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INCENDIARY
OPERA T'IONS
-
. .' -.
{ .:' . <::. w·- ."
HEADQUARTERS XXI
OFFICE OF THE
I<lan~~od9
10. .•
~..,
~tt...t1... l!8 M . •
APO <34, c/o
San Francisco,
;(Ly"~
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff
APPROVED:
-/
/"C(~.
'r" {/"r / //fC:<.
,t' ;.- r
CURTIS E. LeMAY /
Major General, USA
Commanding.
1
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•
ANALYSIS OF INCENDIA~ PHASE
OF OP~~TIONS AGAINST
JAPANESE URBAN AREAS
.........................................................................................................................
2
A - Scope end Purpose of Report
B - The Problem
3
This was the total record of damage inflicted on
enemy targets in four months of B-29 narrare. The
balance sheet of res~ts obtained and losses ~uffere~
clearly showed the need for a radical change ~n tact1cS.
R~ll-P~Rl~Y Bm TAK'~' ,
1WI"O VEL. TIME OF Ml~lf lij j,
\1& UI~!(TiOM O.11/IUlQCLOUUI ~I
, ,
b.
7
it 1'1;;"$ even more important. to accomplish as much of the
return journey as :)ossible in'daylight "Co «void ditchings '7 t
night and to permit damag8d all~craft ~o lanu in daylight, 1f
,',cather ~lt the b~st2s should prove unfavorable. In vievl of
th9 length of the micsions (approxim1:l.tE:ly f'tfteen hours on
the average) it waG n~cedsnry to arrive Dot <l compromise ~1hil:h
is reflected in the time tl;:;.ble below:
No'i<yo
:·t;.,~ ~ .. ...
11135
120/0
-...- T"It,-~/'s
Wff"
~ 0710 - IZ'n I
r
tNAG'OYA I
-. l ..;; .'.
r
;0 SAI<A
!'t".1o-' ~ ...,..
CO.1~)Qr.Ja
'i-ch 15.6 s"';. ~I!l. ,).(:.:,t,.. ::"'-j'..:l.4 Gil '1oicyc ,.tt<~..;:\:,
..11...; .'1~;"'. _t..n .
. jJ.-:·t.i....l f.1.l..li...:, .• ~ on1;,.- .:..0, ",q •. !"i. of Nc:..g-
~
c'y.... '",r~ bUI'u:<i (,.uL Tn.; t.:o forces sent. against. N!.g0'y6. took
,,:hr~~ r,our::, t.c.. drop t.bair t,(j';lbs, oJx-lct1y :;.,., long a::. on tht:l
Tok"'Yo <-;t.rit<e, out 'the concentrar.ion uiffered consider&tl1y. Over
T<;00 't:le bulk of l.he force cr()~~ed in "tile fir::,t t,.;o n(Jur~ (d~%)
.J~ila strc..gglers r;,ccounted for the third hour. On t.he NCigoya mi.,-
610n c..1'i105'(, h&..lf the p1eme~ arrivea c.ver ~he ~i:1I'get in ~he third
hour, ~ith ~ n~jor portion of the other half cro",sing in ~h~ first
hour, and sir.'lgglers f~lling in the hOlli" b.;:t'.'leen. Thi:..; respite
bEft,\7.3en the concentratl0116 at the begirming und end cf the' eriod
enabled f~re fig?ters .to control fires started by the first tJ group,
£..nd practlcull;y- tJ.c.i.lvea th.;! task for th(;m.
By the time the fourth mission (Kobe) uas run the im-
portance of concentration in time was better dj)}lreciated as more
OSAKA A
, 2 KIl.
\-
. -.- '.--'_ ..
~ -~.. _.
On the last missioi.. (Nagoya Ii) the same method .....as used.
The ·'lings ~·fere again giver. a target time (0400K - 05l5K) but did
not achieve the concentration obtained on the previous strike, as
i3 ::;ho'.!n in the photo on the follo·'ling page. The force of 490
1)1an8':' req uired t·,70 hours and forty-four ::J.inutes ovet the primary
t....rget, .11th a concentrl).tion of .!.5d Ciircraft in the first two hours.
11
In analyzing these missions afterwards it was agreed by
the wings as "ell as by the bomber command that neither of the
two methods assured satisfactory concentration over the target.
No solution of the problem has as yet been found. A suggestion
was made to prescribe take-off time as well as a controlled air-
speed to assure simultaneous ~rrival over the target. In view
of the unsatisfactory calibration of instruments and the dif-
ficulties of flying a controlled airspeed on such a long
flight this plan is not considered feasible.
T
L -"-__ ~....l-
ITIME OYER.
TAI<IJEir
TOkYO
279 A/c
NAGOYA 1
2.85 Ale
'-+..+.-
:... +- 31%
OSAKA '+0
274 Ale :+
kOBE
306 Ale _
t
NAGOYA 1f
290 "Ie '
rne cn~nge ~n <itude from bet 'een ~5000 ~nd 3v,UOV feet
i.O c..et. ·een 5UJu c...nd lO,uOU feet \'1:..5 C I"ddical aejJ&rture from
~t,.. na.... rd h~c...vy bO"lbardment t.i.;.ctic~. It proved to be the one
f~<:ture ..bich holas out greater prolJise for the fu"tllI'e thi;.n any
obber tingle 1'... c1.or learned on the incendiury c.a.ttac\{s. The main
ad\'""ntagcls vere the increo.ried bomb lOGd, greater bombing accu-
ri::lcy, l~Je inten:..e ··1100s, bet.ter r.:.de..r returns, less ::;;train on
'the ....lirp1<...ne l:.nd equ1.pment. i'/hdt IH:"o not been expected was the
I
, rel&tiv~ ineffectivcn~ss of Japanese antiuircraft at the alti-
tudes chosen. Variations of the t~ctics e~ployed may be neces-
s~y ~£ a future protection ~guin~t. fla~ but if that oanger is
/
eliminated or cont.rolled 'th_'r<... s~eIll::; to be little rel::.50n for
confining Ollr future operutions to high altitude attacks. The
three '::ing conunanaers echoed the statea of'inion among the com-
bat crE::WS in urging that low a1 titude missions be retained in
the future.
•
I
NAlF~(nOWS '~\.
(FEwelZ.
,ABORTS
if";'~,,:.
"t.:/-i...".
P£WiE/Z ~:
,Of«') •'{ ~,;~".
.... ».~.
A~ yet ~~ h&~
been i~po8slble to measura quanti~&tively
t.ne ~,!lprovenent in bomLing <i~curacy obtained by lo"sering the
.:....lLit'uc.e. Un~il c.tt.:>.ck.:. using HE bo:nb::;. (.ave been .'!lade at 10'7
~l'tJ.tLlQ~:; ,..uo. t.hB t,o!nb hitd plotted, an:,' co:u 1)<irisons of bOr.Jb-
ing .l:'::':UI':.icy .~r.:: ,Purely theoretical. On theoretical grounds,
.... ~on:..~der&[jl.; im')rovament c...n be expected from the dt::cre.... 6e
~n _1 titua.e. The ~ 11:ni ted e.xp9rience gs.ined on tt"t'3 incendia..ry
c.ttack~ points in the seme d~rection.
f!,LTITUO€ """#tt"ssz'on
IN
I_F_££_T
__ TO~.Y_O__
NI>._6gYA I OS;~K_A_-,K~~BE_ _
NA-,6RYAn
11
8000 ......... , .. , , .. . ,_ ,. .... '-
,,
7000
{'
73 ; ' ..
..........\~ ....
6000 ......................
31 ,,
"1' . ',:'i-
~ooo . .
··········································..··..1
PR06ABIUT{ o~ HITS :
VA~I.S '"V.~SHY WITH:
T~~ CUBE OF TME ;
5\..AIoJ'T" 12AI'4&E. ~
.................................... .:.
I
S E'C
19
•
~
TOKYO
-.....t-
were scattered over
a Wide area and could J ~
..
1-
•• .. ,,
be extinguished ba-
rare doing much dam.- Q1a •
age. Ul ail proha-
bi11~ many erews •
, . .#' .. ' Q
... .!~.. .
.
.-:.
. . -,
.
..
',a)_
. ~ .. . '
. ."
. .
20
Thi~ suggests the
for a careful unalysis of n~ed
indlvlau~l crd~ performuncp.. In the case of incendi&ry
night ~isslons this e~ be done only oy an~ly~ing SCOye
photo~ tiud n~viga1jorsI logs. The ";'d.ngs themselves sug-
gested t.hu. t this ana~· sis be .~de by their staffs ....no the
rcsul'ts turneci over to the co~d for conso1:J.dution r;:nd
study. steps have been taken to expedite the shi~adnt
of much needed scope cameras to peroit installc.lt10ns in
every p] ane.
.............................., ,.- .
) G'AOIIt'LlIST€"K EXPLODES
AT 2500 rT.
REl.€4.f//liG
38 M"64J /NeE",·801l.18S'
Wf.JJCf..! FALl IN ,.4'
RAIVtJ/}M PATTe-eN.
~- /"'~-.....
gener~l confl~gration before the fire fignters have had
time to put them out. The bomos of a ~ingle ship, whether
it carries 10-, 15- or 20,000 lbs, must ~roduce a single fire
covering an area corresponding to the bomb load. With a full
bomb load of 17,000 l'os of M--69 bombs, the area burned. out by
a single ship should be around 16 c;.cres. Using tne M--69 bomb,
a density of .3 tons p<::_' ucre, yielding an estima;ted 7Cf1, dam-
age is con~idered ideal. Although this was the p&tteI~ den-
sity, and the type of bomb used on both the Tokyo and Osaka.
attacks, the latter ~&5 not nearly as 5~cessful as the former.
This result ~ee~G to bear out the theoretical assumption ~hQt
"lith t.be M--69 bomb a pattern densit;y of .3 tons per acre is a
prerequisiti -- but not a gUhrantee -- of success.
b. Ared Densitr
n~ m~ntionec before, pattern density controls the
~preud of fire fro~ the bo~bs of only a single ship_ To
~~~ura destruction of the target these ~tterns must be spread
even~y over the entire ~r~u, thus permitting the individual
P.CRET
•v
-, •
'. .
.
•
,•"
"\ ~ KEY
<::::') OE:STROYEO-~ GOYA CIT
flIIJ OlD ~GE £l44IoIIGE •ASSESSMEN
;.
X
(()(Xl)
00
FIRES StAFlTEtl
TARGET NUoW8ERS
AHftOlIoTlON NUMBf"
RE'J:T ~':'
CCWIDENTIAL
FIGURE 4
TM tb1z<l atr1lta (O..kaj . . . . .cheduled before the
t1Dal results or the prerlouB mission were av&1lable, but
F160R£ 6
."
Not until the fourth mission (Kobe) was it realized
that visual distribution methods, which are 1n fundamental
contradiction to the principles behind the selection of aiming
points, were largely responsible for the failures of previous
attacks. It is no'W recognized that all bombardiers must make
a controlled bomb run over the AP in order to produce the
required concentration and the planned dispersion of bombs.
Accordingly, .11 bombardiers on ~he Kobe mission were instruc-
ted to make a controllp.d radar bomb run over the target before
making visual corrections, and to apply such corrections only
to their sightIng on the AP, and not for the purpose of
spreading the bombs visually. The results of the Kobe mission
were inconclusive. The extent of damage accomplished, if ex-
pressed as a percentage of the target area attacked, was satis-
factory, but in terms ot· 'tJl6 tons or ineendtaries carried the
area destroyed was disappointing. The Kobe raid illustrates
the point that the geographical shape of the target ares is often
as important as the size in determining the posi tiOD of the AP' s.
The axis of attEck was selected in deference tc two considera-
tions, first, that the errors in deflection would exceed the
errors in range wbere the OAP was relatively close to MPI's and
second, that the most satisfsctory IP and OAP dictated an approach
tram the south. Again execution rather than plan contributed
to the failure to achieve complete success. The isolated fires
to the southeast and northwest of the APts testify to the
deviation from plan probably caused by navigation errors in
SOllIe cases and reluctance to penetrate thermals in other cases •
. _-
.... -----,--~ ........
In future incendiaIJr oper::..tions t.he uxis of attack
ctnc.i th~ OAP ':lUl be selected "1;.0 prof::" t lJ;}" the lessons le&rn~d
on Lhes€; ut'ta:::k~. It hes been proved thtlt "he uispersion of
comb~ "round t.he APls i3 not ... r~nuom distrlllur.ion, and t.hcit
'tha oi~s depends u~on ~a~- v~riaole6. Of t.hese the mo~t
i~por~ant &~y: t.ha di~tance from t.he OAP t.o 'the MPI, the
rela'tion~hip bet "/een the direction of the "dna .:lnd the axis
of <1.t.t.dck, Lhe time over the te.rget <.md the prospect of
thermal~. TLe reluct£:.ncd of cre'v~ to penetrate therml:l.l~ and
~noke i~ established. Everf effort. is ffi&de in 'the plhnr.ing
to oovidte this necessity. When the b~~s is in range, it is
almo::.t inv<..riC1bly on tho lI~hortn side. ~nen 'the bias i::; de-
flection it frequently developes th\t the course bet,reen IP,
OAP and tAPI was difficult froi:! a nb.vigation stt..:.nopoint.,
<9
,
d. Concentration
A successful incendiary attack not only requires
concentration in space over the tsrget (pattern density aDd
area deusltJ), but al80 concentration in time. 'rhe importance
ot this latter factor was mentioned earlier in this report.
AS pointed out, concentration on the successful TOkyo raid was
left to chance. In planning for the Nagoye mission a tactical
experiment was attempted which did not succeed but brought
ho.e a valuable lesson. By splitting the force into two parts
and scheduling them over the target 80 as to provide a lull
• prior to arrival of the second torce, the tire fighters were
able to deal .ith each of the two attacke: separately and con-
sequently could bring the fires under control more easily.
1 he failure of th18 mission helped to emphasize the Deed tor
0
the wind. Tbis tsrget photo shows clearly the spread of fire
be70nd the target area in the direction of the wind. It is
likely tbet without a helping wind the damaged area may well
have been a third les8. £Yen in subsequent attacks where only
l1cbt or no w1.Dds were present, the spread of fire beyond the
target area was always observed to be in the direction of the
wind.
Aside from increasing the area of d~muge, a strong
surface wind helps to speed up the ~erging of fires into a
general conflagration and thbs to saturate fire-fighting
equipment.
f. Precipitation.
In the early stages c; pla~ning the incendiary attacks
it VIas believed that rain or sno\" occuring prior to, or shortly
after, an attack would interfere with the success of the mission.'
These fears ~ere not borne out. Consideretle rain or snow had
occurred l8 hours before the Tokyo attack and must have im-
pregnated the roofs with moisture. Nevertheless, the fires took
hold and spreed rapidly. On the first Nagoya attack no precip-
itation had taken place for ~0Ur days and the city had had an
extensive c~y spell. Never~neless the restllt was extremely
disappointing.
8,000
6,000
4,000 ,..
2.,000
32
The ann lysis of yielded valuable
lessons for future incendi&ry operations. \hut may prove more
i~portant still, it has sug€~sted certain t~ctics which can be
applied against pinpoint precision targets.
* When the supply of T-19 cluster adapters for M-L7 bombs was
exheusted, M-76 incendiary bombs h~d to be substituted.
,.' ~.","'. 0; •
'... ,~,:, .. ~;;f
, . -. ,,~ 'r'f·
, .0:';> :.: .r
33
5. ENEMY DEFENSES
e.. Antiaircrr ft
')~ ~:D~~.~
proper concentration of air-
craft over the target area
the rcd~r controls (inadequate
at best) could probnhly be
rendered useless. Thus it TIns
concluded th~t Jap AA, both
,! J,.( (6R~Pillc )
/0,000 '
mEdium bnd heLvy,
would be deoendent
upon S/L. Th~refore
it follows thtt, for
,,000' / / ----/
night r~i S~. saturu- I
tion of e~emy defen~es t'
"\,' ,
,,
i~ actually s~turation
of ~nemy secrchlir,hts.
The altitude bracket
from 5,000 to 9,000
\
,,
,
-- ,
,,
-- --
THE:. J.OWEfl 7HE. At f,n,oE., THE L()IIIr:,EIZ AM
A/IlCPAFT /$ WITH/iii RA"'frE •
•
feet promised maximum hombing accuracy and ~lso exploited the
advantages of ~eather and tactical surprise. The first raid
over Tokyo proved that the Japs were unprep&red for us at this
altitude and it was decided to contin.e et the s~me <itude
Q~til further developments dictated a change. Actually, the
losses were so low that a cl:. nge seemd inadvisable. In previous
high altitude missions against the Japr.ncse mainland, using a
totel of 1712 sorties as a s&mple, loss end dUm&pe due to
flak Dmounted to ll.L%. For the Tokyo mission the percentage
of aircraft lost or damaged was estimated at 15.2,%, at NaGoya
6.95%, at Osaka 6.8% and at Kobe 3.6%. As usual most of tbe
flak damage was mi~or, except for the TOKJ-o mission, where there
is ~~ incication that the 105s to damage ratio wes greeter
than in previous high eltit~de attacks. Many faqtors con-
tributed to the unsuccessful Jap defense against the lo~
altitude night missions. The most importcnt are weather, smoke
end saturation of AA defense~. It has already been shovm
that, for all intents rnd pc.rposes, the eneuor flas dependent
upon visual tracking. The undercast oondition, which prevailed
to £ome extent on all the missions except Nagoya I, proved
highly beneficial to the attE:cking force. The same \n.s true
of sr.!oke. Both vleather and smoke acted in conjunction ':lith
the variation in altitude and course to render enemy flak in-
effective.
, -
. .t. . r· ' . •
, . ~ .. ' ~:·"!4 :-.• f; ~ ',:
.' ......
:. ··.'"7;,~,·"Jr·· ~ ,•. ,:~1.
'-~.
four aiming points, and trusting to the ra:1dom dispersion of
bombs to cover the area surrounding the aiming point. These
points can be located b;y radar, by using a radar off':.>et AP
and bombing with the back slant-range method or through
stopwatch timing. This method would be equally effective,
on daylight attacks through an overcast, and would have the
additional advantage of permitting .('ormation bombing 5..1' the
greeter accw'scy and protection against enemy fighters r.lade
possible by formation fl;ying is found to outv'eigh the dis-
advantage of a reduc~d bomb land.
In studying the flak damage suffered on these missions it
becomes clear that no definite trend can be established.
The strength of enemy antiaircraft defense is not uniformly
deployed at the different targets, and h~s not been shifted
to accomplish better distribution, even wh(~re the need for
such shiftR is obvious. ~ithout Bny other evidence, it can
only be expected that the overall efficiency of enemy flak
defense against low level rii~1t attacks will improve as it
becomes adjusted to our tactics. Frequent changes in our
t~ctics and the avoidance.of any sterotyped method of attack
are therefore indicated.
So far our bombers have never been a1le to rely on hitting ,
any t&rget by s~rprise. On the incendiary raids the cities
were found well blacked out and there wes every evidence
that the enemy had hsd ample \'iarning of our <,ttack. The
only surprise we cun count on is in the mGthod uf atteck.
~.'1
' t\'')'-_~''';;<''·
~
1.....
-
'>, ••
~".t',
t.~ : ~.,\v.".
,f--I>!}"
-~ ...-- ,~,~-
.. ~' ,J",rd1<qijf
I.;•. r...·
. I' '0 ~ ~"'. ,
~, ,. 0
,.. \\\'
, in" ~ , fL;.'
. ~:;'!. '! ~~
b. Enemy Fighters .....~---: ~ ·~1~f!".\.: ~
.,r,. . \'.
-??...;b....'~.~;~";o~,~\ .
~,,~
26
2."- 2q 1~ 17** 18** 39 ~O -1:1 L:< I~J 1.1.
MISSION NO. DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY· NIGH'f NIGHT NIGHT NlliHT JI1IGH~
Yission Date ""'7 Jan 4 Feb 10 Feb 15 Feb 19 Fe 25 Feb 4 Mar 9 r.lar 11 Me 13 Mar 16 Mar 18 Ma.·
Target Tokyo Kobe Ota Nagoyu Toky Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Nagoy Osaka Kobe Nagoya
Approx. Average 5,500 25500 ~7,500 27,500 :n ,Q()( 26,500 27000 7,000 7,500 7,000 7,000 6,000
~ombing Altitude
I
E/A Sighted <75 205 230 91 195 13 10 74 93 115 310 19?
/570 '}8
..,
w E/A At t<.H;ks
~ltio Atks:Sghtd 3.6
984 '<73 330
1.4
166
1.8 2.9
0
.0
0
.0
40
.5
45
.5
37
.} .3
41.
1.3 .4
No. Bo<..9s0verJ.:J.p.w1 63 99 101 105 133 202 182 3G2 ./91 280 310 291
~ B49s Dumga &/0 53.9 13.1 .:,,;C.8 4.7 16.5 .0 .0 .0 ,0 ,0 1.0 .3
DC.3'L.royed IJy E/a
%B.:.9~ Lost. to .0 .0 d.O .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .,0
Unkno''m Ca.uses
~
/',:¥l\~--ii
0""","0
\ I _.
\;
'.
1-' /?iy
Oi".~ ~ . . er '~~~Vr\
b.
*
After Ince!ldiary Phnse ~
'l
,
W' ((
~ ~ .y
~
Long before the completion of this operntion, the
element of h~~on endur~nce had firmly cffixed itself to
the growing list of operational planning factors. Could
personnel n~intain c~dence with the neTI and manifest opera-
tion~l capabilities of the B-29 aircraft? Certain facts re-
lative to this human element and observed during and immedi-
ately after this operation are significant. The phenomenal
success of the new tactics had precipitately salvaeed the
morale and fighting spirit of our crews by providing a degree
of battle success proportionate to the effort expended.
Equally important, especially to the older crews, the B-29 was
established as en efficient and reliable combat aircraft.
Thirty-thr~e crews flew all five missions in the ten-day period.
One hu.'1dred ~nd t\'ienty-§iJc. crews flew four of the five missions
of the attack. At the tL""I1ination of the operation an oc-
casional crew was grounded for fatigue and a very few were
sent to O&hu for rest. Generally speaking our creTIS were
moderately fatigued but in good physical condition and in ~
high stcte of more.le. There Vlrs no increase in the non-effect-
iV8 rate for flying personnel during the operation or for
the period immedictely after. Amczingly the number of cases
of flying personnel disorders due to flying, 'i"hieh had been
Mcrch fell off sh~rply
Dfter
60
.N"EI.\I CASES Of
VI 50 FLYING PERSONN~L
'" 40 DISORDERS DLiE
~ 30 TO FLYING-
( 20
v
10
41
CONCLUSIONS
L- __ _
~~ .,~
- --- ....
-~--_
1. HIGH ALTITUDE PRECISION ATTACKS
Precision attacks from 25,000 feet or above agsinst
pinpoint targets are unsuited to operations i~ this theater.
Radr.r operstes inefficiently at high r.ltitude. Weather
conditions -- high wind and poor visibility over the target,
scattering of formations when penetrating fronts on route
interfere with nnvig£:tion, render bombing inaccur&.te and
require highly skilled cre~s.
f.
To a limited extent the requirements shown under
b - e can be substituted one for the other. If all other
requirements ~re fulfilled an attack need not fail bec~use
one of the factors ~s imperfectly repres~nted.
43
4. DAYLIGHT INCEN:'T ARY BOMBING THROUGH THE OVERCAS~
•
out Lhe improved area density ~hich can be expected ~ill ~ore
t.na.n comJ,>en::..ute. Night incendiary mis5ion~ \'Iil1 be cmtinued,
eVE:n t.oough 'the d~.ylig~t incendi....ry technique proves more
v""tbf..:ctory, flGrtly bcci::.usoa the probl:lbility of finding b.d-
v~.nt.a.gzou~ o;.c£>..ther condit.ions impr<?ves at night., and partly
oecdu~C of the ben~ficial effect of variation in tactics .
• 5. GJ~NERAL
I
•
...:md as 1.fLctics are perfected and the
•
11