Summary

1-5 Public Perceptions

 Concept of acceptable risk was difficult for the general public.

 Major objection is due to the involuntary nature of acceptable risk.
 Most people around chemical plant are not aware that there is any risk at all.
 Some naturalist suggest eliminating chemical plant hazards by “returning to nature”

1-6 The Nature of the Accident Process

 Chemical plant accidents follow typical patterns. It is important to study these patterns in
order to anticipate the types of accidents that will occur.

 Economic loss is consistently high for accidents involving explosions.

 Toxic release typically results in little damage to capital equipment. Personnel injuries,
employee losses, legal compensation, and cleanup liabilities can be significant.

 Mechanical failure is the largest cause of loss in a chemical plant.

 Second largest cause is operator error.
 Human error is frequently used to describe a cause of losses.
 Piping system failure represents the bulk of the accidents, followed by storage tanks and
reactors.
Most accidents follow a three-step sequence:

 Initiation (the event that starts the accident),

 Propagation (the event or events that maintain or expand the accident)
 Termination (the event or events that stop the accident or diminish it in size)
1-7 Inherent Safety

 Inherently safe plant by CCPS, relies on chemistry and physics to prevent accidents rather
than on control systems, interlocks, redundancy, and special operating procedures to
prevent accidents.
 Inherently safer plants are tolerant of errors (more in operator errors and abnormal
conditions) and are often the most cost effective.

The major approach to inherently safer process designs:

 intensification

 substitution

 attenuation

 limitation of effects

 simplification/error tolerance
1-8 Four Significant Disasters

 Largest peacetime explosion ever to occur in the UK

 Date: Saturday, June 1974
 Location: Flixborough, England chemical plant owned by Nypro (UK) Ltd
 28 people died and 36 others were injured.
 Designed to produce 70,000 tons per year of caprolactam. Which is a basic raw material for
production of nylon.
 Flixborough process conditions was 155ºC and 7.9atm
 Cyclohexane volatilizes immediately when depressurized to atmospheric conditions
 Each of reactor normally contained about 20 tons of cyclohexane.

Before the accident

 Reactor 5 in the series was found to be leaking.

 It has vertical crack in its structure.
 It was decided to remove the reactor for repairs.
 An additional decision was made to continue operating by connecting reactor 4 directly to
reactor 6.
  The feed pipes connecting the reactors were 28 inches in diameter. And only 20-inch flexible
pipe was used to connect reactor 4 and reactor 6.

Result

 It is hypothesized that the bypass pipe section ruptured because of inadequate support and
overflexing of the pipe section resulting of internal reactor pressure.
 An estimated 30 tons of cyclohexane volatilized and formed a large vapor cloud.
 It was ignited by unknown source estimated 45 seconds after the release.
 The explosion was all over the plant facility, including the administrative office.
 Damage extended to 1821 nearby houses and 167 shops and factories.
 53 civilians were reported injured.
 Resulting fire in the plant burned for over 10 days

Bhopal, India Disaster

 It received considerably more attention than the Flixborough accident.

 Date: Monday, December 3, 1984
 Location: Bhopal, India partially owned by Union Carbide
 The plant was constructed only 1.5 miles away from the residential area.
 Plant produced pesticides. An intermediate compound in this process is methyl isocyanate
(MIC).
 MIC is an extremely dangerous compound. It is reactive, toxic, volatile and flammable.
 Its boiling point is 39.1ºC at atmospheric condition
 It reacts exothermically with water.
 With inadequate cooling the temperature increases and the MIC will boil. MIC storage tanks
are typically refrigerated to prevent the problem.

Result

 Maximum exposure concentrations of MIC for workers over an 8-hour period is 0.02ppm.
But the individuals was exposed to concentrations of MIC vapors above 21 ppm experience
severe irritation of the nose and throat.
 Death at large concentrations of vapors is due to respiratory distress.
 An estimated 25 tons of toxic MIC vapor was released.
 The toxic cloud spread to the adjacent town, killing over 2,000 civilians and injuring
estimated 20,000 others.
 The exact cause of the contamination of the MIC was unknown.

Seveso, Italy Disaster

 Date: July 10, 1976

 Location: Seveso, Italy owned by Icmesa Chemical Company
 About 15 miles away form Milan, Italy with approximately 17,000 inhabitants.
 The product was hexachlorophene, a bactericide, with trichlorophenol produced as an
intermediate.
 TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin) was a undesirable side-product of the plant.
About TCDD

 TCDD was the most potent toxin known to humans. And for animals, TCDD to be fatal in
doses as small as 10^-9 times the body weight.
 It is also insoluble in water.
 Nonlethal doses of TCDD result in chloracne

Day of Disaster

 The trichlorophenol went out of control, resulting higher temperature than normal and
increased production of TCDD.
 Estimated 2 kg of TCDD was released through a relief system in a white cloud over Seveso.
 Also heavy rain washed the TCDD into the soil. Approximately 10 square miles were
contaminated.
 Due to poor communications with local authorities, civilian was not started to evacuate until
several days later.

Result

 Over 250 cases of chloracne were reported.

 Over 600 people were evacuated and an additional 2000 people were given blood tests.
 The most severely contaminated area, the condition it remains in today.
 The Seveso accidents could have been avoided if proper containment systems had been
used to contain the reactor releases.

Pasadena, Texas Disaster

 Date: 23rd of October 1989

 Location: Pasadena, Texas
 23 fatalities. 314 injuries and capital losses of over $715 million
 The explosion occurred in high-density polyethylene plant after accidental release of 85,000
pounds of flammable mixture containing ethylene, isobutane, hexane and hydrogen.
 Release formed a large gas cloud instanteously because the system was under high pressure
and temperature.
 The cloud was ignited about 2 minutes after the release by an unidentified ignition source.
 The normal - and safe - procedure includes closing the DEMCO valve, removing the air lines,
and locking the valve in the closed position. Then the product takeoff valve is removed to
give access to the plugged leg.
 The accident investigation evidence showed that this safe procedure was not followed.
 The DEMCO valve was in the open position, and the lockout device was removed.
 This scenario was a serious violation of well-established and well-understood procedures.

Other factors that contributed to the severity of this disaster were also cited:

(1) proximity of high-occupancy structures (control rooms) to hazardous operation,

(2) inadequate separation between buildings, and
(3) crowded process equipment
Questions

1. A chemical of physical condition that has the potential to cause damage to people, property, or
to the environment.
2. Models representing two-phase flow through a vessel.
3. Injuries that results in the injured person not being able to perform their regular duties but
being able to perform duties consistent their normal work.
4. Any injury such as a cut, sprain, or burn that results from a work accident.
5. Number of occupational injuries and/or illness or lost workdays per 100 full-time employees.
6. Injuries that require treatment that must be administered by a physician or under the standing
orders of a physician.
7. Cases involving an occupational injury or occupational illness, including deaths.
8. Models representing the spread of toxic vapor through a plant after a release.
9. Important measures of the effectiveness of safety programs.
10. To determine the various ways that processes can fail and the probability of failure.
11. Any abnormal condition or disorder, caused by exposure to environmental factors associated
with employment.
12. Identifies and eliminates existing safety hazards.
13. Number of days which the employee could not perform all or any part of his or her normal
assignment during the workday or shift due to occupational injury or illness.
14. A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the
incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss injury.
15. Injuries that result in the injured no being able to return to work on their next regular workday.
16. It has management system that prevents the existence of safety hazards.
17. The prevention of accidents through the use of appropriate technologies to identify the hazards
of a chemical plant and eliminate them before an accident occurs.
18. Injuries that results to death.
19. Any one-time treatment and any follow-up visits for the purpose of observation of minor
scratches, cuts, burns, splitters, and so forth that do not ordinarily require medical care.
20. Any one-time treatment and any follow-up visits for the purpose of observation of minor
scratches, cuts, burns, splitters, and so forth that do not ordinarily require medical care.
21. consistently high for accidents involving explosions.
22. largest cause of loss in a chemical plant.
23. frequently used to describe a cause of losses.
24. Event that starts the accident
25. relies on chemistry and physics to prevent accidents rather than on control systems, interlocks,
redundancy, and special operating procedures to prevent accidents.
26. tolerant of errors and are often the most cost effective.
27. Owner of Flixborough chemical plant
28. Basic raw material for production of nylon
29. Process conditions of Fliborough chemical plant
30. Date of Flixborough disaster
31. Diameter of feed pipes connection of the reactors in flixborough chemical plant
32. Date of Bhopal Disaster
33. Intermediate compound of plant to produce pesticides
34. In Bhopal disaster, death at large concentrations of vapors is due to _________
35. Fatalities made by Bhopal disaster
36. Owner of Seveso plant
37. was an undesirable side-product of the seveso plant.
38. was the most potent toxin known to humans.
39. Number of injured in Pasadena, Texas disaster

Enumeration

Most accidents follow a three-step sequence (3 points)

The major approach to inherently safer process designs (5points)

Other factors that contributed to the severity of Pasadena, Texas disaster (3points)

• Key Answers:

1. Hazard
2. Hydrodynamic models
3. Recordable lost workday case due to restricted duty
4. Occupational injury
5. Incident rate
6. Recordable medical cases
7. Recordable cases
8. Dispersion models
9. Accident and loss statistics
10. Mathematical techniques
11. Occupational illness
12. Good safety program
13. Lost workdays
14. Risk
15. Recordable cases with days away from work
16. Recordable cases with days away from work
17. Safety or loss prevention
18. Recordable fatality cases
19. First aid
 20. Medical treatment
21. Economic loss
22. Mechanical Failure
23. Human error
24. Initiation
25. Inherently safe plant
26. Inherently safer plants
27. Nypro (UK) Ltd
28. Caprolactam
29. 155C and 7.9atm
30. June 1 1974
31. 28 inches
32. Dec 3, 1984
33. Methyl isocyanate
34. Respiratory distress
35. 2000
36. Icmesa Chemical company
37. 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin
38. 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin
39. 314 injuries

Enumerations:

Most accidents follow a three-step sequence:

 Initiation
 Propagation
 Termination

The major approach to inherently safer process designs:

 Intensification
 Substitution
 Attenuation
 Limitation of effects
 Simplification/error tolerance

Other factors that contributed to the severity of Pasadena, Texas disaster

 Proximity of high-occupancy structures to hazardous operation

 Inadequate separation between buildings
 Crowded process equipment.