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SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; FORCIBLE ENTRY. —
The law which forbids a forcible entry into the
dwelling of another relates not only to the
method by which one may pass the threshold of
the dwelling of another without his consent but
also to the conduct immediately after entrance
of one who so enters.
JOHNSON, J. :
TORRES, J.:
An appeal raised by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction rendered in this case by
the Honorable Judge George N. Hurd.
On the night of the 18th until the clearly
morning of the 19th of May, 1910, Elena
Llanera was asleep in her house situated in the
pueblo of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, her husband,
Emilio Soriano, being at the time absent in this
city; she was sleeping under a mosquito netting
in the parlor of the house with her three minor
children and the women Damiana Collado and
Elena Molina, and in the dining room of the
said house the men named Cenon and Luis
Pascual, with their respective wives, were also
asleep. At about 4 o'clock in the morning
Llanera was awakened by the noise produced
on the floor by a mans step, in the direction of
her feet; she therefore awoke Damiana and, on
raising one of the sides of the mosquito netting,
they saw and recognized Faustino Mesina, for
there was then a light in the house; the latter
hurriedly went into another room followed by
the three women who then saw the said party
go out of the window, which on that occasion
was open, and from there alight on the ground
by supporting himself upon a window of the
ground floor. The inmates of the house testified
that before going to bed that night they had
closed all the windows and doors of the house.
1awphil.net
The provincial fiscal, therefore, on September
22, 1910, filed an information with the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, charging
Faustino Mesina with the crime of forcible
entry, and, this cause having been instituted, the
court in view of the evidence and on the 23d of
November following rendered judgment by
sentencing the defendant to the penalty of four
months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 500
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and the costs. From this
judgment the defendant appealed.
The facts related, duly proved in this cause,
certainly constitute the crime of forcible entry,
performed without violence or intimidation,
provided for and punished in article 491,
paragraph, 1, of the Penal Code, inasmuch as,
from the testimony of three eyewitnesses, it
was fully proven that, on the owner of the
house, Elena Llanera, being awakened, early in
the morning of the 19th of May, by the sound
of the steps of a person who was walking inside
of the house near her bed which was covered
with a mosquito netting, both she and her
companions who were sleeping with her under
the same netting on raising one side of the
same saw and recognized the person, by the
light there was in the house, as being the
defendant, Faustino Mesina, who, on observing
that the said women had awakened and had
seen him, immediately and hastily entered the
small room of the house, followed by them, and
went down out of the building through one of
the windows of the said room, which at that
moment was open, by supporting himself on a
window of the entresol, located thereunder,
which must have been the way he got in, for
the inmates of the house had closed that room
window and all the others in the house had
closed that room window and all the others in
the house the night previous before retiring.
The defendant's denial, his exculpatory
allegations and the testimony of his witnesses
were unsuccessful in over-throwing the very
positive evidence of the prosecution, for his
allegation that he was at the said house on the
morning of the day aforementioned, for the
purpose of making some requests to the
husband of the offended woman, Elena
Llanera, who, as she was in the granary nearby,
had to be called and on arriving at her house he
had a long conversation with her and not until
after she had had her breakfast did he leave for
the sitio of Bibclat, was not corroborated by the
testimony of his two witnesses, Buenaventura
Maligsi and Eusebio Landicho, the first of
whom testified that he was engaged that
morning in hauling rice to the warehouse of
Elena Llanera, who was then inside of this
building, and the second witness, that he was
near the warehouse waiting for his neighbor
named Julio; they then saw the defendant enter
the house of the offended party and after a short
while, during which the latter, called by a little
girl, returned to the house, these witnesses saw
the defendant come down out of the
house.1awph!1.net This testimony, far from
proving the defendant's statement, completely
disproves them and belies the fact affirmed by
Mesina relative to the long conversation;
besides, the offended party denied that the
defendant was in her house that morning.
Moreover, the testimony of the municipal
policeman, Timoteo Palis, corroborates the
evidence of the prosecution. This witness
testified that while he was on guard duty at the
municipal building a short while before 4
o'clock on the morning of the said date, the
defendant passed by and advised him that the
policeman should be ready who were to
accompany him, Mesina, to the sitio of Bibclat,
and that the defendant immediately left and
witness did not know whether the latter went.
This testimony, combined with that of the
offended party and her two witness, and all
taken as a whole, produce in the mind a
thorough conviction that the defendant did
commit the crime under prosecution. It is to be
presumed that after passing by the municipal
building the defendant went to the house where
the crime was committed and claimed up into it
through the window, for this was not very high
up.
For the reason stated, the testimony of the wife
of the defendant can not be considered as proof
of an alibi in his behalf to the effect that at the
hour and on the date mentioned her husband
was in his house and that Elena Llanera,
subsequent to the denunciation of the crime,
had talked with her in order that she might feel
no resentment-inasmuch as such statements
were not proved and the offended party denied
that she had had any conversation whatever
with Marcelina Santiago, the defendant's wife.
Article 491, aforecited, provides that any
private person who shall enter the dwelling of
another against the latter's will shall incur the
penalty specified therein, and although the
inmates of the house did not forbid the
defendant to enter the same, nevertheless and
withal when one enters a house by climbing up
into it and passing through a window thereof
which had been closed and was opened by the
perpetrator of the crime for the purpose of his
entry, even though no violence was employed
in doing so, it is unquestionable that the entry
into the house, by taking advantage of the
darkness and when all the inmates thereof were
asleep, bears the character of the crime of
forcible entry, for the reason that, under such
circumstance, it is not necessary that there
should have been a previous prohibition to
enter by the inmates, since this is presumed,
and because the entry into the premises was
affected against the will of the occupants
thereof, there being no proof that the defendant
entered the same with the permission or the
consent of any of them.
In the commission of the crime there is no
extenuating circumstance whatever to be
considered, but there is the aggravating one of
nocturnity, since the defendant perpetrated the
crime by taking advantage of the silence and
darkness of the night: therefore, the penalty
fixed by law of arresto mayor should be
imposed upon him in its maximum degree.
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that
the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed; provided, however, that the defendant
shall be sentenced to the penalty of five months
of arresto mayor, to the other penalties of the
judgment of the lower court, and the costs of
this instance. So ordered.
THREATS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Jose F. Mañacop for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A.
Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez
for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari,
from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite
City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes
of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and
sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case
No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days
of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal
Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of
from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prison
correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the
sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in
both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a
former civilian employee of the Navy
Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose
services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In
the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of
about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration
staged in front of the main gate of the United
States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They
carried placards bearing statements such as,
"Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con
Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;"
"Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan
for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;"
"Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo
chiquiting;" and others. The base commander,
Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia
Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison
Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of
preserving harmonious relations between
personnel of the naval station and the civilian
population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister
requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main
gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col.
Monzon went to the place and talked to
Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura
upon learning that the demonstration was not
directed against the naval station but against
Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for
their having allegedly caused the dismissal of
Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col.
Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in
front of Hallare's residence, but they told him
that they would like the people in the station to
know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan.
They assured him, however, that they did not
intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to
blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office
inside the naval station. When he learned about
the demonstration he became apprehensive
about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's
protection. The colonel thereupon escorted
Hallare, his brother, and another person in
going out of the station, using his (Monzon's)
car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon
purpose slowed down to accommodate the
request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a
good look at the demonstrators and at the
placards they were carrying. When the
demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted,
"Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their
jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook
passed the car while the other to led behind.
After Hallare and his companions had alighted
in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St.,
Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators
parked in front of Hallare's residence after
having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off
his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and
with his right hand inside his pocket and his
left holding the gate-door, he shouted
repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin
kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the
motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes
and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the
house.lâwphi1.ñet
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro
Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961
with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and
2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as
follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the
City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes
of the crime of Grave Threats, as
defined by Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code and penalized by
paragraph 2 of the same Article,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the
City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
orally threaten to kill, one Agustin
Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
The undersigned complainant, after
being duly sworn to an oath in
accordance with law, accuses Rosauro
Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral
Defamation, as defined and penalized
by Article 358 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the
City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, without any justifiable
motive but with the intention to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt to the
undersigned complainant, in the
presence of and within hearing of
several persons, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
utter to the undersigned complainant
the following insulting and serious
defamatory remarks, to wit:
"AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO".
which if translated into English are as
follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a
whore."
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE
Complainant
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City
of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty to both charges and the cases were set for
joint trial. On the day of the hearing the
prosecution moved to amend the information in
Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by
deleting therefrom the word "orally". The
defense counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the accused had already been
arraigned on the original information and that
the amendment "would affect materially the
interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the
amendment was allowed and the joint trial
proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused
appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned
a verdict of affirmance. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the
accused brought this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the
lower court allowing the substantial
amendment of the information for grave threats
after petitioner had been arraigned on the
original information; (2) in proceeding with the
trial of the case of grave threats without first
requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the
amended information; (3) in convicting
petitioner of both offenses when he could
legally be convicted of only one offense,
thereby putting him in jeopardy of being
penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in
convicting petitioner of grave threats when the
evidence adduced and considered by the court
tend to establish the offense of light threats
only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave
oral defamation when the evidence tend to
establish that of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that
after the accused has pleaded the information
may be amended as to all matters of form by
leave and at the discretion of the court when
the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110,
New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch
upon matters of substance cannot be permitted
after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original
information, we find that all the elements of the
crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282
1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by
its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely:
(1) that the offender threatened another person
with the infliction upon his person of a wrong;
(2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and
(3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition. Hence, petitioner could have been
convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that
under the aforementioned provision the
particular manner in which the threat is made
not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such
that the deletion of the word "orally" did not
affect the nature and essence of the crime as
charged originally. Neither did it change the
basic theory of the prosecution that the accused
threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to
require the petitioner to undergo any material
change or modification in his defense. Contrary
to his claim, made with the concurrence of the
Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed
after the amendment to the danger of
conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282,
which provides for a different penalty, since
there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to
a condition. In our view the deletion of the
word "orally" was effected in order to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be
presented during the trial. It was merely a
formal amendment which in no way prejudiced
petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming
that the amendment was properly allowed, the
trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without
first requiring him to enter his plea to the
amended information. Considering, however,
that the amendment was not substantial, no
second plea was necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will
be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision
of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave
threats and of grave oral defamation when he
could legally be convicted of only one offense,
and in convicting him of grave threats at all
when the evidence adduced and considered by
the court indicates the commission of light
threats only.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin
Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval
station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators;
their persistence in trailing Hallare in a
motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof,
culminating in repeated threats flung by
petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one
conclusion: that the threats were made "with
the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind
of the person threatened the belief that the
threat would be carried into effect." 2 Indeed,
Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety
that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon,
who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed
while the demonstration was going on. It
cannot be denied that the threats were made
deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit
of anger, motivated as they were by the
dismissal of petitioner one month before the
incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate
court was correct in upholding petitioner's
conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from
the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina
mo". This is a common enough expression in
the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its
literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the
instant case, it should be viewed as part of the
threats voiced by appellant against Agustin
Hallare, evidently to make the same more
emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-
14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous
remarks is more threatening than libelous
and the intent to threaten is the principal
aim and object to the letter. The libelous
remarks contained in the letter, if so they be
considered, are merely preparatory remarks
culminating in the final threat. In other
words, the libelous remarks express the beat
of passion which engulfs the writer of the
letter, which heat of passion in the latter part
of the letter culminates into a threat. This is
the more important and serious offense
committed by the accused. Under the
circumstances the Court believes, after the
study of the whole letter, that the offense
committed therein is clearly and principally
that of threats and that the statements
therein derogatory to the person named do
not constitute an independent crime of libel,
for which the writer maybe prosecuted
separately from the threats and which
should be considered as part of the more
important offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force
to the facts of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted,
with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case
No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral
defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with
respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave
threats, with costs against petitioner.
COERCION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
C.A. No. 762 February 6, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SILVERIO NEBREJA ET AL., defendants.
SILVERIO NEBREJA, appellant.
Ceferino Inciong for appellant.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Barcelona
for appellee.
FERIA, J.:
The appellant Silverio Nebreja was charged
with several others and found guilty of the
crime of grave coercion by the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, with the accessories of the law, to pay a
fine of P100 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay one-seventh of
the costs. The other accused pleaded guilty of
light coercion and were sentenced to serve the
corresponding penalty and did not appeal.
The following facts are established in this case.
The appellant was an encargado of Mateo
Maningat, an hacendero of Balayan, Batangas,
who bought the Lian Estate, situated in Lian,
Batangas, from the corporation El Colegio de
San Jose, but the buyer could not tare
possession of a portion of the land due to
opposition of the occupants, among them the
offended party Nicomedes Jonson. In the
morning of October 5, 1942, while Nicomedes
Jonson, assisted by Felipe Balbal, Marcelo
Jonson and Alfonso Jonson, was plowing a
parcel of the said land claimed by him and in
his possession, the seven defendants led by the
appellant, all armed with bolos except the
appellant and Mariano Magno, ordered
Nicomedes Jonson to stop plowing the land
because the defendants would plow it.
Nicomedes Jonson answered that he had a right
to continue plowing the land as it was still in
his possession, and that while it was involved
in a litigation there was as yet no decision and
order of the court to deliver possession thereof
to somebody else. The appellant retorted that if
they (Nicomedes Jonson and his companions)
did not stop plowing they would get hurt, and
grabbed the rope of the carabao of Nicomedes
Jonson, while his co-accused, with their hand
on the handles of their bolos, surrounded
Nicomedes Jonson and his companions. Cowed
by this hostile attitude of the defendants,
Nicomedes Jonson and his companions had to
stop plowing, thus enabling the defendants to
take possession of and plow the land.
Nicomedes Jonson immediately reported the
matter to the local authorities, and returned
with Sergeant of Police Amado Caraig and five
policemen. Upon arriving at the place, they
found Silverio Nebreja standing on the land
while three of the defendants were plowing and
the rest were standing guard. Sergeant Caraig
approached and asked the appellant if it was
true that he had stopped Nicomedes Jonson
from plowing the land, to which the latter
answered in the affirmative, stating that it was
he who should plow the land. The Sergeant
then warned the appellant that if the he had and
his men did not stop the plowing they would be
taken to the municipal building; and as the
defendant refused to stop and the appellant said
that he was ready for any eventuality, they were
arrested and taken to the municipal jail.
Appellant's defense is an alibi, that is, that in
the morning of October 5, 1942, when the
alleged crime was committed, he was at the
Central Azucarera Don Pedro in Nasugbu,
Batangas, talking with a certain Captain
Mauchi, and that when he returned to the Lian,
Batangas, in the afternoon of the same day, he
was arrested and thrown in jail.
This alibi set up by the appellant has no
probative value, because it is not supported by
evidence, for neither Captain Mauchi nor any
one from the sugar central was presented to
support it. The negative testimony of the
negative co-defendants, who pleaded guilty and
were convicted, to the effect that the appellant
was not in the land when they were arrested are
not strictly in support of the alibi that the
appellant was in said sugar central, and is
contradicted by Arsenio Nebreja, one of his co-
accused who was presented as a witness of the
defense, who categorically testified that the
appellant was among the arrested in the place
where the offense was committed in the
morning of October 5, 1942, and by the
positive testimony to that effect of the offended
party, Felipe Balbal and Sergeant Caraig.
Besides, considering the short distance between
the municipality of Lian and Nasugbu and the
available means of transportation, it was not
impossible to the appellant, according to the
lower court which took judicial notice of that
fact, to have been in the sugar central at
Nasugbu in the morning of October 5, 1942,
and to have returned to Lian in the same
morning in time to commit the offense charged.
The contention of attorney for the appellant
that the latter, being an "encargado" of the
owner of the land, had the right to eject forcibly
the offended party from the land and prevent
him from plowing it, does not deserve serious
consideration, for no person may take the law
into his own hands.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the
evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt the
appellant's guilt of the crime charge and of
which he was convicted, and that the penalty
imposed is in confirmity with the law, and,
therefore, the sentence appealed from its
hereby affirmed with costs to the appellant. So
ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983
JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents.
Marciano C. Dating, Jr. and Jose &
Fuentebella for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Petition for review of the affirmance in toto
by the Court of Appeals, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, of the
judgment of conviction handed down by
the then Municipal Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No.
4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Jose Timoner, finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of grave coercion, as follows:
têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE this Court finds the
accused JOSE 'PEPITO' TIMONER
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Grave Coercion as
penalized under Art. 286 in the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences the said accused
pursuant to the provision of Rule 64,
Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS OF
IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO
MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD,
to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay
the offended party in the amount of
P5,000.00 as damages, without
subsidiary liability in case of
insolvency. The other accused
SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO
QUIBRAL are hereby ordered
ACQUITTED.
The salient facts are not disputed. At about
10:00 in the evening of December 13,
1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet,
Camarines Norte, accompanied by two
uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and
Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived
in front of the stalls along Maharlika
highway, the main thoroughfare of the
same town. Upon orders of petitioner,
these laborers proceeded to nail together
rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls
which protruded into the sidewalk of the
Maharlika highway. Among the structures
thus barricaded were the barbershop of
Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness
and the store belonging to one Lourdes
Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had
been recommended for closure by the
Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for
non-compliance with certain health and
sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and
others for judicial abatement of their stalls.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
2257, alleged that these stalls constituted
public nuisances as well as nuisances per
se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his
barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two
policemen, Morena and Quibral, were
charged with the offense of grave coercion
before the Municipal Court of Daet. As
already noted, the said court exonerated
the two policemen, but convicted petitioner
of the crime charged as principal by
inducement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
full the judgment of the trial court. Hence,
the present recourse.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of
complainant Dayaon's barbershop was
done in abatement of a public nuisance
and, therefore, under lawful authority.
We find merit in this contention.
Unquestionably, the barbershop in
question did constitute a public nuisance
as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695
of the Civil Code, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act,
omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything
else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health
or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway
or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of
property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public
or private. A public nuisance affects
a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal A private
nuisance is one that is not included
in the foregoing definition.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the
sidewalk of the poblacion's main
thoroughfare and had been recommended
for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.
In fact, the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil
Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop
as a nuisance per-se. Thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Under the facts of the case, as well
as the law in point, there is no
semblance of any legality or right
that exists in favor of the defendants
to build a stall and conduct their
business in a sidewalk, especially in
a highway where it does not only
constitute a menace to the health of
the general public passing through
the street and also of the unsanitary
condition that is bred therein as well
as the unsightly and ugly structures
in the said place. Moreover, even if it
is claimed and pretended that there
was a license, permit or toleration of
the defendants' makeshift store and
living quarters for a number of years
does not lend legality to an act which
is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance
affects the community or
neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons and the general
public which posed a danger to the
people in general passing and using
that place, for in addition, this is an
annoyance to the public by the
invasion of its rights — the fact that it
is in a public place and annoying to
all who come within its sphere
[Baltazar vs. Carolina Midland, Ry,
Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in
11 Tolentino's Civil Code of the
Philippines, p. 375; Kapisanan
Lingkod ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Lacson,
CA-G.R. No. 27260R, March 25,
1964; 61 O.G. 2487].
xxx xxx xxx
... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the Court hereby declares that the
structures subject of this complaint
as well as those occupied by the
impleaded defendants are nuisances
per se and therefore orders the
defendants to demolish the stall and
vacate the premises immediately ...
But even without this judicial
pronouncement, petitioner could not have
been faulted for having fenced off said
barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the
Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a
public nuisance without judicial
proceedings. têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 699. The remedies against a
public nuisance are:
[l] A prosecution under the Penal
Code or any local ordinance; or
[2] A civil action; or
[3] Abatement, without judicial
proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of
the town, merely implemented the
aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal
Health Officer. Having then acted in good
faith in the performance of his duty,
petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a
person who, without authority of law, shall
by means of violence, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law
or compel to do something against his will,
either it be right or wrong." 1 The three
elements of grave coercion are: [1] that
any person be prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will,
be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention
or compulsion be effected by violence,
either by material force or such display of it
as would produce intimidation and control
the will of the offended party, and [3] that
the person who restrained the will and
liberty of another had no right to do so, or,
in other words, that the restraint was not
made under authority of law or in the
exercise of a lawful right. 2
The third element being absent in the case
at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of
grave coercion.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is
hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted
of the crime charged. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
ANTI
WIRETAPPING
LAW
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by
petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester
S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced
a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount
of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the
trial court's discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation
made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads
as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez
(Chuchi) — Good Afternoon
M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia
(ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari
sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung
paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong
ka kung ano ang gagawin ko
sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty
ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero
ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi
ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi hanggang
10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi
ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako
ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply
ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa
review mo, kung kakailanganin
ang certification mo, kalimutan
mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi
ang ano ko talaga noon i-
cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka,
nakalimutan mo na kung
paano ka pumasok dito sa
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa
Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung
paano ka nakapasok dito "Do
you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na
M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na
akong binabalikan doon ng
mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba
kung paano ka pumasok sa
hotel, kung on your own merit
alam ko naman kung gaano ka
"ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka
papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng
exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka
papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang
nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong
ipagmalaki na may utak ka
kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo
ba makukuha ka dito kung
hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako
mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-
anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong
pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa
loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka
ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am,
binbalikan ako ng mga taga
Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako,
pero huwag mong kalimutan
na hindi ka makakapasok kung
hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am
na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi
mo utang na loob, kasi kung
baga sa no, nilapastangan mo
ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita
nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka
na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong
ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the
event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City
Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez
of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day
of February, 1988, in Pasay
City Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the
above-named accused,
Socorro D. Ramirez not being
authorized by Ester S. Garcia
to record the latter's
conversation with said
accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a
tape recorder secretly record
the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in
writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila,
September 16, 1988.
MARIANO
M. CUNETA
Asst. City
Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea,
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an
order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted
the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and
that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200
refers to a the taping of a communication
by a person other than a participant to the
communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution (by the First Division) of June
19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3,
1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently
constitute an offense punishable
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on
the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave
abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990,
petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated
June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main
and principal issue" 7 that the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party
other than those involved in the
communication. 8 In relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or
content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the
facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner
agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping
of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with
private respondent was not illegal under
the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible 11 or absurb or would
lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to
Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes,"
provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any
person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or
spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be
a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, as respondent Court
of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized
tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only
"overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is
intercepted or recorded, the element
of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor,
the recording is not made by all the
parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3
but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to show
the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to
the contract or the act may be
indicative of their intention. Suppose
there is such a recording, would you
say, Your Honor, that the intention is
to cover it within the purview of this
bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by
the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record
should be used not in the
prosecution of offense but as
evidence to be used in Civil Cases or
special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is
a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be
reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is
reasonable because it is not sporting
to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using
it against him. It is not fair, it is not
sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your
honor, is to record the intention of
the parties. I believe that all the
parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce
the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For
example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors
where a tape recording is taken,
there is no objection to this if all the
parties know. It is but fair that the
people whose remarks and
observations are being made should
know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can
understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when
we take statements of persons, we
say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used
against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in
spite of that warning, he makes
damaging statements against his
own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are
going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a
person without him knowing that it is
being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded
may be used against him, I think it is
unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No.
31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand,
Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of
the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he
would be penalized under Section 1?
Because the speech is public, but
the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular
aspect is not contemplated by the
bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person —
not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No.
33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of
the provision, taken together with the
above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is
immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What
R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein.
The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As
the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person
should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the
phrase "private communication" in Section
1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its
ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, 15 or signifies the "process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared
between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner
and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore,
put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada
in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:
It has been said that innocent people
have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well the
undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects
of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are
often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of
anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here,
the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature of
conversations between individuals
and the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They must have known
that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in
the unaudited, and free exchange of
communication between individuals
— free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue
of telephone wiretapping, we held that the
use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favor of the accused." 20 The instant
case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with
the use of tape-recorders as among the
acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as
applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.