EN BANC

[A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010.]

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING

INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR. , J : p

Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts

or passages of his writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and passing them off
as the product of one's own mind. 1
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and
Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the
case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the
Court denied the petition for certiorari led by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
of cers of the executive department 2 to espouse their claims for reparation and
demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed against
them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent
the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent from their article, "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens" published in 2009
in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, "Enforcing
Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law" published by the Cambridge University
Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime" published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del Castillo's discussion of
the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Paci co A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn
(Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan
P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L.
Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members
of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement
on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court's decision in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by
its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work. HEISca

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 Notably, while the statement was meant to re ect the educators' opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not
only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over
Justice Del Castillo's explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles
supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for
the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that
lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The rst paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.

Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo
committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating
extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the
review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Court's alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their published statement reads,
But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its
resolution for almost seven years , oblivious to the deaths of many of the
petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya
petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources . By doing so, the Supreme Court
added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort
the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its
callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance , belies
(sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic
values of decency and respect . (Emphasis supplied).

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding

the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is
the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More
importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized
materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly 3
that any publication, pending a suit, re ecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the
of cers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to in uence the
decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. TDSICH

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only
goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become
harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. 4 The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free
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 from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice." 5
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than
objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case
and undermine the Court's honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion
for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women's claims is not controversial
enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the ames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation
as law professors and of cers of the Court to be the rst to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe delity according to the oath they have taken
as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. 6 Their actions
likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 7 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 9
WHEREFORE , in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Paci co A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J.
Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B.
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and
Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE , within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter
dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards,
for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the purported statement, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court." Enclosed are copies of the said
dummy and signed statement, respectively, attached to the said letter dated August 10,
2010 and to the Compliance dated August 31, 2010 led by Roque & Butuyan Law
Offices with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards. cDTIAC

Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.

Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named UP College of Law faculty
members be effected by personal delivery.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin,
Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J.,I join the Dissenting Opinions of Justice Morales and Justice Sereno.
Carpio Morales, JJ., I certify that Justice Carpio Morales wrote a dissenting
opinion. - CJ Renato C. Corona.
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 Del Castillo, J., took no part.
Abad, J., is on leave.
Sereno, J.,See dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions
CARPIO MORALES , J., dissenting :

The Resolution directs certain members of the law faculty of the University of the
Philippines (UP) to "SHOW CAUSE . . . why they should not be disciplined as members of
the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility." 1
The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive exing of the judicial muscle
that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court
stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is "totally unnecessary,
uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance." 2
The road embarked by the Court as paved by the Resolution leads the Court into
an autocratic pit with only an arti cial twig of "independence of the judiciary" to hang on
to somewhere in that precarious cliff where public esteem shall ultimately reckon what
"dignity of the Court" means. I regret that I could not join in treading such crooked road.
The institution of a disciplinary action
smacks of injudiciousness
In instituting the proceedings 3 against the UP law faculty, the Court appears to be
lending only a semblance of due process by ordering them to answer the administrative
charges. The Resolution is replete with conclusions that already adjudge them guilty of
violating the canons of ethics. Aside from concluding that the publication of the
statement of the UP law faculty was "totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance," the Resolution classi es it as an "institutional attack" and an "insult
to the members of the Court." 4 The Court has already determined that it "could hardly
perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than objective comments" 5 that
"fan the ames and invite resentment." 6 The adverse declarations describing the written
work of the UP law faculty operate to their prejudice since that would render any
subsequent proceeding illusory, because the Court, which would ultimately decide the
administrative case, has already made up its mind even before hearing the parties. HEcIDa

Worse, the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a
show cause order that initiates what would become a newly docketed regular
administrative matter. There is more than meets the eye, however. When stripped of its
apparent complexion, the Resolution shows its true colors and presents itself as a
pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt, without proper recourse left to the parties.
Without the bene t of a hearing and extensively quoting cases involving contempt, the
Resolution admonishes:
. . . We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit,
re ecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the of cers of the court, the counsel
with reference to the suit, or tending to in uence the decision of the controversy, is
contempt of court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
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 criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the
line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating
attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The
Court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business
in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 7

Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the

nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed
against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court to disrepute or
disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to
be done by a court or a judge for the bene t of the opposing party therein and is
therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If
the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.
8 Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for
criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 9
It is highly injudicious to anchor a motu proprio disciplinary action on an irregularly
concluded finding of indirect contempt.
The dignity of the Court will suffer none
by passing it in silence
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or
publication of opinion as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members
of the bar. 1 0 For the most part of the existence of the judiciary, the legal academia has
been an able partner in the administration of justice and a resource provider in various
avenues of capacity building. Throughout these years, they have extended aid and
offered proposals in countless ways with no other interest but to pursue the noblest
intentions of improving the judicial system. A number of law professors/newspaper
columnists have also "attempt[ed] to educate this Court on how to go about the review"
1 1 of certain cases. The Court has taken them without losing equilibrium. STCDaI

It is not unusual that unsolicited suggestions and unconstructive criticisms,

oftentimes fashioned in an ardent manner, nds their way into the Court's sensibilities
and sensitivities. Most recently, various groups have once again turned to media to air
their advocacies in support of or in opposition to the contentious issues involved in the
Hacienda Luisita case. A few months ago, at the height of the "CJ Appointment Issue"
and during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, a number of hard manifestos
and harsh articles saw print, which were no less intense than this plagiarism issue. The
Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that certain quarters even pushed for the early
resignation of Chief Justice Puno to save the Court from resolving the issue, and of the
other Justices to save face. But the Court did not lift its nger. What is so special with
the present case that disconcerts the Court, drawing it to institute this case against
professors of a particular law school?
Unless the Court intends to busy itself into consistently engaging in a judicial witch
hunt against its detractors, it is more in keeping with the Court's dignity not to dignify
each and every write-up that is taken to vilify it, and console itself with the number of
testimonials, written or living, that vivify the judiciary.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally and
wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at
least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that in every case where a judge decides
for one party, he decides against another; and oftentimes both parties are
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 beforehand equally con dent and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is
great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than a bitter feeling,
which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge,
therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but the
momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a
party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by
passing it in silence. 1 2 (underscoring supplied)

Although as a human being, a person naturally gets pissed off by hurtful words, it
would not hurt the Court as an institution and the law as a profession if it passes off the
statement of the UP law faculty at this time.

SERENO , J., dissenting :

Ordering the 37 respondent members of the UP Law Faculty to "show cause" in

this indirect contempt case is like ordering the little boy who exclaimed that "the
emperor has no clothes" to explain why he should not be cruci ed for his public
observation. It is true that the little boy in the present case may have aggravated the
situation by adding that the unclothed emperor did not present a attering gure in his
natural state, but the analogy remains true — that the subject UP Law Faculty members
have been prematurely adjudged guilty and asked to explain why such prejudgment
should be reversed simply for expressing what they believed was the truth. There may
have been exaggeration in the UP Law Faculty's process of expression, but this tempest
is nothing that the Supreme Court has not similarly weathered in the past and faced with
equanimity. What is so grievous about this whole contempt proceeding is that it comes
in the wake of the gross injury that the Court has in icted upon the virtue of honesty in
learned discourses by labeling plagiarism as not plagiarism in the related case involving
one of its members. 1 AICDSa

With all due respect to my colleagues, it is not the place of the Court to seek
revenge against those who, in their wish to see reform in the judiciary, have the courage
to say what is wrong with it. The Court nds its legitimacy in demonstrating its moral
vein case after case, not in aunting its judicial brawn. There is nothing to be gained for
the administration of justice in not letting this one instance pass just because feelings
have been hurt and the urge to retaliate must be satis ed. If the 37 members of the UP
Law Faculty are wrong, there will be recompense in their loss of esteem among the
academic community and the legal profession. But if they are right, then the Court will
have made martyrs out of those who — in their temporary passion — may have acted
recklessly but truthfully and sincerely. Indeed, should they be proven right, they may even
rise in esteem in the eyes of international academic and legal circles, for being the object
of prosecution by one's Supreme Court for bold but intelligent reformist language can be
deemed a badge of honor similar to that bequeathed by history to the great thinkers who
were persecuted by society's reactionary forces.
Indirect contempt is committed in any of the acts enumerated in Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. The majority Resolution, which is the written charge required by
said rule, fails to cite which particular mode of committing indirect contempt appears to
have been violated. It is axiomatic to due process that the accused be informed
speci cally of the charge against them. A proceeding for indirect contempt is criminal in
nature; thus, adherence to due process is more stringently required of this Court.
From a reading of the majority Resolution, it can be inferred that the following
constitute the portions of the text of the UP Law Faculty Statement that draw the charge
of indirect contempt: (a) the accusation that "an extraordinary act of injustice has been
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 committed against the brave Filipinas who suffered abuse during a time of war"; (b) the
casting of the decision as "a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the land"; (c) the further attempt to educate the Court on how to go
about the review of the case; (d) imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
the Vinuya case; (e) the dismissal of the petition on the basis of "polluted sources"; (f)
alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners; (g) the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect. The majority Resolution believes that the UP Law Faculty's comments have no
purpose other than to "discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and
undermine the Court's honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the
motion for its reconsideration." (Emphasis supplied.)
Despite the description of what it considers the allegedly offending language of
the Faculty Statement, the majority Resolution must still identify the speci c paragraph
of Section 3, Rule 71 of which the UP Law Faculty appears guilty and must not leave it to
the reader to infer the basis of the complaint for indirect contempt.TAHcCI

Beyond the majority Resolution's failure to satisfy the technical requirements of

Section 3, Rule 71 is the failure to see the purpose for vesting the Court with contempt
powers. Contempt powers are given to and inhere in the judicial function because these
are indispensable to the administration of justice. Thus, such powers must be exercised
only when there is a causal relationship between the act sought to be reproved and the
positive effect such reproof would have on the administration of justice. Sans this causal
relationship, the exercise may be viewed as tinged with vindictiveness. It must be kept in
mind that Rule 71 under Section 3 (c) and (d) is concerned with the "processes and
proceedings of a court" and the "administration of justice," not with the personal
convenience of a judge.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the
motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP
Law Faculty's statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future
orders would be eroded by the release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in
which the Vinuya decision was received by the public is well-known. It is not as if any
outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is
also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and competence could
be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is honest, has
integrity, or is competent — or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities other than
the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP
Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase
"Restoring Integrity." In the second paragraph, the Faculty says: "Given the Court's recent
history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear
and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this would only further erode faith
and con dence in the judicial system." In the next paragraph, it says: "The Court cannot
regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach." In the same
paragraph, it further says: "It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the
Supreme Court as the nal arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires
competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the
exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics."
These statements indicate the Faculty's passionate desire to see the torch of
justice carried with honor and dignity by the highest court of the land, its steps
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 unfaltering from moral or professional weakness. Instead of denigrating the Court, the
Faculty wants the Court to remain the champion of justice, but the Court can only remain
so if it demonstrates beyond question that it remains faithful to the ideals of truth and
justice in every form, including in the honesty with which it makes use of its reference
materials. The UP Law Faculty has in fact not only suggested ways by which the Court
can uphold this role vis-Ã -vis the Vinuya decision, suggestions that this Court may ignore
— it has fearlessly articulated a thought that is already so common in the minds of
Philippine law practitioners: that sacri ce must accompany the act of atonement
required of this Court for a breach of the standards of professional ethics. aCTHDA

Neither can I agree that Dean Marvic Leonen should be asked to show cause why
he should not be punished for sending the Chief Justice mere dummies of the statement.
In most cases, this Court merely gives the parties' counsel the opportunity to satisfy the
missing requirements. In any case, he has already submitted the signed original
statement, so what is the Court fretting over? This use of a heavy hand on a small matter
is profoundly disturbing.
The reason, I think, is that this Court has already prejudged the respondents.
Reviewing the events, I realize that the language used in the majority Decision in the
matter of the plagiarism charges, 2 and the circumstances under which this "show cause"
order is being issued, paint a chilling picture of the Court. When the UP Law Faculty
statement was issued, the Court was taken aback, teetering a little from the blast of
what they thought was the power of 81 signatures of the UP Law Faculty, including that
of a retired justice. Then it found out that Dean Leonen, when ordered, was actually ready
to transmit a statement with only 37 signatures. The Court recovered its composure and
seethed that it could have been so destabilized. This turn of events may account for the
victorious tone used by the plagiarism majority Decision when it referred to the UP Law
Faculty Statement as a statement that had "appeared like solid teeth in the dummy [but]
turned out to be broken teeth in the original . . . [a]nd retired Justice V.V. Mendoza did not
sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented." It seems to have gloated
over the realization that now the antagonist is more manageable, consisting only of
these 37 law professors, sans any retired Supreme Court justice. With more reason
should the Court evaluate its mental and emotional frame before issuing the "show
cause" order. Is it ready to squarely face the fact that the moral consequences of the
plagiarism majority Decision are too horrible to imagine?
The timing of the "show cause" order; the implication in the related Decision 3 that
the complainants in the plagiarism charge against Justice del Castillo are "hypocrites";
the needling over a small matter such as submission of a dummy vis-Ã -vis the original
signed copies; and the apparent effect that the submission of the Statement had on the
Court — all of these betray a Court that is bent on seeing itself redeemed not by hard and
honest work, with the undertaking of proper remedial actions for when a member is in
breach of ethics, but by showing who, in the land of lawyers, has power.
It is with sadness that I view the issuance of the "show cause" order embodied in
the majority Resolution and dissent therefrom.

ATTACHMENT
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW
Malcom Hall, Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines

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 Tel. 920-5514 local 101/102; Telefax 927-0518
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
August 10, 2010
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through:Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject:Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty eight (38)
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by
the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(SGD.) Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF

LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who
had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very
personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades
for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan,
got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views
the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary . The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System. HCDAac

In common parlance, 'plagiarism' is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another

person's work as one's own. In the eld of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It
constitutes a taking of someone else's ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making
it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
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 pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows
dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the
Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers' works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court's and no
longer just the ponente's . Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the
absence of any mention of the original writers' names and the publications from which they
came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the 'primary' sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
because the original authors' writings and the effort they put into nding and summarizing
those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes
together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism
since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original
authors' work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with
sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied
upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest
Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
article they argue that the classi cation of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the
State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts
of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual
fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the
role of the injured parties' home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or
damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That
the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horri c abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every
solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the
Court. When it dismissed the Vinuy a petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the
Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition,
coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even
the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court
and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems
are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority
and power in a democratic society. Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that
surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without
sanction as this would only further erode faith and con dence in the judicial system. And in
light of the signi cance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but
of women elsewhere in the word who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on
the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts. aScITE

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its
own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily
includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of re ection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment
of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which
are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a
very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them
as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme
Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty
and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it
is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may
consider appropriate; SICaDA

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by
which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and nalizes decisions
in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of
legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 (SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
Dean (1995-1999)
REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
Professor
(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR
DAWAY
Associate Dean and Associate Professor
(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN
Associate Professor
(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY
Assistant Professor
LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA
Dean (2005-2008)
and Professor of Law
(SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
(SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards

Manila

In Re: Organization and Convention of the

Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards
dated 2 August 2010 (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).
COMPLIANCE
Undersigned counsel hereby submits the attached true and faithful copy of a statement
issued by the Faculty of Law of the University of the Philippines dated 27 July 2010 and
entitled, "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation," pursuant to this
Committee's instructions issued at its deliberations on August 26, 2010.
Respectfully submitted, August 31, 2010.
City of Makati for the City of Manila.
ROQUE & BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES

Unit 1904 Antel 2000 Corporate Center

121 Valero St., Salcedo Village

Makati City 1200

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 Tel No. 750-3847 to 48
Email: mail@roquebutuyan.com

Fax No: 887-3893

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

COLLEGE OF LAW

Malcom Hall, Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines

Tel. 920-5514 local 101/102; Telefax 927-0518

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF

LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who
had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very
personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades
for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan,
got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. EaHcDS

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views
the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary . The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.
In common parlance, 'plagiarism' is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another
person's work as one's own. In the eld of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It
constitutes a taking of someone else's ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making
it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows
dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the
Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers' works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court's and no
longer just the ponente's. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the
absence of any mention of the original writers' names and the publications from which they
came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court. TcIaHC

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the 'primary' sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 because the original authors' writings and the effort they put into nding and summarizing
those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes
together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism
since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original
authors' work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with
sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied
upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest
Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
article they argue that the classi cation of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the
State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts
of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual
fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the
role of the injured parties' home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or
damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That
the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horri c abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every
solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the
Court. When it dismissed the Vinuy a petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the
Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition,
coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even
the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court
and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems
are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all
members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority
and power in a democratic society. Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that
surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without
sanction as this would only further erode faith and con dence in the judicial system. And in
light of the signi cance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but
of women elsewhere in the word who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on
the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its
own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily
includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of re ection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment
of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which
are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them
as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law that: EcSCAD

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is

unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme
Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty
and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it
is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may
consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by
which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and nalizes decisions
in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of
legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M. B ACUNGAN BARTOLOME S. CARALE (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1983-1989) Dean (1989-1995)
(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA RAUL C. PANGALANGAN (SGD.) SALVADOR T.
CARLOTA
Dean (1995-1999) Dean (1999-2005) Dean (2005-2008)
and Professor of Law and Professor of Law
REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
Professor
EDUARDO A. LABITAG (SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY
Professor Assistant Professor
ELIZABETH A. PANGALANGAN JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR.
Professor Assistant Professor
DANILO L. CONCEPCION HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.
Associate Professor Assistant Professor
VIRGILIO S. JACINTO (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 Associate Professor Assistant Professor
(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
DAWAY
Associate Dean and Associate Professor Assistant Professor
(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ III
Associate Professor Assistant Professor
VICTORIA A. AVENA (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
Associate Professor Assistant Professor
ROWENA D. MORALES (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
Associate Professor Assistant Professor
LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY DOMINGO P. DISINI, JR.
VICENTE B. AMADOR RAQUEL D.R. FORTUN
(SGD.) MIGUEL R. ARMOVIT (SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA ROWENA V. GUANZON
RUBEN F. BALANE MA. TERESITA J. HERBOSA
CHRYSILLA CARISSA P. BAUTISTA (SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA
MANUEL P. BAUTISTA, JR. ILDEFONSO R. JIMENEZ
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA MARK DENNIS Y. JOVEN
ARACELI T. BAVIERA (SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(The theft of a man's thoughts is a
grosser
crime than the theft of a man's goods.)
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
OTHELO C. CARAG JOSE M. LAYUG, JR.

(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG MA. CAROLINA T. LEGARDA

(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL CARLOS ROBERTO Z. LOPEZ
MONALISA C. DIMALANTA ELIZABETH P. LORIEGA
(SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH DIONNE MARIE M. SANCHEZ
VICTORINO C. MAMALATEO JANUARY A. SANCHEZ
(SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA ARNO V. SANIDAD
ALFREDO B. MOLO III (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
RAFAEL A. MORALES FRANCIS V. SOBREVIÑAS
ALBERTO T. MUYOT, JR. MARY ROSE S. TAN
(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
MARIE CECILE R. QUINTOS (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
MA. GISELLA D. REYES (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
ROCKY D.L. REYES (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
MEHOL K. SADAIN (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA
AUGUSTO A. SAN PEDRO ROGELIO A. VINLUAN

(SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO

Footnotes

1.Black, Henry Campbell, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed., St. Paul Minn., West Publishing
Co., 1979, p. 1035.
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 2.Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Delia Domingo-Albert,
Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, and Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo.
3.35 Phil. 944, 950-951 (1916).

4.In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC,
August 8, 2008, 561 SCRA 395, 434.

5.Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil 630 (1946).

6.Id.

7.CANON 10 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.
8.Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at de ance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 11.05 —A lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

9.Promulgated by this Court on June 21, 1988.

CARPIO MORALES, J., dissenting:

1.Resolution, p. 4.
2.Id. at 3.

3.Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

4.Resolution, p. 2.

5.Id. at 3.
6.Id. at 4.

7.Id. at 3.
8.Ceniza v. Wistehuff, Sr., G.R. No. 165734, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 148, 165, citing
Montenegro v. Montenegro, G.R. No. 156829, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 415.
9.Vda de Victoria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147550, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 78, 88.
10.Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep. 637, cited in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice George
Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935); and in In re: Almacen, 142 Phil. 353
(1970).

11.Resolution, p. 2.
12.People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 999 (1995).

SERENO, J., dissenting:

1.In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, Etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism), AM 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.
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 2.In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, supra note 1.

3.Id.

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