British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in The Era of Decolonisation The Example of Malaya

Intelligence and National Security
ISSN: 0268-4527 (Print) 1743-9019 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20
British intelligence and counter‐insurgency in the

era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya
Karl Hack
To cite this article: Karl Hack (1999) British intelligence and counter‐insurgency in the era of
decolonisation: The example of Malaya, Intelligence and National Security, 14:2, 124-155, DOI:
10.1080/02684529908432542
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432542
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Download by: [University of Leicester] Date: 30 April 2016, At: 09:38

British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency
in the Era of Decolonisation:
The Example of Malaya
KARL HACK
Downloaded by [University of Leicester] at 09:38 30 April 2016
This article uses two approaches to show the Malayan Emergency

(1948-1960) and intelligence were reaching a turning point before
the 1952 appointment of a single commander; and to show the reason
for this success was a counter-insurgency technique which placed
population control at its core. First, the article outlines the
development of intelligence, in order to identify when and why it
became effective. Second, it re-examines intelligence on the Malayan
Communist Party's (MCP) so-called 'October' 1951 Directives. It
argues these confirm the MCP was virtually forced to change its
tactics by late 1951. Together, these approaches challenge existing
historiography, which makes Sir Gerald Templer's era of 1952-54,
when he was both High Commissioner and Director of Operations,
the turning point.
This article argues that a study of intelligence during the Malayan

Emergency (1948-60) can raise serious questions about the historiography
of counter-insurgency.' Explanations of British success need to be rewritten:
more emphasis placed on government use of 'population control',2 less on
winning 'hearts and minds' or concentrating power on one leader.3 The
implications of this extend beyond the Emergency, because this campaign
has been presented as a milestone in Britain's counter-insurgency 'learning
curve'.4 It was the place where a technique was developed based on:5
winning 'hearts and minds',6 military-civilian coordination, small-unit
operations, and methods for developing background into operational
intelligence.7 These and other 'lessons' have been seen as relevant to low
intensity conflict in general. Even American under-performance in Vietnam
has sometimes been ascribed to failure to manage resettlement effectively,
or to achieve the coherence in command and intelligence which Malaya
attained by appointing a supremo.8
This article uses two approaches to show the Emergency and intelligence
Intelligence and National Security, Vol.14, No.2 (Summer 1999), pp.124-155
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND COIN IN MALAYA 125
were reaching turning points before the 1952 appointment of a single

commander; and to show the reason was the success of population control.
First, it outlines the development of intelligence, in order to identify when and
why it became effective.9 Second, it re-examines intelligence on the Malayan
Communist Party's 'October 1951' Directives.10 Issued by the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) Central Committee, these signalled major changes
in Communist strategy. This article argues that these Directives confirm that
the MCP was virtually forced into a scale-down of insurgency by population
control, bringing the Emergency to a 1951 watershed. Together, these
approaches will challenge existing historiography, which makes General Sir
Gerald Templer's era of 1952-54 - when he combined the posts of High
Commissioner and Director of Operations - the turning point. First, however,

the historiography under scrutiny needs to be outlined.
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
The main success against the communists was, in fact, won before
Templer's arrival (Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free, 1954)n
History will credit Tempter with bringing the real turning point to the
challenge presented by the communist terrorists" (Harry Miller, The Story
of Malaysia, 1965)13
And, Harry Miller14 added, 'hearts and minds' tactics. For the thrust of
mainstream Emergency historiography is that there were two key elements
in turning the tide. Relative emphases vary, but the elements stressed are:
first, Templer's combination of the roles of Director of Operations and High
Commissioner15; second, the impact of 'hearts and minds' tactics. This
historiographical line can be summarized as follows.
After the June 1948 outbreak of the Emergency, Britain initially failed
to take advantage of a situation in which the MCP's support was limited by
inter and infra-communal patterns. On the inter-communal level, the
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) was 90-95 per cent from
immigrant-descended Chinese. The Chinese were in turn only 40 per cent
of Malaya's growing 1950s population of 5-6 million. The Malays,
meanwhile, formed a bulwark against Communism, seeing it as foreign, and
as rooted in a Chinese community they perceived as an economic and
political threat. In terms of intra-communal patterns, many richer Chinese
opposed Communism, and even the majority of the rural Chinese were seen
by the government not as committed Communists or nationalists, but as
'wind-blown' who would 'give verbal allegiance to whoever brings the
greatest pressure to bear upon them'.17
126 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
British tactics, however, developed into a pattern of 'counter-terror' in

1948-49.18 Large-scale security force operations, detention without trial,
burning of houses, and deportation broke up larger MRLA units. But the
problem of 500,000 mainly Chinese jungle-fringe squatters, with close
MRLA links, was worsened as the counter-terror alienated them.
Consequently the MCP reorganized its squatter-based civilian supporters
(Min Yuen) and increased in size. Britain had to expand military forces in
Malaya to 40,000 by 1950, in addition to the Malay Regiment and police.19
At this point Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed.
Arriving in April 1950, he was the first Director of Operations, in charge of
co-ordinating the armed services and police. His 'Briggs Plan' involved
systematic resettlement of squatters, about 80 per cent21 of whom were

moved into 'New Villages' by late 1951.22 From January 1951 the
'regroupment' of 600,000 estate labourers (moving houses small distances
to form defensible labour lines) commenced as well.23 Briggs also started
executive committees which included security force and administrative staff
to direct the campaign at every level: district, state and federal.24 The Briggs
Plan's coordinated 'coercion' or 'population control' approach was to be the
platform for victory.
At first the Briggs Plan brought insurgent strength to a mid-1951
highpoint. This resulted from the flight of insurgent supporters into the
jungle, and the MCP decision to contest resettlement. By late 1951,
however, incidents had passed their peak.25
Yet according to what could be called a 'stalemate' historiography, the
Briggs Plan was not sufficient. Incidents remained high. Some resettlements
lacked wire and lighting. By late 1951, according to Short and Stubbs, 'it
was the worst of times'. The murder of High Commissioner Sir Henry
Gurney, on 6 October 1951, was 'a fitting epitaph on the muddled policy',
that month seeing the highest security force casualties for a year, and the
abandonment of the Mawai resettlement.26 There followed a leadership
crisis, with the departure of the Commissioner of Police, Briggs and the
Director of Intelligence by January 1952. Malaya, according to Stubbs,
seemed 'condemned to a chronic state of fairly intense guerrilla warfare for
years to come'.27
According to this 'stalemate' historiography an extra ingredient was
required for victory. For Short this was Templer, who 'energised' the
administration. By contrast, Stubbs sees the main extra ingredient as a
'hearts and minds' approach. He characterizes this as adding the 'carrot' to
the pre-existing 'stick' of potential punishment. Additional measures in
1952 are said to have included political concessions, namely: continuing
municipal elections; extending citizenship to more Chinese; and allowing
Chinese entry into the Malayan Civil Service. Social welfare measures also
intensified. New Villages received schools and medical care. For both Short
and Stubbs, then, the Emergency turned in 1952-54 as Templer's reforms,
or hearts and minds measures, gradually became effective.
There is, however, another interpretation, which this article endorses.
This sees the Templer era not as a turning point, but as a period in which
previous gains were consolidated and efficiency maximized. Briggs'
population control approach had already brought the MCP to recognize they
could not win.28 The MCP in its October 1951 Directives had admitted that
it could not defeat resettlement (Mawai was one of only a handful of New
Villages abandoned). This doomed the MCP's military campaign to
dwindle, despite the government's 1951 leadership crisis.29
We now have two historiographical models into which intelligence

development could be fitted: the 'stalemate' and 'population control'
approaches. Was intelligence at 'stalemate' in 1951, along with the rest of
the campaign? Was it suffering sclerosis due to leadership crisis before
Templer's reforms 'energised' it? Or was it improving, and likely to become
increasingly effective as resettlement developed? To answer these
questions, we need to begin by tracing the development of intelligence.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

At the Emergency's beginning, intelligence was Britain's Achilles' heel.
The Emergency was not declared in June 1948 because of intelligence, but
because five murders on plantations on the 16th confirmed a pattern of
spiralling violence.30 Prior to this, the Malayan Security Service (MSS) had
failed to give unequivocal warnings. Yet in March-May 1948 the MCP had
inaugurated a change from its 'united front' approach of 1945-48 (labour
organization and penetrating political parties) towards revolutionary war.
Intelligence deficiencies, then, are often held accountable for failure to pre-
empt the MCP. And with the Emergency declared, the MSS continued to
seem deficient.32
From August 1948 a major reorganization saw Emergency intelligence
enter a second phase. The MSS - a small, non-executive, mainly urban-
based33 intelligence bureau34 - was dissolved. Political intelligence was
transferred to the Singapore and Federation of Malaya's separate police
forces. It became the responsibility of their respective 'Special Branches'
(SB), set up under each force's Criminal Investigation Department (CID).35
Thus political intelligence could now more easily be supplemented by, or
checked against, information coming from ordinary policing. But SB was
still undermined by chronic undermanning. It also did not adequately
develop its specialist interests, for instance failing to establish a dedicated
intelligence training institute or programme.36 Again, in this second,
1948^9 phase, SB failed to generate much intelligence which could be of

operational use to the army.
Another intelligence reorganization was needed. This coincided with
Briggs' term as Director of Operations (April 1950 to November 1951), and
with the appointment of Sir William Jenkin as intelligence adviser (May
1950). The effectiveness of these changes touches the heart of the
historiography, since there is dispute about whether or not they created the
conditions for effective intelligence by late 1951. Improvements in this third
phase of intelligence will now be examined.
First, SB composition improved dramatically after 1950. In 1948 SB had
just 12 officers and 44 inspectors - most of them expatriate or Malay - to
face several thousand insurgents and several hundred thousand MRLA

sympathisers.37 According to a 1957 report it was 'over a year' after May
1950 'before an adequate number of trained officers were engaged for the
Special Branch with an increment of Military Intelligence Officers'.38 SB
now rapidly expanded, recruiting officers with experience in India, and in
British and overseas police forces.39 By the end of 1953 it had 123 officers
and 195 inspectors. This represented 20 per cent of all police officers and
18 per cent of inspectors in a force expanded from 11,000 (1948) to 73,000
(1952).40
Ironically, then, decolonization and retreats in India, Palestine and
Greece - as well as a residue of intelligence expertise from World War II -
played a role in providing Malaya with the additional personnel it needed.41
However, this meant the vast majority of officers were still expatriates until
the late 1950s. Chinese numbers in particular remained too low, perhaps
paralleling the police as a whole where they rose from around 5 per cent of
the Force in 1948 to 10 per cent in 1953.42 Chinese remained reluctant to
join: because men of the right quality could earn more outside the police;
because the police was perceived as a Malay force; and because it was seen
as partly corrupt and hostile to Chinese.43 Yet the Chinese inspector or
detective was essential. At the lowest level, SB needed Chinese detectives
to live in the police compounds of New Villages. Shortages of Chinese-
speakers meant that even the translation of captured documents continued
to form a potential intelligence bottleneck.44
Intelligence coordination also improved in 1950-51. From 1948
intelligence had theoretically centred on SB, but police shortfalls (such as a
lack of radios in police stations) often left local army units to fend for
themselves.45 In April 1950 Briggs still saw intelligence as the Achilles'
Heel, writing that 'We have not got an organisation capable of sifting and
distributing important information quickly.' He set up a federal Intelligence
Advisory Committee (to exchange information and produce ideas) by May
1950.46 On its advice and that of Jack Morton - Director of the regional
branch of MI5 in Singapore47 - a Director of Intelligence (DOI) was

appointed in August 1950.48 This was Sir William Jenkin, who had been
intelligence adviser in Malaya since May 1950. As DOI, Jenkin now gained
executive powers over CID, which he reorganized. But his authority was
limited. He was still to be responsible to the Commissioner of Police for
CID's running, and as DOI he could coordinate only police and not armed
services intelligence.49
Despite these improvements, intelligence ended 1951 in a state of
leadership crisis. SB remained a sub-division of CID, and tensions between
Jenkin and his Commissioner of Police, Colonel Gray, led Jenkin to resign
by October 1951. While Gray was on leave, in May 1951, Jenkin had got
his line of responsibility - as executive head of CID - re-routed from Gray

to the High Commissioner. He also renamed CID and SB the 'Intelligence
Bureau' in April, concentrating them almost entirely on the Emergency, and
especially guerrilla movements. When Gray returned from leave, relations
between the two men collapsed. Jenkin found he was not backed by Briggs
or Gurney who, according to Short, now feared Jenkin 'not far off a nervous
breakdown'. By October CID was back under Gray's control, with
intelligence again specifically the responsibility of its SB section, rather
than of CID as a whole.50
These intelligence tensions were paralleled by general police malaise.
The police were poorly trained after explosive expansion and the demands
of resettlement. They lacked enough armoured cars, suffered too high a
level of corruption,51 and had poor conditions of service. They also over-
concentrated on paramilitary duties, leading to inadequate normal policing
and a poor relationship with the Chinese public.52 In Gray, the police were
led by a man whose wartime commando background had been ideal for
expansion and paramilitary roles, but whose lack of police training and
organizational ability now seemed an impediment to reform.
These problems in organization and leadership give the initial
impression that intelligence was ineffective on the eve of Templer's arrival.
They make it seem as if the 'stalemate' interpretation of the Emergency is
correct. What is certain is that Templer's arrival in early 1952 saw another
series of major changes - inaugurating a fourth phase of development -
which significantly improved effectiveness.
The Templer-era changes were facilitated by the improvement in SB's
position following the April 1952 secondment of Colonel Arthur Young
(Police Commissioner for the City of London) as Commissioner of Police.
From 1952 his Police reorganization gave SB more independence. Rather
than being under CID's Senior Assistant Commissioner (SAC), as before, it
now received its own SAC and achieved separate status as Police
Department 'E'. 53
According to Guy Madoc (Head of SB, 1952-54), SB's separation made

it easier to set its own priorities and further refine its organization.54 For
instance, it could more easily hold suspects incommunicado before sending
for trial, and siphoned off many of CID's best officers.55 In August 1952
Madoc also set up a Special Branch Training School.56 Previously Malayan-
based training had only been available in the general CID training school.
Prior to the School's establishment, MI5's regional branch, Singapore
Intelligence Far East (SIFE) attached the prospective Commandant of SB
School (Sir Claude Fenner, a Malayan police officer) to its own training
wing for six weeks. From August, the new SB school gave one-month
courses on counter-intelligence and Communism, completing around 300
before the year's end.57

Coordination also improved. In April 1952 Morton, previously head of
SIFE and now the new DOI, was given explicit authority to coordinate all
intelligence, including from the army, rather than simply police intelligence.
The DOI was also no longer to hold any executive post or control SB. The
new DOI's lack of executive power might seem a weakness, but his brief to
coordinate all intelligence was backed by instructions to report problems to
Templer. He was also given a place on the Director of Operations
Committee, which handled the operational direction of the campaign.58 Thus
SB and its SAC could now concentrate on practical work, leaving the DOI
free of the burdens of day to day management, to concentrate on giving
advice and ensuring coordination.
These were just some of the improvements made after the arrival of
Templer - an ex-Army Director of Military Intelligence - in February
1952.59 He took a personal interest in intelligence. To deal with New
Villages which withheld information after Communist attacks, he
introduced the use of confidential questionnaires. These were used in
combination with an intensification of controls - in one case including a 22-
hour curfew. The easing of these controls was made to seem dependent upon
villagers providing information. Templer also personally opened the sealed
boxes into which villagers' forms were placed, and promised that only he
would open his mail. Clutterbuck talks of these measures achieving 'limited
results', though Templer's actions - including a few exemplary collective
punishments - probably had at least a psychological impact.60
In 1952 Templer also attached additional army Military Intelligence
Officers (MIOs) to SB, to help sift out and rapidly transmit 'live', 'hot' or
'operational' intelligence.61 In addition, a few SB officers were later posted
to military headquarters.62 Thus information from surrendered enemy
personnel (SEP), agents or patrols could be efficiently and quickly
translated into military action.63 This use of MIOs as army-police links
addressed what Townshend has identified as a major problem in
insurgencies, that the army and police have each its own modus operandi
and generate and need different types of information.'4 The MIOs
'translated' police into army intelligence, just as interpreters converted
MRLA documents and SEP interrogations, from Mandarin, Hokkien or
other Chinese dialects into English.
With these improvements, the era of Templer, Young, Morton and
Madoc saw a peak in SB efficiency.65 As DOI, Morton even spent many
informal evenings with Templer at King's House in Kuala Lumpur.66 This
period thus saw the solution to a central problem of intelligence in low-
intensity warfare, that of no single authority capable of coordinating all
agencies.67 At the top Templer as Director of Operations, being also High
Commissioner and an intelligence expert, ensured coordination of all

military and civil agencies. He now had responsible to him a non-executive
DOI who had authority to coordinate all intelligence. The DOI himself was
served by a small Combined Intelligence Staff to prepare reports. At the
executive level, 'Planning' Committees ranged from a SB Federation
Intelligence committee chaired by Morton,68 down to SB committees at
police contingent levels (that is, police headquarters in each state) and
below. So an efficient system was in place - centred on SB coordination, but
with the attachment of MIOs at all levels - to ensure coordinated collection,
analysis and dissemination of intelligence, and prioritization of resources.
At first glance, this highpoint of intelligence under Templer seems to
support the 'stalemate' historiography. This is despite the fact that
resettlement was generating more information by late 1951;69 and that by
1951 the foundations for victory had been laid by the expanded number of
intelligence officers.™ It would nevertheless be possible to argue that, for
intelligence as for the Emergency as a whole, these improvements were
nevertheless not enough to break the 'stalemate'.71
However, the effectiveness of intelligence at any one time cannot be
gauged by its organizational condition alone. We need evidence of when
and how it began to produce more information, especially 'operational'
intelligence which could be used to secure the capture, surrender or death of
insurgents and supporters. This will now be done in two ways. First, by
looking at intelligence at its post-1952 peak, and asking which particular
developments had been key to achieving success. Second, by looking at
intelligence surrounding the MCP's October 1951 Directives.
First, what factors made British intelligence effective? For it was the
essential core of operations by 1952-53, and by 1957 had drawn up an
almost complete order of battle of insurgent numbers, names, locations,
organization, and plans.72
Britain was helped by a factor partly out of its control: the surprising
tendency of surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) to give information freely.73
The MCP had already suffered serious betrayals to the much-hated wartime
Japanese occupation forces. The root reasons for the scale and nature of these
betrayals included the Malayan Chinese identity as descendants of
immigrants; and many insurgents' personal and economic, rather than
ideological and nationalist, commitment to the revolution.74 Now British
tactics further encouraged surrender, by using air-dropped safe-conduct
passes, and by giving rewards for betraying colleagues. SEP rates rose from
under 5 per cent of the MRLA in 1950, to around 8 per cent in 1953.75
SEP statements eventually enabled British forces to use voice-aircraft
and leaflet drops to address personalized messages to groups in the jungle.76
They also helped match insurgent units with their supporting squatters. An
MRLA unit and its area could then be subjected to combined food control
and military measures, providing of course that resettlement had already
been carried out.77 Food controls not only blocked MRLA supplies, but gave
New Villagers an 'excuse' to deny the MRLA foodstuffs by saying it was
impossible to buy them, or to get them past checkpoints.78
However, SEP provided insufficient information. Agents - people who
were in current contact with the MRLA — were also needed, who could give
information on future rather than past MRLA plans. To secure agents food
operations were again crucial. Once intensified food denial had forced
insurgents to use up jungle stockpiles, which took up to three months, they
would be compelled to replenish food.79 Some of their suppliers would then
be uncovered as the MRLA came out of the jungle. Recruited as agents they
would provide information with which the MRLA fighters could be
ambushed.80 As the Director of Operations' Report of 1957 put it, 'Such
ambushes are only likely to be possible if the CTs ['Communist Terrorists']
are forced to contact their suppliers in or near villages or their places of
work in order to obtain food or other supplies.'81 Later on, weak spots might
deliberately be created in food operations, as 'honey-pots' into which
MRLA would re-emerge to be ambushed.82
Such operations also played a vital part in neutralizing Communist
counter-intelligence. For agents risked assassination by the MCP, whose
intelligence was strongest among squatters - before and after resettlement -
and in eliminating 'running dogs'(traitors, informants or government
sympathizers). Sometimes the MRLA would execute these in front of their
families, or mutilate their bodies.83 Execution of 'running dogs' was one
reason why about 100 Chinese a month were being murdered by early
1950.84 To counter this, SB might make mass arrests in New Villages at the
beginning of food operations. Previous arrest as one of many might give
cover to those who were to be 'turned', and arrests might cripple the
MRLA's counter-intelligence by removing its best Min Yuen members.85
The increasing level of government control in resettlements was,
therefore, the crucial factor in generating additional information. It provided

everyday opportunities for Chinese in New Villages to contact
administrators without arousing suspicion: for instance, by meeting Chinese
Assistant Resettlement Officers, or during duties as Home Guards. Potential
agents were also easier to identify and observe after resettlement. This was
especially the case after mass arrests had removed the 'hardcore' MRLA
supporters, making it rely on less loyal and skilled suppliers. These were
also easier to 'turn'. Under the controlled conditions of a New Village, they
could be given plenty of scope to incriminate themselves before
recruitment.86
In short, the Briggs Plan's population control slowly added, to the main
pre-existing intelligence source - SEP - substantial new intelligence

sources around New Villages.87 This could be through turning suppliers, or
by channelling insurgents towards predictable supply lines. Thus, though
population control was imperfect - New Villagers spent much of the day
working outside the fence, and many villages lacked perimeter lighting - it
was a crucial if incipient improvement by late 1951.88 Combined SB-police-
army operations, with resettlement as a prerequisite and food control at their
core, remained the most effective route to intelligence after 1951.
This article therefore suggests an account of intelligence which
contradicts the 'stalemate' historiography. In line with the 'population
control' interpretation, it concedes intelligence was far from peak efficiency
in 1951. But it argues intelligence was bound to further improve: because of
the post-1950 recruitment surge; and because resettlement, now around 80
per cent complete but requiring refinement, would facilitate increasingly
effective combined food-control and SB operations.89 Thus, instead of
seeing post-1952 intelligence improvements as part of a bundle of reforms
which turned around the campaign, this article argues that population
control's cumulative effect was bringing the MRLA campaign to crisis point
by late 1951.
But this analysis is still insufficient to undermine the 'stalemate' and
prove the 'population control' interpretation. For this we need further
evidence of the state of the Malayan Emergency in 1951-52. The rest of this
article will, therefore, look at intelligence relating to the MCP's October
1951 Directives. The historiography on these is crucial to evaluating this
period, and yet schizophrenic. Most sources acknowledge the Directives as
vital, but then assert the conflict remained at stalemate after them. Noel
Barber's The War of the Running Dogs is a good example. It calls the
Directives 'a document that was to change the course of the war',
representing the MCP's partial admission of defeat and of the failure of
terrorism. But in a typically schizophrenic volte-face, he also says the
subsequent MRLA killing of Gurney, on 6 October 1951, paved the way for
the appointment of a supremo, which alone could bring victory.90 Hence we

need to turn to intelligence documents on the Directives to interpret them,
and so to judge the state of the Malayan campaign in 1951-52.
First, the October Directives need to be outlined.9' They consisted of at
least seven documents, to which I have added notional numbers. 1. ''The
Party's Achievements and Mistakes' concluded the Party had made
mistakes, and that for supply, support and political reasons it must make
'masses organisation' (mainly meaning the Min Yuen) number one of its
'Seven Urgent Tasks'. This change in 'masses' work had three strands.
First, a reduction in terrorism and damage to ordinary people so as to court
the 'masses', whose cooperation was vital to MRLA supplies, and yet
whose sympathy was strained. Second, increasing emphasis on political

work, including courting the 'medium national bourgeoisie' (medium and
small capitalists); and penetration of unions and schools. Third, increased
work among Malays, Indians and orang asli (indigenous forest dwellers).
The armed struggle would continue, but downgraded from 'Urgent Task'
number one to two. There is also a call to combine a more thorough
understanding of Communist theory - especially Chinese practice - with a
more adequate understanding of Malaya's 'concrete' conditions.
Directive 2, 'Struggle for Greater Victories in the War', sought to boost
confidence by presenting the Malayan campaign as integral to the world
Communist movement, and offering the prospect of an eventual capitalist
economic crisis weakening British imperialism.
Directive 3, 'Functional Directive of the Central Politbureau on
Carrying Out "Party's Task"', contains instructions on how to carry out the
'Seven Urgent Tasks'. As such, it is an excellent guide to the likely
consequences of the Directives.
There follow directives 4-7 on specific aspects, namely: 4, Clearing and
Planting; 5 Material Supplies and Health; 6 Malay and Indian Work; and 7
Security of Min Yuen Executives, all of which had some relevance to the
supply question. This article will now assess these Directives from three
angles: the international context, British intelligence reports, and the MCP
view as revealed by an analysis of the Directives themselves.
ASSESSMENT I - THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
There is a Chinese adage which says 'Rather be the head of a chicken than
the hindquarters of a bull'. (C. C. Too, ex-psychological warfare expert,
New Straits Times, 3 December 1989)92
According to a Director of Operations' report of 1957, the October 1951

Directives were 'based on instructions published in the Cominform Journal
to the effect that Communist Parties in colonial and dependent territories

should follow the Chinese revolutionary model.'93 This stressed political
work, and constructing a broad 'united front' from peasant to middle
classes. Barber cites an SEP confirming that Communist Chinese officers
attended the meeting which issued the October Directives.94 On 25
September the London Times reported mainland Chinese had landed in
Malaya as reinforcements.95 This report was ill-founded according to
Malayan officials, but MCP leaders were being sent to China to recover
from illnesses by 1950.96 Young also claimed in 1953 that there was direct
MCP-Soviet contact, principally for exchanging propaganda materials.
Responding to Foreign Office scepticism, however, Young denied any
impression he had given that information from Moscow arrived as regularly

as six monthly, rather than irregularly.97 The MCP, then, had various
channels to the CCP and Comintern, varying from person-to-person
meetings to the Cominform journal and New China News Agency.98
In this context, Ralph Smith has suggested the October Directives
paralleled changes across SE Asia, whereby China asserted its Communist
'line'.99 A line here means not instructions, but advice on current strategy for
Communist parties. As such parties' strength, psychological if not material,
derived from being part of a world-wide communist movement, the
predominant 'line' would be influential.100 In accordance with Maoist
guerrilla strategy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) line stressed the
importance of forming a wide class base in the early stages of struggle, and
political work adequate to underpin each insurgency so as to achieve self-
reliance.
Following an expensive stalemate in the Korean War from mid-1951,
China made an increased effort to impose this line on regional Communist
parties. It made it clear it would provide direct assistance only for Vietnam.
Even there it was eager not to provoke another American intervention and
Korean-style imbroglio.
Smith suggests that Communist parties across Asia were in 1951
adjusting to this new geopolitical situation. In May 1951, the Indian
Communist Party temporarily abandoned the leftist line of revolution. By
September the Vietnam Workers Party had decided to concentrate on north
Vietnam, downgrading military struggle in the south. In December the
Communist 'Huk' leadership in the Philippines accepted that more political
work was required now the revolutionary current had abated.101
In this context, the MCP's October 1951 Directives - which upgraded
'masses' work to first of its 'Seven Urgent Priorities' and downgraded
military work to number two - looks like an acceptance of the CCP line on
united front tactics. Especially as Malaya was more like south than north
Vietnam, in that there were no insurgent base areas, and a firm imperialist
grip on populated areas. We also know that by November 1951 the MCP
was espousing the idea of a negotiated settlement.'02 The October Directives
could therefore be seen as reflecting international factors, namely: the
stalemate in Korea; the CCP's growing regional authority; the CCP's 'line'
on a broad united front; and the MCP's perception that it had indeed
committed 'left deviation', by relying on too narrow a class base and too
much on violence.103 So were the October Resolutions more a reflection of
changes in the Communist line - emanating from Moscow and Peking -
than of the MCP's assessment of the situation in Malaya?
There are problems with this international perspective. First, veteran ex-
government psychological warfare chief C. C. Too has downplayed the idea
of the MCP following CCP instructions. In a New Straits Times article of

December 1989 he explained that, for the MCP:
although the head of a chicken cannot exert much power, it controls
the brain. Although the hindquarters of a bull packs a powerful kick,
it has no will of its own ... The CPM's [Communist Party of
Malaya's, meaning MCP] top leaders value this autonomy very
highly. Apart from responding positively to such international
communist directives which happen to serve their own purpose, they
would rather remain masters of their small private dictatorship than
become the powerful puppets of a large external force.104
Second, Short has argued that the Comintern line of 1951 was actually far
from clear. Third, the Directives did not just call for increased political work
among the 'medium national bourgeoisie' and Malays, but also for a shift in
resources away from military to political work. Fourth, the Directives, as
we shall see below, explicitly suggest politico-military origins for the
decisions, namely that the military campaign had to be curtailed
temporarily, because of the effects of resettlement, of economic sabotage
undermining support, and of terrorism backfiring.
Finally, the British Foreign Office, as Smith rightly notes, did not see
MCP decisions as merely following an international line. A late 1953
memorandum on the Directives, written to inform overseas governments of
Communist tactics, saw them as a tactical adjustment, partly forced by the
Briggs Plan, yet compatible with Maoist strategy.105 The Foreign Office had
long expressed scepticism about claims of CCP help or direction in Malaya,
partly because publicizing this sort of link might complicate wider China
relations. Their stance - to view the MCP policy as independent, but as
reflecting some international Communist tactics - was rooted in
expediency. But this only partly detracts from the fact that there is little
evidence that either the Foreign or Colonial Offices saw the Directives as
primarily a response to international changes.
The evidence on this issue is therefore mixed. On the one hand, there is
no hard evidence that Communist orders or a line were the main cause of
the October Directives. On the other, it would be foolish to ignore the
combined effect of the CCP line and the international context. These both
suggested regional parties needed to prepare for a long haul. For by 1951, a
range of international factors were also working against a continued, high-
level campaign. By this date land reforms and executions in China meant
that - according to a report by the Commissioner-General's office - 'fear of
Communist China now outweighs the feelings of pride and respect ...
formerly excited amongst overseas Chinese'.106 Malaya's geography -
having no border with any country containing significant Chinese or
Communist forces - also continued to leave the insurgents with little hope
of outside assistance. Finally, the Korean War, where there was a military
stalemate and a start to negotiations by mid-1951 - saw a halt to what had
looked like a 'Red' tide sweeping southward through Asia.
If the degree of CCP and international influence on the origins of the
Directives is thus unclear, its influence on the Directives' outcomes is
murkier still. For in 1951 the MCP was already following Chinese
revolutionary models to some degree. It is therefore not enough to say that
the MCP planned to increase their conformity to Chinese prescriptions for
a broad 'united front'. This still begs additional questions. What practical
measures would be involved, both military and political, in implementing
this policy? Was the desire to increase political work intended as a
consolidation of military success, or a response to support and supply
difficulties? Was it intended to be in addition to, or at the cost of, military
effort? Indeed, references to the Chinese model in the October Directives
anyway suggested this not as an inflexible model, but as providing guides
to analyzing the 'concrete'107 conditions in Malaya and the consequent
actions required. Thus, in order to understand the Directives' origins and
consequences, and to answer the above questions, we must look at the
'concrete', domestic situation in Malaya around October 1951.
ASSESSMENT II - THE VIEW FROM KUALA LUMPUR (BRITISH

INTELLIGENCE)
From early 1952, SB started to capture Communist documents that

indicated a major change in MCP tactics. By late September 1952 it was in
possession of a complete set of the Directives. It took this long because the
MCP's courier system was slow.108 Communist leaders present at the
October 1951 conference may have implemented the Directives quickly,
and MCP State Committees were discussing them by April 1952. But some
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) District Committees probably
only discussed them from September, ironically at the same time as the
Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS).109 Thus as the CIS considered the MCP's
Directives, these were probably already driving the dramatic reduction in
incidents and casualties seen by mid-1952, and were likely to consolidate
these tendencies further. By a final twist, however, the MCP Central
Committee was already so concerned by the resulting loss of initiative that
it issued further instructions in October 1952 - which proved futile - to
increase military activity again."0
How did the Malayan government view the MCP's October 1951 change
in tactics? By late 1951 the Malayan government was arguing that a change
of tactics had been forced on the MCP, partly by the failure of their own
terrorism and partly by resettlement. The Annual Report on the Federation

of Malaya: 1951 (published in 1952) stated that:
Evidence from captured documents corroborated that measures to
control food seriously disrupted the terrorist food supply system.
These measures, coupled with the Security Forces success in finding
a large number of reserve food dumps, caused no little concern to the
Malayan Communist Party leaders and forced [my italics] the merging
of their armed units and supply organisation into small mobile gangs
- a continuation of the trend which had become apparent during the
latter part of 1950.'"
It added that the insurgents had further 'diluted their effort' into jungle
cultivation. But this was an open document, and there are obvious
propaganda implications in its suggestion that government pressure was
forcing the MCP to concentrate more on supply work. What was the
government's intelligence information telling it behind closed doors?"2 For
this we turn to an October 1952 appreciation by the CIS on the six months
of the Emergency up to September 1952.
The CIS contained a representative each of the Civil Service, Special
Branch, Army and RAF, augmented by others as required. They worked
under the DOI and produced appreciations for him. Subjects could vary
from over-views of MCP finance, down to operations in small areas. The
CIS role was to produce accurate information for the DOI, and which was
circulated to the Director of Operations Committee. Though it was not a
policy-making body, it could and did make recommendations."3
The CIS paper was requested by the Director of Operations as
background for an 'off the record' briefing of journalists, on the dramatic
improvement in the Emergency"4 - and the role in this of the Directives.
This raises questions about the document's status, but there is reason to
accept it as untainted analysis. First, the Director of Operations' brief to the
CIS stipulated the 'publicity angle' be discussed after the paper. Second, its
core was an analysis of statistics. Third, the committee's remit was to

provide the underlying reasons for the change in the Emergency in the six
months to September 1952.115 Fourth, the Committee does not seem to have
included a propaganda expert when it drew up the paper.
Finally, the Malayan government remained diffident about publicizing
the Directives, which in effect meant giving the MCP free advertising. After
correspondent Louis Heren published extensive sections of them in the 1
December 1952 London Times - having been shown them in confidence -
Templer was furious."6 Young later suggested SB had seen Heren as a
Communist fellow traveller if not Party member. Heren in turn suggested
Templer had tried to withhold the full Directives in order to magnify his
reputation, rather than allow them to show the tide had turned before his
arrival."7
Less controversially, the CIS report portrayed the MCP's October 1951
change in tactics as a reaction to the maturing of the Briggs Plan and
resettlement. These had 'robbed the MCP of the initiative', resulting in 'a
steadily increasing casualty rate' despite security force casualties falling
dramatically, so that 'The situation clearly called for a drastic revision of
tactics.' Resettlement and food control 'had disrupted the then existent
M.C.P. organisation for the supply of food and intelligence'. As a result the
MCP had been 'forced' into an 'orderly and disciplined' withdrawal, had
changed tactics to increase political and supply work and so 'reduced their
overt activity to a remarkable degree'."8
The above CIS conclusions were echoed by police assessments. A
review of 'The Aim and Strategy of the MCP', in Commissioner of Police
Young's lecture notes for the period (c. 1952-53) argued in the same vein. It
suggested resettlement had pushed the MCP to increase work among
Malays, 'whose importance from the supply point of view had been
enhanced'. The MCP switch to more selective violence was 'because the
reverse policy had alienated mass support'. The Directives were seen as
forced on a reluctant MCP, which considered them necessary if the armed
campaign was to be sustained in the long run."9 There was no fundamental
change in MCP aim, no intention to 'call off the shooting war' - the hope
was that increased political work would retrieve a worsening situation and
eventually allow a renewed offensive - but the Directives are seen as having
military origins and implications.
According to another police 'Review of the Security Situation in
Malaya' of around 1952-53, the Directives had direct consequences for
MRLA strength and priorities. They called for a transfer of effort into
planting, into political work, and into protecting the Min Yuen. This report
estimated the resulting transfer of personnel from the MRLA into these
activities would mean a net MRLA reduction of around 1,500. This
represented over 25 per cent the MCP's average 1952 strength of below
6,000.no
FIGURE 1
EMERGENCY MONTHLY STATISTICS IN 1952121
600 i
Total Incidents
Major Incidents
Estates/Mines
attacked
- r — Rubber Trees
destroyed ('000s)
100
I I l I l I I I I
Source: Combined Intelligence Starf (Malaya) Report of October 1952
In conclusion, by late 1952 Malayan-based intelligence was attributing the

very rapid Emergency improvement of that year to population control
having forced the MCP into its October Directives.122 A 'Short History of
the Emergency' by Police Operations Information Branch in October 1952
added, for instance, that 'the most noteworthy' reason for the security forces
inflicting MCP casualties at above the 1951 rate, despite falling MCP
activity, was 'the increase in information received from the public, which,
thanks to the reorganisation of the Special Branch, is being collated in a
more efficient manner'.123 Nevertheless, even if we accept these documents
as unproblematical statements of British views, the ultimate guide to the
origins and nature of the Directives must be the Directives themselves.
What, if anything, do they tell us about the MCP's intelligence assessment
of their situation in late 1951?
ASSESSMENT III - THE VIEW FROM THE JUNGLE (THE MCP)
In 1950, 1951, and even much later very little resettlement, or regrouping
of labour, could be regarded as effective ... The only hindrance to the
guerrillas was that they might have to walk further to get their supplies
and information (Short, Communist Insurrection, 1975)124
owing to the enemies concentration of and rigid control over the masses
the party is confronted with numerous difficulties ...[with mass
organisations] ...At present, certain difficulties in our procurement of
supplies are closely connected with these weaknesses' (MCP's October
1951 Directives)'25
Short has rejected both the argument that the October Directives were
inspired by international changes, and that they were caused by military
pressure. For him they reflected mainly internal ideological debate.126 As
early as 1949 Siew Lau (MCP State Secretary in Malacca) had objected to
the MCP tactics of its December 1948 Directives. He had wanted a stronger
bourgeois alliance, advocated nationalizing rubber plantations in order to
encourage peasant support, and criticized over-aggressive tactics at the
expense of the people. But in 1949 these suggestions came up against the
MCP's emphasis on peasant and worker led armed revolution, and on using
economic sabotage to undermine British commitment to Malaya and drive
it out of rural areas. Siew Lau was demoted in August 1949, and executed
in May 1950.127
In the later 'South Johore incident' Lam Swee made similar accusations
in 1949, before being disarmed by the MRLA, and surrendering to the
government in June 1950. As a pre-Emergency Secretary-General of the
MCP-controlled Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, his views
carried weight.128 After surrender, he wrote a government-supported
pamphlet, called My Accusation (Kuala Lumpur 1951). About 100,000
Chinese-language copies of this were published. MRLA units held sessions
to denounce it, but this merely increased curiosity.129 In short, the MCP
faced growing ideological criticism, and eventually responded by agreeing
in the October Directives that it should decrease terrorism, and increase
political work.
Short's version, that the Directives were mainly Malayan and political in
origin and result, sits uneasily beside the CIS and police analyses examined
above. But what do the Directives themselves, treated as a reflection of
Communist intelligence estimates of the campaign, suggest?
First, the documents confirm Stubbs' Korean War Boom thesis. This is
that the Korean War Boom was, by 1951, undermining the MCP's position,
and exacerbating the MCP's difficulty in sustaining its level of terrorism.
The prices of Malaya's rubber and tin exports soared after the outbreak of
the Korean War (June 1950) resulting in stockpiling of these commodities,
causing higher workers' wages, and providing sufficient government
revenue to fund resettlement. The original MCP plan of 1948^9 had been
based on a Maoist three-phase war, first using insurgency to drive the
government out of remote areas and set up bases, second linking up these
bases and surrounding the towns, and third moving to positional war. In fact
populated areas were never liberated for more than a few hours, and the
campaign never got past phase one.
An additional strand, however, was the use of economic sabotage to
undermine Malaya's economic and dollar-earning value, and so British
determination.130 Economic measures were therefore central to MCP

activity, from widespread subscription collecting to murdering planters and
slashing rubber trees. The level of economic sabotage was being intensified
as late as the first half of 1951.
The October 1951 Directives clearly rested on an assessment that these
economic activities were undermining mass support, or, as the documents
repeatedly stressed, damaging the 'concrete' interests of the masses. That
this analysis was based on reports from the MRLA and Min Yuen seems
clear. Subscription-collecting from poor, rural Chinese - especially as it was
often carried out too much by threat of force and with inadequate
preparatory political education - was thought to have been undermining
both outside support and some party members' morale. According to
Harper, 'Disgust at taking from the poor was a recurrent theme in the
briefings of surrendered terrorists."31 In addition, workers may have been
frustrated at MCP attacks on trees, plantations and transport interfering with
opportunities to increase earnings during the Korean War Boom.132
Since high-profile party members had been eliminated, or in Lam
Swee's case had defected, for pointing out such problems in 1949-50, the
significance of the change in economic tactics was not the MCP's discovery
of the problem. It was the MCP's belated acceptance that such 'left
deviation' (here meaning excessive reliance on violence) was a serious
problem.
The resulting practical recommendations were to limit attacks to targets
with direct military value, and to take more account of the masses'
'concrete' or 'extant' interests. Document 3, the Functional Directive,
implied incidents would fall sharply, as most attacks on rubber trees and
public transport were to cease, and attacks on New Villages to decrease.133
It also accepted that the MRLA had relied too much on violence. It must
increase education, use less coercion against workers, and try to avoid
counter-productive acts such as killing pregnant women, 'disintegrating'
victims' bodies, or killing bystanders around 'running dogs' by random fire
or grenade throwing. Additionally, the MCP's counter-intelligence killing

of running dogs was backfiring, or, as the documents put it, 'The advocacy
of "preferring killing by mistake to setting free anyone by mistake is
wrong".'134 In short, the MCP recognized economic sabotage and terrorism
had been undermining support.
A second and in many ways crucial set of conclusions which
underpinned the Directives as a whole were those on resettlement. We have
seen that Short's 'stalemate' thesis argues resettlement was ineffective in
late 1951 (for instance with shortages of barbed wire). This is despite the
fact that resettlement was already 80 per cent complete, Gurney was about
to embark on increased welfare measures, and even labour regrouping had
begun in 1951. Short is certainly right in highlighting the serious

deficiencies in resettlement in 1951.135 Facilities were still rudimentary.
Many villages in effect had the entire MCP Min Yuen structure resettled
with them. The stalemate thesis is nevertheless vulnerable on several
grounds. For instance, Coates stresses deficiencies in barbed wire, but his
own work shows that half the initial orders for 2,156 tons of barbed wire had
arrived by the time Briggs left, and that resettlement was increasing
intelligence and damaging MCP supply lines. The question is, was the glass
half-empty and static, or half-full and filling up?136
Ultimately, to answer the above question, we need to look at the
Communist assessment of the impact of resettlement. On this the October
1951 Directives are clear. They explicitly admitted attacks on New Villages
had been counter-productive. They accepted resettlement could not be
reversed, and recognized that it would increasingly threaten their supplies.137
Explicitly related to this supply problem were the documents' orders to
increase stockpiling, deep jungle cultivation and contacts with the orang
asli, and to improve work with Malays. In addition, the Min Yuen were to be
strengthened by adding 'Armed Work Forces' to them. These additional
Armed Work Forces were to be created by redeploying MRLA fighters to
protect district Min Yuen organizations, in the face of increasing government
pressure.'38 It was also made clear that these adjustments would divert
strength from the MRLA. Fighters were even advised that planting was
'glorious' work.139 Hence the October 1952 CIS report cited above
estimating that the net effect would be to divert 1,500 fighters out of the
mainstream MRLA into planting, 'Armed Work Units', and political work.
What of the 'political' aspects of the October Directives? Often the
Directives' orders to make 'masses' work number one of the 'Seven Urgent
Tasks' are not seen as of politico-military significance, or as related to
resettlement. Instead, they are seen mainly as an injunction to increase
political penetration, court the 'medium national bourgeoisie', and so
increase political work in general. They do indeed suggest such a policy of
intensified political work. The MCP was admitting it had previously failed
to effectively carry out Mao's ideas on 'new democracy', that is to build a
wide united front to support its guerrilla war.
But this was not what was meant by masses organization, the subject of
the new first 'Urgent Task'. Increasing political support and courting the
medium national bourgeoisie, for instance, was only named Ihe fifth of the
'Seven Urgent Tasks', not the first.140 The Directives thus did call for an
increase in political work per se, but not as the first priority. The new first
'Urgent Task' was not to be an increase in political activity, but specifically
to improve masses work, that, is, the recruitment and use of suppliers and
helpers. The Directives explicitly related this to the need to fortify the
MRLA's logistical organisation in the face of resettlement. As the

Directives put it when explaining the new 'Urgent Task' number one ('to
expand and consolidate the mass organizations'), 'certain difficulties in our
procurement of supplies are closely connected with these weaknesses of the
Party mass organizations'.141 Masses organization was thus one of several
strands in the documents aimed at the problem posed by the combination of
resettlement and the lack of food in the jungle areas.142
Hence, though the 'Urgent Task' 'to put food and material supplies in a
sound basis' was named only as number seven, it lay behind much of this
concern with the masses organization. It was also supplemented by an entire
document of its own, the directive 'On Clearing and Planting' .143
The Directives thus contain several strands, of which increasing political
work and subversion was an important one in its own right, reflecting the
need to prepare for a long haul, if not the influence of the CCP line.
However, looked at as a reflection of MCP intelligence, the Directives seem
to indicate that the main MRLA concerns were with the effects of the
Korean War Boom, the unsustainability of the existing level of terrorism
and, above all, the increasing problems caused by resettlement.
In terms of the Directives' consequences, several stand out. They implied
an increase in subversion and political activity, and decreases in incidents and
MRLA personnel. The MRLA would only be able to sustain a large campaign
in the future if its counter-resettlement plans - involving better masses
organization, jungle cultivation and stockpiling - ultimately worked. Also,
much depended on the MRLA continuing its military effectiveness, since
otherwise its intimidatory power and so subscriptions would most likely fall,
further eroding the ability to buy supplies. By 1953 this may have been
happening, with the CIS predicting the MCP would find it increasingly
difficult to find the $100 a month per fighter it needed each month.1*14
In addition, one would expect the MCP's own intelligence effectiveness to
continue to deteriorate. This would happen because of the improvements in
government intelligence as New Villages provided increasing control, and
because of the Directives' injunctions to avoid killing the innocent at all costs.
In the context of increasing government control of 'New Villages', the
injunction to avoid killing the innocent would lead to increasing difficulty in
eliminating government agents. None of this meant that the campaign would
not be difficult. The MCP had every intention of intensifying ambushes on
security forces if it could. The new MRLA emphasis on intensifying use of
the orang asli also opened up a new area in which the government needed to
improve intelligence, the deep jungle. Here the government subsequently
built jungle forts, from which orang asli could be given general support, and
could be enlisted in the auxiliary police to provide an intelligence network.145
Overall, however, the MCP's October Directives reveal a party which
believed much of its previous strategy and tactics were in severe trouble.
But was this assessment correct? The question may prove unanswerable,
but Pye's interviews of SEP seem to confirm the above picture.146 In
addition, the MCP could derive considerable intelligence from the Min
Yuen, contacts during subscription collecting, and relatives outside the
jungle, meaning that it should have been capable of making judgements
about its own cadres and members, and potential supporters. What can be
said with certainty is that at least two interpretations are possible.
First, the MCP may have miscalculated, and by issuing unnecessary
orders reduced incidents and eased the pace in 1952, giving Templer a
window of opportunity in which to reorganize and make a return to previous
levels of insurgency impossible. However, even then the MCP itself seems
to have made a high-level recurrence virtually impossible, regardless of
anything Templer might have done. For it began what came to be viewed as
its version of the CCP's 'Long March', its 'Little "Long March'".147 In 1952
Chin Peng (from Pahang) and the 12th Regiment (from Perak) were the first
to move to the MCP's equivalent to Yen'an, the Betong region in the Malay-
Thai border area.148
Second, the MCP may have been right in calculating that resettlement,
and their excessive reliance on terrorism and sabotage, made continuation
of existing tactics counter-productive. Their phased movement towards the
Thai border may have been necessary for long-term survival. This article
suggests the latter interpretation is right. If this is correct, the irony is that
the MCP saw that a combination of their own weaknesses and mistakes, and
British counter-insurgency, had achieved a turning point despite the
government's material and leadership deficiencies of 1951.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that population control was the crucial additional
ingredient used to improve intelligence flows, as well as the key to winning
the Emergency, rather than improving intelligence being the key in itself.149
It has demonstrated that by 1951 population control had already persuaded
the MCP to change its tactics. It has also shown that the intelligence
structure built upon this foundation was then perfected by the improvements
made under Templer, Morton and Madoc in 1952-54.
Success in Malaya must thus be ascribed to the application of a
'population control' model, though it should be noted that its success was
only possible because of propitious local and international conditions.
Locally, for instance, Malaya's communal patterns ensured the neutrality or
support of the Malays and of much of the commercially orientated Chinese.
Internationally, developments in China and Korea, as well as Malaya's
isolation from any potential external Communist support, exercised positive

effects. . • •
'Hearts and minds' tactics, then, and intelligence too, are best seen as
important but subordinate parts of a 'population control' approach. British
traditions of maintaining legality and 'minimum force' helped to ensure that
this did not spiral into self-defeating oppression.150 Political concessions
from 1951 - leading to independence by 1957 - ensured Malays were not
tempted by the MCP's anti-colonialist rhetoric. Social welfare in New
Villages must also have had some impact on the rural Chinese, though most
sources demonstrating knowledge of Chinese attitudes in 1950-53 suggest
villagers remained at best resigned, at worst seething with anger.151
'Population control' was thus the central thread. However carefully
executed, this approach was still one of massive control and intimidation.
The ratio of Security Forces (including Home Guard) to insurgents ranged
from 5:1 to 12:1.'" It also involved demographic upheaval. Around 10 per
cent of the population were resettled, 20 per cent if labour regrouping is
included. This was accompanied by curfews, food control and, during
operations, large-scale arrests, with the right to detain without trial. In
addition, over 12,000 were deported, most between 1948 and 1951.
If this picture is accurate, it suggests Malaya does not fit a model of
British counter-insurgency improving primarily by developing 'hearts and
minds' tactics. Instead, it implies twofold conditions for success, namely: a
local and international terrain that makes it possible to isolate insurgents;
and a skilled application of population control. In a previous work I argued
that this indicates a need for a re-examination of Malayan historiography, to
ask how far local, communal factors - rather than British tactics - were
major determinants of British success and failure.1" This article has pursued
the second strand of this two-part model, by arguing that - in so far as
British tactics had to be added to favourable local conditions - population
control was the key.
This raises one final question. How far, given favourable local
conditions, should population control be seen as central to other low

intensity conflicts - notably the Boer War and Kenya - where Britain did
not merely contain insurgents, but ultimately won the campaign?154
NOTES
I would like to record this article's debt to Leon Comber, Guy Madoc, and various archivists and
librarians at Rhodes House, Oxford for their suggestions, ideas and help. Also to C.C. Chin, for
confirming ideas on the MCP's 'Little "Long March" '. All mistakes and final interpretations are
of course my own.
1. Documents are from Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, UK, unless otherwise indicated.
The document Air20/10377, 'Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to Aug.
1957', by the Director of Operations (Lt-Gen Bowen), Malaya, 12 Sept. 1957, is used as a
reference. It is hereafter referred to as DOO Report, 1957. Documents labelled ISEAS are
from the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore; and those labelled Rho, from
Rhodes House, Oxford.
2. Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-1983
(Singapore: Graham Brash, 1984 ed.) pp.183-7, one of the best accounts of Emergency
intelligence, also seems to see the Briggs Plan's population control central as pressurizing
the MCP into an Oct. 1951 change of tactics.
3. The 1957 report concluded a 'supremo' was necessary for maximum efficiency, see DOO
Review, 1957, pp.28-9, para. 105 (c); and T. Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency,
1919-1960 (London: Macmillan 1990), pp.8-10, 13-14, 180-91.
4. Ibid. (note 3) pp.8-10, 180-91.
5. A more complete list of the technique's components would also include: minimum force,
ultimate civilian control rather than martial law, appointing a supremo at least when in
extremis, etc.
6. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency
(Oxford: OUP 1989).
7. 'Operational', 'hot' or 'contact' intelligence means information which can be used to
directly lead to a government-initiated contact with the enemy. See Frank Kitson, Low-
Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London: Faber 1971)
Chs.6-7, and p. 198; and Charles Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-Insurgency in
then Twentieth Century (London: Faber 1986) pp.28-30.
8. See Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (London: Cassell 1966) esp. pp.65-78, 100,
for an argument (by a member of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam) that the British
model could have worked if better applied in Vietnam; and for coordination, see Michael
H. Schoelwer, 'The Failure of the US Intelligence Community in Low-Intensity Conflict',
in Loren Thompson (ed.), Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern
World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989, pp. 145-64.
9. For the lack of work on intelligence, see Richard Popplewell, "Lacking Intelligence":
Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter-Insurgency, 1900-1960',
Intelligence and National Security 10/2 (April 1995) pp.336-52, p.350. For Malayan
intelligence overviews: Clutterbuck (note 2) Chs.9-14; for agents, Clutterbuck's (note 8);
and Kitson (note 7) Chs.6-7. For further details of a SB/CID operation, see Peter Clague,
Iron Spearhead: The True Story of a Communist Killer Squad in Singapore (Singapore:
Heinemann Educational (Asia) 1980). For police, A.J. Stockwell, 'Policing during the
Malayan Emergency, 1948-60', in D. Anderson and D. Killingray, Policing and
Decolonisation (Manchester UP 1992) pp.105-26.
10. 'October 1951' because there were several documents, with various dates in Sept. and Oct.
1951.
11. For hydraulic imagery on the Emergency see Anthony Short, Communist Insurrection in
Malaya (London: F. Muller 1975), which sees 1950-51 as stagnation - 'slack water',
followed by a changing tide in 1952.
12. Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free (London: Gollancz 1954) p.6. Purcell accused
Templer of installing a police state. He was wrong on many counts, no doubt influenced by
a row with Templer in 1952. But he was an ex-Malayan Civil Service expert on Malayan
Chinese, and a Cambridge academic. See also Short (note 11) pp.318, 379-87.
13. Harry Miller, The Story of Malaysia (London: Faber 1965) p.181.
14. An experienced Straits Times journalist (based in Kuala Lumpur in the 1950s).
15. As DOO he 'directed' all security services in the campaign; being High Commissioner
gave him authority over civilian appointments, and over the Commissioner of Police.
16. Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1954 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1955) p.9.
For MPAJA reprisals on Malay collaborators in 1945, see A.B. Shamsul, From British to
Bumiputera Rule (Singapore: ISEAS 1988) pp.59-60.
17. For the 'wind-blown' Chinese, see CO1022/148, R.P. Bingham, Secretary for Chinese
Affairs, Federation of Malaya, paper on Chinese for Secretary of Defence, Malaya. This is
attached as Appendix B to a memo for the Malaya Borneo Committee, MBDC (51) 74, 16
June 1951.
18. The term is used by Short (note 11) pp.160-9. See also Stubbs (note 6) pp.67-93.
19. See Short (note 11) pp.160-9; and Stubbs (note 6) Ch.3.
20. Briggs was still under the High Commissioner. The Commissioner of Police and service
commanders retained executive control of their services, and the former could appeal to the
High Commissioner.
21. Rho: Young Papers, 'Short history of the MCP', by Operations Information Branch, Police
HQ, 21 Oct. 1952, for 429 New Villages and 385,000 resettled by end 1951, just 80,000
remaining.
22. Short (note 11) pp.235ff for Briggs's 'Federation Plan for the Elimination of the
Communist Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya' of May 1950.
23. From 1952-53 the Security Forces also focused on the orang asli (aborigines) - which the
MCP were increasing links with as they withdrew into deep jungle. In 1953-54 jungle forts
(10 by 1954) and patrols brought 3,500 of 6,000 communist-influenced aborigines under
government control. See Annual Report (note 16) pp.253-5, 410-11. This also meant using
RAF intelligence, for instance photo-reconnaissance to identify jungle cultivation.
24. Briggs also called for a country-wide framework of locally based army units, which
facilitated the army's post-1950 move from large operations, towards longer, intensive area
patrolling: Tim Jones, 'The British Army and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition,
1944-1952', Small Wars and Insurgencies 7/3 (Winter 1996) pp.265-308, esp. p.293. By
1952 more lengthy area patrols of up to 15 men made up the bulk of patrolling, and
accounted for 35 per cent of all contacts.
25. John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1992) pp.89-91 suggests six out of over 500 were
abandoned by 1960.
26. Short (note 11) pp.275-74 for 'slack water', 'worst of times' and tide analogies. Mawai
was abandoned on 19 Oct. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency (note 25) pp.99-111, 126, 186
for the 'fitting epitaph', p.110 for 'worst of times' (and Short supra p.305); and Stubbs
(note 6) pp.133-40.
27. Ibid. p.126.
28. See Karl Hack, 'Screwing Down the People: The Malayan Emergency, Decolonisation and
Ethnicity', in Hans Antlöv and Stein T0nnesson, Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian
Nationalism (London: Curzon 1995) pp.83-109; and Lee Ting Hui, The Open United
Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore: 1954-1966 (Singapore: South Seas Society
1996) pp.14, 34 fn 43, for a version based on Special Branch sources.
29. One problem is that this argument is often seen as anti-Templer (as it was in Purcell's
Malaya: Communist or Free), or pro-Communist (which it cannot be, since it assumes the
Communists were forced to act because of failure). The reason for the latter is possibly a
Communist 'peace' line, that having pressurized Britain into accelerating decolonization,
the MCP post-1951 wanted to rejoin the constitutional process. See Gen. Dato Kitti
Ratanachaya, Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia and Thailand (Bangkok: Duangkaew
1996) pp.53, 71, 74-5, 256-60.
30. Three British planters and two Chinese assistants were killed on 16 June in Perak,
catapulting government into declaring a nation-wide Emergency by the 18th.
31. The issue of how well intelligence performed in the Emergency outbreak is highly
controversial, and will require another article. Some idea of the issues can be found in A.J.
Stockwell, '"A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya"?',
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21/3 (Sept. 1993) pp.66-89; Coates,
Suppressing Insurgency (note 25) pp.7, 25-6; John Cloake, Templer, Tiger of Malaya
(London: Harrap 1985) p.197; D. Mackay, The Domino That Stood: The Malayan
Emergency: 1948-60 (London: Brassey's 1997) pp.31, 159, fn10; Stubbs (note 6) pp.66-9;
and Short (note 11) pp.39-61, 79-90. Note the MSS did warn in 1947-8 that squatters
should be moved, and that the MCP might turn violent. The FO warned in early 1948 that
international Communist policy seemed to be shifting. But there was no hard evidence of
plans, and MSS warnings were overshadowed by equal concentration on militant Malay
nationalists.
32. Short (note 11) pp.65-94; CO 1030/16; Rho: MSS Indian Ocean s251, Dal1ey Papers. Short
supra pp.139-40. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency (note 25) p.45, fn 49.
33. Ibid. p.41, note 8. The MSS had bases in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur (Selangor, national
capital), Penang, Ipoh (Perak) and Seremban (Negri Sembilan).
34. Coates (note 25) p.24, suggests MSS's separate status and lack of rural presence prevented
it drawing conclusions from rural police detection of rising violence, but post-war Malaya's
record of crime, gangsterism, KMT and secret societies, made attributing rising crime to
communism problematical. Stockwell (note 31); Susan Carruthers, Winning Hearts and
Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-insurgency 1944-1960
(London: Leicester UP 1995) Ch.2.
35. See The Federation of Malaya Annual Report: 1947 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1948)
p.97, and 1948, p. 124. The MSS and then SB were parts of a range of intelligence agencies,
including that of the army's Headquarters Malaya Command, which issued weekly
intelligence appreciations. The creation of a pan-Malayan MSS probably reflected
Britain's post-1945 vision, which was of working towards a wider 'Dominion of South East
Asia', to include Malaya and Singapore if not British Borneo. A Singapore-based MSS
paralleled the appointment of Malcolm MacDonald as first Governor-General of British
territories in SEA (1946-48), then as Commissioner-General from 1948.
36. See Guy Madoc interviews in Rho: Granada End of Empire, Malaya Volumes 2 and 4.
37. See note 41 below.
38. DOO Report, 1957, p.15, para. 53.
39. Short (note 11) p.236. DOO Report, 1957, p.15, para. 53. For 1951, see Annual Report on
the Federation of Malaya: 1951, pp.209-10. Briggs was echoing the March 1950 report of
the Police Mission to Malaya (three British senior police) which found intelligence lacking
and Chinese officers too few, see A. Stockwell, Malaya (British Documents on the End of
Empire, London: HMSO 1995) p.176, note 8. For contract officers see Rho: Young Papers,
Mss S486/3/1 (2), 'Review of Developments in 1952', especially Part II. For intelligence
the link with India seems important (the first two DOIs had India links), but the process
may have been mostly one of displacement, overseas recruits replacing Malayan uniformed
police, who could then go to SB.
40. See the following footnote. The figures include special constables, who were part-timers.
41. This was certainly true with the police, which received vital if partially resented Palestinian
reinforcements. Unfortunately, detailed SB data is not available, and one should stress that
the majority of SBs highest officers seem to have been long-serving Malayan policemen.
See also note 39, and Tim Jones (note 24) pp.265-308.
42. The majority of inspectors and rank and file were of course Malay. Contrast the Annual
Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1953 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1954) pp.xiii,
232-3, with that of 1948 (ibid. 1949) p.122. Comparing these, in 1948 under 5 per cent (12
of 253) of Police Officers were in SB, in a then under-strength force. Relevant SB figures
(from above sources) are:
1948 Inspectors and Police Lieutenants: 48 Officers: 12

1952 (increasing in year from and to) 114 -> 195 Officers: constant (under 100)
1953 (given as'others') 195-> 297 Officers: 93-> 126
Coates (note 25) p.43, footnote 28, suggests the Chinese were 426 of 10,000 Police in
1948, 2,500 of 30,000 in 1952. But in 1952, 532 of 625 officers were still European (over
80 per cent!).
43. Stockwell (note 9) p. 117 gives reasons: lack of tradition, Malay nature of force,
recollection of 1942 and fear of China and MRLA. The Tan Cheng Lok papers (ISEAS,
e.g. file 1/30, 'Memorandum on Manpower — A Chinese View', (especially 30h and 30j)
show wages as a problem, but also the need to preserve only sons for filial duties
(presumably economic, ancestor worship, and procreation). See also Short (note 11) p.144.
See also, the Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1956 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt
Printer 1957) p.300. Comparing 1947 with 1956, when the regular police were about
10,000 and 22,000 respectively, Chinese rose from <5 per cent (2 officers, 24 inspectors,
and 402 Constables and subordinate Officers) in 1947 to c10 per cent (49 of 569 gazetted
officers and 368 of 1,198 Inspectors) in 1956.
44. See DOO Report, p.28, para. 86 for inspectors; and Clutterbuck (note 2) p. 179.
45. Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1954 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1955)
p.410. From 1952 central control of intelligence operations was by the Federal SB Planning
Committee (with a counterpart in each contingent), meeting fortnightly under SB's newly
appointed SAC 'E'. The DOI attended most meetings, Heads of Contingent SBs were
present in turn.
46. Called the JIAC (Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee) initially, by 1957 it was known
simply as the Federal Intelligence Committee. DOO Report, 1957, p.15, para. 53-4. It
contained representatives of the Police, Armed Services, Department of Information,
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, the Labour Department and Security Intelligence Far East.
See DOO Report, p.15, 'It provides for a free exchange of information and, while it does
not make policy, it may make recommendations.' For Directive No 1 and the Briggs Plan,
see Air20/2777.
47. Morton seems to have wielded influence, probably not because as regional MI5 head
(called Singapore Intelligence Far East or 'SIFE') he had any formal authority, but because
of his Indian and MI5 experience, and because he was accessible to high officials and
commanders in Singapore.
48. Popplewell (note 9) notes the neglect of Indian influence. Jenkin was a former
Superintendant, Indian Political Services (where he was Morton's superior) and Deputy
Director, Intelligence Bureau. He was brought out of retirement in May 1950 to reorganize
Malayan CID, becoming DOI Aug. 1950. He resigned 1 Sept. 1951, see Stockwell, Malaya
(note 39) pp.174 (fn 7), 306.
49. Coates (note 25) p.125; and Rho: Granada End of Empire series, MSS Brit. Emp 527/9,
Malaya Volumes 2 and 4, interviews. Madoc (correspondence, received 2 April 1998)
maintains 'intelligence did not develop under Jenkin', and his 'morning prayers' (9am
meetings of all staff at HQ) were resented as a waste of time. See also Stockwell, Malaya
(note 39) Vol. II, p.344.
50. Jenkin first tendered resignation in Sept. 1951, and left on 14 Jan. 1952. Morton took over
1 April 1952. Short (note 11) pp.275-76.
51. See Coates (note 25) p.31; and Short (note 11) pp.276-91, 356.
52. Stockwell, 'Policing during the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60: Communism,
Communalism and Decolonisation' in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.)
Policing and Decolonisation, Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester
UP 1992) pp.110-12. See also Commonwealth Records Archives (Canberra, Autralalia):
A5954/1: 2292/4, 'Malaya 1949-52', for 'The Police of Malaya', 26 May 1952, submitted
by office of the Australian Commissioner in Singapore.
53. Rho: Young Papers, MSS s486/3/l (2), 'Review of Developments in 1952'. pp.17 ff. Young
increased the departments, each with a SAC, to five in addition to Field Force under his
Deputy Commissioner: (a) Administration, (b) Operations, (c) Supplies, (d) CID and (e)
SB. Young viewed joint CID-SB SAC Nichol as inadequate, having little relevant
experience or drive, MSS s486/3/l (1) p.25.

54. For internal organisation, see Coates (note 25) pp. 124-5; and Rho: Granada End of Empire
series, Mss Brit. Emp 527/9, Malaya Volumes 2 and 4, interviews with Guy Madoc. Up to
1950 SB was divided into racial desks (for instance 'Chinese', 'Malay'). In 1950-51 Jenkin
introduced functional 'desks', the Communist one being sub-divided into four: external;
banditry; underground; and other communism. In 1952 organization was made still more
functional, with separate SB 'desks' on the MCP mode of operations, military organization,
subversion among Malays and among Chinese.
55. See Rho: Granada End of Empire, Malaya Volume 2, pp. 106-10, and C. Allen (ed.) Tales
from the South China Seas (London: Futura 1984) p.300, where Madoc recalls the gist of
Templer's approach as 'Right, Special Branch has got to be separated completely from CID
and that should be done in 48t hours.'
56. CID training school was established in June 1951, though aimed at criminal intelligence in
general, not at specialist intelligence training. Nevertheless, at this time (April 1951 to Oct.
1951) all CID was concentrated on Emergency intelligence. In the CID school's first six
months, 287 officers attended.
57. SIFE also lent a training officer to brief senior SB officers for two weeks at a time before
the school was established. See Rho: Young Papers, Mss s486/3/l (2), 'Review of
Developments in 1952', esp. pp. 18 ff; and Annual Report 1954, p.278. By late 1954 it had
instructed 4,004, including 232 from government departments, the Army and countries
including Thailand and Burma. See also Annual Report, 1952, p.1; Cloake (note 31) p.232;
Short (note 11) p.360, fn 19; and Rho: Granada interviews, Malaya Vol.2, pp.106-10.
Claude Fenner (pre-war Malay police, SAC of SB, 1954-58) headed the new SB school
1952-54.
58. Lyttelton suggested a DOI on roughly these lines before Templer's appointment, see
Stockwell (note 39) Vol II, p.325, for Lytttelton's Cabinet Memo on Malaya of 21 Dec.
1951. But perhaps it was Templer who made the DOI responsible to himself (as DOO), not
to the new post of Deputy DOO, who was responsible for operational direction under
Templer. See also DOO Report 1957, pp.14-15. The DOI was to coordinate all intelligence
activity, including 'the collation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence and advises
the Director of Operations'. See also Cloake (note 31) p.228.
59. See the Annual Report of 1952, p.1; and Cloake (note 31) pp.227-8.
60. Clutterbuck (note 2) p.179. The classic case for this was Tanjong Malim's week-long 22
hour curfew and ration reduction of April 1952, see Stubbs (note 6) pp.164-5. There were
a few other exemplary group punishments, such as the collective detention of Peramatang
Tinggi's 62 villagers in Aug. 1952.
61. 'Live' meaning intelligence gained without the Communists knowing; as opposed to
'blown' or 'dead'. 'Operational' meaning of use in launching operations, rather than as
background information.
62. SB units or officers, to which MIOs were now increasingly attached, were present at
detention centres, police hq. and posts, and attached to District and State War Executive
Committees. Annual Report 1953, p.232. Mockaitis (note 3) p.118 notes intelligence
committees paralleling the Executive Committee structure under Briggs and the early use
of MIOs.
63. See Coates (note 25) p.125, saying MIOs were attached to SWECs with, he says,
substantial results; and Short (note 11) pp.359-65.
64. Townshend (note 7) pp.26-30.
65. Young now tried to increase SB capacity not just to gather information, but to penetrate
MCP organizations, and to target those leaders the MCP could least afford to lose. See Rho:
Young Papers, Mss s486/3/l (2), 'Review of Developments in 1952', esp. p.18, and Part II;
and 'Progress of the Emergency', c1953, by Operations Information Branch, Federal Police
HQ. For peak efficiency, see also Coates (note 25) p.124. Cloake (note 31) p.198.
66. Cloake (note 31) pp.228-9, and 234-5. Rho: Granada End of Empire, Malaya Vol. 2,
pp.117-18.
67. See Schoelwer (note 8) pp. 145-64.
68. Cloake (note 31) pp.229.
69. See Harper, 'The Colonial Inheritance' (Unpub. Cambridge D.Phil thesis 1991) pp.192-3.
Harper uses CO537/7260 on unionist-turned insurgent-turned government propagandist
Lam Swee. On touring Johore in late 1951 Lam Swee found 'great fear' spreading in New
Villages that those who surrendered would betray previous helpers, leading to 'A
confesional kind of politics'. Chinese Home Guards also proved a convenient channel of
information. There were over 50,000 of the latter in 1954.
70. See Short (note 11) p. 155, for inadequate exchange of information between uniformed
officers and CID, inadequate checking and collating of police information, and the army
sometimes acting on little more than riding 'to the sound of guns'.
71. Oliver Lyttelton, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: Bodley Head 1962) pp.366-7,
as quoted in Coates (note 25) p.111. According to Lyttelton's memoirs 'Intelligence was
scanty and unco-ordinated between the Military and civil authorities.' He was Secretary of
State for the Colonies under the new 1951 Conservative government, and visited Malaya
in Nov. 1951.
72. See for instance, DOO Report 1957, p.27, para. 96, and map (Appendix D) of insurgent
locations.
73. Short (note 11) p.424, gives SEP as: 1949 (251), 1950 (147), 1951 (201), 1952 (257), 1953
(373). For the wartime MCP's MPAJA, Spencer Chapman was 'surprised' at the rate of
betrayals, see F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London: Chatto 1950)
pp.155-6, 182, 280. Chapman cites the importance of personal relations, and a quick
Chinese tendency to 'pique'. See also Lucien Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya
(Princeton UP 1956), a sociological analysis of SEP interviews, also noting the importance
of personal relations — rather than ideology or nationalism. DOO Report, 1957, p.16, para
55 (d), also found SEP 'surprisingly willing to lead SF patrols back to the camps ... and to
give other detailed information ...'.
74. For wartime betrayal see Chapman (note 73) pp.155-6, 182, 280.
75. For MNLA numbers I have accepted the figures in DOO Report, 1957, p.4, namely: 1951
(7,292); 1952 (5,765); 1953 (4,373); 1954 (3,402); 1955 (2,798); 1956 (2,231); 1957
(1,830). By 1957 just 200 of 1,830 insurgents were fighters, the rest 'in the command
organisation'.
76. See for instance Cloake (note 31) p.239. Templer recorded a message in Jan. 1954.
77. Food control measures included reducing rations, licensing food movements, reducing
stocks in shops and puncturing tins. Also communal cooking of rice (dry rice lasted a long
time), searches for MRLA food dumps, spraying jungle crops, and patrols to increase
insurgent movement.
78. Rho: Young Papers, 'Progress of the Emergency', c1953, Operations Info. Branch, Police HQ.
79. Annual Report (note 45) p.4, stated that, 'Food supplies remained the greatest problem
facing the terrorists.'
80. Clutterbuck (note 2) Chs.11-12 (pp.195-219). See also DOO Report 1957, p.15, para. 55
(a), on 'Agents', defined as 'Communist supporters who remain in touch with the CTs'.
81. DOO Report 1957, p.15, para. 55 (a).
82. See Guy Madoc quoted in Allen (note 55) pp.299-301. Madoc was a pre-war Malayan
policeman (1930ff), Deputy Dir. MSS, trained in Bangkok and London cl947-50,
Assistant Superintendent SB 1950, Dir. SB 1952, DOI 1954-58.
83. Yoji Akashi, 'Lai Teck, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Malaya, 1939-1947',
Journal of the South Seas Society 49 (1994) pp.87-95 esp. p.77, for MCP willingness to
kill members feared tainted after arrest in 1943-44. British propaganda made use of the
fear of elimination, see King's College London, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives,
Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell Papers 7/1-7, eg., Leaflet 1534 (22 Jan. 1953). For family
witnesses, see Shamsul (note 16) pp.59-60. For graphic details of a traitor elimination, see
Clague (note 9) pp.30-37, passim.
84. Coates (note 25) p.40.
85. See Clutterbuck (note 9) pp.93-94.
86. Once recruited, agents' identity could protected by using intermediaries or 'cut-outs' to
collect information, such as shop-keepers or taxi-drivers. Clutterbuck (note 2) pp.93-4,
179.
87. For it increasing information and facilitating food control, Prem8/1406, 4 June 1951, MAL
C(51) 1, 'Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner
and DOO.
88. By 1954, most insurgent eliminations were based on SB information. See Coates (note 25)
p.125. In 1957 the DOO still saw food operations as central to combating the few remaining
'hostile' MRLA area by 'screwing down the people in the strongest and sternest manner', see
WO216/901, DOO to Templer, 15 March 1956; and DOO Report 1957, p.15, para.55 (c).
Until late in the Emergency, penetration was only significantly achieved for this outer ring of
MRLA sympathisers. See Coates (note 25) p.125 for Templer on this in April 1952.
89. For resettlement progress by late 1951, see ISEAS: Tan Cheng Lok Papers folio 24,
'Resettlement', Appendix C, dated 10 Nov. 1951, attached with memoranda for the next
Federal War Council meeting; and Rho: Young Papers (note 21).
90. Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Arrow ed. 1992;
orig. pub. Collins 1972) p.161 for the first quotation, pp.157-9 for the second.
91. The following summary is based on the English-language text of the Oct. 1951 Directives,
as found in CO1022/187, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 31 Dec. 1952.
Henceforth referred to as the 'Oct. Resolutions', numbers 1-6 are not SB translations, but
'English versions ... recovered from a camp in RAUB towards the end of September,
1952'. Analysis based on Chinese-language versions - not so far available to this author -
could conceivably lead to slightly different conclusions.
92. ISEAS: DOC M104 c. 1, C.C. Too in the New Straits Times, 3 Dec. 1989, p.lOff. Too was
writing just after the MCP agreed to lay down its arms in Dec. 1989.
93. DOO Report, 1957, p.12, para. 44.
94. Barber (note 90) p.159, and p.250. The meeting was held in Sept.-Oct. 1951.
95. CO1022/145, Officer Administering Government Malaya to CO, 5 Jan. 1952, said the
Times report of reinforcements was based on Singapore correspondent (Heren) access to
RAF Intelligence summaries, showing a recent post-air attack SEP claimed to have come
from China. Heren had a history of suggesting the MRLA was getting aid, see Carruthers
(note 34) pp.107ff.
96. See Aloysius Chin, The Communist Party of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Vinpress 1994)
pp.62-3 on illnesses such as tuberculosis; and for Malayan official views on the reports see,
CO1022/145, (18) Officer Administering Government to Secretary of State, 5 Jan. 1952.
According to this they were based on RAF intelligence of a single Chinese SEP, who
claimed he had come from China, and ibid, (17) reports of a landing by c20 Indonesians
near Malacca who insurgents were awaiting.
97. Rho: Young Papers, 'Notes for the Commissioner of Police lecture, p.3; and Rho; Mss
S486/3/3, pp. 114ff, correspondence between Young and the CO in Aug. 1953 over a
lecture Young gave at the Imperial Defence College. See also CO1022/145, minute of 31
July 1952 and papers at (7), (10) and (14) on the controversy over Young's Imperial
Defence College lecture.
98. Coates (note 25) p.74, fn 60.
99. Ralph B. Smith, 'China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionary Perspective, 1951',
Journal of South East Asia 19/1 (March 1988) pp.97-110.
100. See 'Oct. Resolutions, Struggle for Greater Victories in the War'.
101. See Smith (note 99).
102. CO1022/46, SSB 4019/19, Report from the Director of SB (Singapore) to the
Commissioner of Police (Singapore), 11 Sept. 1953.
103. Smith (note 99).
104. ISEAS: DOC M104 c. 1., (note 92) p.10ff.
105. CO1022/187, 'FZ1016/9/G', 'Captured Communist Party Documents', 27 Nov. 1953.
106. CO1022/148, (13), MBDC (51)74, 31 Oct. 1951, quoting a Commissioner-General Office
report of May 1951 by Mr Kitson (now Acting Commissioner-General for Foreign
Affairs).
107. The call for theoretical thinking and general strategy to be related back to the 'concrete'
and 'extant' conditions in Malaya is a leitmotif in the Directives. See October Resolutions,
passim.
108. For MCP communications, see Leon Comber, '"The weather ... has been horrible":
Malayan Communist Communications during "The Emergency" (1948-60)', Asian Studies
Review 19/2 (1995).
109. Clutterbuck (note 2) p. 180.
110. Pye (note 73) pp.105-06.
111. Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1951, p.4.
112. The government emphasized truth in propaganda, but was not immune to over-optimism —
seeing turning points from 1948-51 - and deception. In 1950 several men, possibly former
SOE, with deception experience were sent to Malaya. See Jones (note 24) pp.292-3.
113. See DOO Report 1957, p.15, para. 54 (c); Short (note 11) p.360; and Cloake (note 31)
p.229, who says Dick Noone, from Australia's AIS, was secretary of the CIS and of the
Federation Intelligence Committee (chaired by the DOI), and that the CIS worked closely
with the Combined Emergency Planning Staff, 'who used their briefs as a basis for
planning operations'.
114. In 1951 incidents averaged 110 a week, in the second, third and fourth quarters of 1952
they fell to weekly averages of 90, 56 and 31 respectively, see Defe 11/47, 'Malaya Report',
March 1952 (c).
115. Rho: Young Papers, MSS British Empire s486/2/3, CIS(52)(7)(Final), 'Combined
Intelligence Staff Review of the Emergency as at 30th September 1952, 10 October 1952,
especially p.28. This will subsequently be called simply 'CIS Review'. For role of the CIS,
see DOO Report 1957, p. 15, para. 54 (c) and Short (note 11) p.360.
116. See Carruthers (note 34) Ch.2; Cloake (note 31) pp.292-3; and CIS Review, p.28; and for
the quotation, Rho: Young Papers, MSS s486/3/3, p.132, for Young on Heren.
117. Carruthers (note 34) p.87.
118. CIS Review, especially paras. 6 -10.
119. Rho: Young Papers, Mss British Empire s486/2/l, (F), 'Review of the Security Situation in
Malaya: Aim and Strategy of the MCP', c1952-53, esp. paras. 5 and 6.
120. Rho: Young Papers (note 119). Item T , Review of the Security Situation in Malaya', esp.
para. 5.
121. CIS Review, adapted from appendices A-G.
122. Too (note 92) pp.l5ff, also sees the Directives as forced for similar reasons.
123. Rho: Young Paper, Mss486/2/l (Miscellaneous, pp.53ff) 'Short History of the Emergency',
operations Information Branch, Federal police HQ, 21 Oct. 1952.
124. Short (note 11) pp.292-3, 305-6, and 381 respectively for quotations. Short also says
(p.381), 'Barbed wire fences were lacking [and] ... perimeter lighting was lacking ...'
125. Oct. Resolutions, p.72, introducing the 'Urgent Tasks of the Party' and explaining the
interconnection between the government's 'starvation policy' (also p.143ff) and masses
organization.
126. Short (note 11) pp.309-21.
127. Clutterbuck (note 2) pp. 172-4.
128. Ibid. pp.172-5. This union was banned in 1948.
129. ISEAS: DOC M104 c. 1, C.C. Too (note 92) p.10ff.
130. For the Korean War Boom, see Stubbs (note 6) pp.107-14; and Richard Stubbs, Counter-
Insurgency and the Economic Factor (Singapore: ISEAS 1974).
131. Harper (note 69) pp.190-91 and fn 23; and Oct. Resolutions, pp.121-2, 126-7.
132. Stubbs (note 6) pp.107-13, for the boom. Shamsul (note 16) pp.63-4, for Malay villagers
paying off debt, even buying refrigerators for which there was no electricity.
133. Oct. Resolutions, pp.106ff, esp. pp.117-18 for stopping attacks on villages and trees.
134. Oct. Resolutions, p.78, and 116-20 (in the Functional Directives) on grenades etc,
pp.131-2 (pregnant women), 139-40 (corpses, grenades again etc).
135. See Coates (note 25) p.99; and...Rho: Young Papers (note 21).
136. Coates (note 25) p.27 for up to 50 per cent of 'bandit' casualties coming from public
information after resettlement, p.42 for captured documents revealing supply problems.
137. October Resolutions, p.72.
138. CO1022/I87, p.165, 'Precis of a cyclostyled booklet, dated 25th Sept. 1951, containing a
Directive of the Central Politbureau: entitled "The Central Politbureau's Decision on the
Security of Min Yuen Executives". This precis of an MCP document notes the policies
'will reduce the strength of MRLA forces in the Districts'. It insists something, at least
under-strength platoons, be kept in districts.
139. Oct. Resolutions, pp.144-5, from the directive on 'clearing and planting'.
140. Ibid., pp.67-8, 82.
141. Ibid., p.72, section on 'The Party's Achievements and Mistakes', sub-section 4, 'The
Urgent Tasks of the Party', task 1.
142. Oct. Resolutions, pp.65-6, for geography. Failure to solve this geo-supply problem before
concentrating forces was seen as one of the main deviations of the MCP's Dec. 1948
Directives.
143. Ibid. pp.85, 141-50.
144. Ibid. pp.137 ff for MCP subscriptions.
145. DOO Report 1957, p.18, para. 67, on the 50-60,000 orang asli, and government tactics of
establishing 11 jungle forts, medical assistance etc. See especially point (iii) for
intelligence. For orang asli in general, see John Leary, Violence and the Dream People:
The Orang Asli in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (Athens: Ohio UP 1995).
146. Pye (note 73) Part III, esp. pp.324-42.
147. The fact that most authors fail to see what is — from an Asian perspective — an obvious
parallel is indicative of the 'colonial' or 'European' mindsets which most (predominantly
European or ex-settler colony born and based) Emergency writers share. The CCP's heroic
6,000 mile Long March of 1934-35 saved it from destruction, and established in Yen'an a
viable northern base. See for instance, Dick Wilson, The Long March of 1935: The Epic of
Chinese Communism's Survival (London: Hamish Hamilton 1971).
148. The Betong salient and border area became the MCP's main base until the 1989 agreement
to end hostilities. See Comber (note 108) p.49 note 6; but the MCP idea of the 'Little "Long
March"' was confirmed by CC Chin - based at the Australian National University and
working on MCP documents. The 10th and 8th Regiment moved in 1954. Of course, the
MCP hoped to make a come-back. On the British side, a Frontier Intelligence Bureau was
set up by Aug. 1953.
149. DOO Report 1957, p.16, 'Success breeds information and information breeds more
success'.
150. See Popplewell (note 9) p.341.
151. Han Suyin, And the Rain My Drink (London: Cape 1956) is normally cited, but it is a novel
based on knowledge as a doctor and from her then Special Branch husband, Leonard
Comber. Her autobiographical My House Has Two Doors (Granada, 1982 ed.) pp.77-9, 81,
232-3 is more satisfactory. See also Loh Kok Wah, Beyond the Tin Mines (Oxford: OUP
1988) Chs.3-4; and Observer, 4 Jan. 1953 for a Johore Resettlement Officer thinking 75
per cent of New Villagers were 'choking with animosity against us', as quoted in
Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds (note 34) p.121.
152. DOO Report, p.7, para. 21.
153. See Hack in Antlöv and T0nnesson (note 28) pp.83-109; and 'British Strategy and South
East Asia, 1941-57' (Unpub. D.Phil thesis, Oxford 1995) pp. 143-88, 200-04.
154. Consider the centrality of communalism in Cyprus in D. Anderson, 'Policing and
Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954-60', Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History 21/3 (Sept. 1993) pp. 189-94. It could also be argued that stalemate
in Northern Ireland was a function of balanced Loyalist and Republican abilities to wreak
violence on each other. E.g. see David Sharrock, 'Inside the Mind of Ulster's King Rat',
Guardian Weekly, 11 Jan. 1998, p.11, for paramilitary thinking.

British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in The Era of Decolonisation The Example of Malaya

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British intelligence and counter‐insurgency in the

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This article uses two approaches to show the Malayan Emergency

This article argues that a study of intelligence during the Malayan

were reaching turning points before the 1952 appointment of a single

Commissioner and Director of Operations - the turning point. First, however,

British tactics, however, developed into a pattern of 'counter-terror' in

systematic resettlement of squatters, about 80 per cent21 of whom were

We now have two historiographical models into which intelligence

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

1948^9 phase, SB failed to generate much intelligence which could be of

face several thousand insurgents and several hundred thousand MRLA

branch of MI5 in Singapore47 - a Director of Intelligence (DOI) was

his line of responsibility - as executive head of CID - re-routed from Gray

According to Guy Madoc (Head of SB, 1952-54), SB's separation made

before the year's end.57

Commissioner and an intelligence expert, ensured coordination of all

therefore, the crucial factor in generating additional information. It provided

pre-existing intelligence source - SEP - substantial new intelligence

the appointment of a supremo, which alone could bring victory.90 Hence we

whose sympathy was strained. Second, increasing emphasis on political

ASSESSMENT I - THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

According to a Director of Operations' report of 1957, the October 1951

to the effect that Communist Parties in colonial and dependent territories

impression he had given that information from Moscow arrived as regularly

of the MCP following CCP instructions. In a New Straits Times article of

ASSESSMENT II - THE VIEW FROM KUALA LUMPUR (BRITISH

From early 1952, SB started to capture Communist documents that

terrorism and partly by resettlement. The Annual Report on the Federation

core was an analysis of statistics. Third, the committee's remit was to

Source: Combined Intelligence Starf (Malaya) Report of October 1952

In conclusion, by late 1952 Malayan-based intelligence was attributing the

determination.130 Economic measures were therefore central to MCP

or grenade throwing. Additionally, the MCP's counter-intelligence killing

begun in 1951. Short is certainly right in highlighting the serious

MRLA's logistical organisation in the face of resettlement. As the

isolation from any potential external Communist support, exercised positive

conditions, should population control be seen as central to other low

1948 Inspectors and Police Lieutenants: 48 Officers: 12

experience or drive, MSS s486/3/l (1) p.25.

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