PQ PDF

SmartGrid
“Improved Power Quality”

Reinhard Kuntner
Ruhul-Islam
Kunal Sharma 28 May 2010
Power Flow - Existing
© OMICRON Page 2
Flaws in Existing System
Less Efficiency
y
Less Reliability
Pollution & Hence Globle warming
© OMICRON Page 3
“Smart
Smart Grid
Grid”- Model
© OMICRON Page 4
Common Terms
Smart Grid
Energy Independent Consumer
Bidirectional Power Flow – Use of Convertors ,
Invertors & Different
Kind of Generators etc
Controlling Appliances - Load Control Switches
Smart Meters - (Act acc. to Tarrif Plans
g)
& Net Metering
© OMICRON Page 5
“Power Quality”
Biggest
gg
Nightmare Of Smart Grid
© OMICRON Page 6
Parameters Power
Quality
• Continuity of service
• Variation in voltage magnitude
• Transient voltages and currents
• Harmonics and inter-harmonics
content in the waveforms
• Flickers & volatge sag
Sources of Disturbances
© OMICRON Page 8
Sources of Disturbances
• Equipment like Inverters, battery
g
chargers,, energy
gy savingg lamp p
also reason of bad power quality.
• Potential disturbance source may

be found on both, generation and
cosumer side.
Step for better Quality
• By using of good available

technology like PWM inverters
with IGBT power semicondutor
• By using FACTS technology for

transmission and distribution.
PQ Analysis
Need - Real Time Power Quality
Monitoring Methods
¾Event Triggered
gg PQ
Q recorder-To
monitor sudden voltage drop in
a network
¾Continuous Measurement-Slow
variation of Voltage and
frequency, harmonics, flickers
and unblance voltage
Principle Of PQ Recording
PQ Measurement
Measurement-Levels
Levels
Low
o Voltage
o age Level
e e
- Dedicated PQ Meters
Medium & High

g Voltage
g
– Integrated measurement system
with PMU
PMU’s
s , MU
MU’ss & Protection
Relays Via WAM
GPS Synchronised WAM
“Power
Power Quality
Quality”
as a
“Commodity”
y
“PQ Devices”
D i ”
Back Bone of the Smart
Grid
PQ Devices according to IEC
61000 4 30
61000-4-30
Quality Check
of
PQ
Q Devices
PQ Device-Quality Check
Hi hl accurate
•Highly t voltage
lt and
d
current Source as per IEC
61000 4 30
61000-4-30
•Magnitude, frequency,
phase angle and signal
shapes, as per standard
•Possibility to synchronize
meas ement
measurement de ice
device and
calibrator
•IEC 61850
61850-9-1
9 1 compatibility
© OMICRON Page 18
CONCLUSION
¾SmartGrid
¾S tG id promises
i i
improved
d Power
P
Quality.
¾Power Quality can be seen on the same
strategic level as Energy Consumption.
Consumption
¾The industry must make appropriate
equipment & methods avaible for
Calibration & Performance testing of PQ
devices
© OMICRON Page 19
Thanks For Your Kind Attention !!!
© OMICRON 28 May 2010

Security
Smart Grid and Security
आधार कर्ाा और सब साधन प्रथक विस्र्ार से,

चेष्टा विविध विध दे ि ये है हे र्ु ऩाांच प्रकार के
र्न मन िचन से जन सभी जो कमा जग में कर रहे

हो ठीक या विऩरीर् इनके ऩाांच ये कारण कहे
LD&C_SCADA
Why Secure
• Interoperability among six aspects of the electric
power industry
• Power generation, transmission and distribution

(all things that are physical)
• Command, control and communications
• sensing,
• collection,
• analysis and
• interpretation of all source operational data into
information, and
• Transfer of such information to facilitate
• commerce and
• safe and reliable operation of power systems;
• Include such things as scheduling and dispatching the
power and control of the whole power system
• If Man in middle, impact is slow/local/partial;
• Everything auto, impact swift/widespread/total
LD&C_SCADA
LD&C_SCADA
IEEE POWER & ENERGY Magzine 2009 – साभार
STRUCTURE
o What need to be secured,

o How it can be secured
o Who will secure what and how
o Operational systems which can be facing
cyber vulnerability
o Security System requirement
o Security practices
o Security audit
o Continual Improvement perspective i.e. we
need to plan, build processes to do, check
effectiveness of the two and act for
improvement.
LD&C_SCADA
SECURITY
• Firewalls and security zoning

• Separation among application
• SCADA/EMS
• ISR
• STOA
• Scheduling
• Metering and settlement
• Web access
• Corporate access
• Competing Objective
• Maintaining Model/values exchange
• Single sign on for users v/s individual
application v/s zonal boundaries
LD&C_SCADA
To Secure
• Malware
• Careless Employees (Password robustness
etc)
• Exploited vulnerabilities
• Zero-day exploits
• Application robustness against known
exploits such as buffers overflow/RPC
LD&C_SCADA
SECURITY
Utility companies Critical-infrastructure custodians

Likely targets of cyber terrorism
Government regulations
Historically DCS/ SCADA/ EMS/ DMS

Protected by proprietary technology
Isolated from enterprise IT
Cost and Skill Issues led to:

Standard operating systems
exposure of internet connectivity
Remote access
Has Exposed these networks to 21st-century cyber threats

LD&C_SCADA
Approach
• A holistic approach based on standards of good

practices (e.g., ISO 27002)
• to achieve and maintain compliance with the
regulations and applicable standards
• Plan-Do-Check-Act
• security gap analysis
• risk based prioritization of remediation requirements
• implementation of controls
• periodic assessment of implemented controls
• Implementing an information security management
system based upon standard to demonstrate high
standard of security
• business partners,
• customers, and
• regulators
LD&C_SCADA
REGULATION
• Discuss regulatory landscape

• CERC,
• IT Act
• List security implications for utilities
• Recommended approach for compliance
• To achieve
• To maintain
• Evaluate The Rules
• implications
• requirements
• approach for compliance
LD&C_SCADA
Possible incident scenario
• An employee has a company laptop on the internet

at his home office, connected to the control
network through a VPN (Virtual Private Network)
• A hacker from overseas infects the laptop with a
virus over the Internet
• The virus then propagates over the VPN connection
into the control network and infects another
Windows PC located right in the heart of the
control system
• Is this just a hypothetical situation? It couldn't
happen to you? The bad news is that this is a real
incident that actually happened to the water
supply system in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 2006
LD&C_SCADA
Communication
• General Issues
• Complacency
• Not a concern since not attacked
• Institute a security process/team building
exercise that includes consequence analysis/
ramifications of a successful security attack
• Utility do not assess any value to the information
being communicated, except in the case of control
actions – Unbundling may change this attitude???
• Dial-Up Modem Usage
• use of auto-answer modems is of concern
• TCP/IP
• increasing dependence on TCP/IP as a transport for
critical information – ICCP; Exchange; schedule
LD&C_SCADA
Communication… contd
• Some information exchanged (e.g. schedule)

is using the Internet instead of
Intranets. The trend may continue, since
connectivity options using the Internet
represent a low cost option.
• security threats
• eavesdropping,
• spoofing,
• denial of service,
• Replay
• number of people/entities attached
• Appropriate security measures should be
deployed based upon an appropriate
consequence analysis
LD&C_SCADA
Internet Connectivity
• infrastructure connectivity point to the

Internet needs to be isolated through a
screening router/firewall combination from
the rest of the corporate LAN/Intranet
• personnel need to be assigned to audit/
monitor this connectivity for any security
attacks that occur
• Given sufficient audit trail, prosecution
of every attacker should be strongly
considered
LD&C_SCADA
FIREWALL
• Firewall represent a valid security countermeasure
• typically validate a remote connection/ user to
• use a given transport -TCP/IP or OSI
• make application service requests - FTP, HTTP, RFC-
1006, DNP
• Limited to a set of well defined nodes/applications
• However, once authenticated and connected,
firewall is not sufficient to enforce
access/service privileges to information on the
destination application
• Internet applications – e.g. FTP, Telnet - have the
ability to be configured for user authentication
(usually passwords) upon which access privileges
(e.g. read, write, etc.) will be granted.
• However, protocols (e.g. DNP/870-5) are inadequate in
this regard
• Active work is ongoing to address the issue of
authentication and security within several protocols
by TC 57
LD&C_SCADA
Risks
• consequence analysis is unique to each business

entity however Bypassing of controls/ control
security can be rated as highest. Others include
• Exposed Trading Functions - analysis of the type
of information conveyed – anticipated financial
damages of a successful attack
• ICCP - Analysis of the dependency on information
conveyed (Telemetry and calculated data from RLDC
to SLDC etc.) by/to other control centers
• Control Center to Substation Communication: The
• disruption of a substation communication can cause
problem only if remotely controlled
• Metering: All revenue is based upon data acquired
through metering - this may not be an area of
concern given alternate available and mode of data
communication
LD&C_SCADA
Substation
LD&C_SCADA
Control System
• Control systems
• Distributed Control Systems (DCS),
• Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC),
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA),
• Remote Terminal Units (RTUs),
• Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
• Designed to be highly reliable and
interoperable
• proprietary operating systems in the
control systems often preclude the use of
existing Information Technology (IT)
security
LD&C_SCADA
Vulnerability
• Vendors and utilities employ

• Remote access
• dial-up modem
• pc
• facilitate maintenance and remote operations
• cyber vulnerabilities can result in business-
related or safety/regulatory issues
• IT security technology will help with known
Internet threats, but is not designed to secure
control systems
• IT is responsible for cyber security but often
does not understand control systems
• Control system suppliers understand control
systems, but they are not security experts
LD&C_SCADA
Differences
• IT security policies such as ISO-17799 do not

address the unique needs of control systems
• Remote access is important for the efficient
operation of control systems
• vulnerability assessments and penetration testing
of T&D and generation control systems lead to
successful breach in obtaining unauthorized access
to SCADA and DCS
• In the near term, control system security can be
enhanced by a combination of implementing cyber
security procedures and utilizing IT technologies
to protect from traditional IT threats
LD&C_SCADA
Smart Grid: Concepts &
Issues ID
R
G
Anil Sinha T
Consultant/ Advisor
A
(anilsinha@live.in)
R
SM
Smart Grid
I
“The smart grid is no revolution
Dbut
R
rather an evolution of a process within
G
which electricity grids are being
T
continuously improved to meet the
A R
needs of current and future customers.”
(European Technology Forum)
S M
28. May 2010 Smart Grid:Concepts & Issues - Anil Sinha, Consultant Page 2
Smart Grid: General I
D
R
G
T
A R
S M
General
Increasing demand of Electrical
D
I Power
R entity
Electricity Grid is a well known
It has three layers G

Generation T
R

Transmission
A

Distribution
S M
Layers
ID
Distribution R
Transmission G
T
AR Generation
SM
General
I
The conventional Generation
D
of
Power: R
G
Thermal – Coal, Gas, etc.
Hydro
T

Nuclear
A R
Depleting stock of fuel

S M
Increased Pollution
General

D
Generation from RenewableISources

of Energy is growing
Renewable Sources: G
R

T
Solar – Photo Voltaic

Wind
A R
Solar – Thermal
Hydro Power (specifically, small Hydro)

M

Bio-Mass

S
Geo-thermal, etc.
General
The Generation from RSE isI
D
essentially distributed inRnature
The consumer may also G be a
T
generator at the distribution level

Smart Grid A
R
This is one input for the need of a
The RSEM generation unpredictable

S
General
I
Among the other reasons for
D
a Smart
Grid are: R
G
Need for Reliability, due to increasing
T
reliance on electric power

A R
Need for improving efficiency of use of
available power

S M
Need to reduce pollution
Need to be ready for fresh applications of
power, e.g. Electric Vehicles
Smart Grid: Concepts I
D
R
G
T
A R
S M
Limits on Scope
I
Only the Distribution level is
D
considered R
Gconsidered
Capacity Building is not
Customer EducationT is not considered
R
Considered in the light of Control &
Automation A

requirement
S M
Concepts
I
A smart Grid is the judicious
D
but
strong combination of theR Electrical
G
Grid with the Information &
It also includesR
T
Communication Technology
the extension of the
A
monitored grid (with the ICT) down to
S M
the consumer premises, down even to
the individual equipment
Concepts
Some new age functions are I D
already
available/ in use, e.g. R
G
Automatic Meter Reading (AMR)

T
Demand Side Management (DSM)

Some more A
R
Distribution Management System (DMS)
functions are selectively

S M
applied to existing infrastructure
E.g. Remote Control of Capacitor Banks
Concepts

D
I Grid:
Our expectation from the Smart
Self healing R
G
Enable Consumer Participation

T
Improve Quality of Power

A R
Accommodate distributed generation &
storage of power, even if intermittent

S M
Provide Real-time data
Increase efficiency, reduce T&C losses
I D
Smart Grid: Communication
R
G
T
A R
S M
Communication
The DMS solution includes I
D
R
communication from Control Room till
G
Sub-station level (WAN)

T
The additional requirement:

A R
Sub-station to Consumer premises (NAN)
Within Consumer premises (HAN)
S M
Communication
ID
S R C
D
U
B G O
T S
N
S
M
S WAN
AR T
A
T NAN
U
M
HAN
I
SM O
N
E
R
WAN: Wide Area Network; NAN: Neighborhood Area Network; HAN: Home Area Network
Communication
Expectation ID
Secure R
Reliable G
Flexible
T

Scalable
Cost-effective AR

SM
Future-Proof
I D
Smart Grid: Applications
R
G
T
A R
S M
Applications
Advanced Metering ID
Traditional meter reading R
Usage Profiling G

T
Remote Connect/ Disconnect

AR
Outage/ Restoration Reporting
SM
Applications
Distribution level ID
Traditional Sub-station Automation R
Video Monitoring
G

T
Work-force Mobility

AR
SCADA System (Expanded)
Transformer Monitoring (DT level)
Capacitor Bank Control

M
Voltage Monitoring
S
Recloser Automation
Applications
Consumer level ID
Informed Consumer R
Energy Efficiency G
Dynamic Pricing
T

Demand Response
AR
Distributed Generation

SM
Distributed Storage
Smart Charging of EV
Smart Grid: Issues ID
R
G
T
AR
SM
Issues
I
Smart Grid is a new Idea, still
D in the
Concept/ Demo phase R
Smart Grid Evolution G
is still on
T
Good Part: We continue to add fresh
usefulness/ A
R
ideas to enhance the usability/
Cost-effectiveness
M
Bad Part: When do we come to the
S implementation?
commercial
Issues
I D
The driver differs with the country of
implementation R
G
General lack of Awareness
T
Very high requirement of
Communication
cost! A R Infrastructure, i.e.
Unclear/Mundefined standards
S
No common functionality definition
Issues
I D
Who will pay/ install/ maintain the
R
consumer level smart interfaces/
G
communication infrastructure

T
Regulatory & Policy Inputs are

incomplete
A R
Data Protection
Possible M
misuse of DSM & Direct Load
Sby the Utility
Control
Way Ahead
Increase the scope of C&A I
D
in the
R System
existing Grid; Install SCADA
Introduce Smart Meters/G AMR
Expand to includeT DT level in the
R
monitoring scheme
A
Extend the monitoring & control
network Mto devices in the homes
S
Add the Smart Grid applications
I
Smart Grid: Conclusion
D
R
G
T
A R
S M
Conclusion
I D
No common definition, Standards are
in draft stage R
Demo Systems are inG place,
T
Applications are being created

to evolve A
R
Regulatory/ Policy framework is still
Source of
S M funds is not clear
It will be a Game-changer!
Thank you ID
R
G
Anil Sinha T
Consultant/ Advisor
A
(anilsinha@live.in)
R
SM
Smart Grid-
A Road to Future
Kuldeep Tickoo
Siemens Ltd, India
© Siemens AG 2009
Page 1 May 10 E D EA Energy Sector
The starting point:
changing needs, growing demands
Network conditions
Energy and requirements
efficiency
Increased
energy trading Cost
Greater network complexity pressure
and vulnerability
Fluctuating infeed
Aging
High supply
infrastructure
Increasing Integration of quality
and lack of
experts distance between distributed
generation energy
and load resources
Legal
Integration of and regulatory
Integration of Power quality intelligent buildings
renewable energy framework
sources
CO2 reduction
External influences Operational factors
© Siemens AG 2009
The starting point:
Drivers for flexible and (cost)-efficient grids
Drivers Challenges for the utilities
Need for more energy Efficient grid

for profitability
Environmental
sustainability Multiple infeed
Regulatory for flexibility
Competitive and
energy prices political
push Demand side management
for accessibility
Security of supply
Quality assurance
Aging infrastructure and workforce for reliability
© Siemens AG 2009
Siemens Smart Grid:
Always aiming for your benefit
Flexibility
Reliability Profitability
Accessibility
© Siemens AG 2009
Welcome to Smart Grid
© Siemens AG 2009
Vision of a Smart Grid
“Auto-balancing, self-monitoring power grid that accepts any source

of fuel (coal, sun, wind) and transforms it for the consumer‟s end use (heat,
light, hot water) with minimal human intervention.”
“A system that will allow society to optimize the use of renewable energy
sources and minimize our collective environmental footprint.”
“It is a grid that has the ability to sense when a part of its system is
overloaded and re-route power to reduce that overload and prevent a
potential outage situation.”
“A grid that enables real-time communication between the consumer and

utility, allowing us to optimize a consumer’s energy usage based
on environmental and/or price preferences.”
Source: Xcel Energy’s
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart Grid - The three core components
Smart
1.
Meters
Grid
2.
Intelligence
3. Utility IT
© Siemens AG 2009
Pathways to a Smart Grid
The solution
From To
Transmission
Blackout prevention by increasing the
Manual reaction to critical
situational awareness and automated
network situations
counter measures
Condition monitoring for controlled

Primary equipment
overload of bottlenecks and reliability-
condition not well known
centered asset management
Complex engineering, Plug-and-play by Smart Substation

testing and manufacturing Automation
Central generation, Integration of distributed generation
Distribution
decentralized consumption and storage by virtual power plants
Unmanaged, not
Smart metering and load management
transparent consumption
© Siemens AG 2009
Pathways to a Smart Grid:
Blackout prevention
From To
Manual reaction to critical Blackout prevention by increasing the

network situations situational awareness and automated
counter measures
What‟s necessary?
 New visualization concepts to increase situation

awareness
 Availability of real-time data
 Problem-oriented decision support
 Smart decision based on increased data volume
and quality
© Siemens AG 2009
Blackout prevention:
Characteristics
Smart Grid
Today„s standard Evolution
blackout prevention
Reactive grid Reactive grid Proactive,

operation operation preventive grid
Manual operation Automated management
switching routines
 Grid dispatcher has to decide within seconds

 Wrong decisions or inactivity > risk of blackout!
© Siemens AG 2009
Reference example
Expert System for ADWEA DMS (Abu Dhabi):

Advanced Network Operation (ANOP) as part of Spectrum Power
Task Optimal action

Unplanned outages / Fault isolation and network
Specially developed algorithm

disturbances restoration
Spectrum Power –
Planned outages Network reconfiguration at
ongoing customer supply
Corrective measures
Emergency cases: elimination of
Normal switching status overloads and undervoltages
Planned cases: Relief of
Contingency evaluation equipment loads
Network reconfiguration to come

back to normal switching status
© Siemens AG 2009
Benefits
 True operator assistance in every

situation – with the right degree of
complexity
 Unique and robust algorithm –
Flexibility
adequate solutions for all operational
tasks
=  Significant time savings – e.g. for
outage planning
Accessibility  Reduced chance of errors during
planning
…with Advanced Network Operation

(ANOP)
© Siemens AG 2009
Condition monitoring
From To
Primary equipment condition Condition monitoring for controlled overload

not well known of bottlenecks and reliability-centered asset
management
Condition monitoring – looking inside your equipment
Gis Transformer
& Tap Changer
CT, VT
Circuit Breaker  Information on the ageing or health condition of a
Isolators, Disconn. Secondary Surge Arrester
primary device in operation
Earthing S. Equipment
 Provided by special sensors and / or derived from
Cable
OHL data typically available
© Siemens AG 2009
Condition monitoring:
Modular integration
© Siemens AG 2009
Reference example
Transformer Monitoring for Hydro Québec (Canada)
Additional benefit: Peak load transmission at low ambient temperatures

© Siemens AG 2009
Benefits
 Extended lifetime
 Improved asset protection
 Reduced maintenance costs
Flexibility  Increased transmission capacity
 Increased reliability
Accessibility
Profitability = through…
Reliability  Congestion Management
 Outage avoidance and blackout
prevention
 Risk management
 Early warning for damages caused
by abnormal weather conditions
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart Substation Automation
From To
Complex engineering, testing Plug-and-play by Smart Substation Automation

and manufacturing
Smart Substation Automation – what does it stand for?
 Integrated solution – offering advanced

functionality based on different devices up to now
 Plug-and-play-like functionality with the latest
standards (IEC 61850)
 Ready-to-tie-in solution
 Access to non-operational data
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart Substation Automation:
Applications
Smart Gear via IEC 61850

Programmable, self-monitoring GM-SG medium voltage metal-clad switchgear
Applications
 Emergency standby
 Primary power supply
 Peak shaving
© Siemens AG 2009
Functionality
Smart Gear via IEC 61850

Programmable, self-monitoring GM-SG medium voltage metal-clad switchgear
Applications
 Auto / manual mode

 Opening and closing
breakers
 Open and close transition
 Auto transfer schemes:
 Generator paralleling
 Synchronization to utility
 Speed and voltage control
 Load sharing
 Load control
© Siemens AG 2009
Benefits
 Fast-available solution – through

shorter cycle times
 Time savings in engineering and
Flexibility =
Profitability commissioning: more than 50 %
Reliability =  Minimized wiring
 Fast start-up – minimal downtime
Accessibility  High reliability through simplicity
 Improved monitoring
 Improved operational safety
© Siemens AG 2009
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and storage
From To
Central generation, Integration of Distributed Energy Resources

decentralized consumption (DER) and storage by virtual power plants
Virtual power plants – main features:

 Energy management system for monitoring,
planning and optimization of DER
 Forecasting system for load, generation of wind
power plants and photovoltaic
 Energy data management for collecting and keeping
the required information, e.g. loads, contractual data
 Front-end for the communication with the
decentralized power units.
© Siemens AG 2009
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and storage:
The DEMS® solution
As a Windows-based system, DEMS (Decentralized Energy Management System) provides…
 Energy forecasts
(Supervisory Control
Energy forecast User interface
Process coupling
Data Acquisition)
 Forecast of the regenerative Forecast of the
SCADA
regenerative production
production
and
Reports
 Cost-optimal planning and Production optimization
management of decentralized
Demand optimization Storage
power supply plants
 Consideration of topological Communication
restrictions in the grid
management
 Analysis and assessment of DEMS
individual energy purchase and
contracts of sale
© Siemens AG 2009
Reference example
Virtual power plant KonWerl (Germany)
 Cost-optimal planning
and management of
decentralized power
supply plants
 Generation ranging
from 500 kW to several
MW each Includes
coordination of
different carriers
© Siemens AG 2009
Benefits of Virtual Power Plants
Improved Market Access:

The bundling enables even small generators to trade at spot
and balancing power markets. Bundling opens up new sales
channels.
Support of network stability:
Flexibility With VPP distributed energy resources can cover peak
=
Reliability demand.
Profitability
Alternative to building new power plants:
The VPP concept makes distributed energy resources
Accessibility
attractive to utilities as well.
Alternative to network expansion:
Bundled distributed energy resources supply electricity to
regionally limited areas.
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart metering
From To
Unmanaged, not transparent Smart metering and load management

consumption
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart metering:
Characteristics
With regard to With regard to With regard to

your customer: your business: legal aspects:
 Monthly meter  Increased efficiency  Platform for the

reading – higher of metering business “energy efficiency
transparency  Reliable directive”
documentation of  Fulfillment of legal
customer supply requirements
 Reduction of non-
technical losses
 Chance for
additional services
Smart metering and load management – what do they stand for?
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart metering:
The AMIS System
AMIS Reference Project for Energie AG Oberösterreich (Austria)
AMIS – the integrative complete solution for all distribution network operators
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart metering:
Reference example
AMIS Reference Project for Energie AG Oberösterreich (Austria):

The most important reasons for implementing an AMIS system are
 Automation of metering processes (meter reading, blocking

of customer installations, billing, prepayment services, etc.)
 Significant improvement of customer processes
 Implementation of various tariffs
 Quality improvement of consumption data due to monthly
meter reading
 Replacement of ripple control
 Recording of the customer supply
 Automation of the transformer stations
 Support of the energy efficiency program of Energie AG
© Siemens AG 2009
Smart metering:
Benefits
 Enhanced customer service

Flexibility  Detection of non-technical losses
(Tamper detection)
=  Power quality monitoring
 Data to improve the outage
Accessibility management
 Load forecasting
 Asset management, including
transformer sizing
© Siemens AG 2009
Thank You
© Siemens AG 2009

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SmartGrid

“Improved Power Quality”

Nightmare Of Smart Grid

• Potential disturbance source may

• By using of good available

• By using FACTS technology for

Medium & High

© OMICRON 28 May 2010

Smart Grid and Security

आधार कर्ाा और सब साधन प्रथक विस्र्ार से,

र्न मन िचन से जन सभी जो कमा जग में कर रहे

• Power generation, transmission and distribution

o What need to be secured,

• Firewalls and security zoning

Utility companies Critical-infrastructure custodians

Historically DCS/ SCADA/ EMS/ DMS

Cost and Skill Issues led to:

Has Exposed these networks to 21st-century cyber threats

• A holistic approach based on standards of good

• Discuss regulatory landscape

• An employee has a company laptop on the internet

• Some information exchanged (e.g. schedule)

• infrastructure connectivity point to the

• consequence analysis is unique to each business

• Vendors and utilities employ

• IT security policies such as ISO-17799 do not

Hydro Power (specifically, small Hydro)

The RSEM generation unpredictable

Siemens Ltd, India

Drivers Challenges for the utilities

Need for more energy Efficient grid

“Auto-balancing, self-monitoring power grid that accepts any source

“A grid that enables real-time communication between the consumer and

Condition monitoring for controlled

Complex engineering, Plug-and-play by Smart Substation

Central generation, Integration of distributed generation

Manual reaction to critical Blackout prevention by increasing the

 New visualization concepts to increase situation

Reactive grid Reactive grid Proactive,

 Grid dispatcher has to decide within seconds

Expert System for ADWEA DMS (Abu Dhabi):

Task Optimal action

Specially developed algorithm

Network reconfiguration to come

 True operator assistance in every

…with Advanced Network Operation

Primary equipment condition Condition monitoring for controlled overload

Condition monitoring – looking inside your equipment

Transformer Monitoring for Hydro Québec (Canada)

Additional benefit: Peak load transmission at low ambient temperatures

Complex engineering, testing Plug-and-play by Smart Substation Automation

Smart Substation Automation – what does it stand for?

 Integrated solution – offering advanced

Smart Gear via IEC 61850

Smart Gear via IEC 61850

 Auto / manual mode

 Fast-available solution – through

Central generation, Integration of Distributed Energy Resources

Virtual power plants – main features:

As a Windows-based system, DEMS (Decentralized Energy Management System) provides…

Virtual power plant KonWerl (Germany)

Improved Market Access:

Unmanaged, not transparent Smart metering and load management