1
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has
been pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries by the RTC and the CA. He had been
part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-
through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born
with an imperforate anus.
FACTS:
Gerald Gercayo was born on June 1992 with an imperforate
(no anal opening) anus. He underwent colostomy, a surgical
procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through
the abdominal wall so that he can excrete waste.
On May 1995, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation. Dr. Resurreccion headed the surgical
team, and was assisted by several doctors. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Solidum. During the operation,
Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His
coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness
only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Luz
lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in SPI
with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the
attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum, alleging: –
He willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use
the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would
dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to
GERALD and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications, causing as a consequence of his said
carelessness and negligence, GERALD suffered a cardiac
arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic
encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the
brain, thereby rendering GERALD incapable of moving his
body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice.
The case was initially filed in the MTC of Manila, but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997).
RTC: rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries, decreeing that he was a principal of the crime
charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 2 MONTHS and 1 DAY of arresto mayor as
minimum to 1 YEAR, 1 MONTH and 10 DAYS of prision
correccional as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and
severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz,
the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. The
bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby
CANCELLED.
CA: affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, ruling that the case
appears to be an example of res ipsa loquitur.
The child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major
operation. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that
he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that
could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the
nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the
events that finally led to hypoxia. Lower court has been left
with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident
to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia.
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issues
(a) whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
applicable herein – NO
(b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal
negligence – NO
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CONVICTION FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL
COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.
ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION
OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT
TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.
FURTHER, CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION, AS THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL
LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST
PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE
CONCLUSION.
II.
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE
IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED
THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART
OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL
CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY AS A
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS
NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF
ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD
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IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS.
SC: GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
ACQUITS Dr. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no
pronouncement on costs of suit.
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur
means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." Hence,
res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of
common knowledge."
Doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is
not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie
evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of
the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this
doctrine. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a
judicial function to determine whether a certain set of
circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given
inference. Although generally, expert medical testimony is
relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the
accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or
failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act.
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on
his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of
anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at
100% halothane.
The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane
used before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no
overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum
stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made
the assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical
care, never leaving the operating room except for a few
minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the
other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor
the operation. He insisted that he administered only a point 1%
not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella
whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that
she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of
the things that happened. She revealed that they were using a
machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent
during the operation.
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless
imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the
circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish
that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of
precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic
agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of
Appeals35 that:
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient.
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the
duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the
physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the
specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b)
the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in
accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the
causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act or omission and the
resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.
Also, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special
medical qualifications in anaesthesia to provide guidance to
the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would
consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether the first three elements of a negligence and
malpractice action were attendant.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now
find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances
that have been established here do not present the factual and
legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive
only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and
competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused.
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That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia
by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia
that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to
speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to
do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil
liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila
civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree
was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal
action refers only to that arising from the offense
charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA
could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally
liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious
fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not
been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby
acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their
judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material
concerns that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it
important, then, to express the following observations for the
instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have
been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only
when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the
subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for
subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first
be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a
corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term
industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry.
G.R. No. 191240, July 30, 2014
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. PHILLIP R.
SALVADOR, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only to the civil aspect
of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been
acquitted of the crime of Estafa.
The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman
engaged in real estate business, educational institution,
boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by
Salvador and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight
and remittance business.
Arraignment: pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent
Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he even
acted as a father to her children while her annulment was
ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business.
She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived
from the business would be equally divided among them and
that respondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the
operations of business in the Philippines and she would be
financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still
raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual
operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed
the same to respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her
disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the
proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed
in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked respondent
about the money and the business, the latter told her that the
money was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query,
respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his
other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not
returned at all.
Respondent’s defense that he and petitioner became close
friends and eventually fell in love and had an affair. They
traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how
popular he was among the Filipino domestic helpers, which led
her to suggest a remittance business. Although hesitant, he
has friends with such business. He denied that petitioner gave
him US$10,000.00 when he went to Hong Kong and Bangkok.
After he came back from the United States, petitioner had
asked him and his brother Ramon for a meeting. During the
meeting, petitioner brought up the money remittance business,
but Ramon told her that they should make a study of it first. He
was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money remittance
business in Pasay City. Upon the advice of Roy, respondent
and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau. He
denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted
that it was petitioner who paid for the plane tickets. After their
Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union at the First
World Center in Makati City. Ramon, petitioner and her mother
went to Hong Kong to register the business, while he took care
of petitioner’s children here. He and Ramon went back to Hong
Kong but denied having received the amount of
US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the
amount of P100, 000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to
Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry
she got from him, which Chau had duly acknowledged. He
denied Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave him the amount
of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house. He claimed that no
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remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no
license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the
same. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never
asked him about the business, as she never gave him such
amount. He intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong
Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique. He
admitted that he loved petitioner and her children very much as
there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short; he
gave her P600, 000.00 for the enrollment of her children in
very expensive schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon
initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips.
RTC: accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par.
2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of 4years, 2 months and 1
day of prision correctional maximum as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum and to indemnify
the private complainant in the amount of US$100,000.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine currency. Accused RAMON
SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
CA: reversing the decision of the RTC, the appealed decision
of the RTC of Las Piñas City, is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and accused appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa.
Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the
case alleging that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE
RESPONDENT SO THAT EVEN IF THE COURT OF
APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT SHOULD HAVE AT
LEAST RETAINED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE
PETITIONER.
Issue: Whether or not the award for damages or the civil
aspect of the case be retained – NO
SC: petition for review is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the
ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is “for the same act or omission.”
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was
acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt The prosecution failed to prove that
all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.
For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not
even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed
the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was
deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions,
in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the
obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of
her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,
respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even
by preponderance of evidence.
In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent
US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner
failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a
short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the
source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent
to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction
and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly
hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as
reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was
inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous
transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the
alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the
actuation of someone who had been swindled.
[G.R. NO. 175256 - August 23, 2012]
LILY LIM, Petitioner, v. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE
CO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179160
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, v. LILY
LIM, Respondent.
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages, while
appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case
for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review
assailing the separate Decisions of the Second and
Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the
issue.
Lily Lim s (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20,
2005 Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138, which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
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Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No.
5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily
Lim s] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim
violated the rule against forum shopping as the elements of litis
pendentia are present.
This Court agrees.
xxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, Charlie Co s (Co) Petition for
Review5 assails the April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the
Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on
the same issue in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
judge. The elements of litis pendentia and forum-shopping
were not met in this case.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
Factual Antecedents
In February 1999, FRCC – owner/operator of a cement
manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for
the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center
and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of
bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the
plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is
valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked
by FRCC Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative
manager, Borja, sold the withdrawal authorities covering
50,000 bags of cement to CO for the amount of P3.15 million.
On February 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim
allegedly at the price of P3.2 million.
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement
bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully
withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the
withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to CO.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw
the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who
explained that the plant implemented a price increase and
would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price
difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim
objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she
bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal
recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with
the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or
Conversion was filed against Co before RTC of Pasig City.
The private complainant, Lim, participated in the criminal
proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to
return her money amounting to P2,380,800.00, foregone
profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney s fees.
RTC: acquitted Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of
evidence.
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with
abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for
which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not
established by the prosecution s evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned,
however, set this case for the reception of his evidence on the
matter on December 2003.
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig
City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim. MR denied.
Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal
case.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to
Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay
her the current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim
the amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal
Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right
to impose price adjustments as a qualification for honoring the
Withdrawal Authorities.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Co´s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may
be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp. caused
Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was made
without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and
without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the
law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, in violation
of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEY S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either
by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements
with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for
6
their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held
solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her
failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages
they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their
rights.23ςrνll
Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case and Lim´s appeal
in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.
He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which
is his liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of
cement, and should be dismissed on the ground of lis
pendens and forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division: ruled in favour
of Co. Forum shopping.
Lim filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court: denied Co´s motion
to dismiss. No forum shopping because the causes of action
invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the civil
complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from
contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in
the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari – nullify RTC´s order for grave
abuse of discretion.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division: denied
Co´s petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court
for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed
with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and
forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because
they do not share the same cause of action. MR denied.
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 179160. Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.
Kou Co Ping – arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she
is asserting only one cause of action, which is for Co´s
violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same, that is,
for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim.
That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her case a
criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific
performance and damages should not detract from the fact that
she is attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice.
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex
contractu and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the
two civil liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless,
the two cases arising from them would have to be decided
using the same evidence and going over the same set of facts.
Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases will
constitute res judicata on the other.
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA
Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a
declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396. In G.R. No. 175256, Co
prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 (which dismissed Lim s appeal from the trial court s
decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).
Lily Lim – arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the
same set of facts because they arose from only one
transaction.A single act or omission does not always make a
single cause of action. It can possibly give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) ex
delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2)
independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts
or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article 2177
of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the
law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends
that it is not forum shopping to pursue them.
Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the
crime of estafa. Co violated Lim s right to be protected against
swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200
bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him. This
is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time
that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver
what he promised. On the other hand, Lim´s cause of action in
Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated
Lim s rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received
payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the
goods that were the subject of the sale.
Issue
Whether or not Lim committed forum shopping in filing the civil
case for specific performance and damages during the
pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case
for estafa? – NO
SC: Lily Lim´s Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. Lily
Lim´s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is
ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals
is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE
DISPATCH.
Charlie Co s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The
assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395
is AFFIRMED in toto.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an
offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that
is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,52 and
(2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may
be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.
The independent civil liability may be based on "an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code
(such as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may also be
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony
but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
7
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code
("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based
on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense;
hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action.
For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted
with the criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil liability ex
delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final
outcome of the criminal action.55 The civil liability based on
delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal
action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist."
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate
from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as
provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state
that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two
kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended
party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the
rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those
arising from other sources of obligations are authorized
by law to proceed independently of each other, the
resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two
cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations
such that they can proceed independently of each other.
The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having
been instituted together with the criminal action.
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the
allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action
arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious
conduct (abuse of rights).
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants
were committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim
without regard for morals, good customs and public policy.
These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct
(abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the
Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations
arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the
estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from
the offense charged. They present different causes of action,
which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their
final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, respondent.
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the
other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Casupanan, figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were
filed with the MCTC Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal
case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then
at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the
civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground
of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal
case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civil
case.
On MR, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the
motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac assailing the MCTCs Order of
dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling: Capas RTC rendered judgment
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The order
of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should
have been an appeal. Further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. It declared that
even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an
abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration –
denied. Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case – YES
8
SC: petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24,
2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED
and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case, which the
MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes
a counterclaim in the criminal case. If the accused in a criminal
case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he
may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper
time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different
from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence,
and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in
a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that
under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point
out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally
defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya
further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right
to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of
the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no
question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is
already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the
petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-
shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil
action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on
the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in
its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless
the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice.
Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the
same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41provides that an order dismissing an
action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule
65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, the RTCs order dismissing the petition for
certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.
The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly requires the accused
to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal
action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there
can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate
civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988,
allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the
criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right
to file such civil action. Thus, to file a separate and
independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules,
the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the
right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is
deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-
delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed
instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
9
independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action
is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent
civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. Verily, the
civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are
separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action
before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the
offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a
separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but
its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under
this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code.
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules continues procedure (1985 RoC) , to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with
the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In
case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution
to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended
party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not
change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing
of the criminal action.Section 2 of the present Rule 111
also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the
criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover
damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case,
can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the
criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides
as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offendedparty. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in
the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party
to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the
present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may
bring such an action but the offended party may not
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule
111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not
to the accused.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero case. Under this provision,
the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same
provision states that any cause of action which could have
been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action. The
present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of
the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent
civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to
the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is
reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal
action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits
for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-
delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
10
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating
the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-
delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused
is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The
accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does
not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive
period may set in since the period continues to run until the
civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way
that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused
from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing
to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny
him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of
dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground
of forum-shopping is erroneous.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC
issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before
the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering
the well-settled rule that -
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent.
[G. R. No. 112985. April 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARTIN L. ROMERO and ERNESTO C.
RODRIGUEZ, accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants Romero and Rodriguez, General Manager and
Operation Manager, respectively, of SAIDECOR, were charged
with widescale estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 based on a complaint filed by Ernesto Ruiz, a radio
commentator. SAIDECOR, engaged in solicitation of funds
and investments from the public, guaranteed an 800% return
on investment within fifteen 15 or twenty one 21 days. Romero
and Rodriguez issued post-dated check in the amount of One
P1,200,000.00, but when presented, it was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
Trial court, after joint trial, acquitted Romero and
Rodriguez of violation of BP 22 but convicted them of Estafa
for widescale swindling. The crime was committed by a
syndicate and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Hence,
this appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Rodriguez
died.
The appealed decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court but modified the penalty to an indeterminate one for
failure of the prosecution to establish that the corporation was
a syndicate as defined under the law. The Court found that
deception was employed on Ruiz by Romero and Rodriguez
then entered into a Ponzi scheme where appellant fraudulently
represented that Ruiz investment would have an 800% return
in 15 or 21 days. It is sometimes called a pyramid scheme
because a broader base of gullible investors must support the
structure as time passes.
Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
However, the claim for civil liability survives if based on a
source of obligation other than delict.
Issue:
ESTAFA; ELEMENTS. -- Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315,
as amended by R. A. 4885, the elements of estafa are:
(1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage
to the payee thereof.
CASE AT BAR. -- In this case, there was deception when
accused fraudulently represented to complainant that his
investment with the corporation would have an 800%
return in 15 or 21 days. Upon receipt of the money,
accused-appellant Martin Romero issued a postdated
check. Although accused-appellant contends that
sufficient funds were deposited in the bank when the
check was issued, he presented no officer of the bank to
substantiate the contention. The check was dishonored
when presented for payment, and the check return slip
submitted in evidence indicated that it was dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. Even assuming for the sake
of argument that the check was dishonored without any
fraudulent pretense or fraudulent act of the drawer, the
latter's failure to cover the amount within three days after
notice creates a rebuttable presumption of fraud.
Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds as evidenced by the check return slip; (2)
complainant notified accused of the dishonor; and (3)
accused failed to make good the check within three
days. Presumption of deceit remained since accused
failed to prove otherwise. Complainant sustained
damage in the amount of P150,000.00.
SWINDLING OR ESTAFA; PONZI OR PYRAMID SCHEME,
CONSTRUED. -- The factual narration in this case
established a kind of Ponzi scheme. This is an
investment swindle in which high profits are promised
11
from fictitious sources and early investors are paid off
with funds raised from later ones. It is sometimes called a
pyramid scheme because a broader base of gullible
investors must support the structure as time passes. In
the recent case of People vs. Priscilla Balasa, this Court
held that a transaction similar to the case at hand is not
an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which
works only as long as there is an increasing number of
new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain
over a long period of time because the operator needs an
ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying the
promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this
type of swindle is that the con-man collects his money
from his second or third round of investors and then
absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, these schemes only last weeks, or months
at most, just like what happened in this case.
DEATH OF ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL; EXTINGUISHES
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES. -- The Court notes
that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez,
died pending appeal. Pursuant to the doctrine
established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict.
SWINDLING OR ESTAFA; PENALTY WHEN NOT
COMMITTED BY A SYNDICATE. - The trial court
considered the swindling involved in this case as having
been committed by a syndicate and sentenced the
accused to life imprisonment based on the provisions of
Presidential Decree 1689, which increased the penalty for
certain forms of swindling or estafa. However, the
prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation
was a syndicate, as defined under the law. The penalty
of life imprisonment cannot be imposed. What would be
applicable in the present case is the second paragraph of
Presidential Decree No. 1689, Section 1.
CASE AT BAR. -- Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code on
complex penalties provides that whenever the penalty
prescribed does not have one of the forms specially
provided for in this Code, the periods shall be
distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules, that
is, those in Articles 61 and 76. Hence, where as in this
case, the penalty provided by Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1689 for estafa under Articles 315 and 316
of the Code is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua,
the minimum period thereof is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal; the
medium period is sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; and the
maximum period is reclusion perpetua. In the case at
bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstance has been
alleged or proved. Applying the rules in the Revised
Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees to
determine the proper period, the penalty for the offense of
estafa under Article 315, 2(d) as amended by P.D. 1689
involving the amount of P150,000.00 is the medium of the
period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is,
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in
accordance with the rules therefor and not merely
imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall
be the maximum range of the indeterminate sentence.
The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from
any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is, prision mayor.
CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES IN ESTAFA. -- To enable the complainant to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral sufferings undergone by him, by
reason of the failure of the accused to return his money,
moral damages are imposed against accused-appellant
Martin L. Romero in the amount of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). To serve as an example for the
public good, exemplary damages are awarded against
him in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH
MODIFICATION the appealed judgment. The Court hereby
sentences accused-appellant Martin Romero to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify Ruiz in the amount of P150,000.00
with interest at 6% per centum per annum from September 14,
1989, until fully paid, to pay P20,000.00 as moral damages and
P15,000.00, as exemplary damages, and the costs.
FRANCISCO G.R. No. 148072
MAGESTRADO,
Petitioner,
Promulgated:
- versus -
July 10, 2007
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES & ELENA
M. LIBROJO
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -x
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
Private respondent Librojo filed a criminal complaint
for perjury against Magestrado with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
After the filing of petitioner´s counter-affidavit and the
appended pleadings, the OCP recommended the filing of an
information for perjury against petitioner with the MeTC
of Quezon City.
That about December, 1997, in Quezon
City, the accused, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful
statement under oath upon a material matter
before a competent officer authorized to
receive and administer oath and which the
law so require, to wit: the said accused
subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss
before Notary Public Espejo of Quezon City,
12
falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate
Certificate of TCT, which document was
used in support of a Petition For Issuance of
New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of
Title and filed with the RTC of Quezon City,
to which said Magestrado signed and swore
on its verification; the said accused knowing
fully well that the allegations in the said
affidavit and petition are false, the truth of
the matter being that the property subject of
Transfer Certificate of Title was mortgaged
to complainant Librojo as collateral for a loan
in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as
a consequence of which said title to the
property was surrendered by him to the
complainant by virtue of loan, thus, making
untruthful and deliberate assertions of
falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of
Librojo.
The case was raffled to MeTC of Quezon City – People of
the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado.
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion for suspension of
proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged
that Civil Case for recovery of a sum of money is pending
before RTC of Quezon City and Civil Case for Cancellation of
Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before RTC
of Quezon City, must be resolved first before Criminal Case
may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar
or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
MeTC: issued an Order denying petitioners motion for
suspension of proceedings – it appearing that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
On 17 August 1999, a motion[7] for reconsideration
was filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in an
Order[8] dated 19 October 1999.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with
a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before
the RTC of Quezon City, on the ground that MeTC Judge
committed GADALEJ in denying his motion to suspend
the proceedings in Criminal Case.
RTC: dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning – no
prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of
the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases.
Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal
case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases.
MR denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the CA – Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge committed GADALEJ in
denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case and sustaining
the denial by MeTC of petitioner´s motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case
CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that
petitioner´s remedy should have been an appeal from the
dismissal by RTC of his Petition for Certiorari. MR denied.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
raising the following issues:
Issues: Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her
jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and
petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration on
the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing
jurisprudence. – NO. It is evident that the civil
cases and the criminal case can proceed
independently of each other.
SC: Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the MTC of Quezon City directed to
proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal
Case, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to
the right of the accused to due process.
The procedural issue – proper remedy which
petitioner should have availed himself of before the Court of
Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari. The
appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioners Petition
for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was
appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case but also because RTC´s Order of
dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have
appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to
petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to
deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of
error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of
judgment which the trial court might have committed. But
petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.
We have time and again reminded members of the
bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when there is
no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for
lost appeal.
Petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner
harps on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case for perjury pending before MeTC based on a
prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil Case (for
cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case (for collection of a
sum of money) which are pending before other trial courts.
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for
Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed
on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against private respondent with
RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163
13
thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of
negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of Sale
prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of
Sale, he noticed that the Deed was already signed by a certain
Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor Spouses
Guillermo and Amparo Galvez. Petitioner demanded from
private respondent a special power of attorney and authority to
sell, but the latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred that
private respondent refused to deliver the certificate of title of
the land despite execution and signing of the Deed of Sale and
payment of the consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to
engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed,
for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private
respondent; to deliver to petitioner the certificate of title of the
land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in possession of
private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing
upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In
fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office
of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s
wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the
existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he
allegedly signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner
categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was
private respondent who falsified the same in order to justify her
unlawful withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner.
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26] on the other hand, is a
complaint for a sum of money with a motion for issuance of a
writ of attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner
on 14 May 1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent
alleges that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount
of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August
1997. As security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land
registered under TCT No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for
additional time to pay the said obligation, to which respondent
agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime in
February 1998 that petitioner executed an affidavit of loss
alleging that he lost the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-
173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on the
original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that
she also discovered that petitioner filed a petition for issuance
of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No.
Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his
obligation, but the latter refused to do so.
As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case
No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into
consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of
prejudicial question. A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
A prejudial question is defined as that which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to
suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to
a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must
be lodged in another tribunal. (Sec 7)
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking
up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve
a prejudicial question.[30] Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.
However, the court in which an action is pending may,
in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance
to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another
court, especially where the parties and the issues are the
same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights
of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the
second action should be stayed.
As stated, the determination of whether the
proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues
raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related
with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the
resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also
determine the judgment in the criminal case.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal
case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless
of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the
innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for
perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution
of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on
whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false
affidavit of loss of TCT.
14
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060
Petitioner,
- versus –
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
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------x
The Antecedent Facts
On October 2004, Lacap (private respondent) filed an action
for frustrated parricide against Pimentel (petitioner), before the
RTC of Quezon City.
On February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear
before RTC of Antipolo City, Branch for the pre-trial and trial of
Civil Case (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that
since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a
key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have
a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City.
RTC Quezon City: issued an Order holding that the pendency
of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it. Criminal Case – injuries sustained by respondent
and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of
petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. MR
denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO before the CA,
assailing the Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
CA: dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in
the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts
of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations – immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged
acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already
been committed.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing
the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner –
NO.
SC: DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of CA.
Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the elements of PJ: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted
first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August
2004. Respondents petition in Civil Case was dated 4
November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly,
the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was
filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in
Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be pre-emptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person
who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is
not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender
and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner
and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case is granted, will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent. The trial in Criminal Case may proceed as the
15
resolution of the issue in Civil Case is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
G.R. No. 208587. July 29, 2015.*
JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN D.
DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH PACIS, and
SHIRLEY DOMINGUEZ, petitioners, vs. CECILIA LICLICAN,
NORMA D. ISIP, and PURITA DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; A prejudicial
question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.—As jurisprudence
elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle
is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on
the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
JMD (Baguio City Country Club) held the election for its new
set of directors was conducted. This event was presided by
then company president, and herein respondent, Liclican, and
attended by her co-respondents Isip and Rodriguez, and by
petitioners Dagdagan, Pacis, and Dominguez as well. Conflict
ensued when petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were not
allowed to vote on the ground that they are not registered
stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was their mother and
grandmother, both deceased, who are the stockholders in
JMD, and that there is still no settlement of their respective
estates to effectively transfer their shares in the company to
Patrick and Kenneth Pacis.
After that, respondents walked out of the meeting. But since
the remaining stockholders with outstanding shares constituted
a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded – Pacis were
elected as VP and Sec. Meanwhile, respondents executed a
Board Resolution certifying that in the stockholders meeting,
the following were elected directors and officers of JMD:
Board of Directors:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican – Chairman and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip
3. Purita C. Dominguez
4. Tessie C. Dominguez, and
5. Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican as President and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip as Vice President
3. Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate Secretary/Treasurer, and
4. Oscar Aquino – Financial Consultant Auditor
Petitioners Dagdagan, Patrick and Kenneth Pacis, and
Dominguez filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC Baguio City for nullification of meetings, election and acts
of directors and officers, injunction and other relief. The case,
after a failed mediation, was referred for appropriate Judicial
Dispute Resolution (JDR) – the RTC. Meanwhile, petitioner
stockholders immediately took hold of corporate properties,
represented themselves to JMD’s tenants as the true and
lawful directors of the company, and collected and deposited
rents due the company to its bank account.
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and
Patrick Pacis, executed charging respondents Liclican and Isip
with qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint (OCP
Baguio) that Liclican and Isip, without any authority
whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19
from the corporation’s savings account with the EquitablePCI
Bank; and that they issued Check in the amount of P200,000,
payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s account with
Robinson’s Savings Bank. Also, the corporation claimed that
respondents Liclican and Isip likewise issued EquitablePCI
Bank Check payable to one Atty. corporation’s account.
OCP Bagiuo: filed an information for Qualified Theft against
Liclican and Isip. And another one for Liclican – raffled to RTC
same branch overseeing the JDR.
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E.
HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H.
RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioners,
-versus-
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR.,
Respondent.
The present petition arose from a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents filed by Vergara against herein
petitioners with the OCP Mla.
On February 2004, an Information for falsification of public
documents was filed with the MeTC of Manila by Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila against petitioners. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable
Cause.
After respondent's Opposition was filed, the MeTC issued an
Order dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable
cause.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed the case to the RTC of
Manila. RTC rendered judgment setting aside the Order of the
MeTC and directing the said court to proceed to trial.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
review – rendered its presently assailed Resolution dismissing
the petition. The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is
interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable. MR Denied.
Issue:
SC: instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of CA are
AFFIRMED.
It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory
right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this
16
strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are
designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside
the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed
to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence.
Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did
not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to
be done on its merits.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondents.
Private respondent Reyes offered her services to BRC as the
latter's real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She
informed BRC that more or less 10 lot owners are her clients
who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her
representations, BRC released the amount of P23,423,327.50
to be used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of
buying those parcels of land, converted and misappropriated
the money given by BRC to her personal use and benefit.
Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the
amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of
the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the
crime of Estafa against Reyes before the ACP Mkt.
Reyes denied having converted or misappropriated the
involved amount of money. She claimed that it was used solely
for the intended purpose and that it was petitioner who
requested her services in procuring the lots. According to her,
it was upon the petitioner's prodding that she was constrained
to contact her friends who were also into the real estate
business, including one named Elejorde. Reyes also insisted
that petitioner knew that the initial or down payment for each
lot represented only 50% of the purchase price such that the
remaining balance had to be paid within a period of 30 days
from the date of receipt of the initial payment. Meanwhile,
Reyes received information that her sub-broker Elejorde had
been depositing the involved money entrusted to him under his
personal account. Reyes, as per BRC´s consent filed a
complaint for Estafa against Elejorde – he was indicted.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes,
the ACP of Makati City issued a Resolution indicting Reyes of
the crime Estafa. Thereafter, an Information for the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) was filed against Reyes before RTC Mkt.
Reyes filed a petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), but it was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice
through State Prosecutor Zuño. Secretary of Justice Gonzalez
issued a Resolution granting the petition for review of Reyes.
Petitioner filed MR, but was denied by the Secretary of Justice.
Eventually, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with the CA – affirmed the questioned
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Hence, petition.
Issue:
It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors
are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under
RAC, exercises the power of direct control and supervision
over said prosecutors; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and
control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors
finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by
an administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.
In reversing the finding of probable cause that the crime of
estafa has been committed, the Secretary of Justice reasoned
out that, theory of conversion or misappropriation is difficult to
sustain and that under the crime of estafa with grave abuse of
confidence, the presumption is that the thing has been devoted
to a purpose or is different from that for which it was intended
but did not take place in this case. It must be remembered that
the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation
constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case.
Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant
need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
A preliminary investigation does not require a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. There is a trial
to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to
substantiate their respective claims. Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
SC: Petition is hereby GRANTED and, accordingly, the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Mkt where the Information
was filed against private respondent Reyes, is hereby
DIRECTED to proceed with her arraignment.
HEIRS OF THE LATE G.R. No. 175887
NESTOR TRIA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 24, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -x
On May 1998, in the morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines
Sur, Engr. Tria, Regional Director of the DPWH, Region V and
OIC of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot
by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was
brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone
gunshot wound on his nape.
NBI Regional Director Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria,
recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur
the indictment Gulpo, Masalonga and Atty. Obias, for the
murder of Engr. Tria.
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit
17
denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr.
Tria. Respondent admitted that Engr. Tria was a longtime friend
and that she went to his residence at about 7:30 oclock in the
morning of May 22, 1998. Since Engr. Tria had many visitors at
that time, they just agreed to see each other at the airport
later. Respondent denied having admitted to NBI Supervising
Agent (SA) Atty. Manuel Eduarte that she was with Aclan then,
and neither did she volunteer the information that Aclan was not
the triggerman. Respondent likewise denied that she met Engr.
Tria as the latter was approaching the pre-departure area of
the airport and that she supposedly shook his hands.
Respondent asserted that from the totality of evidence
gathered by the NBI, it has not established prima facie the
existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of
Engr. Tria.
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur
issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for
murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for
insufficiency of evidence as against herein respondent, Atty.
Epifania Obias.
Petitioners appealed to the DOJ assailing the Provincial
Prosecutors order to dismiss the charge against respondent.
On January 25, 2000, then Justice Secretary Cuevas issued a
Resolution modifying the resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the
information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona.
The DOJ agreed with the contention of petitioners that
there is interlocking circumstantial evidence sufficient to show
that respondent conspired with Aclan and Ona in the killing of
Engr. Tria. The DOJ was convinced that the sequence of
events and respondents conduct before, during and after the
killing of Engr. Tria undeniably points to her complicity with
Aclan and Ona. Moreover, it pointed out that respondents
defense consisted merely of denial which cannot prevail over
the positive allegations of witnesses showing her complicity
with the gunmen in the perpetration of the crime.[12]
Justice Secretary Perez issued a resolution denying
respondents motion for reconsideration.
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It
does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an
inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of
ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal
offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation,
subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the
Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the
executive determination was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with
grave abuse.
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on
record, we find no such grave abuse when the Secretary of
Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with
murder in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 14, 2006 and
Resolution dated December 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 86210 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The January 25, 2000 Resolution of then Justice
Secretary Serafin Cuevas modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur and directing the
latter to include respondent in the information for murder filed
against Aclan and Ona is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
[G.R. No. 143032. October 14, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. SEGUNDINO VALENCIA y BLANCA,
JOHNNY TADENA y TORDA, and DOMINGO
DEROY, JR. y SAROCAM, accused-appellants.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca,
Johnny Tadena y Torda and Domingo Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam
were charged and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for violation of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.)
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, for
unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0 grams of
Psuedophedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug. The
trial court sentenced each of the accused to the supreme
penalty of death and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Hence, the
case is now before us on automatic review.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that on
September 22, 1998, a confidential informant of the PNP
Narcotics Group confided to the group that he was able to
negotiate the purchase of one kilo of drugs from a certain
Junior and Johnny. The information was passed to the
operatives team leader, Insp. Ramon Arsenal and then to their
commanding officer, Supt. Arturo Castillo. Supt. Castillo
immediately formed a buy-bust operation team composed of
P/Insp. Arsenal, P/Insp. Beasa, SPO2 Estrada and SPO1
Facto. SPO1 Larry Facto was designated as the poseur
buyer. He was to buy the one kilo of drugs for the agreed price
of P800,000.00. SPO1 Facto was given ten P100.00 bills
which he used in preparing the boodle money.[1]
The team proceeded to the corner of Baler and Miller
Streets in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. SPO1 Facto
and the informant waited at the corner of Baler and Miller
Streets, while the other members of the team stayed about ten
meters away. At about 10:50 in the evening, a white Mitsubishi
Lancer with plate no. UET 384 arrived. The driver, Johnny
Tadena, called the informant. The informant, together with
SPO1 Facto, approached him. SPO1 Facto was introduced by
the informant to Johnny Tadena as the buyer. SPO1 Facto
asked Tadena where the stuff was. The latter replied, Its here.
He told him not to worry because their boss, a certain Dodong
(Segundino Valencia), was present. SPO1 Facto saw three
persons inside the car. Valencia was seated beside the driver
while their other companion, Domingo Deroy, was at the
backseat. Tadena then asked SPO1 Facto about the money
and the latter showed him a plastic bag containing the
money. When SPO1 Facto asked Tadena to show him the
stuff, Valencia ordered Deroy to hand him the bag containing
18
the drugs. Deroy did as instructed.Valencia then handed the
stuff to SPO1 Facto in exchange for the money. SPO1 Facto
examined the content of the bag and when he saw the white
substance inside, he scratched his head to signal his
companions that the transaction had been
consummated. SPO1 Facto then introduced himself as a police
officer and grabbed the car key from the ignition switch. SPO1
Facto arrested Johnny Tadena while his companions seized
the other accused. The three accused were brought to Camp
Crame for investigation.[2] The substance was submitted for
examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory. It tested positive for
psuedo-ephedrine, a regulated drug.[3]
The defense, on the other hand, alleged that in the
evening of September 22, 1998, Johnny Tadena went to see
Segundino Valencia in Caloocan City to ask him if he knew
anyone who would be interested in buying a 1995 Mitsubishi
Lancer. Valencia was allegedly engaged in the business of
buying and selling used cars. On the way home, Valencia rode
with Tadena to go to Bago Bantay, Quezon City. As they were
crossing an intersection along Iligan Street, an Isuzu van
suddenly blocked their way. The passengers of the van who
appeared to be police officers approached them. They took
Valencias gun which he bought from a police asset. The police
brought Valencia and Tadena to Camp Crame. Tadena was
placed in a jail cell while Valencia was brought before Col.
Castillo. Col. Castillo showed Valencia a plastic bag and said
that he would use it as evidence against him. Valencia claimed
that the police mauled him and extorted from him the amount
of P20,000.00. They also took his necklace worth P5,000.00
and his wallet containing P1,200.00. [4] Meanwhile, Domingo
Deroy claimed that in the evening of September 22, 1998, he
was picked up by the police without any reason at the house of
Valencias parents.[5]
On September 24, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo
B. Vargas filed the following information against the accused:
That on or about the 22nd day of September 1998 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully sell or offer for sale 634.0 grams of white crystalline
substance containing Pseudoephedrine Hydrochloride which is
a regulated drug.
Giving more weight to the testimony of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation, the trial court convicted
the accused of the crime charged. It held that the denial and
alibi of the accused were not sufficient to overturn the
prosecution evidence which established the guilt of the
accused.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the Court hereby sentences each of them (1) to suffer the
penalty of Death; (2) to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (3) to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In this appeal, accused-appellants raise the following
errors:
1. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the
guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime
charged has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight
and credence to the improbable testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution.
3. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that there
was conspiracy in the case at bar.[9]
The appeal is without merit.
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a
buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimony on the operation
deserves full faith and credit. When the police officers involved
in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify
against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption
that they have performed their duties regularly. [10] The trial
court in this case correctly upheld the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation. It did not err in applying the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement
agents. We laid down in the case of People vs. Doria[11] the
test in determining the credibility of the testimony of police
officers regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations.The
Court said:
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of
regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied
with studied restraint. The presumption should not by itself
prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. It is the duty
of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the
prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be used
as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person
be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust
operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by
which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to
the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are
not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however,
examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts
into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the
crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this
must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to
19
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity
of the defense of inducement.[12]
In the case at bar, SPO1 Facto, the poseur-buyer, gave
the complete details of how the transaction was conducted
from beginning to end -- the negotiation between the
confidential agent and the drug dealers, the preparation made
by the buy-bust team before conducting the operation, when
the informant introduced him as the supposed buyer to the
drug dealers, the exchange of the stuff and the payment
between the pushers and the poseur buyer, and the arrest of
said drug dealers. SPO1 Facto positively identified accused-
appellants as the drug dealers. His testimony went as follows:
SPO1 Factos testimony withstood the rigorous cross-
examination by the defense counsel and was corroborated by
SPO2 Estrada, also a member of the buy-bust team.[13]
Accused-appellants contend that it is incredible that the
alleged vendors of the drugs would readily do business with
the alleged poseur-buyer whom they met only on September
22, 1998, considering that the transaction involved the huge
amount of P800,000.00. We are not impressed. It has been
shown that the appellants have previously negotiated with the
confidential agent. Prior to September 22, they have already
closed the deal for the purchase of drugs for the price of
P800,000.00. Hence, it is not as if the appellants were dealing
with strangers. They knew the informant. When they met with
the poseur-buyer, the latter was accompanied by the informant
who introduced them to each other. Nonetheless, the Court
has observed that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to
any customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in
public places, whether daytime or nighttime. Indeed, drug
pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and
openly defiant of the law. Hence, it is immaterial whether the
vendor and the vendee are familiar with each other. It is only
necessary to prove the fact of agreement and the acts
constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs.[14] These
facts have been sufficiently proved in this case.
Accused-appellants also argue that the prosecution has
not shown by clear and convincing evidence whether the sale
was voluntary or whether this was a case of instigation. The
argument deserves scant consideration. A buy-bust operation
is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police
officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in
the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea
to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its
opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its
agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to
prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy
and considered an absolutory cause.[15] In this case, accused-
appellants, apparently, have, for some time, been engaged in
drug dealing. They were in fact the subject of a surveillance
conducted by the operatives of the PNP Narcotics Group. The
police engaged the services of a confidential informant to lead
them to transact with them. The confidential agent facilitated
the meeting of accused-appellants and the poseur
buyer. Hence, it was not the police nor the confidential agent
who induced accused-appellants to commit a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. They were already violating the law
and the police only used the buy-bust operation to apprehend
them in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. This is certainly a
legitimate entrapment operation and not instigation.
Finally, accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy among the three
accused, as it did not show a common plan or design among
them. Again, we find otherwise. There is conspiracy when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [16] The
existence of a conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence because it may be inferred from the parties conduct
indicating a common understanding among themselves with
respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary
to show that two or more persons met together and entered
into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or object to be carried out. It may be deduced from the
mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated or from
the acts of the accused showing a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. [17] The
existence of a conspiracy among the three accused is very
much apparent from the narration of SPO1 Facto about how
the transaction went. Upon the arrival of the Mitsubishi Lancer
bearing plate no. UET 384 at the corner of Baler and Miller
Streets, the driver, Tadena, called the informant and SPO1
Facto, the supposed buyer. Tadena asked SPO1 Facto about
the money. When SPO1 Facto asked for the stuff, Valencia,
who was occupying the front passenger seat, ordered Deroy,
who was seated at the back of the car, to hand him the bag
containing the drugs. Valencia gave the bag to SPO1 Facto as
the latter handed him the money. This demonstrates the
concerted effort of the three accused in drug
dealing. Conspiracy among them is obviously present in this
case.
As regards the penalty, the Court agrees with the
conclusions of the trial court, thus:
Section 20, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended, provides that
The penalties for offense under x x x Sections 14, 14-A, 15,
and 16 of Art. III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: 8. In the
case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the DDB, after consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose. In Section 15, the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. The crime is
aggravated when committed by any person or persons
belonging to an organized or syndicated crime group (Section
30, R.A. 7659; and People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July
10, 1998). In such a case, the death penalty shall be
imposed. An organized or syndicated crime group has been
defined as a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of
gain in the commission of any crime. (Section 30, R.A. No.
7659; and People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July 10,
1998)
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q98-78878 is
AFFIRMED.[18]
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of these cases be
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
executive clemency.
20
G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-
GUTIERREZ (AS THEN OMBUDSMAN), DON M. FERRY,
JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C.
ZALAMEA, OFELIA I. CASTELL, AND RAFAEL A. SISON,
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, RODOLFO M. CUENCA, MANUEL
I. TINIO, AND ANTONIO R. ROQUE, PRIVATE, Respondents.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint6 dated July
15, 2003 filed by the PCGG - through Rene B. Gorospe, the
Legal Consultant in-charge of reviewing behest loan cases -
against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), namely, Ferry, Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea,
Castell, and Sison, as well as former officers/stockholders of
National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon),7 namely,
Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque charging them of violating Sections
3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG
alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V.
Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No.
13,8 creating the Presidential Ad HocFact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify
various anomalous behest loans entered into by the Philippine
Government in the past. Later on, President Ramos issued
Memorandum Order No. 619 on November 9, 1992, laying
down the criteria which the Ad Hoc Committee may use as a
frame of reference in determining whether or not a loan is
behest in nature. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the
assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of
officers and employees of different government financial
institutions (GFIs), examined and studied documents relative to
loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during
the regime of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(President Marcos) -one of which is the loan account granted
by the DBP to Galleon.10
After examining the aforesaid loan account, the TWG
found, inter alia, that: (a) on September 19, 1979, DBP,
pursuant to its Board Resolution No. 3002,11 approved
guarantees in favor of Galleon in the aggregate amount of
US$90,280,000.00 for the purpose of securing foreign currency
borrowings from financial institutions related to Galleon's
acquisition of five (5) brand new and two (2) secondhand
vessels;12 (b) Board Resolution No. 3002 specifically stated
that such accommodation "shall be undertaken at the behest of
the Philippine Government;"13 (c) as a condition for the grant of
the guarantees, Board Resolution No. 3002 required Galleon
to raise its paid up capital to P98.963 Million by 1981, 14 but
Galleon was only able to raise its capital to
P46,740.755.00;15 (d) despite Galleon's failure to comply with
such condition, DBP still granted the guarantees; (e) as of
June 30, 1981, Galleon's arrearages had already amounted to
P40,684,059.37, while the aggregate DBP obligations of
Galleon already totaled P691,058,027.92;16 (f) despite the
outstanding debts, DBP still issued Board Resolution Nos.
400817 and 3001,18 approving further accommodations in
Galleon's favor in the form of one-year foreign currency loans
to refinance the latter's arrearages, which amounted to
P58,101,718.89 as of September 30, 1982;19(g) despite
Galleon's arrearages amounting to P128,182,654.38 and
obligations accumulating to P904,277,536.96, DBP still
approved the release of Galleon's two (2) secondhand vessels
as collaterals resulting in collateral deficiency;20 and (h) as of
March 31, 1984, Galleon's total obligations to DBP amounted
to P2,039,284,390.85, while the value of its collaterals was
only P539,000,000.00.21 These findings were then collated in
an Executive Summary22 which was submitted to the Ad
Hoc Committee.
Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that
the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from DBP
possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering
that: (a) Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan itself was
undercoUateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon
were known to be cronies of President Marcos; and id) certain
documents pertaining to the loan account were found to bear
"marginal notes" of President Marcos himself.23 Resultantly,
the PCGG filed the instant criminal complaint against individual
respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0500-I.
Except for Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell, the other
individual respondents impleaded in the affidavit-complaint did
not file their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.24
In his defense,25 Roque denied being a Marcos crony, and
averred that he was only a minor shareholder of Galleon and
that he was in no position to influence the DBP in extending
the subject loan to Galleon.26For his part,27 Zalamea
maintained that he had no participation or hand in the subject
loan transactions as he joined the DBP as Chairman only in
1982, while the execution of the transactions pertaining to such
loan was done in 1979-1981, and that the criminal charges
against them are barred by prescription since it had been more
than 20 years before the complaint against them was filed on
July 15, 2003.28Similarly, Tengco also argued29 that the
criminal charges against them had already prescribed. He also
contended that his participation in the approval of the subject
loan was at the board level only and was done in the exercise
of his sound business judgment through the collective act of
the DBP Board of Directors.30 Finally, Castell pleaded31 that
her role in the handling of the projects and transactions of
Galleon involved only the supervision of employees, but with
no approving authority for matters like those involving the
transactions pertaining to the subject loan obtained by Galleon
from DBP.32
The Ombudsman Ruling
In a Resolution33 dated May 30, 2007, the Ombudsman found
no probable cause against private respondents and,
accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint against them. 34 It
found that the pieces of evidence attached to the case records
were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the
individual respondents, considering that the documents
presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive
summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-
serving, and of little probative value.35 In this relation, the
Ombudsman noted that the PCGG failed to present "the
documents which would directly establish the alleged illegal
transactions like, the Loan Agreement between DBP and
[Galleon], the approved Board Resolutions by the DBP
officers/board of directors, the participation/voting that
transpired at the board meetings wherein the alleged behest
loans were granted."36
Aggrieved, the PCGG moved for reconsideration,37 which was,
21
however, denied in an Order38 dated April 13, 2009; hence, this
petition.39
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause
to indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA
3019.chanrobleslaw
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has
consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and
to decide whether or not an Information should be filed.
Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.40 The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.41 The Court's pronouncement in Ciron
v. Gutierrez42 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain
noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman
of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This
observed policy is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well.Otherwise, the functions of the Court will
be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 43] (Emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of
preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by the
Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an
accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he
committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,44 the Court defined
probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence
thereof in the following manner, to wit:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information,
has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not
require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. What is determined is whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.45 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode
of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based
on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.46 "[A preliminary investigation] is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the
prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits."47 Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level."48
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that
the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
criminal complaint against individual respondents for lack of
probable cause, as will be explained hereunder.
As already stated, individual respondents were accused of
violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the elements of which are
as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a
private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.49 In the same vein,
they were likewise charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of the
same law, which has the following elements: (a) that the
accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such
contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.50 Notably, private
individuals may also be charged with violation of Section 3 (g)
of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.51
A review of the records of the case reveals that Galleon made
a request for guarantees from DBP to cover its foreign
borrowings for the purpose of acquiring new and secondhand
vessels. In an evaluation memorandum52 dated August 27,
1979, the DBP itself already raised various red flags regarding
Galleon's request, such as the following: (a) its guarantee
accommodation request covers 100% of its project cost, which
22
is in excess of DBP's normal practice of financing only 80% of
such cost; (b) its net profit margin was experiencing a steady
decrease due to high operating costs; (c) its paid-up capital is
only P9.95 Million; and (d) aside from its proposal to source the
increase in equity from the expected profits from the operations
of the vessels to be acquired, Galleon has not shown any
concrete proof on how it will be funding its equity build-
up.53 Despite the foregoing, DBP still agreed to grant Galleon's
request under certain conditions (e.g., increase in paid-up
capital, placement of adequate collaterals), which were
eventually not complied with. Further, when Galleon's
arrearages and obligations skyrocketed due to its failure to
service its debts, DBP, instead of securing its interest by
demanding immediate payment or the foreclosure of the
collaterals, granted Galleon further accommodations in the
form of foreign currency loans and release of certain
collaterals. As a result of the foregoing, among other things,
Galleon's total obligations to DBP ballooned all the way to
P2,039,284,390.85, while the collaterals securing such
obligations were only valued at P539,000,000.00 as of March
31, 1984.54 Further, Galleon's paid-up capital remained only at
P46,740,755.00 as of June 30, 1981.55
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Ad Hoc Committee
concluded that the accommodations extended by DBP to
Galleon were in the nature of behest loans, which then led to
the filing of criminal cases against individual respondents, who
were high-ranking officers and/or directors of either Galleon or
DBP, as evidenced by the various documents on record.
Specifically, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque were Galleon
stockholders and were its President, Executive Vice-President
and Treasurer, and Corporate Secretary, respectively.56 On the
other hand, the following individual respondents exercised
official functions for the DBP during the time it extended
Galleon the aforesaid accommodations: (a) Ferry as DBP Vice
Chairman and Acting Chairman;57 (b) Tengco as DBP Board
Member, Supervising Governor, and Acting Chairman; 58 (c)
Zosa as DBP Supervising Governor and Chairman of the Loan
Committee;59(d) Zalamea as DBP Chairman;60 (e) Castell as
DBP Executive Officer and Manager of the Industrial Projects
Development III;61 and if) Sison as DBP Board Member and
Acting Chairman.62 As may be gleaned from the documents on
record, it appears that each of these high-ranking officers
and/or directors of DBP had a hand in recommending the
approval and/or the actual approval of the series of
accommodations that DBP granted in favor of Galleon, which
constituted the behest loans received by the latter during the
regime of the late President Marcos.
In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant
of behest loans, Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell merely
denied liability by maintaining that they had no participation in
such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense
that are better ventilated during the trial proper. On the other
hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison miserably failed to
debunk the charges against them by not filing their respective
counter-affidavits despite due notice. Indubitably, the foregoing
establishes probable cause to believe that individual
respondents may have indeed committed acts constituting the
crimes charged against them, and as such they must defend
themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the
TWG's findings contained in the Executive Summary which
were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay,
self-serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to
point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings.63 In the recent case
of Estrada v. Ombudsman,64 the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can
be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay, viz.:
Justice Brion's pronouncement in Unilever that "the
determination of probable cause does not depend on the
validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the
admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented" correctly
recognizes the doctrine in the United States that the
determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even
entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person
making the hearsay statement is credible. In United States
v. Ventresca, the United States Supreme Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable
cause," this Court has long held that "the term 'probable cause'
. . . means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation," x x x and that a finding of "probable cause"
may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a
criminal trial, x x x As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United
States x x x, "There is a large difference between two things to
be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the
tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference
in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish
them." Thus, hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the
warrant "so long as there ... [is] a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay." x x x And, in Aguilar, we recognized
that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and
need not reflect the direct personal observations of the
affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of
the underlying circumstances" supporting the affiant's
conclusions and his belief that any informant involved
"whose identity need not be disclosed..." was "credible"
or his information "reliable." x x x.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties, x x x.65 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, assuming arguendo that the factual findings
contained in the Executive Summary prepared by the TWG
from which the Ad Hoc Committee based its conclusions are
indeed hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value, there
is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, as such
factual findings appear to be based on official documents
prepared by DBP itself in connection with the behest loans it
allegedly extended in favor of Galleon. In this regard, it must
be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause,
only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable
cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on
more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction.66 To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a
party's defense or accusations and the admissibility of
23
testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial
stage than in the preliminary stage.67
In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to
indict individual respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g)
of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal complaint against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution
dated May 30, 2007 and the Order dated April 13, 2009 of the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-0500-I are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Office
of the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to issue the proper
resolution indicting individual respondents Don M. Ferry, Jose
R. Tengco, Jr., Rolando ML Zosa, Cesar C. Zalamea, Ofelia I.
Castell, Rafael A. Sison, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Manuel I. Tinio,
and Antonio R. Roque of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, in accordance with this Decision.
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO,
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M.
BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v. MARIO JOEL T.
REYES, Respondent.
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion
or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may cause a
probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the
conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of
preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court
completes its determination of probable cause and issues a
warrant of arrest.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
Decision1 dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution2 dated
September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which rendered
null and void Department of Justice Order No. 7103 issued by
the Secretary of Justice.4 The Department Order created a
second panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a
murder case in view of the first panel of prosecutors' failure to
admit the complainant's additional evidence.
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry,"
was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in
Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was
shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San
Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.5 After a brief chase with
police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the
same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that
he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O.
Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah"
R. Noel, Jr.6
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan
Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who
ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.7
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima
issued Department Order No. 0918 creating a special panel of
prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.
The First Panel was composed of Senior Assistant Prosecutor
Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S.
Cacha, and Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D.
Medina.9
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental
Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. Former Governor Reyes'
brother, Coron Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque
Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial Administrator
Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon Recamata, Dennis Aranas,
Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo
O. Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were also
implicated.10
On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and issued the Resolution11dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-
Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought
the admission of mobile phone communications between
former Governor Reyes and Edrad.12 On July 7, 2011, while
the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the
Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by
the First Panel in the Resolution13 dated September 2, 2011.14
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of
investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case. The Second Panel was composed of Assistant State
Prosecutor Stewart Allan M. Mariano, Assistant State
Prosecutor Vimar M. Barcellano, and Assistant State
Prosecutor Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the
case "in the interest of service and due process"15 to address
the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel in its
Resolution dated September 2, 2011. The Department Order
also revoked Department Order No. 091.16
Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the Second Panel
issued a Subpoena requiring former Governor Reyes to appear
before them on October 6 and 13, 2011 and to submit his
counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.17
On September 29, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the
Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam)
assailing the First Panel's Resolution dated September 2,
2011.18
On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely
abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He
also argued that the parties were already afforded due process
and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation
was neither new nor material to the case.19
24
On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution
finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
informations on all accused, including former Governor
Reyes.20 Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan
subsequently issued warrants of arrest on March 27, 2012.
However, the warrants against former Governor Reyes and his
brother were ineffective since the two allegedly left the country
days before the warrants could be served.22
On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes filed before the
Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad
Cautelam23 assailing the Second Panel's Resolution dated
March 12, 2012. .
On April 2, 2012, he also filed before the Court of Appeals a
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order impleading Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan.24
In his Supplemental Petition, former Governor Reyes argued
that the Regional Trial Court could not enforce the Second
Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and proceed with the
prosecution of his case since this Resolution was
void.25cralawred
On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division
of Five, rendered the Decision26 declaring Department Order
No. 710 null and void and reinstating the First Panel's
Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued
Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel. The
Court of Appeals found that she should have modified or
reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the
2000 NPS Rule on Appeal27 instead of issuing Department
Order No. 710 and creating the Second Panel. It found that
because of her failure to follow the procedure in the 2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal, two Petitions for Review Ad Cautelam filed by
the opposing parties were pending before her.28
The Court of Appeals also found that the Secretary of Justice's
admission that the issuance of Department Order No. 710 did
not set aside the First Panel's Resolution dated June 8, 2011
and September 2, 2011 "[compounded] the already anomalous
situation."29 It also stated that Department Order No. 710 did
not give the Second Panel the power to reverse, affirm, or
modify the Resolutions of the First Panel; therefore, the
Second Panel did not have the authority to assess the
admissibility and weight of any existing or
additional'evidence.30
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-
Ortega filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
March 19, 2013. The Motion, however, was denied by the
Court of Appeals in the Resolution31 dated September 27,
2013.
In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals stated that the Secretary
of Justice had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice
sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second Panel
since both parties were given full opportunity to present their
evidence before the First Panel. It also ruled that the evidence
examined by the Second Panel was not additional evidence
but "forgotten evidence"32 that was already available before the
First Panel during the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.33
Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and the Second Panel filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari34 assailing the
Decision dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution dated
September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals. Respondent
Mario Joel T. Reyes filed his Comment35 to the Petition in
compliance with this court's Resolution dated February 17,
2014.36 Petitioners' Reply37 to the Comment was filed on
October 14, 2014 in compliance with this court's Resolution
dated June 23, 2014.38
Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her
authority when she issued Department Order No. 710. They
argue that her issuance was a purely executive function and
not a quasi-judicial function that could be the subject of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition.39 In their submissions, they
point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to
create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.40
Petitioners' position was that the First Panel "appear[ed] to
have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation" 41 when it
refused to receive additional evidence that would have been
crucial for the determination of the existence of probable
cause.42 They assert that respondent was not deprived of due
process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was
not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega's additional evidence.43 Petitioners argue
that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the
case was already within the discretion of the trial court. 44
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of
Justice had no authority to order motu proprio the
reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was
able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel
when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He
argues that all parties had already been given the opportunity
to present their evidence before the First Panel so it was not
necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.45
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice's discretion to
create a new panel of prosecutors was not "unbridled"46 since
the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be
compelling circumstances for her to be able to designate
another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.47 He argues
that the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was
void since the Panel was created by a department order that
was beyond the Secretary of Justice's authority to issue. He
further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case since the Information filed by the Second Panel
was void.48
The issues for this court's resolution
are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when
she issued Department Order No. 710, and with regard to
this:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
25
a. Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710
was an executive function beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition; and
b. Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to
create motu proprio another panel of prosecutors in
order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
Lastly, whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been
rendered moot by the filing of the information in court, pursuant
to Crespo v. Mogul.49
I Department of Justice.
The determination by the Department of Justice of the
existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or
reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against
"any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions."50 A quasi-judicial function is "the action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature."51 Otherwise stated, an administrative agency
performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards,
determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions
have the same effect as the judgment of a court.52
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent-is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial."53As such, the prosecutor does not
perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v.
Go:54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare-his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it. is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to
conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature,
this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the
prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this
point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties,
and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts
a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file
an information against a person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the
formers order or resolutions.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice,56 a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was filed against the
Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The
assailed order directed all prosecutors to forward all cases
already filed against Celso de los Angeles of the Legacy Group
to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the
This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the
department order was a purely administrative or executive
function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of
Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law, it
is not a quasi-judicial agency:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the
Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on
the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista
v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding,
stating:
. . . [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.cralawlawlibrary
There may be some decisions of the Court that have
characterized the public prosecutor's power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this
characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a
court of law.
But the limited similarity, between the public prosecutor and a
quasi-judicial body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-
judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of
law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications
determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its
decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of
law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a
26
person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the
Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor's orders or
resolutions.57(Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban,58 we have stated that a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court cannot
be brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's resolution
dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause since this is
an "essentially executive function":59chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be
taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by
the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us,
however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing
a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP
of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary
of Justice performed an essentially executive function to
determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents
was committed, and whether there was 'probable cause to
believe that the respondents were guilty
thereof.60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against "the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions."61 The Department of Justice is not a court of law
and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions. The
Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors
is also not a ministerial function.
An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done."62 In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed."63Considering that "full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation," 64 the
functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are
not ministerial.
However, even when an administrative agency does not
perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the
Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. 65 In Auto
Prominence Corporation v.
Winterkorn:66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable
cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to
establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough;
it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but
(he) transcended the same or acted without
authority.67cralawlawlibrary
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the
resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II
Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the
Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Department Order
No. 710.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1007168 outlines the powers
granted by law to the Secretary of Justice. The provision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power
vested in the Secretary of Justice includes authority to act
directly on any matter involving national security or a probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution
staff, regional prosecution office, and the. provincial prosecutor
or the city prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise, modify or
affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final judgments
and orders of the prosecutor general, regional prosecutors,
provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.cralawlawlibrary
A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to
a prosecutor who shall then conduct a preliminary investigation
in order to determine whether there is probable cause to hold
the accused for trial in court.69 The recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor on whether to dismiss the complaint or
to file the corresponding information in court is still subject to
the approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor.70
However, a party is not precluded from appealing the
resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice. Under the 2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal,71 appeals may be taken within 15 days within
receipt of the resolution by filing a verified petition for review
before the Secretary of Justice.72
In this case, the Secretary of Justice designated a panel of
prosecutors to investigate on the Complaint filed by Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega. The First Panel, after conduct of the
preliminary investigation, resolved to dismiss the Complaint on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion
to Re-Open and a Motion for Partial Investigation, which were
both denied by the First Panel. Before Dr. Inocencio-Ortega
could file a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710 and constituted another panel of
prosecutors to reinvestigate the case. The question therefore is
whether, under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of
Justice may, even without a pending petition for review, motu
proprio order the conduct of a reinvestigation.
The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition
for review before the Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm,
or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.73 The Secretary of Justice
may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order to
resolve the petition for review. Under Section
11:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
27
SECTION 11. Reinvestigation. If the Secretary of Justice finds
it necessary to reinvestigate the case, the reinvestigation shall
be held by the investigating prosecutor, unless, for compelling
reasons, another prosecutor is designated to conduct the
same.cralawlawlibrary
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the
Secretary of Justice may motu proprioreverse or modify
resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state
prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. Section
4 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.
— If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that
he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that
the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend
the dismissal of the complaint.
....
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the
Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same
rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the
officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision
over prosecutors and it is within her- authority to affirm, nullify,
reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:74chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to
the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative
Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision
over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV. in relation to Section 5, 8, and
9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice
supervision and control over the Office of the .Chief Prosecutor
and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of
his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section
38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall
include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units[.]75ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in Rural Community Bank ofGuimba v. Hon.
Talavera:76chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they are subject
to review by the secretary of justice who may affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their actions or opinions.' Consequently the
secretary may direct them to file either a motion to dismiss the
case or an information against the accused.
In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of
supervision and control over prosecuting officers, is the
ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories
of the complainants and the respondents should be
believed.77cralawlawlibrary
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary
of Justice the authority to directly act on any "probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution
staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor
or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice
may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior
motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable
miscarriage of justice.
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open the preliminary
investigation before the First Panel in order to admit as
evidence mobile phone conversations between Edrad and
respondent and argued that these phone conversations tend to
prove that respondent was the mastermind of her husband's
murder. The First Panel, however, dismissed the Motion on the
ground that it was filed out of time. The First Panel
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Re-opening of the preliminary investigation for the purpose of
receiving additional evidence presupposes that the case has
been submitted for resolution but no resolution has been
promulgated therein by the investigating prosecutor. Since a
resolution has already been promulgated by the panel of
prosecutors in this case, the motion to re-open the preliminary
investigation is not proper and'has to be
denied.78cralawlawlibrary
In the same Resolution, the First Panel denied Dr. Inocencio-
Ortega's Motion for Partial Reconsideration on the ground that
"the evidence on record does not suffice to establish probable
cause."79 It was then that the Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710, which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the interest of service and due process, and to give both
parties all the reasonable opportunity to present their evidence
during the preliminary investigation, a new panel is hereby
created composed of the following for the purpose of
conducting a reinvestigation . . . .
....
The reinvestigation in this case is hereby ordered to address
the offer of additional evidence by the complainants, which was
denied by the former panel in its Resolution of 2 September
2011 on the ground that an earlier resolution has already been
promulgated prior to the filing of the said motion, and such
other issues which may be raised before the present
panel.80 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
In her reply-letter dated September 29, 2011 to respondent's
counsel, the Secretary of Justice further explained
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
28
The order to reinvestigate was dictated by substantial justice
and our desire to have a comprehensive investigation. We do
not want any stone unturned, or any evidence overlooked. As
stated in D.O. No. 710, we want to give "both parties all the
reasonable opportunity to present their
evidence."81cralawlawlibrary
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of
Justice issued Department Order No. 710 because she had
reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the
additional evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of
justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to
overturn the findings and recommendations of the First Panel
but to make sure that all the evidence, including the evidence
that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated.
Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary
and despotic manner,'by reason of passion or personal
hostility."82
Accordingly, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Petition for Review before
the Secretary of Justice was rendered moot with the issuance
by the Second Panel of the Resolution dated March 12, 2012
and the filing of the Information against respondent before the
trial court.
III
The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court
of the respondent's warrant of arrest has already rendered this
Petition moot.
It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is
different from the judicial determination of probable cause.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia:83chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.84 (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a
preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's determination of
probable cause is solely within his or her discretion.
Prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion to detennine
whether an information should be filed in court or whether the
complaint should be dismissed.85
A preliminary investigation is "merely inquisitorial,"86 and is
only conducted to aid the prosecutor in preparing the
information.87 It serves a two-fold purpose: first, to protect the
innocent against wrongful prosecutions; and second, to spare
the state from using its funds and resources in useless
prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz-
Paño:88chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of
crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
trials.89cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a
trial. It is not a trial on the merits. An accused's right to a
preliminary investigation is merely statutory;' it is not a right
guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, any alleged irregularity
in an investigation's conduct does not render the information
void nor impair its validity. In Lozada v.
Fernando:90chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation
is not properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely
preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to'believe the accused guilty thereof. The right
to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by
the constitution. At most, it is statutory. And rights conferred
upon accused persons to participate in preliminary
investigations concerning themselves depend upon the
provisions of law by which such rights are specifically secured,
rather than upon the phrase "due process of law." 91 (Citations
omitted)
cralawlawlibrary
People v. Narca92 further states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not
the venue for the full exercise of the rights of the parties. This
is why preliminary investigation is not considered as a part of
trial but merely preparatory thereto and that the records therein
shall not form part of the records of the case in court. Parties'
may submit affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses
though they can propound questions through the investigating
officer. In fact, a preliminary investigation may even be
conducted ex-part'e in certain cases. Moreover, in Section 1 of
Rule 112, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is only to
determine a well grounded belief if a crime was probably
committed by an accused. In any case, the invalidity or
absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of
the information nor impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective.93 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires
jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or
to determine the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the
sound discretion of the court. In Crespo v.
Mogul:94chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
29
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant
for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or
was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as
above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While
it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it
was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the
Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the
case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the
motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the
Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot
possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the
fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as
We all know is to see that justice is -done and not necessarily
to secure the conviction of the person accused before the
Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the
duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence
of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at
its own independent judgment as to whether the accused
should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk
from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the
Philippines even under such circumstances much less should
he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands
of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be
null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue
to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still
under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.95 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to
proceed with resolving respondent's Petition for Review
pending before her. It would be more prudent to refrain from
entertaining the Petition considering that the trial court already
issued a warrant of arrest against respondent.96 The issuance
of the warrant signifies that the trial court has made an
independent determination of the existence of probable cause.
In Mendoza v. People:97chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for
the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court' of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the
prosecutor's finding.98cralawlawlibrary
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of
any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the
Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of
the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has
been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case,
therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary
investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by
the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its
warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause
has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari
questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases
to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" 99provided by
law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot
Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed
to trial. Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He may
still file any appropriate action before the trial court or question
any alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during
pre-trial.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot.
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan
is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 26839.