EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs.

LUIS BUNDALIAN
[G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003.]

FACTS: In this petition for review, the petitioner assailed the decision of the Office of the President which ordered his
dismissal as Regional Director of the DPWH for unexplained wealth, as a result of an investigation conducted by the PCAGC
which arrived at the conclusion that the real property he had acquired in California, U.S. was unlawfully acquired for it was
manifestly out of proportion to his salary.

Petitioner’s dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional
Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at Los Angeles, California, making a
down payment of US$100,000.00. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public
works projects.

Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject
property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. And that desiring to migrate in the US, they were advised by an immigration
lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in
buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a prohibition in her mortgage
contract. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner.
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He
attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for
insufficiency of evidence.
The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioner’s counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 3019. The OP concurred with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC.

ISSUE: (1) whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and, (2) whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before
the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.

HELD:
(1) The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling: that PCAGC had authority to investigate the case despite the lack of
verification of the administrative complaint and the complainant’s non-appearance at the investigation; that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; that petitioner’s active participation in every
step of the investigation satisfied the due process requirement; that the findings of facts made by administrative agencies
when supported by substantial evidence are respected on appeal.
(2) Morevoer, the SC did not cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of
the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the
Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee,
was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN

G.R. No. 149335 July 1, 2003

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN

FACTS: An unverified letter-complaint was addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate
General accusing petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged among others that petitioner and his wife purchased a house
and lot in Los Angeles, California and that petitioner’s in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a
number of debts they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent
also accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.

The PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. Petitioner fully participated in the proceedings. After the
investigation, the PCAGC found that petitioner purchased a house and lot in California, for US$195,000.00 evidenced by a
Grant Deed. The body concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual
income of P168,648.00 as appearing on his Service Record. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition of the subject
property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s
dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.

The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, issued
Administrative Order No. 12,4 ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC

HELD: NO. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify
the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue
that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel.
He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of
Administrative Order No. issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active
participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and
satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.

It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is
given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.

Spouses Hipolito vs. Cinco Digest

G.R. No. 174143: November 28, 2011

SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO, JR. and LIZA HIPOLITO, Petitioners, v. TERESITA CINCO,CARLOTA BALDE CINCO and
ATTY. CARLOS CINCO, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner-spouses allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis entered into an agreement with Francisco Villena (now deceased)
to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style
building adjacent to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement,
Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis.

In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all residing in the
property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject property through a deed of
sale sometime in 1976.

Respondents filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection.

In his memorandum, Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials were found in the
premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate
action and disposition.

Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC), the verified request of the
respondents was referred to the Committee for Hearing/ Investigation.

With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, hearings were subsequently held for purposes of resolving the focal issue of
"the structural stability, architectural presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the subject
buildings are still safe for continued occupancy."

A report based on another ocular inspection conducted was submitted through a Memorandum which states the subject
buildings are structurally unsafe as well as fire and electrical hazard thereby endangering the life, safety, health and welfare
[of] the general public specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly recommended that the subject building be declared
dangerous and ruinous.
The OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their demolition. A Demolition Order addressed to
the respondents.

Petitioners thus appealed to the DPWH.

On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for lack of merit
and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and the issuance of the Demolition Order.

Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal with the OP but the same was denied. An MR was also denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA which dismissed their petition. An MR was likewise denied.

Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: (1) Whether OBO can render the challenged issuances, (2) Whether the CA erred in relying on OBOs report when it
rendered the assailed decision.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

OBO CAN RENDER THE CHALLENGED ISSUANCES

The Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view of his finding that the disputed
structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of P.D. No. 1096. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the
process in which the resolution and demolition order were issued is evident. The records show that the OBO issued the
resolution and Demolition Order only after ocular inspections and hearings. The Inspectorate Team of the DPWH came up
with the same conclusion when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises.

CAS RELIANCE ON OBO REPORT

The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received, on reported dangerous and ruinous buildings
and structures that pose a threat to the life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the general public.Otherwise stated,
respondents motive in initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition
Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous and
ruinous. Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO performed
their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it
resolved the petition before it. We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact of the OBO and the
other administrative bodies.

Smart Communications, Inc. & PILTEl v. NTC

G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 152063 August 12, 2003

GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts:

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on
June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the
unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which
contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by
another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an
action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since
such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly
prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid
card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and
void ab initio.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-
Intervention and this was granted by the trial court.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the
following errors. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and
2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy.

Held:

Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of
special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in
setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

Constitutionality of the Circular

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or
quasi-legislative power.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency
in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6,
2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Ruling:

Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather,
what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone
service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of
our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.

Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are reversed and set
aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

RAY PETER O. VIVO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP., G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013

Administrative law; Right to counsel. A right to counsel is not indispensable in an administrative proceeding “because
administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.” In any case, it was held in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 156253) that “any defect in the observance
of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who was afforded opportunity to be heard.”

Petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process and deprived of his right to counsel when he was assisted by a counsel
during the initial stage of the administrative proceedings. Petitioner’s counsel filed in behalf of petitioner the letter-requests to
be furnished documents, answer to memorandum of charges, the letter-request for re-setting of the conference, and even the
motion to reconsider the decision of the Board of Directors to dismiss him from the service. The Court finds nothing legally
objectionable to PAGCOR’s denial of petitioner’s request to re-schedule the conference because his counsel would not be able
to attend.

Administrative law; Right to due process. In administrative due process, “[t]he essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict legal sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied.” CA correctly found that petitioner’s pleadings explicitly admitted his dismissal was effected
through board resolutions. Assuming arguendo that there was no board resolution approving his dismissal, such absence did
not render the dismissal illegal but rather unauthorized that can be subject of ratification.

Facts:
The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986,
and was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela,
the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising that he was being administratively charged
with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;
that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive
suspension.

On February 26, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel, replying to Ela’s letter, assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum
as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the
summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit
(CIU) on March 15, 2002. At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His
statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the
accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its
investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee. The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear
before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the
meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason
that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of
the request.
The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of
Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being dismissed from the service. In its resolution dated April
11, 2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal
from the service. On February 27, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC
upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process.

Issues:

1. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s right for due process was not violated transgressed the
fundamental rules in administrative due process.

2. The Court of Appeals decision in setting aside CSC Resolutions Nos. 070732, dated 01 April 2007, and 071485, dated 01
August 2007, is contrary to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.

Ruling:

The petition for review lacks merit.

The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR. He received
the letter from Ela apprising him of his being administratively charged for several offenses, and directing him to submit an
explanation in writing. He was later on properly summoned to appear before the CIU, which conducted its proceedings in his
own residence upon his request. During the administrative inquiry, the CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of charges,
which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. He was also
given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions. Lastly, he was informed
through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from the service.
In contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by PAGCOR as set forth herein. He
made no credible showing of the supposed violation of his right to due process. He was heard through the written statement
he submitted in response to the memorandum of the charges against him. He actively participated in the administrative
inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own residence. He was afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings
before the Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the adverse decision to dismiss him from the service to the CSC.
There is also no question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice requirement prior to the termination of his employment,
the first notice being made through Ela’s letter dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being administratively charged
for the offenses mentioned, and the second being through the letter dated May 15, 2002 advising him that PAGCOR’s Board of
Directors had resolved to dismiss him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded. The right to counsel is not imperative
because administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service. It is noteworthy, however, that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the
administrative case against him.

Administrative Agency

An administrative body/agency is any government authority, other than a court and a legislature, that affects the state and
its citizens through rule-making, adjudication, and implementation. Its functions are primarily executive but it exercises some
form of legislative and judicial powers.
In the Administrative Code, an agency is defined to include:
 any government unit authorized by law to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate
cases.[1]
 research institutions with respect to licensing functions.[1]
 government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business.[1]
 officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law.[1]

Administrative Agency
An administrative agency is a general term that covers any government authority that can act as:
 an executive body that serves public interests, which is the reason (rationale) for its existence; it shall not represent
any private interests.
 a quasi-legislative body that establishes and prescribes rules and regulations to implement the law; it shall not have
absolute discretion to determine or change the law.
 a quasi-judicial body that conducts hearings and decides on cases; it shall not have inherent powers of a pure judicial
court, and its proceedings shall not be bound by all the rules applicable to proceedings in court.
The administrative agencies act as a mechanism that provides expertise and organizational capability for the three branches of
government.

An administrative agency may be created by

 executive order; as in EO 100, s. 1986 that created PIA.
 legislation; as in RA 10844 that created DICT.
 constitutional provision; as in Art. 9 that created CSC, COMELEC and COA.
An agency is wholly within the power of the law that created it, that prescribes its powers and functions. It may also be
abolished in the same manner it is created if such abolition is justified by the law.

Types of Administrative Agency

The administrative agencies are classified into:
 Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special
priviledge; such as PVAO, NARRA, etc.
 Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions;
such as BIR, BI, CSC, COMELEC, BSP, etc.
 Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public;
such as PHILPOST, PNR, MWSS, CAAP, CAB, etc.
 Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate industry, business, or private
individuals; such as FDA, PhilFIDA, SEC, MTRCB, PRC, IPOPHL, etc.
 Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because
of some strong social policy involved; such as BALA, BLR, BWSC, ECC, PCW, etc.

Powers and Functions of Administrative Agency

The powers and functions of administrative agency are defined in the Constitution, the laws or both.
The powers of an administrative agency are:
 Executive power - the authority to implement or carry out the policy set out in the law or statute.
 Quasi-legislative power - the authority to adopt rules and regulations intended to better carry out the policy; the
function of rule-making.
 Quasi-judicial power - the authority to hear and decide on cases in the performance of duty and to enforce its
decisions according to the law; the function of adjudication.
 Incidental power - the authority necessary to effectively carry out the above express powers; the use of enabling,
directing, dispensing, examining and prosecuting functions. It is often referred to as the determinative power.
The scope of such powers are:
 expressly granted by the legislation and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.[2]
 deprived of quasi-judicial powers unless it is expressly granted.[3]
 liberally interpreted by legislation to enable the accomplishment of assigned duties in accordance with the legislative
purpose.[4]
It is considered unconstitutional for an administrative agency to act outside of its scope.

Administrative Rule-Making
main article: Administrative Rule-Making
Rule-making is the function of administrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the general
provisions of a law into effect. It may also be referred to as subordinate legislation.
An administrative agency must promulgate administrative/implementing rules and regulations in harmony with the law
and not in violation of the authority conferred on the agency.[5]
An administrative agency shall publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and regulations as well as provide an opportunity
to interested parties to submit their views regarding the adoption of any rule.[6]
The promulgation of implementing rules and regulations may be interrupted or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.[7]
The implementing rules and regulations are also subject to amendment or repeal by the agencies that promulgated them, or by
the legislature.

Administrative Adjudication
main article: Administrative Adjudication
Administrative adjudication is the function of administrative agencies to conduct hearings and decide on cases in the duty
of carrying out a law.
An administrative agency must have jurisdiction to give validity to its determinations/decisions as a quasi judicial body or
tribunal. Such jurisdiction is limited and dependent entirely on the source of its authority, which is either from the statutes or
the Constitution.
An administrative agency is normally granted the authority to promulgate its own proceeding (rules of procedures), provided
they do not violate fundamental rights and the Constitution. Such rules of procedures shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.[8]
An administrative proceedings is not required to adapt formal court rules that govern purely judicial proceedings. However, it
is essential for any proceeding to observe due process.
The decision rendered by an administrative agency in a case shall be in writing and shall clearly state the facts and legal basis.
The agency shall decide each case within 30 days following its submission.
The decision of the agency is final and executory after the receipt of copy of such decision by the party who lost the case.
However, an administrative appeal or judicial review may be perfected before the finality of the decision.[9]
An administrative agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication
of contested cases.[10]

Rate-Fixing
main article: Rate-Fixing Power
Rate-fixing is the function of administrative agency to fix or control the charges (rates, wages and prices) exalted to public
utility services.
The rate-fixing by an administrative agency must be accompanied with notice and hearing, specially if its is quasi-judicial in
nature.[11] It must also be reasonable and just in the absence of an express requirement for standard by law.
The proposed rates by the agency shall be valid after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks
before the first hearing thereon.[12]

Determinative Functions
The incidental or determinative functions of administrative agency are:
 Licensing - the function to permit or allow something which the law undertakes to regulate. It is simply the issuance
of license. It is also referred to as the enabling function.
 Directing - the function to determine, assess, valuate and classify for corrective purposes and compliance with the
law.
 Dispensing - the function to exempt one from or relax a general prohibition, or to relieve one from an affirmative
duty.
 Examining - the function to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and
other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during a hearing.[13] It is simply the issuance of subpoena.
It is also referred to as the 'investigatory function'.
 Prosecuting - the power to apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose
without a judicial warrant to authorize such action. It is more often referred to as the 'summary function'.