularly the sheriff "from enforcing or stressed that the residential house which her parents had constructed was
implementing the Order of Demolition issued in Civil Case No. 7042- already there on the questioned lot for as long as she could remember,
After her parent's death, Villegas remained in the property, renovating the M . . ." This was followed by another order dated October 6, 1986 that she herself has lived there all her life and that in the honest belief that
same and spending P300,000.00 in the process. She also leased out a granting a writ of preliminary injunction. The twin orders are now the the land had been "donated" to her parents by her "Aunt Tecla", she made
portion of the land to Siapno Appliances at P600.00 a month without the subject of the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that they have various improvements and renovation thereon. Obviously, such
knowledge and consent of Don Juan Cojuangco. This latter act apparently been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of declarations on the part of Villegas completely negate her absurd claim
destroyed her congenial relations with the landowner because soon jurisdiction. that the factual basis for her subsequent action arose after the ejectment
thereafter, Don Juan Cojuangco, through his attorney in fact, demanded suit became final.
that she leave the property. Despite his repeated written demands for her ISSUES -Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion
to surrender possession of the property, Villegas refused, prompting 1. Whether or not the respondent court validly issued an injunction that she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, the
Cojuangco to institute ejectment proceedings against her before the 2. Whether or not Villegas can successfully raise an independent action to alternative claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch I on August 23, assert that she and her predecessors are builders in good faith and that lot, at least as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the
1978. they are entitled to recover the value of improvements on the lot. buildings and improvements which she and her parents had introduced on
the land.
On February 5, 1979, Don Juan Cojuangco died intestate. In the trial HELD -And while it may be argued that the defense of being a builder in good
court's order of October 22, 1979, his wife Lualhati, herein petitioner, 1. NO. faith would have been inconsistent with her claim of ownership, in the
together with nephews and nieces, were substituted as parties-plaintiffs. Ratio. As early as 1922 in the case of Cabigao v. Del Rosario, this Court case of Castle Bros., Wolf and Sons v. Go-Juno, the Court held that a
laid down the doctrine that "no court has power to interfere by injunction party may set forth as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have,
In its decision dated June 30, 1983, the inferior court dismissed the action with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate whatever be their nature. These may even be inconsistent with each other
for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction. It cited the unassailable fact that jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction." because what is sufficient is that each is consistent with itself.
Villegas and her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession Reasoning. The various branches of the court of first instance of a -Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense (i.e. a builder in
of the subject land for no less than sixty years and that in addition, province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and good faith is entitled to recover the value of improvements) and instead
Villegas asserted an adverse claim of ownership, thus transforming the exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, relied on the sole defense that she inherited the land from her parents, the
suit into an "accion publiciana" which is properly cognizable by courts of cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much rejection thereof was a complete resolution of the controversy between
first instance (now regional trial courts). less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to the parties which bars a later case based upon the unpleaded defense.
confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case
On appeal to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Malolos, Branch XV, constitutes res judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior
the inferior court was reversed insofar as it had erroneously denied 2. NO judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but
jurisdiction over the ejectment case. The trial court then ordered Villegas Ratio. Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory also such other matters as could have been raised but were not. 13
to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to herein counterclaim provides the answer. It states: -It bears emphasizing that in ejectment cases, the rule is explicit that the
petitioner Cojuangco. "A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff
or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the to prevent further damages to him arising from the loss of possession.
The case was elevated to the appellate court and to the Supreme Court subject-matter of the opposing party's or co-party's claim and does not The sense of urgency is more pronounced in the case at bar where the
and in both instances, herein petitioner Cojuangco's right of possession require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court ejectment case in favor of Cojuangco was decided in 1978 and
over the land was upheld. After entry of judgment was made on November cannot acquire jurisdiction. subsequently appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. But the final
20, 1985, herein petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Reasoning. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements victory continues to elude Cojuangco to this day due to a large extent to
Branch XV, where she filed a motion for execution of the judgment, which made on the land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it is the legal maneuvers utilized by Villegas to forestall the inevitable.
the court granted on June 30, 1986. On July 29, 1986, a writ of demolition interwoven with the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation -For its part, respondent trial court has attempted to justify its writ of
was issued against Villegas, who did not oppose the ordered demolition should have been presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is injunction by stating that the impending demolition of Villegas' house and
but instead asked the lower court to give her more time (forty days from deemed barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded other buildings on the disputed property would render inutile her right as a
August 7, 1986) to effect the transfer of her personal properties and to from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. builder in good faith. We cannot agree. The loss to Villegas is not
remove the improvements on the subject lot to which motion the court -The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the sufficient to warrant a blatant disregard of established precedents
acceded. disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. The especially when it is borne in mind that for more than half a century,
philosophy of the rule is to DISCOURAGE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. Villegas and her family have enjoyed the fruits of the land without paying a
On September 16, 1986, before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas -According to Villegas, the reason why the counterclaim for single centavo in return. Surely, the equities are more in favor of
filed a separate civil action docketed as Civil Case No. 9094-M against indemnification was not made in the original action was because it Cojuangco, the landowner.
petitioner Cojuangco and the provincial sheriff "for specific performance became a "ripe issue" only after the ejectment proceedings. Villegas
with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and contended that the estoppel of judgment could only extend to those facts Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent court
preliminary injunction." This case, instead of being referred to Branch XV is hereby ordered to DISMISS Civil Case No. 9094-M and all proceedings
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 38

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held therein are declared null and void. The Regional Trial Court of Manalo in favor of appellants covered only Lot 74-B and not the house house involved therein only for one month. This is not entirely correct. The
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch XV is ordered to immediately execute the erected thereon. record on appeal filed by Manalo in the aforesaid ease shows that the
decision in the ejectment case. Civil Case No. 7042-M. Costs against While the case was pending in the lower court, or more specifically on defendants (appellants herein) filed an answer in which they alleged that
private respondent Villegas. This decision is immediately executory. April 17, 1955, appellees, without the consent of appellants, moved the they were "the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land" subject matter
house in question to the adjoining lot, which compelled the latter to file a of the action by virtue of the deed of sale executed in their favor by Beatriz
CARPENA VS MANALO supplemental complaint to recover from the former the sum of P2,500.00 Manalo, upon the registration of which a transfer certificate of title was
representing the value of the house, plus attorney's fees. issued in their name. Their answer also interposed a counterclaim which
GR No. 74262 As appellees had already vacated Lot 74-B, the lower court, after trial on they incorporated all the allegations made in their answer and further
PARAS; October 29, 1987 the merits, rendered judgment declaring appellant the owners of the alleged that the plaintiffs had filed the action against them maliciously,
house in question and sentencing appellees to pay appellants the sum of thus causing them damages in the sum of P2,000.00. Said answer prayed
NATURE P1,000.00 representing the fair market value thereof. Appellants' claim for not only for the dismissal of the complaint but also for judgment declaring
Action to recover possession damages for the use and occupancy of the premises was, however, said defendants as true and lawful owners of the property in question"
dismissed for not having been set up in Civil Case No. 9194, the same (Exhibit C, pp. 18-23). It is obvious therefore that, for all legal purposes,
FACTS being compulsory counterclaim. The present is their appeal from this appellants had, by way of counterclaim, filed an accion reivindicatoria
Lot 74 of the Calamba Cadastre was co-owned Beatriz Manalo and her portion of the decision of the lower court which, of course, necessarily included the question of possession. This
common-law husband, Luciano Manalo. On November 5, 1947 Beatriz notwithstanding, they failed to claim rents or compensation for the use
sold her one-half interest therein to the spouses Demetrio Carpena and ISSUE and occupancy of the lot and house subject matter of the complaint filed
Salud Catindig for the sum of P5,000.00. To keep the transaction from WON the action filed by Luciano Manalo is a compulsory counterclaim against them. The right to collect these rents or reasonable compensation
Luciano, the sale was made in the neighboring town of Sta. Rosa, being merely incidental to the counterclaim, it seems clear that the fact
Laguna, and the parties agreed that Beatriz would remain in possession HELD that the amount thereof was less than the jurisdictional amount for the
of the property but with the obligation of paying the land taxes due Yes. As stated above, the purpose of the action filed by Luciano Manalo Court of First Instance of Laguna did not deprive said court of authority to
thereon. On May 22, 1948 Beatriz and Luciano were married, but she died (Civil Case No. 9194 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna) was to take cognizance of the same.
three months thereafter. annul the sale made by his wife, Beatriz Manalo, in favor of the Carpena Lastly, appellants contend that there was absolutely no mutuality of claims
On August 30, 1948 the deed of the sale was registered and, as a result, spouses and to recover ownership of the property subject matter thereof. because the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 9194 were Luciano Manalo and
TCT No. 16833 was cancelled and TCT No. 2004 was issued in the name The rents which appellants now seek to collect from appellees were for the heirs of his deceased wife, whereas the claim for rents in the present
of the Carpena spouses for the portion purchased by them, which was the occupancy of said property and of the house constructed thereon. Had case is directed, jointly and severally, against Luciano Manalo, Pelagia
identified as Lot No. 74-B of subdivision plan Psd-23230. Upon the death the sale been annulled, it would have meant that the Carpenas, appellants Cailles Vda. de Unson and Beronica Capareda. This is likewise untenable
of their vendor, the Carpenas notified Luciano of the sale and besides herein, had no right to collect rents from the occupants of the lot and of because a party may not evade the effect of the doctrine of res judicata by
demanded of him the possession of lot 74-B, but the latter, instead of the house aforesaid, while if the court sustained the validity of the sale, simply including additional parties, in the subsequent litigation or by not
acquiescing thereto, filed an action against them to annul the sale made in they would have had such right. It is thus obvious that the claim which including as parties in the latter persons who were parties in the previous
their favor by Beatriz and to have himself declared owner of the property they seek to enforce now as, to say the least, a matter necessarily suit
subject matter thereof (Civil Case No. 9194). Defendant's answer in said connected with the transaction or occurrence subject matter of the Disposition. Decision affirmed
case alleged, as defense, that the sale in their favor was valid and that by complaint filed against them in Civil Case No. 9194. It follows that the
virtue of the same they became owners of the property subject matter same constituted a compulsory counterclaim which they should have CABAERO VS CANTOS
thereof. Consequently, they prayed for the dismissal of the case and for pleaded in their answer filed in the aforesaid case.
damages. The case was dismissed by the lower court after a trial on the G.R. No. 102942
In Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473, it was held that in an action for the
merits and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. recovery of a parcel of land, the defendant must set up a counterclaim for PANGANIBAN; April 18, 1997
It appears that in 1945 a barong-barong was erected on Lot 74-B by a the value of improvements made or introduced by him on the property,
tenant occupying the same. Two years thereafter the building was sold to otherwise his claim would be barred. That this ruling applies to the present NATURE
Beatriz Manalo for P200.00, and thereafter said improvement, with an case can not be disputed because the only difference between both cases Petition filed under Rule 65 assailing the Orders of respondent Judge for
assessed value of P150.00, was declared in her name for taxation is that in the one before us the counterclaim is for rents for the occupancy being contrary to law and for having been issued in excess of his
purposes. After her death, Luciano Manalo and their children continued to of the land sought to be recovered and of the house constructed thereon, jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
occupy said house, making considerable improvements thereon in the instead of being ? as in the Berses case ? for the recovery of the value of jurisdiction.
years 1952 and 1953, but in December 1954 Luciano Manalo sold it to improvements made on the property The Order of July 1, 1991, reads:
Pelagia Cailles Vda. de Unson and Beronica Capareda who began Appellants, however, argue that even assuming that their claim constituted "THE Answer with Counterclaim filed by the accused through counsel,
occupying the same on April 2, 1955. a mandatory counterclaim in relation to Civil Case No. 9194, still they dated February 12, 1991, as well as the Opposition thereto; the
The present action was commenced on April 11, 1955 in the Court of First could not have pleaded it as such in said case because it was not within Memorandum filed by the Private Prosecutor, in Support of Motion to
Instance of Laguna by the Carpena spouses against Luciano Manalo, the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the case Expunge from the Records And/Or to Dismiss Answer with Counterclaim;
Pelagia Cailles Vda. de Unson and Beronica Capareda to recover the was pending. In this connection they contend that their counterclaim the Supplement; and Comment on Supplement, are all ordered expunged
possession of Lot 74-B and the house erected thereon as well as against Luciano Manalo and his co-plaintiffs would have been for unlawful from the Records, considering that this is a criminal case wherein the civil
reasonable rental for its use and occupancy from August 1, 1948. detainer and the collection of one month rent only, because when the liability of the acused (sic) is impliedly instituted therein."
Appellees herein alleged in their answer that the sale executed by Beatriz action was commenced Manalo had been in possession of the lot and
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Petitioners pleaded for reconsideration of said Order but respondent (a) P1,500,000.00 as moral damages;
judge, in the Order of August 21, 1991, denied their motion, thus: (b) P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; Preliminary Matters
"ACTING on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 17, 1991, of the (c) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and Litis Pendentia as a Defense
accused through counsel, this Court finds no merit therein, such that said (d) P20,000.00, as litigation expenses. - Private respondent belatedly interposes litis pendentia to defeat the
motion is hereby denied." Accused pray for such other reliefs, legal and equitable in the premises." petition alleges that the present petition is barred by the cross-claim of the
- During the initial hearing on April 15, 1991, the prosecution verbally petitioners against Aqualand Ventures and Management Corporation, of
FACTS moved that the answer with counterclaim be expunged from the records which petitioners are stockholders and officers, in Civil Case No. 90-
- This petition emanated from a criminal case in the RTC of Manila. Said and/or be dismissed. The respondent judge gave the contending parties 53035 (filed against both petitioners and the private respondent by
case commenced on October 18, 1990, with the filing of an Information time to submit a Memorandum and Comment or Opposition, respectively. Solidbank).
against petitioners charging them with estafa for allegedly defrauding - The Memorandum of the private prosecutor justified his Motion to - SC said : Considerations of due process prevent us from taking
private respondent Epifanio Ceralde of the sum of P1,550,000.00. The Expunge the answer with counterclaim for two reasons: (1) the trial court up the merits of this argument in favor of private respondent. This
accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows: had no jurisdiction over the answer with counterclaim for non-payment of cross-claim was never raised in the trial court -- certainly not in
"... the said accused induced and succeeded in inducing the said the prescribed docket fees and (2) the "compulsory counterclaim the Memorandum dated April 19, 1991, submitted to the court a
EPIFANIO CERALDE to advance the total amount of P1,550,000.00 to be against complainant is barred for failure to file it before quo in support of respondent Ceralde's motion to expunge the
paid to M.C. Castro Construction, Co. representing the purchase price of 6 arraignment." answer with counterclaim. The Rules require that "(a) motion
parcels of land located in Pangasinan which the Aqualand Ventures & - In their Opposition, petitioners argued that this Court in Javier vs. IAC attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections
Management Corporation, a joint business venture organized by accused laid down, for "procedural soundness," the rule that a counterclaim should then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
AMADO F. CABAERO and the said EPIFANIO CERALDE, purchased be permitted in a criminal action where the civil aspect is not reserved. waived." Consequently and ineluctably, the ground of litis
from the said company, with the understanding that the said amount would Further, inasmuch as petitioners' counterclaim was compulsory in nature, pendentia which was not argued in the court a quo is deemed
be returned to the said EPIFANIO CERALDE as soon as the loan for they were not required to pay docket fees therefor. Additionally, the Rules waived.
P1,500,000.00 applied for by the said Aqualand Ventures & Management do not specifically provide for the period for filing of counterclaims in
Corporation with Solid Bank, of which said accused AMADO F. CABAERO criminal cases, whereas Section 3 of Rule 9 and Section 9 of Rule 6 allow The Payment of Filing Fees
is the Senior Vice-President, is released, but both accused, once the said the filing, with leave of court, of a counterclaim at any time before - The Court agrees with petitioners that inasmuch as the counterclaim is
loan had been approved by the bank, in furtherance of their conspiracy judgment. Thus, petitioners contended that their filing was within the compulsory, there is no necessity to pay such fees, as the Rules do not
and falsely pretending that accused CARMEN C. PEREZ had been proper period. require them (as clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion).
authorized by the said Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation to - respondent Judge Cantos granted the prosecution's motion to expunge
receive the check for P1,500,000.00 for and in its own behalf, succeeded and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Main Issue
in inducing the cashier of said Solid Bank to release the same to accused - - Petitioners invoke Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal HELD NO. (NO)
CARMEN C. PEREZ, thereby enabling her to encash the aforesaid check, Procedure. They contend that it is not only a right but an "outright duty" of As held in Javier, counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if
and instead of turning over the said amount to the said EPIFANIO the accused to file an answer with counterclaim since failure to do so shall not set up where the following circumstances are present: (1) that it arises
CERALDE; accused failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to do so result in the counterclaim being forever barred. out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that
despite repeated demands made to that effect, and with intent to defraud, - Petitioners argue that under Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, particularly is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) that it does not
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their own Section 8 thereof, clerks of court are instructed to "keep a general docket, require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
personal use and benefit...” each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving all the cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has jurisdiction to
- petitioners entered a plea of not guilty. entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases x x x." Thus, entertain the claim.
- Atty. Ambrosio Blanco entered his appearance as private prosecutor. respondent Judge Cantos allegedly erred in expunging all records with As categorically recognized in the case of Javier, a claim for malicious
- The Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Hon. Elisa R. Israel, inhibited respect to the Answer with Counterclaim for, on appeal, "if the records prosecution or "grossly unfounded suit" as a compulsory counterclaim has
herself "out of delicadeza" from further hearing the case "considering that elevated x x x are incomplete and inaccurate, there arises a grave danger no appropriate venue other than the same criminal case which is alleged
the complainant is a relative by affinity of a nephew of her husband." that the ends of justice and due process shall not be served and instead to be a malicious suit. The counterclaim stands on the same footing and is
Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to Branch VII presided over by frustrated." to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. A
respondent Judge Alfredo Cantos. - Petitioners further allege that the Order failed to resolve the legal issues counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
- On April 2, 1991, petitioners filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging raised by the parties as it neglected to state the legal basis therefor defending party may have against an opposing party. Compulsory
that the money loaned from Solidbank mentioned in the Information was counterclaim is one which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
duly applied to the purchase of the 6 parcels of land in Pangasinan, and ISSUE connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject
that the filing of said Information was unjustified and malicious. Petitioners WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, matter of plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is
included the following prayer: amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering that the answer with within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after trial judgment be counterclaim of the petitioners in the criminal case, together with all the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
rendered: pleadings filed in relation thereto, be expunged from the records. (WON jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not
1. Dismissing, or quashing the information, and the civil action the accused-petitioners who were charged with estafa may file an answer set up.
impliedly instituted in the criminal action; with counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees - In justifying his Order, Judge Cantos ruled that "this is a criminal case
2. Ordering the complaining witness Ceralde to pay to the accused the and litigation expenses against the private complainant in the same wherein the civil liability of the accused is impliedly instituted therein." This
following amounts: criminal action.) justification begs the question. Basically, that is the reason why petitioners
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herein filed their answer with counterclaim for, apparently, in hiring a 6) Because an accused is not sufficiently apprised of the specific basis of FACTS
private prosecutor, Ceralde intended to prosecute his civil claim together the civil action against him, he may file a motion for bill of particulars or - On Feb.1, 1983, petitioner Felisa Chan and private respondent Grace
with the criminal action. Hence, as a protective measure, petitioners filed take advantage of discovery procedures. The end result, in any case, will Cu, entered into a contract of lease, the terms of which were:
their counterclaim in the same case. Since under Section 1 Rule 111, the be delay and complication in the criminal action and even confusion >>Cu will occupy Room 401 and rooftop of Room 442 of a bldg in
civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, if among the parties. Urbiztondo owned by Chan.
not waived or reserved, includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC, 7) The Rules of Court does not specify the reckoning date for the filing of >>Term of lease is 1 year at a monthly rental of P2,400.
and damages under Art.32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from an answer in an impliedly instituted civil action. >>The premises shall be used as a learning center.
the same act or omission of the accused, should not the accused have the 8) An accused can file his answer with counterclaim only after the initial - The contract was renewed for the succeeding 2 years or up to Feb.1,
right to file a counterclaim in the criminal case? Obviously, the answer is in hearing, because the private complainant may still reserve his civil action 1986, after which date, no written contract of lease was executed although
the affirmative, as was held in Javier. at any time before the prosecution commences to present evidence. On Cu continued to occupy the premises. Increasing every year, the monthly
Some Reservations in the Application of Javier the other hand, an answer in an ordinary civil action should be filed before eventually came to P3, 484.80 in Jan. 1989.
- The logic and cogency of Javier notwithstanding, some reservations and the start of hearing, because hearing commences only after the issues - Nov. 1989: Chan locked the way to the rooftop. In the ensuing exchange
concerns were voiced out by members of the Court during the have been joined, i.e., after the responsive pleadings have been filed. of communication, Cu insisted that she be allowed to use the rooftop of
deliberations on the present case. These were engendered by the obvious 9) Confusion in the application of the rules on civil procedure will certainly Rm.442, while Chan maintained that only Rm.401 was leased and that the
lacuna in the Rules of Court, which contains no express provision for the encourage litigants to challenge before appellate courts interlocutory use of the rooftop was merely tolerated, adding that the use of the rooftop
adjudication of a counterclaim in a civil action impliedly instituted in a incidents of the impliedly instituted civil action. posed danger to the students. Chan eventually terminated the lease,
criminal case. The following problems were noted: 10) Some members of the Court believe that a cause of action for refused to collect the rental for Dec.1989 (turned down a check tendered
1) While the rules on civil procedure expressly recognize a defendant's malicious prosecution may be premature because there is as yet no by Cu) and gave Cu only until Jan.1990 to vacate the premises.
entitlement to plead his counterclaim and offer evidence in support finding of such wrongful prosecution. This fact is precisely what the trial - Cu’s lawyer tendered the payment in cash with notice to Chan that in
thereof, the rules on criminal procedure which authorize the implied court still has to determine. case of non-acceptance, the same will be deposited in court by way of
institution of a civil action in a criminal case are, in contrast, silent on this --By the foregoing discussion, we do not imply any fault in Javier. consignation. At this point, Chan gave Cu up to March, 1990
point and do not provide specific guidelines on how such counterclaim The real problem lies in the absence of clear-cut rules governing - Jan.15, 1990: Cu filed a civil case for consignation with the MTC. Chan
shall be pursued. the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil actions and the answered with a counterclaim for ejectment. The MTC’s decision:
2) A judgment in a criminal action is not required to provide for the award necessary consequences and implications thereof. For this >>declared that the rooftop is included in the lease
of a counterclaim. reason, the counter-claim of the accused cannot be tried together >>fixed the term of the lease until June 30, 1992
3) Allowing and hearing counterclaims (and possibly cross-claims and with the criminal case because, as already discussed, it will >>held valid and legal the consignation by Cu
third-party complaints) in a criminal action will surely delay the said action. unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal proceedings. - Both parties appealed to the RTC. Cu maintained that the MTC should
The primary issue in a criminal prosecution that is under the control of Thus, the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and have fixed a longer period while Chan contended that the MTC erred in
state prosecutors is the guilt of the accused and his civil liability arising the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. extending the term of the lease and in upholding the validity of the
from the same act or omission. Extending the civil action arising from the The counter-claim (and cross-claim or third party complaint, if any) consignation. RTC later affirmed the MTC. Cu then went to the CA on
same act or omission to counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to petition for review, with the same allegation that that the RTC erred in not
complaints, and allowing the accused and other parties to submit their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time. At balance, fixing a longer period of extension of the lease. The CA reversed and set
evidence of their respective claims will complicate the disposition of the until there are definitive rules of procedure to govern the aside the decisions of the MTC and RTC and dismissed, for lack of merit,
criminal case. institution, prosecution and resolution of the civil aspect (and the the complaint for consignation. The CA held that Chan had justifiable
4) Adjudication of compulsory counterclaims and/or related claims or consequences and implications thereof) impliedly instituted in a cause (Cu’s overstay) to refuse to accept the payment. It ruled that the
pleadings logically includes the application of other rules which, by their criminal case, trial courts should limit their jurisdiction to the civil MTC and RTC erred in passing upon the issue of ejectment raised in
very nature, apply only to civil actions. The following matters may be liability of the accused arising from the criminal case. Chan’s counterclaim since an action for ejectment can only be initiated
invoked in connection with the filing of an answer with a counterclaim: the Disposition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Orders through a verified complaint, not a counterclaim. Chan’s MFR was denied
genuineness and due execution of an actionable document which are are hereby MODIFIED. The counterclaim of the accused is hereby set by the CA and so she filed this instant petition.
deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath; affirmative aside without prejudice. The Respondent RTC of Manila is DIRECTED to
defenses like res judicata, prescription and statute of frauds which are proceed with the trial of the criminal action and the civil action arising from ISSUE
deemed waived by failure to interpose them as affirmative defenses in an the criminal offense that is impliedly instituted therein, with all judicious WON Chan’s action for ejectment set up in a counterclaim was proper
answer; and the failure of a defendant to file an answer seasonably may dispatch.
result in his default in the civil aspect but not in the criminal. As a HELD
consequence of these matters, the entry of plea during arraignment will no CHAN V CA (CU) YES.
longer signal joinder of issues in a criminal action. Reasoning Sec.7, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the answer
G.R. 109020
5) In an impliedly instituted civil action, an accused is not sufficiently may contain any counterclaim which a party may have against the
apprised of the specific basis of the claims against him. An accused learns DAVIDE; MARCH 3, 1994 opposing party provided that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the
of the implied institution of a civil action from the contents of an claim and can, if the presence of third parties is essential for its
information. An information, however, is filed in behalf of the People of the NATURE adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of such parties. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 9, a
Philippines. Hence, it does not contain the ultimate facts relating to the Review on certiorari counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily
civil liability of the accused. connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
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the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the Page 26 document of pledge, or whether the difference between the amount
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A described in the document of pledge and that found on hand on the 1st of
counterclaim may be compulsory or permissive. February, 1913, and in the meantime been disposed of by "La Urania
- Chan's counterclaim for ejectment is a compulsory counterclaim FACTS Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," in collusion with Messrs. Sprungli & Co., but that if
because it is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence -allegedly a pacto de retro sale (the other party alleged it was a such disposition was made it was without the knowledge or consent of the
which is the subject matter of Cu's complaint, viz., the lease contract mortgage), Gojo the buyer alleged that the period for redemption has defendant bank.
between them. Consequently, the CA erred when it held that Chan's already lapsed so he filed a petition for consolidation of ownership. - from said 1st day of February, 1913, the defendant corporation had been
cause of action for ejectment could not be set up in a counterclaim. -Goyala’s, the buyers who were alleging that they had obtained a cash in the absolute and exclusive possession of the tobacco, until the 15th of
- The case of Ching Pue vs. Gonzales is inapplicable because in Ching loan from Gojo and the land allegedly sold to Gojo was only a security to May, 1913, when same was sold under and by virtue of the document of
Pue the consignation cases were filed with the CFI which did not have the loan, and that they tried to pay their debt to Gojo but Gojo refused. pledge by the defendant bank for the sum of P12,722.36 which was
jurisdiction over ejectment cases; necessarily, no counterclaim for Goyala’s filed a counterclaim for Gojo to receive the amount due, for the applied on account of said loan, the entire amount of which was then past
ejectment could have been interposed therein. The ratio of the said case document to be declared a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale, for due and unpaid, leaving a large balance thereof still due and unpaid.
is that consignation is not proper where the refusal of the creditor to P1800 per annum for the fruits of said property and that, if ever the - on the 22nd day of April, 1913, the plaintiff Tec Bi & Co., filed a complaint
accept tender of payment is with just cause. In the instant case, the document be deemed a pacto de retro sale, for Gojo to be ordered to in the Court of First Instance of Manila against "La Urania Cigar Factory
ejectment was set up as a counterclaim in the MTC which has jurisdiction execute a deed of resale in favor of the Goyalas. (Ltd.)," claiming the payment of the sum of P11,572.96 as the balance of
over it and Cu joined that issue and the incidents thereto by her answer to -Goyala’s spouse died, TC ordered Gojo to amend the Complaint to the unpaid purchase price of the tobacco
the counterclaim, and the counterclaim to the counterclaim. substitute the spouse with one of her successors in interest as party. - on the 5th day of May, 1913, Tec Bi & Co. asked for and obtained from
- The CA therefore should have confined itself to the principal error raised Notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after receipt of copy of TC order, the Court of First Instance an attachment against the said bales of
in Cu's petition in (the duration of the extended term of the lease fixed in Gojo allegedly failed to submit the amended complaint so Goyala filed a tobacco, but inasmuch as the bodega was locked and the sheriff was
the decision of the MTC and affirmed by the RTC). As fixed, the term of motion to dismiss the petition. TC dismissed complaint, Gojo was also informed that the keys were in the possession of the bank, he demanded
the lease was extended to June 30, 1992. That period had expired six declared in default in re Goyala’s counterclaim. TC ruled in favor of the delivery thereof from the latter, which demand was refused by the
months before the CA promulgated its challenged decision. Considering Goyala. bank, alleging that it held possession of the tobacco under a pledge.
that Chan did not file any petition for the review of the RTC decision and -Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal - the sheriff notified it that the bales of tobacco were attached subject to
was, therefore, deemed to have agreed to the extension; and considering involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC. the results of the complaint filed by Tec Bi & Co. against "La Urania Cigar
further that Cu did not come to us on a petition for review to seek reversal Factory (Ltd.),”
of the decision therein and should thus be considered to have agreed to ON DEFENSES - on 8th day of May, 1913, the bank answered the notification of the
the dismissal of her consignation case, the parties must be deemed sheriff, confirming the fact that it had in its possession the bales of
bound by the extended term, which has, nevertheless, already lapsed. tobacco specified in the notification, as security for the payment of a loan
**On Counterclaims Rule 8, allegations deemed admitted and that it intended to sell the same; that the sheriff communicated the
- A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending answer of the bank to the attorneys to Tec Bi & Co., who replied insisting
party may have against an opposing party. It need not diminish or defeat TEC BI & CO v CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA, upon the levy of the attachment.
the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding AUSTRALIA AND CHINA - on the 19th day of May, 1913, the Court of First Instance rendered
in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's judgment in said case against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," in favor of
claim. Counterclaims are designed to enable the disposition of a whole
41 Phil 596 Tec Bi & Co., for the sum of P11,572.96, with legal interest from April 22,
controversy of interested parties conflicling claims, at one time and in one CARSON; Feb 5, 1916 1913, and costs.
action, provided all the parties can be brought before the court and the - on the 22d day of May, 1913, the sheriff attempted to execute the
matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party. A counterclaim FACTS: judgment upon the bales of tobacco attached and in the possession of the
"is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that when - on the 7th of November 1912, the plaintiff sold to the "La Urania Cigar defendant corporation, but was unable to do so due to the statement of
properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matter Factory (Ltd.)," a quantity of leaf tobacco. the agent of said corporation, that the tobacco had been sold and that the
stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending - on 16th January, 1913, the "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," pledged to proceeds of the sale had been applied upon the payment of the amount
between the same parties, wherein each is at the same time both a the defendant corporation as security for the payment of an indebtedness due to from "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.),"
plaintiff and a defendant . . . . A counterclaim stands on the same footing of P25,000 the bales of tobacco. The bales of tobacco thus pledged were - Court of First Instance found that the plaintiff's claim was a preferred
and is to be tested by the same rules, as if it were an independent action. stored in the bodega of a third person, Messrs. Sprungli & Co., situated at credit under the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 1922 of the Civil
In short, the defendant is a plaintiff with respect to his counterclaim. No. 42 (now No. 214) of Calle David, Manila. Code; that the pledge executed by "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," in
Disposition petition GRANTED. CA decision SET ASIDE. - on or about the 1st day of February, 1913, the defendant corporation favor of the defendant corporation was not binding upon the plaintiff for
demanded and obtained from Messrs. Sprungli & Co. the keys to the said the reason that it was not set forth in a public instrument as required by
bodega, and discovered that of the 436 bales of tobacco there remained article 1865 of the Civil Code in order to be effective against, third person,
only those set forth in paragraph 4 of the answer. (I have no idea how and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
The Answer many. Sorry.) for the amount of the former's judgment against "La Urania Cigar Factory
Defenses - the defendant bank did not know and had been unable to ascertain (Ltd.)," with interest and costs.
whether "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," misrepresented the quantity of
GOJO V GOYALA the tobacco in the said warehouse at the time of the execution of said ISSUE:
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WON the court erred in holding that the plaintiff did not waive any defect in regularly scheduled." private respondent could do no more than claim in its motion for
the private instrument of pledge by expressly admitting its genuineness reconsideration that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to Rule
and the correctness of its date by stipulation, and by failure to object to its - SIP filed answer stating: 8, Section 10, of the Rules of Court
introduction in evidence. 1. That it admits the allegations in paragraph 1 insofar
NOTE: the case dealt with a pledgor-pledgee [credit] relationship. The as its personality is concerned but is w/o sufficient information to ISSUE (for this topic)
discussion here is limited to that pertaining to civil provision. Please see form a belief as to the truth of the rest of the allegations. 1. WON respondent’s answer constitute denial (allegation not deemed
case re issues on credit. 2. That defendant is w/o sufficient knowledge or admitted)
information to form a belief as to the truth, correctness or accuracy
HELD: of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 2 to 6 of plaintiffs HELD
A general admission of the truth of the allegations set forth in a pleading is complaint." 1 NO
not an admission of the truth of an impossible conclusion of fact drawn -The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no
from other facts set out in the pleading, nor of a wrong conclusion of law - PAC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as the answer failed knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
based on the allegations of fact well pleaded, nor of the truth of a general to tender an issue or "otherwise admits the material allegations of the averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply
averment of facts contradicted by more specific averments. Thus, if a complaint”. SIP did not oppose to this motion. Judge Revilla denied the where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so
pleader alleges that two pesos were borrowed on one day and two more motion and set the case for pre-trial. Then the case was set for trial on plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his
borrowed on another making five Pin all, a stipulation of the truth of the the merits. averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue (as held in Capitol
allegations in the pleading does not amount to an admission by the Motors Corporation v. Yabut)
opposing party that twice two make five. Again if a pleader alleges that - PAC presented its case and filed memoranda saying that SIP’s - "an unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records,
one hundred pesos were loaned without interest for one year and had not answer failed to tender an issue as said party "could not have denied the means of information concerning which are within the control of the
been paid, and that the borrower is indebted to the lender in the sum of knowledge of the account in the face of its written admissions," hence, pleader, or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to
one hundred and ten pesos, that being the amount of the capital together judgment on the pleadings was proper. constitute an effective denial."
with interest for the year for which the money was loaned, a stipulation as
to the truth of the allegation set forth in the pleadings is not an admission - SIP presented its case and filed memoranda saying that under Reasoning: The rule that a mere allegation of ignorance of the facts
of the truth of the conclusion of law as to the interest due by the borrower. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, its answer had sufficiently alleged in the complaint is insufficient to raise an issue, for the defendant
These elementary principles have been quite fully developed in a great denied the allegations of the complaint and placed them in issue, so must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so
variety of cases arising on demurrers, and sufficiently dispose of the that it became incumbent upon petitioner to prove its allegations… ; alleged, must be applied in this case, for petitioner's complaint explicitly
attempt of counsel to fix the attention of the court upon this single and that a denial for "lack of sufficient knowledge or information to form averred that the letters (AnnexA&B) were written by private respondent,
averment of the answer, apart from the context and to the exclusion of the a belief as to the truth" of the averments of the complaint is a specific albeit thru its lawyer. Whether or not the said averments in the complaint
specific allegations of fact, the truth of which, as stipulated by the parties, denial and as such places in issue the allegations of the complaint so were true, could not conceivably be unknown to private respondent. As a
cannot be questioned. denied. matter of fact it has never been denied by private respondent that it was
indebted to petitione. It has not been asserted that the letters attached as
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed - TC declared that said answer really failed to tender any issue and Annexes "A" and "B" to the complaint which were sent to petitioner by the
that the claims alleged in the complaint are, therefore, deemed counsel of private respondent were not authorized by the latter. There was
PHIL ADVERTISING COUNSELORS V. CA, HON. admitted. TC ordered SIP to pay PAC the sum of P89,100.03 with legal thus a failure on private respondent's part to deny the material averments
interest, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. of the complaint. Consequently, the same, including the contents of
PEDRO REVILLA, SOUTHERN INDUSTRIAL Annexes "A" and "B", which formed part of the complaint, and in which the
PROJECTS - SIP filed motion for reconsideration. PAC filed an opposition to the existence and validity of petitioner's claim were unequivocally conceded,
GRN L 31869 MFR on the grounds that the decision was in accordance with law and must be deemed to have been admitted. Although sanctioned by the
ANTONIO; AUG 8 1973 the evidence. Judge Revilla granted MFR "in the interest of justice” and rules, the form of denial adopted by private respondent must be availed of
set the case for hearing on the merits. in good faith and with sincerity and not resorted to merely for the purpose
NATURE of delay or to confuse the adverse party as to what averments in the
Appeal from the decision of the CA - PAC filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for execution, complaint are actually put in issue.
contending that the MFR being pro forma, did not interrupt the running
FACTS of the period for appeal, and since SIP received notice of the decision,
-Southern Industrial Projects (SIP) hired Philippine Advertising Counselors the judgment became final and executory, and consequently it could no Disposition Appealed judgment reversed and set aside, and Southern
(PAC) to promote SIP’s products. SIP accumulated unpaid accounts. longer be modified, or set aside. Judge Revilla denied the omnibus Industrial Projects, Inc. to pay Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. the
motion. amount of P89,100.03, with legal interest until fully paid, plus 10% of the
-PAC filed complaint. Attached w/ the complaint were two letters (Annexed principal amount due by way of attorney's fees, and costs.
A&B) from SIP’s lawyer, saying that it would not be possible for SIP to -PAC filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, w/ prayer
settle in full its account of P97,952 08 in one payment and suggested that for preliminary injunction w/ the CA, which gave due course to the LIAM LAW V OLYMPIC SAWMILL
it (SIP) be allowed to settle its account by "periodic amortization"; and that petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. CA later dismissed
129 SCRA 439
SIP had included PAC in its list of creditors "to whom payments are the petition and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. CA said that
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 43

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MELENCIO-HERRERA; May 28, 1984 SCRA - The trial court did in fact make a finding that the documentary evidence
of petitioner failed to prove anything showing that respondent indeed
CORONA; January 13, 2004
NATURE received the proceeds of the loan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Appeal from a Decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan conclusions of the trial court and declared:
NATURE A pre-existing obligation, it may be conceded, constitutes value and may, of and by itself,
Petition for review serve as valuable and sufficient consideration for a contract such as the loan sued upon.
FACTS As an essential element of a contract, however, the same should have been satisfactorily
- Law loaned P10,000 to Olympic Sawmill without interest. The loan proved by the appellant – particularly when, as in the instant case, the absence of
FACTS consideration was precisely put in issue by the pleadings and was buttressed by both oral
became due on January 31, 1960 but was not paid on that date. The - Amalio L. Sarmiento, registered owner of A.L. Sarmiento Construction, and documentary evidence. Having failed in this material respect, the appellant’s
debtors asked for an extension of 3 months (April 30, 1960). applied for a loan from Philippine Banking Corporation in the sum of withdrawal of the amount supposedly credited to the appellee’s account was
- March 17, 1960 – Another loan document was drawn up wherein the understandably interpreted by the court a quo as a termination/cancellation of the loan the
P4,126,000, evidenced by promissory note no. 626-84. latter applied for. Considering further that contracts without consideration do not exist in
obligation was increased by P6,000 (to answer or attorney’s fees, legal - Pursuant thereto, Sarmiento obligated himself to pay the amount with contemplation of law and produce no effect whatsoever (Article 1352, Civil Code of the
interest and other costs). Defendants failed to pay their dues by April and interest at the rate of 29% per annum. Additionally, it was stipulated that if Philippines), the trial, likewise, correctly dismissed the appellant’s case.
when a action was instituted against them by Law in September, they payment was not made upon maturity of the loan, penalty charges of 1% - A statement in a written instrument regarding the payment of
claimed that the additional interest as usurious. per month and 25% of the total amount due would be charged against consideration is merely in the nature of a receipt and may be contradicted.
- A writ of attachment was then executed on real and personal properties him. Respondent Sarmiento denied having received the proceeds of the loan
of the defendant. - Sarmiento signed the aforesaid promissory note together with the and in fact presented evidence showing that on the day petitioner claimed
- TC: ordered Olympic Sawmill to pay Liam Law P10,000 plus the P6,000 disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction provided by the bank. to have credited the subject amount, it was again debited or withdrawn by
interest. - Sarmiento failed to pay the obligation on maturity, prompting PBC to petitioner, admittedly upon the instruction of the officials from petitioner’s
send him a letter of demand. Despite the demand, however, Sarmiento head office.
ISSUE still failed to settle his indebtedness. - Petitioner attempted to controvert this fact by claiming that the proceeds
WON the decision of the trial court was correct - PBC filed a complaint for a sum of money against him. In his answer, of the loan were applied to respondent’s previous obligations to the bank.
Sarmiento denied that he received the proceeds of the loan transaction But there is nothing in the records showing that respondent had other
HELD and prayed that the case against him be dismissed. obligations to which the proceeds of the loan could or should have been
YES - The trial court rendered its decision finding that plaintiff miserably failed applied. Moreover, petitioner failed to explain just exactly what said
Ratio Sec. 9 of the Usury Law envisages a complaint filed against to prove its case by preponderance of evidence. The case was obligations were or to what extent the purported proceeds were applied in
an entity which has committed usury, for the recovery of the dismissed. satisfaction thereof. What appeared clearly was that the proceeds of the
usurious interest paid. In that case, if the entity sued shall not file - PBC filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently loan were deposited then withdrawn the same day by petitioner itself, thus
its answer under oath denying the allegation of usury, the granted despite the opposition of Sarmiento. negating its claim that respondent actually received it. Petitioner therefore
defendant shall be deemed to have admitted the usury. The - The trial court rendered a decision finding the evidence adduced by the failed to establish its case against respondent Sarmiento.
provision does not apply to a case, as in the present, where it is bank to be insufficient to substantiate its claim. The trial court reinstated - Be that as it may, the general rule is that only questions of law may be
the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is alleging usury. its earlier dismissal of the case against Sarmiento and denied Philippine raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Barring a showing that the
Reasoning Banking Corporation’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. findings of fact complained of are totally devoid of support in the records,
- Sec. 9 of the Usury Law states: “The person or corporation sued shall file - PBC appealed to the CA such determination must stand for the Court is neither expected nor
its answer in writing under oath to any complaint brought or filed against - CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s by deleting the trial court’s required to examine or refute the oral and documentary evidence
said person or corporation before a competent court to recover the money award of attorney’s fees. submitted by the parties.
or other personal or real property, seeds or agricultural products, charged - Hence, the instant petition Disposition Petition DENIED.
or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. The lack of taking an
oath to an answer to a complaint will mean the admission of the facts ISSUE
contained in the latter.” WON no proof was required of petitioner to establish the contents of the
- For sometime, usury has been legally nonexistent. Interest can now be
Defense/objection waived
said documents because such judicial admissions of respondent created
charged as tender and borrower may agree upon.4 The Rules of Court in a prima facie case in petitioner’s favor 9
regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered KATON V PALANCA
repealed with retroactive effect. HELD G.R. No. 151149
Disposition Judgment affirmed NO.
- It is undisputed that respondent Sarmiento signed the promissory note 9 For other footnotes in this case:

and the accompanying disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction. [14] The said section provides that “[t]hese rules shall apply in all courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme

How to contest document But said pieces of evidence proved only the existence of such documents. Court.”

There was even no question as to that because respondent Sarmiento [35] §1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

himself admitted the due execution thereof. [37] §2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION V CA - The important issue was whether or not respondent Sarmiento actually “SEC. 2. Parties in interest.- A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,

(AMALIO L. SARMIENTO) received the proceeds of the subject loan so as to make him liable or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted

therefor, a matter which should have been ventilated before the trial court. or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 44

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PANGANIBAN; September 7, 2004 homestead application for the island; that Gabriel Mandocdoc never review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases
undertook the inspection and survey of the island; that he is not a mere appropriately ends useless litigations.
overseer of Katon because he was acting for himself in developing his
NATURE
own area and not as anybody’s caretaker. 1. This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing CA
-Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it with the CA when he moved
decision, and resolution denying MFR.
their respective portions, have declared such for taxation purposes and for reconsideration of CA’s Dec8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected
have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. They contend itself in its Nov20, 2001 Resolution.
FACTS
that Katon has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned -That should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA’s Resolution
-August 2, 1963: George Katon filed a request with the District Office of
(an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a on this point has rendered petitioner’s issue moot. There is no need to
the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-
mere homestead applicant) and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted
classification (forestagricultural land) of a piece of real property known
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that
as Sombrero Island (~18has).
and unexplained period of time. could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of
-BFDO Puerto Princesa ordered the inspection, investigation and survey
-After filing their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and discretion committed by the trial court in denying Katon’s MFR.
of the land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead
Counterclaim, respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of -Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the
patent.
the alleged defiance by Katon of the RTC’s order to amend his Complaint correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of
-Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator)
(substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased Gapilango). MTD was the evidence,[10] more so when no determination of the merits has yet
undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the
granted. Katon’s MFR was denied. been made by the trial court, as in this case.
presence of George, his brother Rodolfo (deceased) and his cousin,
-Katon filed petition for certiorari before CA. Instead of limiting itself to the
Manuel Palanca, Jr., (respondent). During said survey, there were no
allegation of grave abuse of discretion, CA ruled on the merits & held that 2. NO
actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed
while Katon had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest -CA’s “residual prerogatives” under Sec1 of Rule9 of the Rules of Court is
to have been planted by George and Palanca (alleged overseer of
to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the different from the “residual jurisdiction” of TC over cases appealed to CA.
George) who went to the island from time to time to undertake
Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land. Also, granting -RESIDUAL PREROGATIVES: Sec 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:
development work, like planting of additional coconut trees.
arguendo that Katon had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
-The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was
land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his the answer are deemed waived, except when
favorably endorsed by BFDO Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila
right for almost 23 years from the time Palanca’s title had been issued (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente
-On MR, CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of (2) litis pendentia,
Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the
the case. It agreed with Katon that the TC had acted without jurisdiction in (3) res judicata and
endorsement as co-applicants of George. Authorities noted that since the
perfunctorily dismissing his Sept10, 1999 MFR, on the erroneous ground (4) prescription
subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is
that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
therefore certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under
motion. Nonetheless, the complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or
the Public Land Act.
CA – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its “residual prerogative” action.
-George Katon says: the whole Sombrero Island had been classified from
under Sec. 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. CA said that from the -RESIDUAL JURISDICTION: Sec 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court 10:
forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon
allegations of the complaint, Katon clearly had no standing to seek The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the
his request and at his instance.
reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
-However land investigators of the Puerto Princesa District Land Office,
even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
later favorably endorsed the request of respondents Manuel Palanca Jr.
could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey vacant portions of Sombrero
and for reversion of the land to the public domain. It also ruled that records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the
Island consisting of 5hectares each.
prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. records on appeal. In either instance, the TC still retains its so-called
-Subsequently, respondents filed their own homestead patent
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
applications: Lorenzo Agustin (4.3has), Juan Fresnillo (8.5has), and
ISSUES
Jesus Gapilango (??has). Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead
1. WON CA was correct in resolving the petition for certiorari based on an
Patent No. and OCT for 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. 10Rule41.“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
issue not raised in the petition (WON CA was correct in ruling on the
-Katon filed Complaint for “Nullification of Applications for Homestead and upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
merits)
Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title” and “A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval
2. WON CA was correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under
prayed for reconveyance of the whole island in his favor, arguing that the of the record on appeal filed in due time.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the
homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and
Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition (and eventually dismissing
portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents were invalid for the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
the case for prescription and lack of jurisdiction)
having been obtained through fraud. “In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records

Respondent’s arguments: on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
HELD
-Manuel Palanca asserts that he himself requested for the reclassification “In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action
of the island in dispute; that about the time of such request, Fresnillo, and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
clearly appear from the complaint filed with the TC, the action may be
Gapilango and himself already occupied their respective areas and appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
dismissed motu proprio by the CA, even if the case has been elevated for
introduced numerous improvements; that Katon never filed any appeal.”
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 45

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permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and -The dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack Layos is the legal owner and possessor of thwo parcels of land having a
allow the withdrawal of the appeal. of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence of a cause of total area of 837,695 sq. m. located in Biñan, Laguna known as Lots 1 & 2
-CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have action, a defense raised by respondents in their Answer. of Plan Psu-201. Layos claimed that the Southwoods project encroached
been based on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Such order of dismissal -Assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for upon the aforecited lands and thus his rights of ownership and possession
was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed were violated when FERC brought in men and equipment to begin
pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as for being time-barred. development of the said properties.
residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to A. 1977, Feb21: a homestead patent and an OCT was issued to Palanca - February 2, 1993: FERC filed an Opposition to Application for Writ of
dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 1988, Oct6: filing of the complaint, way past ten years from the date of Preliminary Injunction and explicitly stated therein that the developer is its
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of sister company, FEGDI.
of the same rules. fraudulently registered real property. - March 29, 1993: Judge Sultan of RTC Biñan issued an order denying
-Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined B. Palanca’s title attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the the prayer for preliminary injunction in view of Layos’ inability to
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977. It is no substantiate his right.
Katon prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. - June 25, 1993: Layos along with his wife and other individuals filed
patent applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the another case for Injunction and Damage with Prayer for Preliminary
well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record Injunction with the RTC of San Pedro, this time against FEGDI. The
of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so complaint is basically identical to that filed in the Biñan case, except for
Management Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner. -on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or changes in the number of party-plaintiffs and party-defendants and in the
-Q: did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity -an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, area size of the claimed landholdings.
of the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Rule 16), or - FEGDI moved to dismiss the San Pedro case on grounds of litis
Or did it plead merely for reversion? -even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion pendentia, forum-shopping, lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
-Ans: The complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such for reconsideration; or FEGDI argues that a similar complaint was previously filed with the RTC
actions, over which the TC could have exercised jurisdiction. -even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement Biñan court. FEGDI also averred that the documents relied upon by the
-In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the thereof is found in the pleadings; or private respondents are of doubtful veracity and that they failed to pay the
complaint must contain the following allegations: -where a defendant has been declared in default. correct filing fees.
1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the - Judge Cabuco-Andres of San Pedro RTC denied FEGDI’s motion to
issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on dismiss, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. FEGDI filed a Petition
2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction
obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the established by the evidence. with the CA. CA ordered an RTO enjoining Cabuco-Andres.
plaintiff. Disposition Petition denied. CA resolution affirmed. Complaint dismissed - January 25, 1994: RTC Biñan case was dismissed without prejudice on
-In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and grounds of forum-shopping.
that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to prescription. Costs against petitioner.
bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab ISSUES
initio. COMMON PROVISIONS 1. WON Layos is guilty of forum-shopping.
-In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also Re parts of pleading 2. WON the San Pedro case has cause of action.
respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title
thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or HELD
erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. The complaint must FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. V CA 1. YES
allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to (CABUCO-ANDRES) Ratio
the disputed land: 265 SCRA 614 Reasoning Private respondents have indeed resorted to forum-shopping
(1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and in order to obtain a favorable decision. The pattern is undisputably
(2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.
KAPUNAN; December 16, 1996 revealed by the fact that after Felipe Layos instituted in 1992 a case for
-In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that injunction and damages with application for preliminary injunction in the
he had previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary, he NATURE RTC of Biñan, and after his prayer was denied in March 1993, he (and
acknowledged that the disputed island was public land, that it had never Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. other individuals) filed an identical complaint for injunction and damages
been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a with preliminary injunction in June 1993, this time with RTC San Pedro. An
homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. FACTS examination would show that the San Pedro complains is simply an
-Reversion? No. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares - Petitioner Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is the improved version of the Biñan complaint.
that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and residential - Respondents content that there is no identity of part-defendants since it
an action. A private person may not bring an action for reversion or any subdivision project which partly covers lands located in Biñan, Laguna. was FERC in the Biñan case and FEGDI in the San Pedro case. This is
other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its - December 29, 1992: Felipe Layos filed a Complaint for Injunction and unmeritorious, because FEGDI voluntarily submitted to the court’s
derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would again Damages with Application for Preliminary Injunction against Fil-Estate jurisdiction by filing its answer and expressly stating that it is the developer
form part of the public domain. Realty Corporation (FERC) with the RTC of Biñan. It alleged that Felipe
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 46

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of Southwoods, and not FERC. The Biñan court expressly recognized DBP v CA Reasoning
FEGDI as the defendant in the said case. The petitioners before the CA were the DBP, represented by Atty.
G.R. No. 147217
- The willful attempt by private respondent to obtain a preliminary Demosthenes Demecillo, the bank’s Branch Manager at Tagbilaran City,
injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same from the October 7, 2004 and Atty. Nilo Galorport, DBP’s deputized special sheriff. The certification
original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process. against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Demecillo only. Petitioners
SC-Administrative Circular 04-94: NATURE explained in their MFR that in the verification of the petition for certiorari,
Revised Circular 29-91 applies to and governs the filing of petitions petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA Atty. Demecillo stated under oath that he is the DBP’s incumbent Branch
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the DBP and Atty. Nilo Head and its duly authorized officer. They submitted a copy of a resolution
prevent the multiple filing of the petitions or complaints involving the Galorport passed by the DBP Board of Governors, authorizing Branch Heads of the
same issues in other tribunals. DBP to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping of all
The following requirements xxx shall be strictly complied with FACTS initiatory pleadings of the bank. What petitioners failed to explain,
in the filing of the complaints, petitions, applications or other - Bibiana Guerra de Azarcon, herein private respondent, and her late however, is their failure to attach a certified true copy of the resolution to
initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the SC xxx. husband Inocentes Azarcon, obtained a loan from PNB. As collateral, they their petition. Their omission is fatal to their case. Courts are not expected
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and mortgaged 2 lots with the bank. But they could not pay their loan. to take judicial notice of corporate board resolutions or a corporate
subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counter-claim, Asuncion Calceta told Bibiana that she is willing to pay their loan if Bibiana officer’s authority to represent a corporation. Petitioners’ failure to submit
cross-claim, third (fourth, etc) party complaint, or complaint-in- would mortgage the lots to her. Private respondents agreed. Asuncion proof that Atty. Demecillo has been authorized by the DBP to file the
intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his Calceta then made an initial payment of P273,000.00 to the PNB. The petition is a "sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof." Atty. Galorport
claim for relief. bank extended the redemption period to allow Asuncion to apply with the contends that the signature of Atty. Demecillo, representing the DBP, is
DBP a loan of P3.5M to be paid to the PNB. Private respondents executed sufficient since he and DBP are being sued jointly, they having a common
2. NO a simulated deed of sale of their lots in her favor to enable her to interest in the lots under litigation. His contention lacks merit. DBP is being
Ratio In the determination of WON the complaint states a cause of action, mortgage the same with the DBP. sued as a mortgagee, while he is impleaded as the bank’s deputized
the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered, they being - When the proceeds of the loan were released, Asuncion paid the PNB special sheriff who conducted the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
parts of the complaint. P900,000.00 representing the unpaid balance of respondents’ loan. mortgage. Their interests are not the same. The certification against forum
Reasoning The San Pedro case also did not state a cause of action. In However, she failed to pay her loan with the DBP, prompting the bank to shopping should be signed by all the petitioners in a case, and the signing
determining WON a complaint states a cause of action, only the foreclose the mortgage covering the 2 lots. After hearing private by only one of them is insufficient.
allegations in the complaint must be considered. The test if sufficiency of respondents’ application for preliminary injunction, the RTC issued an
the facts is WON admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid Order enjoining the DBP and Atty. Nilo Galorport, the bank’s deputized Disposition
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. special sheriff, from proceeding with the auction sale of the lots pending Petition is DENIED
- There is no cause of action because Layos’ claim on the land in question the final determination of the civil case wherein private respondents
is based on a fabricated document. The affidavit of self-adjudication is a prayed for annulment of the contract and the TCTs transferring title over
the lots to Asuncion Calceta. WEE V GALVEZ
vital part of the complaint that should be considered in the determination
of whether or not a cause of action exists. - DBP and Atty. Galorport filed an MFR but were denied by the RTC. 436 SCRA 96
- The land Psu-201 is an original survey for J. Reed located in Malate, Hence, they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging that in QUISUMBING; August 11, 2004
Manila, and Si-14769 is a survey number for the plan of a land parcel granting the injunctive relief in favor of private respondents, the RTC acted
situated in Bo. Bessang, Cagayan in the name of Gregorio Blanco with grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari NATURE
- However the CA and RTC limited itself to the allegations in the complaint for failure of one of the petitioners, Atty. Nilo Galorport to sign the Petition for review on certiorari
proper of the San Pedro case in concluding that said complaint stated a certification against forum shopping. The CA denied petitioners’ MFR, FACTS
cause of action. This is erroneous. holding that Atty. Demosthenes Demecillo, Branch Manager of the DBP at - Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are
- In the case of Marcopper Mining v Garcia, the RTC had the opportunity Tagbilaran City, failed to show that he is the bank’s authorized sisters. Rosemarie lives with husband Manuel in Bataan. Rosario lives in
to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the representative to file the petition for certiorari. New York, USA
petitioner’s answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for - They entered into an agreement whereby Rosario would send
admission. It was but logical for said court to consider all of these ISSUE Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to be deposited in a savings
pleadings in determining WON there was a sufficient cause of action in WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the account while the balance could be invested in the money market. The
the petitioner’s complaint. petition for certiorari interest to be earned therefrom would be given to Rosario's son, Manolito
- Regalado: The exception is provided in Sec. 2 Rule 9. It as also been Galvez, as his allowance
held that under this ground the trial court can consider all the pleadings HELD - In accordance with her agreement with Rosario, Rosemarie gave
filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. NO Manolito his monthly allowance ranging from P2,000 to P4,000 a month
Ratio from 1993 to January 1999. However, sometime in 1995, Rosario asked
DISPOSITION The certification against forum shopping is fatally defective, not having for the return of the US$20,000 and for an accounting. Rosemarie
The petition for review on certiorari is granted. Respondents’ complaint is been duly signed by both petitioners. This procedural flaw warrants the promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so. A written demand
dismissed. dismissal of the petition for certiorari. The certification against forum was sent to her. When Rosemarie did not comply, Rosario filed a suit
shopping must be signed by the principal parties. against her.
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- The Wees moved to dismiss the case based on the following grounds: 8, Section 133 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and forty-two and one-half feet on the side, and has rented a part thereof
(1) the lack of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for to other persons, and that when plaintiff discovered this anomaly and
compromise had been made in accordance with Article 1515 of the Family her claim. Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph violations of their verbal and initial agreement, defendant was told
Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being 9-A of the amended complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been sometime on October, 1945, to pay a monthly rental of fifty pesos (P50) a
premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a made but the same have failed" is clearly insufficient. The sentence is month, or vacate the lot in question. For the month of October, Baguiaro
compromise; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in paid only the sum of P25, leaving a balance of P25, and for subsequent
defective, having been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of months Baguiaro has refused and still refuses to pay the said rentals of
plaintiff. action, according to petitioners. fifty pesos (P50), or vacate the premises, in spite of repeated demands.
- Rosario amended her complaint to add that “Earnest efforts towards -Respondent rebuts by stating that the amended complaint as well as the -Prayer: defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of fifty pesos (P50) as
have been made but the same have failed” (mali talaga yung sinulat nila). annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety. Thus monthly rentals for the lot occupied by him of the property of herein
The trial court accepted the amended complaint and dismissed the Wee’s taken together, in their entirety, the amended complaint and the plaintiff, beginning with the month of October, 1945, or to vacate the lot in
motion to dismiss. Wee moved for an MFR. It was also denied. attachments to the original complaint, clearly show that a sufficient cause question, with costs against the defendant, and for such other and for
- The Wee couple brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a such other and further relief as this Honorable Court shall deem just and
civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. It was also denied. compromise have been made, according to respondent. equitable.
The Court of Appeals held that the complaint, as amended, sufficiently -A paragraph is "a distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed -Baguiaro filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no
stated a cause of action. It likewise held that the questioned certification composition that consists of from one to many sentences, forms a jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or suit, the action
against forum shopping appended thereto was not so defective as to rhetorical unit. As a "short composition consisting of a group of sentences being either for the collection of rentals of a real estate which do not reach
warrant the dismissal of the complaint. An MFR was filed but was likewise dealing with a single topic," a paragraph must necessarily be construed in to two hundred pesos (P200) or for ejectment from the premises in
denied. its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to be conveyed. jurisdiction over the subject of the litigation.
In the instant case, paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with -CFI motion to dismiss denied and sentencing Baguiaro either to pay two
ISSUE/S the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise hundred fifty pesos (P250) or to vacate the lot in question.
1. WON the certification of non-forum shopping executed by the between the parties. Hence, it is in this light that the defective lead -Petition for Certiorari on the ground the respondent judge acted without
plaintiff’s atty-in-fact is defective sentence must be understood or construed. jurisdiction over the subject matter in trying and deciding the case, and at
2. WON the amended complaint before the RTC states a cause of action -Having examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the the same time asked this Court to enjoin the respondent judge from taking
documents attached thereto, following the rule that documents attached to further action in the case during the pendency of this petition.
HELD a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading,
1. No we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action. ISSUE
Reasoning The Special Power of Attorney executed by her in favor of WON the court acted without jurisdiction
Grace Galvez, if subjected to careful scrutiny would clearly show that the Disposition Petition is denied.
authority given to the latter is not only broad but also all encompassing HELD
that it includes the power and authority to institute both civil and criminal BAGUIARO V. BARRIOS Yes, court acted without jurisdiction. It is an axiom, in civil procedure that if
actions. Corollary with this power is the authority to sign all papers, the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the
00SCRA 00
documents, and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the said law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of the plaintiff's
purpose. FERIA, 30 Aug. 1946 action, and that the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled based on the
facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
The SPA includes: FACTS demanded, is what determines the nature of the action. And that is the
1. To ask, demand and claim any sum of money that is duly [due] from any -Complaint filed on January 7, 1945, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo reason why it is generally added to prayers for relief, though not
person natural, juridical and/or corporation in the Philippines; by Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas against Baguiaro. necessary, the words "and for such other relief as the law warrants," or
2. To file criminal and/or civil complaints before the courts of justice in the -De Atas is the exclusive and absolute and registered owner of the others to the same effect. So if a plaintiff alleges, for instance, that the
Philippines to enforce my rights and interest[s]; following described property, situated in the City of Iloilo. The above lot, defendant owes the former a certain amount of money and did not pay it
3. To attend hearings and/or Preliminary Conference[s], to make without the improvements which were burned during the war, is assessed at the time stipulated, and prays that the defendant be sentenced to return
stipulations, adjust claims, to settle and/or enter into Compromise at P4,680. a certain personal property to the plaintiff, such prayer will not make or
Agreement[s], to litigate and to terminate such proceedings; [and] -That sometime in the month of July, 1946, Baguiaro verbally solicited the convert the action of recovery, of debt into one of recovery of personal
4. To sign all papers, documents and pleadings necessary for the permission of herein de Atas to construct a house of light materials on the property, and the court shall grant the proper relief, or sentence the
accomplishment of the above purposes. lot of some three brazas wide and three brazas long just enough for them defendant to pay his debt to the plaintiff.
to sleep, at a monthly rental of twenty pesos (P20), payable in advance, The attorney of the plaintiff, in his opposition to the defendant's motion to
2. YES and de Atas told Baguiaro that she would think the matter; she found out dismiss filed in the court below, and in his answer to the petition for
Ratio It is true that the lead sentence of paragraph 9-A, may be that defendant had already begun the construction of a nipa and bamboo certiorari in this Court, contends that the plaintiff's principal action is for
incomplete or even grammatically incorrect as there might be a missing house with no approval from her; breach of contract, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
word or phrase, but to our mind, a lacking word like "compromise" could -Instead of constructing a house of three brazas by three brazas as above Instance, because it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. There is no
be supplied by the rest of the paragraph. Baguiaro has built additions after additions to the house such that the such kind of action. Breach of contract may be the cause of action, but not
Reasoning Petitioners submit that the amended complaint violates Rule present house constructed is twenty-eight and one-half feet on the front the action or relief itself. According to our Civil Code, a breach of contract
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is accuse of action, either for specific performance, or performance, or one hundred and seventy-five pesos (P175), could the lower court have -Even where the defendant employs, e. g., violence in taking possession
rescission of the contract. As the plaintiff is entitled is entitled only to one sentenced the defendant to pay the amount claimed had the latter made a of the plaintiff's land, the law does not compel the latter to resort to the
of the two reliefs, if he prays that the defendants be sentenced to perform confession of judgment? summary remedy y furnished by Rule 72, section 1, just as it does not
the obligations imposed upon him by the contract the action is specific compel the plaintiff to file a criminal complaint for any criminal offense
performance, and if he prays that the contract be rescind the plaintiff's Disposition which the defendant may have committed with the use of such violence.
action is rescission. In contracts of lease of a real estate, if the lessee The respondent judge's decision in this case is set aside; with costs The law grants the plaintiff of remedies, as well as a choice of courts, so
violates the terms of the contract by his failure to pay the rent due or to against the respondent Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas. So ordered. long as he lays before the court of his choice the facts calling for a proper
comply with the conditions of the lease, and refuses to vacate or return exercise of its jurisdiction. So that an undisputed owner of land who, as
the possession of the property leased to the lessor notwithstanding PARAS, J., dissenting: such, is by law entitled to its possession, and who is deprived thereof, e..
demand to do so, the action is illegal detainer if filed within one year, and - The willingness of the plaintiff to let the defendant, herein petitioner g., by force, while entitled to the summary remedy afforded by Rule 72,
recovery or restoration of possession if filed after one year, from the Manuel Baguioro, retain possession of the land upon payment of the rent section 1, which according to said section he may resort to, is neither
demand. (which, plaintiff alleges, should be P50) is plainly repugnant to the theory compelled to bring his case thereunder, alleging the characteristic
That the prayer of relief in the complaint seems to convey the idea that the that the principal purpose of the action is ejectment of the defendant or, in circumstance of violence, lodging his action in the proper inferior court,
plaintiff would agree to let the defendant continue in possession if he pays the language of section 1 of Rule 72, "the restitution of possession." nor forbidden to seek redress from the proper Court of First Instance by
the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff, does not change the Upon the other hand, giving such reasonable intendments to the bringing his case under its general jurisdiction "in all civil actions which
nature of the action, since the court may only grant the proper relief allegations of the complaint as are consistent with and implied by the relief involve . . . the possession of real property . . .", waiving the effects of the
according to law, that is, the ejectment of the defendant and the payment sought, the action may be one for the enforcement of a lease contract — violence committed by the defendant as well as the summary remedy to
by the latter of the damages due for the occupation of the land, though the implied or otherwise — in which the court is asked to fix the amount of the which such characteristic circumstance may entitled, had simply alleging,
plaintiff is free to condone said payment. It is evident that the court can not rent for want of corresponding stipulation. The claim that the rent ought to as his cause of action, his ownership of the land, his right to its
authorize the defendant petitioner to continue in possession the land as be P50, when considered with the prayer "for such other and further relief possession and the fact that he has been deprived of such possession by
lessee if he pays the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff since as this Honorable Court shall deem just and equitable," merely invokes the defendant, regardless of the manner employed in such deprivation.
such continuation depends not only upon the plaintiff's will but also upon the discretion and judgment of the court regarding the righteousness of The same law which does not compel the owner to bring a criminal action
that of the defendant. A judgment authorizing the defendant to continue as said claim. by reason of such violence does not compel him to bring a forcible entry
lessee for a certain and definite period of time after the judgment, will not -While the complaint may be treated ;as one for simple ejectment, in the suit by reason thereof. And it would be to my mind scandalous to affirm in
bind the plaintiff to grant such lease nor the defendant to continue as light of some of its averments, the circumstance nevertheless does not a government of laws that in such circumstances the owner will be
lessee paying the monthly rental fixed by the court. A court cannot make prevent it from being an action — its denomination immaterial — that may prevented from bringing his case under the general jurisdiction of the
and impose a contract upon the parties. be filed originally in the Court of First Instance, in view of the other Court of First Instance of the province without invoking the characteristic
Even assuming, arguendo, that the complaint may contain two allegations and the prayer. In the latter situation, matters contained in the circumstance of violence. Of course, in an ordinary action commenced in
alternatives or independent actions, one of forcible entry and another for pleading which are not necessary to, or are incompatible with, the the Court of First Instance, he will not be entitled to the summary
recovery of rents or damages, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo has no jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance may be considered surplusage. proceedings, such as the immediate execution of the judgment, etc.,
jurisdiction to entertain either one or both. It has no jurisdiction over the The complaint might have been awkwardly drafted, but unless the provided for in Rule 72. So long as the plaintiff does not rely on any of the
action of forcible entry, for it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the defendant was actually misled to his surprise or injury, it should be held specific circumstances characterizing the action as one of forcible entry or
justice of the peace; nor over that of recovery of rents or damages, sufficient. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil., 504.) It is needless unlawful detainer, it cannot be said to be within the exclusive original
because the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint, which to state that the nature of an action is determined by its allegations and jurisdiction of the municipal or justice of the peace court, even within the
determines the court jurisdiction, is less than two hundred pesos (P200). prayer. As long as the complaint makes out a case cognizable by the first year following the accrual of the cause of action.
According to the complaint, the petitioner had occupied the lot in question Court of First Instance, the latter's jurisdiction will not be altered or taken
during the months of October, November, December and January when away simply because the action cannot prosper. The judgment in this CHINA BANKING CORP V MONDRAGON
the complaint was filed, and the total amount of rents or damages claimed case was rendered after the defendant had been declared in default.
INTERNATIONAL
as due for that occupation at the rate of fifty pesos (P50) a month, minus HILADO, J., dissenting:
the sum of twenty-five pesos (P25) which was paid on account of the rent -Liberally construed, as it should be (Rule 15, section 17), the plaintiff's G.R. No. 164798
for October, aggregate only one hundred and seventy-five pesos (P175). complaint is susceptible of two constructions: as a complaint in ejectment, PUNO; November 17, 2005
The fact that, in its judgment, the lower court has awarded the plaintiff the and as one aimed at invoking the general jurisdiction of the Court of First
sum of P250, including the rent for February, and not the P25 paid on Instance in actions for possession of real property, as regards the NATURE
account by the petitioner for the month of October as alleged in the same plaintiff's land under section 56, paragraph 2, of Act No. 136. In choosing Petition for certiorari
complaint, did not confer upon the court jurisdiction over the case. If the between these two constructions in justice to the learning and intelligence
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter according to the of counsel for the plaintiff, it seems to me that the court should have had FACTS
allegations in the complaint, it can not acquire it just because the rents no difficulty in concluding that he meant and intended to resort to the latter - In 1994, respondent Mondragon International Philippines, Incorporated
claimed and those that may accrue during the pendency of the suit may procedure, as he should be presumed to know such an elemental rule as (MIPI), entered into a Lease Agreement with Clark Development
amount to a sum within its jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would lead to the that which confers upon the municipal or justice of the peace court Corporation (Clark)to develop the 232-hectare Mimosa Leisure Estate.
absurdity that the jurisdiction of the court depends not upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases They also entered into supplemental lease agreements to develop other
allegations in the complaint, but upon a contingency which may or may within the first year following the accrual of the cause of action. additional areas. Part of the funds used for these projects was generated
not arise or occur. As the damages claimed in the complaint amounted to from loans obtained from petitioner China Banking Corporation (CBC). To
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secure these loans, MIPI executed promissory notes in favor of CBC. In ratified Ms. German’s authority. Though the wording of the board a compulsory and a permissive counterclaim is vital in the application of
addition, respondent Antonio U. Gonzales executed a Surety Agreement resolution leaves much to be desired, it remains equally susceptible of the circular. The Court explained:
in favor of CBC in the amount of P100M. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis interpretation in favor of Ms. German’s preexisting status as an authorized It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular
transpired. The ensuing shock to the Philippine economy affected MIPI’s signatory. aptly taken, to sustain the view that the circular in question has not,
ability to pay its obligations to CBC. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its
- In 2000, CBC filed a complaint for a sum of money with RTC Makati City very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as
against MIPI and Mr. Gonzales. The certification of forum shopping was CRUZ-AGANA V LAGMAN deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can
attached to the complaint. It was to the effect that: MERCEDES E. only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain
G.R. No. 139018
GERMAN, the Manager of Loans & Discounts Dept of the China Banking outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where
Corp certified that the defendant China Bank has not commenced any CARPIO; April 11, 2005 the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso in
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the SC, CA or the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
before any other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of her knowledge, NATURE Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule
no such action or proceeding is pending, and that if a similar action or Petition for certiorari “shall not be curable by mere amendment xxx but shall be cause for
proceeding has been filed or is pending before SC, CA or any other the dismissal of the case without prejudice,” being predicated on the
tribunal or agency, she undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days. FACTS applicability of the need for a certification against forum-shopping,
- In 2001, MIPI and Gonzales filed MTD on the ff. grounds: [1] the - On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Complaint for annulment of title with obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently
complaint failed to comply with the requirements set forth under SC prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent. Petitioner set up.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is the sole owner - The Court reiterated this ruling in Ponciano v. Judge Parentela, Jr.
of Civil Procedure as regards certifications against forum shopping; and of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3907. Petitioner - Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory
[2] there was noncompliance with a condition precedent for the filing of the further claims that the lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who counterclaims. The circular applies to initiatory and similar pleadings. A
case and/or the same failed to state a cause of action or was premature later on transferred the lot to respondent. compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an “initiatory” or
- RTC denied MTD and MFR of MIPI and Gonzales. CA granted the - Respondent seasonably filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim. similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff’s complaint. A
petition for certiorari and reversed RTC. CA ruled that CBC failed to Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent’s counterclaim for lack of a respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the
comply with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of certificate of non-forum shopping. moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise, respondent waives the
Civil Procedure as there was nothing in the records showing that the - In an Order dated 11 March 1999, the trial court denied petitioner’s compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim is a
signatory of the certification against forum shopping was authorized by motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaim. The trial court reasoned reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory
CBC. It referred to the Corporation Code and jurisprudence which state that respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory and therefore excluded from pleading which is the complaint.
that corporations exercise their corporate powers through their board of the coverage of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved - Petitioner’s counsel fails or simply refuses to accept the distinction
directors and no person can bind the corporation without authority from that the trial court reconsider its Order invoking the mandatory nature of a between a permissive counterclaim and a compulsory counterclaim. This
the latter. CA denied CBC’s MFR. Hence, the present petition. certificate of non-forum shopping under Supreme Court Administrative distinction was the basis for the ruling in Santo Tomas and Ponciano.
Circular No. 04-94. On 25 May 1999, the trial court reversed its 11 March The sole issue for resolution in the present case is whether respondent’s
ISSUE 1999 Order and dismissed respondent’s counterclaim for lack of a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. If it is a permissive
WON CBC’s failure to attach the requisite board resolution making Ms. certificate of non-forum shopping. counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is fatal. If it
German an authorized signatory of certifications against forum shopping - Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that is a compulsory counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum
was a fatal error and cannot be rectified by subsequent submission Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory shopping is immaterial.
thereof. counterclaims following the ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. - A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a
Surla. On 4 June 1999, the trial court again reversed itself and recalled its defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of
HELD Order dismissing respondent’s counterclaim. The trial court ruled that the suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction
NO filing of a compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non- or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s complaint.[9] It is
Ratio The Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule forum shopping. compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does
requiring the submission of these certifications and has applied the rule of not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances with respect to the ISSUE court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set
contents of the certification. If the belated filing of the certification against WON a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer can be dismissed up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other
forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings is allowed, with on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum counterclaim is permissive.
more reason should the Court sanction the timely submission of such shopping - Respondent’s counterclaim as set up in its answer states:
certification though the proof of the signatory’s authority was submitted 3. That because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts
thereafter. HELD of the plaintiff, herein defendant has suffered and continue to suffer
Reasoning The court has used the doctrine of stare decisis to enunciate NO actual damages in the sum of at least P400,000,000.00 which the
this principle. The ff. cases were cited as authority: Shipside Incorporated - Santo Tomas clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 with law, equity, and justice require that to be paid by the plaintiff and
v. CA, Ateneo De Naga University v. Manalo, and, Pascual & Santos Inc respect to counterclaims. The Court pointed out that this circular is further to reimburse the attorney’s fees of P2,000,000.00;
v. Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association . At the meeting of CBC’s intended primarily to cover “an initiatory pleading or an incipient - It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from the
Board of Directors, the Board, in a resolution, approved, confirmed and application of a party asserting a claim for relief.” The distinction between filing of plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the
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main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The between the parties. Hence, it is in this light that the defective lead
counterclaim will require a re-litigation of the same evidence if the HELD sentence must be understood or construed.
counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a separate action. Even petitioner YES. -Having examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the
recognizes that respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory. A compulsory Reasoning. In Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the documents attached thereto, following the rule that documents attached to
counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because Court elaborated on this established standard in the following manner: a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading,
a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading. 'The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action.
of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all
Disposition The decision petition is denied. the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a
petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the
Re Efect of Failure to Plead
Re manner of making allegations facts alleged, the court can render a valid Judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer thereof. CEREZO V. TUAZON
PERPETUAL SAVINGS V FAJARDO - In its Decision, CA said, among other the that petitioner Bank's (supra)
complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents Fajardo and
223 SCRA 720 Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities for the reason that. NATURE
FELICIANO; June28,1993 no evidence had been presented to support such alleged liability on the Petition for review on certiorari
"so called alternative cause of action."
FACTS: -The SC held that the CA was in reversible error. It was quite premature FACTS
-J.J. Mining and Exploration Corporation ("J.J. Mining") executed and for the Court of Appeals to consider evidence (or lack of evidence) outside -Bus collided with tricycle
delivered to petitioner Perpetual Savings ("Bank") a promisory note in the the complaint since the trial had not yet started. The allegations made by
amount of P750.000.00 payable in one lump sum upon maturity with the bank could be proven on trial. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
interest at 23% per annum. The note also contained, inter alia, a clause When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a
providing for penalty interest at the rate of 3% , nor month on the amount WEE V GALVEZ motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court,
due, compounded monthly. The promisory note was executed for J.J. and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
(supra)
Mining by respondents Jose Oro B. Fajardo and Emmanuel F. Del negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
Mande. Messrs. Fajardo and Del Mundo are said to be officers of J.J. himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who
Mining. FACTS seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
Upon maturity of the promissory note, neither J.J. Mining nor anyone else -this is regards the sisters, one in US and one in RP who is taking care of remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for
paid the amount of the indebtedness, notwithstanding petitioner's the son of the sister in US. Allowance issues… relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which has been lost thru
repeated written demands for payment. inexcusable negligence.
-petitioner Bank filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, ON MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS Reasoning there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
against J.J; Mining, Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni and herein respondents etitioners submit that the amended complaint violates Rule 8, Section 133 negligence that prevented Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a motion for
Fajardo and Del Mundo, for collection of the amounts due under the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct new trial or a petition for certiorari. It was error for her to avail of a petition
promissory note statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim. for relief from judgment.After the SC’s resolution denying Mrs. Cerezo’s
-Defendant's Fajardo and Del Mundo were impleaded as agents/or Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A of the petition for relief became final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch
representatives of Defendant Corporation who were signatories in the amended complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
Promissory Note or alternatively, in their personal capacities “if it be same have failed" is clearly insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus annulment of the judgment of the trial court. Annulment is available only
shown that they contracted the loan fully knowing that the Defendant requires the reader of the pleading to engage in deductions or inferences on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on
Corporation would be unable to pay the same upon maturity, and/or that in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from its
they used the proceeds of the loan foe their own personal benefit” petitioners. discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel
-Respondent Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the -Respondent rebuts by stating that the amended complaint as well as the bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such fraud was
ground that the complaint had failed to stated cause of action against annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety. Thus used as a ground, or could have been used as a ground, in a motion for
them. RTC denied motion to dismiss. Fajardo and Del Mundo raised the taken together, in their entirety, the amended complaint and the new trial or petition for relief from judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack
case to the SC but SC referred case to CA. Respondents Fajardo and Del attachments to the original complaint, clearly show that a sufficient cause of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud, was her ground for filing the petition for
Mundo, basically alleged that petitioner Bank's complaint did not set forth of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a annulment of judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of
any cause of action as against them personally, and that Section 13, Rule compromise have been made, according to respondent. annulment of judgment under Rule only if the ordinary remedies of new
3 of the Rules of Court on alternative defendants was not applicable to the -A paragraph is "a distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
case at bar. CA granted motion of Fajardo and Del Mundo composition that consists of from one to many sentences, forms a remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. Mrs.
rhetorical unit. As a "short composition consisting of a group of sentences Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own
ISSUE dealing with a single topic," a paragraph must necessarily be construed in fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief, which
WON complaint of Perpetual Savings stated a cause of action against its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to be conveyed. was denied with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the
respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, as distinguished from J.J. Mining, In the instant case, paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with remedy of annulment.
on whose behalf they had purported to act. the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise Disposition PETITION DENIED.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 51

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- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave - Prior to the present rule on default introduced by the 1997 Rules of
SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS VS RTC (HON. abuse of discretion committed by the trial court amounting to lack of Civil Procedure, as amended, Section 1 of the former Rule 18 on default is
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders, declaring them in default and denying silent on whether or not there is need for a notice of a motion to declare
EMMANUEL C. CARPIO) their Opposition to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company’s (Metrobank) defendant in default. The Court then ruled that there is no need. However,
G.R. NO. 153696 Motion to Declare them in Default; and the Orders denying their Motion to the present rule expressly requires that the motion of the claiming party
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ: September 11, 2006 Lift the Order of Default and their Motion for Reconsideration. should be with notice to the defending party. The purpose of a notice of a
- CA denied the petition for lack of merit and accordingly dismissed the motion is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to
same. The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners. It also ruled study and meet the arguments. The notice of a motion is required when
NATURE: that for an order of default to be set aside, petitioners must have a the party has the right to resist the relief sought by the motion and
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court meritorious defense or that something could be gained by having the principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without
order of default set aside an opportunity to be heard.
FACTS: - The CA further found unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that - Therefore, as the present rule on default requires the filing of a motion
- On January 3, 2001, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or they were declared in default without giving them ample time to file an and notice of such motion to the defending party, it is not enough that the
"Metrobank") filed a complaint for sum of money against spouses opposition to Metrobank’s Motion to Declare them in Default; that under defendant failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period to
Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (or "petitioners") before the Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that the court shall, be a sufficient ground for declaration in default.
Regional Trial Court of Davao City. upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party in
- On January 22, 2001, petitioners were served with the summons, default, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default; Disposition. Petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
together with a copy of the complaint. As petitioners failed to file an and that since it is clear from the records that the reglementary period for of Appealsis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of Default of the
answer within the reglementary period, Metrobank, on February 8, 2001, filing an answer had expired with no responsive pleading filed by Regional Trial Court is SET ASIDE and the Answer filed by petitioners is
filed a motion to declare them in default. The motion was set for hearing petitioners, the trial court had properly declared them in default. The CA deemed ADMITTED. The trial court is DIRECTED to continue with
on February 16, 2001. further declared that even assuming that the trial court committed a deliberate speed with the proceedings in the case below.
- Acting on the motion, the lower court, presided over by Hon. procedural lapse in declaring petitioners in default before the scheduled
Emmanuel C. Carpio (or "respondent judge"), issued an order dated hearing of Metrobank’s motion, such error is not so serious as to SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS VS RTC (HON. EMMANUEL C.
February 12, 2001 declaring petitioners in default and setting the ex-parte constitute grave abuse of discretion. CARPIO)
presentation of Metrobank?s evidence on March 7, 2001. G.R. NO. 153696
- On February 15, 2001, petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank’s ISSUE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ: September 11, 2006
motion to declare them in default, claiming that upon receipt of the 1. WON LITIS PENDENTIA raised by petitioners as an affirmative defense
summons, they immediately sought the services of Atty. Philip Pantojan is a meritorious defense.
but it was only on February 12, 2001 that they were able to meet with Atty. NATURE:
Pantojan. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned in law", they were HELD: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
unaware "of the consequences of delay in the filing of their answer." 1. YES
- On the same date, February 15, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to Reasoning Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: FACTS:
admit answer, as well as the answer. In an order dated February 16, 2001, Sec. 3. Default; declaration of If the defending party fails to answer within - On January 3, 2001, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or
respondent judge disregarded petitioners’ opposition to Metrobank’s the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming "Metrobank") filed a complaint for sum of money against spouses
motion for default party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (or "petitioners") before the
- On February 19, 2001, Metrobank filed an opposition to petitioners’ the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
motion to admit answer, arguing that said motion was rendered moot and render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may - On January 22, 2001, petitioners were served with the summons,
academic by the February 12, 2001 order. Metrobank also chided warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit together with a copy of the complaint. As petitioners failed to file an
petitioners for violating the three-day notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of answer within the reglementary period, Metrobank, on February 8, 2001,
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In an order dated February 20, 2001, court. filed a motion to declare them in default. The motion was set for hearing
the motion to admit answer was denied. - Clearly, there are three requirements which must be complied with by on February 16, 2001.
- On February 27, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in - Acting on the motion, the lower court, presided over by Hon.
default; Metrobank opposed the motion. default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to Emmanuel C. Carpio (or "respondent judge"), issued an order dated
- On March 2, 2001, respondent judge issued an order holding in declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be February 12, 2001 declaring petitioners in default and setting the ex-parte
abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of notified of the motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must presentation of Metrobank?s evidence on March 7, 2001.
petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default. prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period - On February 15, 2001, petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank’s
- On March 5, 2001, respondent judge issued an order denying provided by the Rule. motion to declare them in default, claiming that upon receipt of the
petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception of - In filing motions, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, specifically summons, they immediately sought the services of Atty. Philip Pantojan
Metrobank’s evidence on March 7, 2001, as previously scheduled. On that provides: but it was only on February 12, 2001 that they were able to meet with Atty.
date (March 7, 2001), Metrobank presented its evidence and the case was Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act Pantojan. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned in law", they were
submitted for decision. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the March upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written unaware "of the consequences of delay in the filing of their answer."
5, 2001 order but their motion was denied. motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 52

Avena
- On the same date, February 15, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to Reasoning Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: NATURE
admit answer, as well as the answer. In an order dated February 16, 2001, Sec. 3. Default; declaration of If the defending party fails to answer within Petition for a writ of certiorari to set aside certain orders of the CFI
respondent judge disregarded petitioners’ opposition to Metrobank’s the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming dismissing a complaint for breach of contract and damages, denying
motion for default party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare reconsideration, refusing to admit an amended complaint, and declaring
- On February 19, 2001, Metrobank filed an opposition to petitioners’ the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to the dismissal final and unappealable.
motion to admit answer, arguing that said motion was rendered moot and render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may
academic by the February 12, 2001 order. Metrobank also chided warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit FACTS
petitioners for violating the three-day notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of - Petitioner, actress Dauden-Hernaez, files a complaint to recover P14,700
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In an order dated February 20, 2001, court. (the balance allegedly due to her for her services as leading actress), plus
the motion to admit answer was denied. - Clearly, there are three requirements which must be complied with by damages, against private respondents Hollywood Far East Productions
- On February 27, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in (HFEP) and its President Valenzuela
default; Metrobank opposed the motion. default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to - Upon motion of defendants, respondent court dismissed the complaint
- On March 2, 2001, respondent judge issued an order holding in declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be because “claim of plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document,
abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of notified of the motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must either public or private”, and the complaint was “Defective on its face” for
petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default. prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period violating CC A 1356 and 135811, as well as for containing defective allege,
- On March 5, 2001, respondent judge issued an order denying provided by the Rule. petitions.
petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception of - In filing motions, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, specifically - Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the dismissal, and for admission of an
Metrobank’s evidence on March 7, 2001, as previously scheduled. On that provides: amended complaint, attached to the motion
date (March 7, 2001), Metrobank presented its evidence and the case was Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act - court denied the reconsideration and the leave to amend.
submitted for decision. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the March upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written - a second reconsideration was filed
5, 2001 order but their motion was denied. motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. - court denied it as its allegations were more or less the same as the first
- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave - Prior to the present rule on default introduced by the 1997 Rules of motion, and not accompanied by an affidavit of merits. The court further
abuse of discretion committed by the trial court amounting to lack of Civil Procedure, as amended, Section 1 of the former Rule 18 on default is declared the dismissal final and unappealable.
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders, declaring them in default and denying silent on whether or not there is need for a notice of a motion to declare - hence this petition
their Opposition to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company’s (Metrobank) defendant in default. The Court then ruled that there is no need. However, - the respondent court’s defense: The proposed amendment suffers from
Motion to Declare them in Default; and the Orders denying their Motion to the present rule expressly requires that the motion of the claiming party the same vital defect of the original complaint, which is violation of A 1356
Lift the Order of Default and their Motion for Reconsideration. should be with notice to the defending party. The purpose of a notice of a because the contract sued upon was not alleged to be in writing, and A
- CA denied the petition for lack of merit and accordingly dismissed the motion is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to 1358 in because the writing was absolute and indispensable because the
same. The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners. It also ruled study and meet the arguments. The notice of a motion is required when amount exceeds P500; and that the second motion for reconsideration did
that for an order of default to be set aside, petitioners must have a the party has the right to resist the relief sought by the motion and not interrupt the period for appeal because it was not served on 3 days’
meritorious defense or that something could be gained by having the principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without notice.
order of default set aside an opportunity to be heard.
- The CA further found unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that - Therefore, as the present rule on default requires the filing of a motion
they were declared in default without giving them ample time to file an and notice of such motion to the defending party, it is not enough that the ISSUES
opposition to Metrobank’s Motion to Declare them in Default; that under defendant failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period to
11 Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that the court shall, be a sufficient ground for declaration in default.
requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party in
valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases,
default, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default; Disposition. Petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
the right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised.
and that since it is clear from the records that the reglementary period for of Appealsis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of Default of the
filing an answer had expired with no responsive pleading filed by Regional Trial Court is SET ASIDE and the Answer filed by petitioners is
petitioners, the trial court had properly declared them in default. The CA deemed ADMITTED. The trial court is DIRECTED to continue with Article 1358. The following must appear in a public document: (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation,
further declared that even assuming that the trial court committed a deliberate speed with the proceedings in the case below. transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein

procedural lapse in declaring petitioners in default before the scheduled are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405; (2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the
hearing of Metrobank’s motion, such error is not so serious as to conjugal partnership of gains; (3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act appearing
constitute grave abuse of discretion.
STRIKING OUT PLEADINGS or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person; (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding

from an act appearing in a public document.


ISSUE:
1. WON LITIS PENDENTIA raised by petitioners as an affirmative defense DAUDEN-HERNAEZ V ANGELES, HOLLYWOOD
is a meritorious defense. FAR EAST PRODUCTIONS, INC., and VALENZUELA All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one. But sales

of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405. (1280a)
27 SCRA 1276
HELD:
1. YES
REYES, J.B.L.; April 30, 1969
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 53

Avena
1. WON the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled as of right to amend the petitioner called by PNB and the further sum of P351,517.57 representing abuse of discretion in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 31483. Nevertheless,
original dismissed complaint various fees and charges; (v) PII refused to settle said obligations; (vi) in the higher interest of substantial justice and pursuant to the
2. WON xxx respondents Solid and PBAC also refused to pay petitioner despite hornbook doctrine that procedural laws may be applied
demand. retroactively, 16 the Court gives due course to the present petition .
HELD Respondent BF Homes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
1.YES ground that it is undergoing rehabilitation receivership in the SEC and (2) YES. It should be stressed that the amendment of the complaint was
Reasoning Twhen a court sustains a demurrer or motion to dismiss, the pursuant to P.D. 902-A, the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. sought after petitioner had already presented evidence, more specifically,
court must give the party plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint if Respondent PII also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the the testimony of petitioner's Treasury Department Manager and a debit
he so chooses. The first order of dismissal did not provide that the same complaint states no cause of action. The other respondents filed their memo from the PNB proving that petitioner had paid the PNB in the
was without prejudice to amendment of the complaint, or reserve to the respective responsive pleadings. amount of P19,035,256.57 pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to
plaintiff the right to amend his complaint, so the order was erroneous. The trial court, through Judge Roberto M. Lagman, issued an respondent PII.
Hence, petitioner was within her rights in filing her so-called second Order suspending the case only as against respondent BF Homes and
motion for reconsideration, which was actually a first motion against the denying respondent PII's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, hearing on the The record shows that respondents did not raise any objection when it
refusal to admit the amended complaint. merits ensued. presented evidence to prove payment to PNB. Hence, as provided for in
Also, since a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading, the plaintiff- During trial, petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo, its Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, when issues not raised
petitioner was entitled as of right to amend the original dismissed treasury department manager, who testified that the amount of by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
complaint. Paeste v Jaurigue: P19,035,256.57 was paid by petitioner to the PNB through the account of they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
“Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally the National Treasury to cover the principal loan and interests incurred by pleadings. A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by respondents reveal that
PII. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to none of them denied petitioner's claim that said evidence was presented
allowed in the furtherance of justice. (Torres vs. Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913).
Conform to Evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules before the trial court without objections having been raised by
Moreover, under section 1 of Rule 17, Rules of Court, a party may amend
of Court, seeking to amend the pertinent portions of the complaint insofar respondents. None of them claimed that they raised any objections at the
his pleading once as a matter of course, that is, without leave of court, at
as it refers to the fact of payment and the amount paid by petitioner to time when petitioner presented its evidence to prove its payment to PNB.
any time before a responsive pleading is served. A motion to dismiss is
PNB. Respondents Pilar and Aguirre admitted the presentation of the said
not a "responsive pleading". (Moran on the Rules of Court, vol. 1, 1952,
Acting on the motion to amend, the trial court, at that time evidence.
ed., p. 376). As plaintiffs amended their complaint before it was answered,
presided by Judge Joselito J. Dela Rosa, issued the assailed Order,
the motion to admit the amendment should not have been denied.”
dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure of the Respondents contend that since they had already alleged the failure of
Disposition The order dismissing the complaint is set aside, and the case
complaint to state a cause of action, thus in effect, reversing the Order the complaint to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense in their
is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not at
issued by Judge Lagman five years earlier. Petitioner's motion for answer, there was no further need for them to raise an objection at the
variance with this decision.
reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied by Judge de la Rosa. time the evidence was introduced. This is not plausible. It is settled that
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for even if the complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial
PHILIPPINE EXPORT vs. PHILIPPINE certiorari against the trial court. The SC issued referred the case to the thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient
INFRASTRUCTURES, INC. Court of Appeals for disposition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it
G.R. No. 120384 petition and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this intended to allege in the original complaint, and the defendant
petition. voluntarily produces witnesses to meet the cause of action thus
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 13, 2004 established, an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it
ISSUES: (1) WON an order dismissing a petition without prejudice should had been previously joined by the most perfect pleadings. Likewise,
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) be appealed by way of ordinary appeal; (2) WON the Court of Appeals when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money petitioner failed to state a cause of action for not alleging loss or actual been raised in the pleadings.
against respondents Philippine Infrastructures, Inc. (PII), Philippine British payment made by it to PNB under its guarantees; (3) WON the complaint
Assurance Co., Inc. (PBAC), The Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid), B.F. Homes, stated a cause of action. Respondents' failure to object to the evidence at the time it is presented in
Inc. (BF Homes), Pilar Development Corporation (PDC) and Tomas B. court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever perceived defect the
Aguirre (Aguirre). The complaint alleged, among others, that: (i) petitioner HELD: complaint had was cured by the introduction of petitioner's evidence
issued 5 Letters of Guarantee in favor of the Philippine National Bank proving actual loss sustained by petitioner due to payment made by it to
(PNB) as security for credit accommodations extended by PNB to PII; (ii) (1) NO (under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Prior to the 1997 Rules PNB.
PII, BF Homes, PDC and Aguirre executed a Deed of Undertaking binding of Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an action may be appealed by
themselves, jointly and severally, to pay or reimburse petitioner upon ordinary appeal. However, under Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules (3) YES. Petitioner's cause of action against respondents stemmed from
demand such amount of money or to repair the damages, losses or of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an the obligation of respondents under their Deed of Undertaking, a copy of
penalties which petitioner may pay or suffer on account of its guarantees; action without prejudice. It may be subject of a special civil action for which was attached to the complaint. In the present petition, petitioner had
(iii) on April 24, 1985, PNB called on the guarantees of petitioner; (iv) certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Considering become liable to pay the amounts covered by said guarantees when, as
thereafter, petitioner demanded from PII the immediate settlement of that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated in the original complaint alleges, the PNB called upon said guarantees.
P20,959,529.36, representing the aggregate amount of the guarantees of 1994, respondent appellate court could not have committed any grave Respondents' obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 54

Avena
free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as plaintiff did not become the owner of the claims until after the original SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; Nov. 29, 2005
soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for complaint was filed on October 24, 1935. The CFI granted the MTD.
petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action
NATURE
against respondents. The mere inclusion in petitioner's original complaint ISSUE
Petition for review on certiorari assailing decision and resolution of the CA
of the allegation that the PNB had already called on the guarantees of 1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint
petitioner is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents.
FACTS
Clearly therefore, the original complaint, by itself, stated a valid cause of HELD
- Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a lot in Batangas.
action. 1. NO.
- MMCI. filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of petitioners’ title
Ratio Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the
and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction, alleging that
DISPOSITIVE: The petition is GRANTED. Let the original records of Civil time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by
“without any color of right and through dubious means,” petitioners were
Case No. 86-38169 be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court (Branch the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a
able to obtain original title in their names.
29), Manila, for continuation of the trial on the merits. supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such later accrued
- Spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it does not state a
cause of action is not permissible.
cause of action. They averred that respondent is a private corporation,
Reasoning Subject to certain qualifications and except as otherwise
SURIGAO MINING V HARRIS hence, disqualified under the Constitution from acquiring public alienable
provided by law, an action commenced before the cause of action has
68 PHIL 113 lands except by lease, and cannot be considered a real party in interest.
accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed, provided, an
- RTC granted motion to dismiss.
LAUREL; May 17, 1939 objection on this ground is properly and seasonably interposed. The fact
- MMCI filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to file an
that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while
amended complaint for quieting of title. Respondent alleged that the
NATURE it is pending is of no moment.
technical description in petitioners’ title does not cover the disputed lot.
Appeal from the order of the CFI of Surigao dismissing the complaint filed - In this case, timely objection was made by counsel for the appellees
- Spouses filed their opposition, contending that the amended complaint
by Surigao Mining against Harris, et al. upon discovery of the immaturity of the action. The date when a civil
does not also state a cause of action and if admitted, respondent’s theory
action is deemed commenced is determined by section 389 of the Code of
of the case is substantially modified.
FACTS Civil Procedure. Under section 389, which was taken from section 405 of
- RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
- On October 24, 1935, Surigao Mining filed a complaint claiming that it is the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the action is deemed
- Petitioners filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and
the owner by purchase of 14 placer claims and that lode claims were commenced upon the "filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the
prohibition, alleging that the amended complaint does not cure the defect
staked by the defendants Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate. court in which the action is to be instituted." The original complaint was
in the original complaint which does not state a cause of action.
Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., and Otto Weber on plaintiff's placer filed on October 24, 1935.
- CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners filed a
claims after the latter had been validly and duly staked and located by the - The right to amend a pleading is not an absolute and unconditional right.
motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
plaintiff or its grantors and predecessors in interest. It is to be allowed in furtherance of justice under a sound judicial
- On November 23, 1935, the defendants demurred to the complaint on discretion. This judicial discretion, upon the other hand, is of course not
ISSUE
the ground that the complaint was ambiguous and unintelligible. On without any restriction. The cause of action must exist at the time the
WON the CA erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave
January 9, 1936 the CFI entered an order requiring Surigao Mining to action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
amend its complaint so as to contain a detailed description of its placer introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was
respondent’s amended complaint
claims. commenced. As soon as an action is brought and the complaint is filed,
- On January 13, 1936 an amended complaint was filed to which another the proceedings thus initiated are not subject to the arbitrary control of the
HELD
demurrer was interposed but was overruled. On June 11, 1936, a third parties or of the court, but must be dealt with in accordance with
NO
amended complaint in which thirty-two other individuals were included as recognized rules of pleading and practice. Amendments must be such,
- Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 12 shows that
parties-defendant. In this third amended complaint the placer claims were and only such, as are necessary to promote the completion of the action
before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the absolute
reduced, to eleven, and the relief prayed for was about the same as that begun.
right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action
asked in the original complaint, although the amount sought as damages - It is true, that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the
or change in theory is introduced.
was increased to P49,000. place of the originals which are thereby regarded as abandoned. That,
- Petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original
- Exhibits O and O-1 to 0-9 were presented. With the exception of Exhibit however, which is no cause of action whatsoever cannot by amendment
complaint. What they filed was a motion to dismiss, which is not a
O-7, all are deeds of sale in favor of Surigao Mining covering the placer or supplemental pleading be converted into a cause of action: Nihil do re
responsive pleading as contemplated by the Rule. Thus respondent, as a
claims and bear dates posterior to (AFTER) October 24, 1935, the date of accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jua accresceret habet.
plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint
the filing of the original complaint. Exhibit O-7 is a deed of sale executed Disposition Order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet
by Pablo Atillo in favor of Maximo Borromeo on January 23, 1935. The
final, as in this case.
mining claims conveyed by Maximo Borromeo, to Surigao Mining under Filing/ Service of pleadings,
Exhibit O-9 were the same claims acquired by Maximo Borromeo, under
Exhibit O-7.
judgments and other papers
- Before Surigao Mining could close its evidence, the defendants moved 12 “SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that, when the action was BAUTISTA V MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES INC responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.”
commenced, plaintiff's right of action had not yet accrued, since the G.R. No. 148361
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- As to petitioners’ contention that MMCI is barred from acquiring the petitioner, the copy of the decision mailed to him by registered mail considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged
subject lot, suffice it to say that this is a matter of defense which can only although returned unserved is sufficient to serve as notice to him and to that the respondents abused their discretion.
be properly determined during the full-blown trial of the instant case. his client following Sec. 5 of Rule 13 of RoC; it was the duty of petitioner
Dispositive Petition DENIED. CA decision affirmed in toto. to notify the court that Atty. Aquino was no longer its lawyer; if a lawyer is Disposition Petition is dismissed.
going to withdraw as counsel for his client, he should file a motion to
GCP-MANNY TRANSPORT SERVICES INC. V. withdraw as such with the conformity of the client. COMPUTATION OF TIME
PRINCIPE ISSUE/S
GR No. 141484 WON CA decision should be reversed SPS. CONRADO and MA. CORONA ROMERO vs.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; Nov 11, 2005 CA, SATURNINO S. ORDEN
HELD G.R. No. 142406
NATURE NO
- Clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; May 16, 2005
Petition for review on certiorari
case. If it were otherwise, and a lawyer’s mistake or negligence was
admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to NATURE
FACTS
litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or Petition for certiorari filed [R65]
- This petition is filed by GCP, seeking reversal of CA decision.
- The case started when Recolizado filed complaint for damages for experienced. The only exception to the general rule is when the counsel’s
actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client. In FACTS
physical injuries sustained by him as passenger of GCP’s bus. RTC
this case, while Atty. Aquino, counsel of petitioner, was far from being - Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell
rendered decision in favor of Recolizado.
vigilant in protecting the interest of his client, his infractions cannot be said with private respondent Saturnino Orden.
- Copy of decision sent to petitioner was returned because it had “moved”
to have deprived petitioner of due process. - In said contract, Orden proposed to purchase from Romero and her
(residence), while copy sent to Atty. Aquino, then petitioner’s counsel, was
- Petitioner was able to actively participate in the proceedings a quo. siblings a property located at Denver cor. New York Sts., Cubao, QC for
returned “unserved” being unclaimed. Petitioner states that copy of
While it may have lost its right to appeal, it was not denied its day in the total amount of P17M.
decision was personally delivered by Civil Docket Clerk of TC on Atty.
court. Right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process but - The contract stipulated that private respondent shall pay petitioner the
Aquino who refused to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel
only a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale, the
for petitioner, although no notice of withdrawal as counsel was filed by
accordance with the provisions of law. balance of P10M not later than December 19, 1996 and that Orden shall
him.
- When petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property.
- Private respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment, copy
to overturn well-settled jurisprudence. - When Orden failed to pay the down payment, petitioner Corona told him
furnished to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino and petitioner which the court granted.
- Petitioner was wanting in all these areas. Not only did it fail to regularly that she was rescinding the contract to sell.
Writ of execution was issued, which petitioner received.
check on the status of the case, it also failed to ensure that it could be - Orden then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
- Atty. Jose de Luna entered his appearance as new counsel for the
notified of the decision as soon as it was promulgated. Petitioner did not against petitioners before the QC RTC alleging that he has complied with
petitioner with motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion
inform the court that it has severed its relationship with Atty. Aquino. his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to
for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground that
Neither did it hire a new lawyer soon after Atty. Aquino allegedly ceased to demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the
petitioner had not been duly notified.
be its counsel. contract.
- Petitioner received a Notice of Demand for Payment from the deputies
- That Atty. Aquino refused to receive a copy of the decision and no - Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Orden caused the
of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC attaching thereto copies of the writ of
substituted service was effected does not erase the fact that a copy of the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT.
execution and the decision. petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 2 mos
trial court decision had earlier been sent by registered mail to Atty. Aquino - August 11, 1997, Manuel Y. Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius R. Santos,
later, respondent court issued assailed resolution denying petitioners’
This is sufficient service of the decision on petitioner since service upon subsequent buyers of the subject property sold by Corona and her
motion for reconsideration or to quash writ of execution.
counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. siblings, filed a motion for leave to intervene with the RTC and were
- Petitioner went to CA on petition for certiorari. CA found no abuse of
- In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given admitted as defendants-intervenors. - They filed a motion for the
discretion and dismissed the petition. Reconsideration was also denied.
address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. Even then, cancellation of lis pendens which the RTC granted in its Resolution saying
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
in the present case, the trial court had sent a copy of the decision to that the evidence presented by Orden does not bear out the main
- Petitioner argues that: when a copy of the decision which the court sent
petitioner’s known address. allegations in the complaint and that he does not have any actionable right
to Atty. Aquino was returned to sender, respondent Judge resorted in
over the subject property there being no deed of sale executed between
causing the service of the decision to said counsel in open court, as
Obiter him and the defendants over the subject real properties as offered in the
petitioner’s counsel on record, when said lawyer appeared in the sala of
Court reiterates the distinction between petition for review on certiorari alleged agreement.
respondent Judge for another case; petitioner should be deemed as
under Rule 45 and petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It should be - RTC: denied Orden’s MR.
having no notice of the trial court decision since its counsel, who had not
recalled that a petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of - Nov. 16, 1998, Orden filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking
withdrawn as such, refused to receive a copy of the same. What the civil
judgment while a petition under Rule 65 concerns errors of jurisdiction or the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC and asked for the re-
docket clerk of the trial court should have done was to resort to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT.
substituted service.
Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. - The CA granted the petition on 4 grounds: First, they said that the
- Respondent in his Comment contends that since Atty. Aquino is counsel
However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be general rule is “a notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled while the
of petitioner and there is nothing to show that he withdrew as counsel of
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action is pending and undetermined except in cases expressly provided WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re- order petitioners to fulfill their promise to sell the property for the amount
by statute.” Second, CA cited Sec.77 of PD 1529-Property Registration annotation of the lis pendens. of P17M.
Decree which provided for two grounds for the court to order the HELD -While Orden did not explicitly state that he was running after the
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens during the pendency of an action NO. Petitioners have failed to show that the CA committed GAD. ownership of the property, a simple reading of the complaint would show
which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of Reasoning. Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Enriquez: Lis pendens, that such was his intent. This is sufficient for purposes of annotating lis
the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or pendens.
the title of the party who caused it to be recorded (NOW SEC 14, R13 control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the - There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation must
ROC). Third, the Doctrine of Lis Pendens would be rendered meaningless continuance of the action, and until final judgment. prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Thus,
if the private respondents are allowed to file a bond regardless of the -Lim v. Vera Cruz: Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens
amount, in substitution of said notice and that the law does not authorize a is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court may be annotated on the title.
judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment -Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against the
filing of a sufficient bond by the party on whose title said notice is or decree by subsequent alienation. certificate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice of
annotated. Fourth, if there was indeed an agreement to sell between the - Yared vs. Ilarde: Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien.
petitioner and the private respondents-owners (which question of fact is particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who - The rules merely require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a
not for this court to determine in this petition), then the said parties are acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a
bound by the provisions of A1475 of the Civil Code (The contract of sale is gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. right or a lien. It only protects the applicant’s rights which will be
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which - The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the determined during trial.
is the object of the contract and upon the price.From that moment, the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry
parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by Dispositive the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the law governing the form of contract.) successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
-CA denied Romeros MR on January 26, 2000. the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court
Petitioners’ contention. by ordering the re-annotation of the notice of lis will promulgate subsequently. LUZ V NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION
pendens, when private respondent did not even assert a claim of - Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. CA: a notice of lis
00 SCRA 00
possession or title over the subject property, the CA went against the pendens is appropriate in the following:
doctrine in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals where this Court held that the (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; CALLEJO, SR; SEP 24, 2004
applicant must, in the complaint or answer filed in the subject litigation, (b) an action to quiet title thereto;
assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property in order to (c) an action to remove clouds thereon; NATURE
give due course to his application; the CA, in concluding that there was no (d) an action for partition; and Petition for review of the Resolution of the CA
hearing before the annotation was cancelled, overlooked the fact that the (e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title
motion for cancellation was set for hearing on November 12, 1997, that to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. FACTS
private respondent was duly notified but failed to appear, and that he was -Atlantic Erectors, Inc. vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp.: Resorting to lis -On July 18, 1988, the petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential
able to file his opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens which the pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) in the Regional Trial
RTC considered before promulgating its Resolution dated November 26, possession of real property but also applies to suits seeking to establish a Court of Makati City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 427. On March 22,
1997. right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to 2000, the petitioner filed an application for amnesty with the Local
Orden’s contention. the court a quo cancelled the notice of lis pendens enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. In due course, the board denied the said
even before it has been apprised of all the relevant facts of the case; the - The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which application. On August 26, 2002, the National Amnesty Commission
CA was correct in ruling that while the parties are locked in legal battle the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the (NAC) issued a Resolution affirming that of the Local Amnesty Board. The
and until it becomes manifest that the grounds set forth in Sec. 77, P.D. title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. It is motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the NAC, per its
No. 1529 exist, the trial court should not allow the cancellation of the lis essential that the property be directly affected such as when the relief Resolution dated November 13, 2002, a copy of which was received by
pendens; sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the the petitioner on November 22, 2002.
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate their arguments and cited AFP Mutual enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of -Under Rule III, Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals where it was held that a title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or 1999, the petitioner had until December 7, 2002, a Saturday, within which
notice of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis to file a petition for review of the said resolution with the Court of Appeals.
proceeding in court which affects title to or possession of real property. pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such notice is rendered On December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court
They further maintain that the requirement of prior hearing was sufficiently nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. In such for an extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9, 2002, or until
complied with in this case and petitioners did not act in bad faith when she event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio. December 24, 2002 within which to file his petition. The petitioner alleged
sold the subject property pending the outcome of this case since there -To put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens, all a therein that he had just engaged the services of counsel who needed
was no outstanding injunction or restraining order which would have party has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject additional time to study the case and draft the petition. However, the
prevented her from doing so. property. It is not necessary that ownership or interest over the property is petitioner failed to file his petition for review.
proved. -December 24, 2002 was declared a national holiday; December 25, 2002
ISSUE -By praying for the Romeros to be bound by the terms of their contract was also a holiday. On December 26, 2002, the petitioner filed a second
(ie. Specific performance and damages), Orden in effect asks the court to motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from December 26, 2002 or until
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 57

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January 10, 2002, within which to file his petition. The petitioner filed his should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless 3. service in person
petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 10, 2003. of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
-On January 13, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution granting the -The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the
petitioner’s first motion for a fifteen-day extension counted from original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such TOYOTA CUBAO V. CA (GUEVARRA)
December 7, 2002 or until December 22, 2002, within which to file said period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, the CA G.R. No. 126321
petition. On February 20, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension it granted VITUG; October 23, 1997
petitioner’s second motion for having been filed out of time. The petitioner from a date later than the expiration of such period, regardless of the fact
filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 20, 2003 Resolution that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. NATURE
claiming that, since the last day to file his petition was a Saturday, -The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for granting the petitioner’s first Petition for review
December 7, 2002, and the next day, December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his petition for
the last day for filing the petition was December 9, 2002. He reasoned that review, reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not from December 9, FACTS
since he filed his motion for extension of time to file his petition for review 2002 as prayed for by the petitioner. In so doing, it merely applied, with -Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by
on the said date, the said motion was timely filed. fealty, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, as private respondent Guevarra. The repair costwas paid by means of BPI
-On August 19, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioner’s clarified by the Court via its Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC. Had the Check drawn by Guevarra in favor of Toyota.
motion, relying on A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000, CA granted the petitioner�s first motion for extension and reckoned the -The check was dishonored.
which provides that any extension of time to file the required pleading fifteen-day period from December 9, 2002, instead of from December 7, -Guevarra failed to make good the check
should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact 2002, the appellate court would have acted with grave abuse of its -Toyota a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.
that the said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. discretion. -trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address in 29
Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna.
ISSUE Dispositive Petition granted -Process Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
WON the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to Laguna, submitted to the trial court a return on the service; it read in full:
file his petition for review. SUMMONS "Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
HELD
modes of service National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 92, Quezon City, the herein
attached original summon in the above entitled case with the information
NO. Petitioner’s motion for a second extension of time to file his petition 1. voluntary appearance that it was duly served to the defendant DANILO A. GUEVARRA, thru her
for review was filed out of time. 2. Voluntary submission sister-in-law, GLORIA CABALLES, by leaving a copy of the
Reasoning. Section 1, Rule 22, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure summons and complaint but refused to sign.”
provides: -Toyota claims that Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within the
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time
RODRIGUEZ VS ALIKPALA
reglementary period, moved to declare Guevarra in default. A copy of the
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any (supra) motion was furnished Guevarra, through registered mail with return card,
applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated at 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna.
period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance FACTS -petitioner filed the registry return card indicating receipt of the motion
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a -Spouses Tolentino were co-movants in the motion for a judgment on a -trial court granted petitioner's Motion To Declare Defendant In Default
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, compromise with Spouses Rebollado and allowed an ex-parte presentation of petitioner's evidence.
the time shall not run until the next working day.3 -TC in favor of Toyota
-The Court clarified the provision when it issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION - a writ of execution was issued to implement the decision. The Deputy
which reads: the Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise Sheriff, implementing the writ, levied on Guevarra's Toyota Corolla. The
Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of agreement which became the basis of judgment of the City Court. Under notice of levy was served on Guevarra personally but he refused to sign
pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or the circumstances, the Tolentinos are estopped the very authority they the receipt thereof, expressed surprise over it, and stated that he was not
legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next invoked. And even assuming that estoppel lies, we cannot set aside the aware of any case instituted against him. Guevarra turned over the vehicle
working day is deemed on time; principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not originally a but filed a certiorari petition before the CA claiming that the trial court did
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure party to a case may be acquired, upon proper conditions, thru the not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of
to the next working day immediately following where the last day of the voluntary appearance of the person before the court. By coming summons on him.
period is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on compromise -CA in favor of Guevarra-annulled and set aside the default judgment, the
extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from and by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case writ of execution, the levy upon execution and the sale at public auction of
the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period; together with the Robellados, the Tolentinos effectively submitted the vehicle-saying that substituted service of summons was not valid
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench themselves to the jurisdiction of the City Court. -Toyota went to SC
and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day -Jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be acquired by the court upon filing
of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants ISSUE
granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision can be acquired by the court upon service of valid summons and upon 2. WON service of summons is defective
no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading voluntary appearance/submission of a person in court.
HELD
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2. YES. successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7, 1992 and There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered mail is
Reasoning December 11, 1992. complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the addressee
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been -No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date
resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's became final and executory. of the first notice, service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5)
return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the -a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on days therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the
substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This means
Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service (of -petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment With that the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run
summons) be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order, after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster. This is
desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, thereunder alleging, that he was never served with summons and was because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of
"the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, adding that the judgment at that point.
are satisfied; due process is served." Although Moran, on the Rules of he learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 18, 1993 With the reality that petitioner was first notified by the postmaster on
Court, has said that "Irregularities of this kind (substituted service) (might) when a notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge . He thus November 25, 1992, it follows that service of a copy of the MeTC decision
be cured by proof that the copies (have) actually been delivered to the prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC decision and the writs was deemed complete and effective five (5) days therefrom or on
defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to issued in connection therewith. November 30, 1992. Necessarily, the 60-day period for filing a petition
have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on -In a decision dated June 3, 1996, the RTC granted petitioner's petition for for relief must be reckoned from such date (November 30, 1992) as this
execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff. relief and set aside the MeTC decision. The RTC explained that petitioner was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. In short,
The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC decision
the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of anger, tore on November 30, 1992. The 60-day period for filing a petition for
but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital relief thus expired on January 29, 1993. Unfortunately, it was only
instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate squabble. on May 24, 1993, or 175 days after petitioner was deemed to have
court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to -VHF went to SC but SC remanded to CA learned of the judgment that he filed his petition for relief with the
consider the affidavit of the process server (declaring the concomitant -CA-in a decision dated September 17, 1997, upon a finding that RTC. Indubitably, the petition was filed way beyond the 60-day period
facts required to be incorporated in the return) which was presented to it petitioner's petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond the 60-day provided by law.
for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For mandatory period therefor under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face reversed and set aside the RTC decision and reinstated that of the Disposition PETITION DENIED. CA AFFIRMED
value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the defendant MeTC,
(herein private respondent) of his right to due process. SUMMONS – RULE 14
ISSUE
Disposition PETITION DENIED. 3. WON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA NEVER
Contents, when issued, by whom
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER, HENCE ITS issued
DECISION CANNOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. Modes of Service
4. Substituted service 1. Voluntary Appearance
HELD
QUELNAN V. VHF PHIL. 3. NO.
2. Voluntary Submission
G.R. No. 138500 Reasoning The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision 3. Service in Person
GARCIA; September 16, 2005 was sent to petitioner through registered mail at his given address on 4. Substituted Service
November 25, 1992. It should be noted that petitioner was not 5. Extra-territorial Service
NATURE represented by counsel during the proceedings before the MeTC. The first
Petition for review on certiorari notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on November 25,
1992. Thereafter, subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on GUIGUINTO CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC V
FACTS December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992. For sure, a certification that TORRES
-VHF Phils filed an ejectment suit in the MeTC against Quelnan involving the registered mail was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to G. R. No. 170926
a condominium unit the sender after three successive notices was issued by the postmaster.
Hence, service of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after YNARES-SANTIAGO; September 15, 2006
-MeTC in favor of VHF Phils.
-on its finding that "summons together with a copy of the complaint was November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule 13,
Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: NATURE
served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August 25, 1992 by substituted Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
service" and that petitioner "failed to file his answer within the SEC. 10. Completeness of Service. — Personal service is complete
upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
reglementary period", came out with a decision dated November 23, 1992
-Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the FACTS
registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of -Respondents Aida Torres, Nonilo Torres, and Sheryl Ann Torres-Holgado,
petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three (3) addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice
of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis supplied) are members of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI). They availed
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 59

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of loans from the cooperative but were unable to pay on the due dates may deem sufficient. service of summons is not binding upon respondents Nonilo and
despite demands. -In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is Sheryl Ann Torres whose relationship with Pagtalunan was neither
-On March 24, 2003, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over readily ascertained nor adequately explained in the Return of
Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in Summons. Also, no earnest efforts were made to locate
-Summons against respondents were served through their court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under respondent Aida Torres who was allegedly working abroad at the
Secretary, a certain Benita S. Pagtalunan, who received the same Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. time summons was served on her person. No explanation was
on April 22, 2003. The Return of Summons was filed on April 24, 2003 -If he cannot be personally served with summons within a stated in the Return why substituted service was resorted to
by Process Server Valeriano P. Badato reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance through Pagtalunan.
-On November 18, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondents with Section 8 of the said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the -Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the
in default country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such
-TC granted said petition, thereby allowing petitioner to present its (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules
evidence ex-parte outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, of substituted service of summons.
-After presenting petitioner’s evidence ex-parte, the trial court rendered also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may -In the instant case, there was an undue, if not indecent, haste to serve
judgment on September 15, 2004, ordering respondents to pay petitioner deem sufficient. the summons at the first attempt without making sure that personal
the ff: 1. For Aida Torres, the amount of P163,516.80 from April, 2004 plus -In these types of civil actions (in personam), summons on the defendant service was an impossibility because either the respondents had left for a
legal interest until the said amount is fully paid; 2. For Nonilo Torres the must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or foreign country or an unknown destination with no definite date of
amount of P278,151.58 from April, 2004 plus legal interest until the said in case of refusal, by tendering it to him. If efforts to find defendant returning within a reasonable period, or had gone into hiding to avoid
amount is fully paid; 3. For Sheryl Ann Torres the amount of P15,903.93 personally makes prompt service impossible, service may be effected by service of any process from the courts. Since the substituted service was
from April, 2004 plus legal interest until the said amount is fully paid; 4. To leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or not validly effected, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
pay P10,000.00, jointly and severally, as attorney’s fees 5. Costs of suit. residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing persons of the respondents. The order of default, the judgment by default,
-Petitioner thereafter moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place the writ of execution issued by it, as well as the auction sale of the
was granted and accordingly, the writ of execution was issued on even of business with some competent person in charge thereof. respondents’ properties levied on execution are, therefore, null and void.
date. -The proper service of summons is a critical step in litigation because
-On May 4, 2005, Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte levied respondents’ house upon such service rests the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the Disposition. Petition is denied.
and lot and the same was scheduled to be sold at public auction on June person of the defendant.
7, 2005 when the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order. -In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service
-On August 24, 2005, the Court of Appeals annulled the judgment of the are null and void.
trial court on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons -In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that since BONNEVIE V CA (Phil Bank of Commerce)
of respondents since they were not validly served with summons and substituted service was availed of in lieu of personal service, there should
G.R. NO. L-49101
neither did they voluntarily appear in court. be a report stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a
-According to the appellate court, the service of summons to Pagtalunan relationship of trust and confidence that would ensure that the latter will GUERRERO; October 24, 1983
was in violation of Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court because there receive or be notified of the summons issued in their names.
was no explanation why resort to substituted service of summons was -This is because substituted service may only be availed of when the NATURE
made. Thus, the appellate court held that respondents were deprived of respondents could not be served personally within a reasonable period of Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA decision
their right to due process. time, and such impossibility of prompt service must be shown by stating
-The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, that earnest efforts have been made to find the respondents personally FACTS
hence, this petition and that such efforts have failed. - Honesto Bonnevie filed with the CFI Rizal a complaint against Philippine
-Such requirements under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 must be followed Bank of Commerce seeking the annulment of the Deed of Mortgage
ISSUE strictly, faithfully and fully in order not to deprive any person of his property dated Dec 6, 1966 executed in favor of the PBC by spouses Lozano, as
WON summons was not validly served on the respondents, and therefore by violating his constitutional right to due process. The statutory well as the extrajudicial foreclosure made on Sept 4, 1968.
the CA correctly annulled the judgment of the RTC requirements of substituted service must be strictly construed since it is an They assail validity and legality of the extrajudicial foreclosure on the
extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of following grounds: a) petitioners were never notified of the foreclosure
HELD summons, availed of only under certain conditions imposed by the Rules sale. b) The notice of auction sale was not posted for the period required
Yes. of Court. Any substituted service other than that authorized under Section by law. c) publication of the notice of auction sale in the Luzon Weekly
-Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action 7 is deemed ineffective and contrary to law. Courier was not in accordance with law.
brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court -Granting that Pagtalunan is the personal secretary of Aida Torres, as - History: Lozano spouses were the owners of the property which they
acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the appearing in the Affidavit of Merit of Sheryl Ann Torres and attached to the mortgaged to secure the payment of the loan in the principal amount of
defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service Petition of Annulment filed before the Court of Appeals, there is no P75T they were about to obtain from PBC.
of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary showing that the former had indeed a relationship of trust and confidence - They then executed in favor of Bonnevie the Deed of Sale with Mortgage
appearance or submission to the court. with the three respondents. It appears that the process server hastily for P100T, P25T of which amount being payable to the Lozano spouses
-Where the defendant is a natural person, service may be personal, and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons upon the execution of the document, and the P75T to PBC.
substituted, by publication and such other mode of service as the court without ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondents. Such
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 60

Avena
- When the mortgage was executed by the Lozano spouses in favor of bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at to come to a settlement with them. IVO prayed for the issuance of a
PBC, the loan of P75T was not yet received them. regular intervals." The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the
- From April 28, 1967 to July 12, 1968, Bonnevie made payments to PBC long as it is of general circulation. defendants from harassing IVO with their insistent demands to recognize
on the mortgage in the total amount of P18,944.22. Bonnevie then - Whether or not the notice of auction sale was posted for the the contracts entered into by Dominador and from portraying the IVO as
assigned all his rights under the Deed of Sale with Assumption of period required by law is a question of fact. It can no longer be one that defaults on its contracts and obligations and has fallen into bad
Mortgage to his brother, intervenor Raoul. entertained by this Court. Nevertheless, the records show that copies of times and from interfering with IVO's normal conduct of business. IVO
- PBC then applied for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and notice of sale said notice were posted in three conspicuous places in the municipality of also prayed that the defendants pay it damages worth more than P21M.
was published in the Luzon Weekly Courier on June 30, July 7, and July Pasig, Rizal namely: the Hall of Justice, the Pasig Municipal Market and - Respondent Judge Soriano authorized IVO to effect extraterritorial
14, 1968; auction sale was conducted a month after, and the property was Pasig Municipal Hall. service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines Corp.
sold to PBC for P84,387.00. - A single act of posting (which may even extend beyond the period Pursuant to that order, the petitioners were served with summons and
- PBC specifically denied most of the allegations: (a) that the defendant required by law) satisfies the requirement of law. The burden of proving copy of the complaint by DHL courier service.
has not given its consent to the sale of the mortgaged property; (b) that that the posting requirement was not complied with is now shifted to the - On April 25, 1987, without submitting to the court's jurisdiction and only
the demand letters and notice of foreclosure were sent to Jose Lozano at one who alleges non-compliance. for the purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction over their persons, the
his address; (c) that it was notified for the first time about the alleged sale Disposition The appeal being devoid of merit, the decision of the Court of petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the
after it had foreclosed the Lozano mortgage; that the property in question Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper
remained registered in the name of Lozano in the land records of Rizal and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The court
and there was no entry, notation or indication of the alleged sale. denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the
- After petitioner Honesto Bonnevie had rested his case, petitioner Raoul extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that "the
DIAL CORPORATION v SORIANO (RTC Judge)
SV Bonnevie filed a motion for intervention, which was granted. present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the
- CFI dismissed the complaint. MFR was also denied. CA affirmed. 00 SCRA 00 Philippines, or which defendants claim liens or interests, actual or
GRINO-AQUINO; May 31, 1988 inchoate, legal or equitable. And one of the reliefs demanded consists,
ISSUE/S wholly or in part, in excluding the defendants from any interest in such
1. WON the mortgage executed by the Lozanos in favor of PBC is valid NATURE property for the reason that their transactions with plaintiff's former
2. WON extrajudicial foreclosure is valid Petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary president are ultra vires." Furthermore, "as foreign corporations doing
restraining order business in the Philippines without a license, they opened themselves to
HELD suit before Philippine courts, pursuant to Sec. 133 of the Corporation
1. YES FACTS Code of the Philippines." The petitioners' motions for reconsideration of
Reasoning A mortgage follows the property whoever the possessor may - The petitioners ( Dial Corp., C & T Refinery Inc., Nalin sdn. bhb. that order were also denied by the court. Hence this petition for certiorari
be and subjects the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was Berisford Commodities, Ltd., and Pacific Molasses Co.) are foreign with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
constituted. Petitioners voluntarily assumed it and are, therefore, corporations (US, UK and Malaysia). They are not domiciled in the
estopped from impugning its validity. They did not secure the consent of Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or ISSUE
respondent Bank to the sale with assumption of mortgage. property in the Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not WON the extra territorial service of summons was proper
2. YES engaged, in business here. The respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Co.,
Reasoning Act No. 3135 does not require personal notice on the Inc. (IVO) is a Philippine corporation which through its president, HELD
mortgagor. 13 Honesto Bonnevie was not entitled to any notice because Dominador Monteverde, had entered into several contracts for the delivery NO.
as of May 14, 1968, he had transferred and assigned all his rights and of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides only 4 instances in
interests in favor of intervenor Raoul without informing the Bank. between the parties will be settled through arbitration under the rules of which extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely: "(1) when
- Also, petitioners were placed on constructive notice. The notice of sale either the Federation of Oils Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA) or the the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the
was published in the Luzon Courier on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 National Institute of Oil Seed Products (NIOP). Because IVO defaulted action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
and notices of the sale were posted for not less than twenty days in at under the contracts, the petitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
least three (3) public places in the Municipality where the property is proceedings abroad, and some have already obtained arbitration awards actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action
located. Act No. 3135 merely requires that such notice shall be published against IVO. consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
once a week for at least three consecutive weeks. Such phrase, as - On April 8, 1987, IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages (RTC interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the
interpreted by this Court in Basa vs. Mercado does not mean that notice Manila) against 19 foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners, defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
should be published for three full weeks. with whom Dominador had entered into contracts for the delivery of Philippines"
- To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that "it is published coconut oil. IVO repudiated Dominador's contracts on the grounds that The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the
for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a they were mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have
coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties; that the Board of or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The action is
13
Section 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than Directors of IVO removed Monteverde from his position as president of purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing
twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the the corporation, named in his place, Rodrigo Monteverde, and disowned against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, Dominador's allegedly illegal and unauthorized acts; that the defendants coconut oil to the defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks million in damages for such "harassment." It is clearly a personal
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
have allegedly "harassed" IVO to comply with Dominador's contracts and
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 61

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action as well as an action in personam , not an action in rem or The respondent court's finding that, by filing motions to dismiss, the WON the summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the
quasi in rem . "An action in personam is an action against a person on petitioners hypothetically admitted the allegations of the complaint that Philippines temporarily absent may be validly effected by substituted
the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an action they are doing business in the Philippines without any license, and that service under Sec. 8 Rule 14 (on residents temporarily out of the
against the thing itself, instead of against the person." A personal action they may be served with summons and other court processes through Philippines)
is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement their agents or representatives enumerated in paragraph 2 of the
of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the complaint, is contradicted by its order authorizing IVO to summon them by HELD
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or extraterritorial service, a mode of service which is resorted to when the *ON argument that Sec18 (in relation to sec17) is the sole
property. defendant is not found in the Philippines, does not transact business here, provision that governs summons upon a defendant temporarily
As the civil case filed is a personal action, personal or substituted and has no resident agent on whom the summons may be served. absent in an action in personam: substituted service – out of the
service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, Disposition. The extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioners is Philippines - is but one of the modes of effective service to bring a
is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. held to be improper, hence null and void. The petition for certiorari is defendant in court. The normal method of service of summons on one
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: granted. The orders of Judge Soriano are set aside. The complaint is temporarily absent is by substituted service. Personal service outside the
As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in dismissed as against the petitioners for failure of the court to acquire country and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning
the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against him jurisdiction over them. defendants.
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person -in suits in personam, the more circuitous procedure delineated in
unless he voluntarily appears in court. But, when the action affects the Sections 17 and 18 is resorted to by a plaintiff if defendant’s dwelling
personal status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines, or is intended to MONTALBAN V. MAXIMO house or residence or place of business in this country is not known; or, if
seize or dispose of any property, real or personal, of the defendant located known, service upon him cannot be had thereat upon the terms of Sec8.
22 SCRA 1070
in the Philippines, it may be validly tried by the Philippine courts, for then, Since personal service is impossible, resort to substituted service
they have jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of the plaintiff SANCHEZ, March 15, 1968 becomes a necessity.
or the property of the defendant and their jurisdiction over the person of NATURE *ON fact that judgment has been long final: the judgment enjoys the
the non-resident defendant is not essential. Venue in such cases may be Appeal from the orders of CFI Manila presumption of regularity. It is, unless striken down, entitled to respect.
laid in the province where the property of the defendant or a part thereof Non quieta movere. Because “public policy and sound practice demand
involved in the litigation is located. FACTS that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and -Fr. Gerardo Maximo was involved in a motor vehicle accident where the final at some definite date fixed by law.”
complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the son of the petitioners suffered injuries. Petitioners filed suit against Fr.
processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them Maximo for damages. Summons were served at the Malabon Parish Disposition. Orders affirmed.
outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec. 3-a, where Fr. Maximo was allegedly residing. However, Fr. Maximo was in
Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129). Extraterritorial Europe when the summons were served, Fr. Bautista was the one who
DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS
service of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or power to received the summons. Fr. Bautista wrote to the Clerk of Court of CFI
Manila informing him that Fr. Maximo was in Europe. 64 SCRA 23
compel them to obey its orders.
Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire -On Plaintiff’s motion, lower court declared Fr. Maximo in default, AQUINO, May 13, 1975
jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non- sentenced Fr. Maximo to pay for damages. The Montalbans even wrote to
resident defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the Fr. Maximo at the Malabon Catholic Church informing him of the lower NATURE
fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents, so as court’s decision and requesting hi to comply with the decision. Fr. Maximo Original Actions. Certiorari and contempt.
to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service replied that he was not aware of the civil case against him and that he was
within the state which renders the judgment ." acquitted in the criminal case. FACTS
Respondents' contention that "the action below is related to property -Deputy Sheriff of Rizal notified Fr. Maximo of the issuance of writ of - Quemada, allegedly the illegitimate son of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., was
within the Philippines, specifically contractual rights that petitioners are execution and demanded payment. Return to writ expressed that Fr. appointed as special administrator of the latter’s estate by the CFI of
enforcing against IVO" is specious for the "contractual rights" of the Maximo is “financially hard up” and had no property. Alias writ of execution Cebu. As such, he filed a complaint against his half siblings, the spouses
petitioners are not property found in the Philippines for the petitioners issued. Copy received by Fr. Maximo. Deputy Sheriff attached and levied Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval, and Sofia Midgely, who were
have not filed an action in the local courts to enforce said rights. They on a residential house in Caloocan allegedly belonging to Fr. Maximo. all at that time citizens of Spain and residing in that country. The suit also
have not submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts. -After 2 years, 2 months, Fr. Maximo admittedly learned of lower court’s named Atlas Mining as co-respondent. The suit was to settle the question
The lower court invoked Section 33 of the Corporation Code which decision and filed for ANNULMENT OF ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS on of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as
provides that a "foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines verified motion on the grounds that the summons were not duly served Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro
without a license may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine (based on then Sec.7, Rule 7 and Sec18, Rule 14 of ROC) therefore, the Pastor, Sr.
courts or administrative tribunal on any valid cause of action recognized court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person so the trial and the - Quemada, on his own, caused extraterritorial service of summons to be
under Philippine laws." It assumed that the petitioners are doing business decision were null and void. His verified motion was denied, MFR was made through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine
in the Philippines, which allegation the latter denied. Even if they can be rejected. Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons
considered as such, the Corporation Code did not repeal the rules through registered mail upon De Midgely and Pastor, Jr. at their respective
requiring proper service of summons to such corporations as provided in ISSUE addresses in Alicante and Barcelona.
Rule 14 of the ROC and Section 128 of the Corporation Code. - Both De Midgely and Pastor entered a special appearance and filed a
Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Prof. Victoria A. 62

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motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as they are non- G.R. NO. 78328 petitioner and Rallye as additional defendants. Respondent court
residents. They further alleged that earnest efforts toward a compromise admitted the amended complaint and directed service of summons
REGALADO; June 3 1991
have not been made as required in the Civil Code in suits between and the complaint upon Abel at a different last known address in
members of the same family, The motion was denied by Judge Ferandos Antipolo. Summons was supposedly served on Abel through
NATURE
and he ruled that the respondents were properly summoned. publication in the Manila Evening Post according to the affidavit of
Petition for certiorari
- The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by Ferandos publication of its president, with a confusing entry in the notice of
indicating in the order that the action of Quemada was for the recovery of order which stated the Las Pinas address, contradicting the
FACTS
real property and real rights. The respondents were instructed to file their Antipolo address stated by the TC. Petitioner filed her answer to
- It was alleged that petitioner's spouse, Abel Sahagun (Alias
answer. the amended complaint. Abel and Rallye filed no answer, so
Abelardo), manager of Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (Rallye), made it
- De Midgely filed this action with the Supreme Court. Filinvest filed a motion to declare them in default which respondent
appear that his company had sold a motor vehicle to Salazar who
Judge Madayag of the RTC of Makati granted, but not as to Rallye
issued a promissory note for the price and executed as security a
ISSUE/S since summons had not been served upon it. Petitoner went on
chattel mortgage on said vehicle in favor of Rallye. Rallye, through
WON Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying De certiorari to the CA (Feb. 6, 1987), assailing as grave abuse of
Abel, assigned the note and chattel to Filinvest for valuable
Midgely’s motion to dismissed based on the lack of jurisdiction over her discretion the declaration of default of Abel; CA dismissed the
consideration. When the note matured, Salazar failed to pay,
person. petition and a subsequent MFR, hence this petiton.
compelling Filinvest to sue. However, Filinvest found that the
mortgaged car had not been delivered to Salazar by Abel. A writ of
HELD ISSUE
attachment was issued and levied on a house and lot in Las
No. The fact that she alleged as a ground for dismissal the lack of earnest 1. WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction over Abel by the
Pinas, registered in Abel's name. Petitioner had been continuously
effort to compromise is deemed as abandonment of her special publication of summons in the Manila Evening Post
residing in said house and claims ownership, having allegedly paid
appearance and as voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. “When
for it with her own earnings.
the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction HELD
-The TC denied the respondent's motion to declare Abel in default
of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose 1. YES
but directed it to "take steps to effect service of summons and
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If the motion is for any other Ratio As a nonresident defendant, and since the suit involves real
complaint upon defendant, whose whereabouts in the US was
purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he property wherein the defendant ostensibly has an interest and which the
unknown. The TC later dismissed the complaint of Filinvest for
thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, property has in fact been attached at the instance of private respondent,
failure to serve summons extra-territorially upon Abel despite said
- Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely, her the court correctly ordered the service of summons by publication in a
order. Filinvest filed an MFR praying that said order be
motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
reconsidered and set aside and that Abel be declared in default
her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person court may order. Although it would appear that publication should have
and to deny petitioner's motion for leave. TC granted petitioner
of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of been made in a newspaper in the US as it would most likely give notice to
time to file intervention and denied the motion to declare Abel in
summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the Abel, such a sweeping doctrine would virtually unsettle a long standing
default. Petitioner intervened, questioning the jurisdiction of the
requirement of due process. Quasi in rem is an action between parties interpretation of the aforesaid rule on extraterritorial service of summons
TC. Petitioner was declared in default for failure to appear, as was
where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the by publication, as well as its implementation sanctioned by the practice
Abel for failing to answer the complaint. The court rendered
parties or of some interest therein. followed in this jurisdiction.
judgment against Abel, ordering him to pay P97,066.59 (equivalent
- The SC cited the Perkins case as a precedent. In that case, it ruled that Reasoning The instant case is based on the attachment of defendant's
to 25% of the principal obligation due as liquidated damages +
in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not property, and as such is an action quasi in rem, wherein summons by
25% as attorney's fees).
essential. The service of summons by publication is required merely to publication is allowed. Such is called constructive or substituted service,
-petitioner elevated the case to the IAC (Feb. 27, 1985) which
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The judgment of the which does not constitute a service of process in any true sense but
granted her petition for certiorari with prohibition and set aside the
court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes serves as a means whereby the owner may be admonished that his
TC's aforesaid decision, ruling that petitioner was deprived of
of the nature of judgment in rem. The judgment is confined to the res property is subject to judicial proceedings and that he should take steps
opportunity to present evidence (including evidence she and Abel
(properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non as he sees fit to protect it. Such is required to physically acquire
had been living separately since 1970). Filinvest filed a petition for
resident. It should be noted that the civil case filed by Quemada is related jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and for purposes of fair play
review with the SC which was denied. Filinvest filed a motion for
to a testamentary proceeding as it was filed for the purpose of recovering by informing him of the pendency of the action against him. Even then,
leave to serve summons by publicatio on Abel, which the court
the properties which in the understanding of Quemada, belonged to the there is no guarantee that the absent owner shall receive the actual
granted, stating that pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 14, "the summons
estate of the Late Pastor, Sr. and which were held by De Midgely and her notice; as such, under law, actual notice is not considered to be absolutely
be effected out of the Phils. by publication in a newspaper of
brother. necessary (as held in Banco Espanol). Considering this, publication in the
general circulation in the Phils., to which this matter may be
US would be all the more difficult as Abel's exact location is unknown; to
assigned after due raffle, for 3 successive days. Said defendant
Disposition have at hand the available newspapers, research the laws governing
was ordered to file his answer in Court within a reasonable time
Petition is dismissed judicial processes in each state would be too taxing for the TC. Still, it was
(not less than 60 days after notice); that the CoC send copies of
held in De Midgely that in actions quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person
the summons and tills Order by registered mail to last known
SAHAGUN V CA (MADAYAG/FILINVEST CREDIT of the nonresident alien is not essential and service of summons is only
address of said defendant in Las Pinas. Plaintiff is ordered to
required to satisfy due process. Relief in an action against a nonresident
CORP.) implead Rallye as co-defendant within 1 month from notice."
defendant who chooses not to submit himself to Phil. courts is limited to
-Filinvest filed an amended complaint, this time impleading
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the res. GANCAYCO; April 12, 1989
-There is no specific proscription against resorting to foreign publication in It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
the place where the defendant resides, but publication in a local NATURE reasonable time that substituted service may be resorted to. The
newspaper should not altogether be interdicted since the rule specifically Petition for certiorari impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
authorizes service of summons "in such places and for such time as the made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed.
court concerned may order". The matter should be left to the sound FACTS This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary
discretion of the TC in each particular case since it has the facts before it. - Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation (MFC) and private because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
Still, the publication in the Manila Evening Post was defective as there respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money service. It has been held that this method of service is in derogation of the
was no showing that copies of the summons and the amended complaint market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be
were duly served at the defendant's last know correct address. jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute."
-The Court is not inclined to dismiss the case for non-compliance of Code 5. Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of
private respondent to serve the amended complaint to Abel at his Antipolo - Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
address as there is prima facie justification for extraterritorial service of private respondents at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered
summons, and transmission of copies of the summons to the wrong Makati, Metro Manila, which is the stated office address of MFC in the ineffective.
address is a matter which the TC can more readily remedy. Even if Abel is complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot, Jr. who
declared in default, his interest can be duly represented by the non- acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private Reasoning The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show
defaulting defendant since a common cause of action is involved. respondents. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff that such personal service of summons was effected. The office address
Disposition Petition is granted Bernardo San Juan dated May 11, 1983. of the corporation as indicated in the complaint does not appear to be the
- The parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a Compromise office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected
SEPARATE OPINIONS Agreement for the approval of the court which was approved. with the corporation then. Personal service of summons should have been
- Counsel for defendants filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the
Sarmiento, J. [concurring and dissenting] Agreement" on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Securities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the
-service of summons to the wrong last known address is a defect which Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with
cannot justify an order of default. Assuming default were proper, it will not for MFC only. (denied) the Assistant Manager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation
preclude petitioner from presenting her own evidence. - Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng with which as above stated private respondents were no longer
-However, as to extrajudicial service of summons to a nonresident alien, it Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set connected. Such substituted service is not valid. There was no
is only valid when effected in the territory in which the absent defendant aside decision on the following grounds: compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be a previous
may be found. Sec. 17 was in part, taken from Sections 398 and 399 of a. there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate personal service and a failure to effect the same before substituted
Act. 190, which in turn were an adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure of address of the corporation was not their address they were no longer service could be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been
California which states that personal service outside the state must be connected therewith; duly served with summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
named and designated in the publication as most likely to give notice to b. that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent them in the action and their persons.
the person to be served. Publication in the Phils. is not likely to provide compromise agreement;
notice to a US resident. c. that they were not served copies of the decision of the court; Disposition. Petition is DENIED
-As to Banco Espanol and De Midgely: although the court acquired d. that they learned about the same only when it was being executed;
jurisdiction over the res, the res belongs to the defendant, and as such he and 2. Upon Foreign Private Juridical
reserves the right to be heard when his possessions are in peril. Although e. that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the
the court cannot award money by way of relief, judgment condemning the subject transaction. (denied)
Entity
res would yield the same result, that is, liability against the defendant. This - CA reversed
would lead to the fundamental injustice of trial in absentia, especially - Motion for reconsideration (denied) FACILITIES MANAGEMENT V DELA OSA
considering the increase in immigrant Filipinos.
89 SCRA 131
ISSUE
6. By Publication WON private respondents were properly served with summons
MAKASIAR; March 26, 1979
NATURE
HELD
-MODE OF SERVICE UPON CERTAIN NO.
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CIR
DEFENDANTS Ratio Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as
FACTS
1. Upon domestic private juridical directors and officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held
-On July 1, 1967, Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. with full
entity personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the
backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime compensation, swing
complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of
shift and graveyard shift differentials. Petitioner alleged that he was
summons must be observed in that summons must be served personally
PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK vs. KING employed by respondents as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from
on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering
March, 1964 to November, 1964, inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly
172 SCRA 131 it to them.
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rate of $1.26 from December, 1964 to November, 1965, inclusive; (3) It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign and employed a REASONABLE METHOD for apprising such an absent
houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.33 from December, 1965 to August, corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from party of the proceeding against him.
1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August, the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts (Marshall *ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS & DUE PROCESS : the constitutional
1966 to March 27, 1967, inclusive. Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil 70,75). requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be
- Respondents filed on August 7, 1967 their letter- answer without if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not reasonably expected to give reasonably calculated to give the notice
substantially denying the material allegations of the basic petition but banned from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that desired
interposed the following special defenses that respondents Facilities same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine -MILLIKEN V MEYER, supra : its adequacy so far as due process is
Management Corporation and J. S. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines. concerned is dependent on WON the form of substituted service provided
which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Government; for such cases and employed is REASONABLY CALCULATED TO GIVE
that respondent J. V. Catuira, though an employee of respondent Disposition WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED WITH HIM ACTUAL NOTICE of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
corporation presently stationed in Manila, is without power and authority of COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER *interpretation of then Sec8 on substituted service: Same meaning
legal representation; and that the employment contract between petitioner shaped out by the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction where it was patterned
and respondent corporation carries -the approval of the DOL. (American Legal System); the “defendant” means any resident of the
3. Upon Resident Temporarily Abroad
- On May 3, 1968. respondents filed MTD the subject petition on the country without distinction as to whether he is physically present or not.
ground that this Court has no Jurisdiction over the instant case, and on -on Sec18, Rule 14, according to CJ MORAN: Since resident of RP,
May 24, 1968, petitioner interposed an opposition thereto. Said motion MONTALBAN V. MAXIMO jurisdiction may be acquired over his person under Sec8; Extraterritorial
was denied. (SUPRA) Service also allowed. Plaintiff is not duty bound to see to it that the person
upon when service was actually made delivers the summons to defendant
ISSUE/S or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that
FACTS
1. WON Court can acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused defendant does not in fact receive actual notice. This will not affect the
-Fr. Maximo was sued by the parents of the child he injured during a motor
provided that they are domiciled beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the validity of the service.
vehicle accident. He was in Europe when the summons were served upon
Philippine Government -A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of
Fr. Bautista in the Malabon Church where Fr. Maximo was known to
2. WON petitioner has been 'doing business in the Philippines' so that the residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base to which any inquiry
reside. Since was away when trial was being held, he was declared in
service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the CFI of about him may be directed and where he is bound to return.
default and a decision was made in favor of the Sps. After 2y, 2m Fr.
Manila with jurisdiction. Disposition. Orders affirmed.
Maximo questioned the validity of the judgment against him, questioning
the service of summons made
HELD
1. Yes. While it is true the site of work is Identified as Wake Island, it is
4. Upon Defendant whose
equally true the place of hire is established in Manila. Moreover, what is
ISSUE identity/whereabouts unknown
WON the summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the
important is the fact that the contract of employment between the parties
Philippines temporarily absent may be validly effected by substituted
litigant was shown to have been originally executed and subsequently BALTAZAR VS CA (GOOD EARTH ENTERPRISES)
service under Sec. 8 Rule 14 (on residents temporarily out of the
renewed in Manila, as asserted by petitioner and not denied by
respondents. Hence, any dispute arising therefrom should necessarily be
Philippines) G.R. No. 78728
determined in the place or venue where it was contracted. FELICIANO; December 8, 1988
HELD
YES. In suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction over residents Nature
2.
temporarily out of the country. Petition for review on certiorari to annul CA decision
the petitioner may be considered as doing busuness un the Philippines
Reasoning. HISTORY. Common Law (Power Concept of
within the the scope of Section 14, Rule 14 of the ROC
Jurisdiction): Jurisdiction of Courts to render judgments in personam FACTS
in compliance with law, the petitioner had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, as
was granted on their de facto power over defendant’s person. Jurisdiction - Two parcels of land located in Barrio San Isidro, Paranaque were
agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and
was based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. adjudicated to Lorenzo Molera pursuant to the decree in a land
receive, in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by
-Continental Law: Principles of Roman Origin: (1) Suits in personam registration case by the CFI of Rizal acting as a cadastral court. They
processes of the Philippine Courts of Justice, for as long as he remains an
and those relating to MOVABLES – courts of the domicile of the defendant were titled in the name of Lorenzo Molera, under Original Certificate of
employee of FMC. It is a fact that when the summons for the petitioner
have general jurisdiction [Actor Rei Forum Sequitur ]; (2) actions Title (OCT) No. 1866. On 15 August 1965, the parcels of land were
was served on Jaime V. Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC. Mr.
concerning IMMOVABLES: Courts of the situs have exclusive jurisdiction acquired by Good Earth from successors-in-interest of Lorenzo Molera.
Catuira was a on officer representing petitioner in the Philippines.
-FORGED DOCTRINE: Domiciliaries of a state, though temporarily out A transfer of Certificate title was issued in the name of Good Earth.
Aetna Casualty & Curety Company v Pacific Star Line – WON the plaintiff
of its territorial jurisdiction, are ALWAYS amenable to suits in personam so - On 22 March 1977, Artemio Baltazar instituted Civil Case No. 5552-P
appellant has been doing business in the Philippines, considering the fact
substituted service is binding on absent residents. against Good Earth for declaration of ownership and
that it has no license to transact business in the Philippines as a foreign
-MILLIKEN V MEYER: “The attendant duties, like the rights and reconveyance of the parcels of land before the CFI, Rizal. Baltazar
corporation. The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was
privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence traced his claimed rights from an alleged vast Spanish land grant to
not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to
in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the one Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, Governor General of Intramuros,
prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without
state even during sojourns without the state, where the state was provided down to a deed of sale over the subject lots allegedly executed by one
taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts.
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Pedro Asedillo (for whose mother, Baltazar had been a tenant sharing jurisdiction over the person of defendant Good Earth through service of the situation of an "unknown defendant" addressed by Section 16 of
in the rice harvest from the lots) summons by publication; that the suit brought by Baltazar against Rule 14. The second refers to situations where "extra-territorial service"
- The Deputy Sheriff of the trial court, Mr. Ernesto Pre, received a copy Good Earth was an action quasi in rem such that service of summons is proper, governed by Section 17 of Rule 14. The third situation is that
of the summons and complaint for service on Good Earth at its address by publication was appropriate; that Lorenzo Molera, the original of a resident of the Philippines who is temporarily out of the Philippines
set forth in the complaint 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila. registered owner of the subject lands, was not an indispensable party and who may be served with summons by publication under Section
- On 1 April 1977, the Deputy Sheriff pre-certified in his Sheriffs Return to the suit brought against Good Earth; that the action instituted by 18.
that: notwithstanding three attempts made by the undersigned Deputy Good Earth was barred by res judicata; and that defendants Galvez,  Even a cursory examination of Sections 16,17 and 18 of Rule 14 above
Sheriff, particularly on March 25, 27 and 30, 1977, to serve the BGB Development Corporation and Rizaliana Garments, Inc. were will at once reveal that, if at all, service of summons by publication
summons and copy of the complaint upon the defendant Good Earth purchasers in good faith and for value. upon Good Earth could only be done under Section 16. Section 17 can
Enterprises, Inc. at the given address, the same has failed as - CA reversed TC’s decision and directed the defendants to reconvey the find application only where the defendant is both a non-resident and
according to information defendant Corporation has never held office parcels of land in question to Good Earth free from all liens and not actually found in the Philippines. Since Good Earth is a corporation
thereat and its present office address is unknown. encumbrances. Hence this Petition for Review instituted by Baltazar organized under the Philippine law, it cannot be regarded as a non-
- On the same date, Baltazar filed a motion for leave to serve the and Galvez. resident corporation. Section 18, upon the other hand, appears to
summons and a copy of the complaint upon therein defendant Good contemplate a defendant who is a natural person. In any case,
Earth by publication. The trial court granted Baltazar's motion. ISSUE petitioner did not pretend that Good Earth was at any time temporarily
Publication of the summons and the complaint in the "Times Journal," a WON the service of summons by publication upon respondent Good Earth out of the Philippines, assuming such a condition were possible.
newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks was effected was proper. Section 16 itself covers two (2) distinguishable situations: where the
on 6, 13 and 20 August 1977. identity of the defendant is unknown; and where the address of the
- Subsequently the trial court, on motion of Baltazar and upon finding HELD defendant is unknown. Under Section 16, therefore, petitioner must
that Good Earth had failed to file its answer within the sixty (60) day  The regular mode of serving summons upon a private domestic show that the address of Good Earth was "unknown" and that such
period counted from the day following the last day of the publication, corporation (i.e., a private corporation organized under Philippine law address "could not be ascertained by diligent inquiry."
declared Good Earth "as if in default" and allowed Baltazar to present and hence registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission)  In the case at bar, petitioner acted as if the address of Good Earth was
his evidence ex parte 10 days later is governed by Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. "unknown." Petitioner claimed that Good Earth could not be found at
- the trial court then issued the questioned judgment by default against The regular mode, in other words, of serving summons upon a private the address appearing in the TCT issued in the name of Good Earth.
Good Earth which: 1) declared Baltazar true and owner of the property Philippine corporation is by personal service upon one of the officers of The sum total of what the Sheriff actually did, was to ask a security
covered by TCT No. 191048, 2) ordered Good Earth to reconvey that such corporation identified in Section 13. guard he found at 666 Muelle de Binondo and this security guard
property to Baltazar and, should Good Earth fail so to reconvey, 3)  For the purpose of receiving service of summons and being bound by apparently pointed to the building directory where the name of Good
decreed the cancellation of TCT No. 191048; and 4) required the it, a corporation is Identified with its agent or officer who under the rule Earth did not appear. It is argued by Good Earth that had the Sheriff
Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new TCT in the name of Baltazar. is designated to accept service of process. " The corporate power to inquired at any of the offices actually found in the building at 666
These were done accordingly all without the knowledge of Good Earth. receive and act on such service, so far as to make it known to the Muelle de Binondo, he would have found Good Earth which is a
- Baltazar lost no time at all in selling the land so titled in his name to corporation, is thus vested in such officer or agent." A strict corporation owned or controlled by the Ching family, considering that
Aurora Galvez, Rizaliana Garments, Inc. and to BGB Development compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction all the corporations quartered at 666 Muelle de Binondo are Ching
CorporationOn 9 August 1979, Good Earth instituted a complaint for of the court over a corporation. The purpose is to render it reasonably family corporations. Good Earth, in other words, did not dispute that
annulment of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5552-P and for certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila was its correct corporate address. The
reconveyance, against Artemio Baltazar and his vendees Aurora action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a court does not believe, therefore, that the address of Good Earth could
Galvez and BGB Development Corporation, which complaint was representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will be regarded as "unknown" within the meaning of Section 16 of Rule
docketed as Civil Case No. PQ-7410-P, in the Court of First Instance of know what to do with the legal papers served on him.