CRIM
Rebellion Cases
1) People v Hernandez
HELD:
[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.
RELEVANT PROVISION: RPC Art 48, 134,135
ELEMENTS: (of Rebellion, Art134)
1. That there be:
a. Public uprising; and
b. Taking up of arms against the government
2. For the purpose of either:
a. Removing from the allegiance to said
government or its laws:
i. The territory of the Philippines, or
any part thereof, or
ii. Any body of land, naval or other
armed forces; or
b. Depriving the Chief Executive or Congress
wholly or partially of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
NATURE: petition for bail
FACTS:
 Hernandex et al. (31 defendants), were convicted by
the lower courts of rebellion, w/ multiple murder,
arsons and robberies
 Organizations they were found to be affiliated w/ (and
took part in ‘rebellious’ activities w/): Congress of
Labor Organizations (CLO) w/c is an instrumentality
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP);
Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (HMB, a.k.a.
Hukbalahaps/Huks)
 Defendants apparently took arms w/ the Huks to
make armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks
against police, constabulary and army detachments
as well as innocent civilians, and, as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, they also
committed then and there committed acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property
 The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged
with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed
with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the
capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to life
imprisonment
 The defense contends, among other things, that
rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or
robbery.
ISSUES:
1
(1) WoN rebellion can be complexed w/ murder, arson, or
robbery
(2) WoN defendants should be granted bail
(1) NO. Consider first the following Articles of the RPC:
a. Art 48, RPC:“When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.”
i. presupposes the commission of 2
or more crimes, does not apply
when the culprit is guilty of only one
crime
ii. a mere participant in the rebellion,
who is not a public officer, should
not be placed at a more
disadvantageous position than the
promoters, maintainers or leaders
of the movement, or the public
officers who join the same, insofar
as the application of this article is
concerned
b. Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely
participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
i. The penalty is increased to prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 for “any person who
promotes, maintains or heads a
rebellion or insurrection or who,
while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein”: (1)
“engaging in war against the forces
of the government”, (2) “destroying
property”, or (3) “committing
serious violence”, (4) “exacting
contributions or” (5) “diverting
public funds from the lawful
purpose for which they have been
appropriated”.
ii. Whether performed singly or
collectively, these 5 classes of
acts constitute only one offense,
and no more, and are, altogether,
subject to only one penalty —
prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.
Since all of the acts enumerated in Art 135 constitute
only ONE offense, Art 48 cannot apply since it
presupposes the existence of TWO. In no occasion
has the court ever complexed the crime of rebellion.
The rule is that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the
 same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Art 48. (court uses
several cases to show how this rules is applicable to
treason, then says the rule is even more applicable to
rebellion, basically, these violent acts are part of the
crime, they are how one commits them, they are
inherent to the crime).
Citing Spanish and other foreign cases, the SC states
that national, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition
that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as
“common” offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty.
Further, if Art 48 were to be used in this case, it would
be unfavourable to the culprit, and Art 48 was enacted
for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed
by him were punished separately. SC also states that
simply because one act may constitute two or more
offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person
may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the
other, without violating the injunction against double
jeopardy.
(2) YES. Since exclusion from bail in capital offenses is
an exception to the otherwise absolute right
guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency
of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal
appreciation of the evidence in the determination of
the degree of proof and presumption of guilt
necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right. In the
evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is
one other important factor to be taken into account.
The court took into account the ff. things: (1) Whether
it appears that in case of conviction the Defendant’s
criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment (Answer: no clear showing); and (2) the
probablility of flight (Answer: possibility seems remote
and nil). Additionally, the decision appealed from the
opposition to the motion in question do not reveal
satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused
showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release,
during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize
the security of the State.
PETITION FOR BAIL GRANTED.
(summary of separate opinions in next page, might be
asked but not completely necessary I guess)
TL;DR SEPARATE OPINIONS
2
 Padilla—Bail shouldn’t be granted. After conviction
for a capital offense, the Defendant has absolutely no
right to bail, because even before conviction a
Defendant charged with capital offense is not entitled
to bail if the evidence of guilt is strong. Even if the
majority opinion that the crime charged in the
information is rebellion only — a non-capital offense
— be correct, still the granting of bail after conviction
is discretionary, and I see no plausible reason for the
reversal of this Court’s previous stand, because the
security of the State is at stake.
 Montemayor—Other crimes shouldn’t be
absorbed by rebellion. The main contention to why it
cannot be complexed. is that it cannot be complexed
as the acts enumerated in Art 135 are inherent to
rebellion (necessary means to commit it). However,
“necessary means” as interpreted by criminologists,
jurists and legal commentators, does not mean
indispensable means, but merely the means by which
a crime is ordinarily committed. The logic is the same
as why abduction or trespass to dwelling are not
necessary means to rape, they are simply ways the
culprit used to facilitate his crime. Applying Art 134’s
description of rebellion, it may be committed by
merely rising publicly and taking arms against the
government, thus acts mentioned in Art 135 are not
necessary means to committing the crime.
(Montemayor agrees that bail shouldn’t be granted
though)
 Labrador -- Agrees with J. Padilla that bail shouldn’t
be granted, and w/ J. Montemayor that a complex
crime of rebellion exists in our laws.
2) Enrile v Salazar
Doctrine: The Hernandez Doctrine: Murders, arsons and
robberies are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion as
means “necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. The
crime that should be charged should therefore be simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies. Hernandez remains the binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as
a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Summary: Senator JPE was arrested for rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder committed during a failed coup
attempt. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus which was
granted. The court held that the Hernandez doctrine should be
maintained because ruling for the complexing of rebellion
would be unfavorable to the defendant.
Facts:
 In February 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested on the strength of a
 warrant issued by Hon. Judge Jaime Salazar of
Quezon City RTC for the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during a failed coup attempt. On the same
day, JPE filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights being:
1) held to answer for criminal offense which does not
exist in the statute books; 2) charged with criminal
offense which no complaint was filed or preliminary
offense conducted; 3) denied his right to bail; 4)
arrested under a warrant where the judge did not first
determine probable cause.
 The Court issued the writ; the SolGen argued that the
case at bar does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
(see summary) because the common crimes
committed in the latter were necessary means for the
commission of rebellion (delito complejo, Art. 48) but
the crimes committed in the present case were
committed on the occasion, but not in the furtherance
of rebellion (delito compuesto, compound crime).
Issues:
 W/N the Hernandez ruling, insofar as it prohibits the
complexing of rebellion with other offenses, should be
sustained.
 W/N JPE was indeed charged with a crime that does
not exist in the statute books.
 W/N the warrant is valid for violating Sec. 2 Art III of
the Constitution.
 W/N a petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court was the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right
to bail or vindicating its denial.
Ruling/Ratio:
 NO. The Court initially deliberated on either
abandoning the Hernandez and adopting Article 48,
holding the Hernandez doctrine but only to offenses
committed in furtherance of rebellion but not to acts
committed in the course of rebellion or maintain the
doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all other
offenses committed in its course. By majority vote, the
ruling in Hernandez remains good law.
o If Article 48 were to be applied, the penalty
would have to be meted out to the accused
since this provision was enacted to favor the
culprit. Therefore, even in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme
penalty could not be imposed upon him.
Instead of sentencing him for each
independent crime, Article 48 only imposes
the maximum penalty for the more serious
one, on the assumption that it is less grave
than the sum of the separate penalties for
each offense.
 YES. The Court, in maintaining their ruling in
Hernandez opined that the phrasing in the information
3
charging JPE with complex rebellion should be read
as simple rebellion instead, defined and punished by
the Revised Penal Code.
o Also, a complaint was indeed filed against
him, contrary to JPE’s arguments that there
was no initial complaint or investigation. It
was filed by the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation founded on an
investigation.
 YES. Petitioner claimed that the warrant was issued
with undue haste (in an hour) without the judge
making the required personal evaluation of the report.
However, the Court said that even if the judge’s
evaluation was deemed a relatively brief period, gives
no reason to assume he did not comply with what is
incumbent upon him (presumption of regularity).
 NO. It was an improper choice of remedy. He should
have filed a petition to be admitted to bail on the claim
of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only
upon denial should he have appealed his case.
Another option would have been to file a motion to
quash. All grounds for the habeas corpus should have
been brought up in the RTC rather than directly to the
Supreme Court.
DISSENTS:
1. FERNAN, J: The Court should have further
considered between acts or offenses which are
indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the
one hand, and those acts or offenses merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of
rebellion on the other.
2. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: The rule on habeas corpus
should be liberally construed, it being the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding the individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action.
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts
against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set
for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against
him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later
filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and
alleging that the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked
the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where
it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common
crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should
have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which is
bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only took
Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling
of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that
such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to
have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case
from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional
provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after
personally determining the existence of probable cause has
not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that
the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it should
be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like
murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined
probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also
noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which
sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law
provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with
rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said
law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom
Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which
reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still
stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only
interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law
(which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion
law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime
as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are
absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion – which is
bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge
Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the
warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the
fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record
from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient
that the judge follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
3) Enrile v Ramos
4
4) Umil v Ramos (& companion cases)
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas
corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the
“confidential information” that the authorities received. Except
for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest
are charged with subversion for being a member of the New
People’s Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion
cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an
information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were
not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance
of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of
the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be
exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it
would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of
information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient
complaint and after a trial free from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was
nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were
bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not
caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the
authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state.
People vs. Marti -- Marti and his wife went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them
four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that
the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as
gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to
examine and inspect the packages. However, before the
delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's
husband inspected the package and found marijuana which
was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against
Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and
seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an
act of the State would result in serious legal complications and
an absurd interpretation of the constitution
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify
a confidential information which was received by their office,
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted
to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the
day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by
the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of
the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of
this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the

NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested.
The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offensescommitted in
furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of
continuingcrimes.

5) People v Fernando