Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines GR 168546 (July 23,2008) G.R. No.

188191 March 12, 2014

FACTS: ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal vs.
drugs. Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
plea of guilty to avail the benefits of first time offenders. Subsequently, he
applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court FACTS:
said that probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions
in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be invoked to avail probation. It is Almero filed an application for probation, reasoning out that he came to
specifically stated that in drug trafficking, application for probation should know of his conviction only when the warrant of arrest was served upon
be denied. As aside issue, the court discussed the availment of suspension him.
of sentence under RA 9344.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
To see whether the petitioner was eligible or not for probation.
Whether suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given
the fact that the accused is now 21 years old.
RULING:
HELD:
An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the
NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 judgment. In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether
could no longer Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily
under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so
9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has
already reached 21years of age or over and thus, could no longer be
considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the
application of Sections 38 and40 appears moot and academic as far as his
case is concerned.
Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous Judgment
: The Colinares vs. People (G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011) Doctrine
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated
homicide for hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of
stone. He alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and
4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. His
conviction was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
II. THE ISSUES
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser]
offense [of attempted homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may
he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal, MODIFIED the
CA decision and found Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not frustrated)
HOMICIDE and SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but PROBATIONABLE
penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum and 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional as maximum. The Court also voted 8-7 to allow Arnel
to APPLY FOR PROBATION within 15 days from notice that the record of the
case has been remanded for execution to trial court.]
YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court.
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of
attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed
on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to
allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.
[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that
Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he
has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum
jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to
apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial
judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation,
taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the
severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will
also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial
court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the
horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, “By taking this appeal, I choose
not to apply for probation.” The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now
seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute
the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation,
forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for
the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done
him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
Moreno vs. COMELEC, August 10, 2006
Facts: Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from
running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by
final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the RTC.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action
because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of
Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued
that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order
of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his
probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15,
2002 elections.
The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Samar recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running. The
Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for
reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First
Division was affirmed.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)1 of
the Local Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who have served
their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted
probation within the period specified therefore. He never served a day of
his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC does not
apply to him.
Issue: Whether or not Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on
WON his sentence was served
Held: Moreno’s sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for
Punong Barangay.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the
phrase “within two (2) years after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a) of
the LGC.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order
granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain
from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not
even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of
the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not
serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required
to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.