2. G.R. No.
121519 October 30, 1996 The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as follows:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY, accused-appellants.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an
information filed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan. City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owners, proprietors, managers and
administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such said accused had the custody of Arabella Sombong, a minor,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents
of the child of her custody, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the
custody of said Arabella Sombong to her parents by giving said custody of subject minor to another
person without the knowledge and consent of her parents.
Contrary to Law.1
Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on October 27, 1992 when they pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.
After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
123, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping a minor and failure to return the same as defined and penalized by
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. The accused are hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by
way of moral damages caused by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled by the fact that up
to this date she could not determine the whereabouts of her child Arabella Sombong.
SO ORDERED.2
The accused now interpose this appeal alleging the ensuing assignment of errors, viz:
I detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS "DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE THE CHILD
TO HER MOTHER," AND CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND
SENTENCING THEM TO "RECLUSION PERPETUA";
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER ART. 277 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO PRECEDENT IN
"PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ," 197 SCRA 569; and
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING "COMPLAINANT THE SUM OF P100,000.00 BY WAY OF MORAL,
DAMAGES."3
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then only
seven (7) months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First
Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City which was owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella
was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child
at the clinic for speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be
discharged but complainant was not around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back but
did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise
confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she
was working. She then inquired about the rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was
P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella
was transferred from the ward to the nursery. 4
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that accused-appellant Dr.
Ty suggested to the complainant that she hire a "yaya" for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of
P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was then again transferred from the
nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence for the hospital staff.5
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called to inquire
about her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts
to get in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number
where she can be reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the
child's abandonment.6 Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella.7
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a
dentist at the clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian
who could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly needed as she
was thin and sickly. The suggestion was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her
aunt, Lilibeth Neri.8
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5) years back.
When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-
appellants with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said petition was however denied due course
and was summarily dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged
Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against accused-appellants.
Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for dishonorable conduct against accused-appellant Dr.
Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission. This case was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, this time against the alleged guardians of her daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and
Lilibeth Neri. On January 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering
the guardians to immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court
having found Cristina to be the complainant's child. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, said
decision was reversed on the ground that the guardians were not unlawfully withholding from the
complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after finding that Cristina and complainant's daughter are
not one and the same person. On January 31, 1996, this Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals9 affirmed
the Court of Appeals' decision.
In this appeal, accused-appellants would want us to take a second look and resolve the issue of whether
or not they are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. Accused-appellants of course contend
that they are not guilty and the Solicitor General agrees. In its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends their acquittal.
We agree.
As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong v. Court of
Appeals10 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's ruling that
complainant has rightful custody over the child, Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being identical with
complainant's daughter, Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:
Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed
before, the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner's daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as
Cristina.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate
existence of petitioner's child, Arabella, from that of private respondents' foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioner's own witness, testified in court that, together
with Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was
Arabella or some other baby that was given to private respondents. Petitioner's own evidence shows
that, after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989
when she visited the clinic. This corroborates the testimony of petitioner's own witness, Dra. Ty, that
Arabella was physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies
with her assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital
until April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of private respondents that
they obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on
April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of the herein assailed
decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing petitioner's
demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the following personal but relevant manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted to see how petitioner as an
alleged mother of a missing child supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would react on seeing again
her long lost child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late, and she walked
inside the courtroom looking for a seat without even stopping at her alleged daughter's seat; without
even casting a glance on said child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes the
reunion of a loving mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the
undersigned ponente noticed no signs of endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been
deprived of the embrace of her little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of Cristina Neri has
been given support by aforestated observation. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the
minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into
the validity of the mode by which private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced in this case accused-appellants
must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to
return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established to be complainant's
daughter, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as
one and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the
custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or
guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor
but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to
indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to
his parents or guardians.11 Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be
persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to
obtain custody.12 The key word therefore of this element is deliberate and Black's Law Dictionary
defines deliberate as:
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash; circumspect; slow in determining.
Willful rather than merely intentional. Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful
thought and weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan. Carried on coolly and steadily,
especially according to a preconceived design; given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a
choice or decision; careful in considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried;
characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18.
By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the
motives for the act and its consequences, the nature of the crime, or other things connected with his
intentions, with a view to a decision thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and that the act is not
suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of such mental
powers as are called into use by deliberation and the consideration and weighing of motives and
consequences.13
Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as:
DELIBERATE.
As a Verb A: Yes, mam.
Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day period?
The word is derived from two Latin words which mean literally "concerning" and "to weigh;" it implies A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and she told me the exact address of the guardian, mam.
the possession of a mind capable of conceiving a purpose to act, and the exercise of such mental powers Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of the guardian, did you informed (sic) the PAO?
as are called into use by the consideration and weighing of the motives and the consequences of the act; A: Yes, mam.
and has been defined as meaning to consider, reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and ATTY. WARD:
against a proposed course of action; to consider and examine the reasons for and against, consider Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?
maturely, ponder, reflect upon, or weigh in the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a choice; to weigh A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure that the child was really there, mam.
the motives for an act and its consequences, with a view to a decision thereon. Q: And did you see the child?
A: Yes, mam.
As an Adjective Q: What did you do with the child?
A: I just tell (sic) the child, "Ay ang laki mo na pala," I just told the child like that and I've (sic) talked also
The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection, and relates to the end proposed; to the guardian during that time, mam.
indicates a purpose formed in a mind capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based upon an intention Q: And what did you tell the guardian?
accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own purpose and design. It A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was claiming for the child and that we should talked (sic)
has been defined as meaning carefully considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with each other at the PAO for the decision, mam.
with fixed purpose, formed after careful consideration, and fully or carefully considering the nature or Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAO's Office (sic)?
consequences of an act or measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or rash, carefully considering the A: No mam, she did not appear.
probable consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing facts and arguments with Q: Why?
a view to a choice of decision; well-advised. A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to contact a lawyer but for (sic) several days, she did not
respond anymore, mam. 15
Under some circumstances, it has been held synonymous with, or equivalent to, "intentional,"
When the guardians refused to return the child, accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the
"premeditated," and "willful."
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted a conference among the parties but since a case
was yet to be filed, the custody of the minor remained with the guardians. This fact is evident from the
Under other circumstances, however, it has been compared with, or distinguished from, "premeditated,"
following testimony, thus:
"sudden," and "willful."14
Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located the whereabouts of the child sometime later,
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; what steps did you take up (sic) after you found the child?
it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal agreement between the supposed to be guardianship was
only a plain guardianship and not as an adoption, sir.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused- Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the child, why did you go to the NBI?
appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her. When the accused-appellants learned A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to surrender the child to the PAO's Office (sic), that is why I
that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they asked their help, sir. 16
tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic's ...
care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella's guardians but as soon as she Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian that the natural mother is now claiming the child,
obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians' why were you not able to get the minor?
residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help of the NBI to have the child surrender (sic), mam.
follows: ATTY. WARD:
Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you placed the child under the (sic) guardianship, you are Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the assistance of the NBI?
(sic) aware that the natural mother will get back the child, why did you not return the minor to the A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to surrender the child, mam.
natural mother? Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written agreement between you or your hospital and the
A: During that time mam, the resident physician who will (sic) discharged the baby was not present guardian of the minor, is that correct?
because she was abroad. A: Yes, mam.
Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the child was and to whom it was given? Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the guardian did (sic) not follow you or obey you when you
A: The exact address was not given to me, mam, before the resident physician left for abroad so, I asked want (sic) to get back the child?
the PAO to give me one month to have (sic) a long distance call to this doctor and asked her for the A: I don't know of any reason, mam. 17
whereabout(s) of the child. The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate
Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the Officer of the PAO? the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother.
Evidence is simply wanting in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants' conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic's
care up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an
earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellants VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged and are ordered to be released immediately unless they are being detained for other lawful
causes. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
3. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents-appellees Mr. & Mrs. Cabangbang.
Enrico R. Castro for respondent-appellee Victor T. Villareal.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal direct to this Court from the decision of May 21, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition for habeas corpus directed against Bartolome Cabangbang and his
wife Flora Cabangbang.
Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a hostess.
And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with a certain
Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay
by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December
15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no one to fall
back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until
she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl,
was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without
means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.
Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of
the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have since brought her up as their own. They
had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12, 1958. 1
There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of the girl Betty
(or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she and Villareal were still living together, the
latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for
favors received. She supposedly came to know of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when
the girl, who was then about three years old, was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter
returned the child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats intimidation, fraud and deceit. The
Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at
the gate of their residence; that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her; and that nobody
ever molested them until the child was 5-½ years of age.lâwphi1.ñet
At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang spouses by
Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.
By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to Villareal,
Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to secure
such custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed on June 14, 1963 a petition
for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of
and recognize her parental authority over the girl. Named respondents in the petition were Villareal and
the spouses Cabangbang.
On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any of his deputies to
produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the court a quo on June 17, 1963, at
8:30 a.m. However, for reasons not stated in the record, the child was not produced before the lower
court as ordered.
On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their answer the next
day.
After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964 promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has come to the conclusion that it will be for the welfare of the
child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under the custody of respondents Mr. and
Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Petition dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders for resolution two issues of law which, by her own
formulation, read as follows: "The lower court erred when it awarded the custody of petitioner's
daughter Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old, in favor of
respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, and [2] illegally deprived petitioner of parental
authority over her daughter."
We resolve both issues against the petitioner.
I.
Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate contained in article 363 of the
Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child who was less, seven years of age, and that she cannot
be deprived of her parental authority over the child because not one of the grounds for the termination,
loss, suspension or deprivation of parental authority provided in article 332 of the same Code obtains in
this case.
Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is
an issue that is now moot and academic. Having been born on December 15, 1957, the child is now 11
years of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the
separation of a child under seven years of age from her mother, "unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure," has no immediate relevance. The petitioner correctly argues, however, that
the reasons relied upon by the lower court — i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright woman" and "it
will be for the welfare of the child" — are not strictly speaking, proper grounds in law to deprive a
mother of her inherent right to parental authority over her child. It must be conceded that minor
children — be they legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural by legal fiction or illegitimate, other
than natural as specified in art. 269 of the Civil Code — are by law under the parental authority of both
the father and the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But we take the view
that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises, the petitioner can be
deprived of her parental authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays down the rule
that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of guardianship or adoption
approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession," it indicates in the next that "The courts may, in
cases specified by law deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid reasons,
as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental authority over the minor Betty
Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal with the
knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it cited the facts that the petitioner
did not at all — not ever — report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had
not taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the
Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that she did not make any move to recover the child
because the Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The petitioner is bound by the foregoing findings
of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court, she is deemed to have waived the right to dispute
any finding of fact made by the trial court. 2
Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:
The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they
should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or
examples, or should make them beg or abandon them. (emphasis supplied)
Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over their
children.
Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the Cabangbangs tantamount
to abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere acquiescence — without more — is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host of circumstances which, in their totality,
unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to completely forego all parental
response possibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child.
She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after
the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she
did not take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does
not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be
reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she alleged,
and her child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs — should have been to move heaven and earth, to
use a worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.
It is a matter of record — being the gist of her own unadulterated testimony under oath — that she
wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner the
support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away. A woman
scorned, she desires to recover the child as a means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he
gave her and altogether stopped living with and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that at
the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her willingness that the child remain with the
Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep and some money.
The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings below, reveal that her motives
do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably
selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain concessions — financial and
otherwise — either from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for
her would be forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if the
Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they gave her a jeep and some money.
Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but confirm her intention to abandon the
child — from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be
noted that the abandonment took place when the child, barely four months old, was at the most fragile
stage of life and needed the utmost care and solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter
she did not once move to recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations
which she owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity
to display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and maintenance. Her silence and inaction
have been prolonged to such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of
parental claim over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of law. 3
Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh and blood. She
gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could not
support it.
Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course of the petitioner's lengthy testimony
did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang — or, for
that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal — because she loves her, cares for her, and wants to
smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so
that the alleged father would resume giving her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate
and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her knowledge and consent, gave the child to the
Cabangbangs. But — "most unkindest cut of all"! — she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up
the child, in exchange for a jeep and some money.
We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a ground which
the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child. 4
Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang — especially the
respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the child was given to them, took care of her as if
she were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she reached school age enrolled her in a
reputable exclusive school, for girls.
Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist not in taking the child away
from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the custody of the petitioner.
For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income, and it is doubtful, to say the
very least, that she can provide the child with the barest necessities of life, let alone send her to school.
There is no insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay — an unknown quantity, as far as the
record goes — would resume giving the petitioner support once she and the child are reunited. What
would then prevent the petitioner from again doing that which she did before, i.e., give her away? These
are of course conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is the bounden duty of
courts — which they cannot shirk — to respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to a child's
natural and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual environment. 5
This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure future is guaranteed for her.
For life is beset at every turn with snares and pitfalls. But the record indubitably pictures the Cabangbang
spouses as a childless couple of consequence in the community, who have given her their name and are
rearing her as their very own child, and with whom there is every reason to hope she will have a fair
chance of normal growth and development into respectable womanhood.
Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be to assume — quite incorrectly — that only
mothers are capable of parental love and affection. Upon the contrary, this case precisely underscores
the homiletic admonition that parental love is not universal and immutable like a law of natural science.
II.
The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody of Grace Cabangbang or
Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon the grounds, first, that the couple are not related by
consanguinity or affinity to the child, and second, because the answer of the spouses contains no prayer
for the custody of the child.
The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower
court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the custody of a
child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or against both. Thus,
in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated — either legally or de facto — and where it
appears that both parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and control of the
child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest
brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to and
suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society." 6
Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the petitioner's contention that
the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which states that
In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount.....
applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and the mother. That the policy
enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision is of general application, is evident from the use of the,
adjective all — meaning, the whole extent or quantity of, the entire number of, every one of. 7 It is,
therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a child's custody is between a parent and a stranger,
the law must necessarily award such custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely
contemplates, among others, a suit between a parent and a stranger who, in the words of the provision,
is "some reputable resident of the province." And under the authority of the said rule, the court — if it is
for the best interest of the child — may take the child away from its parents and commit it to, inter alia,
a benevolent person.
The petitioner's contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang contains no prayer for the
retention by them of the custody of the child, is equally devoid of merit. The several moves taken by
them are clear and definitive enough. First, they asked for her custody pendente lite. Second, they
sought the dismissal of the petition below for lack of merit. Finally, they added a general prayer for other
reliefs just and equitable in the premises. Surely the above reliefs prayed for are clearly indicative of the
Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain the custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
III.
Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." The petitioner has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and
moral obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal and
moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted correctly in dismissing her petition.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
5. B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial
Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14
August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath
of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not
last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man
of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives
nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight
and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For
these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by
standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to
enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights
and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral
character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the
due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have
not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance
so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession
of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character
the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a
Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission
to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal
the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as
we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and
to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that
he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that
he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of
the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
10. Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine BloomingMills Co., Inc. and Court
of Industrial Relations (1973) G.R. No. L-35867 March 31, 1932
Facts
–
Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) weredismissed for allegedly violating the
no strike-no lockout provision of theircollective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass
demonstration atMalacañang.PBMEO was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969against abuses of the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and thirdshifts will
participate. PBMEO informed company two days before the saiddemonstration and asked to excuse all
the workers participating.But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice
normaloffice operations, thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who failto report for
the first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violatingtheir CBA.However, union officers
said there was no violation because the demonstration wasagainst the Pasig police and not the
company. They added that the rally was anexercise of their freedom of speech.In a decision penned by
Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations,eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills
Employment Organization (PBMEO) officerswere found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and were thus
removed as employees ofPBM.PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the
motion forpassing two days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.Issue
–
Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated
PBMEO’s
freedom ofexpression and assembly on the grounds that PBM Co. illegally dismissed itsemployees for
participating in a mass demonstration.Held
–
VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is noviolation of the
“
no strike-no lockout
”
provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO ofbargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA
and inhibits freedom of
speech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig police’s abuse of
power, went to the extent of dismissing their employees, and instead prioritizedmaterial losses.
Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion forreconsideration. Procedural rules do not
supersede the Constitution and may beoverruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in cases of free
speech. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt

school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the

7. Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and

cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws,
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
FACTS: HELD:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as

Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection

account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to

band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and

patriotic pledge. freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within

the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is

school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests

patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory where State has right to prevent.

in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand
compulsory in all educational institutions. at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to

participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion no warrant for their expulsion.
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional

limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents

relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the

explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state

and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The

children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony.
8. Gerona v. Sec. of Education Digest
Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they
refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued
by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The
petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This
was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director
of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem
of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our
system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with
the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect;
otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or
followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated
by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion
involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not
being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they
could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they
forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic
of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is
not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the
fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance
of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-
discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
9) MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., WILLIAM A. YOTOKO and FELIPE BENABAYE, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., respondent.
Roxas and Sarmiento for petitioners.
Rufino B. Risma and Pedro S. de Guzman for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
February 14, 1961, in CIR Case No. 1616-ULP.
On June 6, 1958, Acting CIR Prosecutor Pedro M. Ligaya filed with the CIR, on behalf of respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Magdalena Estate, Inc. (NAFLU), a complaint for unfair labor practice
(docketed as Case No. 1616-ULP) against petitioners Magdalena Estate, Inc., William A. Yotoko, and
Felipe Benabaye, under Section 4(a), subsections 1, 4, 5 and 6, of Republic Act No. 875. In substance, said
complaint alleged that petitioners locked out the 66 members of respondent Union on November 25,
1957, resulting in the filing in the CIR of Case No. 1517-ULP; that thereafter because the workers were
readmitted on December 9, 1957, the said Case No. 1517-ULP was dismissed at the instance of the
Union; that shortly before December 25, 1957 the officers and agents of petitioner Corporation required
the members of the Union to sign application form (Annex E of complaint), otherwise they would not
receive Christmas bonus; that sometime on February 28, 1958 and thereafter, petitioner Corporation, by
its officers and agents, again required and had been requiring the members of respondent Union to sign
another application form (Annex F of complaint) under threat of dismissal, but they refused; that, as a
consequence, on April 13, 1958, petitioner Corporation dismissed from employment the following
officers and/or members of respondent Union, to wit: Buenaventura de la Cruz, Ramon Veloso,
Potenciano Lerios, Serapio Gasigan, Nicolas Benigno, Manuel Orbien, Rosendo Manuel, Domingo
Limbauam, Andres Mayuga, Amando Losana, Nicasio Palogan, Roberto Lopez, Geronimo Gilliaco, Isidro
Gatan, Antonio Tandaya, Candido Quilang, Eugenio Narabe, and Cenon Galvez, without just cause,
because of their union affiliations and activities, due to their refusal to sign the application form (Annex
F), and for having filed charges against the petitioners, as well as for being about to give testimonies in
connection therewith; and that on March 6, 1958, another member of respondent Union (Nelson
Helican) was unjustly dismissed from work for union membership.
Answering amended complaint, petitioners specifically denied all the material allegations therein
contained, but admitted that the laborers specified in Paragraph 13 of said complaint were in fact laid off
on April 13, 1958, and the services of Nelson Helican were, likewise, terminated on March 6, 1958. As
special defenses, petitioners contended that the controversy was submitted by respondent Union for
conciliation to the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor (Regional Office 111), and while
conferences were being, the Union ceased attending them and its members resumed working after the
overhauling and inventory of the equipment of petitioner Corporation, leaving the impression that the
Union desisted from pursuing its demands; that Republic Act No. 875 does not require that the
responsive reply of the employer to the proposals or demands of its employees be in writing,
consequently, the verbal replies of petitioners on October 24, and 29, 1957 and on November 19 and 26,
1957, constitute substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the matter; that respondent Union
is not yet qualify to be the exclusive representative of all the employees and laborers in petitioner
Corporation, for purposes of collective bargaining, because it has not been designated or selected by the
majority of the employees there having been no certification election; and that the members of
respondent Union are employed in petitioner Corporation, as per agreement, on a day-to-day basis, and
depending upon the needs and exigencies of the Roads Department of petitioner Corporation and that
the latter reserved the right to determine who and how many laborers will be hired to work in said
department from day to day.
Issues having been joined, the case was heard and, thereafter, the CIR (on September 5, 1960) rendered
a decision (thru Judge Arsenio Martinez) declaring petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice and directing
them to cease and desist from further committing unfair labor practice acts, and to reinstate respondent
Union members Candido Quilang, Buenaventura de la Cruz, Eugenio Narabe, and Nelson Helican to their
former positions in the Roads Department of petitioners, with full back wages from April 13, 1958 (for
Quilang, Cruz, and Narabe) and from March 6, 1958 (for Helican) up to their actual reinstatement, with
all the rights, privileges, and benefits, including seniority appertaining thereto. The CIR also suggested
that in case of an opening or when the exigencies of petitioners' business requires additional laborers,
the other 15 complainants-members of respondent Union who did not testify and prove their case be
given the chance to work again with petitioner Corporation.
From this portion of the decision omitting the 15 complainants-members of the Union in the order of
reinstatement, respondent Union filed a motion for reconsideration and, on March 27, 1961, the CIR en
banc issued a resolution1 declaring that "there being substantial evidence of unfair labor practice
committed against the fifteen employees, the affirmative action taken for said four (Quilang, Cruz,
Narabe and Helican) should be applied to the fifteen, namely, reinstatement with back wages from April
13, 1958, until reinstated."
Dissatisfied with said resolution, petitioners filed with us the present petition for review.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners claim that the present case is not a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court;
hence, the relief granted to the 4 dismissed employees who appeared and testified may not be extended
to the 15 others who did not appear and testify at the hearing of the case. Petitioners might be correct if
this were an ordinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. But this is not and, as a rule, the CIR, in the
hearing, investigation, and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising its duties and
power under Commonwealth Act No. 103, "is not bound by any technical rules of evidence, but may
inform its mind as it may deem just and equitable". Substantially, though not strictly, the complaint in
the Instant case complies with the requirements of a class suit under the Rules of Court. Note that, as
the CIR correctly found, the complaint was filed in the name of the respondent Union, and all the
dismissed laborers, except Nelson Helican, are regular employees of the company and members of the
Union. Said the CIR:
1. The complaint was filed in the name of the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Magdalena Estate
(NAFLU):
2. All the dismissed laborers involved in this case are members of the complainant union. Their
membership was known to the respondents, through Exhibits "1-A" and "12" which, according to the
company's counsel, Mr. Sarmiento, came to their possession in the latter part of 1957;
3. All the dismissed laborers, except Nelson Helican, are all regular employees of the company. The
fifteen who did not testify are also regular employees, is could be seen from respondents' Exhibits "31",
"31-A" to "31-IIII", where their periods of employment with the respondent are made to appear under
the columns "Experience", "Employer", "Position Held", and "Salary".
The causes of action and common to all the complainants, viz: the requirement to sign application forms
which would place them under temporary basis, removable at pleasure of the company; their refusal to
sign said applications; and their dismissal because of said refusal.
The subject matter of the complaint (namely, reinstatement with full back-wages to their former
positions) is a matter of general or common interest to all 19 dismissed employees.
Petitioners next contend that the CIR erred in finding that there is substantial evidence of unfair labor
practice committed by petitioners against the 15 employees who did not appear and testify at the
hearing of the case. The following factual findings of the CIR disclose, however, substantial evidence of
unfair labor practice committed by petitioners against said employee-members respondent Union:
All these employees worked continuously for a long time. They were never required to sign any contract
of employment. It was only on December 16, 1957, January 2 and February 1958 that they were required
to sign application forms. By signing these contracts, they would be placed at the mercy the company,
because after the expiry date of said contracts, the respondents could dismiss them.
After two years of employment, and after the company came to know of the existence of the union on
November 10, 1957, the fifteen who did not testify were required to sign contract forms, the same
contract required of the four who testified. The contract makes the employees temporary after the have
worked for two years.
As could be seen from respondents' Exhibits "33", "33-A" to "33-GGGG", the fifteen who did not testify
did not sign the contract.
Respondents' Exhibits "20", "20-A" to "20-K", show that on April 12, 1958, the fifteen who did not testify
were given notices of separation and letters of dismissal like the four who testified.
3. It is claimed that the dismissal was due to the trenchment policy. This policy was implemented only in
the Road Department in the early part of 1958, because that was the only department wherein a labor
union existed. The fifteen dismissed laborers were working in that department.
4. Respondents claim that all these dismissed laborers are inefficient and lazy. If this is true, why did the
company send them separation notices when they could have discharged the without notices?
Lastly, it must be noted in said letters of dismissal the company said: "We thank you for your invaluable
services and do not hesitate to approach us if you need references in the future." This expression of
gratitude does not tally with the imputation of inefficiency, drunkenness, laziness, etc.
The case of Dimayuga, et al. v. CIR, et al. (L-10213, May 27, 1957) cited by petitioners is not in point.
Unlike the instant case which was filed in the Union's name for its dismissed members, the Dimayuga
case was filed in petitioner's individual names as individual complainants. Secondly, the instant case is an
unfair labor practice case, whereas the Dimayuga case is not. In the Dimayuga case, the CIR warned
petitioners that unless they appear individually and testify to justify their respective claims, the same
may be denied, whereas in the case at bar, there was no such warning and neither the court nor the
petitioners asked that the 15 others give testimony. Lastly, in the instant case, the 4 dismissed
employees testified not only on their behalves, but also on behalf of the other 15 who did not testify.
Petitioners also contend that the CIR erred in not considering their claim of a retrenchment policy, by
reason of which, the 19 employees in question had to be dismissed. The claim is untenable, in the light of
the factual finding of the CIR, to wit:
3. It is claimed that the dismissal was due to the retrenchment policy. This policy was implemented only
in the Road Department in the early part of 1958, because that was the only department wherein a labor
union existed. The fifteen dismissed laborers were working in that department.
Lastly, petitioners argue that the lower court erred in not considering the evidence on the cause of the
dismissal of the 15 employees. There was actually no necessity for so doing on the part of the CIR, it
having found substantial evidence of unfair labor practice against the other 15 dismissed employees
from the testimony of the 4 employees who appeared and testified during the hearing of the case. To do
so would have been a useless formality. Suffice to say that, as the complaint alleged, all 19 were found to
have been dismissed by petition "their union affiliation and activities, for their sign the application form
Annex "F", above referred to, and for having filed charges against the respondents (herein petitioners)."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the resolution of the court a quo appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioners. It is so ordered.
10. PBM Employees vs PBM
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining
in bad faith, hence this appeal.
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore
stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration against policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly
the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech"
and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of
free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants,
the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-
third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks
which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble
violated.

Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees,
so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local
police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their
basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed
they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that