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The Facts About

“DIRTY BOMBS”
Prepared for
THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH

By
Kathleen Meister, M.S.
P. Andrew Karam, Ph.D., CHP

Art Director
Jennifer Lee

June 2005

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH


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mission.
The Facts About

“DIRTY BOMBS”
01 Executive Summary
TABLE OF CONTENTS
01 Introduction

02 Radiological Dispersal Devices

03 Differences Between Radiological and Nuclear Weapons

04 History of Radiological Dispersal Devices

05 Health Effects of Radiation

06 Economic Consequences of a Radiological Attack

07 What to Do in Case of a Dirty Bomb Attack

08 Policies and Regulations

09 Summary

09 References
The Facts About 1
“DIRTY BOMBS”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Dirty bombs,” more correctly called radiological dis- • The cost of recovery after a dirty bomb attack could
persal devices, are weapons that are designed to be reduced, without increasing risks to human
spread potentially harmful radioactivity. The prin- health, by modifying regulations pertaining to per-
cipal type combines a conventional explosive with missible levels of residual radioactivity so that they
radioactive material. are based on real risk rather than the ability to
detect ever-lower levels of contamination.
• Dirty bombs are not nuclear weapons. Unlike a
nuclear bomb, which could cause hundreds of thou- • In the event of an explosion, experts advise people to
sands of deaths and devastate an entire city, a dirty move away from the immediate area (by walking at
bomb would most likely cause a few hundred least several blocks from the explosion), go
deaths at the most. Physical damage would be com- indoors, and turn on local radio or TV for instruc-
parable to that produced by other conventional tions (including instructions about testing for
explosions, and radioactive contamination would radioactive contamination). If it is determined that
probably affect an area of only a few city blocks. the explosion involved radioactivity, people who
were in the immediate area should remove and save
• Most deaths and injuries from a dirty bomb attack clothing and take a shower if possible. Experts rec-
would result from the explosion itself, rather than ommend that people should not handle any object
the radioactive material. However, the presence of thrown off by an explosion and should not take
radioactive contamination could lead to panic, dis- potassium iodide unless specifically advised to do
ruption, and the need for costly and time-consum- so. Driving away from an attack is also unwise,
ing cleanup. since it can hamper emergency response and cause
crashes.

INTRODUCTION

Of all the possible types of terrorist attacks, those be made, the possible health and economic conse-
involving radioactivity are among the most feared. quences of an attack, the actions that citizens should
One type of attack that involves radioactivity is the use and should not take if a radiological attack occurs, and
of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty the types of policy changes that may need to be consid-
bomb.” Misconceptions about dirty bombs may lead ered to facilitate prevention of radiological attacks and
people to be more anxious than the facts justify and recovery from them. The principal source of informa-
might even prompt some people to take inappropriate tion for this booklet was a technical manuscript enti-
actions in the event of a dirty bomb explosion. tled “Radiological Terrorism,” written by Dr. P.
Andrew Karam of the Rochester Institute of
This report by the American Council on Science and Technology. Additional information sources are listed
Health summarizes the scientific facts about radiolog- at the end of this report.
ical dispersal devices — what they are, how they might
2 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL
DEVICES
Radiological dispersal devices, also called radiologi- take unwise or even unsafe actions. (For example,
cal weapons, are devices that are designed to spread people who mistakenly believed that they would need
potentially harmful radioactivity as part of a hostile to get many miles away from a dirty bomb attack in
act. The principal type of radiological dispersal device order to be safe might drive away at dangerous speeds
combines a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, or crowd the roads with their cars, thus interfering
with radioactive material. This is the type of device with access to the scene by emergency vehicles and
that is often referred to as a “dirty bomb.” When a also causing a risk of death and injury from motor
dirty bomb explodes, the explosion itself can cause vehicle crashes far greater than the risk of death or
considerable damage — just as any explosion can. In injury from the attack itself.) Costly cleanup efforts
addition, the area surrounding the explosion may would almost certainly be necessary, and the buildings
and facilities in the affected neighborhood (probably
become contaminated by radioactive material.1
several city blocks) might be unavailable for a pro-
longed period of time. In addition, as has been seen in
Although the exact details would vary depending
incidents of accidental radioactive contamination,
upon the type and amount of radioactive material
anxiety and economic disruption due to stigmatization
used, as well as the nature of the explosive device,
of the affected area might continue for long periods of
most deaths and injuries from a dirty bomb would
time.
almost certainly result from the explosion itself, rather
than the radioactive material. People who were closest
Dirty bombs are not classified as Weapons of Mass
to the explosion — and therefore most likely to have
Destruction because the number of deaths and injuries
been injured by it — would also be the most likely to
they are likely to cause is relatively small. However,
be exposed to dangerous amounts of radioactivity.
they are sometimes referred to as “Weapons of Mass
Some radioactive material might be spread beyond the
Disruption” because of the many disruptive effects
damaged area — perhaps to a distance of a few city
that they could have on a community.
blocks — but the intensity of contamination would be
much less than that in the immediate vicinity of the
Although there have been no successful radiological
explosion. Experts expect that there would be few, if
attacks, it is possible to get a rough idea of the type
any, deaths or serious illnesses caused by radiation in
and extent of problems that might result from the
individuals who had not been in the immediate vicin-
radioactive component of a dirty bomb from instances
ity of the blast for a prolonged period of time.
of accidental radioactive contamination.
Although the radioactive component of a dirty bomb
One well-known incident that involved widespread
would probably cause few deaths or injuries, problems
radioactive contamination occurred in Goiania, Brazil,
of other kinds would result. The presence of radioac-
in 1987. A cancer treatment facility had closed, and its
tivity would make the jobs of firefighters and rescue
radiation therapy source, which contained radioactive
personnel who respond to the emergency more diffi-
cult. Healthcare facilities might have to cope with cesium, had been left behind.2 Unsuspecting residents
injured patients who are also contaminated with found the abandoned equipment, and someone opened
radioactivity. Large numbers of people might seek the canister containing the radioactive cesium.
care out of concern over possible contamination, pos- Fascinated by the blue powder they found, residents
sibly overloading healthcare facilities. Widespread played with it and spread it on their bodies, unaware
panic could develop, and this might prompt people to of its radioactivity. By the time the nature of the mate-

1. It is also possible to design a radiological attack that does not 2. Obviously, this should not have happened. Regulations should be in
involve an explosive. For example, a powerful source of radioactivity place in all countries to require that sources of radioactivity no longer
might be hidden in a public place. Terrorists might also spread radioac- in use are disposed of safely. Unfortunately, the extent of control over
tivity covertly or try to contaminate the food or water supply. radioactive sources, both at the time of the Goiania incident and today,
varies greatly in different parts of the world.
The Facts About 3
“DIRTY BOMBS”

rial was known, nearly 250 people had been exposed to expensive. However, the social impact was far greater;
elevated radiation levels; four died of radiation sick- even a decade later, Goiania residents were stigmatized
ness. by their association with the region. This stigmatization
included an economic impact because sales of agricul-
During the response to the Goiania incident, more than tural products from Goiania declined for absolutely no
3,000 cubic meters of contaminated materials were reason related to food safety or health.
removed for disposal and over 100,000 persons were
surveyed for contamination at the city’s soccer stadium
(of whom only a few hundred were actually contami-
nated). The recovery process was time-consuming and

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A radiological weapon (dirty bomb) is very different


from a nuclear weapon (atomic bomb). In a nuclear
weapon, energy is produced by splitting uranium or plu-
tonium atoms in such a way that enormous amounts of
energy are released in a very brief period of time. The
resulting explosion is huge and can devastate a very large
area. In a radiological weapon, the explosive itself is a
conventional one; it releases a much smaller amount of
energy and causes much less destruction. The radioactive
material present in the bomb is dispersed by the explo-
sion, but it does not cause or participate in the explosion;
the explosion in this instance is not a nuclear blast.
Nuclear bombing of Hiroshima during World War II.
To understand the difference in magnitude between con- Photo by US Army
ventional and nuclear bombs, it may be helpful to com-
pare a large conventional bombing — the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in
1995 — with the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima during
World War II. The bomb used in Oklahoma City was
equivalent to a few tons of TNT; the bomb detonated over
Hiroshima was approximately 10,000 times more power-
ful. In Oklahoma City, 168 people were killed, the target
building was destroyed, and nearby buildings were seri-
ously damaged. In Hiroshima, nearly 100,000 people
were killed, and an entire city was virtually destroyed.

An attack with a large radiological weapon might com-


bine the physical destruction and casualty level of an
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building after bombing attack.
Oklahoma City-type bombing with a small number of Photo by Oklahoma City Police Department
additional radiation-related casualties and substantial
radiation-related disruption similar to that resulting from
the Goiania incident.
4 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”

HISTORY OF RADIOLOGICAL
DISPERSAL DEVICES

The idea of radiological weapons is not new. The must be obtained — most likely either by theft or
possibility of using bombs that would distribute by smuggling them from countries where they are
radioactivity in enemy territory as military weapons available for legal or illegal purchase. Second, the
was considered as early as 1941. Today, radiologi- materials must then be incorporated into a bomb —
cal weapons are no longer considered practical for a difficult task, since working with radioactive
military use; instead, they are potential terrorist materials can be hazardous. Obviously, many ter-
weapons. rorists are not deterred by sacrificing their lives, but
a terrorist would need sufficient working time to
No radiological dispersal device has ever been suc- complete his work; it is hard to construct a device if
cessfully used as a weapon. However, attempts the terrorists working on it receive an incapacitat-
have been made. In 1997, Chechen terrorists set but ing radiation dose within 15 minutes, for example.
did not explode a device containing radioactive Finally, once constructed, the device must be trans-
cesium in a Moscow park. In 2002, an arrest was ported to the destination and detonated without
made in the U.S. of a person involved in an alleged being discovered.
dirty bomb plot. In several instances, radioactive
materials that might be suitable for use in a radio- Each of the steps in this process suggests ways in
logical dispersal device have been stolen, and which radiological attacks may be prevented. For
attempts have been made to smuggle or sell such example, increased security at facilities that use
materials. Thus, it is clear that terrorists continue to radioactive materials, such as hospitals and
be interested in the possibility of radiological research laboratories, can help to deter theft, and
attacks. increased use of radiation detectors at border cross-
ings can make it easier to detect smuggling of
Constructing and detonating a dirty bomb are not radioactive materials.
easy tasks, however. First, radioactive materials

HEALTH EFFECTS OF
RADIATION
The health effects of radiation exposure vary, In the event of a radiological attack, people are
depending upon the type of radioactive material, likely to find themselves in situations where they
the dose of radiation to which a person is exposed, have an opportunity to aid a victim of the attack,
and the route of exposure (e.g., inhalation, inges- and they may wonder whether it is safe to do this in
tion, external exposure). Exposure to very high spite of the possibility of radioactive contamina-
doses of radiation can cause radiation sickness, tion. For example, a bystander might see an injured
which is fatal at very high doses but is milder and person with dust on his clothing coming out of a
temporary at lower doses. Contact with radioactive building where an explosion had taken place.
material can also cause radiation burns, which can Would it be safe for the bystander to help the vic-
also range from mild to severe. In most dirty bomb tim move to a safe place or to provide first aid?
scenarios, however, radiation exposure levels Experts say that the answer is yes; contaminated
would be far lower than those shown to cause these patients do not pose a hazard to those who are help-
effects, except perhaps for individuals in immediate ing them. Emergency responders and medical per-
proximity to the blast. Unlike the situation with a sonnel can and should help these people;
nuclear attack, widespread radiation sickness bystanders can do so as well without jeopardizing
would not result from a dirty bomb attack. their own health.
The Facts About 5
“DIRTY BOMBS”

It is often reported that the initial symptoms of Another health issue that is often misunderstood is
radiation sickness include nausea, vomiting, and the effect of radiation exposure during pregnancy.
diarrhea. This is correct, but it is important to People often believe, incorrectly, that any expo-
remember that these are nonspecific symptoms sure to radiation during pregnancy, no matter how
that can also be produced by many other causes, small, will have disastrous effects on the unborn
including stress (as millions of people who have child. Thus, women who had routine dental X-
become “sick to their stomachs” in response to rays before realizing that they were pregnant
upsetting events can attest). In the aftermath of a sometimes panic and consider abortion, even
dirty bomb incident, it is likely that many people though this is unnecessary (routine dental X-rays
would experience such symptoms. However, in all result in insignificant radiation exposure to the
or practically all cases, the symptoms would prove unborn child). Low doses of radiation pose much
not to be the result of radiation exposure. less risk to an unborn child than most people (and
even some physicians) realize. In the event of a
Exposure to radiation doses lower than those that dirty bomb attack, most pregnant women in the
cause radiation sickness, but much higher than affected area would not be exposed to amounts of
those normally found in the environment, may radiation sufficient to cause harm and would not
increase a person’s risk of developing cancer later need to consider terminating their pregnancies.
in life, especially if exposure is prolonged.
However, although radiation is known to be a car-
cinogen (cancer-causing agent), it is a weak car-
cinogen, and even radiation levels significantly in
excess of natural background levels do not signif-
icantly raise cancer risks. Just because a person is
near a source of radioactivity for a short time or
comes in contact with a small amount of dust that
contains radioactive material does not mean that
the person will develop cancer. The increase in
risk resulting from such exposures would be quite
small. In most instances, the detonation of a radi-
ological dispersal device would not lead to a sub-
stantial increase in the number of cases of cancer
in the affected population in later years.

Some recent news accounts have predicted that


exposure to even small amounts of radiation from
a radiological attack would cause some additional
cases of cancer. Such predictions are based on the
faulty assumption that effects that occur at high
doses of radiation can be directly extrapolated to
much lower doses. Increasing scientific evidence
indicates, however, that this type of extrapolation
is not valid, and that the health risks associated
with low-level radiation exposure are smaller than
such extrapolation would predict.
6 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK

Although the number of casualties from a radiolog- and Regulations,” could decrease the cost of recov-
ical attack would probably be relatively small (tens ery after a radiological attack and allow normal
to hundreds), the economic impact could be very activities to resume more quickly.
great. Some experts think that the cost of recovery
from a dirty bomb attack could equal or even People’s fears of radiation could add to the eco-
exceed the $30 to $40 billion cost of restoring nomic impact of a radiological attack. The biggest
lower Manhattan after the September 11 attack, long-term economic problems faced by people in
despite a much smaller amount of physical damage Goiania (an agricultural region) resulted from the
and fewer casualties. refusal of people from outside the region to buy its
agricultural products, even though those products
The high costs would result primarily from the were safe. In the case of a radiological attack on an
need to clean up and decontaminate the affected urban area, similar fears might lead to a reluctance
area. Much of this effort would consist of physical- to purchase industrial products, conduct business in
ly removing contaminated material (perhaps the area, or visit tourist attractions, all of which
including a layer of soil, as was done in Goiania) could cause lasting economic damage.
and hauling it away to a low-level radioactive
waste depository. Buildings would also need to be
decontaminated — a process that is difficult and in
some instances not technically feasible with current
technology. If a structure could not be decontami-
nated successfully, it might be necessary to demol-
ish it, even if it was not physically damaged by the
attack.3

In addition to being expensive, cleaning up an area


after a radiological attack would be very time-con-
suming; it is likely that normal activities in physi-
cally undamaged areas surrounding an attack site
would not be able to resume for much longer than
in the case of a non-radiological attack. After the
September 11 attack, much of the surrounding area
was reoccupied within days or weeks; in the case of
a radiological attack, it could be months or longer
because of the need for decontamination.

It may be possible to substantially reduce the extent


of the area that would receive extensive decontam-
ination after a radiological attack without increas-
ing risks to human health by changing the regulato-
ry standards for the amount of radiation permitted
to remain after cleanup. This type of change, which
is discussed in more detail below under “Policies

3. Alternatively, a building or area could be abandoned and fenced off, but this option is unlikely to be practical in a major metropolitan area.
The Facts About 7
“DIRTY BOMBS”

WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF A DIRTY BOMB ATTACK

It is important to note that radioactivity cannot be seen, within sight of or downwind of the explosion should
felt, or smelled. Therefore, the fact that an explosion consider changing clothes and showering if possible.
involved radioactivity would not be immediately obvi- These actions will remove at least 90 percent of
ous (unless a terrorist group announced it). In most external contamination. Contaminated clothing
instances, emergency responders, who routinely have should be placed in plastic bags and sealed until the
access to radiation detectors, would be able to conduct amount of contamination can be measured.
radiation surveys and determine fairly quickly, probably • If radioactive material was released, local news
within a half hour, that a radiological attack had taken broadcasts will advise people where to report for
place. This information would then allow the authorities radiation monitoring and blood and other tests to
to issue correct instructions to the public via the news determine whether they were in fact exposed and
media. what steps to take to protect their health.
• Because inhaling any kind of dust, and especially
If a dirty bomb attack occurred, people would find out dust that may be contaminated with radioactive
about it in two different ways. Some individuals would material, is unhealthful, some experts recommend
be close enough to hear, see, or feel an explosion. that people take simple precautions to avoid inhaling
Others, who were farther away, would hear about the contaminants during the immediate aftermath of an
attack through the news media or official announce- explosion, such as breathing through a folded cloth if
ments. one is readily available and going indoors and clos-
ing doors and windows as soon as possible.
• For those people who were not close enough to the • Another important precaution is to not handle or pick
explosion to hear, see, or feel it, the most important up any object thrown off by an explosion. In the
thing to do would be to turn on a local radio station event that the object was part of the radioactive
or television channel and wait for advice from emer- source used in a dirty bomb, it could be quite danger-
gency response authorities. In all likelihood, people ous. Handling things without knowing what they
in this situation would not be at any immediate risk. were is what got people into trouble in Goiania; the
However, just as with any other type of emergency, same could occur after a dirty bomb explosion.
the authorities might have important instructions for
the public to follow. For example, people might be People sometimes wonder whether they should take
advised to stay away from an affected area to avoid potassium iodide to protect their health if a radiological
interference with emergency personnel and perhaps attack occurs. The answer in almost all possible dirty
also to avoid exposure to radioactive contamination. bomb scenarios is no. Potassium iodide protects only
• For people who heard, saw, or felt an explosion, the against damage to the thyroid gland from radioactive
situation would be different. These individuals iodine; it does not protect other parts of the body, and it
would know that an emergency had occurred, but is of no use against other radioactive materials. It is very
they would not know immediately whether radioac- unlikely that radioactive iodine would be used in a dirty
tivity was involved. Because these individuals were bomb.
close to an explosion and might continue to be in
danger, they would need to take some actions that Another course of action that is usually unwise (unless
people farther away from the explosion would not. specifically advised by authorities) is driving away from
the area of an attack. People can move to a safe distance
After an explosion, experts recommend that people from a radiological attack by walking rather than driv-
should do the following: ing; staying off the roads reduces the risk of traffic con-
gestion that can hamper response to the emergency or
• Move away from the immediate area — at least sev- cause crashes. Also, an automobile that was in the imme-
eral blocks from the explosion — and go indoors. diate vicinity of a dirty bomb explosion could be con-
• Turn on local radio or TV channels for advisories taminated with radioactivity. People who drive away in
from emergency response and health authorities. that automobile might expose themselves to more
• If it is determined that an explosion involved radioac- radioactivity than they would if they walked to a safe
tivity and if facilities are available, people who were location.
8 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”

POLICIES AND REGULATIONS

As societies make efforts to prevent radiological these unnecessarily stringent regulations might ham-
attacks and to ensure the most effective response if an per a community’s ability to recover by increasing
attack occurs, consideration may be given to modify- the amounts of time and money mandated for cleanup
ing some policies and regulations that were not without providing any benefits that would offset
designed with radiological attacks in mind. Citizens these costs. Therefore, society may wish to revisit
need to understand the rationale behind such propos- regulatory guidance so that regulations are based on
als in order to make informed decisions about their real risk rather than the ability to detect ever-lower
merits. A proposal that appears “overly restrictive” or levels of contamination.
“insufficiently protective” on the surface might well
be found to be beneficial when all its advantages and It has been proposed, for example, that the standard
disadvantages are taken into consideration. The fol- for the amount of added radioactivity allowed to
lowing examples may help to illustrate this point. remain after cleanup from a radiological attack be
increased tenfold.4 This might decrease the cost of
Legal purchase of radioactive materials in the U.S. recovery by perhaps 90 percent and somewhat
requires possession of a radioactive materials license. decrease the time needed for cleanup.
These licenses are considered public documents and
therefore are available for public scrutiny. This The current standard set by the Nuclear Regulatory
means that a terrorist organization may be able to Commission is 25 mrem (millirems) of added
obtain copies of the documents and use these to iden- radioactivity per year5; the Environmental Protection
tify likely targets for theft. Thus, it may be worth- Agency’s standard is 15 mrem per year. For compar-
while to consider prohibiting public access to these ison, it helps to know that the natural background
documents. The government — and by extension, the radiation to which people are normally exposed is
public — would need to decide whether the potential several hundred millirems per year, with substantial
benefits of this regulatory change justify limiting cit- variations from place to place. Residents of
izens’ freedom of access to this particular type of Washington, D.C., for example, are exposed to 300
information. mrem/year, which is close to the national average.
Residents of Denver, Colorado, which is at a higher
If terrorists are to construct and transport a radiolog- altitude (therefore allowing more exposure to cosmic
ical dispersal device with reasonable safety to them- radiation) and has underground uranium deposits, are
selves, they would need to obtain large quantities of exposed to about 500 mrem/year.
lead to use as shielding. Accordingly, a case could be
made for requiring lead vendors to report large sales Increasing the standard for residual radioactivity ten-
of their products. If such a proposal is considered, its fold would mean allowing about 200 mrem/year of
potential benefits would have to be weighed against added radiation to remain in the environment after
the additional burdens that would be placed on the cleanup from a radiological attack; this is the same as
lead industry and the likely resulting increases in the the additional exposure that would come from living
cost of this industry’s products. in Denver rather than Washington. No radiation-asso-
ciated health risks have been associated with living in
Some current regulations pertaining to permissible Denver; cancer rates there are similar to those in
levels of radioactive contamination may have been Washington. Similarly, no adverse effects on human
based more on what is achievable or what is health would be expected if a residual radioactivity
detectable than on what is truly necessary to protect standard of around 200 mrem/year were adopted.
health and the environment. In the event of an attack,

4. This proposal is recommended and discussed in detail in 5. A rem is a unit that relates the absorbed dose of radiation in human
Zimmerman, Peter D. with Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat tissue to the effective biological damage of the radiation. Different
Revisited, National Defense University, January 2004. Available types of radiation have different biological effects; expressing
online at http://hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf amounts of exposure in rems allows these different types of radiation
to be compared.
The Facts About 9
“DIRTY BOMBS”

SUMMARY

Dirty bombs, more correctly referred to as radio- scenarios, few if any people who were not close
logical dispersal devices or radiological weapons, enough to the blast to be injured by it would expe-
are conventional explosive devices with added rience any adverse health effects from radiation
radioactive material. They are designed to spread exposure. Citizens can help to minimize the harm-
radioactive contamination — and with it, panic, ful impact of a radiological attack by following
anxiety, and social and economic disruption — in the instructions of emergency response authorities
a community. To ensure appropriate responses in and by avoiding hasty actions prompted by panic
the event of a radiological attack, citizens need to or unwarranted fears of even small amounts of
understand that the principal danger from a dirty radioactivity.
bomb lies in the explosion itself; in most

REFERENCES

Karam, P. Andrew, Radiological Terrorism. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, in press.

Ferguson CD and Potter WC. 2004. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey Institute for
International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey CA.

Ferguson CD, Kazi T, and Perera J. 2003. Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper #11,
Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks. Monterey Institute Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA.

NCRP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements). 2001. Report #138.
Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dirty bombs [fact sheet], March 2003. Available online at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder on dirty bombs, April 2005. Available online at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Frequently asked questions about dirty bombs,
March 2005. Available online at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/dirtybombs.asp

Zimmerman, Peter D. with Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited, National Defense
University, January 2004. Available online at http://hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf
ACSH BOARD OF DIRECTORS

John H. Moore, Ph.D., M.B.A. Christine M. Bruhn, Ph.D. A. Alan Moghissi, Ph.D. Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada
Chairman of the Board, ACSH University of California Institute for Regulatory Science Lorraine Thelian
Grove City College Ketchum Public Relations
Taiwo K. Danmola, C.P.A. Albert G. Nickel
Elissa P. Benedek, M.D. Ernst & Young Lyons Lavey Nickel Swift, inc. Kimberly M. Thompson, Sc.D.
University of Michigan Harvard School of Public Health
Thomas R. DeGregori, Ph.D. Kenneth M. Prager, M.D.
Norman E. Borlaug, Ph.D. University of Houston Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., M.P.H.
Texas A&M University American Council on Science and Health
Henry I. Miller, M.D. Stephen S. Sternberg, M.D.
Michael B. Bracken, Ph.D., M.P.H. Hoover Institution Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Robert J. White, M.D., Ph.D.
Yale University School of Medicine Case Western Reserve University
Mark C. Taylor, M.D.
ACSH EXECUTIVE STAFF

Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., M.P.H., President


ACSH BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY ADVISORS

Ernest L. Abel, Ph.D. Ronald W. Brecher, Ph.D., C.Chem., Neville Colman, M.D., Ph.D. David F. Duncan, Dr.Ph. William H. Foege, M.D., M.P.H.
C.S. Mott Center DABT St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital Center Duncan & Associates Emory University
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ACSH BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY ADVISORS

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FRCPC
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The opinions expressed in ACSH publications do not necessarily represent the views of all ACSH Directors and Advisors. ACSH Directors and Advisors serve without compensation.
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