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SANTIAGO v BAUTISTA, GR No.

L-25024, March 30, 1970

FACTS: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named
Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers
concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class
and deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago,
Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. But three days before the graduation, the "third
placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought
the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting a civil case in the Court
of First Instance of Cotabato, against the committee members

Having been required by an order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved
for the dismissal of the case instead on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper,
and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had
already become academic. The motion was granted for being improper and for being academic.
It was also ruled that allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion
that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction
may not be corrected by means of certiorari.

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.

Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on
the grounds - discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted - (1) that the
petition does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies
were not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that
the court below did not err, in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they, argue in favor
of the questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings
of students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section
1 of Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of
teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no
longer be necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not judicial function can be exercised in this case

HELD: The SC ruled that certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial functions. A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of
the court.

In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following
circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons
or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and obligations.
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and
applying the laws to that end.

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs
to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.

Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought
before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is
rendered.

The court also ruled that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, the court is
still inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to
comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65.

It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programmer of the
graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that
graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the
decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition.
The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said
committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even
before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally
appealed the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named
school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition
various other documents or papers as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by
appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade
I certificate - which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt
then that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With
this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant.

NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE,, GR No. L-28790, April 29, 1968

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed as the Commissioner of Land
Registration and entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance under section 2 of Republic Act No. 1151.
Subsequently, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to
explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans
covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered
that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court
of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge
of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary suspending him from service.

Petitioner applied to this Court claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying
for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as
Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be
considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of
Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or
executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions
or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in
violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance.

HELD: NO. The SC ruled that first, as to the contention of the petitioner that in accordance to
section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, it
there is none mentioned in the said provision that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a
District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

Second, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court, would necessarily result in the
same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges and would mean placing upon the Supreme Court
the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive
which will curtail the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are
presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's
supervision and control.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature
had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges
of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges
would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers,
by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.

As to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as


contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section,
the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all
Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose
resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are
appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise
appealable to the corresponding department head.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v ANG CHO KIO, GR No. L-30001, June 23, 1970

FACTS: Respondent Ang Cho Kio and Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and convicted of
various offenses committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties. After serving
six and one-half (6) years of his sentence said respondent was granted conditional pardon by the
President on the condition that they will voluntarily leave and will never return to the country.

However, Ang Cho Kio returned to the country under the name "Ang Ming Huy". Ang Cho Kio was
identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was
deported to Taipeh when they went to the office to request for an extension of his stay in the
Philippines. He was arrested, and the immigration authorities conducted an investigation
regarding his presence in the Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow him to proceed
with his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were
imposed on him, for having violated the condition of his pardon.

The petitoner fuled a petition for habeas corpus witn the CFI which however dismissed the
petition. Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
dismissing Ang Cho Kio's petition for habeas corpus.

In due time the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration,
praying for the deletion from the majority opinion of the recommendation to allow Ang Cho Kio to
leave the country on the first available transportation abroad. The Court of Appeals, by a vote of
three to two in the special division which decided the case, denied the motion. Hence this appeal
by certiorari by the Solicitor General to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the majority of the special division of five justices of the Court of Appeals
erred in making such recommendation since the courts are not empowered to make such a
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers, as it is the power
of the Chief Executive.

HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are
limited to those expressly provided in the law - and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, "Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation...”

Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express
an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of
the Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature.

It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the majority opinion of the special division
of the Court of Appeals simply represents the private opinion of the three justices, and judges
should be left free to express even their private opinions in judicial decisions. We believe,
however, that the better practice should be that the decision of a court should contain only opinion
that is relevant to the question that is before the court for decision.
IN RE LAURETA, GR No. L-68635, May 14 1987

FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the
her case (aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was
an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from
finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference.

Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was
established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and
counsel for the opponents.
The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution
was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was
about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents
counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats
to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.” True to her
threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices
with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were
also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press,
without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the
Justices were charged with graft and corruption.

The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.

Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.


They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor
the court

Issue: W/N the petitioners were denied or deprived of their constitutional right of due process.

Held: The court denies reconsideration in both instances. The argument premised on lack of
hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard. The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type"
proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta
was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected
to disciplinary action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the disciplinary action against him be
dismissed contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given
a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or
the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that
the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double
spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having
authored the letters written by lustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having
circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed
acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and
the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray
not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two
highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of
powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Nothing
more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentiary
hearing was obviated (see People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G. R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135
SCRA 712). Atty Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact,
heard.
(1) In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the
show-cause Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the
dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous
letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint
was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record.

Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan
and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly
completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy
intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on
Ilustre as well.

The close tie-up between the co-respondents is heightened by the fact that three process servers
of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre
personally.

Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter"
of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had
nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his
disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to
the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and
propriety. But he did "nothing of the sort". He gave his comment with alacrity.

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this
Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the
"adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned
before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to
serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice” was
implemented to the full. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare
of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it
is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to
destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate act", to "undermine
the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes", and to subvert
public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the
orderly administration of justice.

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a
modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional
misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.

(2) Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to
any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of
their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to
blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation"
was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or
by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in
the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the
Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in
any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them
being present.
No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information
Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired. The personality of the Solicitor General never came into
the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the
First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered.
Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation.

The fact that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division
emphasizes the unmeritoriousness of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities
involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-
around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam
Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record.

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists
in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process
servers were told that she was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for
her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further
standing before this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for
the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla
Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL.
Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from
notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the
stipulated period. SO ORDERED..

ECHEGARAY v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GR No. 132601, January 19, 1999


*Execution of decions v amendment of decisions

FACTS: For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner
and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

It is the submission of public respondents that the Decision has alreadybbecame final and the
issuance of thr TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority and that
the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that the order is within the scope of judicial power and
duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already
been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function.

HELD: No. The Court ruled that the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It
is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that
became final.
The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By
the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment
has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the
judgment becomes final.

When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event
that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But
it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the
date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law.

The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the
authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members
of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts
to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of
judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the
same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of
death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power
to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final
sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life.
DAZA v SINGSON, GR No. 86344, December 21, 1989
*Political Questions

FACTS: After the congressional elections, the House of Representatives proportionally


apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political
parties represented in that chamber, where petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and
was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

However, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political


realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including
therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption
of his seat by the respondent while the respondent argues that the question raised by the
petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is beyond the jurisdiction of the court

HELD: No. The Court ruled that it has the competence to act on the matter at bar. That the case
is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Since the petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the
Senate in doing so, the Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case.

In the case at bar, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if the court were to assume that the issue presented was political in nature, it would
still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question if whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

TAN v MACAPAGAL, GR No. L-34161, February 29, 1972


*Legal standing & actual controversy

FACTS: A petition was filed Tan et. al. assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution. dealing
with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would have this Court
declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act
6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution
through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the present
Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present
Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein."

Accordingly the Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came a motion for reconsideration.
It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on
a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of the Conventional
Convention

HELD: No. The court ruled that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the
'expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer." Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually
been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Hence, petitioners in
the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category.

Moreover, as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to
whether or not it should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is indicated. Nor
should petitioners feel discriminated against just because in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, a member of the Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to
prosecute his action for prohibition instituted by him as a taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for
legitimate resentment as such suit could be distinguished from the present.

Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before
filing his suit until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was ripe for
adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation
of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.
Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged
in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility
according to its lights.

More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room
for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit
for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS v COMELEC, GR No. 132922,
April 21, 1998
*legal standing

FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an


organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio
and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by
Congress.

Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing

HELD: No. In those cases in which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their
standing in view of the “transcendental importance” of the constitutional question raised which
justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioners’
substantive claim is without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party’s standing is determined
by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must
be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question
only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Members of
petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P.
Blg. 881.

Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since this case
does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely
in upholding its validity.
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that
he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.

Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio and
television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown
that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot
assert his constitutional right, or that the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in
court is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claim. None of these circumstances is
here present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does
not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.

IN RE COA OPINION ON COMPUTATION OF APPRAISED VALUE OF PROPERTIES, AM NO.


11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012
*Fiscal Autonomy

FACTS: This issue has its roots when Commission on Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found
that an underpayment when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme
Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA
attributed this underpayment to the use by the SC of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal
value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously
appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG)
when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A.

In her Memorandum, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect
the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the
COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35.

More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its
budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility
in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of
what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums
as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the
COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an
encroachment into this judicial prerogative.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA erred in questioning the authority of the Court in using CFAG
Joint Resolution No. 35 as it enroached the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy

HELD: YES. The SC held under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence
encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve
justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its
constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for
those imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be “broken down into
two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence.” Decisional
independence “refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence
based solely on the individual facts and applicable law.” On the other hand, institutional
independence “describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative
branches of government.” Simply put, institutional independence refers to the “collective
independence of the judiciary as a body."

Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole
repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the
Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected
and maintained.

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty
(for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature
may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from
their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While,
as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial
branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate
resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative
power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of
separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal
autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition
of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not
only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of
the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders.
We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision.

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief
Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the
privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within
the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions
of the grant as grantor.

The Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and
responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office,
he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit.
As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation
with the Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme
Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for
interpretations and insertions.

DE CASTRO v JBC, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010


*Stare Decisis

FACTS: This is about the motion for reconsideration filed innrelation to the decision issued by the
SC on March 17, 2010 re appointment of the SC Justice. One of the contentions is that the Court
cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the
Court en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC erred in reversing the doctrine in Valenzuela and the application
of Section 4(1), Article VIII is incompatible with the prohibition provided in Section 15, Article VII.

HELD: No. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means
that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling
the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction,
unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-
bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of
the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each
other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule
according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent.
Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or
reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore,
devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself
recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle
of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
FORTICH v CORONA, GR No. 131457, August 19, 1999
*cases v motion for reconsideration

FACTS: This resolves the pending separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this Court en banc.

Respondents and intervenors jointly argue that Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein
we voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24,
1998, as a result of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said
motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court sitting
en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors
also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without action the
intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc"
. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated
April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e.,
three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court
en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be forwarded to en banc

HELD: No. A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention
of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other
hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which include motions, are "resolved".
Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to
"matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation
of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution
where these words appear.

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court
en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule
does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of
a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks
only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3)
pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision.
The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if
a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does
not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of
the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if
the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.
FRANCISCO v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR No. 160262, November 10, 2003
*Judicial review

FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was
referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect
has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings and whether or not the essential pre- requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been fulfilled

HELD: Yes. The SC Ruled there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review


(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

XXX
PACU v SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, GR No. L-5279, October 31, 1955
*judiciable controversy

FACTS: The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act
No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive
owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without
due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children
for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.

On the other hand, Government’s legal representative submitted a memorandum contending that,
(1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding
the constitutional questions

ISSUE: Whether or not there exist a judiciable controversy

HELD: No. Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and
recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction."
Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and
regulated all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the
general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.

It should be understandable, then, that the Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner’s demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert,
petitioners suffered no wrong — nor allege any — from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent
thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity.

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that,
it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection
of the rights of the parties concerned.

in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Court quoted by petitioners,
apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have decided to look into the
matter, lest they may allege we refused to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental
personal rights of liberty and property.

However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We
are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners
refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial
privileges or rights for so refusing.
PASCUAL v SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
*taxpayer-legal standing

FACTS: In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”.
Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved
were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who
was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that
Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property
would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld.
Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated
the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing

HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in
question, upon the ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above
referred to because the same does not affect him directly.

Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statuia may be contested only by one who will sustain
a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that
"the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.

Hence, the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioner's action in contesting
the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by
the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.

DAVID v ARROYO, GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006


*moot and academic principle, requisites of judicial review, locus standi, transcedental importance

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked
all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition
of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care
power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic and whether
the other petitioners have legal standing.

HELD: The SC held the following:

Moot and academic- No. It is still subject for judicial review

Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must
be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision
of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

The Court holds that President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court's assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates
the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public's interest,
involving as they do the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the
press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and
in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

Locus standi- yes, the petitioners have the legal standing applying the transcedental
importance principle

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule. It provides that "every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the
"real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could
be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion where there is a "transcendental importance"
of the cases to promot the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental.
Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance."

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;


(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality
doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5
is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase
Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court
on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental
importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017
cases."

LEGASPI v CSC, GR No. 72119, May 29, 1987


*right to information as a public right

FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked
in this special civil action for Mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information
on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Mandamus
to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly compel the respondent to disclose the
information sought

HELD: YES. The SC held that as stated in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for Mandamus must have been instituted by a party
aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully
excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore
be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a
direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case
upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature,
is a public right.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit.

2. It is clear from the pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.

It was further held that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not
carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse
outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the
manner in which the access is to be afforded.

3. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concerns not absolute. It
does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second
sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such
as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a)
being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation
of the guarantee. To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

It is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this
case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles
for the positions to which they were appointed.

Public office being a public trust, it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to lie
in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know
who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right
to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v COLET, GR No. 122241, July 30, 1996


*juridical entities, general claim of standing as taxpayers

FACTS: R.A. No. 8050, entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education,
Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the Revised Optometry
Law of 1995 was passed into law and accordingly, the petitioners filed a petition for declaratory
relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.

However, the case docket disclosed that among the petitioners included in the caption of the
petition were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines
(OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist
(ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines (SMOAP) "each
allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to
the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, as it merely listed the names
of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses.
Subsequently, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics.

Then the petitioners in this case, filed an Opposition to the application for preliminary injunction
and alleged that: (a) petitioners therein do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to
the relief demanded; (b) petitioners have unquestionably not shown their legal existence or
capacity to file the case, much less their authority to file it in a representative capacity.

The trial court still granted the writ of preliminary injunction, thus the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have the locus standi

HELD: NO. The SC held that only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP,
COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in the Civil Case makes no mention
of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they
are juridical entities. For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents
OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring
an action.

A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In the
case at bench, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities,
they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Moreover, the private
respondents and also bereft of any allegation to make them real parties in interest to challenge
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.

As an attempt in extremis, the private respondents now assert in their comment that the petition
for declaratory relief, prohibition, and injunction was filed in their capacity as "taxpayers and
citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers
public health." They thus suggest that their petition is in the nature of a taxpayers’ class suit.
As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail. Not only did the private respondents fail to
allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and prove the requisites of
a class suit, viz., the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court.

Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as
those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim
denial of due process.

Neither may the private respondents be allowed at this late stage to seek refuge under the
doctrine allowing taxpayers’ suits. While they claimed their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770
was a taxpayers’ suit, and although this Court, in a catena of cases, has shown liberality in
granting locus standi to taxpayers in taxpayers’ suits, the private respondents have not adequately
shown that this liberality must be extended to them. Their plea of injury or damage is nothing but
a sweeping generalization.
TONDO MEDICAL v CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
*when can one sue as a citizen or invoke transcedental importance

FACTS: In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA
Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from several
consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the adequate expertise and
experience in the health sector. Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal
autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. They also assailed the issuance of draft
administrative orders issued by the DOH for imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who
cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void
for being in violation of some constitutional provisions.

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
"Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services
to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the
devolution of basic services to local government units.
Petitioners contended that Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH,
should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that
Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the President's authority.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved
fatal. One if those is that the petitioners failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the
suit, nor any direct or personal injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners' assertion that Executive Order No. 102
is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision but the
same was denied.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

HELD: NO. The court ruled that the Petitioners' allegations are too general and unsubstantiated
by the records for the Court to pass upon. The persons involved are not identified, details of their
appointments and transfers — such as position, salary grade, and the date they were appointed
- are not given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not specified.

Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still
not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation
of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department
Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are
properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of
2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The
validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule
that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
misabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of
a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish
the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

In a number of cases, the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the
"transcendental importance" of the constitutional question justified the granting of relief. It
demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was
of transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest. Present
substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a
party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It is distinguished from
a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.

In the same way, the court ruled that a citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only
when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise stressed
that the rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be
invoked where a party's substantive claim is without merit. After a careful scrutiny of the
petitioners' substantive claims, this Court finds that the petitioners miserably failed to show any
merit to their claims.
PEOPLE v VERA, GR No. L-45685, November 16, 1937
*direct injury; constitutionality raised at the earliest time; exceptions; standing of the State

FACTS: In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter
was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s
petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation.
The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First
Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila
is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation
officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC
averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the
probation law – if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation
officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed – hence, that makes it violative
of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave
the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the
legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power
to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with
the issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the
State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221,
which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself
had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the
said law (estoppel).

ISSUE:

HELD:

NARRA NICKEL MINING v REDMONT, GR No. 195580, April 21, 2014


*mootness, exceptions, capable of repetitions yet evading review

FACTS: Narra and its co-petitioner corporations – Tesoro and MacArthur, filed a motion before
the SC to reconsider its April 21, 2014 Decision which upheld the denial of their MPSA
applications. The SC affirmed the CA ruling that there is a doubt to their nationality, and that in
applying the Grandfather Rule, the finding is that MBMI, a 100% Canadian-owned corporation,
effectively owns 60% of the common stocks of petitioners by owning equity interests of the
petitioners’ other majority corporate shareholders. Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur argued that the
application of the Grandfather Rule to determine their nationality is erroneous and allegedly
without basis in the Constitution, the FIA, the Philippine Mining Act, and the Rules issued by the
SEC. These laws and rules supposedly espouse the application of the Control Test in verifying
the Philippine nationality of corporate entities for purposes of determining compliance with Sec.
2, Art. XII of the Constitution that only corporations or associations at least 60% of whose capital
is owned by such Filipino citizens may enjoy certain rights and privileges, like the exploration and
development of natural resources.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is already moot and academic

HELD: No. This case not moot and academic The claim of petitioners that the CA erred in not
rendering the instant case as moot is without merit.

Basically, a case is said to be moot and/or academic when it “ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.” Thus, the courts “generally decline jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness.”
The “mootness” principle, however, does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an
issue of “mootness” will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do
so. The four our instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case are:

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;

3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and

4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

All of the exceptions stated above are present in the instant case. We of this Court note that a
grave violation of the Constitution, specifically Section 2 of Article XII, is being committed by a
foreign corporation right under our country’s nose through a myriad of corporate layering under
different, allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the Canadian
company, MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest since it
undeniably affects the exploitation of our Country’s natural resources. The corresponding actions
of petitioners during the lifetime and existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle
is to be applied to cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been
pronounced by the Court; hence, the disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will
serve as a guide “to the bench, the bar and the public.” Finally, the instant case is capable of
repetition yet evading review, since the Canadian company, MBMI, can keep on utilizing dummy
Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate layering and conversion of
applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in Philippine soil.

As stated before, petitioners’ Manifestation and Submission dated October 19, 2012 would want
us to declare the instant petition moot and academic due to the transfer and conveyance of all
the shareholdings and interests of MBMI to DMCI, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and is at least 60% Philippine-owned. Petitioners reasoned that they now cannot
be considered as foreign-owned; the transfer of their shares supposedly cured the “defect” of their
previous nationality. They claimed that their current FTAA contract with the State should stand
since “even wholly-owned foreign corporations can enter into an FTAA with the State.” Petitioners
stress that there should no longer be any issue left as regards their qualification to enter into FTAA
contracts since they are qualified to engage in mining activities in the Philippines. Thus, whether
the “grandfather rule” or the “control test” is used, the nationalities of petitioners cannot be doubted
since it would pass both tests.
The sale of the MBMI shareholdings to DMCI does not have any bearing in the instant case and
said fact should be disregarded. The manifestation can no longer be considered by us since it is
being tackled in G.R. No. 202877 pending before this Court. Thus, the question of whether
petitioners, allegedly a Philippine-owned corporation due to the sale of MBMI’s shareholdings to
DMCI, are allowed to enter into FTAAs with the State is a non-issue in this case.
In ending, the “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation
is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to
undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines.
When in the mind of the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of
the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation, then it may apply the
“grandfather rule.”
TORRECAMPO v METROPOLITAN, GR No. 188296, May 30, 2011
*political questions, executive wisdom

FACTS: In his petition, Torrecampo narrated that his constituents approached him to report that
personnel and heavy equipment from the DPWH entered a portion of Barangay Matandang
Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project. Torrecampo alleged that if the MWSS and
the DPWH are allowed to continue and complete the C-5 Road Extension Project within Barangay
Matandang Balara, three aqueducts of the MWSS which supply water to eight million Metro
Manila residents will be put at great risk. Torrecampo insisted that the RIPADA area, consisting
of Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and Pook Dagohoy, located in Barangay University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, Quezon City, is a better alternative to subject lots.

Torrecampo filed the present petition on the very next day after the DPWH's entry. One of the
contentions of the respondent is that the filing of the petition for injunction is premature as there
is yet no road expansion project to be implemented; that the project as conceived has yet to pass
prior review by the MWSS after submission by the DPWH of a detailed study as to actual
engineering design and actual tests for the conduct of any construction work; that the entry of
DPWH in the area is to conduct study on the soil and on the location of the aqueducts; and that
under the premises, there is yet no justiciable controversy as alleged by petitioner.

ISSUES: Whether or not the peition is considered as a political question

HELD: YES. The Court's ruled that the petition must fail. Torrecampo is not entitled to an
injunction. Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside
this Court's jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power.

Judicial Review of a Question of Executive Policy


At the outset, we declare that Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy,
and quotes the Constitution as a thin veil for his weak arguments.
Torrecampo asserts that "[t]he right of the eight million residents of Metro Manila to clean and
potable water is greatly put at risk x x x" and alleges that the MWSS and the DPWH violate Section
16, Article II and Section 6, Article XII of the Constitution should they choose to proceed with the
C-5 Road Extension Project using MWSS' properties instead of the RIPADA area.

These issues, however, are "dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
Under the guise of the relative importance of the rights of a lesser number of motorists to a wider
road vis-a-vis the rights of some eight million residents of Metro Manila to clean and potable water,
Torrecampo wants this Court to determine whether the Tandang Sora area is a better alternative
to the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project.

Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an inquiry
on issues raised by Torrecampo would delve into matters that are exclusively within the wisdom
of the Executive branch.

MWSS Board of Trustees, mindful of its mandate under its Charter, issued Resolution No. 2009-
052 on March 12, 2009. The MWSS Board resolved to allow the use by the Department of Public
Works and Highways of the MWSS Balara, La Mesa aqueducts' Right of Way for the
implementation of the Katipunan-Tandang Sora segment circumferential road [extension] project.
However, as pointed out by counsel, the implementation of the Resolution, is subject to two
conditions precedent: (1) prior review by management of MWSS of the road construction design,
and (2) opinion from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel approving the use of the
Right of Way. To date, the conditions have not been complied with, simply because no road
construction design has been prepared and submitted to the MWSS management for
consideration. The objective, therefore, of the entry into the MWSS property last week is two (2)
fold. First, the purpose of the entry is to fence off, clear, segregate and secure the property in
order that DPWH can conduct the necessary complete study and detailed design of the proposed
road extension project. The study includes test pitting and geo-technical profiling. The results of
the study will show the condition and location of the aqueducts, the condition and classification of
the soil, the requirements to protect the aqueducts, assuming that the detailed design is approved
by the MWSS. Second reason, the entry is simply an act of the ownership of the MWSS over its
property along Tandang Sora. The lease contract with Capitol Golf expired in 2005. And therefore,
with or without the road extension project, the property should be fenced off. In sum, no approval
of the road extension project has been made by the MWSS since no study has been submitted
to it.

The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is
obviously not within the province of this Court. Such determination belongs to the Executive
branch. Moreover, in this case the DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine
whether a road can be safely constructed on land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without
such study, the MWSS, which owns the land, cannot decide whether to allow the DPWH to
construct the road. Absent such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction can be alleged against or attributed to respondents warranting
the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power.
DE AGBAYANI v PNB, GR No. L-23127, April 29, 1971
*effect of unconstitutionality, operative fact

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained the loan from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July
19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said
loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining
unpaid. Plaintiff countered with this suit against both defendants, her main allegation being that
the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the
date of maturity, July 19, 1944. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit
as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period
from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the
recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and
decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court failed to adhere to the applicable constitutional doctrine
as to the effect to be given to a statute subsequently declared invalid.

HELD: YES. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act,
for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity,
cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents
and purposes a mere scrap of paper.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This
is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions.
What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been
done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact
must be reckoned with.
Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental
response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view
in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period
that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

SAMEER v CABILES, GR No. 170139, August 5, 2014


*unconstitutional provision cannot be revived

FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency. Respondent Joy’s applied where she was accepted and was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal. She alleged that she was asked to pay a placement fee amounting to 70k when she
signed her contract.

On the other hand, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain
Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that
“she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to
“prepare for immediate repatriation.”

Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and
Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her “failure to comply with the work requirements [of]
her foreign [employer].” The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee. As
evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of
?20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been
transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.
Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.

Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It alleged that there
was no employer-employee relationship between them. Therefore, the claims against it were
outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s
illegal acts.

On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint ruling that her complaint was based
on mere allegations.

Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission where she was declared illegally
dismissed. It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based
on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer. The National Labor Relations Commission did
not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to
entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address the
validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific.

Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent should be entitled with her salary for the unexpired term
of her contract

HELD: YES. Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for
the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees
and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-
month equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent
to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.”
We are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
No. 10022 in 2010.

Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement
of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination
from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022
governs this case.

This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court
of Appeals. At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the
judgment in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.

Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to “[p]romulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.” When cases become moot and academic,
we do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same
violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there
are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection
because of the restoration of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as
unconstitutional.

We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed
so as to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in
accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence
of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997
and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to
June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would,
in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may
violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit
from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.”

FILM DEV. COUNCIL v COLON HERITAGE, GR No. 203754, June 16, 2015
*separability clause, parts of statutes mutually dependent, operative fact

FACTS: Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu passed City Ordinance No. LXIX otherwise
known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax ordinance) which
Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement, to pay an
amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the
Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City.

Almost a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167, creating the Film
Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film Development Foundation
of the Philippines, Inc. and the Film Rating Board.

According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and independent component cities, with the
sole exception of Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.

Accordingly, petitioner,through the Office of the Solicitor General, sent demand letters for unpaid
amusement tax reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) due to the producers
of the Grade “A” or “B” films to the following cinema proprietors and operators in Cebu City:

Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to remit the said
amounts as FDCP demanded, on one hand, and Cebu City’s assertion of a claim on the amounts
in question, the city finally filed before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction which sought the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of
RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional. Similarly, Colon Heritage filed before the RTC seeking
to declare Sec. 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.

Then the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) ruling the assailed provisions as
violative of Section 5 Article X of the 1997 (sic) Philippine Constitution.

By the same token, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, the RTC, Branch 5, in its Decision of September
25, 2012, also ruled against the constitutionality of RA 9167 as refered tomits decision’s fallo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC branch 5 erred in declaring RA 9167 unconstitutional instead of
the assailed provisions only and whether or not the petitioner should be compelled to return the
remitted taxes to them

HELD: Yes as to the decision of the RTC Branch 5. Noticeably, the RTC, Branch 5, in its
September 25, 2012 Decision in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ruled against the constitutionality of the
entire law, not just the assailed Sec. 14.
In this regard, it is well to emphasize that if it appears that the rest of the law is free from the taint
of unconstitutionality, then it should remain in force and effect if said law contains a separability
clause. A separability clause is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision
shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is not, however, controlling and
the courts, in spite of it,may invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is
not complete and workable.

In this case, not only does RA 9167 have a separability clause, it is also true that the
constitutionality of the entire law was not put in question in any of the said cases.

Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the
valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.The exception to this is
when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, in which case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.

This being the case, and in view of the elementary rule that every statute is presumed valid, the
declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entirety of RA 9167 as unconstitutional, is improper.

No as to the return. Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it has not been passed at all. Applying this principle, the logical conclusion would be to order
the return of all the amounts remitted to FDCP and given to the producers of graded films, by all
of the covered cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of millions, if not billions. Again, this
amount represents the unpaid amounts to FDCP by eight cinema operators or proprietors in only
one covered city.

An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an
executive act by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be
ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law.

Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already received the
amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned provisions of RA 9167, to return the
amounts received to the respective taxing authorities would certainly impose a heavy, and
possibly crippling, financial burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith,
complied with the legislative fiat subject of this case. For these reasons, We are of the considered
view that the application of the doctrine of operative facts in the case at bar is proper so as not to
penalize FDCP for having complied with the legislative command in RA 9167, and the producers
of graded films who have already received their tax cut prior to this Decision for having produced
top-quality films.

In view of the declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167, all


amusement taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of the finality of this decision shall
remain legal and valid under the operative fact doctrine. Amusement taxes due to petitioner but
unremitted up to the finality of this decision shall be remitted to petitioner within thirty (30) days
from date of finality. Thereafter, amusement taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall be
remitted to the local governments.
PEOPLE v MATEO, GR No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
*power of the court to promulgate rules, CA review of capital penalty rulings, when life and liberty
at stake

FACTS: On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly
committed on ten different dates were filed against appellant EFREN MATEO. The complaintes
alleaged that the said accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining
witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and
intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her consent.
Appellant denied each of the charges. Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the
malicious “retribution” of a vengeful stepdaughter. At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo
issued its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape.
The Solicitor General then assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an
acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be directly forwarded to the SC since the penalty imposed
is capital punishment

HELD: No. Since the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower
but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment is imposed), It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is
not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked
absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are
convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the
recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the
determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to
face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the
direct mandate to review factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his
guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can
ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual
issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
PEOPLE v GUTIERREZ, GR. No. L-32282-83, November 26, 1970
*transfer of venue

FACTS: In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora
Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses
therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and
province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the
destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After
investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson)
charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified
persons. Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and voluntarily appeared
before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

The Secretary of Justice then issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino
Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos
Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, the Secretary further issued Administrative
Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court.

The prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit
Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the
circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the
hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and
personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and
the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No.
258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice
required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases.

The prosecution resorted to the SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue of trial should be transferred.

HELD: The present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what
court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation
of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the
Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the
rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. The very terms of Administrative Order No.
226 relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing. Respondent Judge
Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory,
acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders
heretofore mentioned.

It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No. 226
of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the
contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein should
be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage
of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court
sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered.
To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty
to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very
purpose for which courts have been established.

Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case
in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged
were committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place
is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not
be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos
Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the
respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case
transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by
it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V
should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either
in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date.

DAMASCO v LAQUI, GR No. 81381, September 30, 1988


*cannot diminish, increase, modify substantive rule
FACTS: In an Information dated 11 September 1987, but filed only on 17 September 1987 with
the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaluyong, presided over by respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui,
petitioner Atty. Efigenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent Judge found that the
evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. As a
result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00
and the costs.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent
Judge's decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in
grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the
information was filed. Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the
information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days. Upon the other
hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months which means
sixty (60) days.

In denying petitioner's motion, the lower court held that since the Court acquired jurisdiction to try
the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for the crime charged,
which is Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after trial what has been proven
is merely light threats. However, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, recommends
that the petition be given due course.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be given due course.

HELD:
Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the
State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. Hence, while it is the rule
that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections
which are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription,
which extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could
contravene said Article 89, which is a part of substantive law. This position is further strengthened
by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction of offense as one
of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a
motion to quash.

Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA,
can be done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give
prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the commencement of a criminal action and
therefore, waivable." But this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not
however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

SANTERO v CFI-CAVITE, GR No. 61700, September 14, 1987


*cannot diminish, increase, modify substantive rule

FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari which questions the order of the respondent court granting
the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents.
Meanwhile before the court could act on the instant petition private respondents filed another
Motion for Allowance date with the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all
surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an order
be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to
each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo
Santero. The respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but oppositors
(petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsidered said Order.

The respondent Court directed Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as to the
additional three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. She stated that among others
that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the mother,
Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and her first three (3) children who were
then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance
as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under Art. 188, of the
New Civil Code.

Petitioners on the other hand argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance
since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married as
provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court

ISSUES: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the motion for allowance

HELD: No. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but
Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of
their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse
and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a
substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during
the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS v HON. CORTES, GR No. 165922, February 26, 2010
*limit of the Congressional power to exempt parties from legal fees

FACTS: Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit


cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives from the payment of all court and
sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government.
The petitioner then filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City a petition
to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage. Under the Ruled of Court, as amended, petitions for
extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee's claim.
Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.

The trial court denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, exempting from the Rule's coverage only the "Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities" and certain suits of local government units.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion.Hence, this petition.

The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22
of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. However, the OCAT recommends the denial of the
petition, opining that Section 22, Rule 141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938
because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2) the 1987 Constitution
insulated the Court's rule-making powers from Congress' interference.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners should be exempt from legal fees

HELD: YES. The SC held that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner's foreclosure
proceeding.

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing
scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law." However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to "repeal,
alter or supplement" such rules.

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress' subsidiary and corrective power. The rule making
power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.[T]he payment of
legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one
of the safeguards of this Court's institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive domain.

PNB v ASUNCION, GR No. L-46095, November 23, 1977


*cannot diminish, increase, modify substantive rule

FACTS: Philippine National Bank (hereafter referred to as the petitioner) granted in favor of
respondent Fabar Incorporated various credit accommodations and advances. Said credit
accommodations had an outstanding balance of P8,449,169.98 as of May 13, 1977.

All of the above credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose
Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo and Tomas L. Borromeo (private respondents herein) and
Manuel H. Barredo. For failure of private respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding
repeated demands, petitioner instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and
Manuel H. Barredo in a complaint.

Before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. Subsequently, respondent Court
issued an Order of dismissal pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion contending that the dismissal should only be as against the
deceased defendant Manuel H. Barredo. However, respondent Court denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration for lack of meritorious grounds.

Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed

HELD: NO. The court ruled that the Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.

A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein
prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely
sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against
the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to
"proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." The
choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce
collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so
chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the
estate of the deceased debtors. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making
it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would
deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.

As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied
literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of
Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only.
Obviously, this provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against
any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle,
which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural, rule.
PEOPLE v LACSON, GR No. 149453, April 1, 2003
*remedial law retroactive or prospective application, cannot diminish, increase, modify
substantive rule

FACTS: Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for the determination of
several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases filed against the respondent and his co-
accused with the said court. The respondent opposed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration .
The Court held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are attendant. The Court further held that the reckoning date of
the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended
parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.

HELD: Yes. The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations
and that the time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a
criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline
under the new rule, the State is presumed to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the
case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer
be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included therein.

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished.

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would
work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of
the Court.

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively
or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose
and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular
conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of
criminal laws in particular.

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new
rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and
the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved
by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and
the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of
trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the
accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period
for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no
longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of
the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the
State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite
criminal proceedings.

AMPONG v CDC, GR No. 167916, August 26, 2008


*supervision over all court personnel, estoppel

FACTS: On November 10, 1991, a Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) was
held in Davao City. A certain Evelyn Junio-Decir applied for and took the examination at Room
16, Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary School. She passed with a rating of 74.27%.
However, it was confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility was different from the one who
took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under
the name Evelyn Decir.

The CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the
service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction. She
argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme
Court as she was appointed as Interpreter III of the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province
on August 3, 1993.
The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. The CA likewise denied the petition for lack of
merit niting that she was estopped from questioning the Commission's jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has the jurisdiction over her and whether or not she was estopped
when she admitted her guilt to the CSC

HELD: NO as to the jurisdiction. The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power,
it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with
all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

It is well settled that the jurisdiction to try a case is to be determined by the law in force at the time
of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. Consonant with
this principle, the time of commission is not material to determining which court has jurisdiction. It
stands to reason that administrative jurisdiction over petitioner belongs to the Supreme Court, the
action having been instituted by the CSC at the time when petitioner was already a judicial
employee.

YES as to the estoppel. The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking
the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. As this Court declared in Aquino v. Court of Appeals:

In the interest of sound administration of justice, such practice cannot be tolerated. If we are to
sanction this argument, then all the proceedings had before the lower court and the Court of
Appeals while valid in all other respects would simply become useless. It was held that a party
who fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC and was accorded due process is
estopped from subsequently attacking its jurisdiction.

MACEDA v. VASQUEZ, GR No. 102781, April 22, 1993


*administrative supervision of SC, duty of the Ombudsman to refer

FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit
and other controverting evidences.

In his affidavit-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A.
Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service
by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1989," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered some
cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificates of service for a total of seventeen (17) months.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes
an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction over the case

HELD: NO. We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against
him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the court's power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or
to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint.

CHAVEZ v JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012 and April 16, 2013
*a representative from congress

FACTS: The case arose when Chief Justice Renato C. Corona unexpectedly departed on May
29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his
potential successor, triggered the filing of this case.

The Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit
in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to
both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would
send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1)
representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature

Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as
members of the JBC. According to them, the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a
representative of Congress.” Reverting to the basics, they cite Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution to determine the meaning of the term “Congress.” It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress”. In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate
and vice-versa, is not Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires
that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which
is to legislate. Thus, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise
the entire Congress.

ISSUES: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC

HELD: NO. As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress
may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, “from the enumeration of the membership
of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only.”

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Not any
of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of
the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic
aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the
Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident
that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government
- to legislate. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

VARGAS v RILLORAZA, GR No. L-1612, February 26, 1948


*uninterrupted continuity

FACTS:

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