Mimesis and Understanding: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics 4.

1448B4-19
Author(s): Stavros Tsitsiridis
Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Dec., 2005), pp. 435-446
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4493348
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Classical Quarterly 55.2 435-446 (2005) Printed in Great Britain 435
doi: 10. 1093/cq/bmi041

MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING: AN

INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE'S POETICS
4. 1448B4-19*

The structure of the first chapters of the Poetics, before Aristotle embark
cussion of tragedy proper, is clear enough: chapters 1-3 set forth a tripl

of the kinds of mimesis, based on the Platonic method of 3LalpEot

according to the means, the object, and the modes of mimesis respec
chapters 4 and 5 discuss the origins and the development of the m
genres.1 More specifically, the first part of chapter 4 (a chapter 'der int
gehaltsreichsten, aber auch schwierigsten der Poetik', as Gudeman h
expounds the two underlying causes of poetry: (i) man's natural tend
mimesis and (ii) his innate affection for rhythm and harmony.2 Sp
natural instinct of mimesis, Aristotle stresses from the outset that th
man's distinctive feature, which sets him apart from all other species:
early childhood the mimetic being par excellence, and he develops his e
standing through mimesis.3 Aristotle then proceeds to underline a secon
distinguishes humans from other animals: 'all humans find pleasure
objects'. At this point he continues as follows (1448b12):

MqThE ov t' onv Uov Te 'avlgauvov '7Tt T(vaivepyowv. apW yperal'trmAvpuam bgOuEv, rovtV rAdT' ElKova
TaS- ~ciaAtra 77KpL/w/IpvaS xagPOE OEwpoOv7Er, otov t&ol7pwv TE oppasd TWv aTL rOTtLXorrWV Kat
VEKpwV. a'ttov SE Kat TOTOVU, 7TL avOavEtv oV~ tovov rotf ?ptAoao`potg 7St7TOV UAAaL Kal "rois
&AAoLg 6oiwsog, AA' AI'7T fpaxv KowWvogUw aavTO. apta y Tp ToVTO xatpOvaL dTaS EIKOvas OPCOvTES,

presents an 'empirical verification' (/& Trov ,pywv) of the fact that the pleasure felt in
things imitated is universal: mimetic works with an unpleasant content still offer plea-
sure, and this in their own right, not only on account of their workmanship. Second, he
underscores the natural cause which explains both the pleasure drawn from imitations

* I wish to express my gratitude to A. Schmitt, V. Liapis, and Th. K. Stephanopoulos, who

read an earlier draft of this paper and offered a number of useful comments. Thanks are also due
to the anonymous referee, whose careful comments improved this paper.
See F. Solmsen, 'Origins and methods of Aristotle's Poetics', CQ 29 (1935), 196-200.
2 For the second 'cause', see J. Vahlen, Beitrdge zu Aristoteles' Poetik (Leipzig and Berlin,
1914), 10-11; A. Gudeman, Aristoteles. HEpt 7ToLIrq/TKS (Berlin and Leipzig, 1934), ad 48b8;
D. de Montmollin, La Poetique d'Aristote (Neuchatel, 1951), 32-34; G. F. Else, Aristotle's
Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 127-30; D. W. Lucas, Aristotle: Poetics
(Oxford, 1968), ad 48b22. For a different interpretation (the natural pleasure in mimesis as
the second 'cause'), see A. Rostagni, Aristotele: Poetica (Turin, 19452 [19271]), ad loc.;
J. Sykutris, A4pwtroT"AovS THEpt 7To0q1TLKS, AKa8r&lIa A40q7vwv,'EAA-qv. BtLA. 2 (Athens, 1937),
ad loc.; S. Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (London, 1986), 70-71.
3 For learning through mimesis, see also H. Koller, Die Mimesis in der Antike (Bern, 1954),
57-63. Concerning the mimesis of children, S. Halliwell, The Aesthetics ofMimesis (Princeton
and Oxford, 2002), 153 n. 4, and 178, takes Aristotle to be thinking 'mainly of children's play
acting' (on this point cf. Pol. 7.17.1336a33-34).

Classical Quarterly 55.2 ( The Classical Association 2005; all rights reserved

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436 STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

and the fact (one that he had mentioned earlie

of his life by imitating.4 In addition to the s
section on the two causes of poetry--a dispro
esis devoted to the explanation of the first
also, from Aristotle's prior comment on
Tovnw ... rTS rapd;c-as)5--the above-mentio
part, a series of further questions on matter
what exactly does vtavO vEtw consist, when
cisely does uvAAoy5EacOaL mean in this case
requisite for someone to have seen the depic
if the concrete example has to do with pai
'vilest animals and corpses' render it almo
are dealing with images of the same kind
any other art entirely accidental?
Let us begin from our last question, the one
in the above passage it is indeed painting tha
does not make this a certainty-this is beca
characteristic form among the representat
and colours, painting approaches reality mor
and it is for this reason that, from very ear
552]6), it had been compared with poetry, in
the latter's imitative character. In the Poe
painting occurs no less than eight times.7 It
acter of this parallelism betrays Platonic inf
probable in the passage from chapter 4 unde
value is discussed.9
Why, on the other hand, do the examples o
whether the discussion focuses on the pleasu
general, or from learning as the cause of p
case Oqpta LT9tO1TraTa or VEKpOVs, while
human being? One would have to admi
'corpses' would by no means be appropriat
latter case Aristotle could have simply refr
whatsoever, contenting himself with a
Rhetoric's parallel passage.10 This is, in an

4 For the phrase aittov ? KaL roTrov, see Else

s Cf. Montmollin (n. 2), 34-5; Else (n. 2), 127
6 For a different view, see A. Ford, The Origins
96-8.
7 See the passages in Gudeman ad 47a18 and in Halliwell (n. 2), 53 n. 11, 124 n. 27.
8 See Halliwell (n. 2), 123-4.
9 It is well known that Plato had sharply criticized painting in his works (particularly from
the Republic onwards); see E. C. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting (Leiden 1978), 33-47, 118
25. Painting is for Plato the most characteristic mimetic art and as such is often compared to
poetry (Cra. 423D, Resp. 597E, 598C, 601A, 603B, Plt. 306D). The parallelism of mimes
to a mirror which can be held and turned around in different directions (Resp. 10.596D) also
refers to painting.
10 Rhet. 1.11. 1371b9: iAAad ovAAoytatuds i artv OTv 70r70O EKEWVO, UISTE /tavOaVELV TL UUPOaLVEL
Cf. Gudeman ad Poet. 1448b17: 'Man erwartet 70T70 EKEivo, was auch die oben zitierte, gan
ihnliche Stelle aus der Rhetorik bestitigt, denn das iiberlieferte Masculinum involviert ein
nicht zu motivierende Einschriinkung des Gedankens.' Also Lucas ad loc.: 'the masc. i
strange after Ti E.'Karov'.

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 MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING 437

after the phrase uvAAoy?EaoOal 7 iEKacTOV. The fact th

vidual as an example of the inference process, as well
parallel Rhetoric passage, cannot be insignificant,
Aristotle's reference to portrait-painters (EZKovoyp(po
torial or sculptural, which in classical antiquity depict
the art form par excellence where the depiction of t
a certain person is attempted."1 It can, therefore,
mimesis in which distinct characteristics are repr
might be of some significance.
There is also, however, something in the Poetics pa
absent from the parallel Rhetoric passage and which
This is the reference to common folk who are set ap
are inferior to them as far as their intellectual capa

fpaXb
folk KoLvwvojtlv
in his discussion ofaTroi, [sc. T70oprocess
the recognition CtavOvELv]).12 Aristotle's
can be neither singling
without some pointout of common
nor without some grounding on empirical observation. Our common everyday experi-
ence suggests that average people looking at photographs will react in a special way if
they recognize well-known persons in them. Their reaction is even more marked when
they manage to make out faces whose features have faded away: the more demanding
the recognition process, the greater the pleasure derived from its successful con-
clusion. Aristotle's formulation aims at stressing this: namely that we are dealing
here with an elementary cognitive process, one that we can observe even in ordinary
people who are not possessed of particular intellectual capacities.
We may now proceed to examine, in greater detail, the very same cognitive process

described in chapter 4: avjpalvEL OEcWpovbva T /av8OcvELv Kaal avAAoytEaOa rT E"KaUTov,

otov 'OTL oVrog EKELvo. From the parallel passage in Rhetoric (avAAoytLot E"UTV O"T
7Too70 KEVO0, TE tatVdVELV 7 GVTULPCtVEt) it becomes clear that in this process
ovAAoyiEoUa6 logically precedes while tlavcaveLv denotes the result. Leaving aside
the meaning of ovAAoy,[EaOat for the moment, there can be little doubt that
/CavwOcvEV here denotes 'understanding' rather than 'leaming'.13 At any rate, the

" See E. Voutiras, Studien zur Interpretation und Stil griechischer Portrdts des 5. undfriihen
4. Jahrhunderts (Diss. Bonn, 1980), 19ff. Sometimes pictorial portraits were on display: we
know, for example, that Sophocles was depicted (yEyp~ipOat) in the Stoa Poikile playing the
lyre (Soph. Vita 5=T 1, 25 Radt; see the discussion in L. Sechan, Etudes sur la tragedie
grecque [Paris, 1926], 194ff.). On 'informal sketches', see G. Richter, The Portraits of the
Greeks 1 (London, 1965), 18. In relation to Poet. 1454b9 (T70o k yalobs EtKovoypa<povs), see
Voutiras, 34. Of course, El'K V is not applied to portraits only, as is made clear from
1448b11; see also Halliwell (n. 3), 183.
12 The phrase Eri /tpaXv means in general 'a little way, a little' (LSJ s.v. rtn C.I.2c, cf. Thuc.
1.118.2). It cannot refer here to a phase of a man's lifetime, as W. Kullmann, Aristoteles und die
moderne Wissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1998), 341-2, suggests. What Aristotle principally refers to
here is learning, not to mimesis, his point being (to my mind) that ordinary men participate
in it only to a limited extent, that is, to the degree that learning is easily and effortlessly acquired
(cf. Rhet. 3.10. 1410b10).
13 Halliwell in his article 'Aristotelian mimesis and human understanding', in 0. Andersen
and J. Haarberg (edd.), Making Sense ofAristotle: Essays in Poetics (London, 2001), 92 ff., and
(n. 3), 201, points out that tavO~ivev might imply both meanings at the same time. But, since
Aristotle (i) is well aware of the difference between the two meanings of the verb (Soph. El.
4.165b33), and (ii) uses the verb at the same time here and in a passage of the Rhetoric with
reference to a basic and very general cognitive process, it is more possible to believe that he
uses the verb here in the sense 'understanding' (cf. Met. A 1.980blff.). For the primary mean-
ings as well as the semantic evolution of tavO66vEv, see B. Snell, Die Ausdriickefiir den Begriff
des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie (Berlin, 1924), 72-81.

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 438 STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

sense of ovAAoyLEaOaL is by no means a tech

used here in a general sense to denote 'compre
so, the question remains of what we are to ma
exactly it is that the common man 'compreh
that the figure represented in a portrait is
already seen'.
The problem was first stated in 1789 by T
Poetics. According to Twining, Aristotle's w
tators, but 'even with respect to them, the p
portraits, and individual resemblances, such
even so Aristotle's words fail to yield satisf
momentary ignorance, or doubt, I do not s
be acquired by the spectator'.16 Since Ari

inartistic portraits-it is precisely the reference

that favours the exactly opposite interpret
highly pertinent.
The problem has been the object of extensiv
interpretations have been added, namely th
referring to pleasure as the natural outcom
the 'discovery or recognition on our part of
further, that the pleasure of mimesis consis
broadest sense (in the realistic reconstruction
etration, in the discovery of its deeper, under
or that the pleasure of recognition we are de
elevated aesthetic gratification, since the r
popular appreciation of likeness than to tr
picture is a kind of concept, which presen
'cow'), but with some basic or underlying f
or that it is not a question of recognizing a c

14 Montmollin (n. 2), 35, presumes that the verb

gisme (vrai ou faux)' (viz. not as in 25.1461b2, b
this would require that there be more than one p
conclusion would ensue. Additionally, the syllogist
lar, individual being, but only to individual specie
15 Cf. LSJ s.v. I; Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus s.v.
tionof OEwpoivrES (1448b11): 'Poetics 4 contrasts
images as objects having certain shapes and colo
means of theoria we learn and reason about a repre
and the object imitated. Theoria is non practical' (

rule the verb OEWopE~v with e.g. lKo vas, ypaps, r

no more than 'view', 'look at', and I see no reason w
this case as well.
16 Th. Twining, Aristotle's Treatise on Poetry 1 (London, 18122), 284 (I was unfortunately
unable to see the first edition; the italics are Twining's). Similar objections are expressed by
Lucas in his commentary (ad 48b13): 'The explanation is inadequate. When we have learnt
what already familiar thing a picture represents we have not learnt much.'
17 I. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art ofPoetry (Oxford, 1909), ad 48b16. For this interpretation
Bywater refers to Probl. 19.5.918a3.
18 J. Sykutris (n. 2), *80-*81.
19 S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (London, 19074), 201-2.
20 J. M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector (Chicago and
London 1975), 52-55. For a similar view, see R. Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot, Aristote: La
Poetique (Paris, 1980), ch. 4 n. 3.

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 MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING 439

the genus to which the particular person belongs ('that he is

... "That is a So-and-So" ).21 But the aforementioned inter
tisfactory, or they do not remove all the difficulties.
Special reference must, however, be made to two mo
Sifakis assumes in this passage that we are dealing with
which is closely akin to EvOtBV~Lta: 'Because the artist ha
versal terms, we recognize in the representation an ins
variant of a general type, and such a recognition provi
the character of the represented subject, being regarded,
ground of the katholou.'22 According to him, the inference
stitute a judgement on the identity of the depicted perso
character traits of the represented person. For exam
marble statue by Pheidias, we could infer that the statue
like, the statue being his ideal image'.
Halliwell, on the other hand, argues that the pleasure
derives from the recognition and the understanding
words, the spectator realizes from the beginning that
that one must not therefore assume that what Aristotle has in mind are the mimetic
works as mere representations of already familiar, particular objects: 'When we
appreciate mimetic works, we recognize and understand the ways in which possible
features of reality are intentionally signified in them.'23 According to Halliwell, the
pleasure of knowledge that is derived from mimesis must, at least in the case of dra-
matic poetry, be associated with the knowledge of universals which is mentioned in
chapter 9. Tragedy's olKEca 8ov75 'must instantiate, must be one major species of, the
generic pleasure defined in Chapter 4'.24
Both Sifakis and Halliwell are trying to connect chapter 4 with chapter 9, consider-

ing that, since that tragedy is mimesis, tragedy's olKEla 1ovr5 must either be contained
in or coincide with the pleasure derived from the knowledge that mimesis offers. At
first sight, such an assumption appears to be unproblematic. But could we presume
that Aristotle writes chapter 4 having in mind tragedy in particular and presupposing
everything he says about KaO6Aov in chapter 9? Even more importantly, could
we assume that, according to Aristotle, any mimema (also an EIKOJV u'OdV ara

21 G. F. Else (n. 2), 131-2. However, in order to support this interpretation Else is forced to

alter the text (o,roS

The Fragility EKEZVO[Cambridge,
of Goodness instead of ov'ros
2001 E'KEL.
], 388,For this conjecture
apparently (whichsee
also adopts) M.R.
C. G.
Nussbaum,
C. Levens, JHS 81 (1961), 190. Gudeman had conjectured (although he did not adopt it in
the text) 70o70o KEVO (cf. above n. 10), using the Rhetoric's parallel passage in support of
his proposal. D. Gallop, 'Animals in the Poetics', OSAP 8 (1990), 168, suggests an even
greater change to the text, considering that 'what Aristotle has in mind is not the identification
of the subject of a human likeness ('that is so-and-so'), but the recognition of each element
within a complex diagram or replica as representing a corresponding part of a living thing
('that is the kidney'), and the learning through inference of general truths about living things
of the relevant type ('what the kidney is', that is, what it is for and how it works).
22 G. M. Sifakis, Aristotle on the Function of Tragic Poetry (Herakleion, 2001), 50 (Sifakis's
interpretation was first published in J. Betts et al. [edd.], Studies in Honour of T B. L. Webster
[Bristol, 1986], 1, 211-22).
23 S. Halliwell, 'Pleasure, Understanding, and Emotion in Aristotle's Poetics', in A. O. Rorty
(ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton, 1992), 247; also id. (n. 3), 189; cf. id. (n. 13),
102: 'It is, then, after all, unproblematic that Aristotle's example of understanding a mimetic
image in Poetics 4 should be a case of identifying a particular: understanding particulars, in
all their complexity . .. must play an important part in the appreciation of poetry, as in the appro-
priately sensitive judgement of ethical issues.'
24 Halliwell (n. 13), 253.

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 440 STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

17KpLOtf3 W,7V such as, for example, an

versal qualities? Apart from this, there is a
tragedy, as Heath proved very persuas
described in chapter 4, since the latter (
tragedy, (ii) is purely cognitive, and (iii) f
Therefore, in order to be able to grasp ac
chapter 4, we must initially confine our
clarify Aristotle's words, possibly by d
ceuvre. Certainly, neither the Poetics nor t
source of Aristotelian thought with regard
this passage, namely the issue of the kno
fully to understand that matter, one must
about the different stages of knowledge, as
passages: the last chapter of the Poster
Metaphysics.
In the much-discussed passage 2.19 of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle tries to answer
the question of how man is in a position to know about the 'first principles'. What he
attempts, in other words, is to explain how man attains his knowledge of the natural
world. The basic question that concerns him is whether we possess inborn knowledge
of those principles, or whether that knowledge is acquired. If the latter is true, then the
process of this acquisition has to be explained. Aristotle endorses neither alternative.
All living creatures, he says, possess an inborn ability for 'sense perception' that we
call aisthesis (99b35). Some of these creatures retain a trace of that perception in their
soul, while others do not. Those creatures that belong to the first category fall, in turn,
into two subcategories: on the one hand, there are those that experience a recurrent
presence of the remaining trace of that perception (in other words memory,
mneme), and are thus lead to rational thought, while, on the other hand, there are
those creatures in which no such process takes place. The accumulation of many
images of the same object in the memory, results in 'experience', empeiria (100a5:

at yap 7roAAcd LV-L tLa dptOtp4L E7TLrELpla t ua 'riv). From empeiria, namely 'all
the universal which has come to rest in the soul', derives the principle of technical
dexterity and science. Through these four stages, according to the Aristotelian
'genetic epistemology', man arrives, via induction, to the knowledge of the first prin-

ciples: s-Aov r-t E5TaywyY yvwpL'Etv avayKca'OV. Ka'L yap 77 a't'aOrlat rco 7TO
KaOO6 ov L-oLE-tbegins,
The Metaphysics (100b3).26
as is well known, with the celebrated utterance that 'all
men by nature desire to know'. This becomes apparent, as Aristotle says, from the
love we have for our senses, particularly that of sight, which permits us to differentiate
among things.27 All living creatures are endowed with the same senses, but few
command the ability of 'memory', while only man can attain 'experience' through
'many memories of the same object'. When from many notions of experience there
comes a single universal judgement, then men attain technical knowledge and

25 M. Heath, 'Aristotle and the Pleasures of Tragedy', in Andersen and Haarberg (n. 13),
9-10.
26 For the problems of interpretation which the Aristotelian passage presents and all relevan
doxography, see W. Detel, Aristoteles: Analytica Posteriora, Aristoteles Werke 3 I-II, Bd. I
(Berlin, 1993), 831-54.
27 As W. Jaeger, Aristoteles (Berlin, 19232), 68-9 has shown, Aristotle had already devel
oped in a more detailed fashion in his Protrepticus the views he puts forth in the first tw
chapters of Metaphysics.

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 MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING 441

science. In the Metaphysics, therefore, we encounter th

we had already found in the Posterior Analytics. We m
points in this second Aristotelian exposition: first, the
lighted, particularly in regard to the differentiation
entirely clear that empeiria pertains exclusively to hum
species.
One observes, then, that in both references the function of memory is very import-
ant. This, according to Aristotle, constitutes the interim stage between sense percep-
tion and the acquisition of the capacity for abstraction. What is worth noting is that
memory plays a very important part in the passage under discussion as well-a
fact that, until now, has not been pointed out. Not only does 'KETVo~ in the phrase
OVT70o KECVOQ refer to the past,28 but it is also explicitly mentioned that no understand-
ing can be reached and no conclusion can be arrived at (and, consequently, no plea-
sure can be derived from mimesis), unless one has not seen before (rrpoEwpaK0s) that
which is represented in the visual work of art.29 This is the crucial point: one does not
see the depicted and the real face simultaneously, but the very fact that there is an
identification to take place means that a certain amount of time has elapsed (iXE-vos
refers to a more or less distant past), a fact that most certainly enforces the activation
of memory. To fully grasp, then, the nature of the cognitive process implied in this
passage, we must take into consideration Aristotle's ideas on memory and particularly
on recollection.
Aristotle expounds his ideas on these topics in his brief but interesting essay De
memoria et reminiscentia.30 Let us summarize his essential propositions: memory,
as any other mental activity,31 is based on the function of phantasia, which from
sense-images (aloalqxara) creates mental images (cpavrdaolara) in the human soul.
The mnemonic process is paralleled with the recognition of an object in a painting
or of an impression made by a signet-ring.32 The distinctive feature of those
images is that they are copies or models of the objects that man has already perceived
through his senses in the past.33 Maintaining an object's representation in one's
psyche while, at the same time, being conscious that this representation is the

28 For the phrase o70ro AKELVO;, see Halliwell (n. 3), 178 n. 3 and 189. I disagree on this point
with the interpretation of Sifakis ([n. 22], 47-8 with n. 29) who does not distinguish between
this and the colloquial use of the phrase; for this important distinction see P. T. Stevens,
Colloquial Expressions in Euripides, Hermes Einzelschriften 38 (Wiesbaden, 1976), 31-2;
see also M. Schanz, Novae commentationes Platonicae (Wiirzburg, 1871), 16; further
W. Havers, 'Das Pronomen der jener-Deixis im Griechischen', IF 19 (1906), esp. 4-5.
29 The prevailing question is what happens in the case of mythical persons. Aristotle would
have accepted, I assume, that in those cases the identification of the depicted person could
derive from other similar pictures or by different means (something that also happens in the
case of Christian saints).
30 Belfiore (n. 15), especially 49-50, is one of the few scholars who took this particular work
seriously into consideration in her interpretation of Poetics.
31 See Mem. 449b31 (Kat VOE v oVK E"rtv IavEv Oav7r aU Trogs), De An. 3.431a17 (8t6 obiTorTE
VOEL aVEr avTaordkEaros 4 Ovx(), 431b2-8.
32 Picture-like: Mem. 450b30 ('anTEp Ev 77 ypaqpj cs ElKva OEWpEL, (cf. also 450b21, 23, 27,
451a2, 12, 16); impression produced by a signet-ring: 450a30 4- yap ywvotirl Xivrl~os
EvarlalvETratL otov TV7ov rtval Tov aLaOt7Lcar ,s KaOdrWrLp ol L(ppayLSO(EvotL roig SaKTvAlotL~, also
450b16 carOrEp r5roS~ ypagq iv -'t1av. Both the notion of mental image and the metaphorical
vocabulary betray Plato's influence, see R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory (London, 20032), 5
n. 1; cf. R. McKeon, 'Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity', in R. S.
Crane (ed.), Critics and Criticism.: Ancient and Modern (Chicago, 1952), 121-7.
33 If these were not likenesses, we would not be in a position to recollect something which is
not present; see Sorabji (n. 32), 7.

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 442 STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

object's image is what constitutes memory (

~cvTraaa, E"~s). An important conclusion fo
same terms as he perceives mimesis in visua
The preservation of an object's image an
amount of time-that is, memory-forms, a
distinct from that of recollection. Anamnes
sciously the mental depictions of the past.
cessful end and the incomplete memory i
This recovery is possible because anamnesis i
rence, even a slight one, the soul searches fo
towards the recovery of the knowledge, sen
state within the soul.34 It is true, of course, t
interconnection of ideas; nevertheless it pre
the temporal localization of the person or o
the recreated image. As a conscious proces
exclusive characteristic of man.35 Aristotle no
he also draws a parallel-in a passage of gr
a kind of syllogism (Mem. 453a12):

a 6t ov Tt TO ava1vCL/tl7aKEuOaL EUTV OL tOV UVAAOyUJOrya69 rt" rt yO p 7ITp'TEpOV EJSEV ) 7KOVUEV 7) TL

rotoTroV naOEI G, avAAoyIErato 6 'valipvi)aK6/LEvor, Kal 'cav oOv ri7Tair trT. TOo 6S' r01 Kar. TO
/0VAEEUVTK6o 6 7Ta'PKEL, qPuEL atIvotg CJUrV//lE'KEV- KaL yatp T O30ov0AE6EUrOL uVAAoyLuFL'r rr rEtTTv.

Both the phrasing (oJov ovAAoytcr6C rtrc) and the general tenor of this passage (par-
ticularly the reference to the fPovAEvUtK6v), make it clear that ovAAoytcprs, is not
used here in the narrow sense of the term.36 Syllogism consists in a search, which
has as its point of departure the inference of an initial conclusion ex effectu ad
causam. From this point of view the frequent use of pr/Ikw and 5T7qus, in this part
of the work, are noteworthy.37 This notion of recollection as search and understanding

is strongly reminiscent of the Platonic concept of avctvrlvatJ, though Aristotle does not
accept, of course, his teacher theory in its entirety.38 In any case, the important fact is

34 Mem. 451b3: AA' oTavy avaAatLg3av- ")v 0Tpirepov ELXEI E7TLAT7rLv 7V a7 O ?tCyNoV ,7 06 IorT 7V
EetV TAYo/1EV tkV7lUkV, ror'T EUTL Kal TOTE T oava/.LIV?7)KE(Ta Oat TV EPqpE`VC0WV Tt.
35 Cf. Hist. An. 1.1.1488b25: Kal 'LV77/Lr LEV Kat 6&S6ax7-) ToA KOLtvavWd, avaft/Lv41aKEala 6'
o'6Sv 'AAo Uvarat 7rirv vOpworog.
36 J. I. Beare, The Parva Naturalia (The Works ofAristotle 3 [Oxford, 1908]), ad loc.) renders
the term with the word 'inference', and explains: 'The only deductive factor in the process is the
major, that every such qpavraajLa must have a cause (viz. an "experience") or be capable of being
accounted for. This starts the process of 7qT7aLsr. While the goAEvaLs ends by finding out the
way to act, avlv-~Ves ends by placing the qpivraata in its relation to past experience'. W. D.
Ross, Aristotle: Parva Naturalia (Oxford, 1935), ad 453a9-14, attempts to interpret the term
more narrowly: 'One has a general impression that a cpcivaafka in one's mind must have a
cause in previous experience (major premiss). One is aware of a present paivraupLa (minor
premiss). One therefore concludes that this qpxvraTaua must have a cause in previous experience.
On this follows the ,~q7)UtL for the cause, which 7T7)oUL leads to recollection.' But Ross's
interpretation seems to me pedantic. I agree with P. Siwek (Aristotelis Parva Naturalia
[Romae 1963], 167 n. 107) who believes that the term is not used here in its literal sense,
but 'in sensu latiore', as is very often the case in Aristotle (cf. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus
s.v. 711b48).
37 451b22 (r/7TroL), b23 (pC9 ('qrovrTIE), b28 (rrpo7IqT/ouaS, del. edd.), b30 (Ir/~7TrE), 452a8

(~rq7Tv), a16 (n'rm7TrCv), a22 (~r5EL), a23 (&rrqTEZ'), 453a12.15 (5TrI7qS), a25 (Tob ~7Tro7V'evov).
38 Cf. especially Meno 81D4-5: To yap q7reTLV apa Kal T7 oavOaVELV avapVat gAov EovUT . See
also C. E. Huber, Anamnesis bei Plato (Munich, 1964), ?206-13; J. Klein, A Commentary on
Plato's Meno (Chapel Hill, 1965), 108-72; Sang-In Lee, Anamnesis im Menon, Europiische
Hochsculschriften R. XV, Bd. 83 (Frankfurt, 2001), 147-59, B. Kyrkos, Die Dichtung als

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 MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING 443

that recollection is characterized as a kind of syllogi

identical with the one we have encountered in chapt
more, Aristotle, in the above-mentioned passage fr

verbs that indicate utterances (that is, A,yEW, KplVELV

is, /vWfLYovEV"ELV, LEvIaOL, and so on), but only ver
(Gtav06vELv Kac avUvAAooyEUat). To summarize: in m
the knowledge and the subsequent pleasure derived
that the mimetic art is based on a cognitive process w
of memory and especially to that of recollection.39 W
depicted as his starting point, the spectator is led, th
identify the said image with the actual object that i
guided from the features of the figure, as they are
through a cognitive process, to identification with the
trate what he means, Aristotle uses the most typical ex
ognition of an individual (which means, primarily, his
The objection one might raise is that in the Aristot
there is no indication that any amount of time has e
the recollection process needs to be activated. This is true
ect indications that, at least, some temporal distance is
that Aristotle is not interested here in offering distin
does not even mention the relevant notions.41 Nor d
had thoroughly elaborated on the theory of mimesis in

Wissensproblem bei Aristoteles (Athens, 1972), 106-7, is righ

trine of anamnesis, but he does not interpret correctly, in my o
Poetics, when he presumes that: 'Ahnlich wie bei Platon de
anf'inglicher Verlegenheit des Denkens zum "bewundernde
fiihrt (Phaidros u. Symposion), wird bei Aristoteles das
(1448b13), die intuitive Erfassung der Wahrheit, als pl6tzli
Wissens in der Art des Verstehens bzw. Wiedererkennens
cf. 105 n. 4). It does not seem at all probable that Aristot
denote only a 'pl6tzliche Vision'.
39 In the parallel passage from the Rhetoric (1.11.1371b4
same thought is lurking, albeit obfuscated for a simple reaso
Aristotle, discussing forensic speeches and considering the qu
to commit unjust acts, is simply enumerating things that giv
cause pleasure, because of its connection with learning and
obvious that what we have here is simply a passing reference
relevance to our subject; hence, it can be interpreted indep
Aristotle's reference to metaphor in the third book of the
this would require special discussion. Suffice it to m
'Substitution et connaissance: une interpretation unitaire (ou
enne de la metaphore', in D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (edd.),
1994), 283-305. P. Swiggers, 'Cognitive Aspects of Aristotle
(1984), 40-5 arrives at the interesting conclusion that the cog
is 'constituted by Aristotle's theory of mimesis' (43).
40 Aristotle's reference to the recognition of a person is pe
an authority in cognitive neurology, mentions (in his book In
and Brain [Oxford, 1999], ch. 17) that the brain does not onl
ognition of faces, but is characterized by even greater special
of the brain which recognize if the face is a familiar one. He
dition of 'prosopagnosia'.
41 1 am not sure, however, that the Aristotelian distinction
can be applied as easily in reality as in theory. For example, h
that, in the course of a mnemonic process, recollection is also
lar detail, or to a very limited degree?

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 444 STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

He is merely trying to show, in a very sim

presence of a cognitive element in mimesi
One should remember here a familiar scene from the Platonic Phaedo. Socrates is
trying to prove to Simmias that knowledge is recollection. As an example illustrating
the recollection cp' 6pootwv he uses the hypothetical portrait of his interlocutor (73e9):
'Is it possible, then, if someone could have seen Simmias depicted', asks Socrates, 'to
recollect (&vakvorlcq)vat) the very same Simmias?' 'This is absolutely certain',
Simmias answers. Aristotle does not of course subscribe to Plato's general conclusion
concerning the nature of knowledge, but it is noteworthy that Plato characterizes the
recognition of his interlocutor by a third person based on his pictorial representation
as 'recollection' and not as 'memory'.42
Special mention should be made of the fact that, in the Poetics passage under dis-
cussion, Aristotle approaches the phenomenon of mimesis less from the creator's per-
spective, and more from that of the spectator. He indirectly formulates a very
important observation, namely that the spectator's intellect also participates in the
process of mimesis. This is extremely hard even to become aware of, let alone
explain, but modem readers will be better equipped to understand this Aristotelian
concept if they turn to two chapters in Ernst Gombrich's book Art and Illusion,43
namely 'The Image in the Clouds' and 'Conditions of Illusion'. Gombrich refers to
the psychological function of the 'guided projection' and draws the following con-
clusion: 'The likeness which art creates exists in our imagination only' (191). At
another point he stresses: 'The mind of the beholder also has its share in the imitation'
(182). Apart from the examples he uses from painting, Gombrich also quotes an extre-
mely interesting passage from Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana. In that
passage Philostratus says that 'the art of mimesis is presupposed also for those who
observe the paintings', because nobody could really appreciate the painted horse or
bull or admire the painted Aias, if he could not 'recall to mind' their image.44
One might, of course, wonder why Aristotle does not proceed to elaborate-
according to the views he sets out in his other works--a more complex and all-embra-
cing interpretation of the phenomenon of recognition described in chapter 4. He could
have mentioned, for example, that since, in this case, the thing imitated is perceived as
being a copy of another thing, it also constitutes a starting point and a useful tool (see

Mem. 450b27, 451a2: tiv7tyrvEv?a) for the spectator to begin his search in order to
recollect the original object. Furthermore, the spectator does not compare the depicted
figure with only one mnemonic image, but, in most cases, with an abstraction derived
from one, or more than one, mnemonic images, that is, with an image that results from
E(?urEpla. He could also have pointed out here that the beholder makes a pronounce-
ment related to the identity of two representations, in other words, he interlaces the
representations after having 'dislocated' them. This combination (as Aristotle had
already established, and as we undoubtedly acknowledge today) constitutes a

42 Plato makes this distinction in Phlb. 34A-B. For the Aristotelian notion of recollection in
comparison with its Platonic counterpart see Sorabji (n. 32), 35-46.
43 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation
(New York, 19612).
44 Philostr. VA 2.22 (p. 66, 5 Kayser): 0GEv EITOLV' Z KaL Trob 6pvrag 7 ~a - ypaotK'q Epya
ptL/qTrLK7/ SEWOO aL. 0o yap av EIaLVEUEE L 71r ) rvyEypa(LoLEvv U7T7Trov 1ravpov fi- 7 To4Cpov

aEvOvtFL'ELrtO,
M/o prlqv74, EL 'tv7
ELKaaTraL,
ivahdlao-rtoi'TVc
&vv -rv
vovvAtavTr4 rTLcAov
A'aVTO Et" r7vKat'
TttoLudXOv a.aaO[q5`,
Os ,EK0s aavrov 3 5 'alivayiypamrrat
TaEKTOVCLa
T-it v 11- Tpo' fov3K6ALa KaOTOcLL ct 7TELp-qKOTa, fOgVoAi1ITOtOvEVOV Kat Eav7-l KVTE TvaL.

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 MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING 445

judgement: the inference 'this person is that one'

typical sense of the term.45 Why not, therefore, a m
The answer to this question is, I believe, a simpl
here is to establish a biological-anthropological ex
mimesis. This has an exact parallel in two oth
Metaphysics begin, as has already been mentione
civOpwlTor r oToo E2SivaL opEyoVrat paL e. With this phrase, and with what follows after-
wards, man is ranked, after he has been compared with the other living species, in the
scala naturae. It is furthermore emphasized that philosophy has a biological-anthro-
pological basis. The same also holds for the beginning of the Politics: in the second
chapter of the first book, Aristotle puts forth the argument that 6 ovOpwos ro(1pbaE
7TOALTLK6V W4 ov (1253a2). In an identical manner, man is placed on the scale of the
animal kingdom according to his social behaviour.46 This is not very far from what
we suggest is Aristotle's argument in the Poetics. Man is distinct from the other
animals because he is the most mimetic of them all, and because he learns from
the earliest stages of his life through mimesis, a feature that is innate (a;6vlPVrov).
If the above interpretation of the knowledge connected with mimesis and of the
relation of this cognitive process to recollection is correct, then it is worthwhile to
examine further the more general consequences of the Aristotelian conception.
Firstly, it follows that Aristotle not only regards the phenomenon of mimesis as
being innate to the human kind, but he also ascribes cognitive characteristics even
to the simplest forms of mimesis. He rejects, in other words, Plato's views on art,
not only as far as its most refined achievements, such as tragedy, are concerned,
but also with regard to all its different genres and at all its levels. As a result, the
idea of divine inspiration has no place in the Aristotelian theory of art. Apart from
that, however, the Aristotelian concepts offer a general explanation for the question
why mimetic works of art are attractive and give pleasure to all (7TcvraS), irrespective
of the object of mimesis. The explanation does not apply, as is commonly thought,
only to the distinction between the represented object and the real one. It applies
mainly to the very elementary (although, in essence, far from simple) process of rec-
ognition, by means of intellectual search, of the content of mimesis. This elementary
cognitive process is, in other words, the one that offers pleasure: i70t tvOivEtLv ob

?6vov 70ro <(ptoa(o'pots qaurov LAAal KaL TO ,c?LAAOs 6olwso (1448b13, cf. Rh.
3.10.1410b10).
The next question might be, what is the importance of this concept for tragedy? In
chapter 4 is quite obvious that the emphasis is given to the similarity of the mimema
with the object of mimesis. This is the basis of all mimetic arts. Tragedy, of course,
cannot be an exception to this, and it is for this reason that later on, in chapter 14,
Aristotle formulates an unequivocal principle: when the poet deals with well-
known myths, he is obliged not to deviate radically from traditional stories (for
example, that Clytemnestra was assassinated by Orestes, or Eriphyle by
Alcmeon).47 If someone bears in mind what has been said in chapter 4, the expla-
nation for this rule is simple: the spectator will not otherwise recognize structural
elements of the myth and, consequently, the story might not be recognizable or

45 Cf. De An. 3.432a11.

46 See W. Kullmann, 'Aristoteles' Staatslehre aus heutiger Sicht', Gymnasium 90 (1983),
459-63.

47 1453b23: 706S v oI v 7rapEt %rpELA vov ~tb0Oov AELv obK EUrTL, /~wo 6 O~ov 7
Khv-ratlt-arpav 0TroOavoav a rl O 0 ITOLOEKUTOV KaL ta N 'EptO.Aeqv l TOr 70o 'AApI'hO,,o(, a2Tov0
SE EbpiCrKELv S.E t K " t rogi 7TapaWSE~O IEVOtLS KptaOatL KaA. See also Vahlen (n. 2), 50.

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446 STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

persuasive enough. According to Aristotle, t

modify or skilfully handle the 'sufferings' d
down, in order to make it more effective
Electra and Orestes are very good examples o
in the case of Clytemnestra's murder, which
Finally, one question remains: that of the r
sion with the important first part of chapter 9
of poetry and to its superiority over history
sophical. One cannot, of course, venture at t
ation of the much-discussed ninth chapter.
in both cases is the relationship between mi
poetry is mimesis and the description pLAoao
of knowledge. This, after all, has led several
Nonetheless, the differences are significant
analysis of chapter 4. Near the beginning
mimesis and the accompanying elementary
case of poetry something more complex is
action', which, by using particular means
most clearly stated--in a more successful ma
last point might be the following: since poe
rather the kinds of things that might hap
within the plot in a causal manner 'in orde
philosophical scope of comprehension and d
ing'.49 In other words, it is within the spec
lead himself inductively to something bey
the simple and exact mimesis of painting wh
sals are not presented, nor is inductive thou
I would like to end my discussion of this im
tioning an interesting view that Umberto Ec
Poetics:

As I am absolutely convinced that Kant has said the most interesting things about our cognitive
processes, not in the Critique of Pure Reason (where he speaks about knowledge), but in the
Critique of Judgement (where he seems to talk about art), why, in the same way, does one
not look for a modem theory of knowledge, not (only) in the Analytics, but in the Poetics
and the Rhetoric as well?50

While it is certain that Eco did not have in mind the problem we have been trying to
examine here, his words may contain a fair amount of truth.

University of Patras STAVROS TSITSIRIDIS

tsitsiridis@upatras.gr

48 See Th. K. Stephanopoulos, Umgestaltung des Mythos durch Eurip

esp. 37-8 and 131-60 (on Orestes).
49 Halliwell (n. 3), 199.
50 U. Eco,'La Poetica e noi' in Sulla letteratura (Milan, 2002), 273 (my

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