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Waisbord / Antipress
7(3) Summer
Violence
2002 and the Crisis of the State
Silvio Waisbord
The collapse of authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and 1990s opened new
opportunities for the emergence of a democratic press worldwide. The pros-
pects for a journalism that monitors power abuses and provides spaces for criti-
cism and citizenship improved as liberal democracies gradually replaced com-
munist and military governments in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
Civilian administrations eliminated systematic official censorship and made pro-
nouncements in favor of press freedom. A decade later, several developments
have raised questions about the limitations that journalism faces around the
world.
Press/Politics 7(3):90-109
© 2002 by the President and the Fellows of Harvard College
90
One area of concern has been the legal framework that regulates the function-
ing of the press in new democracies. Existing laws grant officials powerful mech-
anisms to manipulate the press. Unlike dictatorships, civilian governments only
sporadically resort to coercive means; instead, they have often used legislation to
chill critical coverage. Gag laws and the lack of an independent judiciary discour-
age a more audacious journalism. The fact that several governments proposed
(and passed, in some cases) legislation to dissuade press criticism, coupled with
official reluctance to eliminate gag laws, became a recurrent point of tension.
Critics have often lambasted such policies on the grounds that a democratic and
responsible press cannot legitimately function when, for example, insult and
contempt laws provide mechanisms for authorities to suppress any signs of dis-
sent. Moreover, the existence of laws that, in principle, favor hard-hitting
reporting is insufficient. Without judicial systems that, if not completely inde-
pendent, are, at least, minimally committed to respecting and enforcing basic
press liberties, press laws that favor critical reporting are dead letter.
A second area of concern has been press economics. Amid several economic
difficulties worldwide, two situations severely constrain the press. On one hand,
the economic weight of states on media economics reduces the autonomy of
news organizations. Because states are still crucial for keeping them afloat, gov-
ernments can meddle in newsrooms and editorial policies. Press companies,
particularly if interested in expanding business opportunities, need to assidu-
ously court governments to receive advertising, import permits, tax breaks,
loans, and other benefits. On the other hand, business concentration, a tendency
certainly not unique to new democracies, further restrains press autonomy.
Tight linkages between political and economic interests, represented in the
ascent of politicians/media moguls and media/political dynasties in many new
democracies, make the idea of press independence illusory. But while the elimi-
nation of gag laws and the strengthening of a judiciary committed to defending
bedrock principles of the Western press are mandatory to solve legal problems,
alternatives to the domination of business interests seem more difficult. Deci-
sions to separate political and business media interests inevitably affect funda-
mental power relations.
A third area of concern has been antipress violence, attacks through verbal
intimidation and physical harm inflicted on reporters and journalistic organiza-
tions. Violence is a reality for a large majority of journalists and news organiza-
tions outside of the wealthy West (Sussman 1991). Every year, scores of journal-
ists are attacked and assassinated. Twenty-four journalists were murdered in
2000 (Committee to Protect Journalists 2000). In Eastern Europe and Latin
America, the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy has not con-
tributed to the elimination of antipress violence. Amid persistent political crisis,
attacks also continue in sub-Saharan and Central African countries (Martz 1998;
Mostafa 1999). Despite official pronouncements and pressure put by
state’s fulfilling its mission to monopolize the legitimate use of violence and the
lack of accountability of those responsible for the attacks. In situations when the
state is on the verge of collapse,certainly it is not only the expression of ideas,but
any form of political participation, that is dangerous. Because it is a central arena
in the battle for public expression, the press becomes a prominent target when
naked violence replaces the rule of law. The fate of the press is intrinsically linked
to the fate of the democratic state. There cannot be a democratic press as long as
the state does not secure minimal institutional conditions that modern democ-
racy demands.
Argentina 3 31 11 11 13 2 3 8 3 1
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Bolivia 2 4 1 7 4 1 6 2 1 2 2
Brazil 2 2 2 2 5 1 2 4 4 1 1
Chile 24 15 22 4 1 1
Colombia 8 6 8 10 7 4 2 10 11 3 6 24
Costa Rica 1 2
Dominican Republic 1 2 7 1
Ecuador 1 6 8 2
El Salvador 4 22 8 31 1 1 1
Guatemala 9 4 3 16 10 31 12 15 5
Honduras 2 1 1 4 2
Mexico 1 1 4 2 6 6 8 11 10 1 4 5
Nicaragua 4 2 3 9 2 2
Panama 31 33 6 5 6
Paraguay 8 9 2 6 5 1 16 2
Perua 11 10 9 27 51 17 22 19 6 16 11
Uruguay 1
Venezuela 3 2 26 24 45 2 4
Source: Committee to Protect Journalists (1997, 2000); Reporters sans Frontières (Annual Reports; see http://www.rsf.org/rsf/uk).
a. Peru’s immigration office issued a decree invalidating the Peruvian citizenship of the station’s owner, Baruch Ivcher. The government alleged that the Israel-
born Ivcher did not follow the proper administrative procedures when he was granted Peruvian citizenship in 1984.The law precludes foreigners from owning
media outlets. After several months of legal wrangling, the police entered Ivcher’s station to enforce a court order upholding the Immigration Office’s deci-
sion. Control of the station was turned to the pro-government minority owners. After this episode, Ivcher left the country and returned after Fujimori
resigned from office in November 2000.
95
96 Press/Politics 7(3) Summer 2002
Argentina 1 1 1 3
Bolivia 0
Brazil 2 2 1 1 4 1 2 13
Chile 2 2
Colombia 4 13 5 10 1 4 2 3 1 4 5 52
Costa Rica 0
Dominican Republic 1 1
Ecuador 1 1
El Salvador 9 1 10
Guatemala 1 1 1 3 2 1 9
Honduras 1 1 2
Mexico 4 2 2 2 1 3 2 16
Nicaragua 0
Panama 1 1
Paraguay 1 1
Peru 1 5 2 6 3 1 2 20
Uruguay 0
Venezuela 2 1 3
Total 12 32 11 21 6 9 6 12 3 10 6 6 134
Source: Committee to Protect Journalists (1997, 2000); Reporters sans Frontières (Annual Reports; see http://www.rsf.org/rsf/uk).
97
98
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Table 3
Number of journalists murdered, by region
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Metro 1 13 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 32
Interior 11 19 9 19 3 6 4 11 2 8 5 5 102
Total 12 32 11 21 6 9 6 12 3 10 6 6 134
Source: Committee to Protect Journalists (1997, 2000); Reporters sans Frontières (Annual Reports; see http://www.rsf.org/rsf/uk).
Waisbord / Antipress Violence and the Crisis of the State 99
in the past and more related to the reporting of sensitive issues that directly affect
organizations and individuals wielding power in today’s democracies.
Journalists have seemingly been targeted for their professional activities
rather than for their partisan or ideological sympathies. In the aftermath of the
brutal murder of an Argentine news photographer in 1997, the Buenos Aires
correspondent for the main Brazilian news weekly observes, “Newsphoto-
grapher [Jose Luis Cabezas] was a professional without known political partici-
pation. Hard-working and ambitious, he had a natural concern with career suc-
cess.” Military terror was responsible for the murder of one hundred journalists
in the 1970s. They were linked to left-wing parties, unions, and armed organiza-
tions. The death of Cabezas is different. “It’s the first case of a journalist assassi-
nated because of practicing his profession,” observes Noticias managing editor
Hector D’Amico (Moreira Leite 1997).
Antipress violence responds to the interest of individuals and organizations to
muffle or eliminate an emergent critical press. In countries where mainstream
media have historically cultivated close relations with official authorities, attacks
are a symptom of a less acquiescent press,a press that dares to take jabs at govern-
ment officials and look into the activities of paramilitary organizations and drug
cartels (Waisbord 2000).No need to resort to violence when news organizations
fully comply with official lines and are not interested in bringing different pow-
ers to public scrutiny. The present situation is not one of an all-out war against
the press but one in which targets are carefully picked. It has not been “the press”
as a whole that has been a target of violence but reporters and news organizations
that denounced acts of wrongdoing. In Mexico, publications that investigated the
linkages between drug barons and local police and judges, such as the Tijuana-
based Zeta, have been attacked and journalists harassed and murdered.
Reporters who wrote about police corruption, such as reporters from TV
Azteca, Reforma, and El Universal were also attacked, and a journalist with the
magazine Como was assassinated. In Peru, muckraking publications such as the
news weekly Caretas and the daily La República, as well as print and broadcast
investigative reporters, have been frequent targets of intimidation by military
and intelligence services during the Fujimori government. In an episode that
gained wide national and international repercussion, reporters for a news pro-
gram and the owner of the television station Frecuencia Latina were threatened
and had to leave the country in the aftermath of reports that denounced links
between army officers and drug cartels, an interview with an intelligence officer
who accused the army of having tortured her and murdered colleagues for alleg-
edly leaking information to the press about a plan to harass the press, and the
broadcast of conversations about the wiretapping of journalists.2
a high degree of presence of the state both functionally and territorially, that is, a
zone in which the rule of law is efficiently and equally applied across class and eth-
nic groups, and the bureaucracy is efficacious in administering policies across the
entire territory. A green zone [indicates] a high degree of the press of the state
across the territory of a given nation,but a significantly lower presence in terms of
the efficient and equal application of the rule of law. Brown [designates] a zone in
which the presence of the state is very low, or even non-existent. (P. 51)3
the military and the police patently reveals the deficit of contemporary Latin
America democracies to institutionalize the rule of law. Democracy replaced
authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s, but states still fail to guarantee the
observance of basic constitutional rights. Nor do they protect the safety of
human life or an independent judiciary system. Moreover, as dozens of attacks
committed by paramilitary, intelligence, and police organizations attest, the
state has also been responsible for breaking laws.
The combination of powerful drug lords and corrupt officials, especially in
regions where guerrilla movements have been dominant in the past decade, has
proven to be lethal for journalists. As in the 1960s and 1970s, when guerrilla
movements gained strength throughout Latin America, insurrectionary groups
are still present in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. A complex web of interests
including drug lords, local bosses, police and military forces, and guerrillas have
been confirmed or suspected behind dozens of attacks against reporters. In
Colombia,
out of the four journalists who died in the line of duty [in 1997], one may have
been murdered by local police, another by a paramilitary group, and in a third
case, both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas are suspected. The opinion editor
of the Cali daily El País, was gunned down in front of his home by a professional
gunman only days after he wrote a column in favor of extraditing Colombian drug
traffickers to the United States. (Committee to Protect Journalists 1997).
Is the state unable or unwilling to prevent such attacks and monitor the rule of
law? Are extralegal powers linked to either drug-trafficking organizations or
police and military squads completely beyond the control of elected authorities?
Or are civilian administrations unconcerned with the faith of journalists and
other citizens who are victims of official and unofficial violence? Are govern-
ments lenient or weak in effectively exercising power and bringing justice to the
victims?
Answering these questions confronts the difficulty of singling out official
responsibilities in countless episodes and offering a comprehensive explanation.
Some cases show that governments have been directly responsible for the
attacks. Others, instead, attest to the privatization of violence, that is, the exis-
tence of hit men and death squads in the service of powerful bosses and drug
lords. State-sponsored violence and privatized violence are not separate but
related phenomena. Not only can the state not put an end to the autonomization
of violence, it was originally responsible for granting “licenses to kill” to police
and military officers as part of the repression of guerrilla movements and politi-
cal dissidents. Individuals who once staffed police departments and paramilitary
death squads now offer their skills to drug lords and corrupt politicians. Trained
by the state, they became “hand-for-hire” with the end of military regimes and, in
some cases, after civilian administrations deactivated the machine of violence
expanded by the dictatorships. The flip side of the privatization of violence is the
privatization of safety. Journalists chauffeured in armored cars and protected by
around-the-clock bodyguards or newsroom buildings tightly guarded by secu-
rity personnel and cordoned off from the streets patently express a situation in
which states, when not directly involved in the attacks, cannot protect
journalists.
When the state fails to centralize violence and the rule of law is weak, human
rights are the victim. Whereas the state qua perpetrator was responsible for
human rights violations during military dictatorships, the state qua guarantor is
responsible for being inefficient in enforcing human rights principles in contem-
porary democracies. Amid this situation, journalism (and freedom of expression
in general) is vulnerable. The basic rights of journalists, and of any other citizen,
are under threat.
The difference is that unlike average citizens, journalists, especially those
affiliated with major news organizations in metropolitan areas, have immediate
access to the means for getting publicity about attacks. Large media organiza-
tions as well as national and international organizations offer the possibility of
“deterrence by publicity.” Committee to Protect Journalists director Ann Coo-
per (2000:36) affirms that “exposure can protect journalists.” Putting the spot-
light on the fate of journalists has proven to be effective in many cases, but it does
not address the structural conditions that breed violence. Needless to say, public
attention does not guarantee invulnerability. Well-known journalists have been
killed in broad daylight. Publicity, however, somehow protects journalists from
fatal attacks. The condition is different for journalists (and citizens) in non-urban
and marginal areas. Removed from the fishbowl of the big media, they lack built-
in defenses and thus are more susceptible to police brutality or paramilitary
repression. This is tangible in “brown” areas subjected to the rule of drug lords
and paramilitary groups. Disregarding the old warning about not picking a fight
with someone who has a barrel of ink,perpetrators confidently attack journalists
as impunity rules. The sword continues to be mightier than the pen.
Notwithstanding the fact that journalists are linked to the powerful echo
chambers of the newsrooms and local and international organizations, antipress
violence goes on as justice is rarely, if ever, served. Besides local and federal gov-
ernments that do not monitor the respect of basic human rights, the ineffective-
ness of the judicial system exacerbates the situation of lawlessness. Perpetrators
are rarely captured; if captured, they are rarely brought to court; and cases are
often shelved and forgotten. For example, only in 6 cases out of 108 murders of
Colombian journalists between 1977 and 1995 were the perpetrators—not the
instigators—identified and captured. If impunity does not directly encourage
violence, it legitimizes violence as a means to police civic life and further con-
tributes to the difficulties of consolidating accountability mechanisms. The issue
at stake is not so much whether societies are equipped with legislation that could
prevent crimes against reporters from happening; it is actually the weakness of
law enforcement. This problem is certainly not unique to violence against the
press but is another manifestation of the larger difficulties of institutionalizing
the rule of law and eliminating impunity in the region.
the existence of a strong state, in terms of its ability to centralize violence and to
enforce the respect for human rights, is a fundamental condition for the press,
and more broadly, for the existence of democratic governance. Whenever states
are weak, as in situations of civil and uncivil wars, freedom of expression suffers.
The absence of the state results in a Hobbesian scenario in which the press is cer-
tainly not the only, but is one of the most visible, victims.
This situation brings us to a central theme in contemporary writings about
globalization: the weakness of the state (Van Creveld 1999). This situation is a
matter of celebration rather than of concern for both globalization and
antiglobalization positions. Corporate and “free-flow-of-information” apolo-
gists applaud the fact that states face tremendous difficulties in taming the jug-
gernaut of global commerce and communications. The end of national econo-
mies and nonstop, cross-border flows of information and money usher in a brave
new capitalist world and promises of abundant riches and knowledge (Wriston
1992; Ohmae 1995). Antiglobalization advocates find this scenario troublesome
(Kalb et al. 2000). It promotes and legitimizes the consolidation of global capi-
talism, and it has damaging consequences in terms of social, environmental, cul-
tural, and human rights issues. For them, however, the flip side of corporate-led
globalization is “globalization from below,” the possibility that global democratic
movements can increasingly monitor states, particularly those with long record
of abuses and disregard for human rights in the Third World. Global movements
and organizations pave the way for a truly global democracy that saps the
(authoritarian) foundations of the state.
What falls through the cracks between two positions is that for the press (as
well as for other democratic institutions), the prospect and reality of an absent
and/or minimal state offers little reason to rejoice. Notwithstanding the affir-
mation of a global civil society,the state remains a central institution for ensuring
basic conditions for the functioning of the press. No alternative institution to the
modern state currently exists that can condense power and institutionalize con-
ditions for order. As of now, the alternative to weak and fragmented states is not
the rosy picture of global commerce or global democracy but, instead, absolute
chaos. As the situation of the “new global disorder” painfully demonstrates, the
impossibility of securing minimal political order raises the specter of perpetual
violence that brings down democracy and its institutions (Bauman 1998). The
efforts of global organizations to promote better conditions for the press are
certainly important. It is undeniable that international law is helpful in assist-
ing journalists and prosecuting those responsible for attacks against reporters
(Perkins 2001). Their impact is limited without a democratic state that effec-
tively centralizes violence and imposes the rule of law. Notwithstanding the rise
of a global public sphere and its important contributions to democratic citizen-
ship worldwide, the work of journalists is mired in local conditions. Antipress
violence ultimately rests on the inability of the state to suppress violence and
enforce laws. Without the regulation of violence through democratic mecha-
nisms, the press is caught in the crosswinds of extralegal, unaccountable vio-
lence. A fully functioning state that replaces a stateless society is desirable, for it
is, ideally, the only institutional arrangement to secure conditions for journalis-
tic labor and to enforce laws that protect the human rights of journalists.
Conclusions
Notes
1. The situation in Cuba is not considered, as it is the only country in the region that is not a
“transitional” or “consolidated” democracy.
2. Threats and harassment of a group of journalists are considered as a single attack.
3. The still unsolved murder of radio journalist Parmenio Medina in Costa Rica in 2001 was
exceptional in a country where few episodes of antipress violence have been recorded in the
last decades.
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Biographical Note
Silvio Waisbord is director of the Journalism Resources Institute and an associate professor in the
Department of Journalism and Media Studies at Rutgers University. He holds a Ph.D. in sociol-
ogy from the University of California, San Diego, and a Licenciatura in sociology from the Uni-
versity of Buenos Aires. He was a fellow at the Annenberg School for Communication at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and the Media Studies Center.His most recent book is Watchdog Journalism
in South America (Columbia, 2000). He is also coeditor of Media and Globalization (Rowan &
Littlefield, 2001) and Latin Politics, Global Media (Texas, 2002).
Address: 612 E. Capitol St., #3, NE, Washington, D.C. 20003; e-mail: waisbord@scils.
rutgers.edu.