Negotiating with the Chinese: Their Views on Tactics and Relationships

Cheryl Rivers
School of Management
Faculty of Business
University of the Sunshine Coast
Maroochydore DC, QLD 4558
Australia
crivers@usc.edu.au

Paper submitted to the

21st Annual Conference of the
International Association for Conflict Management
Chicago, USA
July 3 – 6, 2008

Program Content Area of Negotiation

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298526

 Negotiating with the Chinese: Their Views on Tactics and Relationships

Abstract

The Chinese negotiation style is enigmatic for many foreign negotiators. Of

particular concern is the use of unscrupulous tactics by the Chinese. This paper explores how

Chinese negotiators think about ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics focussing on how the

relationship with the other party influences perceived appropriateness of such tactics. Two

studies are presented: an interpretation of interview data, followed by a study measuring

differences in ratings of appropriateness of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics according

to the closeness of a relationship with the other party. The implications of the finding that

Chinese negotiators rate tactics as significantly less appropriate when they have a relationship

with the other party is discussed.

Keywords: China, negotiation, ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (EANTs),

relationships.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298526

 Negotiating with the Chinese: Their Views on Tactics and Relationships

Some foreign negotiators view Chinese negotiators as ‘‘immoral’ business people

who can ‘cheat’, ‘lie’, or do whatever is necessary to throw you off balance’ (Fang, 2006, p.

51). For instance, many foreign negotiators would consider the Chinese negotiation tactic of

‘calling the general manager of the foreign company directly to criticise the behaviour of its

negotiators, questioning their competence and sometimes their honesty’ (Faure, 2000, p.183)

as inappropriate. Indeed, U.S. respondents rated three tactics very like this one toward the

inappropriate end of a 7-point scale (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000).

With the growing economic importance of China (Hitt, Franklin, & Zhu, 2006) and its

attractiveness as a venue for foreign direct investment (Fang, 2006), the likelihood that

Western and other negotiators will find themselves opposite a Chinese negotiator is

increasing. The more light we can shed on the Chinese negotiation mindset, the better, for

enhanced knowledge of Chinese negotiating practices can help increase the success rate of

negotiations (Ghauri & Fang, 2001). Although there is a long history of books and papers on

Chinese negotiators (recent ones include Fang, 2006; Kumar & Worm, 2004; Lee, Yang, &

Graham, 2006; Ma et al., 2002; Miles, 2003; Stark, Fam, Waller, & Tain, 2005; Tan & Lim,

2004), the question of how Chinese negotiators view and use ethically ambiguous negotiation

tactics1 (EANTs) has not been a focus, and so, understanding about the issue is tentative at

best. The negotiation ethics literature does not shed much light on the issue of Chinese

negotiator’s view of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics either. Studies on the use and

perceived appropriateness of EANTs across cultures (see Rivers & Lytle, 2007 for a review),

rarely include Asian or Chinese negotiators. Thus, many questions remain about how the

1
An ethically ambiguous negotiation tactic is a manoeuvre used in the course of a negotiation that may be
regarded as wrong by at least some individuals who participate in or observe the negotiation (Rivers & Lytle,
2007). Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics are referred to as EANTs in this paper.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298526

Chinese view EANTs and more importantly for practitioners – do they really approve of

EANTs and if so, what can be done to avoid being on the receiving end of EANTs?

The perception that Chinese negotiators cheat and lie may be related to their

‘paradoxical personality’ (Fang, 2006). Chinese negotiators behave either as a ‘Confucian

gentlemen’, and pursue integrative strategies and a win-win approach to negotiation, or

behave as a ‘Sun Tzu-like strategist’ when they will manipulate the other party and adopt a

win-lose approach to negotiation (Fang, 2006). Presumably, it is this Sun Tze-like strategist

that does the cheating and approves of EANTs to beat the other party. In deciding which

approach to take, the Chinese negotiator’s relationship with the other party is instrumental.

He or she perceives the other party as either a civilised person if the other party conforms to

Chinese ritual or as a barbarian (Faure, 1998). If the other party is viewed as ‘a barbarian,

one is entitled to borrow from a much wider range of tactics, and many tricks are allowed’

(Faure, 1998, p. 143).

This dichotomy of negotiating styles can be explained by the collectivist orientation

of the Chinese. Triandis et al. (2001) have argued that negotiators from vertical collectivist

countries (such as China) are likely to lie in a negotiation situation because the distance

between the enemy (the out-group, in a negotiation ‘the other party’) and self is great.

‘Honesty is only a norm that concerns the in-group or people with whom one has established

personalised relations. … According to Chinese morals it’s not wrong to lie, or a more

nuanced view would be that the Chinese are honest and loyal to persons they know, not

toward people in general’ (Worm & Frankenstein, 2000, p. 275). In other words, the key to

being perceived as a civilised person, rather than a barbarian is to have a relationship with the

Chinese negotiator. The importance of relationships in negotiating with the Chinese has been

established in a number of studies (Leung & Yeung, 1995; Leung, 1997; Sheer & Chen,

4
2003) and relationship-building has been identified as a key factor in achieving a successful

negotiation outcome and success (Li & Labig Jr, 2001).

Any negotiator who has done their research prior to going to China should be well

aware that Chinese negotiators are relationship-focussed. However, some of the earlier

research could lead a foreign negotiator to ‘board the plane with naive expectations of a

warm and easygoing negotiation experience’ (Miles, 2003, p. 454) because research

emphasised the positive side of the Chinese relationship focus. Early research focussed on

how Chinese collectivism led to the pursuit of harmony with their negotiating partner and

preference for co-operative tactics (e.g.: Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Buttery &

Leung, 1998; Tinsley, 1996). This view is true enough, on the proviso that the harmony-

seeking Chinese negotiators are negotiating with other Chinese negotiators who they view as

a ‘civilised person’.

Given that the relationship between the negotiation partners is critical to the

negotiation process in China (Kumar & Worm, 2004), the two studies reported in this paper

on Chinese negotiators’ perspective on EANTs focus on the relationship with the other party.

The first study is interpretation of data from a series of interviews with Chinese negotiators

about how they viewed EANTs. From this, an hypothesis was developed and subsequently

tested in the second study which surveyed 254 Chinese using a Mandarin version of the Self-

reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies or SINS scale (Robinson et al., 2000) which is

used by negotiation researchers to collect ratings of appropriateness of EANTs.

This paper informs our understanding of Chinese negotiating practices and contributes

to the broader negotiation and culture and negotiation ethics literature. It addresses recent

calls for more studies of Chinese negotiating tactics and empirical description of the Chinese

approach to negotiation (Ghauri & Fang, 2001). By incorporating the relationship with the

other party in the investigation, it also begins testing of Rivers' & Lytle's (2007) interactionist

5
model of the influence of culture on ethical decision making in negotiation, albeit only in

China.

The rest of the paper is presented as follows. Each study is presented in turn. The

methodology of the first qualitative study is followed by the interpretation of the data. The

methods and results of the survey study are then presented before a discussion of what the

results of the two studies mean to negotiators going to China.

Interpretive Study of Chinese Views about EANTs

Methods. An interpretive study was the starting point in exploring how Chinese

negotiators’ view EANTs. An in-depth interview was conducted with 18 Chinese managers

(7 were women) with an average age of 31 years and 9 years average work experience. Table

1 of the demographic details of the participants and their code names (Chinese numbers) is

given below. Interviews took place in Qingdao, China in 2002.

Table 1 – Characteristics of Respondents for STUDY 1

Code Age Gender Work Current Role Ownership
Name Experience Structure of
(years) Organisation
Yi 35 M 12 Manager Export Dept Semi-privatised
Er 25 M 2 IT Manager Government
San 27 M 5 Immigration Consultant Private
Si 44 M 20 Manager Export Dept Semi-privatised
Wu 38 M 18 Manager Export Dept Semi-privatised
Liu 37 M 15 Project Manager International JV
Chi 25 F 3 Administrator Export Dept Semi-privatised
Ba 32 F 8 Manager Export Dept Private
Jiu 32 M 10 Import and Export Manager Semi-privatised
Shi 30 F 7 Export Manager Semi-privatised
Shi yi 24 F 1.5 Sales Manager Government
Shi er 23 M 2 Procurements Officer Private
Shi san 26 M 5 Sales Manager Government
Shi si 29 M 6 Exporter Private
Shi wu 40 F 18 Exporter Own private
Shi liu 40 M 20 Sales Manager Own private
Shi chi 28 F 4 Merchandiser Private
Shi ba 26 F 3 Sales Manager Private
Average 31 9

6
 Although interviews are one of the most common techniques used in ethics research

(Randall & Gibson, 1990), social desirability effects remain an issue. In order to limit social

desirability effects, a vignette technique was used. The vignette shown below was designed

for this study and contains a complex set of relationship and obligation dilemmas for the

negotiator.

You are the lead negotiator for a company called ABC Manufacturing and are engaged in developing a joint
venture project with an international company, XYZ Corporation. The leader of XYZ’s negotiation team is
someone you went to school with and were quite friendly with at school, and through your university days, but
you lost contact when he/she went to work overseas.
In the course of your negotiation, you have renewed your friendship over drinks and dinners after hours. You
respect the negotiating skills of your former classmate very much. He/she is a formidable negotiator, a good
match to your own skills and you are enjoying the process.
After three weeks of negotiation, where you have been working on the assumption of 50-50 ownership, your
boss at ABC Manufacturing has come and told you that ABC Manufacturing wants at least 51%. You know
from your negotiations to date that XYZ Corporation will not view this requirement favourably and wants to
maintain 50% control.
Your boss at ABC Manufacturing has suggested that the lead negotiator from XYZ (your friend) ‘is just too
good and we ought to get rid of him’. Your boss is quite insistent that you should adopt this strategy.
You know that you have a good opportunity to do as your boss has asked at the next dinner with the XYZ
Corporation because you know that you will be sitting next to his boss and could easily tell the boss that your
friend is not doing a good job and could get him/her removed from the negotiation.
You also know that a successful agreement is very important to your friend because he/she is new to the job and
if he/she fails, then he/she may lose his job, which will affect his/her family badly. He/she helped you out when
you were at university with getting your first job.
On the other hand, you know that if you succeed in fulfilling the requirements set down by your boss, you are
likely to get a prestigious promotion and substantial pay rise which is much needed because you have a new
baby in the house

The vignette was loosely based on item 3 of Robinson's et al. (2000) SINS scale used

by negotiation ethics researchers: ‘attempt to get the lead negotiator from the other party fired

from his position’. To incorporate the impact of relationship with the other party, the

vignette said that the other party was a former school and university friend. A school and

university friend was selected because of the meaning of the Mandarin word ‘tongxue’ which

has in it a ‘reservoir of binding ties and ethical obligations’ (Yang, 1994, p. 111).

Participants were asked what actions they would take and were asked questions about how

they perceived the friendship, how they balanced the friendship off against their desire to

7
achieve the company goals and against their personal goals and motivations. The scenario

was translated and back-translated and decentred (as recommended by Gudykunst, 2000)

with a Chinese researcher. Interviews were conducted with a translator.

The analysis of data from the interviews drew on the principals of grounded theory

(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). All data were coded by the author and then analysed using the

constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The constant comparison was

between participants and between the codes.

The influence of relationships on perceived appropriateness of EANTs. Three

themes emerged from the analysis of the interview data. Of these, the first theme is of most

important in understanding the way Chinese think about using EANTs in negotiation. The

Chinese respondents expressed more willingness to use the EANT in the vignette if they have

no relationship with the other party. Participants also emphasised that their first obligation

was to their friend rather than the company and said they would have to manage the impact of

their business actions on their personal relationship. The second theme emphasises how

important relationships are in the Chinese cultural context and the final theme – guanxi –

demonstrates the level of obligation that the respondents felt toward their friends. The three

themes are described in turn.

Relationships influence willingness to use EANTs

The data were interpreted to mean that the Chinese negotiators think EANTs are more

appropriate if they do not know the other party. Negotiators said they would act differently

with the other party if they were not friends. In the first quote below, participant Qi

expresses willingness to use the EANT proposed to her in the scenario, saying that if the

other party is not her friend, that it is an appropriate tactic. Similarly, participant Si says that

8
if the other party was not his friend, he was willing to do anything to achieve the goal set for

him by his boss. In the final quote given below, participant Shi san shows the relative

importance of friendship to his obligations to his boss and the organisational goals. He says

that if the other party is not his friend then he will show loyalty to his boss.

Participant Qi If she is not my friend, it is a proper tactic. But if Mary is, it is not.
Participant Si Even if my boss did not give me any specific instructions, if John is not my friend,
I will try every method to achieve my boss’s goal.
Participant Shi san If John is not my friend, and there is an old Chinese saying ‘people should be loyal
to his boss’. I must consider the company’s goal. As long as it is legal. You can
do that.

Not all the Chinese respondents were prepared to use the EANT suggested to them –

participant Ba insisted that an unethical tactic was unethical for everyone, friends or not –

however, the increased willingness to use EANTs with outsiders than with friends was a

recurring theme. These quotes articulate what was labelled the paradoxical personality of

Chinese negotiators in the introduction, with a wider set of tactics available when the other

party was considered a barbarian.

Obligations towards their friends

The second theme was not related to the use of EANTs per se, but it does demonstrate

how important friendship is to Chinese negotiators. Participants expressed that their first

obligation was to their friend, rather than to their company. Although one respondent chose

loyalty to the company over the friend, saying she ‘had no other choice’ than to do what her

boss wanted of her to do, because it was ‘the decision of the company’, most expressed that

their first obligation was to their friend.

In the first quote below, participant Wu tells the story of the Chinese god Guan Gong

who provides an exemplar of behaviour for others to follow. Participant Liu argues that he

will not ‘sacrifice the friendship’ just to do well in his job. The final quote provides a reason

9
why a Chinese participant will not take the action requested by his boss. Participant Er says

that friendship is more important than any rewards a company can give him.2

Participant Wu In traditional Chinese culture, I don’t know if you have noticed it or not, in many
companies there is a person [sculpture of] Guan Gong – the advantage of that
person is that he emphasises honesty and friendship. To show that we are honest
and emphasise friendship very much and the old Chinese man can bring us luck in
making money. In order to help his friends, he will even sacrifice his own life.
Participant Liu Friendship is the most important thing. I won’t sacrifice the friendship in order to
perform excellently in my job.
Participant Er The reason why I won’t do this, is that there is a strong friendship between us.
And even if he will never find it, I will never do it. I think friendship is more
important than benefit.
I will prefer to give up the chance to be promoted and to give the chance to John.
I will make money in the future, but once I lose friendship, I cannot get it back.

Managing Guanxi

The third theme that emerged from the data related to their obligation to help the

friend was the Chinese consideration of guanxi. Guanxi is guided by two concepts: the code

of brotherhood and the code of reciprocity (Chenting, Sirgy, & Littlefield, 2003). Concern

for guanxi was shown when the participants talked about their obligations to help their

friends if the negotiation left their friend in an unsatisfactory position. A number of

participants suggested that they should look after their friend ‘privately’. In the quotes

below, participant Shi liu talks about providing economic help if his friend loses his job.

Participant Shi san offers a tangible way how he would help his friend: he would ask his boss

to employ the friend if he is ‘defeated’ in the negotiation.

Participant Shi liu But in this way I will take some method to help my friend as well. From the other
hand – for example, [if] my friend lost his job, it will make difficult, for him and
his family, his wife and children. I will support him from economic. I have to do
so.
Participant Shi san If my friend is defeated by me, I will compensate him, for example, to ask my
boss to employ my friend.

2
This participant was very wealthy and this may have influenced his answer.

10
 Summary and hypothesis. The interpretation of the data here shows that how the

other party is perceived is complex. The Chinese negotiators expressed a greater willingness

to use the proposed EANT when they did not know the other party. It is posited that

closeness of the relationship will impact Chinese negotiators view of appropriateness of

EANTs. The second and third themes identified in the data demonstrate the importance of

relationships and the obligations that go with these relationships to Chinese negotiators.

Based on interpretation of the data, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1: Chinese negotiators will consider EANTs as less appropriate when negotiating with another party
with whom they have a relationship compared to when negotiating with a stranger.

Influence of Relationship on Chinese Ratings of Appropriateness of EANTs

Methods. To test this hypothesis, two scenarios were devised that varied according to

the closeness of the relationship with the other party and these scenarios were presented to

the respondents followed by the SINS scale (Robinson et al., 2000) which required

respondents to rate the appropriateness of the 16 EANTS on a 1-7 lickert-type scale. A

repeated measures (within-subjects) design was used and the hypothesis tested in a repeated

measure General Linear Model (ANCOVA). Estimated marginal means were calculated

controlling for age, gender and work experience. Two copies of the SINS scale prefaced by

the contextual scenarios were distributed to 254 working adults in Qingdao, China. The

average age was 29 years with average work experience of 8 years. 51.2% (130) of the

sample was female.

The two scenarios are shown below with the differences shown in bold type. The

survey was administered in Mandarin after a back-translation process as recommended by

(Ady, 1994 and Gudykunst, 2000).

11
Scenario One
You are the lead negotiator for Company X and are engaged in developing a joint venture project with a local
company, Company B. You have just discovered that the lead negotiator for Company B is someone you
know: someone who was in your class at school. Your classmate has a reputation of being a good negotiator.
Your company wants the majority share of equity in the joint venture project. You believe that Company B will
not be happy about this.

Scenario Two
You are the lead negotiator for Company X and are engaged in developing a joint venture project with a
company from overseas, Company B. You have not met the negotiator from Company B before, but you
have heard that the lead negotiator has the reputation of being a good negotiator. Your company wants the
majority share of equity in the joint venture project. You believe that Company B will not be happy about this.

Again, a school mate was used to operationalise a relationship with the other party.

The second version of the scenario refers to a negotiator ‘you have not met before’. Hwang,

(2000) proposed three levels of interpersonal relationships in Chinese society. A classmate

belongs in Hwang's, (2000) middle level of interpersonal ties, which he calls ‘mixed ties’:

relationships with acquaintances outside the immediate family. Someone you have not met

before falls into Hwang's, (2000) third and most distant level of interpersonal relationships

which he calls ‘instrumental ties’: those established between an individual and stranger

simply for the purpose of acquiring a particular resource.

Because the SINS scale had not been validated in China, exploratory factor analysis

was run for each scenario to check for metric equivalence, a normal procedure in cross-

cultural research. The factor analysis showed that the factor structure was not uniform across

the data sets or with previous reported factor structures. This led to the data being analysed at

the item level3 rather than the aggregating the 16 items into five types of EANT.

A potential limitation of applying the SINS scale in China is that some of the items

may not make sense or fit Chinese cultural expectations. For example, item 13: gain

3
Single-item measures, although not popular, are appropriate when the construct being measured is sufficiently
narrow and unambiguous to the respondent (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997).The purpose of this
administration of the SINS scale is diagnostic and direct. It is seeking to measure differences in ratings of
appropriateness of EANTs. Because the factor analysis of the two data sets showed no consistency, analysis
was forced down the road of item-level comparisons. However, it is important to note that item-level analysis is
appropriate for this study irrespective of the results of the factor analysis.

12
information about Company B’s lead negotiator’s position by cultivating his/her friendship

through expensive gifts, entertaining or personal favours may be ethically ambiguous in the

U.S. and other Western countries where it could be deemed corruption, but it may not be

ethically ambiguous in China where gift-giving is an intrinsic part of relationship building

(Yang, 1994). Similarly, tactics that involve the negotiator misrepresenting the progress of

the negotiation back to his/her own organisation appear to run counter to the practices of

Chinese organisations where high uncertainty-avoidance on the part of negotiators would

inhibit the use of such tactics because of potential loss of face in their organisation.

Results. Table 2 shows that the hypothesised influence of relationship with the other

party on ratings of appropriateness of EANTs was supported. Chinese negotiators rated the

appropriateness of EANTs as significantly less appropriate when negotiating with another

party with whom they have a relationship compared to when negotiating with a stranger for

13 of the 16 EANTs on the SINS scale. The trend was in the expected direction for all of the

items on the SINS scale.

Discussion

It is interesting to compare the ratings of appropriateness of the EANTs on the scale.

The rating scale was a 7 point scale with 1= not at all appropriate and 7 = very appropriate.

The respondents rated tactic 1: ‘promise that good things will happen…even if you

can’t (or won’t) deliver…’ as the least appropriate for the scenario with a former classmate.

This low rating of appropriateness may be related to the guanxi concerns that were identified

as the third theme in the interpretive study. Chinese consider the long-term nature of

relationships so it may be that they are reluctant to use false promises as a tactic if there could

13
be a loss of face later down the track. This tactic was rated as significantly more appropriate

when negotiating with a stranger where face concerns may not be present.

Table 2 – Estimated Marginal Means of Perceived Appropriateness of EANTs

Item Rating Rating Significant

S1 S2 Differences
Classmate Stranger

1: Promise that good things will happen to Company B’s lead negotiator if 1.79 2.28 .49 ***
he/she gives you what you want, even if you can’t (or won’t) deliver these
things when the other’s cooperation is obtained.
2: Intentionally misrepresent information to Company B’s lead negotiator 2.38 3.26 .87***
in order to strengthen your negotiating arguments or position.
3: Attempt to get the lead negotiator from Company B fired from his/her 2.50 3.30 .80***
position so that a new person will take his/her place.

4: Intentionally misrepresent the nature of negotiation to your constituency 2.09 2.32 .28*
in order to protect delicate discussions that have occurred.

5: Gain information about Company B’s lead negotiator’s position by 3.72 4.24 .52 ***
paying your friends, associate and contacts to get this information for you.

6: Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope 3.97 4.34 .37 ***
to settle for.
7: Convey a false impression that you are in absolutely no hurry to come to 5.35 5.47
a negotiated agreement, thereby trying to put time pressure on Company
B’s lead negotiator to concede quickly.
8: In return for concessions from Company B’s lead negotiator now, offer 3.28 3.42
to make future concessions that you know you will not follow through on.
9: Threaten to make Company B’s lead negotiator look weak or foolish in 1.94 2.21
front of a boss or others to whom he/she is accountable, even if you know
that you won’t actually carry out the threat.
10: Deny the validity of information which Company B’s lead negotiator 3.18 3.9 .22*
has that weakens your negotiating position, even though that information is
true and valid.
11: Intentionally misrepresent the progress of negotiations to your 1.88 2.03 .15 *
constituency in order to make your own position appear stronger.
12: Talk directly to the people to who Company B’s lead negotiator reports 2.67 3.10 .43 ***
to, or is accountable to, and tell them things that will undermine their
confidence in him/her as a negotiator.
13: Gain information about Company B’s lead negotiator’s position by 3.66 3.98 .32 ***
cultivating his/her friendship through expensive gifts, entertaining or
personal favours.
14: Make an opening demand so high that it seriously undermines 3.63 3.88 .25 **
Company B’s lead negotiator’s confidence in his/her ability to negotiate a
satisfactory agreement.
15: Guarantee that your constituency will uphold the settlement reached, 2.98 3.19 .21 *
although you know that they will likely violate the agreement later.
16: Gain information about Company B’s lead negotiator’s position by 4.01 4.25 .19*
trying to recruit one of his/her team members (on the condition that the
team member brings confidential information with him/her).

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001

14
 Tactic 11: ‘intentionally misrepresent the progress of negotiations to your

constituency’ was also rated very low in both scenarios. This tactic may be an example of an

item that is not appropriate in the Chinese context. As noted in the methods section, Chinese

negotiators may be concerned about loss of face in their organisation.

The tactic that was rated highest on the appropriateness scale was item 7: ‘convey you

are in absolutely no hurry…thereby putting time pressure on the other party’. There was no

significant difference in the rating across the two scenarios and given the high rating, the

results support previous case study research that found delaying tactics are commonplace in

Chinese negotiations (Miles, 2003). Chinese negotiators are often taught ‘the 36 strategems’

and it may be that when an EANT aligns with one of these strategems, it will be rated as

more appropriate. Item 7 is roughly equivalent to Chinese negotiation stratagems number 9

which is translated as ‘master the art of delay and wait for favourable conditions to emerge’

(Fang, 2006) and stratagem 4 which has been translated as ‘relax and preserve your strength

while watching the enemy exhaust himself’ (Fang, 2006). The appropriateness of this tactic

may also reflect the long-term time orientation of Chinese negotiators.

Other tactics that can be linked to the 36 Chinese negotiation stratagems were also

rated toward the appropriate end of the scale. Item 16: gain information about the other

party’s position by trying to recruit a member of the team’ was rated above 4 on the 7 point

scale for both scenarios. It can be related to stratagem 24 which has been translated to mean

‘deal with the enemies one by one. Use a nearby state as a springboard to read the distant

state’ (Fang, 2006). Similarly item 13: gain information by cultivating the negotiator’s

friendship through expensive gifts, entertaining and personal favours’ which can be linked to

stratagem to 31: use women, temptation and espionage to overpower the enemy (Fang, 2006)

was rated 3.66 and 3.98 for the friend and stranger scenarios respectively.

15
 It is also possible to relate tactic 5 ‘gain information about Company B’s lead

negotiator’s position by paying your friends, associate and contacts to get this information for

you’ to Sun Tzu’s writings. In chapter 13 of Sun Tzu’s writings, he notes that it is inhumane

to not employ spies if their information will shorten a war, and the only way to get good spies

is to pay them fairly (Sun, 1981). This tactic was also rated toward the appropriate end of the

scale at 3.72 for the friend scenario and 4.24 for the stranger scenario. If the Chinese know

little about the other party as they would in scenario 2, it is logical that they would rate it as

more appropriate in scenario 2 than in scenario 1, thus accounting for the significant

difference between scenarios. The perceived appropriateness of this tactic is supported by an

interview-based study of Chinese negotiators that reported ‘approximately half of the Chinese

interviewees disclosed that they had effectively gathered important information through

covert channels’(Sheer & Chen, 2003, p.77).

The EANTs in the SINS scale that related to Sun Tzu’s Art of War have been rated

toward the appropriate end of the scale. It is posited that the rating reflect the fact that the Art

of War is widely studied throughout Asia by businessmen (Chu, 1988) and Chinese

negotiation pedagogy reinforces the view that Sun Tzu view that ‘the marketplace is a

battlefield’ (Zhao, 2000).

Managerial Implications and Conclusions

Although recent research that has suggested that Chinese negotiators are becoming

more focussed on doing business, with less emphasis on relationships (Stark et al., 2005), the

results presented here suggest there is benefit in foreign negotiators spending time building a

relationship with their Chinese counterparts. Chinese negotiators rate ethically ambiguous

negotiation tactics as more appropriate when they are dealing with a stranger than with

someone who they have a relationship so it is logical that if a foreign negotiator can build a

16
relationship with a Chinese negotiator, they can potentially avoid being on the receiving end

of EANTs.

The best advice to foreign negotiators on how to create a relationship may well be the

advice that is taught to Chinese negotiators on how ‘to create and maintain a friendly

atmosphere for building a long-term cooperative relationship…include making small talk

about personal interests, hobbies, education or travel experience, reserving a hotel for one’s

counterparts, receiving the counterparts at the airport and holding social meetings in

restaurants’ (Zhao, 2000, p.220). Foreign negotiators, particularly those from cultures where

time is money, need to be aware that the Chinese invest a lot of time in their relationship

building and foreign negotiators need to build an expectation of slow relationship building

into their excursions to China.

In the discussion section, many of the EANTs in the SINS scaled were linked to

Chinese strategems. These results show that the Chinese rate these tactics or strategems as

moderately appropriate in negotiation. It may well be useful for foreign negotiators to

familiarise themselves with these tactics and to enter the negotiation in the expectation that

they may be used. For example, the ratings showed that Chinese negotiators thought giving

the impression that they are in no hurry is quite appropriate in negotiation. It is logical that

they are likely to use such a tactic.

It would be useful for future research to explore the perceived appropriateness of

other traditional or classical Chinese tactics. Future research could also measure Chinese

negotiators’ willingness to use EANTs. Such results would provide foreign negotiators with

insights into what tactics they can expect to face. The absence of the Chinese stratagems in

the SINS scale suggests that an extended scale could be developed that would be more

universally applicable.

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 Because use of EANTs can cause anger and disrupt the flow of the negotiation,

practitioners can also apply the results of the second study by purposefully avoiding the use

of tactics that Chinese negotiators rate as inappropriate. Tactics that may result in loss of

face, such as item 9: threaten to make the negotiator look week or foolish in front of his boss,

received low approval ratings and should be avoided by foreign negotiators.

It is likely that Chinese negotiators will continue to see the use of EANTs on some

foreign negotiators as appropriate and in so doing will feed the view that the Chinese are

‘immoral’ business people. However a closer look at the results in the studies presented here

show that it isn’t quite as simple as that and foreign negotiators have to invest time and

energy into developing a relationship with their Chinese counterpart in order to do what they

can to avoid being on the receiving end of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics.

18
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