A.C.

1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the
bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity
of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due
weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous
with the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The
minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is
without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be
amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since
the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,.
Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause
or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23,
1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of
Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the
Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there
were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration
dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full
competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned
out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said
to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal
were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to
task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the
extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former
clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can
integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had
elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It
may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing
the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission
to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is
that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition
on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.
Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues
filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in
the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that
after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from
July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in
the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of
Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is
the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity
of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated
Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues
is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost
of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual
dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of
his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved
by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP
Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory
payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he
has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his
removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the
community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to
levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member
is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of
his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay
membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
 This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails
the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-
2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that
failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D.

BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.

D E C I S IO N

VITUG, J.: JVITUG

Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon
9 thereof, viz:

"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." barth

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled
students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the
defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise
agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which,
in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal
defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant
averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part
in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements
complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil
Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira
O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli
A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of
DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the
paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of
hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the
student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring
students. Jksm

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise
to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students,
to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-
Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March
1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement
of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven,
assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter
of apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October
1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito,
assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated
06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D.
Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the
manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed
Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against
the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case." Chief

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case.
Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were
represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was
counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or
because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter
disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative
aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation[1] which, among other things, explicitly contained
the following stipulation; viz:

"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. Esm

"x x x......x x x......x x x

"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them."

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors
in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat
too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this
decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.

Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.

Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's
disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.

The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:

Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L.
Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning to
Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United States government as a widow of a
US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until
the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get,
demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above
documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.

On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special power
of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the special
power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages
against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B.
Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on

23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post
office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for attempting to
circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap,
the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to
prevent all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.

On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the pension
checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but only the
signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without the
participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant
Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that
complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54
months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement
was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on the
following allegations:
 7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and
signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or
at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the
same;

8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement;
(b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c)
respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents
foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;

9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;

10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent

complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,

Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty.
Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of complainant
and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the compromise agreement.

Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed that her
lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.

Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant stated that
respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion to
withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly loaded in
favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October 1984. There
is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to be paid. The only
additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note was 25% of the principal as
attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.

In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's debt to
Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10) months. This
translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise
agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at
an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required to
see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.

With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise agreement, it is
of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado.
Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons
enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.

There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise
agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged
abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw an
opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise
agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to
complainant.

Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

9. Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of

controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim,
warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts constituting
malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and
trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION
from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his receipt of this
decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member of the
Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.