Académique Documents
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CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968,
specifically directed against the following observation therein made:
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by
their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the
petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration
of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct"
and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After
mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case,
however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded
to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay,
and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is
patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the
subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were
obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but
calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of
stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very
start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the
legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable
dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion,
causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than
eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet
to be satisfied.
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this
morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the
fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view
thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence
in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent
motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order
of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do
for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied
stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in
the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on
December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the
said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never
fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the
said motion for reconsideration.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil
cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and
regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ,
but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the
projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks
should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in
the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed
of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting
satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not
be branded as having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted
statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the
petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the
sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove
the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to
thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the
suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper
remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the
said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their
territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the
writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the
termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez
spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done
so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when
she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in
the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced
in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9,
1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually
deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with
urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the
said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the
consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition
for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners'
counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not
to be condemned."
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case
but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the
decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the
petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel"
may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel"
we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the
inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case
39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of
November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty.
Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar
about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners'
Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior
to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he
"became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N.
Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the
urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case
39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the
law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968,
specifically directed against the following observation therein made:
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by
their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the
petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration
of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct"
and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After
mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case,
however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded
to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay,
and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is
patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the
subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were
obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but
calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of
stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very
start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the
legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable
dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion,
causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than
eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet
to be satisfied.
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this
morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the
fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view
thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence
in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent
motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order
of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do
for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied
stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in
the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on
December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the
said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never
fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the
said motion for reconsideration.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil
cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and
regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ,
but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the
projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks
should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in
the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed
of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting
satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not
be branded as having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted
statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the
petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the
sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove
the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to
thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the
suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper
remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the
said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their
territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the
writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the
termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez
spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done
so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when
she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in
the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced
in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9,
1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually
deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with
urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the
said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the
consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition
for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners'
counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not
to be condemned."
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case
but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the
decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the
petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel"
may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel"
we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the
inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case
39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of
November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty.
Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar
about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners'
Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior
to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he
"became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N.
Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the
urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case
39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the
law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint
charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of
the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do
not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of
the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation,
report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman
Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented
evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel,
cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel
on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in
the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging
respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the
complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and
has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows
that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of
the Philippine Bar.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the
hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant
submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to
present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to
present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963),
the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where
respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine
the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule
139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in
the complaint.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when
the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left
for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year
telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September
and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she
went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent
and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he
and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that
complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity
and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth
certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate
of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by
the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria
Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November
3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred
that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact
that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the
testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.);
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section
2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege
to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No.
376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had
sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to
show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the
charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall
under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar
as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a
settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can
not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de
Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm.
Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly
immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.
(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
BENGZON, J.:
In October 1954 Josefina Mortel filed in the Manila court of first instance a
complaint against Anacleto F. Aspiras and Cesar Aspiras (Civil Case No. 24414)
alleging substantially:
The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in a court
resolution explaining that this case "is a reiteration substantially of the old case
No. 19115" . . . which was "dismissed upon separate motions of both parties" and
such "dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits in accordance with
the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court".
Civil Case No. 19115 was admittedly filed March 1953. The allegations of the
complaint therein were practically the same as those in the present litigation;
before filing of the answer, plaintiff Josefina Mortel submitted on April 9, 1953 a
motion to dismiss her complaint "stating that she was in fact and in truth married
to the defendant Cesar Aspiras and Anacleto F. Aspiras participated in the
solemnization of the marriage as the father of Cesar Aspiras, and that she filed
her said complaint at the height of anger and thus the contents thereof did not
represent her true sentiments" (29 Record on Appeal). It is also admitted that on
April 1, 1953 the defendants in said Civil Case No. 19115 presented a motion to
dismiss, asserting the plaintiff had no cause of action because she "was a school
teacher, knew that she contracted the marriage with Cesar Aspiras and that
there were no misrepresentation or fraud perpetrated against her." (15, 29
Record on Appeal.)
There is no question that on April 11, 1953 the court issued, in said civil case, an
order stating, "upon separate motions of both parties the complaint is hereby
dismissed".
For the sake of clearness the rules cited by both sides are quoted:
SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff . — An action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service of the answer. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without prejudice, except that. . . .
In the light of the above provisions, let us examine what transpired in Civil Case
No. 19115. Before the answer was made, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Withdraw
and/or Dismiss"; and she asked the court "that the complaint . . . be withdrawn
and/or dismissed". At first glance her pleading does not fall exactly within the
letter of the "notice" contemplated by section 1. In addition it asked for a court
order of dismissal.
But if it does not fall under section 1, it may be considered as a motion which the
court could dispose of under section 2. When acting under such section to court
could consult the wishes of the defendant. The defendant may object; but the
court may order dismissal, and such order is without prejudice. Wherefore if the
defendant agrees, the order is a fortiori also without prejudice. Unless otherwise
expressly stated, of course.1awphil.net
Now then, the defendant's motion to dismiss in April 1953 could in legal
contemplation be deemed a conformity to plaintiff's motion to withdraw.
Therefore, the court's order upon both motions should be without prejudice,
under section 2.
On the other hand, viewing the pleading with liberality a and seeing thru the
form to the substance, the plaintiff's "motion to withdraw or dismiss" of April 9
amounted practically to a "notice" of dismissal, before service of the answer,
because it advised the defendants of plaintiff's desire to withdraw. Its caption
did not alter nor disguise its nature as plaintiff's statement of her determination to
drop the matter. It contemplated, it is true, a court order of dismissal; but it was
not thereby taken out of the purview of section 1, since even after a "notice"
given under said section, a court's order of dismissal would not be incongrous.
Defendant's conformity, if openly given, would be surplusage, and would not
modify the ensuing juridical situation.
As we see section 1, when the plaintiff files the notice, the matter is dismissed
without the necessity of a court order; but a court order may subsequently be
entered definitely taking cognizance of the withdrawal and shelving
the expediente, without thereby throwing the matter out of the scope of said
section 1 (b).
Being then of the opinion that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 19115 could be
classified either under section 1 or under section 2, we cannot but declare
section 4 to the inapplicable. In other words, we hold the dismissal to be without
prejudice. At most, defendants may contend that the order of April 11, 1953 was
also an order sustaining their motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, such
order barring subsequent litigation. In fact such was their contention in the court
below. (p. 27 Record on Appeal.) However, we do not believe that the court's
order meant to declare that plaintiff had no cause of action. It did not say, "For
the reasons stated in defendant's motion" the case is dismissed. It merely stated
"upon separate motions of both parties the complaint is dismissed" — which
ordinarily could mean "since both parties ask for dismissal, the case is dismissed".
In all probability the court did not stop to consider the merits of the controversy.
Indeed it would be a debatable point whether the court could still properly
delve into the merits of the case after plaintiff had withdrawn. b
Anyway, even granting that the court's order also held that no cause of action
existed, the situation would be one wherein the order was both provisional and
final in character (if that is legally possible). Then it would not be fair to apply
such finality to plaintiff, since she would thereby be forever barred from
submitting her claim to the courts, although she had reasons to believe the
order was a provisional dismissal. On the other hand, considering the order as
provisional, defendants would not be unduly prejudiced nor definitely harmed,
because they are not deprived of the opportunity to defend themselves.
Defendants should have insisted either that the court make a specific ruling
upon their motion or that the dismissal be expressly
made with prejudice.lawphil.net
It may be stated that in this connection that we are all the more inclined to
permit this new litigation, because in another expediente we have just decided,
(of which we may take judicial notice) (Adm. Case No. 154, Mortel vs.Aspiras),
evidence has been introduced indicating that the plaintiff's motion for dismissal
had been prepared at the request of defendant Anacleto Aspiras who
promised plaintiff full support, — and that there is prima facie merit to her claims
for annulment and damages.
This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the
purpose of assisting the parties to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their controversies — without regard to technical objections
that do not square with the ends of justice.
The appealed order is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.
PER CURIAM:
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of
Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan
Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to
respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason
Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had
done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus
which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she
had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her
penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order
and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the
Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both
parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating
Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put
clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not
appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and
rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986,
notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail
once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor
accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present
evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were
given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so
on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report
and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of
the complainant in the following manner:
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and
respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge
Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981,
respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When
the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of
respondent with complainant.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a
spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's
evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent
Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by
which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito
being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second
marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew
or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case
law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good
faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed
valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is
shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that
her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being
supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents.
After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant,
respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his
actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of
the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of
his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to
take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said
through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her
bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal
necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying
another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret
while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held
such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent
filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all
the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense,
averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man
whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the
Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant,
testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-
sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the
allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge
of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further
alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's
vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval
of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from
enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her
subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present
respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because
nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal
knowledge of the complainant.
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the
hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar
Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them
every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not
much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that
they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February
14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban
testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife
and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however,
are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony,
therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the
accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than
three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the
premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would
render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying
that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the
report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of
the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the
Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report
of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy
this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in
the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral
standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once
pronounced by the Court:
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame
for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is
a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18,
1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed
from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3)
years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the
court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the
said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent
reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly.
complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the
case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual
intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of
respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede,
she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where
complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that
respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent
would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion
of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing
his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited
period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is
a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such
requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in
the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its
members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to
define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
SO ORDERED.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the
Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner
described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his
answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of
the report reads as follows:
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard
by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because
of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone,
ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him.
Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she
was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for
Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5,
1959).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but
to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited
himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she
completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse
on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one
week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in
December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times,
mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the
opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract
marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will
permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster
parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child,
something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a
sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good
moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him
"to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August,
1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented
himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing
that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists.
This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations,
and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have
been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to
take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his
adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same
misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership
to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a
lawyer.
RECOMMENDATION
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent
did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other
misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he
appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe
to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render
judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office
as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense
that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said
complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape
and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule
128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing
for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive
the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the
parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to
submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That
no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent
when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is
not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and
her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red
Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time
(t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees.
When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single'
(t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at
respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked
her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on'
(t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and
respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942(
t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as
husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after
their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and
respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n.
27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines
Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he
told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga,
she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a
wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to
Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she
is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his
first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was
already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-
law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began
courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband,
Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on
October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on
February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that
her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that
from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been
living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks
thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was
already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga;
that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in
the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had
left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to
return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia
strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot
separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told
him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in
fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no
choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition
to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest
intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a
married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his
petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in
1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and
believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from
the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did
not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition
to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators,
pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts
on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after
he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that
the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on
April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina
Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman,
are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant
was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral
ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor
General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her.
From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called
him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her
mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience
and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not
resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal
liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity
expected of a member of the bar.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney
and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an
attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice
of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
(Emphasis supplied).
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he
admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not
controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of
decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the
respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in
that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse
for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to
extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the
complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means
he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then
free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married
woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct
therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his
authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and
perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally
charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense
charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment.
Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he
may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of
himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is
clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and
not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed:
An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral
character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of
personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted
to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to
escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626,
citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447;
In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612).
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles,
and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to
remain a member of the bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y.
Laguitan charged Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16
November 1987, referred the Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation,
Report and Recommendation.
During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February
1988, only respondent and his counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant
had not been duly served with notice of the hearing. The hearing scheduled for
24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent
and upon failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor
General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for
investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order dated 18 August 1988, the
Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both
complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings
within ten (10) days from notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20
September 1988 because only complainant appeared, respondent having
failed to present himself despite due notice to him. The hearing of 20 September
1988 was again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither complainant nor her
counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14
November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14
November 1988 was rescheduled two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988
and second to 17 January 1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained
failure of respondent to appear at the hearing on 17 January 1989, required
petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter submit
the case for resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's counsel on
31 January 1989.
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors submitted to us its findings and recommendation, which may be
summed up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and
in time became lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband
and wife. As a result, complainant bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now
about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In
the course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that respondent Tinio,
before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that the
prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with
respondent until eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children by
respondent Tinio were abandoned by the latter in November 1986. Feeling
helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's parents in
supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's parents
gave her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio
appeared before the IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his
illicit relationship with complainant and his having begotten two (2) children by
her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate
children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of
the IBP Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended
from the practice of law "not for having cohabited with the complainant, but for
refusal to support his illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in effect until
respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the
practice of law but not merely because he has failed in his obligation to support
the children complainant bore him but also because for a prolonged period of
time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of conduct
inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for
the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine
Bar, 2Concubinage imports moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the
basic social institution of marriage.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of
this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in
Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his
job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino
Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G.
Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and
children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado
lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova
introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely
Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish
a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to
support his legitimate family.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board.
We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and
necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is
required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that
"the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition
for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character
that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating
to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards
of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the
inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being
already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's
conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his
mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son
after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which
he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period
of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife,
cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them.
Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the
community at large.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
ATTY. DANILO S. VILLARAMA, JR.,
VELASQUEZ, PEREZ, and
Respondent. MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD)[1] with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in
her Position Paper[2] as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover
and common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the
mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a
religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which
he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in
November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval,
Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his
instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When
she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her
spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale
food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including a
certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and
Recommendation[12] dated September 29, 2008, found that:
xxxx
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners
evaluation and recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[15] When a lawyers moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyers Oath reading:
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts
which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer.[21]
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately
executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.