Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec Digest

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said
district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a
Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the
constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven”
months to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended
COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with
Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck
off the amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda
chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there
by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her
place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But
the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24,
1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She
contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which
has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:
1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
2. Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the
elections?
3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore
possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the
House of Representatives for the following reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when
her father brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not
automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in
civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is
that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and
wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that
when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte,
while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is
evident that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs
Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected

Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of
Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum

antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the
other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of

February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election

Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which
shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of

elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners
continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired;
and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace

petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on
Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by

respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal
has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987,

therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no
longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the
1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
 Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
12 SCRA 648
Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License
on August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954.
All the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However,
two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing her
that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the
union. The following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will be
returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and has not been heard
since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court
ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings
and motion for new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the
judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of
promise to marry?
Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
LABO VS. COMELEC,
GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law – Loss of Citizenship)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-
elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an
oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous
and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a
dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine
citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation
of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable
to the petitioner.

DIGEST: Tanada v.s. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

G.R. No. L-63915

FACTS:

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for

Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. petitioned Hon. Juan C. Tuvera (Executive
Assistant), Hon. Joaquin Verus (Deputy EA), Melquidas P. Dela Cruz (Director,
Malacanan Records) and Florendo S. Pablo (Director of Bureau of Printing) to publish in
the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The
respondents through the Solicitor General prayed for outright dismissal because
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the petition and they are not
“aggrieved parties.” The petitioners maintain that this concern is a public right and its
object is to compel performance of duty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to compel for the publication of
various administrative issuances in the Official Gazette?
HELD:

The implementation of presidential decrees in the Official Gazette is an operative fact

which consequences which can not justly be ignored. The publication of all presidential
issuances of “public nature” or “general applicability” is mandated by law. Those
issuances which apply to particular persons are assumed to be circularized. Since the
petition concerned of a public policy the petitioners have the said personality.

PREAMBLE We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: [1] Those who are
citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; [2] Those whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the Philippines; [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and [4] Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens. Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.