Partido ng Manggagawa vs COMELEC

(GR No 164702, March 15, 2006)

The petition at bar involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any,
for winners in party-list elections. For failure of the respondent Commission to resolve the
substantive issues raised by petitioners and to cause the re-tabulation of the party-list votes
despite the lapse of time, petitioners PM and BUTIL filed the instant petition, they seek the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commission: a) to convene as the
National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System; b) to declare them as entitled to one (1)
additional seat each; c) to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees; d) to declare
other similarly situated party-list organizations as entitled to one (1) additional seat each; and
e) to immediately proclaim similarly situated parties' second nominees as duly elected
representatives to the House of Representatives.

Respondent Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submits that petitioners'
recourse to a petition for mandamus with this Court is improper. It raises the following
procedural issues: (a) the proper remedy from the assailed resolution of the respondent
Commission is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (b) the instant
action was filed out of time; and (c) failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution with the respondent Commission is fatal to petitioners' action.

Respondent Commission further contends that its duty to proclaim the second
nominees of PM and BUTIL is not ministerial but discretionary, hence, it is not subject
to the writ of mandamus.

Under the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. We have consistently ruled that where the duty of the
respondent Commission is ministerial, mandamus lies to compel its performance. A
purely ministerial act, as distinguished from a discretionary act, is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.

The case at bar is one of mandamus over which this Court has jurisdiction for it is
respondent Commission's ministerial duty to apply the formula as decided by this Court
after interpreting the existing law on party-list representation. It is given that this Court
has the ultimate authority to interpret laws and the Constitution. Respondent Commission
has no discretion to refuse enforcement of any decision of this Court under any guise or
guile.

Racaza vs Gozum
(GR No. 148759, June 8, 2006)

This is petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
Germelina Torres Racaza and Bernaldita Torres Paras seek the nullification of the decision as
well as the resolution rendered by the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
consequently dismissing the complaint for accion publiciana filed by petitioners against
respondent Ernesto Gozum.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case, holding that the lower court
had no jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana considering that it had been
filed before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the last letter of demand to respondent had
been made. The CA ruled that the proper remedy of petitioners should have been an
action for unlawful detainer filed with the first level court, or the municipal or
metropolitan trial court.
The allegations of a complaint determine the nature of the action as well as which court will
have jurisdiction over the case. Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement
when the action is based on the expiration of the lease. Undeniably, the foregoing averments
constitute a cause of action that is based primarily on unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any
land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
This summary action should be filed with the municipal trial courts within one year
after the occurrence of the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Beyond
the one-year period, the real right of possession may be recovered through the filing of an
accion publiciana with the regional trial courts.

Moreover, it is too late for respondent to invoke the defense of lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that the action was filed before the lapse of one year from the date of last demand.
Based on the records, respondent never pursued this line of argument in the proceedings
before the trial court and even in his appeal to the CA. While it is true that prior to the filing of
his answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the theory that the allegations
therein merely constituted an action for unlawful detainer, the motion did not raise any
jurisdictional issue relative to the second demand letter.

MERALCO vs ERB
(485 SCRA 19)

Private respondent Edgar L. Ti, filed a verified complaint before the ERB against petitioner
MERALCO. In it, Ti alleged inter alia that MERALCO unlawfully disconnected partially the
electric service in his business establishment. MERALCO filed its comment to Ti’s complaint in
and there moved for the dismissal thereof on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The ERB issued
an Order denying MERALCO’s motion for reconsideration.

Dissatisfied, MERALCO went to the CA on a petition for certiorari but was denied.

Petitioner MERALCO urges the resolution of the issue in the negative on the rationale that
there is no provision in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 172, series of 1987, the ERB charter,
granting that agency adjudicative jurisdiction over violations of R. A. No. 7832, let alone order
the restoration of a disconnected electric service. Such jurisdiction, as petitioner insisted all
along, is vested with the regular courts.

Petitioner MERALCO, being an electric service provider, is under the regulatory jurisdiction and
supervision of the ERB. It is fairly clear from the foregoing that the ERB can properly take
cognizance of respondent Ti’s complaint for reconnection of electric service in ERB Case,
touching as it does on the obligation of a public utility to supply adequate electricity and
proper service to the consuming public. It bears to reiterate that the ERB, by force of the
aforecited Sections 13 and 17(a) of C.A. No 146, as amended, in relation to Section 14 of E.O.
No. 172, has jurisdiction, control and supervision over all public services, their
franchises and properties, with power to investigate any matter respecting its
jurisdiction and to require any public service to furnish safe, adequate and proper
service as the public interest may require. To us, the power of control and supervision over
public utilities would otherwise be meaningless delegations were the ERB is precluded from
requiring a public utility to reconnect pending the determination of propriety of the
disconnection. For sure, respondent Ti’s complaint prayed for no other relief than the
immediate restoration in his business establishment of electric light and power service.
Administrative agencies, such as the ERB, are not considered courts; they are neither part of
the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The prohibition against the issuance
of restraining order or writs of injunction does not thus apply to ERB as the term "court"
contemplated in the aforequoted provision refers to a regular court belonging to the judicial
department. Parenthetically, Section 14 of R. A. No. 7832 authorizes the ERB to issue the
necessary implementing rules and regulations to ensure the efficient and effective
implementation of its provisions.