Offcase

Federalism
 1NC
A. Uniqueness and Internal Link – Federal power is constrained now, this protection of
state autonomy is critical to modelling American federalism abroad.
Somin 5/9/2017 Ilya Somin, Professor of Law at George Mason University, 5-9-2017, "Courts In
Federal Countries: The Us Case," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/05/09/courts-in-federal-countries-the-us-case/?utm_term=.7cbc2279a9d7

The relative scope of federal and state power under the U.S. Constitution has been a
major bone of contention for over 200 years. Courts have sometimes enforced substantial limits on federal authority by
striking down federal laws deemed to be outside the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution. Very often, the judiciary has also
constrained state power by invalidating state laws as violations of constitutional rights. While judicial review has therefore promoted both centralization and state
autonomy at different times, on balance it has strengthened the former at the expense of the latter. This pattern has been especially prevalent since the 1930s, as
the Supreme Court largely abandoned earlier efforts to police limits on congressional power, while simultaneously enforcing a growing array of individual rights
against state and local governments. This chapter examines the impact of judicial review on American federalism without attempting a normative judgment. It
briefly outlines the structure of American federalism and judicial review, and then describes the history of judicial review of structural limits on federal power. In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court engaged in limited, but significant efforts to constrain congressional power. These efforts were to a

The Supreme Court has recently

large extent abandoned after the constitutional revolution of the New Deal period in the 1930s.

attempted to revive judicial enforcement of limits on federal power. But so far these
efforts have had only a limited effect. The chapter then summarizes the history of judicial review of state laws. The range of issues
on which federal courts have invalidated state laws is extremely broad. Overall, the impact of these rulings in curbing state autonomy significantly exceeds the
effects of the courts’ more limited efforts to constrain federal power. The last part of the chapter briefly explains why the latter result was not accidental. Because
federal judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the chance that they will resist the political agenda of the dominant political coalition in
the federal government is reduced. Even when federal judges do want to invalidate federal legislation, they may hesitate to do so when the result might create a
political confrontation that the courts are likely to lose. Federal judges face fewer political risks when they strike down state legislation. The chapter is empirical, not
normative. Still, if my empirical analysis is correct, it is fair to ask whether there is a tension between my strong support for decentralized federalism, and my
support for robust judicial review. History suggests that American states and localities might have greater autonomy if judicial review by federal courts were
eliminated or at least significantly curtailed. The seeming contradiction between these two commitments can be reconciled because of the fact that most

judicially enforced constraints on state power take the form of enforcing individual
rights rather than expanding the regulatory power of Congress or the president. As I discuss in
the chapter, and more fully in this article, in many situations the ultimate decentralization is empowering individual choice in the private sector: [J]udicial

protection of individual rights against state governments… promote[s] decentralization

in another important sense; it devolves more decision-making power to individual
citizens and private organizations, which often means an even greater extent of decentralization than would regulation by state and
local governments. If, for example, federal courts prevent state governments from censoring speech, regulating religion, restricting marriage rights, or overriding
private property rights, power over these aspects of society is transferred to a lower, more decentralized level than the state government or even a local one. As a

I do not value
result, individual citizens are now more free to speak as they wish, use their property as they see fit, or marry the partner of their choice.

federalism for the sake of the states, but because it serves as a check on the
concentration of political power (particularly important in a highly diverse society like our own), and a mechanism for
enabling citizens to vote with their feet. Decentralization of power all the way down to individual citizens
can often serve these purposes even more effectively than decentralization to the state.
I do not claim that we should always strive for the maximum possible limitation on federal power, or the strongest possible protection for individual liberty. But

there is, I think, great value in protecting both to a far greater degree than the legislative and executive branches of government are
likely to do on their own. From this standpoint, American judicial review, has been a net plus, despite its very real and

significant shortcomings. In its absence, the federal government would today have somewhat greater

power over the states, and both federal and state authorities would probably have substantially greater power to restrict the freedom of
individual citizens. While I lament the breakdown of judicial enforcement of structural
constraints on federal power during the New Deal era and its aftermath, there has been a
modest, but notable revival in recent years, one that could potentially gather additional
momentum…. Given the extreme difficulty of amending the US Constitution, we are probably stuck with the current method of judicial selection, at least
for a long time to come. But other federations can still learn from our experience and potentially

experiment with alternative methods of judicial selection that give a greater role to subnational
governments.
B. Link – Federal control of education is overreach and takes autonomy away from the
states.
Burke et al 13 - Jennifer Marshall, Lindsey Burke, Rachel Sheffield, Brittany Corona and Sandra
Stotsky, 10-7-2013, "Common Core National Standards and Tests: Empty Promises and Increased
Federal Overreach Into Education," Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/education/report/common-core-national-standards-and-tests-empty-
promises-and-increased-federal

Education is no exception. Growing federal intervention in education over the past half century
has come at the expense of state and local school autonomy, and has done little to
improve academic outcomes. Every new fad and program has brought not academic excellence
but bureaucratic red tape for teachers and school leaders, while wresting away decision-
making authority from parents. Despite significant growth in federal intervention,
American students are hardly better off now than they were in the 1970s. Graduation
rates for disadvantaged students, reading performance, and international
competitiveness have remained relatively flat, despite a near tripling of real per-pupil
federal expenditures and more than 100 federal education programs. Achievement gaps
between children from low-income families and their more affluent peers, and between
white and minority children, remain stubbornly persistent. While many of these problems stem from a lack
of educational choice and a monopolistic public education system, the growth in federal intervention, programs,

and spending has only exacerbated them

C. Internal-Link – changes in the balance of education federalism are key to the

balance of American federalism.
McGuinn, P. (2016). Patrick McGuinn PhD, Professor of Political Science at Drew University, From no
child left behind to the every student succeeds act: Federalism and the education legacy of the Obama
administration. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 46(3), 392-415. (2016)

Political scientists Paul Peterson, Kenneth Wong, and Barry Rabe (1986) observed thirty years ago that federal education policy
tends to go through cycles of overreach and consolidation. The Obama Administration embraced an
expansive view of the federal role in education and one which built on the test-based accountability framework put into place by NCLB, even as
it sought to push in some new directions (McDonnell 2010). Education reform is likely to be viewed, along with health care, as one of the most
 While the Affordable Care Act was drafted by
significant domestic policy legacies of the Obama Administration.

Congress and enacted through the ‘‘normal’’ legislative process, the Obama
Administration opted to push its education agenda through unilateral executive branch
action. The long-term impact of these actions on the separation of powers and
federalism remains uncertain but may ultimately prove to be significant. Through the use of
competitive grant programs such as Race to the Top (RTTT), Investing in Innovation (I3), and School Improvement Grants (SIG),
and the NCLB waiver process, the administration was able to change the national conversation around education, move the

Democratic Party to embrace reform, and push states to enact important policy changes, particularly

around charter schools, common core standards and assessments, teacher evaluation
processes and school turnarounds. The administration’s aggressive push on school
reform, however, eventually led to a political backlash against those same reforms and against
federal involvement in education more generally, which resulted in an ESEA
reauthorization (the ESSA) that rolls back the federal role in K-12 schooling in some
important ways. There is, to be sure, some debate about the extent to which ESSA undoes important elements of the Obama
education agenda or in fact 408 P. McGuinn codifies them into law (Weiss 2015). Nevertheless, the legacy of the Obama Administration in
federal activism effectively advanced the standards-based
education is bifurcated: on the one hand,

accountability movement in states, but it also mobilized opposition against ‘‘federal

overreach’’ which helped to enact a law (ESSA) that will constrain the power of the national government in K-12 schooling in the future
(Ujifusa 2015)

D. Impact - US-style federalism is key to stabilizing conflict in Syria.

Rubin, 4-14-2017, Trudy "Federalism, U.S. role are keys to stabilizing Syria," Seattle Times,
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/federalism-us-role-are-keys-to-stabilizing-syria/
You are understandably skeptical. But for the sake of argument, let’s assume such a strategy is being drafted at the Pentagon and National
Security Council. This brings me to the importance of the Syrian Kurds. Tough
Syrian Kurdish fighters are the key to
crushing the Islamic State caliphate in Raqqa. And please take note: Any hope that Assad and Russia will do
this dirty job for the United States is nonsense. As noted above, Assad doesn’t have the troops. Moreover,
Assad and Putin are happy to let the Islamic State trigger refugee flows that undermine Europe. So,
much rests with the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) within which Kurdish troops provide the muscle. They are
accompanied by an increasing number of Sunni tribal fighters who are being trained by U.S. Special
Forces and backed by U.S. airstrikes. The Kurds have already driven the Islamic State out of
broad swaths of the Syrian northeast and have declared their own federal state in
Kurdish areas, called the Federation of Northern Syria. In liberated Sunni Arab areas, like the critical town of
Manbij, they have established civilian and military councils of local residents. “We have to talk about a decentralized

Syria,” I was told in Brussels by Saleh Muslim, the co-head of the Syrian Kurdish PYD political party,
which controls their federal state. “Raqqa after ISIS will be like Manbij, a military council, then a civilian
council.” “The Americans and the SDF together” are already setting up the civilian council that will
administer Raqqa after liberation, says Muslim. “They can have their own federal state or be part of the north federal
(Kurdish) state, whichever they choose.” The Russians have shown some interest in autonomy for the Syrian Kurds, but Assad has furiously
opposed the concept. Some U.S. officials hint that, after liberation, Raqqa could be handed back to Assad (with whom the Kurds have had some
dealings). These officials believe the regime would keep the jihadis from returning. Given the past, that is bull. Muslim insists the Kurds
would never agree — unless Assad accepted the concept of federalism. “There won’t be a
centralized authority like before,” he says. “If (the regime) accepts federalism it would be a different
basis. But if they are not going to change, Syria will be divided.” Ultimately, a federal formula
holds the only hope for stabilizing Sunni Arab areas in the rest of the country . Muslim thinks
the Syrian regime might accept the federalism formula if not for Iran, the other key Assad backer. He
hopes America will keep some forces in the Kurdish federal state as a balance to Iran and
to help prevent any return of jihadis. (A U.S. presence, and intense diplomacy, would also
prevent Turkey from clashing with Syrian Kurds, whom it views with the same hostility it does
its own PKK Turkish rebels.) Bottom line: The White House must continue to warn Putin that a centralized Syria can’t survive because
a federal formula,
Assad won’t be able to control it and the United States won’t let him gas his way to achieving it. Moreover,

whether formalized or de facto for now, is the only way to stabilize Syria, and the Kurdish template
provides the model. “If you want to prevent the return of Syrian extremists there should be good relations between Kurds and Americans,” says
Muslim. He’s correct.

E. Conflict in Syria risks escalatory global nuclear war.

Bruce Blair 15, 11-27-2015, "Could U.S.-Russia Tensions Go Nuclear?," POLITICO Magazine,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/russia-us-tensions-nuclear-cold-war-213395

The Russian warplane recently shot down inside Turkey’s border with Syria fits a pattern
of brinkmanship and inadvertence that is raising tensions and distrust between Russia and U.S.-
led NATO. Low-level military encounters between Moscow and Washington are fanning

escalatory sparks not witnessed since the Cold War. And there exists a small but steadily growing risk
that this escalation could morph by design or inadvertence into a nuclear threat. The backdrop for these
concerns is that both the United States and Russia maintain their nuclear command posts and

many hundreds of strategic nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert. This is a long-standing practice, or
habit, driven by the inertia of the Cold War. The two sides adopted the accident-prone tactic known as

launch-on-warning in order to ensure that their strategic forces could be fired before
incoming warheads arrived. President Barack Obama’s recent nuclear employment guidance reiterated the need to preserve
this option. Our nuclear command system and forces practice it several times a week. So do the Russians. And believe it or not, Russia

has shortened the launch time from what it was during the Cold War. Today, top
military command posts in the Moscow area can bypass the entire human chain of
command and directly fire by remote control rockets in silos and on trucks as far away
as Siberia in only 20 seconds. Why should this concern us? History shows that crisis interactions, once
triggered, take on a life of their own. Military encounters multiply; they become more
decentralized, spontaneous and intense. Safeguards are loosened and unfamiliar operational environments cause
accidents and unauthorized actions. Miscalculations, misinterpretations and loss of control create a fog of crisis out of which a fog of war may
emerge.In short, the slope between the low-level military encounters, the outbreak of
crisis and escalation to a nuclear dimension is a steep and slippery one.
 Neg bloc
School regionalization represents federal overreach
Crawford 16 Bill Crawford,, 9-8-2016, "Bill Crawford: Federal overreach impacts
Mississippi," Hattiesburg American,
http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/story/opinion/columnists/2016/09/08/crawford-
federal-overreach-impacts-mississippi/89960856/

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 was passed to eliminate unjustified discrimination based on disability. It provides protections
against discrimination to disabled Americans, requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, and imposes
accessibility requirements on public accommodations.

Now, the U.S. Department of Justice is telling Mississippi the ADA provides mentally ill adults an unconstrained constitutional right to
community-based services.

Forced school desegregation was implemented by federal courts to eliminate illegal discrimination based on race. States that had passed laws
requiring segregation by race have seen their school districts face decades of court ordered desegregation plans.

Cleveland, Mississippi, the U.S. Department of Justice has gotten a new federal
Now, in

judge to rule that students have a “constitutionally-guaranteed right of an integrated

education.”
Both of these cases represent overreach by the federal government, particularly by the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ). Hopefully, seasoned federal judges will see fit to rein in such excess.

In 1999 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “unjustified isolation” of mentally ill individuals “is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability.” The Olmstead ruling further said the state must provide community-based mental health services when they “can be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the entity and the needs of other persons with disabilities.” The key words here
are “unjustified” and “resources available.”

Since 2011 the DOJ has been pushing the state to shift its emphasis and funding from state mental institutions to community-based services.
While the state has built a system of community-based mental health services, most of its limited funding still goes for institutional care. The
Legislature’s PEER Committee has reported several times the state would need to do more to comply with Olmstead.

In August, DOJ filed suit to force the state to comply. U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch proclaimed that
“Mississippi has failed people with mental illness, violating their civil rights by confining them in isolating institutions.”

Notably, the lawsuit avoids addressing the “resources available” requirement. Instead it argues that
since the state provides a lower proportion of funding to community-based care than other states, it is discriminating against the mentally ill.

The Cleveland desegregation case came before U.S. District Judge Debra M. Brown who was appointed to the federal
bench in 2013 after 16 years practicing commercial law. In her ruling, Judge Brown forthrightly ignored prior orders by distinguished judges
William C. Keady, Glen H. Davidson, and L.T. Senter to determine that Cleveland’s freedom of choice school desegregation plans were
showed great deference to the arguments of DOJ expert Clare Smrekar,
unconstitutional. She

but little to the local school district or its expert Christine Rossell, despite guidance by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
that she should as much as possible “defer to the District’s plans.”

Should Judge Brown’s new constitutional right take root, many schools and some universities
face consolidation. Cleveland has appealed her ruling.
While Mississippi needs to do better in many ways , federal overreach is not the answer.
 Charter schools CP
The USFG should increase its funding fof Charter Schools specifically in STEM areas.
CP solves- Charter schools give off the impression of school choice and can be
specialized for STEM
Their 1AC Author The Equality and Excellence Commission 13(The Equality and Excellence
Commission. "For Each and Every Child: A Strategy for Education Equality and Excellence." US
Department of Education (2013): 34-37. Web. 10 July 2017.
<https://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/eec/equity-excellence-commission-report.pdf>.) RB

, it is incumbent on the states to

Because charter schools are an important and growing part of our public school system

monitor performance and to figure out ways to ensure good outcomes—in both
traditional and charter schools. From the first charter schools in Minnesota in 1991, 4 percent of all students now attend
more than 6,000 charter schools. Charter schools are quite varied in their mission, operations and

performance. They are all public schools that receive varying funding from state, local,
federal and philanthropic sources. The underlying concept is that they may offer an
alternative to the local school district and that they depend upon sufficient enrollment to meet their expenses. In
most states, they must have open enrollment and be nonselective, relying on admission
lotteries when oversubscribed. Supporters note four potential benefits to charter
schools. First, they are generally expected to promote innovation, since they are
authorized to adopt approaches to curriculum, hiring patterns and other matters that
are different from the practices of public schools in their district. This innovation in
some cases has also extended to the use of technology, the flexible staffing of schools
and an emphasis on non-cognitive aspects of their training. Second, they are intended
to offer some amount of choice to parents and students over the school they attend.
Third, they are intended to offer competition for the traditional public schools and
provide an incentive to the traditional schools to improve. Fourth, they are proposed as
a potential educational reform for underserved students and communities. While charter schools
are likely to remain part of the educational landscape, they remain controversial in many ways. Additionally, each of the 44 states with charters
. Charter schools
have different policy regimes and regulatory requirements and have had varying success with the charter sector

have had their clearest overall success in providing choice to parts of the population
that have not found choosing school easy or feasible. In particular, while some families
exercise considerable choice over the schools their children attend through residential
location decisions, many others, particularly those facing financial constraints, have
limited options. We have seen that charter schools disproportionately serve low-income
communities and communities of color—two groups that have had more limited
alternative choice mechanisms. The largest area of controversy about charter schools remains their impact on student
performance.101 Even while it is very difficult to make generalizations across states and districts, it is becoming increasingly clear that there are
Some of the very best schools, particularly
wide differences in performance across charters and across states.102

for serving disadvantaged populations, are charter schools. Yet, many charters are providing poorer
 One of the most significant areas
academic performance than alternative public schools serving the same populations.103

of state experimentation in public education over the past two decades has been the
authorization of charter schools as an alternative means of governing public schools at
the local level. It is important that the federal and state governments undertake research and evaluation in this area to understand
better the effects of charters on equity and access under different policies and in different contexts.

STEM Charter Schools solve

Machi Et al 09 (Ethel Machi, an independent researcher, drafted this report. Jena Baker McNeill is Policy Analyst for Homeland
Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies; Jennifer A. Marshall is Director of Domestic Policy Studies; Dan Lips is Senior Policy Analyst in Education in the Domestic
Policy Studies Department; and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation., “Improving US competitiveness, with K-12 Education and training”, Heritage Institute,
http://www.heritage.org/education/report/improving-us-competitiveness-k-12-stem-education-and-training RB)

Charter Schools. Some of the most impressive improvements in STEM scores have been
accomplished by charter schools. The U.S. currently has 4,300 charters serving 1.3 million
students, 3 percent of the public-school attendees. On national tests, students in charter schools
score on average 10 percent higher than students in traditional public schools. Charter
schools can fill specific niches allowing students of all abilities to find an environment
that suits their learning styles and skills. Charters can provide opportunities for gifted
and talented students beyond what a regular public school can offer. At the same time,
charters can enable children who are not college bound to tailor their high school
education to a future in a specific trade. These students could have lucrative STEM
careers, filling some of the chronic vacancies that exist in STEM fields.
Neolib K
 ***1nc Shell
The affirmative locks in a global war for talent – configuring US education towards
skill development, competition, and STEM ensures global inequality and economic
nationalism – trades off with education as democratic citizenship
Brown & Tannock 9
(Philip Brown and Stuart Tannock, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK, “Education,
meritocracy and the global war for talent,” Journal of Education Policy, 24:4, 377-392)

the discourse of the global war for talent has

Over the past two decades,

been picked up by nation-states . In large part, this is derived directly and explicitly
from the corpo- rate human resources literature. The same global talent ideologues (Richard Florida, Thomas Friedman, McKinsey, etc.) are invoked. The same rhetoric, arguments and
assumptions are made. ‘We are in competition for the brightest and best talents – the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology specialists who make the global economy tick’,
announced British Immigration Minister Barbara Roche in 2000 (quoted in Rollason 2001, 338). Alastair Darling, while UK Secretary of Trade, used the well-known example of foreign all-star
talent in Britain’s premier football league to state that ‘attracting the Cantonas and Bergkamps of science to the UK can only help take our world-class domestic research to the next level .... To

nation-state global wars

be the best you have to work with the best’ (quoted in Jha 2006). The corporate and

for talent are carried out also driven by much the same set of interests. Indeed, to a great extent, the latter i s

to enable multinational corporations to

source talent globally, and attract and/or thus

retain corporate investments on national

soil .

The
Arguments about why nation-states are now compelled to launch into a global war for talent with each other start with, but go beyond, corporate human resources rhetoric.

basic story goes as follows national : the path to

prosperity lies in maximising global competitiveness to be ;

competitive globally, nations (rich nations, in particular)

need to maximise their share of the world’s
high tech, high skill, knowledge economy jobs to help create and fill ;

these jobs, nations need to recruit the

world’s most skilled individuals and talented , from wherever they come;

since other nations are competing for these same workers (and indeed, for

nations need to adjust their

one’s own set of domestic workers), immigration,

education policy to attract and retain them

, economic and social in order ;

the global war for talent thus puts into play

a game of never-ending one-upmanship ,

and reinforces the hegemonic development model of the competition state (Abella 2006; Lavenex

2007; Shachar 2006).

Underlying this basic storyline is a , however,

further set of claims about impending shortages current and/or

of skilled labour These labour

in OECD countries that threaten growth, prosperity and the overall standard of living.

shortages are caused by (or soon will be) : demographic shifts, namely the ageing of the

population; quick production cycles in the high tech sector that demand skilled workers instantly; failures of the public education system; the
unwillingness of the native-born skilled to work in certain jobs given current conditions; and the personal failures of the native-born unskilled to acquire the skills needed to work in the

Because of these
contemporary knowledge economy (Kapur and McHale 2005; Kuptsch and Fong 2006; OECD 2006).

alleged labour shortages , because talent has never been more globally mobile or sought after, and because

previous cycles of liberalisation of global capital and trade have created global supply chains and production systems which require internationally mobile professional and managerial workforces
in order to operate effectively, political elites around the world argue that they have no

choice but to enter into the global war for talent.

For nation-states, competing in the global war for talent entails making what are sometimes radical changes in national immigration policy. Over the past two decades, OECD countries, virtually
without exception, have opened their borders to high skilled immigrants, actively recruited top workers from around the world, and trans- formed education, employment, tax and investment
policy to make themselves more competitive and attractive to high level professional and managerial workers (Kuptsch and Fong 2006; OECD 2006). In Britain, the election of the New Labour
government in 1997 ushered in a radically new era in immigration policy, that saw the country move from a goal of zero immigration to the active recruitment of the ‘most skilled and most
enterprising people from abroad’ (Flynn 2005; Rollason 2001, 333). Over the next decade, new legislation and programmes to attract high skilled immigrants were introduced quite literally on a
yearly basis; and in 2006, the government overhauled its immigration system entirely, in order to install an Australian-style ‘points system’ that heavily favours the entrance, to the country, of
the highly skilled (Tannock forthcoming). Even traditional immigration countries such as Canada saw a series of fundamental reforms to its immigration policy and practice in the late 1980s and
early 1990s that both expanded overall immigration numbers and skewed these numbers more heavily towards the highly skilled (Arat-Koc 1999; Hiebert 2006). The flipside to this global
liberalisation of skilled immigration has been the worldwide effort to crackdown on and strictly limit and control low skilled immigration, as well as refugee and family reunification migration
streams.

The impact of these shifts in immigration policy (in conjunction with other shifts in the world economy) has been enormous. Globally, high skilled migration increased at a rate of two and a half
times faster than low skilled migration between 1990 and 2000. By 2000, the college-educated made up 34.6% of immigrants to OECD countries, up from 29.8% in 1990, and far out of
proportion to the 11.3% of the world’s overall labour force that they represent (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 167–8). Small and poor countries in the Caribbean, Pacific and Africa have been hit
hardest by these global migrations of the highly educated. Over 50% of college-educated individuals from Sierra Leone, it is estimated, have left their home country to work elsewhere, as have
over 60% of the college-educated from Cape Verde and the Gambia, over 70% from Tonga and Samoa, and over 80% from Haiti and Jamaica (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 175).

Large and wealthy countries, too, are losing some of their highly skilled – Britain, for example, has lost a greater number of its college-educated citizens overseas than any other country in the
world (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 175). But they also have seen their labour forces mushroom with high skill immigration. Over a 12-year period (1986–1997), Canada saw its flow of immigrant
computer scientists increase 15-fold, the flow of engineers increase 10-fold, the flow of natural scientists increase eight-fold, and the flow of managerial workers increase four-fold (Bambrah
2005, 40). In Britain, it is estimated that 80% of all new doctors and 73% of all new nurses registered between 1997 and 2003 were foreign-born (Pond and McPake 2006), while 22% of all new
graduate recruits hired in the financial and business services sector are now foreigners (Financial Services Skills Council 2006). Between 1992 and 2000, there was a 110% increase in the number
of foreign-born computer analysts and programmers working in the UK, a 60% increase in the number of foreign-born financial and office managers, and a 48% increase in the number of foreign-
born teaching professionals (Dobson, Koser, McLaughlan, and Salt 2001). The global war for talent between nation-states, then, has ushered in two new facts of life on the ground: first, highly
skilled and educated individuals have the potential to be more globally mobile than ever; and second, immigrants make up a large and growing proportion not just of the lower echelons of the
labour market, where they have long toiled, but the high skill, upper-most levels as well.

Implications for education, social justice and meritocracy

talk of the global war for talent

Though centres on the fields of corporate human

has profound implications for

resource strategy and immigration policy reform, it theory,

education the global

policy and practice in the field of as well. Most fundamentally,

war for talent threatens to undermine one of the

key assumptions and goals of education policy and practice in the post-World War II period:

that education should be firmly nationalist in its orientation, scope and provision, committed to the

obliged to provide educational justice and

national interest, geared to increasing national wealth, productivity and competitiveness, and

equality of opportunity to each and every one of its citizens (but not necessarily anyone else).
Neoliberal policies in the early phase of globalisation did little to challenge these national foundations of education. Indeed, as the other planks of the welfare state were undermined and
dismantled, national governments came to regard education as one of the most effective remaining instruments of national policy (Green 1997). Education is commonly described as being
pivotal to ‘national strategies for securing shares of global markets’ (Slaughter 1998; Tannock 2007). The dominant model for economic and educational development over the past quarter-
century, which was articulated most clearly by Robert Reich in The work of nations, held that while capital was globally mobile, labour largely was not:

All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people who comprise the nation. Each nation’s primary assets will be its citizens’ skills and insights .... The real economic challenge ... is
to increase the potential value of what [the nation’s] citizens can add to the global economy, by enhancing their skills and capacities. (Reich 1991, 3, 8)

With the rise of the global war for talent, however, Reich’s paradigm no longer holds true. It is not just jobs, capital and goods that are moving around the globe, but increasingly, people as well –
especially individuals who are highly skilled and educated. This, inevitably, has an impact on education policy and practice as we have come to know them, and demands a rethinking of education
theory, goals and principles, particularly as these have to do with issues of equality, opportunity, inclusion and fairness.

The global war for talent promotes social, economic and educational inequality
The commitment to equality, according to
the global war for talent, is an old-
fashioned relic from the past, at best, and an obstacle to survival and success, at worst. ‘Countries that insist on clinging to egalitarianism are

paying a heavy price’, warns The Economist: ‘Sweden, for instance, finds it hard to attract foreign talent. And across Europe, egalitarian universities are losing out to their more elitist American
rivals’ (Wooldridge 2006, 12). Labour migration economists document ‘evidence on the links between the propensity of the skilled to migrate ... and income inequality’, finding that ‘in more
unequal societies the elite have less incentive to leave’ (Kapur and McHale 2005, 80–3). ‘Because the distribution of income in many of the other industrial coun- tries is more equal than that in

The
the United States’, writes Çaglar Ö zden (2005, 239), ‘we would ... expect those at the upper end of home-country distributions to migrate to the United States’.

conclusion is nations ‘have to either that

tolerate much higher levels of income inequality or risk losing

their best and brightest’ to other countries (Kapur and McHale 2005, 83; Ö zden 2005).

In the field of higher education, the global war for talent is inducing European universities to bring in more ‘US-like changes’, including private industry/public university partnerships, university
patenting rights, an emphasis on fostering entrepre- neurship and competitiveness, and a more highly stratified ‘all-star’ salary and fund- ing structure (Economist 2004; Chu 2004). The UK
Department for Education and Skills (2003, 1.17) writes:

Comparing US and UK academic salaries, it is striking that the difference in average salary scales is far smaller than the difference in salaries at the top end, for the best researchers. This raises
questions about whether our institutions are using salaries to the best possible effect in recruiting and retaining excellent researchers.

the potential flight of talented

Jamie Peck (2007) notes that

workers is the new competitive threat that involves

‘giving the creatives what they want, or
else’ increased inequality that results from
(2007, 5). The

efforts to avert ‘professional flight’ is , in turn,

legitimised by the rhetoric of skill itself The highly .

skilled and educated are ‘held to have

earned their superior position ... by virtue of their over- endowments of raw talent and

creative capital, validated through the market’ (Peck 2007, 2).

 past commitments
In the fields of primary and secondary education,

to comprehesive schooling have been

abandoned as families seek to middle and upper class

position their children in the most desirable and

prestigious schools and programmes , to become one of the select

This process
members of the internationally sought after, high skill elite (Ball 2003; Brown 2000; Tomlinson 2007). is now being driven by the global

war for talent which rejects a model of universal meritocracy, in which the talent and educational achievements of all are incrementally rewarded. Alternatively, it

promotes a form of ‘hyper-meritocracy’ characterised ,

by ‘winner-takes-all’ markets (Frank and Cook 1995).

Those defined as the ‘best’ are

disproportionately rewarded as the war for
talent devalues everything other than ‘top’ performance (Brown and Hesketh 2004;
Frank 1999).

The global war for talent undermines the rationale for public
education and promotes educational privatisation
, and educational poaching

To the degree that middle and upper class

families see themselves as competing in a
global labour and education market , rather than as participating in a

nationally defined economy, their support for and investment in public systems of schooling is likely to wane.
Indeed, for some elite families (from non-Western countries especially), getting ahead in the global labour market entails opting out of national schooling altogether, whether public or private, as
they send their children overseas to obtain prestigious degrees in Western prep schools and universities (Waters 2006). Conversely, the increasing focus on recruiting international students in
higher education systems throughout the world may be seen as a stealth project to further privatise higher education by removing it from what remain nationally based public good expectations
(Naidoo 2003; Vinokur 2006). With international students, there are no strong equity demands to accept lower achieving students from disadvantaged social backgrounds, provide free or heavily
subsidised student tuition, emphasise social science and humanities education relevant to students’ personal identities or support the needs and interests of local communities surrounding
college campuses as there are for higher education students domestically.

The global war for talent threatens to also

undermine state support for investing in

public education : for why should a country invest in education if it is easier and cheaper to import already educated workers from

In a process Harvey calls accumulation by

abroad? that (2005)

dispossession rich nations have

, Vinokur (2006) calls poaching and Bond (2006) calls looting,

shown an increasing propensity to procure

skilled labour that has been developed and
paid for by other much poorer countries , often
(Kapur and McHale 2005). Richard Florida (2005, 102), a leading protagonist of the war for talent, says:

Isn’t it somewhat unbelievable that the scientific and engineering establishment in what is arguably the richest country in the world [the United States] is being underwritten by the people of
some of the poorest countries, who spend enormous resources investing in this talent so that talent can come to American universities?

the working class and poor within the

At the same time,

USA find it more and more difficult to access top level education
and other rich nations , training

and employment. As worldwide concern about a global brain drain has resurfaced in the wake of the global war for talent, a new literature has arisen to talk of the universal benefits of ‘brain

there is a
circulation’ and ‘beneficial brain drain’ (Saxenian 2002; Stark 2004). At the end of the day, however, three key facts remain: first,

growing movement of the highly educated

from poor to wealthy nations of the world, and not the other way around; second,

this movement is especially damaging to

the poorest and smallest nations , particularly when the workers involved provide

public services in health care and education; third, noble and uplifting rhetoric aside, managed migration policy in rich nations continues to be set by a concern, first and foremost, with national
self- interest, not a concern with global responsibility or the interests of other nations

(Kapur and McHale 2005; Schiff 2005).

The global war for talent undermines conventional ways of judging fairness in educational opportunity, by attacking the ideology of meritocratic nationalism, while offering in its place the
(equally) problematic ideology of global meritocracy

Contemporary education in all OECD nations is based on an ideology of meritocratic nationalism: students compete for top jobs and college slots in a national system of schooling; nations invest
in education so that their citizens can out-smart and out-compete citizens from other nations; and educational justice is defined largely as the provision of equal educational opportunity for
those living within the borders of the nation (Lauder, Brown, Dillabough, and Halsey 2006). The global war for talent poses a challenge to meritocratic nationalism by splitting meritocracy apart
from its nationalist base and identity, and forcing states to address newly emergent conflicts between meritocratic and nationalist principle over fair access to elite education, high level
employment, and social and economic mobility. Who should get the top jobs and most sought after college entry positions in our society? We are used to saying that these should be given to the
‘best qualified’, but this rests on the assumption that this only applies to full-citizens, rather than to all workers or students regardless of nationality.

In a recent debate in the British House of Commons, for example, over the employment of foreign doctors in the UK, Home Department Under-Secretary of State Joan Ryan asserted:

It is only right that jobs and training programmes that are available in the UK for junior doctors should go first to UK nationals. That is the principle of ensuring that UK workers have access to
jobs, which is the principle at the heart of our migration system and, indeed, the migration systems of developed countries throughout the world. I make no apology for the fact that the
Government are committed to fostering the talent and harnessing the abilities of our own citizens. (Hansard 2006) Such attitudes help to explain why, despite stereotypes conjured up by the
global war for talent of skilled immigrants as high fliers, jet-setters, cosmocrats, all-stars and transnational elites (Favell, Feldblum, and Smith 2006), the majority of skilled immigrants are actually
slotted into second-tier jobs, filling positions that the native- born who are trained in their occupational specialties won’t touch. Immigrant doctors, nurses and teachers in the UK, USA and other
rich nations tend to work in the least desirable specialties and in the poorest, more under-resourced and remote locations. This raises social justice questions about the fairness of treating
immigrants as second class (non-)citizens, whose welcome in a country is contingent on their not competing directly with the native-born for preferred jobs. But when we consider the numbers
involved – 30% of physicians in the UK are foreign-born, for example, as are over 25% of academic faculty; in the USA, 50% of the engineering workforce with PhD degrees are foreign-born, etc. –
we need to ask what happens to our societies when such a large proportion of our skilled workforce is denied full access to the meritocratic principles of equal opportunity and reward for equal
talent and achievement that we supposedly hold so dear, simply on the basis of citizenship-status and national origin.

Should educational and occupational opportunities be awarded instead, solely on the basis of merit, regardless of where individuals come from or what passports they hold?

Should we embrace the vision of global

meritocracy through the rhetoric of that is on offer

the global war for talent ? There are good reasons to be cautious about the official view of a global

in reality, economic
meritocracy. Its ideologues like Thomas Friedman invoke images of a ‘flat earth’ and ‘level playing field’. Yet , social and

education inequalities both within and between nations are vast and increasing. In fact, as noted above,
the global war for talent itself tends to promote and embrace inequality, rather than to reduce it. How are we to speak meaningfully, for example, of equality of educational opportunity in a
world where developed nations account for 16% of the world’s population, but 79% of public education expenditure? (UNESCO 2000). Not only are such inequalities enormous, there are no
political or moral (social justice) frameworks at the global level that provide an alternative way of re-imagining equality in educational opportunity as a global project (Jordan and Dü vell 2003;
Tannock 2009a).

The war for talent speaks extensively of the challenges of chasing after and recruiting the world’s ‘best and brightest’ – the alleged

pays little attention to

product of a global meritocracy. But it what we might call the process of meritocracy, or

the social structure of competition the issue of (Brown 2006): that is to say,

how to ensure that all individuals are

equally able to develop their talents and
abilities through formal education and elsewhere. Indeed, the fact that this

new ideal of a global meritocracy is being most fervently promoted by wealthy corporate elites begs the question of who stands to benefit most from the embrace of such an ideology? To what
degree is this about the escape from and negation of social justice and equality norms and expectations that have been most fully operationalised at the nation-state level, and little more than
that?

The impact is extinction and global structural violence – neoliberalism generates

resource and social crises, while creating a planetary health crisis that destroys
everyday quality of life – only resisting market expansion prevents the acceleration of
inequality and environmental destruction
Sparke 16
(Matthew Sparke is Professor of Geography, International Studies and Global Health at the University of
Washington, USA, where he also serves as the Director of Integrated Social Sciences, “Health and the
embodiment of neoliberalism: pathologies of political

economy from climate change and austerity to personal responsibility,” in The Handbook of
Neoliberalism, pgs. 237-247)

Neoliberalism is commonly understood in terms of the expanding global influence of disembodied market forces and rationalities. However, unlike the invisible hands and competitive
calculations it unleashes on the world, neoliberalism’s implications for health are neither intangible nor abstract. Instead, they are materially embodied in ways that are deeply consequential
for life and death (Navarro 2007). Evoked in book titles such as The Deadly Ideas of Neoliberalism, Dying for Growth, Sickness and Wealth, Infections and Inequalities, Pathologies of Power,

neoliberalism and associated forms of

Blind Spot, and, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills,

inequality, austerity and precarity have been tied by health scholars to a vast variety of
embodied suffering, disease-vulnerability and low life expectancy right across the
planet (Rowden 2009; Kim et al. 2000; Fort et al. 2004; Farmer 2001, 2005; Keshavjee 2014; Stuckler and Basu 2013). Rallying against these lethal links, a gathering of the World Social
Forum in Tunis in 2015 recently concluded that today’s global crises in health , health services and social protection are

‘in fact the consequence of neoliberal politics globally’ (WSF 2015). Meanwhile, amid all the
crises, individuals are also now routinely told that their health is simply their own
responsibility, a form of resilience that will only endure if they invest in it with the same individualistic and entrepreneurial prudence that is the trademark of personalized
neoliberalism more generally (Brown and Baker 2012). As a result, all sorts of embodied health challenges – hunger and

obesity being two especially physical examples – are repeatedly recoded as personal
management problems even as they embody neoliberal socio-economic developments in
society at large (Carney 2015; Guthman 2009).

How then can we better theorize the processes through which neoliberalism becomes embodied in health? While the ill-effects of neoliberal policies and practices have been spreading across
borders like an infectious outbreak, neoliberalism is clearly not a biological disease agent itself. Even if it is conceptualized as an epidemic in terms of transnational health impacts, its

extraordinarily diverse sequelae do not constitute a singular medical syndrome (Schrecker and Bambra 2015). The etiologies of illness involved are
extremely complex, multi-causal and as geographically uneven as they are historically and economically interconnected (Labonté et al. 2009). Whether it is the global

consequences of the cutbacks in health care caused by neoliberal austerity, or the impact
of business deregulation, privatization and user fees introduced in national neoliberal
reforms, or the everyday destabilization of communities caused by increasing income
inequalities, social insecurity and environmental deterioration, the varieties of experiences, processes and time-space scales
to consider are extremely heterogeneous. And then, on the other side of the ledger, there are the health benefits claimed by the privileged for neoliberal innovations in personal risk
management, customized medicine, medical tourism and pharmaceuticals – benefits that also sometimes come with increased risks for others such as organ donors and experimental subjects
recruited for drug trials in poor countries (Parry et al. 2015; Sparke 2014). Across such a wide range of economic, political and social life, ‘neoliberalism’ – the term – means many different
things. Thus before proceeding here to offer a survey of research on the health outcomes that can be diagnosed as embodiments of neoliberalism, this chapter begins by first unpacking what
the term means and how we can best theorize its ties to health.

Defining neoliberalism in relation to health

Put most simply, neoliberalism names a way of governing capitalism that emphasizes liberalizing
markets and making market forces the basis of economic coordination, social distribution, and personal motivation (Sparke 2013).At a macro scale these developments can be seen
as comprising ‘neoliberal governance’, a set of governmental norms including privatization, business deregulation, and trade

liberalization, that reconstitute politics in the shape of the market and repurpose the state as an entrepreneurial actor that governs through proliferating public–private
partnerships in the interests of business classes and global investors (Brown 2015; Harvey 2005). At a more intimate scale of personal behaviour it becomes ‘neoliberal governmentality’, a
suite of practices in which individuals across a much wider set of social classes are enlisted into becoming competitive agents who invest in their human capital as entrepreneurs and who
reimagine the meaning of their lives, citizenship and individuality – including their personal health – as calculating consumers constantly comparing metrics of ownership, mobility and social
ranking (Brown 2015; Dardot and Laval 2013; Lemke 2001). And at once enabling and mediating developments across these different scales, neoliberalism is also a set of economic-turned-
political ideas: ideas (like von Hayek’s view of health as just another consumer choice) that keep evolving as adaptive and protean yet hegemonic common-sense about market norms and
necessities, and ideas that thereby continue to inspire both the macro policies and micro practices of neoliberalization in different ways in different places (Gaffney 2014; Mirowski 2013; Peck
2010). All these accounts of neoliberalism are useful, but, as has been widely cautioned (including by many of the authors cited above), each one risks turning the term into a singular and
seemingly inevitable metanarrative when divorced from attention to the historical-geographical circumstances in which neoliberal ideas and discourses actually shape assemblages of
neoliberal governance and governmentality (Ong 2006; Sparke 2006; Springer 2012). This is precisely where studying neoliberalism in terms of embodiment becomes so critical, offering a way
of coming to terms with how all the global-to-local processes of neoliberalization come together materially to condition and, too often, to shorten and diminish human life.

Not surprisingly, scholars of health have already led the way in reconceptualizing neoliberal- ism in terms of embodiment.They are not all necessarily informed directly by the account of illness
as ecosocial embodiment offered by epidemiologist Nancy Krieger (2001, 2005; but see Birn et al. 2009). All sorts of other ecologies and ‘epidemiologies of inequality’ have been charted as
well (Heggenhougen 2005): some stressing the ties between ill-health and the high in-country inequalities created by neoliberal reform (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; De Vogli, Schrecker and
Labonté 2013); others surveying the severe constraints placed on poor country primary health care, health services and, more recently, on health systems strengthening by the structural
adjustments and neoliberal austerity imposed by international finance and its polit- ical representatives (Birn and Dmitrienko 2005; Gloyd 2004; Kim et al. 2000; Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010);
others highlighting in turn the complex biosocial mechanisms through which everything from dam-building to user fees, curtailed drugs programmes, and other structural adjustments
materialize as structural violence on the poor (Farmer 2005; Farmer et al. 2013); and yet others identifying the particular routes through which poor people’s bodies, blood and bio- logical
material have been turned into new molecular frontiers for capitalist growth amid the crises and speculative leaps of neoliberal globalization (Cooper 2008; Crane 2013; Rajan 2007). These
varied epidemiologies are informed in turn by varied analyses of the pathways through which neoliberalization comes to be embodied. Some stress the transfer mechanisms of neolib- eral
ideas through international financial institutions, free trade deals and NGOs (Labonté and Schrecker 2007; Rowden 2009; Keshavjee 2014). Others emphasize the class interests and policy
reforms of neoliberal governance, including health services privatization (Navarro 2007; Schrecker and Bambra 2015; Schwiter et al. 2015). And yet others address the prudential risk-
management practices of neoliberal governmentality, whether as they are practiced by consum- ers of personalized medicine in privileged contexts (Brown and Baker 2012; Lupton 2015), or
as they are extended, however unevenly and incompletely, to aid enclaves of therapeutic citi- zenship in desperately poor contexts (Ngyuen 2010).

The main focus in what follows is on the pathways that can be addressed in terms of conditionalization, including under this heading the diverse developments through which

neoliberalism in macro political-economic governance has become embodied in various

forms of premature mortality and morbidity. Given limited space, less attention is paid here to the various forms of personalized
responsibilization through which more micro modes of neoliberal governmentality have come to be embodied in individual experiences of risk and biomedical self-management. However, by
way of a conclusion, the last part of the chapter points to how both conditionalization and responsibilization are increasingly coming together to shape contemporary global health formation:
the formation of a field of research, intervention and outcomes in which we see micro neoliberal innovations in personalized health risk management frequently being advanced as answers to
the destructive legacies of macro neoliberal structural adjustment. It is a field in which neoliberal market failures are at once acknowledged and contested even as neoliberal assumptions still
strongly shape the ways that corrective counter-measures to the legacies of neoliberal structural violence are imagined, assessed and defended (Kenworthy 2014; Mitchell and Sparke 2016).

to understand the global health problems in poor countries that corrective global health
But

interventions are designed to address we first need to come to terms with the ways in
which embodied experiences of health have been structured by neoliberal
conditionalization.
Neoliberalization as global political-economic conditionalization

Last year, our imperfect world delivered, in short order, a fuel crisis, a food crisis, and a
financial crisis. It also delivered compelling evidence that the impact of climate change has
been seriously underestimated. All of these events have global causes and global
consequences, with serious implications for health. They are not random events. Instead, they are
the result of massive failures in the international systems that govern the way nations and
their populations interact. In short: they are the result of bad policies.... In far too many cases, economic growth has been pursued , with
single-minded purpose, as the be-all, end-all, cure-for-all. The assumption that market forces
could solve most problems has not proved true.
(Margaret Chan 2009)

a Director General of the World Health

She did not use the word neoliberalism itself, but, in 2009, in one of the most critical speeches ever made by

Organization, Margaret Chan delivered a damning diagnosis of the effects of neoliberal

policy-making on health outcomes around the world. At the centre of the ‘bad policies’ she targeted for critique in this way was the single- minded pursuit of economic
growth, and her subsequent references to globalization, market forces, and trade liberalization indexed, in turn, wider neoliberal developments as the underlying causes of the widening global
crises. Coming on the heels of the 2008 global financial crisis, Dr Chan thereby summed up a widespread realization that the neoliberal norms tied to market-led global growth were creating
massive problems of inequality, volatility and precarity. ‘Something,’ she said, ‘has gone horribly wrong.’

the WHO’s own Commission on

Dr Chan’s diagnosis was by no means just a rhetorical response to a bad year. It built upon a comprehensive assessment of

the Social Determinants of Health, which had already reached similar conclusions collected together in a report
that was published in 2008 before the full scope of the global financial crisis even became clear (WHO 2008). ‘Social injustice is killing people on a

grand scale,’ announced this report (ibid.: 26).And, as well as presenting voluminous data to buttress their critique, the commissioners also sought to chart some of the
pathways of causal connection linking high mortality and morbidity around the world to the structural force of neoliberal policies and associated economic impera- tives. The report also did
not use the term ‘neoliberalism’. It only showed up once in a reference to an online paper on uneven health outcomes and neoliberalism in Africa (republished as Bond and Dor 2007). But as
they endeavoured to describe the market-made and market-mediated ‘structural drivers’ that set the conditions in which people ‘are born, grow, live, work, and age’, and as they documented
how these political-economic forces are experienced and thus embodied as ill-health, the commissioners effectively underlined a form of conditionalization linked to globalization that others
would clearly recognize as neoliberalization. ‘This toxic combination of bad policies, economics, and politics’, they argued, ‘is, in large measure, responsible for the fact that a majority of
people in the world do not enjoy the good health that is biologically possible’ (WHO 2008, 26).

Irrespective of the terminology used, one of the most useful lessons of the analyses offered by the WHO chief and the 2008 WHO report on the social determinants of health is their focus on
the processes of conditionalization through which global structural forces become embodied in health outcomes. ‘Conditionalization’ is a useful term to employ here for two reasons. First of
all, it indexes the many indirect ways through which neoliberalization around the world has set the basic conditions in which people strive to live their everyday lives. Conditioning connects in
this way to vital processes of social reproduction, as well as communicating as a verb – ‘to condition’ – how living conditions, in turn, become embodied in people’s health.

Inequality, financial volatility, and the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ tendencies
associated with the relentless global competition for investment and jobs are all important
aspects of neoliberal health conditioning in this respect, as too are the massive challenges of
climate change, pollution, and food and water insecurity, all of which have been further
exacerbated by market liberalization and associated efforts to attract and accommodate business interests globally. More directly, the second
reason for using the term ‘conditionalization’ is that it also points to the very specific neoliberal policies known as ‘conditionalities’ comprising the rules imposed on poor countries around the
world by the IMF,World Bank and US Treasury Department as conditions for sup- port with debt management from the debt crises of the 1980s onwards. Also known as the ‘Washington
Consensus’, the rules of conditionality – rules that included privatization, trade liberalization, financial deregulation, austerity, cuts to health programmes, user fees for health services, cuts to
food and fuel subsidies, and diverse experiments in export-led development – constituted the main components of the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes or SAPs administered by
the three agencies based in Washington, DC. These same SAPs have subsequently become the subject of a powerful set of critical studies documenting the structural violence and suffering
that structural adjustment imposed on societies across the global South, violence and suffering that has, in turn, been embodied in a whole series of diminished health outcomes (Pfeiffer and
Chapman 2010). Let us now examine these contextual and structural patterns of health conditionalization in more detail, starting with the most generalized and global conditioning affect of
all: namely, climate change.

Neoliberalism and the contextual conditioning of health

Climate change is viewed by many health scholars as ‘the biggest global health threat of the 21st century’ (Costello et al. 2009). Even if the ties to neoliberalization are not always noted,

the health risks of climate change can also, in turn, be examined as being increased and
intensified by neoliberal developments globally (Goodman 2014).The freeing-up of market
capitalism has undoubtedly freed-up additional carbon as gas and put it straight into the
atmosphere, creating the basic conditioning effect – the greenhouse effect – needed to create anthropogenic
climate change. The liberalization in neoliberalization takes on a whole new meaning in this regard. As Naomi Klein puts it, ‘the liberation of world markets, a process powered by the liberation
of unprecedented amounts of fossil fuels from the earth, has dramatically sped up the same process that is liberating Arctic ice from existence’ (Klein 2014: 20–1). These liberalization links
noted, it would be mistaken simply to blame neoliberalism alone for climate change.The Keynesian welfare-state capitalism of the pre-neoliberal West was itself the world’s greatest
greenhouse gas generator until market-led globalization brought developing countries into the club of big carbon emitters. Looked at like this over longer time-spans, economic development

Neoliberalism has undoubtedly

based on energy supplied largely in the form of fossil fuels was always going to lead to the greenhouse effect.

accelerated the process and enabled recent phenomena such as fracking and tar sands
exploitation by blunting government regulation of energy corpo- rations and legitimating new norms for extractive development (Finewood and Stroup 2012; Preston 2013).
But, many other older aspects of global development have been contributing to carbon build-up for far longer.
Pre-neoliberal pollution noted, when it comes to how climate change impacts human health, and how societies might mitigate or adapt to the dangers, neoliberalism makes a very big

‘we have not done the things that are necessary to lower
difference indeed (Fieldman 2011). As Klein underlines,

emissions because those things fundamentally conflict with deregulated capitalism’ (Klein
2014: 18). Mitigation has thereby been repeatedly mitigated, leading to a series of dead-ends
in global climate negotiations from Kyoto to Copenhagen to Cancún to Durban (Bond 2012a).The same economistic appeals to the inevitability of market
logics that have helped to naturalize neoliberal globalization have also helped in this way to make shifts away from carbon-intensive energy production seem impossible to political elites. As a
result, whatever worries endure about climate change are generally transformed into new market-friendly and market- mediated ‘adaptive’ opportunities through developments such as
carbon credit markets, weather derivatives, patented climate-ready crops and public forest land grabs privatized as carbon sinks (Bond 2012b; Cooper 2010; Dempsey and Robertson 2012).

Thus the dominant neoliberal response to climate change has been to focus on the
depoliticizing development of so-called resilience, turning market tools and techniques for
risk management into new climate adaptation products for those who can afford to invest
in insurance and insulation from the most health-threatening implications of climate change (Bracking 2015; Felli 2015; Gilbertson and Reyes 2009; MacNeil and
Paterson 2012; Parr 2015). And far from the centres of financialized climate adaptation, the bodies of the poor are simultaneously left

vulnerable under neoliberalism to the floods, storms, desertification, droughts, heat

waves, and disease outbreaks that the Inter- national Panel on Climate Change describes as being
created or worsened by climate change, as well as all the associated shortages of reliable food and secure water supplies (IPCC 2014).
The hazardous contexts for human life created by deregulated risk-evading industry impose risks on human health through more than just greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Mudu 2009). There
are many other health-damaging ecologies ensuing from the ways in which the neoliberal competition to attract and retain investment globally has led to diminished controls over corporate

Ocean
activities ranging from power generation to farming, fishing, logging and mining to chemical and pharmaceutical production to the management of food and workplace safety.

acidification, aquifer depletion, overfishing, biodiversity loss, and carcinogenic chemical

exposure all threaten the ecological systems that support the reproduction of healthy human
bodies, and they are all intensified by neoliberalization (Castree 2010). Similarly, the ‘race to the bottom’ on (and for) factory floors
created by the creation of the increasingly neoliberal global division of labour (i.e. competitive, contingent and highly precarious ‘flexible’ labour markets) has led to the sidelining of

occupational health and safety protections as well as to the undermining of unions and the historic health and pension benefits secured by collective bargaining (Mogensen 2006). The
deaths and injuries of workers through hyper-exploitation, suicide, factory fires,
building collapses and other industrial disasters are, in this sense, just the most egregious
embodiments (indeed disembodiments in some cases) of more pervasive tendencies towards
increasing work-related stress, vulnerability and ill-health (Baram 2009; Ngai and Chan 2012). Most vulnerable of all, the precarious
sub-citizenship of poor migrant workers in today’s global economy – many of them forced into migration by the impact of neoliberalization on domestic economies – leads directly to broken
bodies, painful insecurities and, as Megan Carney puts it in her powerful analysis of the food insecurity facing women migrants on both sides of the US– Mexican border, unending hunger
(Carney 2015; see also Holmes 2013).

workers’
While many workers suffer injury and deprivation in labouring to produce food and other consumer goods and services for the global economy, another way in which

bodies come to embody neoliberal precarity is as consumers too. The free market
deregulation of cor- porate activity and other policy shifts away from social welfare protection put
populations at increased health risks by exposing consumers , and especially poor and poorly educated consumers, to
an increasingly inescapable ‘corporate-consumption complex’ (Freudenberg 2014). Freudenberg’s name for this hybrid
assemblage of business interests and networks also underlines – with its echo of the military-industrial complex – the huge importance of public health research into the dangers posed to
consumers by industries ranging from alcohol, tobacco and fast food to firearms, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals (Mercille 2015;Wipfli and Samet 2009). With the increasing globalization
of the corporate consumption complex we also return to a form of public health conditionalization highlighted by WHO Director Chan in her account of the rising chronic disease and non-
communicable disease dangers associated with market-led devel- opment. Unfortunately, though, such structural conditioning is simultaneously being down- played in individualistic
approaches to behavioural responsibilization in public health, approaches that focus on cultivating healthy consumer ‘choices’ and which constitute a form of neoliberal governmentality that is
now travelling transnationally to many of the same consumers being chased by global corporations themselves (Cairns and Johnston 2015; Hughes Rinker 2015; Ormond and Sothern 2012;
Parry 2013; Sun 2015). While these micro neoliberal approaches have been theorized as bringing opportunities for customized medicine at the molecular level, and while it is suggested that
this new biological citizenship comes without the racial exclusions and other biases of national twentieth-century biomedicine, empirical studies show that they often contribute to personal
shame and guilt that leads in turn to the denial of structural conditioning and related forms of vulnerability and dependency (compare Rose 2007, with Eliason 2015; LeBesco 2011; Peacock et
al. 2014; and Wehling 2010).Thus, insofar as this per- sonalized neoliberal individualization of risk management obscures the socialized neoliberal production of heath risks, it presents what
Sara Glasgow and Ted Schrecker usefully refer to as ‘the double burden of neoliberalism’ in global public health (Glasgow and Schrecker 2015).
The judge should vote negative to embrace education as a process of critical
democratic citizenship
Reconfiguring education around the model of critical democratic citizenship is good –
only displacing the neoliberal myth of the citizen-as-consumer can create a robust,
egalitarian social ecology
Kelty 14
(Robert Kelty, EdD [Doctor of Education] in Curriculum and Instruction from Northern Arizona, from
dissertation titled: “HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM AND THE APPARATUS OF
SCHOOL PRIVATIZATION,” January 2014, pgs. 278-281)

the ethics of the “Neoliberal

Outside of hyperbole,

Citizen” are applied to teachers and already

students through an array of means and pressures in

the contemporary: students have been commodified (vouchers, education savings accounts, per
pupil expenditures), market indicators exist to some degree (standardized tests), market need is
dominating the curricular and assessment conversation,203 market signals subsist (school letter
grades), and individual and competitive-based learning infiltrate our schools (performance pay, high-stakes

a new, hidden curriculum has

learning, retention versus intervention, on-line learning, school lotteries, school closures, etc.). Indeed,

emerged with this neoliberal ethos meta-governed, .

The biopolitic of market rationality is

smothering the public school – like smoke from Hestia’s extinguished hearth.

policies attempts at ideological

This dissertation, therefore, holds that ,

persuasion and governing networks can be , all

seen as “specific events” in realizing a particular
world-view . Consequently, what is seen is a tightly construed web – pure in its ideology, congratulatory in its successes, hegemonic in its knowledge. On

neoliberalism is not omnipresent

the other hand, and of more consequence, this dissertation also holds that : it is based on

It can be deconstructed,
certain actors in certain networks inspired by certain ideas.

ethically analyzed, and countered .

In the end, myth and philosophy fall to reality, and the reality is a polemic. The polemic was identified in 1937 by none other than John Dewey. Dewey (1937) critiqued Walter Lippmann’s The
Good Society, and Dewey’s most pointed criticisms were the following:

My impression of Mr. Lippmann’s book...is that in spite of its criticism of laissez- faire...its net effect is to give encouragement and practical support to reactionaries: not because he has not said
many things which need to be said on special points, but because the picture he draws of Liberalism is in terms of an idealistic Utopia (p. 487).

Dewey continued:

[W]hen Mr. Lippmann speaks of the “perfect market” he is speaking of an ideal which is a Utopian vacuum, apart from the social meaning by which and the social context in which it can be
brought into being....The separation of the individual from the social milieu in which he lives, moves and has his being is the straight road to social philosophy in vacuo. (pp. 491-495)

Dewey’s criticism still rings with noted relevancy.

Yet, I do not argue that the public domain was and is sacrosanct. It, too, is filled with the

human, all too human frailties of broken promises. I also do not argue that free markets are not valuable; they certainly are, just not applied to all facets of the social, public, and governance

this dissertation calls for a new

domains. Consequently,

philosophical structure to the American

school embedded in culture, diversity,
, one cognizant of markets but

equity, ecology, and cognizant of democratic citizenship

most importantly, one and self-

transformation in a complex and changing world.

There is no call for a return to a slow and

bureaucratic public school nor an plagued by “the bigotry of low expectations,”

endorsement of a utopic market mythical and

system a new intellectual

which exacerbates these same issues in variant ways. Rather,
endeavor is needed advocating , one free of ideological persuasion and rather for

exemplary and equitable education centered as defined by decades of authentic peer-reviewed research and

on the principles and demands of a robust

democracy A utopian dream that .

advocates for children’s individual

transformation and critical agency in a
public and collective democracy is of no danger at all.

is a rejection of the “status quo”

Rather, in my opinion, it in

this dissertation is a calling for a

itself. For that reason, : a call

new revival of the democratic public school, an intellectual project, for an authentic and meaningful education for all children. A blueprint, in all

a democracy must
its imperfections, has been provided. As Lippmann (1937/1943) stated, “In other words,

have a way of life which educates the

people for the democratic way of life ” (p. 262). Lippmann, in this
regard, was correct, and a twilight of the neoliberal idol should cede to his words.

neoliberalism has become

All the same, as Jamie Peck (2012) stated: “

practically indistinguishable from the alleged

‘logic’ of globalization – it seems to be everywhere, and it seems to be all that there is” (p. xi). As we have seen, it is

the public school,

more than logic, it is a meta- governmentality; it is a reality; it is a network; it is an idea. However,
without an intellectual counter-narrative, is
indeed dead without historical . The public school,

understanding of its meaning and a public

citizenry demanding and participating in
the fulfillment of its statement of aims , will remain dead. And
we, as individual consumers, have killed it. How shall we, murderers of all murderers to the idols of democracy and the public domain, extinguishers of Hestia’s public hearth, console ourselves
from the cold individualism of the market?

Your ballot is a decision between competing political imaginaries – the 1ac’s framing
of education policy produces a particular account of globalization as economic
competition renders their plan and advantage claims plausible – interrogating their
framing of political economy is a prior question
Cameron & Palan 4
(Angus Cameron, University of Leicester, Ronen Palan, University of Birmingham, The imagined economies
of globalization, pgs. 4-8)

Not every myth, however, is believed and not every story is acted upon. Why, then, are the various stories of globalization, those told by its proponents and opponents alike, so readily believed

The reasons why particular stories of

by so many? social,

political and economic reality are taken become acceptable,

as ‘common sense’ are varied and

truth or ,

complex . Material interest certainly plays a role, but the reasons why certain theories are accepted and others are not cannot be reduced to mere ideological ploys
propagated by interested parties. In fact, as Regis Debray (1981) argued, the cultural and historical specificity of mythologies means that a general theory of myth-making is probably impossible.

these stories become common sense because they are

One thing is clear, at the very least

constructed historically in a way that generates

plausibility This suggests cultural . , in turn, that

theories and literary criticism may be of
much greater use for political science and
political economy than is normally
acknowledged social . The historiographer Paul Ricoeur (1981) argues compellingly that

theories should be considered story-

, including history, as a special example of

telling They are no different

. from other in essence, he maintains,

forms of story-telling, except in the ways

they are deployed, consumed and
reproduced as truth as representations of objective reality – . Social theories and historical analysis employ the same
techniques of narrative construction that are common in all other fictions, myths and legends, differing from the latter not in their internal structure, but in the assumed relationship they have to

This implies the generation and

the ‘external’ world. , in turn, that

reproduction of social theories as stories is

a dialogic and evolutionary process which
takes place not only in the world ‘out there’ but in the forms of inter-personal ,

and inter-institutional narrative construction we are all engaged in This is , wittingly or not, . ,

equally true of that range of stories we

therefore,

call globalization theory

(currently) . The process of theory construction as narrative construction, of generating plausible stories about plausible worlds,

We can no longer accept the

therefore has important implications for the way we treat theory.
conventional notion theories are external that

to the realities they seek to describe – as if they inhabit a world

we can only understand the role of

parallel to social reality. Rather,

theory, belief, narrative as integral parts and so on,

of the production of social reality itself In .

the case of globalization the relationship between its , we will argue here,

‘objective’ processes and manifestations and the construction of theories about it is in itself
undertheorized and, furthermore, is partly obscured, because in time the historical evolution of the theory has gone unnoticed or been forgotten.
We will examine, therefore, in this book the processes of production and consumption of stories about globalization. This is a complex process, and crucially, we would argue, not one confined to

From a legal and economic

formal academic or policy debates.

perspective the , which tends on the whole to be where we acquire our knowledge about globalization, act of

merger between Daimler and Chrysler , for instance,

was a ‘transaction’ of ownership , a unit of transfer of legal control, an exchange

titles From a sociological

and the moment of the creation of a new legal entity.

perspective the merger was an – the one that we seek to advance in this book –

‘act’, a social performance This act , conducted for the benefit of observers.

is not viewed in any naïve or by its various audiences

unmediated way the act is interpreted by . Rather, a

the public who

host of professional observers, analysts and academics, as well as ordinary members of ,
construct a picture of its significance, place
it in an historical context, and frame it in a more or less

This emerging narrative serves

coherent narrative of social development. in turn

to suggest a limited range of plausible implications Out of these developments for the future.

of this welter of observations,

performances, interpretations and
predictions certain collective stories then emerge . These are
the partial and heterogeneous narratives by which any society informs itself about itself and in response to which its members can prepare for future action. We should make it plain from the
outset that we are not claiming to have made some startling discovery about the nature of social reality. Far from it; the power of naming and narrating social realities has been recognized for
centuries as one of the most powerful aspects of social reproduction and regulation. Listen to Thomas Hobbes, normally credited with being the father of the ‘realist’ theory of international
relations, writing in Leviathan in 1651:

the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they
are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been among men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace.
(1951, 100) For Hobbes, society itself is a function of speech and of naming because it is only through speech that mankind can develop the communicative structures required to manage
complex and abstract practices and concepts. Speech, therefore, consists of common social narratives, what Hobbes calls ‘universals’, that define the domain of the social. Hobbes continues;
There being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named are every one of them Individual and Singular. (1951, 100) Hobbes, the alleged ‘realist’, was obviously perfectly
aware of the epistemological gap between the world of things and the realm of words – a problematic that is often thought to emerge in Western philosophy only between Hegel in the
eighteenth century and contemporary deconstruction theories. Hobbes was clearly aware that we are discussing not the real in any unmediated and unreflective way, but rather ‘universalls’ –
names or abstractions. Stripped of the hype, globalization is at root a concept, a universal name, in Hobbes’ terminology. But because the act of naming is also an act of constitution and
universalization (objectification), it is not a disinterested or innocent act. Indeed, the act of naming and the construction of stories around these names are so important that we cannot
understand ‘globalization’ (or, for that matter, any other social phenomenon) independently of the processes of communal story-telling and the rules of narrative construction. As Alfred Schutz
once said: I can look upon the world presenting itself to me as one that is completed, constituted, and to be taken for granted, but, when I do this, I leave out of my awareness the intentional

This should be
operations of my consciousness within which their meanings have already been constituted. (quoted in Bloor 1983, 9)

viewed as a warning to any social theory

that seeks to present itself as objective by
ignoring the processes by which meanings
are constituted a ‘reflexive’ glance is necessary, ‘by . Schutz concludes from this that

which we are to catch ourselves in the act

of conferring meaning’ (p. 9). This reflexive production of meaning is fundamental not only to understand how
Hobbes’ Universalls are constituted, but also to the unique human capacity of preparing for an uncertain future. A key theme of this book, therefore, is that this elemental reflexivity must be
incorporated as a central epistemological assumption and accommodated in any informed social scientific thought. All too often, however, it is not. But this propensity for ‘reflexive self
regulation’ (Onuf 1989, 62) must be incorporated not only in order to better understand contemporary developments, but also to guide us to the extent that it is possible, to future possibilities

This book offers a reflexive

of action, to the novel directions that may be taken. , therefore,

glance into the shaping of the stories of

globalization . But although in the course of our argument we place great stress on the rules of narrative construction, this is not intended to invalidate

approaches to globalization as an analytic or descriptive construct. Neither do we wish to validate them. Nor do we want merely to force more careful thought about the quality of some of the
assertions that are made in the name of globalization – their status, their applicability, their relationship to the practice of business and states. Our aim is far more ambitious. We will show that,

over and above the various concrete

processes of technological, economic and
institutional change which are commonly
presented as the essence of globalization ,

the more fundamental significance of the

concept is the role it is playing in rewriting the
collective imagery of society. Again, we are not saying, in principle, something particularly new: a constant theme in cultural theory of the late twentieth century
has been that of the disempowering nature of modern global capitalism which has engendered, as Christopher Lasch famously put it, a ‘culture of narcissism’ in Western societies (Lasch 1979).
There has been much concern with the debilitating effects of mass consumerism and the pressures of ‘exhausting modernities’ (Brennan 2002, Bauman 1998a). But the link between these
‘cultural’ phenomena (which tend to be analysed on a micro- and/or ‘domestic’ scale) and narratives of global political economy is rarely made. What we argue in this book is that contained
within the complex dialogic relationships between rhetoric, perception, practice and institutional adaptation, is a subtle rewriting of the basic spatial imaginary of the state, and hence of the
entire social field. This is not, however, the process conventionally associated with globalization – that of the scalar transcendence of the territorial nation-state and its replacement by a larger

the pervasive adoption of the

‘global’ domain. Rather,

narratives of globalization is having the

effect of altering the very meaning of
spatiality within and across contemporary states. We are aware, of course, that the reflexive nature of social change complicates matters, and we are in danger of

falling into an abyss of end- less recursive loops, as each observation, analysis or utterance becomes a social ‘act’ adding to the array of acts under investigation. Like the mutually reinforcing
perceptions and misperceptions in R.D. Laing’s collection of poems, Knots, observation of another’s observation becomes in itself an observation to be observed, and so on ‘da capo sine fine’

(1970, 13). Not surprisingly, many economists and social

scientists shy away from loops of these apparently never-ending

mutual causality Yet, the reflexive nature of .

social change cannot be ignored , and indeed, remains an underlying, if often

forgotten theme in social investigation. The ‘myths’ of globalization should not, this implies, be taken as a reason to dismiss the concept, but are as important, if not more so, as its ‘empirical’

in place of the
reality – indeed, they are an integral part of that reality. The book is founded on the proposition that

single, unified spatiality of the nation-state,

globalization opens up a multiplicity of
spatial domains each characterized by
different modes of social being and identity .
The image of the bounded, sovereign, territorial space of the state which equated to the ‘imagined community’ of the nation (Anderson 1991) is being replaced by a fundamentally different

the imagined
image of the state whereby the relationship between state, citizen, economy and polity is redrawn. To put it differently,

community of the territorial nation-state , the

is very rapidly giving

dominant and perhaps constitutive imagery of political life in the past two centuries,

way to a series of imagined economies which maintain

the fiction of the state but situate – and indeed perpetuate it as a legal entity –

it within a radically different set of

boundaries and notions of social space the . So

state continues to play an important role:

but it is a very different state . The transformation of the state takes place through the deterritorialization and denationalization of myths of
identity and belonging particular to the nation-state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which in turn necessarily imply a radical recasting of the spaces of the political. Of course, the
political domain was never entirely national, nor has it now become entirely globalized, nor are we arguing that globalization necessarily and inevitably generates these effects. We argue simply

the prevailing narratives of political

and empirically that

action and engagement are changing, and

they are changing in and through the production of
the particular imagery of globalization.
 2nc links
The STEM crisis is an industry myth used to drive down worker wages – the
affirmative transforms K-12 education into a hedge fund for high-technology
companies – that trades off with resolving environmental crises and locks-in economic
inequality
Pierce 14
(Clayton Pierce, Assistant Prof. Education, Culture, & Society @ University of Utah, “STEM Crisis Myth
Revealed: Industry Leaders and Politicians Need a Surplus Army of STEM Workers,” March 26, 2014,
https://educationalbiocapital.wordpress.com/2014/03/26/stem-crisis-myth-revealed-industry-leaders-
and-politicians-need-a-surplus-army-of-stem-workers/)

Over the past 10 years especially, calls to increase Science, Technology, Math, and Engineering (STEM) output from our country’s schools has been
deafening. It is impossible to listen to almost any policy maker or CEO speaking on the topic of education reform in the U.S. who does not couch their entire analysis on the STEM
worker shortage crisis the country is currently facing. Schools and universities in the U.S., if they are to do one thing, so the story goes, is to produce a massive STEM workforce that can help the
economy roll past fast moving competitors such as India and China (insert any other country that scores better on the trends in international mathematics and science study [TIMSS] test).

The problem with this story, as Harvard Law School senior research associate Michael S. Teitelbaum has recently pointed out in his study on the STEM workforce shortage, is
that it does not match the facts on the ground.

studies on the STEM workforce show that, in fact, STEM workers in most fields
Teitelbaum’s as well as other recent

are suffering from the same rates of unemployment as other professional degree fields. The constructed perception of a vast
open horizon of employment opportunities awaiting the 21st century student/worker is exactly that: a manufactured discourse

driven by politicians and industry leaders who want to manage the STEM worker
population in this country to their advantage. Given this new data on the STEM workforce in the U.S. it is time to reassess what I have
called the Neo-Sputnik narrative driving current neoliberal educational reform in the U.S. through the actual
verifiable contours of the STEM workforce. Here is what I see as the most compelling and insightful findings from the recent research done on the STEM crisis in this country as it relates to major
K-12 educational reform policy initiatives such as Race to the Top or Rising above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future.

• Wages are stagnate or falling in many STEM fields. This finding is telling because, as Teitelbaum rightly asserts, if there
were truly a STEM work shortage companies would increase wages in order to draw bright young people into the
workforce

• Wages are not increasing (which should follow if worker demand is high and supply is low) because STEM industry
lobbyists and politicians have passed legislation that allows for a steady stream of lower-wage
workers from other countries (see the legislation for international student visa waivers that has accompanied many economic recovery acts of late)
• The few areas where STEM degree holders are enjoying raises is in booming industries such as the petroleum fracking industry

STEM careers are actually among the most unstable and volatile employment types in the
• Finally,

economy given the short-term, project based nature of the work (1-3 year post-doctorate work for example makes up a large
segment of the STEM workforce).

Given these conclusions what are we to make of the unrelenting STEM driven educational reform drumbeat that continues to seize public discourse around school failure and economic recovery
in this country? Moreover, how can corporate actors such as The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and other STEM reliant industry leaders continue to have credibility in calling for hyper STEM
focused education reform to be the centerpiece for addressing long term social/political problems associated with the so-called achievement gap and the overall growth of racial and economic
inequality in this country? Michael Anft’s Chronicle of Higher Education article makes questions like these more relevant by emphasizing one of the most important findings in Teitelbaum’s study.

In particular that “ Most of the claims of such broad-based shortages in the U.S. STEM work force come from employers
of STEM personnel and from their lobbyists and trade associations,” says Michael Teitelbaum, a Wertheim Fellow in science
policy at Harvard University and a senior adviser at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. “Such claims have convinced some politicians and

journalists, who echo them.” But if there truly were an across- the-STEM-spectrum labor shortage, Mr. Teitelbaum and others note, we’d be seeing an overall
rise in wages in technology and science fields. And that isn’t happening”. One of the most important findings from Teitelbaum and Anft’s analyses of the STEM workforce data in terms of its

STEM industry actors in fact benefit from the perception of a STEM

impact on K-12 education reform is that

workforce shortage in the U.S. and the reality of not having to pay higher wages for a relatively
uncompetitive labor pool. But how could this be?
Here’s one way I offer to interpret the intersection of the STEM crisis myth and K-12 Neo-Sputnik school reform (and really K-graduate school) within the context of this new data. To start with, I
think we have to ask the question of who benefits (profits) most from generating the perception of a STEM workforce crisis in the U.S.? There are many historical examples one could point to
suggest a possible way to answer this question. One I would suggest comes from a classic early critique of industrial capitalism formulated by a man with an impressive beard and ability to sit for

Marx argued (and provided strong evidence on the

long hours at the British Museum Library in London. In his classic critique of capitalism, notably in Volume 1 of Capital, Karl

subject) that one important developmental aspect of capitalist growth was the establishment of disciplining

mechanisms (schools being an important one) in society capable of shaping the working class population within a competitive

wage labor situation. That is, peasants and farmers didn’t just drop their rakes and ploughs and walk peacefully into urban factories—they had to be coerced and
disciplined into a worldview where they (and in most cases were left with no alternative) had to accept their fate as competitive economic actors trying to survive on the new productive playing
field brought into existence through industrial capital and wage labor.

One of the most effective ways workers were disciplined into participating in society as a competitive economic actor set against other workers who were also
selling the only commodity available to them (their body’s energy as labor power) was, as Marx points out in Volume 1 of Capital, through the industrial

owners/politicians actor network that governed laws such as the working day, amount of education child
workers should be allowed, health and safety of workers, and minimum amount of pay. For any or all of these governing strategies over the working class in England (and other parts of the
world) to work however there needed to be segmented groups of workers —populations of wage workers that could be pitted against one another to get around pesky work reform laws such as
the limitation of the working day to 10 hours or a minimum amount of hours children had to spend in school. Marx of course named this phenomenon, the disciplining and creation of different

The pattern Marx was onto that is

segments of the working population, reserve, floating, and semi-permanent worker populations among other categories.

important and relevant to understanding the STEM myth today and why schools play such an
important role in it is that powerful economic industries always need to create and regulate working populations in order to maintain and maximize profitability and
growth. If workers went on strike to increase wages in Birmingham or London, for instance, it was handy for factory owners to simply compel the reserve working class (or a surplus of workers) in
nearby towns to work in the factory for what the owners wanted to pay or perhaps even drop wages (thereby increasing the golden egg of surplus value that originates from human labor).

Having an escape valve to release the pressure of exploitative work relations, in other words, is
part of how a capitalist economy is organized and regulated as Marx showed us 150 years ago in his analysis of industrial
capital and the creation of surplus working populations. I think this is one important (if not the most) explanation as to why high-

tech industry leaders in fields such as pharmaceuticals, biomedical, biotechnological, and information technologies have taken control of
educational reform policy and based it upon the false premise of a STEM workforce labor
shortage.
K-12 schools, as it turns out, are one of the most important and influential spaces in society that such a strategy can
play out, one that is interested in producing not necessarily 21st century skilled workers but 21st workers that can be put into competition

with one another. The STEM crisis in other words and the call for a total curricular overhaul to address this need should be read, I am
suggesting, as a crisis in the reserve STEM working population —a role that has largely been filled by workers from other countries.
What seems to be missing, and is what I see as one of the driving forces behind the STEM crisis myth, is the need to grow out a larger domestic surplus in the STEM workforce in order to increase
the overall pool of available labor that can be set into competitive relation to each other. But the project to create and regulate a surplus population of STEM workers does not work exactly the
same as it did during the industrial period of capital. As researchers (such as Kaushik Sunder Rajan and Melinda Cooper) who have looked at the nature of capitalism in its high-tech/biocapitalist

production in “knowledge society” is largely based on some promissory or

phase have pointed out,

speculative future. Things like the next wonder drug, for example, are years down the road and
investments need to be made now in order to realize their potential value or at least to participate in the high risk/reward economic gamble that many biocapitalist ventures are based upon.

The domestic STEM workforce similarly is built on the same speculative bubble: the jobs will
eventually come some time in the future and we (biocaptialist actors/policy maker networks) need to start building the
promissory workforce to meet this perceived labor demand. Schools, in other words, have become
a hedge fund site for the speculative needs of industries with an eye toward the future—one where a whole
new standing and reserve army of workers needs to be created so profitability and
growth can be realized. Instead of being held hostage by the speculative agents of the
country’s educational future, shouldn’t we be focused on the present that is beset with real social
and ecological crises like global climate change, water shortages, widespread environmental

injustices in working class and communities of color or simply let communities decide for themselves what problems should be addressed? In our present moment the
educational future is being decided by those who are focused on solving very different
problems, and for them, all we need to do is fall in line to help our country recover by doing our part to stem the STEM crisis.

Democracy promotion link- The aff’s narrative of backsliding and freedom of

information relies on an inaccurate historical reading of the fall of the Soviet Union
that makes global failure of democracy inevitable, while re-entrenching economic
inequality –their rhetoric only emboldens dictators and ensures massive violence
Morozov 11
(Evgeny Morozov, contributing editor at the New Republic and the author of To Save Everything, Click
Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism, The Net Delusion, pgs. ix-xvii)

For anyone who wants to see democracy prevail in the most hostile and unlikely environments, the first decade of the new millennium
was marked by a sense of bitter disappointment, if not utter disillusionment. The seemingly inexorable march of freedom that began in the

late 1980s has not only come to a halt but may have reversed its course.¶ Expressions like “freedom recession” have begun to break out of the think-tank

circuit and enter the public conversation. In a state of quiet desperation, a growing number of Western policymakers began to

con- cede that the Washington Consensus—that set of dubious policies that once promised a neoliberal paradise at deep discounts—has
been superseded by the Beijing Consensus, which boasts of delivering quick- and-dirty prosperity without having to bother with those pesky institutions of democracy.¶ The
West has been slow to discover that the fight for democracy wasn’t won back in 1989. For two decades it has been resting on its laurels, expecting that Starbucks, MTV, and Google will do the

a laissez-faire approach to democratization has proved rather toothless against

rest just fine. Such

resurgent authoritarianism, which has masterfully adapted to this new, highly globalized world. Today’s authoritarianism is of the hedonism- and consumerism-
friendly variety, with Steve Jobs and Ashton Kutcher commanding far more respect than Mao or Che Guevara. No wonder the West appears at a loss. While the Soviets could be liberated by
waving the magic wand of blue jeans, exquisite coffee machines, and cheap bubble gum, one can’t pull the same trick on China. After all, this is where all those Western goods come from.¶
Many of the signs that promised further democratization just a few years ago never quite materialized. The so-called color revolutions that swept the former Soviet Union in the last decade
produced rather ambiguous results. Ironically, it’s the most authoritarian of the former Soviet republics—Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan—that found those revolutions most useful, having
discovered and patched their own vulnerabilities. My own birthplace, Belarus, once singled out by Condoleezza Rice as the last outpost of tyranny in Europe, is perhaps the shrewdest of the lot;
it continues its slide into a weird form of authoritarianism, where the glorification of the Soviet past by its despotic ruler is fused with a growing appreciation of fast cars, expensive holidays, and

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were started, if anything, to

exotic cocktails by its largely carefree populace.¶

spread the gospel of freedom and democracy, have lost much of their initial
emancipatory potential as well, further blurring the line between “regime change” and
“democracy promotion.” Coupled with Washington’s unnecessary abuses of human rights and rather frivolous interpretations of international law, these two wars
gave democracy promotion such a bad name that anyone eager to defend it is considered a Dick Cheney acolyte, an insane idealist, or both.¶ It is thus easy to forget, if only for therapeutic
purposes, that the West still has an obligation to stand up for democratic values, speak up about violations of human rights, and reprimand those who abuse their office and their citizens. Luckily,
by the twenty-first century the case for promoting democracy no longer needs to be made; even the hardest skeptics agree that a world where Russia, China, and Iran adhere to democratic
norms is a safer world.¶ That said, there is still very little agreement on the kind of methods and policies the
West needs to pursue to be most effective in promoting democracy . As the last few decades have so aptly
illustrated, good intentions are hardly enough. Even the most noble attempts may easily backfire, entrenching

authoritarianism as a result. The images of horrific prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib were the result, if only indirectly, of one particular approach to promoting democracy. It did
not exactly work as advertised.¶ Unfortunately, as the neoconservative vision for democratizing the world got discredited, nothing viable has come to fill the vacuum. While George Bush
certainly overdid it with his excessive freedom- worshiping rhetoric, his successor seems to have abandoned the rhetoric, the spirit, as well as any desire to articulate what a post-Bush “freedom

agenda” might look like.¶ But there is more to Obama’s silence than just his reasonable attempt to present himself as anti-Bush. Most likely his silence is a sign of
an extremely troubling bipartisan malaise: the growing Western fatigue with the project
of promoting democracy. The project suffers not just from bad publicity but also from a deeply
rooted intellectual crisis. The resilience of authoritarianism in places like Belarus, China, and Iran is not for lack of trying by their Western “partners” to stir things up
with an expectation of a democratic revolution. Alas, most such Western initiatives flop, boosting the appeal of many

existing dictators, who excel at playing up the threat of foreign mingling in their own
affairs. To say that there is no good blueprint for dealing with modern authoritarian- ism would be a severe understatement.¶ Lost in their own strategizing, Western
leaders are pining for something that has guaranteed effectiveness. Many of them look back to the most impressive and most unambiguous triumph of democracy in
the last few decades: the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union . Not surprisingly—and who can blame them for seeking to bolster their

own self-confidence?—they tend to exaggerate their own role in precipitating its demise. As a result, many of the Western strategies tried back then , like

smuggling in photocopiers and fax machines, facilitating the flow of samizdat, and supporting radio broadcasts by Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America, are given much

more credit than they deserve.¶ Such belated Cold War triumphalism results in an
egregious logical fallacy. Since the Soviet Union eventually fell, those strategies are
presumed to have been extremely effective—in fact, crucial to the whole endeavor. The implications of such a view for the
future of democracy promotion are tremendous, for they suggest that large doses of information and

communications technology are lethal to the most repressive of regimes.¶ Much of the
present excitement about the Internet, particularly the high hopes that are pinned on it in
terms of opening up closed societies, stems from such selective and, at times, incorrect
readings of history, rewritten to glorify the genius of Ronald Reagan and minimize the role
of structural conditions and the inherent contradictions of the Soviet system.¶ It’s for these chiefly historical reasons
that the Internet excites so many seasoned and sophisticated decision makers who should really know better. Viewing it through the prism of the

Cold War, they endow the Internet with nearly magical qualities; for them, it’s the ultimate cheat sheet that could help
the West finally defeat its authoritarian adversaries. Given that it’s the only ray of light in an otherwise dark

intellectual tunnel of democracy promotion, the Internet’s prominence in future policy

planning is assured.¶ And at first sight it seems like a brilliant idea. It’s like Radio Free Europe on steroids. And it’s cheap, too: no need to pay for expensive programming,
broadcasting, and, if everything else fails, propaganda. After all, Internet users can discover the truth about the horrors of their regimes, about the secret charms of democracy, and about the
irresistible appeal of universal human rights on their own, by turning to search engines like Google and by following their more politically savvy friends on social networking sites like Facebook. In

By this logic, authoritarianism becomes unsustainable

other words, let them tweet, and they will tweet their way to freedom.

once the barriers to the free flow of information are removed. If the Soviet Union couldn’t survive a platoon of
pamphleteers, how can China survive an army of bloggers?¶ It’s hardly surprising, then, that the only place where the West (especially the United States) is still unabashedly eager to promote
democracy is in cyberspace. The Freedom Agenda is out; the Twitter Agenda is in. It’s deeply symbolic that the only major speech about freedom given by a senior member of the Obama
administration was Hillary Clinton’s speech on Internet freedom in January 2010. It looks like a safe bet: Even if the Internet won’t bring democracy to China or Iran, it can still make the Obama
administration appear to have the most technologically savvy foreign policy team in history. The best and the brightest are now also the geekiest. The Google Doctrine—the enthusiastic belief in
the liberating power of technology accompanied by the irresistible urge to enlist Silicon Valley start-ups in the global fight for freedom—is of growing appeal to many policymakers. In fact, many

What could possibly go

of them are as upbeat about the revolutionary potential of the Internet as their colleagues in the corporate sector were in the late 1990s.

wrong here?¶ As it turns out, quite a lot. Once burst, stock bubbles have few lethal consequences; democracy bubbles, on
the other hand, could easily lead to carnage. The idea that the Internet favors the oppressed
rather than the oppressor is marred by what I call cyber-utopianism: a nai ̈ve belief in the
emancipatory nature of online communication that rests on a stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downside. It stems from the starry- eyed
digital fervor of the 1990s, when former hippies, by this time ensconced in some of the most prestigious universities in the world, went on an argumentative spree to prove that the Internet
could deliver what the 1960s couldn’t: boost democratic participation, trigger a renaissance of moribund communities, strengthen associational life, and serve as a bridge from bowling alone to
blogging together. And if it works in Seattle, it must also work in Shanghai.¶ Cyber-utopians ambitiously set out to build a new and improved United Nations, only to end up with a digital Cirque
du Soleil. Even if true—and that’s a gigantic “if ”—their theories proved difficult to adapt to non-Western and particularly nondemocratic contexts. Democratically elected governments in North
America and Western Europe may, indeed, see an Internet-driven revitalization of their public spheres as a good thing; logically, they would prefer to keep out of the digital sandbox—at least as

long as nothing illegal takes place. Authoritarian governments, on the other hand, have invested so much
effort into suppressing any form of free expression and free assembly that they would never
behave in such a civilized fashion. The early theorists of the Internet’s influence on politics failed to make any space for the state, let alone a brutal authoritarian state with

no tolerance for the rule of law or dissenting opinions. Whatever book lay on the cyber-utopian bed- side table in the early 1990s, it was surely not Hobbes’s Leviathan.¶

Failing to anticipate how authoritarian governments would respond to the Internet, cyber-utopians did not predict how useful it would

prove for propaganda purposes, how masterfully dictators would learn to use it for surveillance, and how sophisticated
modern systems of Internet censorship would become. Instead most cyber-utopians stuck to a populist account of how
technology empowers the people, who, op- pressed by years of authoritarian rule, will inevitably rebel, mobilizing themselves through text messages, Facebook, Twitter, and whatever new tool

comes along next year. (The people, it must be noted, really liked to hear such theories.) Paradoxically, in their refusal to see the downside of the
new digital environment, cyber-utopians ended up belittling the role of the Internet, refusing to
see that it penetrates and re- shapes all walks of political life, not just the ones conducive to democratization.¶ I myself was intoxicated with cyber-utopianism until recently. This book

is an attempt to come to terms with this ideology as well as a warning against the
pernicious influence that it has had and is likely to continue to have on democracy promotion.
My own story is fairly typical of idealistic young people who think they are onto something that could change the world. Having watched the deterioration of

I was drawn to a Western NGO that sought to promote

democratic freedoms in my native Belarus,

democracy and media reform in the former Soviet bloc with the help of the Internet. Blogs, social networks, wikis: We
had an arsenal of weapons that seemed far more potent than police batons, surveillance cameras, and handcuffs.¶ Nevertheless, after I spent a few busy years
circling the former Soviet region and meeting with activists and bloggers, I lost my enthusiasm. Not only were our strategies failing, but we also noticed a significant
push back from the governments we sought to challenge. They were beginning to experiment with censorship, and some went so far as to start aggressively engaging
with new media themselves, paying bloggers to spread propaganda and troll social networking sites looking for new information on those in the opposition. In the
meantime, the Western obsession with the Internet and the monetary support it guaranteed created numerous hazards typical of such ambitious development

predictably, many of the talented bloggers and new media entrepreneurs

projects. Quite

preferred to work for the extremely well-paid but largely ineffective Western-funded
projects instead of trying to create more nimble, sustainable, and, above all, effective
projects of their own. Thus, everything we did—with generous funding from Washington and Brussels—seemed to have
produced the results that were the exact opposite of what my cyber-utopian self wanted.¶
It was tempting to throw my hands up in despair and give up on the Internet altogether. But this would have been the wrong lesson to draw from these disappointing experiences. Similarly, it
would be wrong for Western policymakers to simply dismiss the Internet as a lost cause and move on to bigger, more important issues. Such digital defeatism would only play into the hands of
authoritarian governments, who would be extremely happy to continue using it as both a carrot (keeping their populace entertained) and a stick (punishing those who dare to challenge the
official line). Rather, the lesson to be drawn is that the Internet is here to stay, it will continue growing in importance, and those concerned with democracy promotion need not only grapple with
it but also come up with mechanisms and procedures to ensure that an- other tragic blunder on the scale of Abu Ghraib will never happen in cyberspace. This is not a far-fetched scenario. How
hard is it to imagine a site like Facebook inadvertently disclosing the private information of activists in Iran or China, tipping off governments to secret connections between the activists and their
Western funders?¶ To be truly effective, the West needs to do more than just cleanse it- self of cyber-utopian bias and adopt a more realist posture. When it comes to concrete steps to promote

cyber-utopian convictions often give rise to an equally flawed approach that I dub
democracy,

“Internet-centrism.” Unlike cyber-utopianism, Internet-centrism is not a set of beliefs; rather,

it’s a philosophy of action that informs how decisions, including those that deal with
democracy promotion, are made and how long-term strategies are crafted. While cyber-
utopianism stipulates what has to be done, Internet-centrism stipulates how it should be
done. Internet-centrists like to answer every question about democratic change by first reframing it in terms of the Internet rather than the context in which that
change is to occur. They are often completely oblivious to the highly political nature of technology,
especially the Internet, and like to come up with strategies that assume that the logic of the
Internet, which, in most cases, they are the only ones to perceive, will shape every environment than it penetrates rather than vice versa.¶ While
most utopians are Internet-centrists, the latter are not necessarily utopians. In fact, many of them like to think of themselves as

pragmatic individuals who have abandoned grand theorizing about utopia in the name of
achieving tangible results. Sometimes, they are even eager to acknowledge that it takes more than bytes to foster, install, and consolidate a healthy democratic
regime.¶ Their realistic convictions, however, rarely make up for their flawed methodology,

which prioritizes the tool over the environment, and, as such, is deaf to the social, cultural, and political subtleties and indeter- minacies.
Internet-centrism is a highly disorienting drug; it ignores context and entraps policymakers into believing that they have a useful and
powerful ally on their side. Pushed to its extreme, it leads to hubris, arrogance, and a false sense of

confidence, all bolstered by the dangerous illusion of having established effective command of the Internet. All too often, its practitioners fashion themselves as possessing full
mastery of their favorite tool, treating it as a stable and finalized technology, oblivious to the numerous forces that are constantly reshaping the Internet— not all of them for the better.

Treating the Internet as a constant, they fail to see their own responsibility in preserving
its freedom and reining in the ever-powerful intermediaries, companies like Google and Facebook.¶ As the Internet takes on an even greater role in the politics of both authoritarian
and democratic states, the pressure to forget the context and start with what the Internet allows will only grow. All by itself, however, the Internet

provides nothing certain. In fact, as has become obvious in too many contexts, it empowers the strong and
disempowers the weak. It is impossible to place the Internet at the heart of the enterprise
of democracy promotion without risking the success of that very enterprise. The premise of this book is thus
very simple: To salvage the Internet’s promise to aid the fight against authoritarianism , those of

us in the West who still care about the future of democracy will need to ditch both cyber-utopianism and Internet-
centrism. Currently, we start with a flawed set of assumptions (cyber-utopianism) and act on
them using a flawed, even crippled, methodology (Internet-centrism). The result is what I call the Net Delusion. Pushed to the extreme,
such logic is poised to have significant global consequences that may risk undermin- ing
the very project of promoting democracy. It’s a folly that the West could do without.¶ Instead, we’ll need to opt for policies informed by a realistic
assessment of the risks and dangers posed by the Internet, matched by a highly scrupulous and unbiased assessment of its promises, and a theory of action that is highly sensitive to the local
context, that is cognizant of the complex connections between the Internet and the rest of foreign policymaking, and that originates not in what technology allows but in what a certain

giving in to cyber-utopianism and Internet-centrism is akin to

geopolitical environment requires.¶ In a sense,

agreeing to box blindfolded. Sure, every now and then we may still strike some powerful
blows against our authoritarian adversaries, but in general this is a poor strategy if we want to
win. The struggle against authoritarianism is too important of a battle to fight with a voluntary intellectual handicap, even if that handicap allows us to play with the latest fancy gadgets.
Court Clog
 1NC – Court Clog DA
The courts can handle the workload of cases right now.
Prost 15 (Sharon Prost, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 9-23-2015, "Innovator Insights", IPO Education
Foundation, https://www.ipoef.org/?p=1513, accessed 7-11-2017)

How will the Court manage the workload?

For now, we’re ok. We just got our twelfth vacancy filled when Judge Kara Stoll came on board, so for
the first time we have six senior judges. We’re all hands on deck in a way we’ve never been. A few years ago,
under former Chief Judge Paul Michel, we rose from three clerks each to four clerks each. I’m fairly optimistic that in the foreseeable

future we’ll be up to the task. We’re proud of the fact that we’re very current; we have virtually no
backlog and are probably one of the most current appeals courts in the country, so we’d like to be able
to keep that going. It may get a little harder with the influx of PTAB cases, but we’ll do the best we can.

Empirically education cases require courts to explore massive amounts of

sociology literature – has taken up to 18 years
- link turns the case – courts strike down the aff and long cases means solvency takes forever
- solvency advocate for the “declare a RTE and have the states determine what that means”
CP/aff
- that CP avoids the link

Wilkins 5 — (Brooke Wilkins, JD from BYU, “Should Public Education be a Federal Fundamental
Right?”, 2005 BYU Educ. & L. J. 261, 2005, accessed 7-11-2017)

Yet if public education is considered a federal fundamental right it could embroil the
federal judiciary in administrative educational issues. A fundamental right should invoke strict
scrutiny. n212 Strict scrutiny means that any governmental regulation must be narrowly
tailored to accomplish a compelling interest. Few regulations survive such analysis. So any
educational policy that anyone would care to litigate would most likely be struck down
by the court. The State could not accurately predict how to create educational policy. The
difficulties and costs associated with litigation could harm educational processes. Courts
would have to depend upon mounds of sociology, rather than legal or constitutional
principles, in order to make decisions. The judiciary could be forced to expound the
minutest details of educational policy.
Missouri v. Jenkins n213 is an example of what can happen when the judiciary takes on educational
policy issues. The federal district court was attempting to enforce desegregation laws. By the time the
issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the federal district court judge was ordering
salary increases, ordering funding of educational programs, approving facility
improvements and otherwise using judicial decrees to effect an increased attractiveness
of the district. The course of the litigation took over eighteen years. A federal district
court became mired in minute [*290] educational procedures, and the resulting cost of
litigation. n214 However, what was the district court to do when the political branches of the state
government were not desegregating the schools? The tension is difficult.

The traditional repository for educational policy-making power is with the states. Such a federalist
approach has the advantages of local control and of allowing for experimentation. The
complex issues affecting educational processes and policies are not easily resolved.
Finding that public education is a federal fundamental right would require the federal
government to carry the responsibility to fund education. n215 Centralized control from
the federal government may not be the best manner for controlling public education.
Perhaps the best approach, that respects federalism issues and the competencies of the judiciary, while
placing appropriate emphasis on the importance of education is for the federal judiciary to state
explicitly the un-held holding of Rodriguez - that there is a right to some basic level of
education, and that the states must determine and enforce this level. n216 Such a finding
would be in accord with natural law principles, that a right to education does exist, n217 while avoiding
embroiling the federal judiciary in day to day educational procedural matters or incurring additional
federal funds. n218

Increasing the federal circuit court’s workload would hinder current courts
ability to guarantee IP protection
Kirk 06 – Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee; United States Senate
http://www.aipla.org/Advocacy%20Shared%20Documents/TES_2006-03-24_109C_ImmigrationBill-
Specter-Kirk.pdf pg.1-2 KKC

regarding the pending immigration

I am writing to you on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)

reform legislation that would transfer jurisdiction over immigration appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We believe that
such broadening of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction would seriously hinder the court’s
ability to render high quality, timely decisions on patent appeals from district courts,
and patent and trademark appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This runs
directly counter to the present efforts of Congress to otherwise reform and improve this
nation’s patent system.
We take no position on other specific elements of the legislation or on the underlying need for immigration reform. Our concern focuses solely
on the proposed shift in appellate jurisdiction, which we believe will do more harm than good.

AIPLA is a national bar association whose approximately 16,000 members are primarily lawyers in private and corporate practice, in government service, and in the

academic community. AIPLA represents a wide and diverse spectrum of individuals, companies, and institutions involved
directly or indirectly in the practice of patent, trademark, copyright, and unfair competition law, as well as other fields of law affecting

intellectual property. Our members represent both owners and users of intellectual property, and have a keen interest in an efficient federal
judicial system.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established in 1982 after more than a
decade of deliberate study and Congressional consideration. The Hruska Commission (chaired by Senator
 a study lasting nearly three years before recommending to Congress the
Roman Hruska) conducted

establishment of a national appeals court to consider patent cases. It took two

Administrations, several Congresses, and a number of hearings in both the House and
Senate before legislation establishing the Federal Circuit was finally enacted . Over the past 26
years the Court, through its thoughtful and deliberate opinions, has made great progress in providing stability and consistency in the patent law.

Removing immigration appeals from the general jurisdiction of the twelve regional Courts of Appeals and centralizing it in the Federal Circuit is an enormous

the Federal Circuit is simply not equipped to

change. Leaving aside the impact, both pro and con, on the affected litigants,

undertake the more than 12,000 requests for review of deportation orders that twelve
courts now share each year. The Federal Circuit currently has no expertise or experience in the field of immigration law. While the legislation
envisions adding three judges to the twelve currently on the Court, we have serious concerns whether this increase will be adequate. Judge Posner has calculated
that, even with the three additional judges proposed in the legislation, each of the fifteen Federal Circuit judges would be responsible for about 820 immigration
cases per year, on the average—an incredibly large number that we believe will have a significant adverse impact on the remainder of the court’s docket.

It seems inevitable that the proposed legislation will have a dramatic, negative impact
on Federal Circuit decisions in patent cases and appeals from the USPTO. Such an
increased caseload will necessarily delay decisions in these appeals, which in turn will
cause uncertainty over patent and trademark rights and interfere with business
investments in technological innovation. Beyond mere delay, the Federal Circuit's ability to issue
consistent, predictable opinions in patent cases will be complicated by an increase in
the number of judges. If conflicts in panel opinions increase, the inefficient and often contentious en banc process will have to be used more
often, further adding to the overall burden on the court . Business can effectively deal with decisions, positive or negative,

but it cannot deal with protracted uncertainty caused by inconsistent opinions or long

delays in judicial review.

Demand for reform of the patent system has been the topic of considerable public debate of late. Congress held extensive hearings on this
subject last year, and more are scheduled in coming weeks. The House is currently considering legislation that would dramatically change the
patent statute, and we understand that patent reform legislation may soon be introduced in the Senate as well. It would be unfortunate for
Congress to inadvertently compound the challenges facing the patent system by weakening the ability of the Federal Circuit to give timely and
consistent consideration to patent cases. We appreciate your attention to this matter and urge you to reconsider this proposed expansion of
Federal Circuit Court jurisdiction.

Innovation is key to the economy, that’s their Hausman and Johnson evidence
Economic collapse leads to war, that’s their Gartzke 11 evidence
 2nc links
Regionalization leads to more lawsuits that clog the courts.
Pressreader 14, Daily local news, West Chester, PA, March 7, 2014
http://www.pressreader.com/usa/daily-local-news-west-chester-
pa/20140307/281651073036437
carving up the district into regions opens us up to gerrymandering . Even with contiguous
Additionally,

regions, lines have to be drawn somewhere and will include or exclude voters and potential

candidates in particular regions. Maybe this board would not draw lines that benefit themselves, but who is to say future
ones would not be tempted to do so? The numerous court briefs from school districts in our state with

regionalized boards highlight the issues with this system, as teacher and citizen groups
have sued the districts regarding how lines were drawn, population shifts, redistricting,
etc. It would be costly to have potential lawsuits brought against our school district.

Empirics prove that desegregation rulings cause an increase in cases

Heise 7 — (Michael Heise, Professor, Cornell Law School. “Symposium: High-Poverty Schooling In
America: Lessons In Second-Class Citizenship: What Are The Limits And Possibilities Of Legal Remedies?:
Litigated Learning, Law's Limits, And Urban School Reform Challenges,” North Carolina LR, 85 N.C.L. Rev.
1419, lexis)

III. Past Reform Litigation in the Urban School Setting

Although the number and type of reform litigation involving schools dramatically
increased during the decades following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, school litigation prior to 1954, while far less frequent, was not unknown. n90 Legal
historians note that a review of school litigation during the pre-Brown era would not uncover a "golden
age of comity." n91 Rather, the pre-Brown years witnessed less litigation, fewer and less
complex state and federal regulations, and more legal deference to education
professionals. n92 Further distinguishing the litigation terrain during the pre-and post-
Brown years is the wider range of issues legally [*1439] contested, the "scope of
education jurisprudence," and a marked increase in litigation involving traditional
political "outsiders." n93
Today's concerns involving urban public schools differ from past concerns to some degree.
Notwithstanding these differences, however, in assessing prospects for litigation endeavoring
to improve urban public schools in the future a look backwards at past education
litigation efforts during the post-Brown years provides helpful guidance. The intersection of
litigation, law, and education policy reveals two major recent litigation efforts that
involve urban public schools: desegregation and school finance.
A. Desegregation
Interpretations of the Brown decision, what it "means" and what it accomplished, vary
tremendously and reveal just as much about ourselves as they do about the decision itself. n94
Although Brown has always been correctly perceived as about more than school desegregation, the
decision has always been understood to be at least about school desegregation. Thus, assessments of
Brown's efficacy need to account for its impact on school desegregation. What is clear after
one-half a century is that although Brown manifestly succeeded in eliminating de jure
segregation and, more generally, in articulating the equal educational opportunity
principle, n95 the decision fell short of eliminating de facto segregation. Indeed, the
Brown decision's inability to eradicate de facto segregation has special currency in the
urban public school context. Not only did Brown fall short of increasing integration levels in urban
public schools, but it plausibly exacerbated student racial isolation. n96

1. Urban Public School Demography

A review of demographic data on the nation's largest school districts brings the evolving
racial, ethnic, and poverty segregation intensity into focus. As Table 4 illustrates, all but one
(Hillsborough County, Florida) of the nation's largest school districts are mostly [*1440] minority, many
overwhelmingly so. Closer inspection of Table 4 reveals three other important, yet subtle,
developments. First, columns 1 and 2 present residential and public school enrollment demographic
characteristics at a single moment in time (2000). Column 1 presents Census data on the percentage of
white, non-Hispanic students living in the relevant urban school district. Column 2 presents similar
demographic information for the urban public school system serving the residential area for the school
year that began in fall 2000. A comparison of columns 1 and 2 illustrates that in every instance the
percentage of white, non-Hispanic individuals living in these large urban areas exceeds the percentage
of non-Hispanic white students attending the urban public schools. What Table 4 suggests is that white
families' mobility - both in terms of departing urban for non-urban areas and exiting public for private
schools - creates a disproportionate absence of white schoolchildren in urban public school settings and
contributes to levels of racial and ethnic isolation in urban districts that exceed what general residential
integration levels predict.

Second, column 3 suggests that the trend evidenced in the comparison of columns 1 and 2 likely persists
over time. Although Census demographic information on a school district's residential population does
not exist for 2001, annual school demographic information is gathered by school districts each year. All
of the ten large urban districts presented in Table 1, already predominantly minority by the 2000-01
school year, became even more so one year later in the 2001-02 school year. Jonathan Kozol, a veteran
education observer and critic, has noted that, with respect to urban public schools, he "cannot discern
the slightest ... vestige of the legal victory embodied in Brown v. Board of Education." n97 Kozol went on
to observe that when he visits urban public schools, "I simply never see white children." n98

Third, in addition to student racial isolation, the nation's largest school districts are noted for their
concentrations of poverty as well. The relation between race and poverty in the education context is
startling. A larger percentage of white students typically guarantees a school a smaller percentage of
poor students. These trends interact in devastating ways. Less than 10% of schools whose enrollments
are between 10% and 20% minority are predominantly poor. Exactly [*1441] half of the schools that
are 50% to 60% minority are predominantly poor. And nearly 90% of schools that are 90% to 100%
minority are predominantly poor. n99

New rights create whole new classes of litigation – those weaken the authority
of the court while causing tradeoffs with other cases
The four-point font is a boring analogy about a poor family taking a lot of vacations – we swear there
isn’t an aff ballot in there

Coan 12 — (Andrew B. Coan, Asst. Prof @ Wisconsin Law, “Judicial Capacity and the Substance of
Constitutional Law”, Yale Law Journal, 122 Yale L.J. 422, accessed 7-11-2017, lexis)

The first and most obvious thing we can say on this subject is that the Court will be constrained to
decide cases in a way that keeps the total volume of litigation below some threshold
level, beyond which the basic normative commitments discussed in Part I would be threatened. n22 In
this formulation, "total volume of litigation" is a shorthand. The real issue of interest is demand
on the capacity of the judiciary, which is determined not just by the number of the cases
but also by their complexity and their tendency to produce disuniformity. The bottom line
is that the Court cannot spend more capacity than it has. It cannot invite more litigation
than the court system as a whole can handle consistent with the bedrock normative
commitments of most judges. But there are a wide variety of tools or approaches that the Court
might employ to keep its expenditures of capacity below the ceiling imposed by these normative
commitments.
An analogy may be helpful. Imagine a family of four with an annual budget of $ 100,000. There are some things that such a family flat-out cannot afford. It cannot buy a $ 300,000 Ferrari, even on credit. It cannot buy a $ 5 million house - it could not get a mortgage or make the payments
if it did. Still, there are an almost infinite number of ways that such a family can draw up its budget. The family could buy a new Lexus SUV. It would have to cut back in a lot of other areas, and this is probably not the choice most families would make, but it could be done. The family could
take three extravagant Caribbean vacations a year. It might need to live in a one-bedroom apartment to do so, [*433] but it could be done. Certainly, the limits of the family budget will be relevant to these decisions, in the sense that those limits dictate the nature of the tradeoffs each
decision requires. But the budget would not constrain the family's decisions in the hard sense of placing any of them firmly off-limits. Whether the family buys the Lexus or takes the vacations will depend not only or even principally on its budgetary constraints but rather on the value it
places on these things relative to other potential uses of its limited funds.

In the same way, there are a wide variety of approaches the Supreme Court might take to
budgeting the judiciary's limited capacity. Just as a family might splurge on a new car or
an expensive vacation, the Court might choose to invite more litigation in some areas, by
making substantive law more friendly to plaintiffs n23 or employing vague standards that produce
greater uncertainty and thus make settlement more difficult. n24 Alternatively, it might choose to
loosen pleading standards or to liberalize Article III standing requirements. n25 These options are all on
the table, so long as the Court is willing to make compensating tradeoffs that keep the total volume of
litigation below the threshold imposed by judicial capacity. These tradeoffs, too, could take any
number of forms. The Court might make substantive law in some other area less friendly
to plaintiffs, thus reducing the expected value of litigation. n26 Or it might employ more
categorical rules in the hope of reducing disuniformity in the lower courts and encouraging settlement
by potential litigants. n27 Or it [*434] might make various procedural rules more stringent
to reduce the volume and complexity of litigation across the board. n28 The range of
permutations is practically infinite. n29
Of course, many of the factors affecting the total volume of litigation are outside the direct control of
the judiciary. Within broad constitutional limits, Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and thereby the kinds of disputes those courts are permitted or required to hear.
n30 Congress also has the power to make the procedural rules governing federal
litigation more or less stringent. n31 Perhaps most important, it has the power to create
new substantive rights (and to eliminate old ones), thereby creating or eliminating
whole classes of litigation. n32
-----Footnote 33 begins-----

n32. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law,
68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631, 1649 (1995) ("If the elected branches seek to weaken the authority of
the Supreme Court, one way to do so is to pass laws that increase the caseload of the
lower courts.").
-----Footnote 33 ends-----

Other factors that the judiciary has little control over but that have the potential to
substantially affect its workload include the cost of [*435] legal services and the
availability of free legal services to those who cannot afford to pay. n33 Social and economic
changes too can have a large impact. n34 None of this, however, changes the basic reality: whatever
the balance of external factors, the Supreme Court must so manipulate the levers in its
control as to keep the volume of litigation below the ceiling imposed by its bedrock
normative commitments. In doing so, it enjoys a wide range of choice.
 2NC ! – Warming
IP innovation solves climate change.
Santamauro 13 (Jon P. Santamauro, Senior Director, International Government Affairs at AbbVie, 2013, " Environmental Technologies,
Intellectual Property and Climate Change ", Edward Elgar Publishing,
https://books.google.com/books?id=XsfQfW_oA2oC&pg=PA89&lpg=PA89&dq=%22There+is+general+consensus+that+innovation+is+critical+to+res
olve+the+world%27s+climate+change-
related+challenges.%E2%80%9D+Recent+studies+have+further+confirmed+the+scale+of+need+to+develop+such+technologies%22&source=bl&ots
=bDoOWT29t3&sig=O20_-
xtaPdTXMcl7u4TJ2BSCgVI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiYhPbwyvTTAhUE1mMKHQF8DaAQ6AEIIzAA#v=onepage&q=%22There%20is%20general%20
consensus%20that%20innovation%20is%20critical%20to%20resolve%20the%20world's%20climate%20change-
related%20challenges.%E2%80%9D%20Recent%20studies%20have%20further%20confirmed%20the%20scale%20of%20need%20to%20develop%2
0such%20technologies%22&f=false, accessed 7-12-2017)

3.3 ROLE OF IP IN INNOVATION AND ITS RELATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGIES

3.3.1 Addressing Climate Change Requires Innovation
There is general consensus that innovation is critical to resolve the world's climate change-related
challenges.” Recent studies have further confirmed the scale of need to develop such technologies. One 2007 study found that, if limited to technologies
available in 2005, the present value cost of achieving stabilization of the level of CO2 (at 550 ppm) would be over US $20 trillion greater than with expected
developments in energy efficiency, hydrogen energy technologies, advanced bio-energy and wind and solar technologies.’2 A recent report by the International
Energy Agency claims that clean
technology innovation must rise by a factor of between two and ten times to meet
global climate change goals, including reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent by 2050.”
3.3.2 IP in the Innovation Cycle
The basic premise underlying intellectual property is that recognition and rewards stimulate further
inventive and creative activity and, in turn, stimulate economic growth. A recent OECD study confirms the
positive relationship between strengthening intellectual property rights, on the one hand, and increased
trade, foreign direct investment, technology transfer and innovation, on the other hand.35 While the broader
debate persists, there is need for a better understanding of the role intellectual property plays in the innovation process. It should be stressed at the outset that
intellectual property laws, in and of themselves, do not result in innovation but rather are an essential part of a process. WIPO has described this as a 'continuum from
problem [to] knowledge [to] imagination Ito] innovation [to] intellectual property [to] the solution, in the forms of products’.36 Thus, to maximize its utility to bring
about effective innovation and dissemination policies, it is important to consider the role of intellectual property in its proper context.
3.3.3 IP Is Not a ‘Barrier’
The proposals made for greater, or even comprehensive, exclusions and exceptions reflect concerns that intellectual property, particularly 'patents,’ may act as a
‘barrier’ to the development and diffusion of technologies. However, there are a number of distinct, yet interrelated, issues that need to be addressed in that debate,
namely: (1) the role of intellectual property, including patents, in innovation or development of ne technologies: (2) the role of intellectual property in technology
transfer: (3) the effect of intellectual property on prices for commercialized goods or processes: and (4) the effects of intellectual property on dissemination of
technologies. Because technology transfer is specifically noted as a means of diffusing climate change technologies in the UNFCCC and is a consistent source of
controversy, we will focus on this aspect.37
The patent system plays an important role in technology transfer by requiring inventors to provide full
disclosure of their inventions to the public as a condition of receiving a grant of exclusive rights to the
patented invention for a limited period of time.38 Trade secrets and knowhow also grant protection to knowledge developed by an
innovator in relation to the optimum utilization of these technologies, and, as a result, are often coupled together with patents in licensing agreements to transfer
technology.39 Both patents and trade secrets provide exclusive rights that permit a right holder appropriate returns on their investment. This
not only
facilitates development, but also provides an incentive for diffusion of working technologies through
licensing and other cooperative arrangements with the knowledge that the holder's investment is still
protected.
In addition, there is no support for any special concern about intellectual property rights as a barrier to technology transfer in the climate change area.40 For
example, many low-emission energy technologies are simply not patented in the vast majority of developing countries. A recent study round that, while 215,000
patents were registered for such technologies over the period of 1998—2008, only 0.1 per cent or these patents were obtained in low-income developing
countries.41 In addition, a study of the photovoltaic, biofuel and wind technology sectors from 2007 finds that patents are unlikely to be a barrier to access to
technologies.42
Consistent with these findings, a study by the International Energy Agency had found in 2001
that strengthening intellectual property rights is one of the most effective government actions to be
taken in order to improve the enabling environment for climate-related technology transfer.43 Another study
from 2008 provides empirical data illustrating that strengthened IPR systems in developing countries, in response to the TRIPS Agreement, are associated with greater
transfer of technology.

Warming causes extinction, that’s their 1ac evidence

Generalization K
 1nc
The 1AC’s calls for democratization of Africa lacks specification of countries and
regions. These generalizations are forms of subtle racism that reinforce racial
stereotypes.
Bischof 15, Jackie Bischof is a producer and reporter for The Wall Street Journal, 12-1-
2015, "You’re 100 Percent Wrong About 'Africa'," Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/11/youre-100-percent-wrong-about-africa-
399037.html
Over 11 million square miles: That’s roughly how much land constitutes Africa, a
continent with more than 50 sovereign states, trod by 1.1 billion people who speak
thousands of languages. A continent so varied, and with such a deep and complex history, it’s the source of some of the earliest
advances in mathematics, urban planning, engineering and surgery. So why are people always telling me that they recently returned “from a
Why is this diverse and massive
visit to Africa”? Or that their lifelong dream is to go on safari in “Africa” one day?

continent constantly referred to as though it were a single country? “When it comes to Europe,
people want to be very specific: Eastern Europe, Western Europe,” says Kathleen Bomani, a creative consultant and researcher from the
Upanga neighborhood of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. “We didn’t have a Berlin Wall to separate us, but...they get all the nuance!” In talking about
the continent, she says, “there's a disregard [where] for so long it’s been OK for anyone to refer to it as just ‘Africa,’ a huge landmass. It has
to change, and really we need to start doing that ourselves. The onus is on us.” As South Africans, my
family and friends laugh when we’re questioned about whether we ever rode elephants to school or spotted a lion in our backyard. Taking
potshots at ignorance about the continent has been a cornerstone of Daily Show host and South African Trevor Noah’s comedy, and he even
“to a lot of Americans, Africa is just one giant village full of AIDS,
quipped in his first episode that

huts and starving children.”Toyin Falola, a history professor at the University of Texas at Austin who hails from southwest
Nigeria, says the narrative of Africa as a hotbed for the “chaotic, the erotic and the exotic”

has applied particularly to “Black Africa”—countries in sub-Saharan Africa that international

organizations traditionally view as separate from North Africa and the Middle East. Often, people who visit Egypt, Morocco and Algeria say
they’re traveling to those countries, while people who are going to Nigeria or Tanzania are more likely to say they’re en route to “Africa.”
the problem is often not as glaring as overt
According to Lebogang Mokwena, a South African policy researcher,

racism but is instead something subtler, such as when people “refer to Africa not as a
convenient initial shorthand, but when the sum total of the knowledge of the continent
is just that—without a sense of the linguistic, ethnic, cultural, political and other forms
of diversity and dissimilarity.” The argument comes down to the power of words. South Africa is still reeling
from the physical and linguistic wounds of people whose lives were destroyed and
whose culture and traditions were reduced to racial stereotypes. A little nuance may not heal those old
injuries, but as long as dangerous generalizations persist, new ones are inevitable.

The Glick evidence is specific only to the horn of Africa, but they chose to highlight to
talk about Africa in General. This homogenization is bad and reinforces negative
stereotypes of single story narratives.
This racism justifies war and genocide and recreates racial hatred of others
Batur 7 (PINAR BATUR, Department of Sociology, Vassar College, 2007 "Heart of Violence: Global Racism,
War, and Genocide" p. 446-449
http://swauop.yolasite.com/resources/Handbook_Of_The_Sociology_Of_Racial_And_Ethnic_Relations.pd
f#page=443

Albert Memmi argued that “We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as
a result of it” (Memmi, 1965:114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that
segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions
employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the
continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide.
legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the
The third point is that

resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge
global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide. In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global
politics” (Huntington 1993:22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the
West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to
develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the
conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with
September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.”
The vehement denial of racism, and the fervent assertion of democratic equality in the West, are matched by detestation and anger toward
Muslims, who are not European, not Western, and therefore not civilized . Since the context of “different” and
“inferior” has become not just a function of race or gender, but of culture and ideology,
it has become another instrument of belief and the self- righteous racism of American
expansionism and “new imperialism.” The assumed superiority of the West has become
the new “White Man’s Burden,” to expand and to recreate the world in an American
image. The rationalization of this expansion, albeit to “protect our freedoms and our way of life” or “to combat terrorism,” is fueled by
racist ideology, obscured in the darkness behind the façade of inalienable rights of the West to defend civilization against enemies in global
culture wars. At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism
toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretch- ing from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this
imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind
(VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational,
savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct,
proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and
global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist
assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an
opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.”
In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and
superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of
Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to
foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in
the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going
back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by
the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist
attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a
speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what
Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith
he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of
religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some
Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted”
comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian
civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology
from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m
deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered
offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the
racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but
rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are
subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for
Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and
is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoic- ing and celebration. But
for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if
necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such
cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-
destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a
constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have
to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and
claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with
George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who
will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the
fight against terrorism is the ide- ological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism,
and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the
talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the
rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim com- munity” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to
equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of
civilizations. As Bush said, “ . . .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what
we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the
imagination, and racial- ized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of
the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and
physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are

never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and
such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in
ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve
the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

The alt is to abandon the damaging single story narrative in favor of more specific
positive stories.
Jamme 10, Marieme Jamme is a Senegalese businesswoman, blogger, technologist and
social entrepreneur based in London. , 12-10-2010, "Negative perceptions slow Africa's
development," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2010/dec/10/africa-postcolonial-perceptions
For generations, the palaver tree was a symbol of communication and collaboration throughout Africa: people would gather under its
protective shade to listen to stories, share ideas and news and resolve community problems and conflicts.

Though the tradition of sharing remains deeply rooted in African culture, it has been
undermined by the economic and political upheavals of recent decades, depriving many
Africans of their sense of belonging. The void left in its place has been filled by a
negative narrative coming from outside, what novelist Chimamanda Adichie calls "the
single story". This has created a distorted, one-dimensional view - eagerly embraced by
the west, but also by many Africans themselves - that sees the continent only through a prism of war,
disease, poverty, starvation and corruption.
Adichie, in her excellent TED conference talk in 2009, questioned how these negative perceptions have impacted African development. She's
not alone. Other African authors, such as Chinua Achebe, Amadou Hampâté Ba and Ousmane Sembene, have written remarkable books that
challenge post-colonial narratives.

The single story has helped to generate millions of dollars in "aid" and an industry
dedicated to spending it. It has enriched corrupt African dignitaries and raised the
profile of western celebrities like Bono and Sir Bob Geldof . It has fuelled conflict and
ultimately undermined African leadership. It has not helped Africa move forward. It has
not protected the vulnerable, cured the sick, educated the illiterate or ended conflict.
The failure to represent Africa fairly has reinforced western prejudices and deflected
international development efforts from what should have been their core objectives.
Africans have become passive recipients of often counterproductive aid instead of
active participants in positive change.
African countries have now celebrated 50 years of independence, but the negative
Most

message is still circulating. Sadly, members of the African diaspora, cut off from the reality of life in their countries of origin and
searching for a new identity in the west, are sometimes complicit in this deception, telling stories that merely serve to perpetuate the negative
stereotypes that are harming Africans. I realised this at a recent workshop I was running in Washington, where I watched an articulate
American-Nigerian, with one foot in the US and the other in Africa. So the problem is not only the western messengers who feed us with
inaccurate stories. Too often, we generalise, talking of Africa as if it is one country. Nobody is pretending that Africa's many serious problems
should be played down or ignored, but the rest of the world, and Africans themselves, need to hear the good news stories as well. Africans in
particular need to take ownership of the positive narrative to become ambassadors for positive change.

Africans are becoming increasingly critical of conventional news sources.

But change is coming.

They want to see a narrative that does them justice. For the first time, western news outlets are being
challenged by bloggers and highly qualified in-house writers from Africa who are not on the payroll of well-known media like CNN or the BBC.
We are seeing a new generation of accidental writers emerging. Facebook, Twitter and the blogosphere are central to these developments.
Indeed Twitter – where Dambisa Moyo, author of the controversial book Dead Aid, has 20,000 followers – is in some senses the new palaver
tree, a place where Africans can communicate and share ideas.

we are also seeing a shift in the tone of the language coming from
From outside and inside Africa,

the international development community and global corporations, at last engaging

with Africans to repair the damage created by decades of the "single story".
There's a huge opportunity for the media and the
Looking to 2011 and beyond, the prospects look bright.

international development community to reinvent their communication strategies for

the continent. There is no single story of Africa or any African country. Although serious problems
remain that need to be tackled head-on and reported accurately, Africa also needs to be given credit for the exciting advances being made in
These positive
terms of progressive leadership, social entrepreneurship, innovation and technology, health and the arts.

narratives need to be heard loud and clear both inside and outside the continent
 Other stuff
Their media coverage of Africa is bad
Mheta 15. Ahmed Mheta* 1-6-2015, "Why Western Media Focuses on Negative
Coverage of Africa," Pan African Visions,
https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2015/western-media-focuses-negative-coverage-
africa/
Bennett explains that the personalization bias is the media‘s focus on human-interest stories and the tendency to identify emotionally with
these stories rather than present the larger social, economic, or political issues involved.68 Additionally, the focus on emotion hinders analysis
of the event and its implications in the political, economic and social arenas. Bennett notes that ―the reasons for this are numerous—from the
journalist‘s fear that probing analysis will turn off audiences to the relative ease of telling the human-interest story as opposed to explaining
The media, as
deeper causes and effects.‖69 The dramatization bias is evidenced in what will subsequently be called ―crisis‖ news.

Bennett notes, is predicated on a narrative storytelling format. Narratives require drama or

more accurately plot.70 The plot of many news stories is either personal identification
or ―melodrama.‖71 If it is possible to combine both, this is also done. Examples of this will be seen in the
case study of the famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The crisis news model captures drama well. As Bennett notes,
crisis news follows a typical movie-like pattern that includes the ―rising action [often of breaking stories], falling action, sharply drawn
characters, and, of course, plot resolutions.‖72 The crime story is the archetype of the crisis news model. Because of this, the media attempts
to frame most crisis news in the same way as crime news by ―focusing on arrests, number of injuries, and related statistics. Equating violent
resistance with crime makes the ‗event‘ easier to explain.‖73 Crisis news is news primarily because the ―dominant formula of journalism in
the media is self-defeating in
the world is a journalism of exception.‖74 Crises are exceptions to the normal order. However,

employing this approach because by focusing 35 primarily on crisis it normalizes crises

and makes the exceptional seem not just average, but often only the tip of the
iceberg. Thus, ―pictures of violence often produce terrifying multiplication effects. Audiences
tend to believe that the violent acts shown are merely a tiny sample.‖75 Bennett notes the importance of this type of imagery to television and
print news in that ―there is often, however, tension between not reporting important stories that are hard to picture and reporting possibly
unimportant stories simply because they offer great visual images.‖76 The images of crisis become stand-ins for explanations of events and
processes. Thus, TV news, in particular, as well as still images ―construct a particular way of looking at the world.‖77 These ―visual messages
encode and, in turn, reinforce prevalent cultural attitudes and values‖ which are often stereotypes undergirded by myths.78 ―Coverage of
foreign affairs is especially important since the viewing audience is less likely to have direct experience with life and issues in these societies
and [is] therefore less able to assess the validity of the messages [it] receive[s].‖79 Furthermore, the lack of direct experience makes it difficult
for audiences to realize that there might be other stories which are being neglected. ―The very labeling of some situation as a ‗crisis‘ [and
therefore newsworthy] is in itself an ideological and political act. So is the failure to attribute crisis status to a particular situation.‖80 ― The
tendency is, therefore, for media to seek out crisis where it does not exist, and to
obscure the actual forces of change. . . Paradoxically, this means that media will tend to pay even more attention to a
fabricated crisis than to one that can stake a material claim to reality.‖ Thus, important political, economic and social concerns are neglected in
favor of celebrity crisis news such as the O. J. Simpson trial or the death of Anna Nicole Smith.81 36 Bennett summarizes the fragmentation bias
as ―the isolation of stories from each other and from their larger context so that information in the news becomes fragmented and hard to
assemble into a big picture.‖82 Additionally, Bennett notes that ―the fragmentation of information begins by emphasizing individual actors
The fragmentation bias is a significant problem in the
over the political contexts in which they operate.‖83

reporting of African news because it makes crises seem like ―events rather than
processes.‖84 Furthermore, the actors involved are usually limited to a few government spokespersons. Sweeping
generalizations are often made in an attempt to explain an issue. Catch words and phrases such as
corruption and communism are used as stand-ins for an analysis of the historical factors and persisting concerns. Decontextualized news
The overall impression many Westerners feel after reading
―strip[s] it of its social relevance and value.‖85

or watching news regarding Africa is a general sense that the Africans have a lot of
problems that they either can‘t or don‘t want to fix and there is little anyone else can do
to help. One of the primary reasons for the overgeneralized coverage of Africa that reveals how little the Western media understands
Africa is the ―safari tradition‖ of the media in Africa.86 This refers to the tendency of the media to plunge into African issues when they
become a hot news item and then leave a few weeks (or days) later. This is particularly a problem for the U.S.
media. The European news agencies tend to dedicate more journalists to representing Africa and stationing them there. The U.S.
journalists, however, feel that Africa may be a place to start a career or break a great story, but it isn‘t worthy of the dedication of a lifetime.
Therefore, these journalists who present news from Africa do not have the time (or often the inclination) to investigate the context for the
. It is then easier to close the story by
events. The result is 37 reports focusing mainly on what is happening and not why

focusing on the emotional aspects. This reinforces the idea that the situation is
hopeless. The appeal to emotion substitutes for a real understanding of the situation, which would reveal that there are possible
remedies. The authority-disorder bias concerns the media‘s intense concern for order and

their reliance on authority and official sources. In order to present emotionally charged crises, the media focuses
on disruptions of order. The news relies on government leaders and field experts to comment on situations. Often political leaders, police, and
scientists merely state what they know to be the case. The media then layer this with an increasingly challenging and critical tone.87 The
Western media is often held to be a watchdog. This challenging and critical tone seems to be in keeping with this role. However, the critical
tone often covers a lack of actual investigation and in foreign news studies have shown that the media primarily reports the official stance of
the government.88 As Asgede Hagos notes, in many instances the media seems to act ―like a lapdog whose main mission is to protect,
legitimize and reinforce the status quo.‖89 One of the interesting results is that the media challenges the officials it cites, but ultimately relies
on their information to close the news story.90 Thus, while Bennett demonstrates that the authority-disorder bias is an interrelated problem,
there are two simpler biases that form this more complex problem. First, the media relies heavily on official sources about which it is selective
the media focuses on issues of order and disorder to the extent that it
in questioning. Second,

seems that order is valued above other concerns such as fairness. This is particularly
prominent in foreign news where disagreement is seen as threatening and the primary
goal is to maintain stability rather than resolve the issues. When issues reach the stage
of conflict, blame must be assigned. While in some conflicts it is clearly possible to see a good and an evil (a common
example being the extermination of the Jews during World War II), many conflicts start because there are two legitimate or, at the very least,
understandable concerns that it is difficult to resolve. The Cold War Framework within the media addresses these issues.

Africa is not a country. (retag)

John 13 - Arit John, 8-29-2013, "Confusing a Country for a Continent: How We Talk
About Africa," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/confusing-country-
continent-how-we-talk-about-africa/311621/
the West has a perception problem. Because when we talk
Africa has an image problem. Or, put another way,

about Africa, more often than not, it's to talk about catastrophes and epidemics, and to
conflate a single country with a 1 billion-strong continent. Take this recent Time magazine article, "Africa's
Drinking Problem," which took a few scattered facts and anecdotes about alcoholism in Kenya and decided to create a story about an entire
population's issues with alcohol. "While governments in the West are considering minimum pricing standards for alcohol, in nearly a dozen
countries across Africa... governments are applying tax breaks to booze," writes Jessica Hatcher. (Nearly a dozen...out of the 54 nations that are
part of the African Union. Let's just say the article's argument deteriorates from there.)

Africacheck.org, based in South Africa, responded to the Time piece today, addressing a key issue: The tendency to make sweeping
generalizations about entire continents. According to the World Health Organization’s 2011 Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health, the
same report that served the basis for the Time article, Kenya ranks 118th out of 189 countries for heavy drinking. Also worth noting:

The WHO Africa region "excludes seven African countries with large Muslim populations – Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Djibouti, Morocco, Somalia and
Sudan"
"The WHO Africa region’s per capita alcohol consumption is only 0.02 litres higher at 6.15 litres a year. This is lower than Europe and the
Americas, which consume 12.18 litres and 8.67 litres respectively."

The WHO report doesn't have statistics on the number of heavy drinkers in 20 African countries (so, nearly half of the region)

So no, Africa does not have a drinking problem, though Time's piece fits into the larger, convenient Western narrative of Africa as a barren
Even people who know that Africa isn't a country, and that's not
continent plagued by problems.

everyone (you too, Rick Ross), can't get past the images of poverty stricken villages, violence-
plagued townships, AIDS, malaria and misery. The Time article, though purportedly about a continent-wide binge
drinking epidemic, sprinkles in familiar imagery, namely, corrupt politicians and poor people rummaging through trash heaps next to pigs. Jina
Moore, a journalist previously based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, described the single-mindedness of Africa portrayals in the Boston
Review in 2012 when she wrote:

We[writers] blame our editors, who (we like to say) oversimplify our copy and cut out
context. They also introduce clichéd shorthand, such as “Arab north versus Christian and animist south” (Sudan), or boilerplate
background, such as “the 1994 genocide, in which 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed” (Rwanda). Virtually any story can be sold
more easily if set in a “war-torn country.”

For these tendencies, our editors in turn often blame readers, whom they assume can’t
or won’t follow us through villages with difficult-to-pronounce names or narratives with
nuanced conclusions or moral ambiguities.
the problem with journalism from Africa isn’t about professional conventions. It’s
Ultimately,

about all of us—writers and readers, producers and viewers. We continue a storytelling tradition that
hasn’t fundamentally changed since Joseph Conrad slapped Congo with “the heart of darkness” label.

The other major narrative often attached to the continent is the concept of the White
Savior. When the KONY2012 viral campaign launched last year, Ugandan bloggers took issue with the campaign's portrayal of Ugandans:
poor, helpless Africans who can't do anything to solve their own problems. As Ugandan blogger Rosebell Kagumire explained in a video:

I think it’s all about trying to make a difference, but how do you tell the story of Africans? It’s much more important what the story is, actually,
because if you are showing me as voiceless, as hopeless… you shouldn’t be telling my story if you don’t believe that I also have the power to
change what is going on.

Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie spoke on the dangers of a

In a 2009 Ted Talk,

"single story," the idea that an entire culture can be summed up in one narrative. Adichie
described meeting her American roommate after moving to the United States to attend Drexel University. The roommate expressed an interest
in listening to Adichie's "tribal" music, wondered where she'd learned English (it's Nigeria's official language) and assumed she didn't know how
to use a stove. Adichie continued:

What struck me was this: She had felt sorry for me even before she saw me. Her default position toward me, as an African, was a kind of
My roommate had a single story of Africa: a single story of
patronizing, well-meaning pity.

catastrophe. In this single story there was no possibility of Africans being similar to her
in any way, no possibility of feelings more complex than pity, no possibility of a
connection as human equals.
Adichie offers a solution to the single story problem that is both simple and complex:
We should try to move beyond it. "Of course, Africa is a continent full of catastrophes," she said. "But there are other
stories that are not about catastrophe, and it is very important, it is just as important, to talk about them."
Referrals to Africa as a conflict zone are a result of racialized assupmtions.
Venkatasawmy 15 Ethnic Conflict in Africa: A Short Critical Discussion, Dr Rama Venkatasawmy is a
Senior Lecturer in the Discipline of Communication and Media and he currently teaches in the Bachelor
of Communication program., Transcience (2015) Vol. 6, Issue 2

Early
During the 1950s, post-war reconstruction became one of the most important concerns in the development agenda internationally.

’modernization theory’ and ’development’ discourses focused on identifying why certain

countries could not be like those in the First World and subsequently on working out
how the First World could assist Second and Third World countries to modernize,
develop and become like First World countries. Walt Whitman Rostow’s modernization theory (1960) in particular
became the dominant influence in the formulation of modernization initiatives and development strategies by the World Bank and major
international development agencies. With regards to the African continent, Obeng-Odoom (2013: 156) explains how ”it was in the 1960s that
greater emphasis was given to broad social concerns of economic development. Economic development then became a process of change to
free nations and peoples from multiple deprivations. Poverty alleviation or reduction was one key objective.” With economic growth becoming
the most important goal, what was hence prioritized in most development strategies implemented in Africa was the building of infrastructure
(roads, hospitals, schools, telecommunications, and so on) conducive to economic prosperity.

The various American and European initiatives of development in Africa can simply not
be dissociated from Rostow’s (1960) theory about the stages of growth with regards to
desired outcomes of the drive for modernization in African countries. But those outcomes were
realistically unachievable in African countries that were simultaneously undergoing radical transformation as a result of decolonization and
First World modernization initiatives and development strategies were
independence.

doomed to fail in Africa because they excluded or plainly ignored many significant
contextual specificities and some of the ’scars’ created over many decades by European
colonial powers, such as: the arbitrary separation and amalgamation of entire tribal, language and ethnic groups; fracture zones
produced by high ethnic diversity; and the ’colonization of the mind’ complex (as described by Steve Biko) translated into a sense of inferiority
Such predicaments influenced the emergence of a
that prevents black Africans from fulfilling their real potential.

First World ”discourse that sees Africa as a problem to be fixed” and that is ”tinged with Afro-pessimism
because the continent is a sign of the failure of modernization or of development strategies” (Houston 2011: 84).

The alt is to change our narratives of Africa from one of war and violence
Warner 14 Gregory Warner, 8-3-2014, "Africa's Leaders Aim To Change Perception Of
The Continent," NPR.org,
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/08/03/337601447/africas-leaders-aim-to-
change-perception-of-the-continent
Berman says the narrative about Africa needs to change from one of "war, disease and
poverty to one of hope, aspiration and opportunity." And perceptions need to be
updated to reflect a continent that contains six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in
the world, and is home to an increasingly educated middle class hungry for Western
goods.
Berman says American businesses have not, for the most part, taken advantage of investment
opportunities on the African continent. China's volume of trade with Africa is 2.7 times that of the U.S.

He blames old stereotypes, in part, for holding the U.S. back. "Businesspeople are not that much
different from other people," he says. "They're informed by the ecosystem around them ... by what they
heard growing up."

Growing up, many heard the constant calls to feed the starving children in Ethiopia. But Ethiopia's
growth rate, according to the World Bank, has now exceeded China's. So Berman says this summit has a
corrective aim: to enable meetings between American CEOs and African CEOs and leaders.

Those meetings matter because ultimately, Berman says, an executive needs to go beyond the numbers
and ask: "With whom am I going to do business?"

That very question was recently posed not to a business executive, but to a human rights activist named
Tutu Alicante, in exile from Equatorial Guinea. It's a country where oil riches have resulted in the highest
GDP per capita in all of Africa, while real wealth is stuck in the hands of a few.

The actual poverty rate in the nation, which Tutu calls a "perfect kleptocracy," is over 75 percent;
meanwhile, the family of President Teodoro Obiang controls all of the oil revenues.

President Obiang not only is invited to the White House summit, but also is the featured guest at a
separate forum this week with the Corporate Council on Africa — a forum intended to drum up more
investment in the country. Alicante says that's the precisely wrong way to bring change to Africa.

"In South Africa [in the '70s and '80s] it took companies boycotting the apartheid regime in order for
that regime to change," Alicante says. "It wasn't investing further into the apartheid regime that got
them to change."

'Not Meant To Be Solved On American Soil'

The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit has been criticized by international groups for not inviting more human
rights groups and government reformers.

Chris Byaruhanga works for the international anti-poverty group ActionAid. He's been honored by the
White House's Young African Leaders Initiative for his work in his native Uganda, for trying to bring
transparency to oil deals. He reports on deals that seem to line official pockets instead of helping
ordinary Ugandans.

Byaruhanga has been called a saboteur by his own government. But surprisingly, he does not want his
president to miss this opportunity to come to Washington, D.C., to this summit and make deals.
(President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is indeed one of the honored guests.)

"I want investment to come to Africa so badly," Byaruhanga says. "I have three children that I want to
work in Uganda when they come of age."

But Byaruhanga says keeping African governments accountable is his job and the job of other young
middle-class, educated Africans, more than the job of American corporations.
"Our concern with government is not even meant to be solved on American soil," he says.
"So let them come and sign these deals. But when you come back home, tell us what you've done, and
allow us to make some input."

Byaruhanga is trying to change another old perception about the continent — that
Africa always seems to need help from the West. His new narrative: Africans can help
themselves.
Case stuff
 Solvency
Federally mandated regionalization may be more expensive and prevents more
effective local consolidation efforts.
Russel 09, Bart russel, Hartford Courant, May 15,, 5-15-2009, "On Regionalization, Towns Know Best,",
http://articles.courant.com/2009-05-15/news/russell-regionalization-town.artfriday_1_regionalization-
local-government-towns

Connecticut has 169 cities and towns and their history of local control is often seen as the reason
municipalities resist regionalization. The desire to maintain local government is offered as a quaint
explanation for what, in reality, is solid public policy. In the summer of last year, University of
Connecticut economist Steven P. Lanza did a study on the cost and benefits of the
regionalization of local government. What he found was surprising to a number of advocates of
regionalization. In short, the UConn study, published in "The Connecticut Economy" last summer, found
regionalization works very well with school systems of a certain size. However, it also
found that "expanding the scale of government non-education services is unlikely to
generate any significant cost savings, and may actually make public services more
expensive." Intuitively, we think combining existing local government entities would allow for savings
in administrative costs and savings related to greater purchasing power. In reality, local
government costs have more to do with the size of the population being served than
any other factor. And population size does not change as the result of merging town
governments or programs. Public safety offers the most obvious example. The UConn study shows
expanding the jurisdiction of one local police department to cover an adjacent town offers no
appreciable return. The same number of officers would still be necessary to cover the same geographic
area, regardless of the town name on their uniforms. Even on the education side of the budget, real
savings are achieved only when a very small district is able to merge with a larger one.
After the total district student population reaches a certain level, efficiencies fade. This is
not to say regionalization of local services is always a bad idea. Connecticut has several regional school
districts and hundreds of voluntary regional compacts covering other services. The key to making
regionalization work is to avoid state or federal government programs that dictate
consolidation. Good policy, like common sense, tends to find its own partners. It is no accident that
many Connecticut towns have entered into cooperative agreements with their neighbors. They know
best what works for their towns and what won't work. Local knowledge is the biggest
benefit of local control. During difficult times it is human nature to grab whatever lifeline might be
tossed in front of you. In the case of regionalization, cost savings is not a guaranteed result .
Connecticut local governments are in favor of teaming up to reduce costs, but the decision about
when it makes sense should be made at the local level. Forced regionalization is a top-
down approach that could prove more costly in the long run.
 Diversity
There are actually plenty of workers to fill stem jobs. The issue is quality, not quantity
of STEM education.
Teitelbaum 14 Michael S. Teitelbaum, 3-19-2014, "The Myth of the Science and
Engineering Shortage," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/03/the-myth-of-the-science-and-
engineering-shortage/284359/
Everyone knows that the United States has long suffered from widespread shortages in its science and engineering workforce, and that if
continued these shortages will cause it to fall behind its major economic competitors. Everyone knows that these workforce shortages are due
mainly to the myriad weaknesses of American K-12 education in science and mathematics, which international comparisons of student
performance rank as average at best. Such claims are now well established as conventional wisdom. There is almost no debate in the
mainstream. They echo from corporate CEO to corporate CEO, from lobbyist to lobbyist, from editorial writer to editorial writer. But what if
what everyone knows is wrong? What if this conventional wisdom is just the same claims ricocheting in an echo chamber? The truth is that
there is little credible evidence of the claimed widespread shortages in the U.S. science
and engineering workforce. How can the conventional wisdom be so different from the empirical evidence? There are of
course many complexities involved that cannot be addressed here. The key points, though, are these: Science and engineering

occupations are at the leading edge of economic competitiveness in an increasingly

globalized world, and science and engineering workforces of sufficient size and quality
are essential for any 21st century economy to prosper. These professional workforces also are crucial for
addressing challenges such as international security, global climate change, and domestic and global health. While they therefore are of great
importance, college graduates employed in science and engineering occupations (as defined by the National Science Foundation) actually
comprise only a small fraction of the workforce. A compelling body of research is now available, from many leading academic researchers and
from respected research organizations such as the National Bureau of Economic Research, the RAND Corporation, and the Urban Institute. No
one has been able to find any evidence indicating current widespread labor market
shortages or hiring difficulties in science and engineering occupations that require bachelors
degrees or higher, although some are forecasting high growth in occupations that require post-high school training but not a bachelors degree.
U.S. higher education produces far more science and engineering
All have concluded that

graduates annually than there are S&E job openings—the only disagreement is whether it is 100 percent or 200
percent more. Were there to be a genuine shortage at present, there would be evidence of employers raising wage offers to attract the
Most studies report that real wages
scientists and engineers they want. But the evidence points in the other direction:

in many—but not all—science and engineering occupations have been flat or slow-
growing, and unemployment as high or higher than in many comparably-skilled
occupations. Because labor markets in science and engineering differ greatly across fields,
industries, and time periods, it is easy to cherry-pick specific specialties that really are in
short supply, at least in specific years and locations. But generalizing from these cases to the whole of
U.S. science and engineering is perilous. Employment in small but expanding areas of information technology such as
social media may be booming, while other larger occupations languish or are increasingly moved offshore. It is true that high-skilled
professional occupations almost always experience unemployment rates far lower than those for the rest of the U.S. workforce, but
unemployment among scientists and engineers is higher than in other professions such
as physicians, dentists, lawyers, and registered nurses, and surprisingly high unemployment rates prevail for
recent graduates even in fields with alleged serious “shortages” such as engineering (7.0 percent), computer science (7.8 percent) and
information systems (11.7 percent). Over time, new technologies, price changes, or sharp shifts in the labor market can create rapid rises in
demand in a particular occupation. When that happens, the evidence shows that the market seems to adjust
reasonably well. Entire occupations that were previously unattractive and declining, such as petroleum engineering in the 1980s and
1990s, have rather suddenly become attractive and high-paid—due to increased energy prices and new technologies for domestic extraction of
oil and gas. Others, such as those linked to manufacturing and construction—industries in which well over half of all engineers are employed—
have declined over the same period. Surprisingly, some of the largest and most heavily financed scientific fields, such as biomedical research,
are among those with the least attractive career prospects, as a recent blue-ribbon advisory committee reported to the Director of the National
Institutes of Health. Biomedical Ph.D.s are unusually lengthy and often require additional years of postdoctoral training, yet after completion
those with such degrees experience labor market demand and remuneration that are relatively low. Labor markets for scientists and engineers
Employer demand is far higher in a few hothouse metropolitan areas
also differ geographically.

than in the rest of the country, especially during boom periods. Moreover recruitment of domestic
professionals to these regions may be more difficult than in others when would-be hires discover that the remuneration employers are offering
does not come close to compensating for far higher housing and other costs. According to the most recent data from the National Association
of Realtors, Silicon Valley (metro San Jose) has the highest median house prices in the country, at $775,000—nearly four times higher than the
national median. Far from offering expanding attractive career opportunities, it seems that many, but not all, science and engineering careers
are headed in the opposite direction: unstable careers, slow-growing wages, and high risk of jobs moving offshore or being filled by temporary
workers from abroad. Recent science Ph.D.s often need to undertake three or more additional years in low-paid and temporary “postdoctoral”
positions, but even then only a minority have realistic prospects of landing a coveted tenure-track academic position.

Lack of STEM diversity is not an issue of educational opportunity.

Marcus 15 Bonnie Marcus is journalist and author working for forbes, 8-12-2015, "The
Lack Of Diversity In Tech Is A Cultural Issue," Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2015/08/12/the-lack-of-diversity-in-tech-
is-a-cultural-issue/2/#7943841771b9
Recently, Pinterest made a bold public announcement. Addressing their commitment to increased diversity, they shared their hiring goals for
women and minorities for 2016 along with programs and initiatives to support the achievement of those stated objectives. By doing so,
Pinterest not only challenged themselves but other tech companies to get serious about their diversity efforts and be accountable for results.
Tech companies are experiencing growing pressure to diversify their workforce which is predominantly white, Asian, and male. The increased
public scrutiny has resulted in some larger tech companies disclosing their employee information, which indicates little progress. A recent
survey of the top 9 tech companies in Silicon Valley by Fortune reveals that on average, women comprise about one-third of the workforce.
That gap expands the higher up you go in an organization, with the best company showing women holding 29% of leadership jobs. In general,
companies made slightly better progress on ethnic diversity than they did on increasing their percentages of female employees, although not in
leadership roles.It has been a commonly held belief that the gender gap in tech is primarily a
pipeline issue; that there are simply not enough girls studying math and science. Recently
updated information indicates an equal number of high school girls and boys
participating in STEM electives, and at Stanford and Berkeley, 50% of the introductory computer science students are
women. That may be the case, but the U.S. Census Bureau reported last year that twice as many

men as women with the same qualifications were working in STEM fields. A USA Today study
discloses that top universities graduate black and Hispanic computer science and computer

engineering students at twice the rate that leading technology companies hire them.
Although these companies state they don’t have a qualified pool of applicants, the evidence

does not support that claim. If it’s not a pipeline issue, why don’t we see a greater representation of minorities
and women in STEM industries? The answer is we don’t see more progress because the pipeline concern is not the primary reason for the
It’s the culture. We can attempt to solve the problem by educating more women and
discouraging statistics. There’s a bigger issue.

minorities and challenging hiring practices which are all important initiatives, but the underlying issue that must be

addressed to solve this problem is the hidden and often overt discrimination that prevails in the
tech industry. The reality is that gender and racial bias is so ubiquitous in the technology
industry that it forces talented female and minority employees to leave . Companies can hire more
minorities and women but without addressing this critical issue, they will not experience improvement in diversity. Kieran Snyder, a former
senior leader at Microsoft and Amazon and now CEO and co-founder of Textio, interviewed 716 women who held tech positions at 654
companies in 43 states. On average, these women worked in tech for seven years and then left. Kieran asked these women specifically why
they opted out. Some 192 women (27%) cited discomfort working in these companies. The overt or implicit discrimination was a primary factor
in their decision to leave tech. That’s just over a quarter of the women surveyed. Several of them mentioned discrimination related to their age,
race, or sexuality in addition to gender and motherhood. They also stated that lack of flexible work arrangements, the unsupportive work
environment, or a salary that was inadequate to pay for childcare all contributed to their decision to leave. In another study of women of color
in science done at UC Hastings College of Law, 100% of the sixty women scientists interviewed reported gender and racial bias. Nearly half of
the Black and Latina scientists reported they had been mistaken for administrative or custodial staff, and the majority of Black, Latina, and
Asian-American women stated they felt compelled to provide more proof to co-workers that they were as competent as their male peers. More
than half of the participants reported receiving backlash when they expressed anger or assertiveness at work. Sixty-four percent who are
mothers experienced discrimination and gender stereotyping. To realize their diversity goals, companies must address their cultural issues.
Those organizations that recognize the bias and unfair workplace practices can design customized programs to help retain their talented
employees. I have some suggestions for those companies that are committed to this initiative. First, retain an outside firm to do a thorough
assessment of the culture of the organization including discrimination in pay and hiring practices. Secure senior leadership commitment to a
corrective action plan that addresses gender and racial issues. Without senior leadership sponsorship these programs often fail. Second, offer
mandatory training in unconscious bias for every employee. I think Pinterest is on the right track including this initiative in their diversity plan. It
is imperative that all employees at every level of the organization understand their own bias and subsequent behavior. Third, develop career
paths that enable employees to see their potential advancement opportunities. Without a clearly defined plan and support, talented
employees lose interest and leave believing the company is not invested in their success. Fourth, develop specific coaching and training
programs for women and minorities on relational skills such as strategic networking and relationship building, negotiation, consensus building
and self-promotion with the goal of guiding employees to create visibility, credibility, and influence within their organization. Fifth, create
mentor programs with the goal of helping women and minorities understand the politics and culture of their organization and specifically hone
their political skill. Mentors must be committed to giving frank, honest assessments of the company environment along with strategies for
positioning themselves. Mentors must also be committed to helping mentees build a critical support network of allies and champions. With the
increased public awareness of the lack of diversity in technology and other STEM fields, companies will experience more pressure to disclose
their statistics and be accountable for reaching diversity objectives. It is time for organizations to address their cultural bias and create
Addressing bias in workplace practices along with providing
initiatives to retain women and minorities.

employees with the tools to survive and thrive in the workplace will have a positive
impact on diversity.
Solvency deficit - None of their evidence says regionalization leads to diversity, means
they can’t solve climate change.

Their plan can’t generate people who are prepared to work in STEM until 2030, by
that point it is probably too late to solve climate change.
Kahn 16 Brian Kahn, Senior Science editor at Climate Central, "The World Passes 400 PPM Threshold.
Permanently," Climate Central 9/27/2016, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/world-passes-400-ppm-
threshold-permanently
20738?utm_content=bufferd6901&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buf
fer]
In the centuries to come, history books will likely look back on September 2016 as a major milestone for the world’s climate. At a time when
atmospheric carbon dioxide is usually at its minimum, the monthly value failed to drop below 400 parts per million. That all but ensures that
2016 will be the year that carbon dioxide officially passed the symbolic 400 ppm mark,
never to return below it in our lifetimes, according to scientists. Because carbon pollution has been
increasing since the start of the Industrial Revolution and has shown no signs of abating,
it was more a question of “when” rather than “if” we would cross this threshold. The inevitability doesn’t make it any

less significant, though. September is usually the month when carbon dioxide is at its
lowest after a summer of plants growing and sucking it up in the northern hemisphere. As fall wears on, those plants lose their leaves,
which in turn decompose, releasing the stored carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere. At Mauna Loa Observatory, the world’s marquee site
for monitoring carbon dioxide, there are signs that the process has begun but levels have remained above 400 ppm. Since the industrial
humans have been altering this process by adding more carbon dioxide to the
revolution,

atmosphere than plants can take up. That’s driven carbon dioxide levels higher and with
it, global temperatures, along with a host of other climate change impacts. “Is it possible that
October 2016 will yield a lower monthly value than September and dip below 400 ppm? Almost impossible,” Ralph Keeling, the scientist who
runs the Scripps Institute for Oceanography’s carbon dioxide monitoring program, wrote in a blog post. “Brief excursions toward lower values
we won’t be seeing a monthly value below 400
are still possible, but it already seems safe to conclude that

ppm this year – or ever again for the indefinite future.” We may get a day or two reprieve in the next month,
similar to August when Tropical Storm Madeline blew by Hawaii and knocked carbon dioxide below 400 ppm for a day. But otherwise, we’re
Even if the world stopped emitting carbon dioxide tomorrow, what
living in a 400 ppm world.

has already put in the atmosphere will linger for many decades to come. “At best (in that
scenario), one might expect a balance in the near term and so CO2 levels probably wouldn't change much — but would start to fall off in a
decade or so,” Gavin Schmidt, NASA’s chief climate scientist, said in an email. “In my opinion, we won’t ever see a month below 400 ppm.” The
carbon dioxide we’ve already committed to the atmosphere has warmed the world about 1.8°F since the start of the industrial revolution.
This year, in addition to marking the start of our new 400 ppm world, is also set to be
the hottest year on record. The planet has edged right up against the 1.5°C (2.7°F)
warming threshold, a key metric in last year’s Paris climate agreement. Even though there are some
hopeful signs that world leaders will take actions to reduce emissions, those actions will have to happen on an

accelerating timetable in order to avoid 2°C (3.6°F) of warming. That’s the level outlined by policymakers as a safe threshold for
climate change. And even if the world limits warming to that benchmark, it will still likely spell

doom for low-lying small island states and have serious repercussions around the world,
from more extreme heat waves to droughts, coastal flooding and the extinction of many coral reefs. It’s against this backdrop that the
with each passing day, we’re
measurements on top of Mauna Loa take on added importance. They’re a reminder that

moving further from the climate humans have known and thrived in and closer to a
more unstable future.
Economic collapse doesn’t cause war
Drezner 14 Daniel Drezner, professor of International Law at Tufts, The System Worked: Global
Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession
on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts
asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool
for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to
an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms
races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in
the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in
global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has
concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it
was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial
crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that
the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and
Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for
the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold
War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date
generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have
been expected."45
 Democracy
Turn- Democracy actually causes peace, their laundry list is bullshit
Ostrowski 15 James Ostrowski is a lawyer in Buffalo, New York and an adjunct scholar at
the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He is author of Political class dismissed: essays against
politics, including 'What's wrong with Buffalo', The Myth of Democratic Peace: Why
Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace in the 21 st Century, Peace Prosperity & Freedom 11
2015
There are numerous theoretical and empirical problems with the superficially appealing theory of democratic peace. Power kills and democratic
states are quite powerful.The most powerful democratic states have been quite bellicose.
Naturally, they have killed many, both internally and externally. Many of the pacific elements of
democracies are in fact accidents: not essential elements of democracy but rather hangovers from a more republican past. It is a

mistake to focus on inter-democratic state violence when what really plagues the world
is: 1. violence between democracies and non-democracies that democracies often
provoke 2. violence within democratic states 3. the symbiotic relationships between
dictatorships and democracies 4. the instability of democracy Democracies are
implicated in the three main threats to world peace today: terrorism, nuclear war and
ethnic/religious conflict. Democratic pacifism fails to explain how we can achieve world
peace and the theory itself continues to cause war! It is literally an intellectual dead end. We have
every right to be skeptical about the world's desire for peace. How does one reconcile this purportedly
sincere and intense desire for peace with the utter lack of interest in defining the term? If you don't know where you are going, you are unlikely
to get there save by accident. My suspicion is, even if the world pondered the question and was inexorably drawn to the common sense
definition of peace proffered herein - the absence of violence or the palpable threat of violence against persons and their property - most
. It's not that these
people and most politicians and most intellectuals would recoil in horror at the prospect of such a world

people don't like peace in general terms; it's just that there are many things they value
more highly. Many of these things can only be achieved by the use of democratic
violence or the palpable threat of democratic violence against persons and their
property. That is why we live in such a violent world. We are lying in the bed we have made. Most people don't
want peace, not really. If they did, it could be achieved without enormous difficulty since "There is no way to peace; peace is the way."

Turn – Democracy Promotion causes increased instability in the Somalia. Their great
power war impact is specific to the horn of Africa.
BBC 13, BBC Monitoring Africa - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring August
14, 2013 Wednesday Somalia: Writer says ethnic violence institutionalized by colonial
powers. Accessed via lexis nexis 7/2217
This paper sought to situate the actions of agents whether they are states or otherwise in an effort to understand the clan or ethnic violence
phenomenon such that took place in Rwanda and Somalia. In both cases we discover that clan or ethnic identities were politicized to achieve
certain goals. Local politicians with assistance from external forces colluded in unison in pursuit of selfish interests. In the case of Rwanda, we
witnessed how the Rwandan government elites organized militias to carry out plans to divide the society along clan or ethnic lines in order to
stay in power, while the French state made utilitarian rationale choice to maximize its interests in Africa. This interest is in connection with the
Eurocentric colonial approach which is pursued by many former colonial powers to expand their economic base and influence. Resource
extraction and expansion of economic base were the driving force behind the colonization of African states and these objectives provide the
thrust of today's neo-colonial operations in Africa. Tools such as clan or ethnic divisions, application of neo-liberal economic policies or
the state and economic
promotion of democracy in Africa are capitalized to intervene in these countries. Moreover,

collapse of Somalia and the continued violence can be traced back to the division of
Somalia by the colonial powers as well as the lack of development due to this fact. The colonial legacy has
created a system of dependence on foreign aid and lack of development. As a result,
Somalia has descended into economic and social chaos as soon as soon this aid was
withheld in the post Cold War. In this context, clan or ethnicity does not cause clan or ethnic violence. The development of
political institutions and how these institutions evolve and mediate social and economic relations constitute the basis for analysis to understand
clan or ethnic violence. Clan or ethnicity in both Rwanda and Somalia are socially constructed identities for political and economic purposes as
cultural and linguistic differences are merely not there and the colonial powers had to invent one. In this effort, access to education, political
there are external
and economic power to one group has created two classes as the bases of assigned differences. In this view,

power relations and material benefits associated with this political configuration and
repression is used to reinforce these stereotypes. This domination model is reproduced across time and space.
Robinson contends that identity based political conflicts in developing countries are exacerbated

by the forces of globalization, especially after the end of the Cold War as they stir societies to demand
for reforms and democratization in the hope that the colonial and authoritarian political structures would be replaced by
new institutions that would mediate social relations within and between nations in the world system. Such a move is

unpredictable as the potential always exists that a new hostile power structure might
arise in these countries. To pre-empt any radical political change in the developing nations, the United States has
developed a range of policy instruments to preserve its economic domination in the
current global order. Central to these policy instruments, Robinson argues, is the launching of
democracy promotion intervention operations which is designed to provide the US an
opportunity to shape the social and political order of the targeted nations in its mission
to advance its national and international capitalist interests. In the context of Rwanda and Somalia,
violence was in response to political power with external connection and not violence emerging from
clan or ethnic differences.

Western democracy has wreaked destruction on many African Countries

Mountain 12, Thomas C. Mountain is an independent journalist currently living in
Eritrea, 5-1-2012, "Destroying Africa With Western “Democracy”," Foreign Policy
Journal, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/05/01/destroying-africa-with-
western-democracy/
Western style “democracy” is destroying Africa. It seems everywhere you look in Africa you see elections marked
by violence and bloodshed. “Buy, rig or steal” is the name of the game and if that doesn’t work, send in the French army and UN
“peacekeepers” and rocket the presidential residence and just take over by brute force. “Democracy” is supposed to mean that the leaders of a
nation do what their people want them to do. If you ask almost all Africans what they want most from their leaders they will tell you; 1) Enough
food to eat. 2) Clean water to drink 3) A roof over their heads 4) Accessible and affordable medical care 5) Education for their children Elections
are way down on the list of grassroots African priorities. Food, water, shelter and medical care, if a countries leadership is getting these
priorities taken care of then they are actually practicing democracy and if they don’t provide these services to their people they are not
nations of Africa except
democratic, no matter the praised heaped on them by their neo-colonial masters in the west. All of the

one are caught in the western elections trap. And all of Africa except one is bleeding,
and in more than one way. Many if not most African countries pay more in interest on their
debts to western banks than the combined total of all expenditures on medical care and
education. Many if not most African countries suffer from food dependency, they do not grow enough food
to feed their people. Many if not most African countries are economic basket cases, even Nigeria with its oil, staggering from one western
bankster emergency bailout to another. Everywhere you look in Africa it seems you see conflict and war and everywhere you look you see
western style “democracy”, elections. It is so bad then when an election is held without a major outbreak of violence it is considered a “victory
After
for African democracy” even if the serving president is the only one on the ballot (see “Liberia; Plenty ‘democracy’, No electricity”).

WWII, the western colonialists found out the hard way that they couldn’t continue to
militarily occupy their “possessions”, so they created neocolonialism to control Africa
and used western style “democracy” to run it. Traditionally, Africans practiced their own
forms of “democracy”, most often via a council of elders persuading all parties to arrive
at a consensus where everyone got something. It wasn’t a win or lose situation like
takes place in a western style election. Being that all parties agreed to the final decision, all parties were duty bound to
respect and enforce what they had agreed to, and thus the peace was kept and folks got along with each other. As for national decisions, there
were kings or high chiefs who almost always consulted a council of tribal or clan elders. In many societies, and this was a society of villages,
Peace was
there were oftentimes chiefs, but still the most often used dispute resolution was consensus, a mediation by elders.

maintained and societal unity preserved. Western “democracy” in Africa creates just the
opposite. In Kenya, the Kikuyu, an ethnic minority installed in power by the departing
British empire has to win the election or risk losing everything to their larger tribal rivals,
the Luo. The result? Elections and thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. This upcoming election may see even worse.
The Congo? Ethiopia? Even that supposed success story for African Democracy, Senegal,
saw blood in the streets. Yet there is one island of peace and stability in the midst of all this chaos and crisis. One place where
the people of the country, especially the people of the villages, still some 70%, will tell you that the government has kept its promises, and the
proof is there for all to see. The solar powered wells, the micro dams for irrigation, the medical clinics and schools, all are spreading to even the
most remote villages. HIV/AIDS down by 40%, the best in Africa by a mile, malaria mortality down 80%, the biggest breakthrough in malaria
history. Maternal and infant mortality seeing “remarkable improvement” (from the World Bank, no less) and the Millennium Development
goals all on track for achieving. And on top of this, the fastest growing economy in Africa. The one real success story in Africa and the only
not allowing western “democracy” is what it takes for
country NOT to have elections. Maybe, just maybe,

Africa to succeed. Eritrea and Eritreans want nothing to do with neocolonialism and
“democracy” western style. No thanks, we have our own version of democracy, real democracy, and our people are seeing the
benefits. Paradise? No, life is still hard for most, but the very poorest are the priority and their lives have changed, dramatically. In Africa the
If elections mean
poor are most of the people and if you are not taking care of them first and foremost, you are NOT democratic.

democracy, and sick and hungry children in their millions is business as usual than
Eritreans will tell you to keep your “democracy”. This is about Africa’s one “undemocratic” country, where peace
reigns and our lives are getting better, especially for those most in need. Don’t shoot me, I am just the messenger, though a real believer in the
message. I have lived here in Eritrea since 2006 and am telling you what I have witnessed and come to believe in. Instead of falling into the
western “democracy” trap, try taking an unbiased look at a role model here in Africa instead of another African victim, bleeding from
neocolonialism. So before I finish, let me pass on what is probably the only reliable firsthand account of how that Founder of American
Democracy, Thomas Jefferson treated “his” Africans: “After dinner the master [Jefferson] and I went to see the slaves plant peas. Their bodies
dirty brown rather than black, their dirty rags, their miserable, hideous half-nakedness, these haggard figures, this secretive anxious air, the
hateful timorous looks, altogether seized me with an initial sentiment of terror and sadness that I ought to hide my face from. Their indolence
in turning up the ground with the hoe was extreme. The master [Jefferson] took a whip to frighten them, and soon ensued a comic scene.
Placed in the middle of the gang, he menaced, and turned far and wide (on all sides) turning around. Now, as he turned his face, one by one,
the blacks changed attitude; those whom he looked at directly worked best, those whom he half saw worked least, and those he didn’t see at
all, ceased working altogether; and if he made an about-face, the hoe was raised to view, but otherwise slept behind his back”. This firsthand
account is from a founding member of the French “Society for Friendship with Blacks”, the first French antislavery organization. His name was
Constantine Volney, and he was the publisher of that African-Centered classic historical work, “Ruins; Or, Meditations on the Revolutions of
Empires” in 1791. It is a fascinating account about his visit to Africa’s Nile Valley before the last major desecrations began. Being an honest,
antiracist historian, Volney believed, based on what he saw with his own eyes in the Egyptian tombs and temples, that civilization
began in Africa, on the banks of the Nile River. In his own words; “It was there that a people, since forgotten, discovered the elements
of science and art, at a time when all other men were barbarous, and that a race, now regarded as the refuse of society, because their hair is
wooly and their skin is dark, explored among the phenomena of nature, those civil and religious systems which have since held mankind in
awe”. “Ruins” was one of the most widely read historical texts of the late 18th and early 19th century. It was published in 6 languages in over
15 editions. Volney was eventually driven from the USA by the forerunner of the Undesirable Aliens Act, passed by a slave owner Congress still
having difficulties achieving a good night’s sleep, haunted by dreams of the revolution in Haiti and the slaughter of their fellow slave owners by
their erstwhile captives, Toussaint and his fellow Africans. It remains a bitter fact that the works of Volney, one of history’s truly great scholars,
remains a mystery to most all of today’s students. To say that Thomas Jefferson was in any way a “progressive” in his day is to fly in the face of
all that Volney stood for. Let us use Volney’s first hand recollection to once and for all provide a proper burial for the idea that the USA was
founded by persons of noble character or democratic principles. The USA was racist in essence at birth and remains racist in essence today.
That despite a black American President, a black American Attorney General, a black American Supreme Court Justice, a black American UN
Ambassador and multiple black military generals, it is only an illusion that anything has really changed for the masses of black folk in the USA.
here in Eritrea “we the people” know what
And they want to export this slave owners’ democracy to Africa? At least

we want and that is real democracy, taking care of all our people, starting with our
neediest.
7 Alt causes to African Conflict
Oyeniyi 11, Conflict and Violence in Africa: Causes, Sources and Types, 28 February 2011
Adeleye Oyeniyi – TRANSCEND Media Service
https://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/02/conflict-and-violence-in-africa-causes-
sources-and-types/
Thecauses of conflicts in Africa are many and they frequently recur, including major causes of
potential tensions and conflicts, which could perhaps be summarised and classified below.
1. Inter-state borders Common to many conflicts is the unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders. Nearly all these borders were
inherited from colonial times, and were the product of negotiations and treaties between the colonial powers, decided in Europe with the aid
of poor maps and with scant attention to African peoples. At independence, the African governments shied away from making adjustments,
existing state structures do
and in any case, this was difficult as they did not all reach independence at the same time. The

not satisfy variously the aspirations for cultural identity, autonomy, economic
democracy and self-determination of different nationalities co-existing with the
contemporary states. Thus, the ease with which dissidents of a state are harboured in neighbouring countries and guerrillas
armed and trained there, is itself a cause of both internal and inter-state conflicts. 2. Ethnicity A major cause of African

conflicts has been ethnicity, and it has continued to be so. The creation of new nation-states at the time of independence was
accompanied urgent calls for nation-building by the new African leaders who were well aware of the difficulty in transcending African ethnic
and regional loyalties. The European concept of a nation was exported to Africa. Stephen McCarthy’s definition of a nation as ‘a complex web of
common cultural, social and economic interests among people, leading to a sense that what they share in common is greater than their
There have been a
regional, tribal or other differences’ simply reflects features which many African states did not have.

number of separatist movements causing attempts at secession, such as Katanga in Zaire, Biafra in
Nigeria, and others in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Military coups have also often been caused by ethnic rivalry,
as well as personal rivalry such as Idi Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971, caused by inter-ethnic rivalry among leading army officers, as well as by
ethnic resentments against the civil head of state. Idi Amin was able to recruit soldiers loyal to him from across the northern border, from the
Sudan, for his own Kakwa tribe had been split in two by the colonial border. Thus it came about that it was Sudanese troops who played a large
Use of foreign troops in such
part in the coup, and Sudanese officers commanded key positions in the subsequent military regime.

cases tends to exacerbate the cruelties and abuse of human rights inflicted on the civilian

population, for these troops feel little affinity with populations they are sent to control. 3. Military: Inter-state
aggression, annexation, intervention or hostility; for example, support for the rebels of other states, or for
separatist movements. 4. Political / International This takes the forms of ideological or political

campaigns, territorial claims, and religious expansionism against other states, regional
rivalries, terrorism, coercion or discrimination respecting the trade or economies of
other states. 5. Political / Domestic Power struggles, hostile groups, over-population,
economic or religious disparities, oppression, and demands for democracy, communal or ethnic violence related to
economic, social, religious, cultural or ethnic issues. 6. Persecution It connotes violations of human rights, mass

movements of refugees, poverty or instability caused by the mismanagement or

ineptitude of the government, including evident and perceived levels of corruption by the government beyond any
acceptable limits of traditional toleration. 7. Poor economic performance A more basic and long-term cause of

conflict has been the catastrophic economic performance of many African countries.
Coupled with the debt problem, poor flows of private capital into some African countries, and

foreign aid programmes often inefficient, as Neil MacFarlane points out, economic discomfort can bail out into
conflict. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated as the deepest causes of conflict: ‘economic despair, social injustice, and
, African ruling classes, or the elite group who happen to hold power at a particular
political oppression.’ In the midst of poverty

time, have enriched themselves and become the targets of envy or of rivalry by other elite

groups. Politics is a commercial venture in his own right, as Roger Tangri puts it; conflicts arise not so much out of clashes of ideologies or
programmes, but for profit – often for just an elite few, for the masses take little part in this part of conflict: nearly all tribal or ethnic conflicts
are rooted in competition between individuals, for the scarce resources of wealth, state and power. Amiclar Cabral’s dictum posits that ‘there
are no real conflicts between the peoples of Africa. There are only conflicts between the elites. Ali Mazrui quotes Nigeria as an example of the
tendency. In the African state, there is a pull towards privatisation of the state and towards militarisation. The resources of Nigeria under the
civilian rule from 1979 were the private hunting ground of those in power and their supporters. Rampant privatisation caused the military to
act, in the coup of 1983.

The Joseph evidence says literally nothing about the Horn of Africa, which is the only
context the Glick evidence is. Joseph is a writer about Nigerian politics.

The horn of Africa has been unstable for a long time. It has been ten years since the
Glick evidence, and no great power war has occurred. No reason why now is uniquely
important

The Glick Evidence doesn’t actually say anything about conflict WTF
 Extra Cards
Western democracy is not a good strategy in Africa
Ayittey 10, Why Western-style democracy is not suitable for Africa By George Ayittey,
Special to CNN August 20, 2010 6:22 a.m. EDT .George Ayittey is a Ghanaian economist
and the author of several books on Africa, including "Africa Unchained" and the
forthcoming "Defeating Dictators in Africa and Around The World."
(CNN) -- Western-style multi-party democracy is possible but not suitable for Africa. There are
two forms of democracy. Democratic decisions can be taken by majority vote, which is the Western form. It has the advantage of being
transparent, fast and efficient. But the downside is thatit ignores minority positions. The alternative is to take decisions by
consensus. This has the advantage of taking all minority positions into account. However, the demerit is that it can take an awfully

long time to reach a consensus the larger the number of people involved. Nevertheless,
the Nobel Peace Committee and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all take decisions
by consensus. So too do many traditional African societies. Just because a group does not take its decisions
by voting does not mean they have no understanding of the essence of democracy. In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the former
Soviet Union, the winds of change swept across Africa, toppling long-standing autocrats. In our haste to democratize -- and also as a condition
The
for Western aid -- we copied and adopted the Western form of democracy and neglected to build upon our own democratic tradition.

Western model allowed an elected leader to use power and the state machinery to
advance the economic interests of his ethnic group and exclude all others: Kenyatta of
Kenya and the Gikuyu, Moi of Kenya and the Kalenjin, Biya of Cameroon and the Beti,
Eyadema of Togo and the Kabye, to name a few. Virtually all of Africa's civil wars were started by politically
marginalized or excluded groups. In the West, the basic economic and social unit is the individual; in

Africa, it is the extended family or the collective. --George Ayittey Africa Civil War Elections and Voting At Africa's
traditional village level, a chief is chosen by the Queen Mother of the royal family to rule for life. His appointment must be ratified by the
Council of Elders, which consists of heads of extended families in the village. In governance, the chief must consult with the Council on all
important matters. Without this council, the chief is powerless. If the chief and the Council cannot reach unanimous decision on an important
issue, a village meeting is called and the issue put before the people, who will debate it until they reach a consensus. The village assemblies
exist among various African tribes including: the Ashanti of Ghana, the Igbo of Nigeria, the Somali, the Tswana of Botswana, the Shona of
Zimbabwe, the Xhosa and the Zulu of South Africa. If the chief is "bad" he can be recalled by the Queen Mother, removed by the Council of
Elders, or abandoned by the people, who will vote with their feet to settle somewhere else. Traditionally, African kings had
no political function. Their role was spiritual or supernatural -- to mediate between the cosmological forces: the sky, the earth and
the world, each of which is represented by a god. The king's role is to propitiate these gods and maintain harmony among them. If the sky god
is "angry" there will be thunder, heavy downpour, floods, etc. That would mean the king had failed to perform his function and off went his
In the West, the basic economic and social unit is
head (regicide). Africans could have built upon this system.

the individual; in Africa, it is the extended family or the collective. The American says, "I am because I
am." The African says, "I am because we are." The "we" denotes the community. So let each group choose their leaders and place them in a
National Assembly. Next, let each province or state choose their leaders and place them in a National Council. Choose the president from this
. Those
National Council and avoid the huge expenditures on election campaigning that comes with Western-style democracy

resources can be better put to development in poor African countries. Next, let the
president and National Council take their decisions by consensus. If there is a deadlock,
refer the issue to the National Assembly. This type of democracy is in consonance with
our own African heritage.
The plan results in more white flight, and previous efforts to desegregate have failed
A five-decade fight to desegregate the schools in a small Mississippi town continues, as the school
district is appealing a federal court order for the district to combine its two high schools and two middle
schools.

Two of the school district’s schools, a middle school and a high school, are overwhelmingly black. As of
May of last year, in fact, every single child enrolled at the Cleveland school district’s high school was
black. The federal judge presiding over the case concluded that consolidating schools would allow the
“greatest degree of desegregation possible” in the county.

The school district is appealing this decision, however. The school board’s three white board members
voted to appeal while its two black board members voted against it, according to the Washington Post.
The school board’s lawyer, Jamie Jacks, told the Post that “the district has the most integrated
classrooms of any school district in the area,” and that school consolidation would result in white
flight from the schools.
Although these two schools continue to be racially isolated, the school district has been ordered to
desegregate through various reforms. A 1969 court order instructed the school district to divide into
attendance zones to ensure diversity in schools. But in the 1980s, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a
complaint claiming some of the school district’s policies were still standing in the way of integration.

The Cleveland school district certainly isn’t alone. There are a lot of school
desegregation cases that remain open decades after they first began. ProPublica took a
close look at these desegregation orders in 2014 and found that, although many court orders have been
lifted over the past 15 years, some still remain open. The highest number of these cases, both voluntary
and court-ordered desegregation cases, were concentrated in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi.

For instance, there has been a lawsuit against the Avoyelles Parish School Board in Louisiana for almost
50 years by now. Last year, a desegregation order from the U.S. Department of Justice laid out the
various policies and expectations the Avoyelles Parish school system must meet. Critics of Louisiana’s
school voucher program say that the program is increasing school segregation.

There were still fairly high numbers of open cases in New York, California, and Connecticut, however.
Looking at the national picture, a high percentage of students of color attend segregated schools. A
study released in 2012 from the University of California, Los Angeles, found that 43 percent of Latino
students and 38 percent of black students in the U.S. attend schools where fewer than 10 percent of
their classmates are white. More than one in seven black and Latino students attend “apartheid”
schools or schools where less than 1 percent of their classmates are white.

Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases haven’t aided efforts to desegregate. The court ruled
public school assignment plans would not “take account of students’ race” in a 2007 case affecting
students in Louisville, Kentucky and Seattle, effectively hamstringing many school districts’ efforts to
make their schools more diverse.