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Arnault vs Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

Nature of Action:
Petition for Habeas Corpus

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was
the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American
citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only
amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was
one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.


Whether the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt.


From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with

Ratio Decidendi:
The power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative functions. Experience has shown that mere requests for certain information are often
unavailing and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so, some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. Hence, When Arnault refused to divulge the
identity of the person to whom he gave an amount of P440.000, whose identity the Senate investigating
committee believed him to know, the Senate pronounced him guilty of contempt and ordered his
imprisonment until he would be willing to identify such person.
87. ……

The United States v. Cayetano Ramayrat

G.R. No. L-6874. March 8, 1912.

Nature of Action: Petition for review

Defendant, Caytano Ramayrat, was charged with a crime of gross disobedience to the authorities
committed refusing to deliver parcel of land to Sabino Vayson pursuant to the demand made by the
deputy sheriff. Judgment of the recovery of possession of parcel of land was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff sentencing the defendant to make the return and pay the cost of the case. The court sustained
a demurrer on February 9, 1911 interposed by the defense and therefore dismissed the complaint. The
demurrer was based on the ground that the facts do not constitute a crime. This appeal was taken by
the Attorney General.

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of gross disobedience to the authorities.

Upon the foregoing grounds we hold that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a crime;
we therefore affirm the order appealed from, with costs de officio.

The order issued by the justice of peace and alleged to have been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and
addressed, as was natural and proper to the competent sheriff and not to the defendant. It is exclusively
incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in
fact, he himself, and he alone was ordered by the justice of peace to place the plaintiff, Vayson, in
possession of the land.

Article 252 of the Penal Code consist of failure to comply with orders directly issued by the authorities in
the exercise of their official duties and not with legal provisions not with judicial decisions merely
declaratory of rights or obligations, such as those proper to be rendered in a civil suit. The duty of the
sheriff in the present case is to place Vayson, in the possession of the land. Instead of doing so, he
limited his action to ordering the defendant to deliver the land to Vayson. The sheriff did not only fail to
perform his function but he openly neglected to perform the same.
88. …..


CHAN FOOK, defendant-appellant

Nature of Action:

Chan Fook, a Chinese subject, was a passenger of the United States Military Transport South
Bend. Having been allowed by the immigration authorities to land, he left the boat on the same day. The
following day, he went back to the pier to get his baggage. After the search for the baggage in which
postcards of an indecent character were found, a customs agent attempted to search the body of the
accused, to which he objected. A dispute took place by which the secret agent seized the accused by the
arm with intent to search his body, after showing him his police badge. The accused resisted and struck
the agent on the stomach. Only when a customs inspector intervened and explained that Cruz was a
customs secret service agent, that he made no further resistance and allowed himself to be searched.


Whether or not Chan Fook committed the crime resistance and disobedience to public


The judgement appealed from is reversed, and the accused must be, and is hereby, acquitted
with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Ratio of Decidendi:

The gravity of a disobedience to an order of a person in public authority is measured and graded
by the circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it, and the real importance of the
transgression rather than by the source of the order disobeyed. And, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the present case, wherein the agent Cruz had exceeded his functions, and wherein the
accused acted in defense of the most highly esteemed of individual rights — the constitutional right to
be secured against unreasonable searches — we are of the opinion that there is no ground for finding
the accused guilty of the crime defined in article 252 of the Penal Code.
89. ….


[G.R. No. L-2578. July 31, 1951.]

Nature of Action: Appeal

Material Facts:

In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948, Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an
information charging him with the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed
on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, same province when he fired his sub-machine gun thereby injuring
Consorcia Pasinio. Thereafter he was arraigned in another case for having caused a public disturbance on
the same date.

His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of the
first information.

The motion to quash was granted, and the People appealed in due time.

Issue: W/N the lower court erred in its decision?


From the foregoing observations it follows that the court a quo made a mistake in dismissing the second
information. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is remanded for further
proceedings. So ordered.

Ratio Decidendi:
It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant’s having fired a sub-
machine gun. The first, however, charged him with physical injuries inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio thru
reckless imprudence. On the other hand the second information accuses him of having deliberately fired
the machine gun to cause a disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby producing panic among the
people present therein. The two informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime against
persons; but the other is an offense against public peace and order.
90. ……

The sentence must be "by reason of final judgment."

The crime of evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by a
convict by final judgment. Hence, if the convict escapes within 15 days from
the promulgation or notice of the judgment, without commencing to serve
the sentence or without expressly waiving in writing his right to appeal, he
is not liable under Art. 157. Detention prisoners and minor delinquents who
escape from confinement are not liable for evasion of service of sentence.
Detention prisoners are not convicts by final judgment since they are only
detained pending the investigation or the trial of the case against them.
Minor delinquents confined in the reformatory institution are not convicts,
because the sentence is suspended.
If the accused escaped while the sentence of conviction was under
appeal, he is not liable under Art. 157, the judgment not having become
final, and this is true even if his appeal was later dismissed because he had
escaped. (Curiano vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. L-8104, April 15, 1955)
Petitioner was convicted of robbery by the Court of First Instance of
Albay. He appealed from the decision, but, as he escaped during the pendency
of the appeal, his appeal was dismissed. As a result, he was prosecuted
for evasion of service of sentence and was sentenced to the corresponding
penalty. While petitioner was serving his sentence in the robbery case, he
again escaped from his place of confinement. He was again prosecuted for
evasion of service of sentence, and pleaded guilty.
The Solicitor General agrees with the claim of petitioner that the
sentence imposed for the first alleged evasion is null and void for the reason
that when he escaped, the decision of the trial court in the robbery case
has not yet become final. The petitioner was sustained. (Curiano vs. CFI,
[Unrep.] 96 Phil. 982)
91. …..


G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948

Petition for Review.

On or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro
during which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by
virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for
attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence
by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.

Whether or not accused is guilty of evasion of the service of the sentence.

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by
virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the

Yes. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has
been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte wherein the Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor
General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was
ratified by the Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, where it was held that one
evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of
conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its
provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
92. ….

[G.R. No. L-1782. February 2, 1948.]


Nature: Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Facts: Petitioner, Fidel B Fortunato seeks his immediate release wherein his aggregate penalty
is more than 20 years of imprisonment. He raises the following grounds:
1. The recommitment order directing the confinement of the petitioner for the unexpired portion of
his maximum sentence was illegal and otherwise premature, because (1) petitioner's one-day trip to
Santa Rosa, Laguna, merely to get money from his relatives, did not constitute a violation of his, and
(2) the mere filing against the petitioner of several complaints for estafa, without final judgment of
conviction, did not constitute a violation of a condition of his parole.
2. The additional penalty of 10 years of imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner, was illegal and in
excess of the jurisdiction of the court, because his conviction for illegal possession of counterfeit
bills should not be counted for habitual delinquency purposes, since said conviction is not for
robbery, theft, estafa or falsification. In other words, petitioner's contention is that his previous
conviction for illegal possession of counterfeit bills was wrongly included.
3. The petitioner is entitled to a special allowance of one-fifth of his aggregate penalty on
account of his failure to escape from his place of confinement during the war.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be released from imprisonment based on the following
Ruling: It appearing that the petitioner has not yet served his total term of imprisonment, as
the periods sought by him to be deducted are not allowable, the petition will be, as the same is
hereby, denied without costs. So ordered.
The court explained the following based on the grounds raised by petitioner:
1. Petitioner's position is untenable since it may be held that he broke a condition of the
parole; namely, that he would not commit any crime, since the petitioner was
prosecuted for and finally convicted of the series of estafa committed by him during the
period of his parole. Petitioner's contention that the recommitment order was
premature, because it came down before his convictions, is now rather academic, even
assuming that final conviction is necessary in order to constitute a violation of the
condition in dispute.
2. On the inclusion of his previous conviction to support that he is a habitual delinquent,
such mistake, even if true, cannot be corrected in a proceeding for habeas corpus, for
there is virtually no difference between the alleged error and that pointed out
in Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140, wherein it was held that the error of
counting as separate convictions various convictions which should be counted as one
due to the proximity of the commission of the crimes, should "have been corrected by
appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an undue exercise of judicial
power which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding.”
3. The court ruled on the third ground that "the special allowance for loyalty authorized by
articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having
evaded service of their sentence by leaving the penal institution, give themselves up
within two days," and not to those who have not escaped.
93. …..

People of the Philippines versus Remigio Pontillas

GR No. L-45267 June 15, 1938

Action: an appeal of the decision of the lower court

Facts: On December 1935, accused, having been granted on September 1922, by the
Governor-General, a pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of his sentence of six
years one day imposed upon him by Court of First instance of Manila for the crime of
Bigamy, which he began to serve on February 14, 1921, subject to the condition that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines, which was accepted by
him on September 8, 1922, causing his immediate release from the Bilibid Prisons,
violated the condition of his pardon by committing the crime of damage to property thru
reckless driving, for which he was received again in Bilibid Prisons on June 26, 1936, to
suffer thirty days' subsidiary imprisonment in lieu of P61 fine and P60.30 indemnity
imposed upon him by the Municipal Court. An information was then filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon such information for the evasion of sentence of which accused
interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute a public
offense which was sustained by the trial court.

Issue: Whether a person who has been conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive
be criminally prosecuted for violation of a conditional pardon on the ground that,
contrary to the condition that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands"?

Ruling: In view of all the foregoing, the question raised must be answered in the
affirmative. Wherefore, the appealed resolution is hereby reversed and it is ordered that
the trial proceed in accordance with law. With costs de oficio. So ordered.

Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court cited De Leon versus Director of Prisons where it
was held that a conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties: the Chief
Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does not become
perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all its conditions
which accordingly, if it is a contract, it cannot be doubted that the pardoned convict is
bound to fulfil its conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but
according to its strict terms. Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation as
before he was pardoned and he could be compelled to serve the remainder of his
sentenced, which he has not yet served.
94. …..



G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987

Nature of Action: Original Petition of Habeas Corpus

Relevant Facts:

Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa. In April 1979, he was pardoned by
the president on the condition that he shall not violate the penal laws again. He accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with
multiple crimes of estafa, and in 1986, the Chairman of the Board of Paroles Nepali Gonzales petitioned
for the cancellation of the pardon of Torres. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon and, later, an
order was issued for his arrest and recommitment. Torres appealed the before the Supreme Court
averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.


Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.


This Petition is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi:

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either (1) a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (2) it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional

Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
95. …

G.R. No. L-1809 January 23, 1948


Nature of the Action

This case was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the
respondent for illegally detaining the former when the President has already granted the
petitioner absolute pardon on December 23, 1946 for the crime of murder.

Material Facts

On June 5, 1945, petitioner was convicted by the lower court for the crime of murder, sentencing
him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. After his conviction, the petitioner evaded his sentence
on October 25,1945 and was prosecuted and convicted for evasion of sentence in March 22,
1946. However, the petitioner again evaded his sentence, this time on April 8, 1946 and was
prosecuted and convicted on August 20, 1946 for evasion of sentence. The President, through the
recommendation of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner absolute parole
for the crime of murder on December 23, 1946.


So, was the petitioner correct that by virtue of the absolute pardon, not only the burden of
serving the penalty for murder was removed, but also the burden of serving the penalty for
evasion of services would also be removed?


Petition is therefore denied. So ordered.

Ratio Decidendi

No, the petitioner was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that the absolute pardon only remitted
the penalty for the crime of murder and not of evasion of serving the sentence because he was
convicted of such offense prior to the granting of absolute pardon and that he evaded it when he
was still serving the penalty for the crime of murder.
96. …..

It makes no difference, for purposes of the effect of quasi-recidivism

under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which
an accused is serving sentence, at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, falls under said Code or under a special law.
97. ….

The People of the Philippines v Nicolas Layson, et. al.

G.R. No. L-25177. October 31, 1969.

Nature of Action:
Automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Davao

On 17 January 1964 the four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao
Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for various felonies. Early morning of that day the four,
armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell of the victim. Without warning and acting in concert they
swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They barricaded themselves and refused to surrender to the
trustees who came to the scene of the crime. They agreed to surrender only to supervising prison guard,
Vicente Afurong. Gasang died shortly after being brought to the hospital.

Three of the four defendants admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups a number of times and the other defendant stated that he killed Gasang because he spat on
him a week before. They plotted to kill Gasang a few days before the slaying. Upon arraignment the four
accused, assisted with their counsel pleaded guilty. The Court on 30 September 1965 rendered its
decision declaring the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt with mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty and aggravating circumstance of recidivism and/or reiteracion and qualifying circumstance of
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength and hereby imposing upon them the
sentence of DEATH.

Whether or not the four accused is deserving of the sentence of DEATH.

Accordingly, the judgement a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cesar RAgub, Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino Gasang,
is herby increased to P12, 000, to be paid jointly and severally by the four accused.

Court held to consider the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty and the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation and treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism.

It is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity.
Therefore it rule out any defense of passion and obfuscation from the acts of the victim. Treachery was
proven to be present during the commission of the crime, the victim was killed in a manner insuring
utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the offense which resultant incapability of
the victim to offer resistance. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder and the abuse of superior is
absorbed in treachery. Evident premeditation then becomes an ordinary aggravating which is offset
against the plea of guilty. Special Aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism was correctly considered
against the accused since all of them are still serving their respective sentence when they committed the
offense. Reiteracion was erroneously attached since reiteracion requires that the offender shall have
already served out the penalty of his prior offenses.
98. …….Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency vs. Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph

GR No. 196390 September 28, 2011

Nature of Action:

Petition for Review


On April 13, 2009, the state charged Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously selling, trading and giving away prohibited drugs. Also on April 16, 2009 Brodett had been charged for
the willful, unlawful and felonious possession of dangerous drugs. In the course of the proceedings in the RTC,
Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non- Drug Evidence. He averred that during his arrest, PDEA had seized several
personal non- drug effects from him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car owned by a third person, Myra S. Brodett.
The PDEA refused to return his personal effects despite his repeated demands. The Office of the City Prosecutor
refused to return the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of Sec. 5 RA
9165. November 4, 2009, the RTC directed the release of the car. PDEA assailed the order in the Court of Appeals
by petition for certiorari which was later on denied.


Whether or not the court may order the release of the Honda Accord car, belonging to a third person, and
other non-drug effects..


We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act. IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is DENIED.

Ratio Deceidendi:

Ordering the release of the car when the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of
Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived
therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it. The
status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the
RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such.
To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties’ access to it as evidence. As
such, the RTCs assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
99. ……

G.R. No. 88282 May 6, 1992




Edwin Pascual was charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.

On May 28, 1988 at around 7:10 o'clock in the evening, Police elements conducted a "buy-bust"
operation at Pateros, Metro Manila where the accused allegedly indulged in the illicit trade of
marijuana. They spotted the accused in a dimly lit vacant lot talking to a person and when the
poseur-buyer came near them, the accused asked him: "Iiskor ka ba". The poseur-buyer answered
yes, the accused told him to wait for a while as he would come back. A few moments later, the
accused appeared and handed to the poseur-buyer three (3) tea bags of marijuana worth 30 pesos.


W/n trial court erred in finding no violation against arrest without warrant and against
unreasonable search.


PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification above indicated changing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment.


This contention is unmeritorious. Accused was arrested while in the act of selling marijuana to
one of the police; he was caught in flagrante delicto. It is clear that the constitutional guarantee
against warrantless arrest, as well as unreasonable searches and seizure, was not violated.
100. ……

G.R. No. 176157 June 18, 2009

[Formerly G.R. No. 155937]


Nature of Action: Petition for Review


On November 7, 1993, around seven o’clock in the evening, AAA was inside their house. She was with
appellant (allegedly her father), her sister BBB and her brothers. While watching television with her
siblings, AAA was suddenly pulled by the appellant towards the room of their house and was told to look
for his shorts. AAA asked her brother to look for the shorts but the latter did not obey her, so she looked
for them herself.

After AAA found his shorts, appellant again pulled AAA towards the room, and this time, he took off AAA’s
shorts and panty. AAA cried and tried to resist appellant’s advances. In response to AAA’s resistance,
appellant forced, boxed, and then pushed her towards the bed. Appellant then laid on top of her and
inserted his penis into her private part while embracing her tightly. After completing his beastly act,
appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what he did. AAA, however, confided to BBB that appellant raped
her. AAA and BBB likewise reported the incident to their mother, EEE, who sought the help of FFF, AAA’s
aunt. Dr. Vergara examined AAA and found that she had healed lacerations on her hymen and that was
eight to nine weeks pregnant.

For his part, appellant denied the charge against him and raised the defense of alibi. He alleged that on
that day, he was in Quiapo, Manila, as a stay-in plumber because he had a three-month contract to install
water pipes.

RTC convicted appellant for simple rape and the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC
decision thus this instant petition.





WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION.

Ratio Decidendi:

To obtain a conviction for qualified rape, however, the minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must be both alleged in the information and proved with certainty. In the case at bar, only the
circumstance of minority was alleged in the information and the prosecution failed to show independent
proof to establish the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Thus, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appellant may only be convicted of simple rape and
not qualified rape.