EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of
the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could
not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel
for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the
MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation
on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of
Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that
his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for
mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his
oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took
the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is
a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated
when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him
before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized
Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the
same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate
Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of
law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court
for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel
for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon
your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the
decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and
10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not
impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of
which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases
of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems
that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
"boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required
to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report
for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held
up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions
as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove
only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he
abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for
him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for
"Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years,
but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to
cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the
refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination
from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the
National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That
complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same
and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly
treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert
the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987
to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left
their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor
arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the
labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however,
such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their
"boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees
to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a
"practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be
refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which
deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied
by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the
practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of
Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools,
materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to
defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private
respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper
accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00.
With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition.
We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he
had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of
illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is
incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and
as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were
made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed
the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver
as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It
will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if
they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty
is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222
of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may
appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their
organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories.
Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a
condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative
is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing
said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private
respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution
up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109149. December 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-
AN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the judgment should
be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a
lawyer shall be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape[1] of a girl less than nine (9) years old,
committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented as its
witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the
victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied committing the rape
and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision[2] finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the
amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and another amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of
failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he has agreed
in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full
duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal.[3] In his brief,[4] appellant made the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN TO BE
DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue of proper
representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all
intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of
the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr.,
who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the
Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.[5] Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to
counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellants
counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has been given an
opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said person presented the evidence for the defense with the
ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner.
However, the right of the accused to be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper than
the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of
basic rights of the individual may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a professional learned
in the law as well as ethically committed to defend the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issue in the
case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals.[6] In Delgado, petitioner and two others were convicted by the trial court
of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents. One accused did not
appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
petitioners conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that her
lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion, hence, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that -
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed
against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any
defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the
court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.[7]
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was represented by three
successive counsels from the Public Attorneys Office, the Court has ordered the remand of a rape case when it
found that accused was given mere perfunctory representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not
properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No.
120420, April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for
failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for having fallen much too short of their
responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused
was not even duly represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous his
representation might have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly.[8] Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence.[9] The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in
the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
State.[10] Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights;
it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.[11]
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987
Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment.In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to
the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law
in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in
the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public
trust.[12]Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[13] a Bar candidate
who has already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of
attorneys, and who was caught in the unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section
3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. Ompong in connection with
this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a
prompt and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within
ninety (90) days from notice of this order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant,
be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &
VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, &
QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition
for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer,
attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29
March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas.
Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning
complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963,
Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of
their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered"
equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground
that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through
Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his
motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was considered
submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be
represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations,
even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a
party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section
24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not
one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with
PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are
sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted
to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the
court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an attorney with
authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law will
not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law;9 and that if were to be
allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice
to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not
weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone,
that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas
did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently
filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners
was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an
action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the
emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the
union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal
to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of
Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances
as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding
corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose.
But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case.
Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of
law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as
attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.
concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN,
ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T.
WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS
CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT
CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS
AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS,
INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of
the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3
million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the
Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite
the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank
issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs
assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of
First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated
by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel
Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita,
Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery,
Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development
Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services
and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc.,
Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to
herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo,
Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to
nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties comments,
this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The
motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central
Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. [12] It further ruled that
respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited
period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986.
The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the
Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the
other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-
bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the
PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut
our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and
other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were
not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust
of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth
and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were
at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a
duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had
broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly
from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural
rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater.
The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in
the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the
formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency
and reasonable fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This
concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth
century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other
lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of
mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of
colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started
to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality.
Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet,
as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their
discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their
practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by
lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the
oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again,
picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the
Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full
measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association
adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their
concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government
service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and
update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA
amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-
interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government
lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in
such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in
1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to
study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed
substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational and the
proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise
observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented
by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. [34] In the case of
Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35]became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the
canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983,
the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement
format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format
was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were
the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the
black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to
conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of
the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite
nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to
reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21,
1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the
word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-
interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later
as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The
American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General,
actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said
banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of
the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C.
Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor
Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a
conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not
be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate
the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate
the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown
that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in
filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes
reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on
the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case
at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising
the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept
of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265,
section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising
or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall
be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts,
and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate
the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General,
file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the
Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the
banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell,
assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such
institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and
assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section
and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the
court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining
order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action
of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the
clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an
amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be
dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank
cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary
course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-
insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary
demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342
is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls
within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent
Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved
in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing
the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in
Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the
liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of
stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged
banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene
means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first interpretation,
intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.[44]We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought
to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a
former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad
sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former
government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended
only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983
Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a
private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a
public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has
to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note
that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal
role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to
assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of
the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from
similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in
the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will
achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already
difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government
will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of
entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from
engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with
which they become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit
can only make it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused
to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing
party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so
prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. [48] Even
the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification
motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is
difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated
after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which
were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very
least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners
motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which
will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the
client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has
confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done
by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for
it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work
vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands
by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom. [53] He
adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on
the ability to quit inhibits official independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General,
the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to
refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer
may extend to all members of his law firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as
well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best [56] which can
lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former
government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of
impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [59]and some
courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest
exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and
the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in
the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no
inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the
contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and
selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. [61] The
example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or
she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary
words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration
of government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x
x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his
or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best
government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.[65] But
again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive influence of
former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He
explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an employees influence may actually be
the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x
x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the
merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or
talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the
officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga
opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are
disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet
adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made
after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they
make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that.
Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of
the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the
Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San
Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession
of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands
for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.[5] When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the
appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed
an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the
fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to
the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against
Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or
partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and
Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded
to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently,
however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio.
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief,
position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA
6713:[8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on
the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As
worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in
which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he
was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF

PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging
in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to
all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of
which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a
special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an
exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by
public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the
city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal
vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the
members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their
time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours.
In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at
least once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior
permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members
and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in
any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the
presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not
mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a
month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should
have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW

MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of
the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he
failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the
law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy
and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
(emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers
oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts
of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.