Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
1. People
- Numerous enough to be self-sustaining and capable of self-defense but
small enough to be easily administered.
2. Territory
- 5 items which comprise our terrestrial domain:
i. Items mentioned in Treaty of Paris and its amendment (which
added to PH territory Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibuto);
ii. Treaty with UK to include the Turtle and Mangsee Island;
iii. Inclusion of the Batanes Islands under the 1935 Constitution;
iv. Other territories claimed by the Philippines by historic right.
- Maritime territory
i. Magallona v. Ermita challenged the implementing law of UNCLOS III
which asserted that the law made PH subservient to international law.
But the Court found that the question is political.
ii. UNCLOS III maximized the water rights of archipelagic states.
iii. Note UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of
territory. International law provides that acquisition or loss of
territory. UNCLOS III prescribes only for the proper land water ratio
and the length and contours by the baselines.
iv. UNCLOS III was challenged for providing unhampered access to
foreign ships to our internal (archipelagic) waters. The Court simply
disposed of the argument by saying that international permit this
already because of the customary right of innocent passage.
- Note the case of Capitol v. Provincial Government of Batangas –
realty tax case. Respondent basically wanted to impose realty tax on
underwater cables. SC responded by arguing that the cable pass
through our EEZ therefore taxable
- Aerial Domain
- anything State sends up, they are responsible for when it comes
down.
3. Government
- Republicanism
- In any republican regime, the will of the majority prevails
- Note, however, that at times plurality is enough. Why is this not inconsistent
with Republicanism? Simply, the constitution says so. Thus, it is permitted
that the will of a lesser number of senators may strike down the will of the
majority with respect to the concurrence of a treaty.
- Separation of Powers
- The difficulty here is that there are powers of government which is difficult
to determine where it properly pertains
- It is exercisable by a department if it is expressly granted
- If the power is inherent in the branch of government then it can be
exercised by such branch.
- The power of legislative investigation is inherent in congress
(actually it is expressly granted under the present constitution but
note that what is listed are limitations so inherent). Thus,
contumacious power is inherent to congress’ power of legislative
investigation. Note
- Doctrine of necessary implication
- Best illustrated by the case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
- Note that at the time, COMELEC was a statutory creation.
COMELEC was tasked to resolve election contests.
- Position was respondent had no authority to promulgate
rules of procedure. Court held that such authority is
necessarily implied in order to effectively perform its statutory
duties.
- Once the power is established to be exercisable by a branch does not
necessarily mean that it is to the exclusion of others. Thus, the
following doctrines exist:
- Blending of powers
- Powers are exercised cooperatively; e.g. the
preparation of the national budget is by the president
and passed by congress.
- Checks and balances
- The exercise of power by one department is checked
by another department, e.g. presidential veto, amnesty
concurrence, etc.
- Cases on separation of powers
- Carpio v. Executive Secretary
- Regarding the constitutionality of one feature of the PNP Law
which establishes a joint oversight committee (of congress)
which will be involved in the implementation of the law. This is
challenged for encroaching on the exclusive power of the
executive to implement the law
- The Court held that the oversight authority is allowed
because it is not going to participate in the implementation of
the law. The committee is only to ensure to compliance with
the law crafted by them and to ensure that there is
coordination to allow for amendment, if the need arises
- Macalintal v. COMELEC & ABAKADA v. Purisima
- Joint legislative oversight committee in these cases were
struck down as unconstitutional because the committee were
allowed to change the IRR which encroaches on the executive
department’s right to implement the law.
- Legislative oversight must solely be for the purpose of
bureaucratic streamlining.
- 3 kinds:
i. Scrutiny
ii. Investigation
iii. Legislative veto
- Legislative oversight through scrutiny is permitted (question
hour) as provided for by Art. VI, Sec. 22
- Legislative oversight through investigation is permited as
provided for by Art. VI, Sec. 21 – this is coercive
- Legislative supervision or legislative veto is unconstitutional
because:
i. Offends separation of powers – once a law is passed
the matter of implementation pertains exclusively to the
executive branch.
ii. Changing of the rule is effectively an amendment of
the law in violation of the rule on presentment. For this
to be done, it must go through the proper process for
the passage of a law
iii. Legislative oversight committee preempts the SC
exercise of judicial power in determining the validity of
the IRR.
- Araullo v. Aquino
- Carpio-Morales v. CA
- Gonzales (theory of relative constitutionality)
- Sameer v. Cabiles