LNG SAFETY REPORT

“Gas Tanker accidents, although less probable than the accidents with oil tankers, can
cause so-called flameless explosions. It happens due to the rapid evaporation of pieces
of ice and as clouds followed by combustion and explosions. In 1980, three out of seven
accidents of the vessels transporting liquefied gas caused such kinds of explosions. Such
explosions can destroy everything alive in areas of up to 400 km2 [over 150 sq.
miles]{Voloshin, 1989, in Russian}.”

Quote from Stanislav Patin, 1999

Environmental Impact of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
Ecomonitor Publishing, Eastport NY

The Safety of Liquefied Natural Gas transport raises several disturbing

questions. Unfortunately the gas industry’s efforts to provide public
assurances have been incomplete and less than candid.

From the LNG industry’s own fact sheet:

1. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY SERIOUS LNG ACCIDENTS?

First, one must remember that LNG is a form of energy and must be respected as such.
Today LNG is transported and stored as safely as any other liquid fuel. Before the storage
of cryogenic liquids was fully understood, however, there was a serious incident
involving LNG in Cleveland, Ohio in 1944. This incident virtually stopped all
development of the LNG industry for 20 years. The race to the Moon led to a much better
understanding of cryogenics and cryogenic storage with the expanded use of liquid
hydrogen (-423°F) and liquid oxygen (-296°F). LNG technology grew from NASA's
advancement.

In addition to Cleveland, there have two other U.S. incidents sometimes attributed to
LNG. A construction accident on Staten Island in 1973 has been cited by some parties as
an "LNG accident" because the construction crew was working inside an (empty, warm)
LNG tank. In another case, the failure of an electrical seal on an LNG pump in 1979
permitted gas (not LNG) to enter an enclosed building. A spark of indeterminate origin

1
caused the building to explode. As a result of this incident, the electrical code has been
revised for the design of electrical seals used with all flammable fluids under pressure.

This rather rosy picture of LNG accidents conveniently ignores those

incidents in the U.S. which are frequent and small. These smaller
accidents indicate that release of a large amount of LNG could be
catastrophic for populated areas. One such example occurred near
Boston in 1998; which is detailed in the news story below:

Driver killed as LNG tanker flips; explosion averted

by Shirley Ayers, Editor

WOBURN, Mass. -- The driver of a tanker truck carrying 10,500 gallons

of liquefied natural gas was killed when his vehicle flipped over on busy
Route 128 in Woburn, MA, raking down about 300 ft. of guardrail. Diesel
fuel tanks burst, setting the cab on fire.

The accident happened at about 9:30 p.m. when the Transgas Inc. rig,
which was headed south for Connecticut, collided with a car and
overturned onto the meridian on its side. About one mile of the highway
was closed between Routes 93 and 38 because the gas carried a high
methane content and authorities feared an explosion. According to Woburn
Police Chief Philip Mahoney, some 300 people were evacuated from their
homes and from businesses, restaurants and two hotels. All public schools
in Woburn were closed for the day.

Although the fire did impinge on the tanker, quick action by the Woburn
Fire Department, prevented the natural gas from expanding. Water was
hosed onto the tanker to keep the liquefied natural gas cool. Liquefied
natural gas expands in a ratio of 600 to 1. "In a worst case scenario," said
Woburn Fire Chief Paul Tortolano "if the tank had heated in the fire, it
would have expelled liquid instead of gas. We would have had a BLEVE,
and a very severe fire involving a liquefied flammable gas."

Thomas Kiley, president of the New England Gas Association credited the
design of the tanker with averting a disaster. "These vehicles are very
stringently constructed and they are designed to withstand an accident."
The tank vehicle is built like a large thermos bottle, with a reinforced
aluminum inner tank and a carbon-steel exterior. Pressure relief valves
allow any gas that leaks from the inner tank to blow off without rupturing

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 the outer tank.

Fortunately the outer tank did not rupture and no natural gas escaped from
the truck. "Had the LNG gone up, it would have been like a bomb," State
Police Lt. Paul Maloney said. "They estimate that it would have thrown
shrapnel about 2,000 ft. It probably would have created a crater out on the
highway that would have kept the highway closed for days if not weeks."
(Fall, 1998 Volume VIII, No. 1)

The nature of this type of potential exposion is explained in detail

below:
The BLEVE Effect.
The Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) effect depends crucially on a
phase change from liquid to vapor that might occur during a loss of containment.
BLEVE occurs when sealed containers of liquefied gases such as LPG are accidentally
exposed and enveloped by fire. Vapor is generated and internal pressure rapidly rises. At
the same time the container wall temperature rises in the ullage area; wall strength
deteriorated and eventually, even though a pressure relief valve may be operating, the
stress impaired by the increased pressure exceeds the reduced strength of the wall. The
container ruptures and superheated liquid is released, expands and vaporizes in seconds
resulting in catastrophic damage from the spread of ignited vapors.

Just such a catastrophe occurred in Australia in 1994 as documented in

this notice from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.
9/1994
TECHNOLOGY RELATED ACCIDENTS

Modern ships in Australia are highly automated and have cargo

control systems of varying degrees of sophistication. These
systems, although appearing simple to use, can be quite complex
and require officers engaged in cargo handling duties to develop a
thorough understanding of the manner in which the system works.

A number of accidents have recently occurred as a result of failures

in operational procedures on ships with automated cargo control
systems. These accidents are essentially the result of the following
systemic failures:

Alarms accepted but not cancelled:

- in some systems this results in the disabling of audible alarm

indicators, future alarm conditions going unnoticed.

Reliance on remote digital read outs:

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 - if gauges stick or sensors malfunction, the absence of on-site
checking, particularly during topping-off operations on tankers,
inevitably leads to problems such as over-filling or
over-pressurising of cargo spaces.

Deviation from set procedures:

- many systems require actuating events to occur in strict

sequence; variation from this often leads to unforeseen effects,
such as the wrong set of valves being opened or closed, or safety
interlocks being by-passed.

Erroneous assumptions made from system indicators:

- in one (non marine) instance, an operator pumping LNG noticed a
large pressure drop in the system, assumed it was caused by an
upsurge in demand and increased the pumping rate. In reality, the
pipeline had ruptured and the explosion of the resultant massive
vapour cloud killed 400.

P McGrath
Chief Executive
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
PO Box 1108 BELCONNEN ACT 2616
June 1994
File: M94/608

Copyright: AMSA

Before we look at other safety considerations we need to understand

more about the nature of LNG and its transport. Again the industry’s
own fact sheet is the principle source of information.

LNG Fact Sheet

WHAT IS IT?
When natural gas is cooled to a temperature of approximately -260°F at atmospheric
pressure it condenses to a liquid called liquefied natural gas (LNG). One volume of this
liquid takes up about 1/600th the volume of natural gas at a stove burner tip. LNG weighs
less than one-half that of water, actually about 45% as much. LNG is odorless, colorless,
non-corrosive, and non-toxic. When vaporized it burns only in concentrations of 5% to
15% when mixed with air. Neither LNG, nor its vapor, can explode in an unconfined
environment.

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COMPOSITION
Natural gas is composed primarily of methane (typically, at least 90%), but may also
contain ethane, propane and heavier hydrocarbons. Small quantities of nitrogen, oxygen,
carbon dioxide, sulfur compounds, and water may also be found in "pipeline" natural gas.
The liquefaction process removes the oxygen, carbon dioxide, sulfur compounds, and
water. The process can also be designed to purify the LNG to almost 100% methane.

HOW IS IT STORED?
LNG tanks are always of double-wall construction with extremely efficient insulation
between the walls. Large tanks are low aspect ratio (height to width) and cylindrical in
design with a domed roof. Storage pressures in these tanks are very low, less than 5 psig.
Smaller quantities, 70,000 gallons and less, are stored in horizontal or vertical, vacuum-
jacketed, pressure vessels. These tanks may be at pressures any where from less than 5
psig to over 250 psig. LNG must be maintained cold (at least below -117°F) to remain a
liquid, independent of pressure.

HOW IS IT KEPT COLD?

The insulation, as efficient as it is, will not keep the temperature of LNG cold by itself.
LNG is stored as a "boiling cryogen," that is, it is a very cold liquid at its boiling point for
the pressure it is being stored. Stored LNG is analogous to boiling water, only 470°
colder. The temperature of boiling water (212°F) does not change, even with increased
heat, as it is cooled by evaporation (steam generation). In much the same way, LNG will
stay at near constant temperature if kept at constant pressure. This phenomenon is called
"autorefrigeration". As long as the steam (LNG vapor boil off) is allowed to leave the tea
kettle (tank), the temperature will remain constant.

If the vapor is not drawn off, then the pressure and temperature inside the vessel will rise.
However, even at 100 psig, the LNG temperature will still be only about -200°F.

The following provides a brief history of U.S. LNG incidents.

Cleveland, 1944:

LNG is not a "new" industry. Earliest patents involving cryogenic liquids date back into
the mid-1800's. The first patent directly for LNG was awarded in 1914. In 1939 the first
commercial LNG peak-shaving plant was built in West Virginia. A second facility was
built in Cleveland in 1941 by the East Ohio Gas Company.

The East Ohio Gas Company peak-shaving plant was run without incident until 1944,
when it was decided to add a much larger new tank. Stainless steel alloys were scarce as
this was during World War II. The new tank was built with a low-nickel content (3.5%).
The tank was placed in service and shortly after failed, spilling its unconfined contents
into the street and storm sewer system. A disastrous fire resulted killing 128 people. This

5
accident set back the embryonic LNG industry substantially. The conclusion of the
investigating body, the U.S. Bureau of Mines, was that the concept of liquefying and
storing LNG was valid if "proper precautions were observed," so says "Report on the
Investigation of the Fire at the Liquefaction, Storage, and Regasification Plant of the East
Ohio Gas Co., Cleveland, Ohio, October 20, 1944," U.S. Bureau of Mines, February,
1946.

Staten Island, 1973:

Those "proper precautions" are common place in all of the LNG facilities built and
placed in service after the Cleveland accident. It wasn't until the late 1960's that gas
companies started experiencing supply shortages during periods of severe cold in the
winter. Between the mid-1960's and mid-1970's more than 60 LNG facilities were built in
the United States. (Today there are nearly 100.) These peak-shaving plants have proved
to be economically successful with an excellent safety record. There was, however, one
construction accident that has at times been inappropriately attributed to LNG -- the
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation (TETCO) tank roof collapse.

An LNG tank at the Staten Island TETCO facility that had been in service for over three
years was taken out of service in order to make an internal tank repair. The tank was
warmed up, purged of the remaining combustible gases with inert nitrogen and then
placed under fresh recirculating air. A construction crew entered the tank in April of
1972. Ten months later, in February of 1973, the polyurethane insulation foam inside the
tank was accidentally ignited. The rapid rise in temperature caused a corresponding raise
in pressure. The pressure increase was so fast that the concrete dome on the tank lifted
and collapsed down inside the tank killing the 37 construction workers inside the tank.
The accident was clearly a construction accident and not an "LNG accident," according to
"Report of Texas Eastern LNG Tank Fatal Fire and Roof Collapse, February 10, 1973,"
Fire Department of the City of New York, July, 1973.

Cove Point, 1979:

The Cove Point Terminal was under construction at the time of the Staten Island
accident. No specific changes were made to the design of the facility as the TETCO tanks
were of a significantly different insulation and tank design. Cove Point was placed into
service with LNG in the Spring of 1978. By the Fall of 1979, Cove Point had unloaded
over 80 LNG ships. On October 6, 1979, anisolated incident occurred at the Cove Point
that lead to three major design code changes.

Around 3:00 AM on October 6, 1979, an explosion occurred within an electrical

substation at Cove Point. LNG leaked through an inadequately tightened LNG pump
electrical penetration seal, vaporized, passed through 200 feet of underground electrical
conduit, and entered the substation. Since natural gas was never expected in this building,
there were no gas detectors installed in the building. The natural gas-air mixture was
ignited by the normal arcing contacts of a circuit breaker resulting in an explosion. The
explosion killed one operator in the building, seriously injured a second and caused about

6
$3 million in damages. This was an isolated accident caused by a very specific set of
circumstances. The National Transportation Safety Board found that the Cove Point
Terminal was designed and constructed in conformance with all appropriate regulations
and codes. It further concluded that it is unlikely that any pump seal, regardless of the
liquid being pumped, could be designed, fabricated, or installed to completely preclude
the possibility of leakage. With that conclusion in mind, code changes were made
pertaining to the equipment and systems downstream of the pump seal. Before the Cove
Point Terminal was restarted after the accident, all pump seal systems were modified to
meet the new codes and gas detection added to all buildings. This is reported in
"Columbia LNG Corporation Explosion and Fire; Cove Point, MD; October 6, 1979"
National Transportation Safety Board report NTSB-PAR-80-2, April 16, 1980

The world-wide LNG industry has compiled an enviable safety record based on any
industrial safety standard. There has not been a death or serious accident involving LNG
in the United States since the Cove Point accident.

When Radio Island North Carolina was targeted for a potential LNG
Loading Facility they responded with the following safety concerns.

Risks to Public Safety and Property

According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the major safety concerns related to
LNG are:
 The spillage of the entire contents of a full LNG storage tank that can ignite creating a
large unusually hot fire that produces thermal radiation. This intense heat causes severe
burns in as little as 3 seconds; spontaneous combustion of clothing and wood; and the loss
of structural integrity in metal.

 An LNG tank spill can also produce a flammable vapor plume. The danger zone can
extend to a radius of up to approximately 4,000 ft. in diameter, creating the potential for
serious personal injury and property damage or destruction.

 Another major safety concern is an LNG tanker spill on the water. The hazard from such
an accident is the creation of a flammable vapor plume that can travel up to two miles
creating fire risk for everything in its path.

 According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, LNG can also explode in confined
spaces. The Department warns that spills on water are particularly dangerous because
the vapors can travel into sewers or other confined spaces where they might be ignited
and explode putting public safety and property at extreme risk.

It is apparent that FERC is either not aware of or chooses to ignore the

LNG incidents in Russia which resulted in the loss of at least three LNG
tankers.

7
The Department of Transportation was much more thorough in their
examination of risks related to the LNG industry.
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department
of Transportation in the interest of information exchange.

Clean Air Program: Summary Assessment of the Safety, Health,

Environmental and System Risks of Alternative Fuel

LNG - Important hazardous properties and hazards for LNG include:

o Flammability hazard - fire or explosion from ignition of leaks

of fuel. Non-odorized fuel gas increases the hazard. Note
that the design base for cryogenic fuel system components is
still relatively small.

o Toxicity hazard - asphyxiation from exposure to non-odorized

fuel gas. High pressure hazard - while LNG storage pressures
are not as high as those for CNG, they are still significant.
Also, trapped liquid fuel can produce extremely high pressures
upon warming and vaporization.

o Cryogenic hazards - LNG presents several hazards associated

with the cryogenic property of the fuel:

Personal injury may occur from exposure to cold fuel or

fuel vapors. This is especially true if proper personal
protective gear is not worn.

Structural failure can occur due to stress from

contraction of structural members exposed to cold fuel or
fuel vapors.

Structural failure can also occur due to embrittlement of

materials exposed to cold fuel or fuel vapors.

The third development, which adds to the complexity of alternative

fuel use, is the recognition that more hazards must be considered
than the traditional "Will it burn or explode?" examination of fuel
issues. For example, LNG has the potential to cause blindness if
splashed in the face.

3.3.4 Liquefied Natural Gas

3.3.4.1 General Description

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Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is produced by cooling natural gas and
purifying it to a desired methane content. The typical methane
content is approximately 95% for the conventional LNG produced at a
peak shaving plant. Peak shaving involves the liquefaction of
natural gas by utility companies during periods of low gas demand
(summer) with subsequent regasification during peak demand (winter).
It is relatively easy to remove the non-methane constituents of
natural gas during liquefaction. Therefore, it has been possible
for LNG suppliers to provide a highly purified form of LNG known as
Refrigerated Liquid Methane (RLM) which is approximately 99%
methane.

The primary advantage of LNG compared to CNG is that it can be

stored at a relatively low pressure (20 to 150 psi) at about one-
third the volume and one-third the weight of an equivalent CNG
storage tank system. The big disadvantage is the need to deal with
the storage and handling of a cryogenic (-160o~C, -260o~F) fluid
through the entire process of bulk transport and transfer to fleet
storage.

3.3.4.2 Safety Issues

(a) General Properties Affecting Fire Hazards

Even though the end product of the use of CNG and LNG for vehicular
applications is essentially the same, the general properties
affecting safety are quite different. On one hand, LNG is a more
refined and consistent product with none of the problems associated
with corrosive effects on tank storage associated with water vapor
and other contaminants. On the other, the cryogenic temperature
makes it extremely difficult or impossible to add an odorant.
Therefore, with no natural odor of its own, there is no way for
personnel to detect leaks unless the leak is sufficiently large to
create a visible condensation cloud or localized frost formation.
It is essential that methane gas detectors be placed in any area
where LNG is being transferred or stored.

The cryogenic temperature associated with LNG systems creates a

number of generalized safety considerations for bulk transfer and
storage. Most importantly, LNG is a fuel that requires intensive
monitoring and control because of the constant heating of the fuel
which takes place due to the extreme temperature differential
between ambient and LNG fuel temperatures. Even with highly
insulated tanks, there will always be a continuous build up of
internal pressure and a need to eventually use the fuel vapor or
safely vent it to the atmosphere. When transferring LNG,

9
 considerable care has to be taken to cool down the transfer lines in
order to avoid excessive amounts of vapor from being formed.

The constant vaporization of the fuel also has an interesting effect

on the properties of the fuel, unless it is a highly purified form
of LNG, i.e., RLM. The methane in the fuel will boil off before
some of the other hydrocarbon components such as propane and butane.
Therefore, if LNG is stored over an extensive period of time without
withdrawal and replenishment the methane content will continuously
decrease and the actual physical characteristics of the fuel will change to
some extent. This is known as "weathering" of the fuel. 7

Another consideration is that under low temperatures, many materials

undergo changes in their strength characteristics making them
potentially unsafe for their intended use. For example, materials
such as carbon steel lose ductility at low temperature, and
materials such as rubber and some plastics have a drastically
reduced ductility and impact strength such that they will shatter
when dropped.

(b) Fire Hazards During Transport

An explosion of an LNG container is a highly unlikely event that is

possible only if the pressure relief equipment or system fails
completely or if there is some combination of an unusually high
vaporization rate (due to loss of insulation) and some obstruction
of the venting and pressure relief system preventing adequate vapor
flow from the inner pressure vessel with a resultant pressure build
up. If the pressure builds up to the point where the vessel bursts,
the resulting explosion is known as a BLEVE (boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion) with the container pieces propelled
outward at a very high velocity.' This is a highly unlikely event
due to the extensive requirements for pressure relief including
pressure relief valves and burst discs that are built into the
design codes. (There have been no reports in the literature reviewed
of any BLEVE occurring with LNG.)

Note: This is only true if you ignore the incidents in Australia and
Russia!
In the event that the LNG vessel is ruptured in a transport accident
and the LNG is spilled, there will be a high probability of a fire
because a flammable natural gas vapor/air mixture will be formed
immediately in the vicinity of the LNG pool. In an accident
situation, there is a high likelihood of ignition sources due to
either electrical sparking, hot surface, or possibly a fuel fire

10
created from the tanker truck engine fuel or other vehicles involved
in the accident. The vapor cloud from an LNG pool will be denser
than the ambient air; therefore, it will tend to flow along the
ground surface, dispersed by any prevailing winds.

When spilled along the ground or any other warm surface, LNG boils
quickly and vaporizes. A high volume spill will cause a pool of LNG
to accumulate and the boiling rate will decrease from an initial
high value to a low value as the ground under the pool cools. The
heat release rate from an LNG pool fire will be approximately 60%
greater than that of a gasoline pool fire of equivalent size.

(c) Fire Hazards During Transfer to Fleet Storage

The complexity of the fuel transfer arrangement creates the potential

for leaks and spills through human error and equipment failure.
One of the particular concerns is that the fuel transfer
equipment goes through a continuous cycle of cool down to cryogenic
temperatures and warm up to ambient temperature. This type of
thermal cooling can create additional stresses on equipment and
sealing devices which could result in decreased reliability over
time.

(d) Fire Hazards During Fleet Storage

One of the major provisions at any LNG storage facility is the

requirement to provide an impounding area surrounding the container
to minimize the possibility of accidental discharge
of LNG from endangering adjoining property on important process
equipment and structure, or reaching waterways. This requirement
ensures that any size spill at a fleet storage facility will be
fully contained and the risk of any fire damage will be minimized.

(e) Other Hazards

LNG has a unique safety hazard among the alternative motor fuels (AMFs)
because of the potential exposure of personnel to cryogenic temperatures.
Workers can receive cryogenic burns from direct body contact
with cryogenic liquids, metals, and cold gas. Exposure to LNG or
direct contact with metal at cryogenic temperatures can
damage skin tissue more rapidly than when exposed to vapor. It is
also possible for personnel to move away from the cold gas before
injury.

The risk of cryogenic burns through accidental exposure can be

11
 reduced by the use of appropriate protective clothing. Depending
upon the risk of exposure, this protection can range from loose
fitting fire resistant gloves and full face shields to special extra
protection multi-layer clothing.

Another unusual hazard associated with aged LNG will arise in the
unlikely event that there is a large spill of LNG onto a body of
water. This could occur in an accident situation involving an LNG
transport vehicle container rupture and spill into an adjacent water
body. The hazard is known as a rapid-phase transition (RPT) - in
this case a rapid transformation from the liquid phase to vapor. If
significant vaporization occurs in a short time period, the process
can, and usually does, resemble an explosion.'

The RPT "explosion" phenomenon for LNG on water has been observed in
a number of situations and has been studied extensively in both
laboratory and large scale tests. The temperature of the water and
the actual composition of the LNG are important factors in
determining whether an RPT will take place.

3.3.4.3 Health Issues

The principal constituents of natural gas, methane, ethane, and

propane, are not considered to be toxic. The American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) considers those gases as
simple asphyxiants, which are a health risk simply because they can
displace oxygen in a closed environment. The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) has set a time-weighted average
(TWA) personal exposure limit (PEL) of 1,000 ppm for propane. A
number of the minor constituents of natural gas have ACGIH listed
threshold limit values (TLVs), including butane - 800 ppm, pentane -
600 ppm, hexane - 50 ppm, and heptane - 400 ppm. The effective TLV
for an average natural gas composition, considering all of these
limits, is about 10,500 PPM.3~

Unlike CNG, LNG cannot be odorized; therefore, there is some concern

about the ability of personnel to detect TLV concentrations. This
is another reason to ensure that methane detectors are in place
wherever personnel may be exposed.

The following tables from the Department of Transportation show that

handling of LNG is more dangerous than dealing with gasoline or diesel
fuels. This is contrary to what is asserted in the LNG industry fact
sheet.

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 TABLE 3-1. RELATIVE POTENTIAL FOR SPILLS DURING TRANSPORT

RELATIVE SPILL POTENTIAL

(COMPARED TO GASOLINE/DIESEL TRUCK SPILL)

REASON

LNG Lower Double walled cryogenic transport tank

TABLE 3-2 RELATIVE POTENTIAL FOR LEAKS DURING TRANSPORT

RELATIVE LEAK POTENTIAL

(COMPARED TO GASOLINE/DIESEL TANKER TRUCK)

REASON

LNG Higher 300 F temperature differentials and

pressures up to 150 psi

TABLE 3-3. RELATIVE POTENTIAL FOR SPILLS DURING UNLOADING

RELATIVE SPILL POTENTIAL

(COMPARED TO GASOLINE/DIESEL TRUCK SPILL)

REASON

LNG Higher Combination of temperature

cycling/mechanical failure
and complexity of transfer
process

TABLE 3-4. RELATIVE POTENTIAL FOR LEAKS DURING UNLOADING

RELATIVE LEAK POTENTIAL

(COMPARED TO GASOLINE/ DIESEL TANKER TRUCK)

REASON

LNG Higher Temperature differential

and moderate pressure

TABLE 3-5. RELATIVE POTENTIAL FOR SPILLS DURING FLEET STORAGE

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 RELATIVE LEAK POTENTIAL
(COMPARED TO GASOLINE/ DIESEL TRUCK)

REASON

LNG Higher Temperature differentials

LNG Transport and utilization represents a significant risk for a

catastrophe to occur in Boston and vicinity either through
equipment/materials failure, terrorist action or human error. Boston is
one of the few ports which permits unloading of these hazardous
substances in close proximity to major population centers. The details
of safety concerns have been well documented in this and other regions.
Given the additional information on LNG disasters in Australia and
Russia, it is now incumbent on the city to stop or significantly delay
these dangerous shipments until such time that a thorough investigation
can be conducted of global LNG safety incidents.

David Lincoln
GFWA 2001

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