Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 41

Assignment No.

12

1. LAMBERTO V. TORRIJOS vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No.


L-40336, October 24, 1975]

Facts: Wakat Diamnuan and his wife were the registered owners of one-fourth share of a
parcel of land situated in Sitio Cacuban, Barrio Gumatdang, Pitogon, Benguet, which was
sold in favor of petitioner Torrijos. Torrijos was refused registration because he did not have
the copies thereof held by the other co-owners. The entire property, together with the share of
Wakat Diamnuan and his wife, was sold to Victor de Guia. Hence, Torrijos prosecuted Wakat
Diamnuan for estafa. The trial judge convicted the accused sentencing him to an
imprisonment of 3 months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P7,493.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment, to indemnify petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in the sum of P7,493.00 and to pay
the costs. Upon appeal, the accused died, for which reason his counsel moved to dismiss the
appeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the
death of a convict extinguishes, not only the personal penalties, but also the "pecuniary
penalties" as long as the death occurs before final judgment. Complainant Torrijos opposed
the said motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that the term "pecuniary penalty" should not
include civil liability in favor of the offended party, which was decreed by the trial court in this
case, as the civil action therefor was not reserved, much less filed separately from the
criminal action.

Issue: Whether the civil liability is extinguised?

Ruling: It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of
the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto
extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment.
The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither
solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. The
estafa or swindle existed only after the subsequent sale by the accused of the same interest
in favor of Victor de Guia. There was no crime of estafa until the accused re-sold the same
property to another individual about 5 years after the first sale to Torrijos. If the accused did
not comply with the sale he executed in favor of Torrijos in 1964, after his receipt of the
purchase price from Torrijos, but before the second sale to Victor de Guia in 1969, there is no
question that the accused would be merely civilly liable either through an action by Torrijos for
specific performance with damages or for rescission of contract also with damages. If
rescission were pursued by the first vendee, the vendor would be liable to refund the
purchase price as well as be responsible in damages. Consequently, in the case at bar, the
civil liability of the accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the
extinguishment of civil obligations.

2. TERESITA Q. TUCAY vs. JUDGE ROGER A. DOMAGAS, Branch 46, Regional Trial
Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan [A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286 March 2, 1995]
Facts: Ludovico Ellamil, Bernardo Ellamil and Melchor Ellamil are accused of murder in
Criminal Case No. U-6762. The case was formerly assigned to the respondent judge. Teresita
Tucay, the wife of the victim, is the complainant in that case. A petition for bail was filed on
behalf of the accused Bernardo Ellamil however it was denied on the ground that it did not
bear the conformity of the provincial prosecutor. A second petition for bail was filed by the
accused. This time, the petition contained the notation "No objection" of Provincial Prosecutor
Jose Antonio Guillermo. Without holding a hearing to determine whether the evidence of the
prosecution was strong, respondent judge granted the bail. Teresita Q. Tucay filed this
complaint against Judge Roger A. Domagas of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 46),
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, charging him with ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and grave
abuse of discretion.The present complaint was filed, protesting the grant of bail without
hearing and without notice to trial fiscal, Atty. Tita Villarin, of the Provincial Prosecutor's
recommendation for approval of the bond.

Issue: Whether Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion>

Ruling: He should have called a hearing for the additional reason of taking into account
the guidelines in Rule 114, sec. 6 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in
fixing the amount of the bail. As it is, the respondent judge simply fixed the amount of bail
at P50,000.00 and ordered the release of the accused. It turned out that the property given as
security for the bond had a market value of only P42,940. 00. Although it appears that an
additional bond was later posted, this was done only after the complainant had objected to the
bond.

3. CELESTINA B. CORPUZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Urdaneta,


Pangasinan vs JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan [A.M. No. MTJ-96-1106, June 17, 2003]

Facts: Celestina B. Corpuz, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, filed an Affidavit Complaint against the respondent Orlando Ana F. Siapno,
Presiding Judge of the same Court, charging him with Violation of Administrative Circular
Nos. 3-92 and 17-94, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Falsification, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Public Officer, Abuse of Authority, Delay in the Administration of Justice and
Ignorance of the Law. Respondent vehemently denied the charges against him. The OCA
recommended that all the charges against respondent Judge be dismissed, except that for
Ignorance of the Law for failure to award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 12527 and
13482.

Issue: Whether respondent Judge is correct that prosecution’s failure to present evidence
regarding the civil aspect of the case will warrant omission to award civil damages?

Ruling: In justifying his omission to award civil damages, respondent Judge alleges that the
prosecution did not present any evidence regarding the civil aspect of the case. This was
error. Concomitant with his rendition of a guilty verdict, respondent should likewise
make a finding on the accused’s civil liability because it is basic that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable. Furthermore, Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides
that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages may have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.

Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when a complaint or information is filed
even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, it is
understood that the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver
or reservation is made, or unless in the meantime, the offended party instituted a separate
civil action. In such case, the civil liability arising from a crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

The rule expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect
to the civil liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to
ventilate it in a separate action. Indeed, even in case of an acquittal, unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall
make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. Therefore, it
was error for respondent not to have entered judgment with respect to the civil liability.

It is also fundamental that the imposition of the fine imposed in the criminal case is not
for the purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party but for vindicating the State for the
offense committed by the wrongdoer.

The methods for indemnifying the private complainant is provided for under the provisions on
civil liability which, under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, includes:
restitution; reparation for the damage caused; and indemnification for consequential
damages. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, it behooves respondent to require the
production of evidence to make a finding on civil liability. This is especially so where
the accused has pleaded guilty and has therefore admitted his liability.

When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to
be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.

4. EVANGELINE L. DINAPOL vs. JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, Regional Trial


Court, Branch 45, Bais City [A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, August 5, 1993]

Facts: Complainant charges the respondent Judge with grave abuse of discretion, ignorance
of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench in that notwithstanding the fact
that the spouses Crozoro Palermo and Jovy Palermo, accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G
for murder, had not yet been arrested pursuant to the warrant of arrest he had issued on 3
March 1992 and were "freely roaming in the municipality of Guihulngan," said respondent
Judge entertained a petition for bail and set the same for hearing despite the vigorous
opposition of the complaining witness. Respondent Judge maintained that he had in fact
denied in his 24 April 1992 Order the accused's first motion for bail precisely because his
court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused. In the same vein, he
asserted that he cannot be charged with ignorance of law because he graduated (sic) Cum
Laude in both Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws at Silliman University." He has likewise "
continued to work for such excellence in his practice of law, and has applied with more vigor
the quest for the same upon his assumption to the bench." He allegedthat there is no clear
and direct proof to support the allegation that both accused were in his chambers for, as a
matter of fact, the Prosecutor himself, in his Reply of 9 July 1992, admits that the said
allegation "is not of our personal knowledge.”

Issue: Whether jurisdiction over the person of the accused is essential in the petition for bail?

Ruling: It is axiomatic that a court cannot entertain an accused's motion or petition for bail
unless he is in the custody of the law. Bail is defined Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court as "the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions" specified in Section 2 thereof. A person is considered to be in
the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
Elsewise stated, the purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until
his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38
[1975], citing Green vs. Petit, Sheriff, 54 N.E. 2d 281). Accordingly, it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 [1961], citing Manigbas vs.
Luna, 52 O.G. 1405; see also Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369
[1973]). The right to bail is guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides in part that:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion


perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law
5. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1427 February 27, 2003

MODESTO MAGSUCANG, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE ROLANDO V. BALGOS, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Complainant Modesto Magsucang charged Judge Rolando Balgos, Presiding Judge,
MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, of bias and partiality, grave abuse of discretion, requiring
excessive bail, and violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Pepito Lim, owner of the Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft
against complainant's daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly for misappropriating cash
amounting to P11,200, with grave abuse of confidence.

Respondent judge, before whom the preliminary investigation was conducted, issued a war-
rant of arrest. Bail was set at P30,000. On May 11, 2000, Rosalie was arrested. Complainant
posted bail for his daughter from the proceeds of the sale of his banca and with money bor-
rowed from friends.

Meanwhile, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Mr. Lim against Rosalie. After prelimi-
nary investigations were conducted in these cases, corresponding warrants of arrest were is-
sued by respondent judge. In Criminal Case No. 1635, bail was set at P24,000. Neither Mod-
esto nor Rosalie had money to pay for bail so Rosalie remained incarcerated.

Complainant faults respondent judge for allegedly committing irregularities in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation when respondent judge administered the oath to Pepito Lim and
for having sent Rosalie to prison without the benefit of a hearing. According to complainant,
when respondent judge issued several subpoenas on June 2, 2000, requiring Rosalie to file
her counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos. 1608 to 1613, inclusive, he likewise committed
grave abuse of discretion since he failed to consider that Rosalie was, at the time, locked in
jail and incapable of defending herself in court. Lastly, complainant states that respondent
judge violated applicable rules and regulation when he required excessive bail.

Respondent further declared that, excluding Criminal Cases Nos. 1634 and 1635, which were
dismissed, he found probable cause to hold Rosalie Magsucang liable for eight (8) counts of
qualified theft. The resolution and the records of the case have been transmitted to the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor in Bacolod City for review.

The incumbent Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero Velasco, found respondent judge in-
nocent of the charges contained in the letter-complaint, except the charge related to exces-
sive bail. Justice Velasco recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administra-
tive matter and that the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge required excessive bail in this case

HELD: YES. We agree with the OCA. Respondent judge required excessive bail in this case

Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in crimi-
nal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the ac-
cused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense
charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f)
weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the
trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

The amount of bail should be 'reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall not be required. In
implementing this mandate, regard should be taken Of the prisoner's pecuniary circumstanc-
es. That which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man
charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the pres-
ence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this pur-
pose.

In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that Rosalie Magsucang is illiterate, the
daughter of a poor fisherman. She had very limited financial ability to post bail. In Criminal
Case No. 1635, one of the nine cases that came after Criminal Case No. 1593, Rosalie Mag-
sucang was accused of stealing only P4,300. Indeed, each of the ten (10) cases carried sepa-
rate warrants of arrest, each with its own recommended amount of bail. In fixing the unrea-
sonably excessive amount of bail at P24,000 in the last cited case, it is clear that the re-
spondent judge disregarded the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. In the same breath
that Rosalie was told she could be bailed out, she was practically denied the means to do so.
The excessive amount required could only mean that her provisional liberty would be beyond
her reach. This is ironic, like categorically telling her that she could not avail of the right to
bail. It appears respondent did not pay heed to the admonition that the court should not permit
any act or omission which undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary.

6. G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUE-


ZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA ES-
GUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose
L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos
were taken. An information, dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the perpetrators
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed thereat as Criminal Case
No. G.R. No. 42078.

Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein respondent
spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the
jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.

The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the court's order of 21
March 1986.

The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the
commission of robbery, in this case committed in Quezon City, the information therefor filed in
said City accords with the provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
and the refusal of the Court a quo to assume and exercise jurisdiction thereover constitutes a
serious error of law and a grave abuse of discretion. He theorizes that fencing is a "continuing
offense." He explains that the Anti-Fencing Law has been enacted for the purpose of impos-
ing a heavier penalty on persons who profit from the effects of the crime of robbery or theft,
no longer merely as accessories under Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
but as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the robbery or theft itself.

ISSUE: WON the crime of "fencing" is a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an in-
formation therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily
where the property, unlawfully taken is found to have later been acquired.

HELD: The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on
fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or
to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither
is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be
consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by
means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconse-
quential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presuppos-
es a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at
the place where the prior marriage has been contracted.

We are not unaware of a number of instances when the Court would allow a change of venue
in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the
case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice." Here,
however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling circumstances, nor are we pre-
pared to state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in its questioned orders.

7. G.R. No. 138364 October 15, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.

ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: Reseilleta Villanueva is the eldest of the daughters in a brood of nine (9) children.
Her parents, the spouses Rogelio Villanueva, appellant herein, and Estelita Villanueva, could
hardly afford to send their children to school due to extreme poverty. As a fisherman, appel-
lant’s meager income was insufficient to even provide for the basic necessities of life.

Appellant Rogelio Villanueva sent his daughters to do laundry in a nearby water pump.
Reseilleta, then fifteen (15) years old, although prepared to help her younger sisters in their
assigned task, was told to stay behind by appellant saying that her sisters could already take
care of themselves.

As soon as her sisters left, Reseilleta was dragged by her father from the kitchen to the living
room. Gripped in fear, she asked him what he was going to do to her. Without answering, ap-
pellant told her simply to remove her panty. When she refused, he poked a knife at her and
forced her to lie down. Reseilleta resisted and tried to free herself from her father’s hold, but
he grabbed an iron bar and struck her at the back twice, then punched her in the abdomen.
As a result of the blows, she fainted.

Fearing that it would not be the last of her father’s sexual assault, he having molested her
several times in the past, she fled to her maternal uncle’s house in Jade Valley, Buhangin,
Davao City.

Appellant vented his satiric desires on another daughter Mary Joy, younger sister of
Reseilleta. After he attempted to sexually abuse her twice, Mary Joy ran away from home and
went to her Aunt Adela Benzillo where she sought refuge. Mary Joy recounted her ordeal to
Aunt Adela who immediately accompanied her to her mother Estelita in Davao City.
Accompanied by her mother Estelita and sister Mary Joy, Reseilleta went to the Sta. Cruz
Municipal Police Station in Davao del Sur and reported the sexual assault on her by her fa-
ther. Reseilleta and Estelita likewise executed sworn statements at the police station. They
then proceeded to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, where Reseilleta
formally lodged her complaint for rape against appellant.

Appellant denied the accusations against him.

The trial court convicted appellant Rogelio Villanueva of rape qualified by the minority of the
victim and her relationship with appellant as father and daughter, and sentenced him to death.

ISSUE:

1. WON the court is correct in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape

2. WON the qualifying circumstance of relationship is mentioned in the opening paragraph of


the Information or in the second paragraph which alleges the acts constituting the crime
charged since either paragraph is an integral part of the Information

HELD: 1. YES.

We affirm the conviction of appellant Rogelio Villanueva of raping his own daughter Reseilleta
Villanueva, a minor of fifteen (15) years when the crime was committed. Well settled is the
rule that assessment of credibility of witnesses is a function that is best discharged by trial
judge whose conclusion thereon are accorded much weight and respect, and will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless a material or substantial fact has been overlooked or misappreciated
which if properly taken into account could alter the outcome of the case. We are convinced
that the trial judge prudently fulfilled his obligation as a trier and factual assessor of facts.

At any rate, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix by which
courts may draw their conclusions and findings of guilt. Where, as in this case, the victim
could not testify on the actual commission of the rape because she was rendered uncon-
scious at the time the crime was perpetrated, the court is allowed to rule on the bases of cir-
cumstantial evidence provided that (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the combination of all the circum-
stances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.15 The corollary rule is
that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical
conclusion than appellant’s guilt.

2. YES.

Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates the material allegations should be stated in
the body and not in the preamble or caption of the Information. Instead, both sections state
that as long as the pertinent and significant allegations are enumerated in the Information it
would be deemed sufficient in form and substance. We hold that it is irrelevant and immaterial
whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship is mentioned in the opening paragraph of
the Information or in the second paragraph which alleges the acts constituting the crime
charged since either paragraph is an integral part of the Information.

The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of descrip-
tive words and phrases. It is as much an essential part of the Information as the accusatory
paragraph itself. The preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its
strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while
the accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the accusatory
paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment.
Thus, any circumstance stated in the preamble (i.e., minority, relationship) should also be
considered as an allegation of such fact.

Significantly, the name of the accused is set forth, not in the body of the Information, but only
in the opening paragraph. The name of the accused is a fundamental element of every Infor-
mation and is crucial to its validity. If the preamble can validly contain such an essential ele-
ment as the name of the accused, there appears to be no logical reason why it cannot like-
wise contain the equally essential allegations on the qualifying circumstances.

Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the operative word "accuses," which sets in motion
the constitutional process of notification, and formally makes the person being charged with
the commission of the offense an accused. Verily, without the opening paragraph, the accu-
satory portion would be nothing but a useless and miserably incomplete narration of facts,
and the entire Information would be a functionally sterile charge sheet; thus, making it impos-
sible for the state to prove its case.

8. G.R. No. 72994 January 23, 1991

FELICISIMO ROCABERTE, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S. SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran,
Bohol, respondents.

Lilio L. Amora for petitioner.

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: At the off offshore of West Canayaon, province of Bohol, the accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the own-
er, take, steal and carry away the properties belonging to and owned by the Philippine Sinter
Corporation.

The accused, thru counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L. Amora, moved to quash the information,
alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the felony charged was fatally defec-
tive. The motion was denied as was, too, the defendants' motion for reconsideration.

Felicisimo Rocaberte then instituted in this Court, thru his aforenamed counsel de oficio, the
special civil action of certiorari at bar, impugning the denial by respondent Judge Santos of
his motion to quash, or his refusal, at the very least, to direct the amendment of the infor-
mation pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Court, supra. He is correct, and
will be granted appropriate relief.

ISSUE: WON impugning the denial by respondent Judge Santos of his motion to quash, or
his refusal, at the very least, to direct the amendment of the information pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Court is correct.

HELD: YES.

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation
of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.

It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the of-
fense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may
be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint will permit.

A variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that established by
the evidence during the trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant
reversal of a conviction solely on that score. Hence, where the information sets the date of
commission of a robbery at March 25, 1900, evidence was allowed to show that the offense
was actually perpetrated on the 5th or 6th of March; and an amendment of an information so
as to change the year therein stated to that following it, was allowed it appearing that the al-
teration impaired none of the defendant's rights.

Where, however, there was a variance of several years between the time stated in the infor-
mation, 1947, and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the dismissal
of the case by the Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since to allow amendment of the
indictment to conform to the evidence would be violative of defendant's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, howev-
er, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a
motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that can be cured by
amendment; instead, the court shall order the amendment to be made by stating the time with
particularity.
9. G.R. Nos. 140786-88. March 14, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDGARDO MAURO, appellant.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: On January 3, 1992, as she was accustomed to, Florida cecilias mother who married
Mauro (cecilias step dad 20 years old) left their house at or about 2:00 a.m. to sell fish. Then
9 years old and in grade II, Cecilia was awakened when she felt Edgardo on top of her. She
protested and tried to push Edgardo, to no avail. Edgardo is five foot seven inches tall. He
then removed her panties and his briefs. She wanted to shout but Edgardo covered her
mouth with his palm. She resisted with all her might but he was too strong for her. Edgardo
inserted his penis inside her vagina. As she was still a virgin, it took a while before he was
able to penetrate her vagina. Cecilia felt pain and blood oozed from her vagina. After Ed-
gardo satiated his lust, he warned Cecilia not to tell her mother, otherwise he will kill her. He
then dismounted and went back to sleep. Afraid of what Edgardo might do to her mother,
Cecilia did not tell her mother about the bestial assault on her by Edgardo. She cried all by
herself. Nevertheless, she went to school.

Edgardo sexually abused Cecilia for three times in October 1996. One Sunday morning in
January 1997, Florida and Eva were in the market selling fish. Jayson went up north to play.
Cecilia went to the house of her uncle who went fishing while her grandfather went to the
north to drink, like Edgardo used to. She tended to her mute and disabled cousin. After put-
ting the baby to sleep, Cecilia put him to bed. At about 11:00 a.m., the unsuspecting Cecilia
went back to their house to cook food. By then, Edgardo had already returned to their house.
Upon entering their house, Cecilia was grabbed from behind by Edgardo. She pleaded to him
not to molest her again. However, Edgardo ignored her pleas, undressed her and himself and
laid her down on the floor. He then went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina and
made push and pull motions for about five minutes. Cecilia could do nothing but cry. When
Edgardo extricated his penis from her vagina, Cecilia saw white substance oozing from his
penis.

Sometime toward the end of 1997, Cecilia told her mother that she did not have her monthly
period for three months and that she might be pregnant. Florida confronted Cecilia who told
her that she had been raped by Edgardo in 1992, 1993 and in January of 1997. When Florida
confronted Cecilia and Edgardo and demanded to know if they had consensual amorous rela-
tions, the two denied having such relations. Edgardo left Tayug, Pangasinan, and hid in his
native place in Barangay San Felipe, Llanera, Nueva Ecija.

On June 30, 1997, Florida brought Cecilia to the rural health center for a pregnancy test. She
was told that Cecilia was about twenty six (26) weeks pregnant. Florida and Cecilia then went
to the police station where Cecilia lodged a complaint against Edgardo for three (3) counts of
rape.

On December 18, 1997, Edgardo was duly arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte and en-
tered a plea of Not Guilty to all the charges. TRIAL COURT FOUND HIM GUILTY

ISSUE: WON date of rape is required for conviction


HELD: NO. The precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential ele-
ment of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not
render the information ipso facto defective. After all, the gravamen of the crime is carnal
knowledge of private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Court ruled that as long as it is alleged in
the Information that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when
the offense was committed, an information is sufficient.

It should be stressed that appellant and Florida cohabited since Cecilia was only two (2)
years old. Cecilia grew with appellant and considered him as his real father (p. 8, TSN, May
28, 1998); thus, it is highly improbable that she would initiate a sexual relationship with appel-
lant. Instead, what was evident was that having helped his live-in partner rear Cecilia, appel-
lant exercised moral and physical ascendancy over her which he used sufficient (sic) to cow
Cecilia to submit to his lustful desires. Furthermore, it is improbable that Cecilia, who was only
fourteen year old at the time she revealed what he had done, and one who was not exposed
to the ways of the world, would impute a crime as serious as rape to any man, let alone her
stepfather, if what she claimed was not true [People v. Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228 (1999)].
Clearly, appellant’s claim that he and Cecilia were maintaining amorous relations behind her
mother’s back was concocted in a desperate attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liabil-
ity.

10. G.R. No. 145995. March 20, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SATURNINO ILUIS y JANDOC, ac-


cused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: Juliene was barely four years old when her mother Julieta died. She was left to the
care of Maritess Raguindin, Julieta’s sister, who had several children of her own. Ultimately,
Maritess gave the child to Ana Abriam for “adoption.” Maritess gave Ana the birth certificate
of Juliene that she had taken from Julieta’s wallet. With her husband Dominador Raguindin,
Maritess executed a document in the dialect, dated 13 October 1993, to confirm that the cou-
ple had entrusted Juliene to the custody of Ana. Two days after giving the custody of Juliene
to Ana, Maritess received from Ana dollars equivalent to P10,000 “as a sort of help.” Ana
would also give some sums to Maritess whenever she would come around and visit Juliene,
also called Jing, at the Abriam residence.

In August 1997, Rosita(ANA) left for the United States; she returned on 18 November 1997.
A few days later, on the early evening of 21 November 1997, Rosita was viewing a television
show with Juliene when the latter held Rosita and meaningfully pressed the middle of Rosita’s
palm. Realizing that the gesture conveyed something that was “not a nice act,” Rosita told Ju-
liene, “Whoever did that thing to you tell me his name because that man might kidnap and kill
you.” When Juliene refused to talk, Rosita “threatened” Juliene that she would not give the
girl the things that had been bought for her. Juliene uttered, “I am afraid, Grandma, but I will
tell his name. He is Uncle Masong.” Rosita called Tessie and her nephew so that they could
also hear what the child was saying. Once again when asked, Juliene disclosed that Masong
molested her. He would embrace, kiss, touch her private part, and then garawen her. When
Rosita asked Juliene what she meant by garawen, Juliene said that Masong would put his
penis into her vagina.

According to Dr. Nebril-Ramilo, these findings revealed the “possibility of penetration” of the
child’s sex organ by a blunt object

The trial court found Saturnino Iluis guilty of the crime of qualified rape for which it imposed
upon him the death penalty,

ISSUE: WON He is guilty of Rape.

HELD: YES. The unflinching testimony of the child victim notwithstanding, appellant would
insist that her statement that “he (appellant) put his penis into my vagina” was inadequate to
warrant conviction for the crime of rape. The trial court correctly brushed aside this argument.
Granting that there was no complete penetration of the vagina, even just the briefest contact
of the pudendum by the phallus, however, would be enough to consummate the crime of rape

Considering her age, Juliene’s failure to give the gory details on the sexual debasement
would be understandable and typical of an innocent child whose virtue had unexpectedly
been violated and her chastity abused. Ample margin of inaccuracies should be accorded to a
child witness who obviously had been gripped with tension on the witness stand. Most signif-
icantly, no plausible reason was given by the defense why Juliene would fabricate the charg-
es.

While the age of the victim, i.e., of being barely six years old at the time of the rape, is sup-
ported by the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit “A”), showing that Juliene was born on 23 Sep-
tember 1991, and the testimony of Maritess Raguindin (the sister of Juliene’s mother), in or-
der, however, to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, it is required that the qualifying
circumstance of the rape victim being “below seven years of age” should be aptly alleged in
the Information. The Court has made it explicit that qualifying circumstances, which would in-
crease the penalty by a higher degree, “must be properly pleaded in the information con-
sistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him.”
Mindful, indeed, of the entitlement of an accused to this fundamental right, the Court has now
provided for in Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

11. G.R. No. 140762 September 10, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.

PO3 ROGER ROXAS Y CABASAG, appellant.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: Joelyn B. Maceda, a security guard at the First Unity Textile Mills in Novaliches,
Quezon City, stayed with her sister, Lorna Maceda Puno, in San Roque, Bagong Pag-asa,
Quezon City, in a one-storey structure with the front door leading to the kitchen and with two
steps leading to the sala. Joelyn shared the house with Lorna and her husband, the couple’s
five-year-old son, Jonas, and a niece. Lorna, like Joelyn, was a security guard at the Citibank
in Makati City. When on duty, the sisters were issued caliber .38 service firearms that they
were not, however, allowed to bring home and, instead, had to entrust each time to a reliever.
Although the sisters were trained to handle firearms, they, upon the other hand, only had min-
imal instruction on self-defense.

Between nine o’clock and nine-thirty on the evening of 8 March 1996, Joelyn was washing
clothes in front of the door of their house, lighted by a fluorescent lamp, when she saw Lorna
coming home from work in her type B uniform and carrying a brown bag. From a distance of
barely four to five meters, Joelyn could see Lorna running away from appellant. Appellant,
apparently drunk, had no clothes from waist up, was wearing shorts and carrying a gun.
When Joelyn asked the pale and trembling Lorna why she was running, the latter replied,
"Lyn, Lyn, enter, close the door, a man (is) following me!" (Lyn, Lyn, pasok, sarado ang pinto,
may sumusunod sa akin lalaki). Joelyn promptly closed the door but appellant was able to
kick it open. Joelyn, her forehead hit by the door, was pushed aside. Appellant grabbed Lor-
na’s bag, opened it and, apparently not finding what he could have been looking for, hurled
the bag to the floor (binalibag po niya ang bag sa sahig). Appellant asked Lorna, "Why did
you run? Why did you not mind me?" (Bakit ka tumakbo? Bakit ‘di mo ‘ko pinansin?). Lorna
answered, "I did not hear you." Joelyn tried to hold the hand of appellant but he pushed her
hand away. Appellant then shot Lorna with a caliber .45 gun with its muzzle just two feet away
from Lorna’s face. Lorna fell on the floor with half of her body outside the door and the other
half inside the house. Joelyn held her sister. Lorna was still alive. A neighbor responded to
Joelyn’s cries for help. Lorna was brought to the hospital. At six o’clock the following morning
of 9 March 1996, Joelyn went to Camp Karingal to report the incident. Later, Joelyn, accom-
panied by Randy who took down her statement at the camp, went to the East Avenue Hospi-
tal where Lorna had been taken.

Lorna, only 27 years old, died three days after she was shot.

RTC convicted PO3 ROXAS

Pursuant to law and the Rules of Court, let the entire records of this case be forwarded forth-
with to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review. Because of Death penalty back
then.

ISSUE: WON he was guilty of Murder?

HELD: YES. Appellant’s argument that the trial court disregarded "the law on ballistics" when
it ignored the fact that the slug found was that of a caliber .45 gun, not that of a .38 caliber
handgun, like the service revolver of appellant, hardly could be material. It would only show
that it was not appellant’s service revolver which was used in the commission of the crime.
With the positive identification by eyewitness Joelyn of appellant as being the perpetrator of
the crime, the non-presentation by the prosecution of the weapon used in committing the
crime would not at all be fatal. Joelyn witnessed at close range the killing of her sister. Her
testimony, an eyewitness account, was found credible by the trial court.

an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used
in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling that was not alleged in the information.

The use of the word `must’ indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to
comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although prov-
en at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stat-
ed in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.

Article 248(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a person who commits the
crime of murder, attended by the qualifying circumstance of, among other circumstances, tak-
ing advantage of superior strength, with reclusion perpetua to death. No generic aggravating
penalty being attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

Reclusion perpetua instead of Death penalty.

12. G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003

ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTH-
ERS MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from
J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans
of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Pru-
dential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in
the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioner’s assurance
that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner.
Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account
(“Account Closed”). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Pruden-
tial Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which,
however, was returned with the word “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).

After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court

alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she
was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d)
on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no
sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena
Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dis-
honored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore
been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal
check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for “DAUD,” which in banking par-
lance means “drawn against uncollected deposit.” According to the petitioner, this means that
the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check,
had not yet been cleared.

On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as pay-
ment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not es-
tablish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the
private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never
met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large

Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the
motion.

In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her
demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was
not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the pri-
vate respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended par-
ty, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.

ISSUE: WON she was denied rights with regard to demurer of evidence?

HELD: YES. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court
issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the ac-
cused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended
party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the
constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated.

This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order
or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the
case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the
parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Sec. 11. Order of trial. – The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if
any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to pre-
sent additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.) PEOPLE v. RULLEPA y GUINTO, G.r. No. 131516, March 05, 2003.
Facts: An information for rape was filed against the accused for having inserted his organ to
Cyra May’s private parts and her mouth. It was alleged that when the Victim’s mother came to
know about the beastly acts against her child, she waited for the accused-appellant to arrive
since the latter was with her husband. Upon arriving, she then sent the accused-appellant out
for an errand and the informed her husband about their daughter’s ordeal. Upon returning, the
spouses confronted the accused-appellant about what he did with Cyra May which the
accused-appellant admitted.
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He denied He denied having
anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra May’s genitalia, and claimed that prior to the
alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty
urinating. The trial court convicted him of the crime charged.
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they
were made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra May’s parents “bullied and
questioned him.” He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny
the statements during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Issue: Whether or not the trial erred in giving weight in the testimony of the victim who was
then a minor?
Held: No. This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court
regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the
necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the competence to
testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable child – as all others of
her age are – but her narration of Kuya Ronnie’s placing his “titi” in her “pepe” was certainly
one which could not be considered as a common child’s tale. Her responses during the
examination of counsel and of the Court established her consciousness of the distinction
between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a “bad” act of the
accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described the act of the
accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness – manifested during trial by her unhesitant,
spontaneous, and plain responses to questions – further enhanced her claim to credit and
trustworthiness.
18.) PEOPLE v. PEREZ, G.R. No. 142556, February 05, 2006.
Facts: An information was filed charging appellant with the crime of rape for having a carnal
knowledge of Mayia, a minor, against her will while the latter was on her way home. During
her confinement at the hospital, the Ponseca couple reported the incident to the Palauig PNP
Police Station and recounted their daughter’s narration including the name of the culprit as
"Johnny" who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at the fishpond of Bartolome
Tolentino. Police operatives then proceeded to the said fishpond and arrested appellant. In
the police station, she was able to positively identify the appellant as the person who sexually
assaulted her, Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the
alleged rape incident, he was working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the
rape of a young girl from his manager, Bartolome Tolentino. The trial court convicted the
accused of statutory rape. Hence, this appeal, where the appellant alleged among others,
assuming that his guilt been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains that the death penalty cannot be imposed on
him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by independent evidence. Appellant
points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was duly marked during the pre-trial, it was not
presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayia’s minority must not only
be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable
doubt during the trial.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty since Mayia’s age
was not proven and that his minority was not established during the trial?
Held: No. At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the
criminal case. Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement which, as
incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order, stated that: "x x x.
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her
birth certificate;x x x
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia’s birth certificate as
Exhibit "A". The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence which included Exhibit "A", a
certified true copy of Mayia’s birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit "A" without any
objection from the defense.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation
of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to
admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial
of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.32 Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during
pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure33
provides that after the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on
December 15, 1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident
occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was "8 years old
last May 23." Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her
birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997,
the day the crime took place. Therefore, the prosecution has indisputably proven that Mayia
was below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.
19.) PONCE ENRILE v. AMIN, G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990.
Facts: Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
having committed rebellion complexed with murder, government prosecutors filed another
information charging him for violation of PD No. 1829 for delaying the apprehension of
Honasan by harboring or concealing the latter in his house. Respondent Judge Ignacio
Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's
Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829. the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that: (a) The facts
charged do not constitute an offense; (b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause
was devoid of factual and legal basis; and (c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the
prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion
under PD 1829. His Motion was denied. Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the
theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal
Code or a general law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him?

Held: No, the petitioner cannot be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being
prosecuted in the rebellion case. Rebellion cannot be complexed with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. If a person cannot be charged with
the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged
separately for 2 different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion. The act of harboring or concealing Honasan is a mere
component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion, it cannot therefore be
made the basis of a separate charge. All crimes whether punishable under a special law or
general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged separate
crimes in themselves.

(HINDI KO ALAM KUNG TAMA TONG RULING KO EH, PAKICHECK NALANG AND PLEASE
LET ME KNOW. Capslock at malaking font para damang dama niyo  )
20.) PEOPLE v. LAPITAJE, G.R. No. 132042, February 19, 2003
Facts: an Information was filed before the trial court against Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje, Mario
Reyes, Wendell Arellano y Tanio and Romy Baluyos y Pingki-an for Robbery with Frustrated
Homicide[2] to which they all pleaded not guilty. Despite timely medical attention, victim
Nelson Saavedra died by reason of which the Information was amended to Robbery with
Homicide. All accused pleaded not guilty to the Amended Information. Trial ensued. The
prosecution presented oral, documentary and real evidence. It was alleged that they robbed
Domingo Colonia’s store, and when his wife shouted for help which their neighbors went to
their rescue, the 3 men hurriedly went away and in the course thereof, a gun fire was heard
where one of their neighbor was shot. The trial court found all the accused guilty of the crime
charged.
Issue: (1.) whether or not there was an error in the conviction of all the accused?
(2.) Whether or not the trial court erred in not finding that the arrest of all appellants
were illegal and the subsequent alleged recovery of incriminatory evidence presented against
the latter was a product of a poisonous tree, hence inadmissible in evidence
Held: (1.) Yes. The well-settled rule is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of any
clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.”
After a painstaking review of the prosecution evidence, the Court found certain facts and
circumstances of such great weight that the trial court overlooked and misappreciated or
misapplied, as follows:
1. The trial court had erroneously given credence to the testimony of Lt. Col. Oarga who
testified that he had seen four men running towards a waiting taxicab; and that the four who
boarded the taxi were apprehended together with the driver. On this basis, the trial court
hastily concluded that Wendel and Romy acted as lookouts while Arnold and Mario robbed
Domingo’s house and that after the robbery, the four ran towards the waiting taxi. The other
prosecution witnesses consistently and unequivocably belied the testimony of Lt. Col. Oarga.
Prosecution witness Fred Ares categorically testified that Oarga’s men held only three
persons: the driver of the taxi, the man with crutches and another who was still about to enter
the taxi. Fred Ares further clarified that Wendel was just inside the taxi and was not one of the
persons who were running towards the taxi. The testimony of Fred Ares is corroborated by
Rizalina Ares who testified that she met three persons coming from the store of Domingo
Colonia. Another prosecution witness, SPO2 Nuñeza testified that Oarga turned over to him
only three persons, namely, the driver Romy Baluyos, Wendel Arellano and Arnold Lapitaje.
2. The trial court miserably failed to consider that appellant Wendel had a physical disability.
Wendel could not have ran together with the other robbers because he had an amputated leg
and walked on crutches.
3. The firearm and live ammunitions allegedly found under the front seat of the taxi cannot
be used as evidence against Wendel and Romy for they were taken as a result of an illegal
search and seizure which will be discussed forthwith.
Thus, Oarga’s testimony of the event leading to the arrest of appellants is not accurate
and could not be a valid basis for the conviction of appellants Wendel and Romy.
Even if the defense of general denial posited by Wendel and Romy is uncorroborated,
the trial court committed an error in disregarding said defense considering that the evidence
of the prosecution failed to establish the participation of both accused Wendel and Romy in
the commission of the crime charged. As the Court has enunciated in People vs. Ladrillo:
“xxx. The rule that this Court should refrain from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses, does not apply where, as in the instant case, the trial court
overlooked certain facts of substance or value which if considered would affect the outcome
of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on misapprehension of facts.
(2) With respect to appellant Arnold: By the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Fred
Ares and SPO2 Nuñeza, it is established that Arnold was arrested by Lt. Col. Oar-
ga. However, it must be stated that the warrantless arrest of appellant Arnold together with
Wendel and Romy was not lawful. Oarga testified that he caused the arrest of “four men”
running towards the taxi since they were acting suspiciously. However, Oarga did not elabo-
rate why he thought said men were acting suspiciously.
None of the aforesaid circumstances under Sec. 5 Rule 113 were attendant in the case at
bar. The “four men” were not prisoners who had just escaped from a penal establish-
ment. Oarga did not testify that the “four men” he had seen running towards the taxi have
earlier committed or were actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in his pres-
ence.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant Arnold, had entered his plea and actively partici-
pated in the trial of the case, he submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court thereby curing
any defect in his arrest. Legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.
In spite of said waiver, the firearm and live ammunition taken from the taxi during the
search, cannot be admitted in evidence against appellants because they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibil-
ity of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. However, the search cannot be jus-
tified on the ground that it involves search of a moving vehicle. Warrantless search of a mov-
ing vehicle is allowed only when it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
carrying the prohibited drugs can be quickly moved out of the area or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. We have already clarified in a number of cases that this exception in
no way gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

21. G.R. No. L-45772 March 25, 1988

PEOPLE vs. Hon. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia
G, Valdez, filed an Information for "Roberry" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV-B, Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against Antonio Cimarra,
Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private respondents)
were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as accessories-after-
the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded
guilty and had been convicted in Criminal Case No. QF-76-051 before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of
the same items, articles and jewelries belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P 75,591.40.
Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered
a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them. Accordingly, trial on the merits was
scheduled by the respondent court. However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting
fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to
amend the original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to
"Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3)
deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original Information
and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80.

Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent
court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information in
the previously referred to order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the said motion was valid?

RULING: YES.

Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be
made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the
trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that
no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after
the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.

On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at
anytime.

The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly
substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable
under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the
Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty
as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to
which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment.

Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different
articles from those originally complained of, affects the essense of the imputed crime, and
would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended
information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be
observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor
Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the
original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different
from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the
Court.

The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not
previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling
the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the
trial court.

This decision is immediately executory.

22. G.R. NO. 121211. APRIL 30, 2003


PEOPLE VS. RONETO DEGAMO

PER CURIAM:

Before us for automatic review is a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12)
of Ormoc City imposing the supreme penalty of death on appellant Roneto Degamo alias
“Roy” for the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.

On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant with the
crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.

On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed the complaint
to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has
become insane.

In the early morning, RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, being then armed with a bladed weapon,
by means of violence and intimidation, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant
herein ELLEN VERTUDAZO, against her will and in her own house.

A discussion of certain procedural rules is in order before going into the merits of the case. It
has not escaped our notice that the complaint for rape with use of a deadly weapon was
amended after arraignment of appellant to include the allegation that the victim has become
insane by reason or on the occasion of the rape. Although the penalty for rape with the use of
a deadly weapon under the original Information is reclusion perpetua to death, the mandatory
penalty of death is imposed where the victim has become insane by reason or on the
occasion of rape as alleged in the Amended Information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint was valid?

RULING: YES.

Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the
accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is obtained; and
(ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is
not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.

In Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, we had occasion to state that a substantial amendment
consists of recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following were held to be
merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) amendment, which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.

We further elucidated in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an amendment is
only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would
be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.

Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of
substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in the Teehankee case.
The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the
rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction
and does not charge another offense different from that charged in the original Information.
Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape
committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon
where the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment
did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly
allowed the amendment.

Furthermore, it is also settled that amendment of an information to charge a more serious


offense is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy even where the accused was
already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge, where the basis of the more serious
charge did not exist, but comes as a subsequent event. In this case the basis for the
amendment was the psychosis of complainant which was determined after the filing of the
information.

Besides, the trial proper started only after appellant had been re-arraigned and appellant
never objected to the amendment at any stage of the proceedings. It is basic that objection to
the amendment of an information or complaint must be raised at the time the amendment is
made, otherwise, silence would be deemed a consent to said amendment. It is a time-
honored doctrine that objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for when the
trial was had upon an information substituted for the complaint or information without any
objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.

23. G.R. NO. 148468. G.R. NO. 148769. G.R. NO. 149116. JANUARY 28, 2003

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing
the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion
for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to
Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with
former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal
Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee
of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson through the latter’s
assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said
amount to the Foundation’s treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation’s account with
the Equitable PCI Bank.

In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E.
Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the
illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the
Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as
OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and
Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as
OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.

Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other
respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman
conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint
resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be
charged with the criminal offense of plunder.

ISSUE: WAS the denial of the said motions and petitions of the herein accused- appellant
valid?

RULING: NO.

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

“Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it


states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.”

The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable
the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately
the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the
specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in
the Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare for his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found
guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of
derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.

In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including
petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit
plunder “through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes
or means.” And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused
are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in
the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
(Third Division), et al., we held that the word “series” is synonymous with the clause “on
several instances”; it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word “combination” contemplates the
commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that
“plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused therein, including
petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2)
of the law”

According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than
one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public
funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.

This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not charged
as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.

(read this case… sobrang mahaba to but this is so IMPORTANT!) hindi ko na sinama pa ung
ibang ruling kc sobrang haba at iportante sana. Just ahave a quick review of this case. Its
COOL! :p

24. G.R. NO. 143468-71. JANUARY 24, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FREEDIE LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decisionof the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54,
finding accused-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
qualified rape and meting on him the death penalty for each count.

Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3)
children, namely: Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985; Jepsy, who was 11 years old,
and Rossel, who was nine years old. However, the couple decided to part ways and live
separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with her young children. She worked as a
waitress to make both ends meet.

IN 4 different dates the accused raped ANALIA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

RULING: YES. The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14


of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” This
requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:

“SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.—The judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.”

The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on
how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the
relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The
parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the trial court that they were
accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge. More substantial
reasons for the requirement are:

“For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if
permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For
another, the decision if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its
merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation
with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and
the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will
constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as
precedents in the resolution of future controversies.”

The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its
conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal
basis for its resolution. Trial courts should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of
witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of
the prosecution and of accused-appellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made
referral to the documentary evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and
sentenced him to death, on each count.

The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on
their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal
issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the
crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant with the curt
declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the
prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution.
It failed to explain in its decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of
the prosecution. Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial
court ignored the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even bother
specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the supreme penalty of death on
accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no.
1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of
what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
should not be.

The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the
decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert
further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their
merits considering that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had
been elevated to the Court. The parties filed their respective briefs articulating their respective
stances on the factual and legal issues.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man
of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2)
considering the nature of things, and only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. By the very nature of the crime of
rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence.
However, if the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element of the crime, and
the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence, the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and hence, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.

25. People vs. Consing Jr. 395 SCRA 366, G. R. No. 148139, January 16, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, represented to
Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot
situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of
Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously
covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the
representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.
PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject
lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respond-
ent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not
on file with the Register of Deeds. PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his
mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by
PBI.
Respondent filed with the RTC of Pasig City an action for “Injunctive Relief against PBI,
Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz
and 20 other John Does. Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other
defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599. PBI filed against
respondent and his mother a complaint for “Damages and Attachment,” with Branch 12 of the
RTC Manila. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and
pendency of case.
A criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against
respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
Respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question, i.e., the
pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381. The trial court denied respondent’s
motion.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary re-
straining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin
the arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case. The Court of Appeals grant-
ed respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. A decision was
rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the trial court and permanently enjoining
it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases for
Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided. Hence,
the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief
and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed
against the respondent.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which per-
tains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to
be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal pro-
ceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Re-
vised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evi-
dence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action.

26. Manuel vs. Alfeche, Jr. 259 SCRA 475, G. R. No. 115683, July 26, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of the City of Roxas filed with the Regional Trial Court, 6th
Judicial region, Branch 15, Roxas City an Information for libel against the author/ writer,
editor-in-chief, associate-editor and assistant-editor of Panay News for impeaching the
integrity, credibility, honor and reputation of Delia Manuel who is allegedly "SHABU QUEEN"
in Western Visayas and has been raking in millions of pesos since she started peddling
shabu, marijuana and other prohibited drugs in this part of the country. After trial, the
respondent judge rendered the assailed Decision finding three of the accused guilty and
acquitting a fourth. However, "the civil indemnity by way of moral damages was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction" on the ground that petitioner did not pay the filing fees therefor.
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner sought to overturn the above dismissal via the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue:
Whether the civil aspect of the case is not dependent on the criminal, but rather, may
proceed, independently thereof, and that therefore, the review of the civil aspect by this Court
may take place simultaneously with and separately from the review of the criminal aspect by
the Court of Appeals.
Ruling:
No. Such reasoning is misplaced. Sec. 1 of Rule 111 provides that the civil action for recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action. In the present case, the civil action had been actually (not just impliedly)
instituted with the criminal prosecution, as shown by the fact that petitioner took an active part
in the prosecution of the criminal case. As admitted in the petition, "the private prosecutor,
counsel for . . . the petitioner herein" was allowed "upon prior authority under the supervision
of the City Prosecutor, to handle the prosecution, by presenting all the prosecution's
evidence" and even filing the Prosecution's Memorandum. Obviously then, there can no
longer be any independent civil action to speak of, as the civil aspect had previously been
included in the criminal. And the petitioner, by attempting to have recourse to this Court with
the criminal aspect still pending with the Court of Appeals, was effectively trying to split a
single cause of action. This we cannot allow.
27. Marcos vs. Ruiz, 213 SCRA 177, G. R. Nos. 70746-47, September 1, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
After conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting 2nd Assistant City
Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol
two informations against petitioner herein for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The
petitioner posted a surety bond for his temporary liberty. The arraignment was set but the
petitioner appeared on that date and asked for a resetting on the ground that his lawyer had
just withdrawn and he had to look for another lawyer. The court granted his request and the
arraignment was reset. Petitioner settled his obligation with the offended party who executed
an Affidavit of Desistance which she subscribed and swore to before Notary Public Paulino G.
Clarin. Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. The motion
bears the approval of Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal Miguel Relampagos who acted for the
Acting City Fiscal because of the latter’s absence, and the consent of petitioner.
Petitioner appeared together with his counsel de parte, Atty. Carlos Marcos. He was
arraigned in both cases and he entered a plea of not guilty. Forthwith, the court set the trial of
the cases. The petitioner, his counsel and the Assistant City Fiscal were notified in open court
of the setting. When the cases were called in the afternoon of 8 April 1985, neither petitioner
nor counsel appeared. The prosecution presented its evidence ex-parte and rested its case.
The court then issued an Order 8 forfeiting the bond posted by the petitioner, directing
Paramount Insurance Corp., the bondsman, to show cause, within thirty days form notice,
why no judgment should be issued against the bond and declaring that as no evidence has
been submitted by the petitioner, the cases were deemed submitted for decision. Petitioner’s
counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the order which was denied. A Notice of
Promulgation setting the promulgation of sentence in the two cases to 17 May 1985 was sent
to the parties. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the respondent court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the bail bond when petitioner
failed to appear on 8 April 1985 and allowing the Prosecution to present its evidence ex parte
and declaring the petitioner as having waived his right to present his evidence
Ruling:
Yes. A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is
specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the
bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear in
person as so required. 21 There is no showing that the court had specifically required the
bonding company to produce the body of the petitioner on 8 and 9 April 1985. Moreover, since
Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892, which involve two checks with a face value of P3,000.00
each, were merely for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which imposes a penalty of
"imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court," the presence of the accused at the hearing on 8 and 9 April 1985 was not
indispensable.

Under the Rules of Court, the accused has to be present:

(a) at the arraignment pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 116;

(b) at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in which
case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative
pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed under the
third paragraph of said section; and

(c) when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.

28. Concerned Citizens vs. Judge Elma, 241 SCRA 84, A. M No. RTJ 94-1183, February
6, 1995
Facts:

This administrative case arose from an anonymous letter-complaint charging Judge


Armie E. Elma, presiding judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 153, with the Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion for granting bail in a non-bailable
offense. The records disclose that one Alfredo Gatus y Tiamzon was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa in five separate Information before the sala of
respondent Judge Elma. In the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, no bail
bond was recommended. Accused Gatus file a motion to fix his bail. Respondent judge,
instead of setting the application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its Comment or
Opposition to accused's Motion to Fix Bail within five days from notice. Respondent judge set
the accused bail at P100,000.00 and approved the bail posted by the accused. Considering
the complaint, the Court required respondent judge to file his Comment. In his
Comment, respondent judge admits that he failed to conduct a formal hearing prior to his
grant of accused Gatus' application for bail in Criminal Case No. 94126. He, however,
maintains that in ordering the prosecution to comment on accused's motion to fix bail, he has
substantially complied with the requirement of a formal hearing. He further claims that he
required the prosecution to adduce evidence but the latter refused and left the determination
of the motion to his discretion.

Issue:

Whether the respondent judge erred in granting the application for bail of the accused

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent judge, in granting bail to accused Gatus in Criminal Case No. 94126,
disregarded this basic rule of procedure. It is a rule of long standing that bail is not a matter of
right in cases involving capital offenses or where the offenses for which the accused stands
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. It is true that the
weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However,
such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt
of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. At
the hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to adduce
evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. In the case at bench, however, no formal
hearing was conducted by respondent judge. He could have not assessed the weight of the
evidence against accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail.

The Order speaks eloquently for itself. On its face, it is once apparent that respondent
judge did not make any finding that the evidence against the accused was not strong to justify
his grant of bail. Respondent judge merely adverts to "particular circumstances" of the case
without in any way hinting their nature and character. Such an inscrutable statement does not
satisfy the Constitution and the Rules.

The stance of respondent judge magnifies his ignorance of the law. Summary hearing
is "such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is to determine the weight of
the evidence for purposes of bail." In receiving evidence on bail, it is true that the court is not
required to try the merits of the case nor is it called to speculate on the outcome of the
trial. Nonetheless, hearing of the application cannot be totally dispensed with. To do away
with the hearing is to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness.

The importance of the Rule requiring the conduct of the hearing in an application for
bail cannot be overemphasized. On its result depends the right of an accused to provisional
liberty as opposed to the duty of the State to protect its people against dangerous elements.
The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society, liberty on one hand, and
order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judge's decision,
the Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of
their evidence.

29. FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: Sy Bon Ping is the owner and operator f a freight truck and Salvador Mendoza is his driver. At about five
o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the
Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, they rammed into the residential
house and store of plaintiff Felix Lanuzo . As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing
damage to the latter. Consequently Lanuzo filed complaint for damges against Ping and Mendoza. The defendants moved to
dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250 for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence,
was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff
opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for
damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit. The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Lower court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants moved for Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial and To Set Aside Order of Default but was denied. Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of
Appeals they urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part that
"after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in
the criminal action." Additionally, they contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed
an error in holding them jointly and severally liable. The Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure
questions of law.

ISSUE: Whther the civila action is prematurely instituted as there was also a criminal case pending for the same cause of
action and parties.

RULING: NO. We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.,
that: A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-
extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce.
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident
from the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship between the appellants, alleging that
damages to the house and store were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross
negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the safety of persons
and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and solidarity liable for damages. These are, basically, what
should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict.
As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred
from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of
interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed
independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or commission of the defendant.
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

30. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila, and NAVOTAS
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 116463. June 10, 2003]
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: The DPWH allocated the P615 million to several projects covered by twenty-one contracts. One of the
contractors that was awarded was Navotas Industrial Corporation (“NIC”), P194,454,000.00 worth of dredging work in
four contracts for completion within 350 calendar days. NIC alleges that the dredging work proceeded pursuant to specific
work schedules and plan approved by DPWH. They accomplished 95.06 percent of the required total volume of work.
However, DPWH paid only 79.22 percent of the accomplished work, leaving a balance of P30,799,676.00. Consequently,
NIC filed a complaint for sum of money with the Malabon trial court against the Republic of the Philippines, thru the
DPWH. In its Answer, petitioner contends that NIC is not entitled to the amount claimed. Therafter, DPWH created a fact-
finding committee to audit the flood control projects in the National Capital Region, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. The
DPWH fact-finding committee discovered that the dredging contracts of NIC with DPWH were null and void. NIC worked
on the project five or six months before the award of the dredging contracts to NIC. The contracts of NIC were awarded
without any public bidding. Moreover, DPWH discovered that NIC, through its corporate officers, connived with some
DPWH officials in falsifying certain public documents to make it appear that NIC had completed a major portion of the
project, when no dredging work was actually performed. As a result, DPWH fact-finding committee filed with the Office of
the Tanodbayan a case for estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against
former Minister Hipolito, and Other DPWH officials involved. However, it was only on 17 June 1991 that former
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor finding probable cause for
estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA No. 3019. Subsequently, the
Ombudsman filed the corresponding Informations with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan against all the respondents
in TBP Case No. 86-01163.Petitioner filed before the Malabon trial court a Motion to Consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN
with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 in the Sandiganbayan. However, Malabon trial court denied it. An MR was filed yet
the same was denied thus petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the petition. Then, it filed with SC a petition for review. The Court resolved to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for by petitioner. Consequently, the Malabon trial court desisted from hearing further Civil Case
No. 1153-MN.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL
CASE NO. 1153-MN WITH CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16889-16900 WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 4(B) OF P.D. 1606.

RULING: NO. Consolidation is a matter of discretion with the court. Consolidation becomes a matter of right only
when the cases sought to be consolidated involve similar questions of fact and law, provided certain requirements are
met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the
work of the trial court, and save unnecessary expense. We cannot order the consolidation of the civil case for collection with
the criminal cases for two reasons. First, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the collection case. Second, the Rules
of Court do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal case.
First, the Sandiganbayan was created as a special court to hear graft cases against government officials of a particular salary
grade for violations of specific laws. Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic
An essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have jurisdiction over all the cases consolidated before
it. Since the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the collection case, the same cannot be consolidated with the
criminal cases even if these cases involve similar questions of fact and law. Obviously, consolidation of the collection case
with the criminal cases will be a useless and empty formality since the Sandiganbayan, being devoid of jurisdiction over the
collection case, cannot act on it.
Second, we cannot order the consolidation of the civil action filed by NIC with the criminal cases in the Sandiganbayan
because the civil case amounts to a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal case. While NIC, as a corporate
entity, is not an accused in the criminal cases, a consolidation of NIC’s collection case with the criminal cases will have the
same effect of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint against petitioner and DPWH. n such case, the rule against
counterclaims and third-party complaints in criminal cases may be applied by analogy.

A counterclaim in a criminal case must be litigated separately to avoid complication and confusion in the resolution
of the criminal cases. This is the rationale behind Section 1 of Rule 111. The same rationale applies to NIC’s collection
case against petitioner and DPWH. Thus, NIC’s collection case must be litigated separately before the Malabon trial court
to avoid confusion in resolving the criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.

31. ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, petitioner,


vs.
HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, 'Vacation' Judge of RTC, BRANCH 170, Malabon, Metro Manila, and SPS.
CRISTINA MALICSI and DANILO MALICSI, respondents.
G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986
PATAJO, J:

FACTS: Cristina Malisci was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. Zenaida Cruz Reyes was the aggregative
party. In said criminal case, Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor named Atty. Barayang. Malisci pleaded guilty to
the information and was sentenced to pay P50. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present
evidence to prove damages against the accused. Reyes was not able to make a reservation of her right ti file a separate civil
action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malisci and her husband with RTC for damages arising
from defamatory words which were the subject of information in the Criminal action. At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that
she was represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case against defendant Malisci and in said case she did not
reserve to file a separate civil action for damages. There was also an admission that the private prosecutor was for proving
damages against the accused.. RTC ruled in favor of the defendant. RTC based its ruling in the case of Roa v Dela Cruz:
There is no question that in defamation cases (such as the present) as in cases of fraud and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, and such action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. There is,
however, an exception to the above rule; namely, when the offended party actually intervenes in the criminal action by
appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have
waived his right to file a separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a reservation therefor. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether intervention of private prosecutor and failure to make reservation bars plaintiff from filing separate civil
action for damages against the accused.

RULING: NO. Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We find and so hold that the mere appearance of a private
prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the
part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said
criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded
guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in
support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.
Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not foreclose her right to file said
separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the
filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case
and such reservation is not necessary, the provision of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding.

32. FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.
GANDIONCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her
husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and
ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends
that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.

RULING: NO. Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. in view of the amendment under
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of,
or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same
offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as,
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from
the innocent spouse, among others.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence
in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in
Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then
allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement,
under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal
action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has
been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can
always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.

33. ALENJANDRO RAS, petitioner, vs.HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Basilan, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-50441-42 September 18, 1980

TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS: Luis Pichel filed a complaint against petitioner Alejandro Ras and a certain Bienvenido Martin before the CFI of
Basilan, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Alejandro Ras in favor of his codefendant Bienvenido
Martin and for the declaration of the prior deed of sale allegedly executed in his favor by the defendant Alejandro Ras as
valid. In their answer, the defendants (the Ras spouses) alleged that they never sold the property to Pichel and that the
signatures appearing in the deed of sale in favor of plaintiff Pichel (in Civil Case No. 73) were forgeries and that therefore
the alleged deed of sale in Pichel's favor sought to be declared valid was fictitious and inexistent.
Meanwhile, as the civil case was being tried, the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed an Information for Estafa in the same
court against Alejandro Ras arising from the same alleged double sale subject matter of the civil complaint filed by Luis
Pichel. Ras through counsel, filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" in said Criminal Case No. 240 claiming that the
same facts and issues were involved in both the civil and criminal case and that the resolution of the issues in the civil case
would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his
opposition. The respondent judge saw no prejudicial question and accordingly denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the civil case shall be suspend as there is a prejudicial question in it in the criminal action.
RULING: YES. A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action
pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be
necessary determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing
concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that
petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of
sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based on the very
same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If
the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be
innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross
injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale
was a forgery and spurious.

34. BERNIE G. MIAQUE, NOEL R. CABOBOS, RODOLFO H. DIVINAGRACIA and PETER G. JIMENEA, complainants,
vs. JUDGE NILO P. PAMONAG, in his capacity as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pototan-
Mina, Branch 008, Iloilo Province,respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1412. March 28, 2003]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: complainants were charged before the MCTC of Pototan-Mina, Iloilo, Branch 008, presided by respondent
Judge Nilo P. Pamonag, with the crime of libel. Acting thereon, the respondent Judge conducted a preliminary investiga-
tion and thereafter issued on September 2, 1998 warrants for the arrest of the herein complainants, fixing the bail at
P10,000.00 each. Consequently, the latter filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary re-
straining order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the respondent judge or any other officer from enforcing
the assailed warrants of arrest.
Consequently, complainants filed an administrative case against the respondent Judge for “gross ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of judicial functions and authority and issuing patently illegal orders.” Complainants contended that un-
der Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, the respondent Judge neither has the authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation nor to issue warrants for their arrest. In his Comment the respondent Judge admit-
ted his mistake and explained that the same was his first libel case and that he issued the challenged warrants in good
faith. He said that he erroneously relied on a pamphlet of the Revises Penal Code quoting Article 360 which consisted only
of four (4) paragraphs, without any word on the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The Office of the Court Adminis-
trator (OCA) found the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law
ISSUE: Whether preliminary investigation in a libel case shall be conducted by provincial or city prosecutor as such
respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING: YES. We agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator that the respondent Judge is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, which took effect on June 19, 1965,
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases is indeed lodged with the provincial or city prosecutor
of the province or city or with the municipal court of the city or capital of the province. Moreover, as early as April 5,
1967 the Department of Justice issued a circular relative to the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. No. 4363. Pertinent portion thereof reads:
It should be noted from these provisions that a complaint or information for libel may be filed only in the Court of First
Instance. The preliminary investigation of the criminal case may, however, be conducted by the city court of the city
or the municipal court of the capital of the province where the case is filed.
While we believe that the reliance of the respondent on the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 4363, was an honest mistake, we cannot, however condone his failure to keep himself
updated with the amendments and latest jurisprudence on the said statute. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.
Judicial competence requires no less

35 G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of
the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting
a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges
they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.They approached the
petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty
and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged

Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. Hence, the herein
petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which
were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a lawful warrantless arrest and search and seizure

Held:

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)

From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

36. [G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALEN-
CIA, accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.

Facts:

On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a
briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a
delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the
suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the
checkpoint.
At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tri-
cycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-
accused Rosita Nunga.[3] In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when
asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same baran-
gay. They brought with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag.
In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As
soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and per-
sonnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The
leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it
was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confisca-
tion receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course
of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996.
Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were mari-
juana leaves weighing eight kilos
Issue:

Whether or not the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers
who arrested both accused.

Held:

No. In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive
odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; [13] (b) where an informer positively identified the
accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously;[14] (c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped
and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of
marijuana;[15] (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Prov-
ince had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so;[16] (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to
which the accused belong -- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;[17] (g) where the arresting
officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a
previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; [18] (h)
where police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag,
would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;[19] and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he
was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset.[20]
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division
had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that
once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996,
the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were inter-
cepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs
in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstanc-
es, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi