ELEC
(CHAPTER 5)
1. De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers
[G.R. No. 24721. November 3, 1925.]
TOMAS DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF L
A UNION and JUAN T. LUCERO, respondents.
A. de Guzman for petitioner.
Gregorio Talavera for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LECTIONS; CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY;
OATH. — While Act No. 3030, in its section 3, requires the
candidate to file a "certificate ofcandidacy duly verified," that
is, sworn to, in order that he may be eligible, yet the
lack of oath of the certificate of candidacy, while fatal to the
recognition of the status of the candidate before election, is
not a sufficient ground for annulling his election after the
people has manifested its will, the provincial secretary having
certified that Said candidate was a legal candidate for the
office.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J p:
This proceeding is for the purpose of having this court
issue a mandamus addressed to the
provincial board of canvassers of the Province of La Union,
ordering it to meet and reject and annul all the votes
adjudicated to the respondent Juan T. Lucero, and after
correcting the election return, to proclaim and certify the
petitioner elected for the office of provincial governor of La
Union in accordance with law.
As ground of the petition, it is alleged that the
respondent provincial board of canvassers met on June 22,
1925, for the purpose of counting the votes cast in the election
for provincial officers and certifying the result of the count, and
after gathering all the election returns, it found that the
petitioner had obtained 7,662 votes and the respondent Juan
T. Lucero 8,771 votes; that the original of the
certificate of candidacy of the respondent Juan T. Lucero, a
certified copy of which is Exhibit A, was not duly sworn to, as
required by law, while the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner Tomas de Guzman, the original of which is Exhibit
B, was prepared and filed in accordance with the
requirements of the law; that notwithstanding that Juan T.
Lucero did not file a certificate of candidacy duly sworn to, as
provided in section 404 of the Election Law, the respondent
provincial board ofcanvassers willfully and illegally
adjudicated the 8,771 votes to the respondent, and afterwards
illegally proclaimed and certified him as governor-elect of the
Province of La Union; that in view of these facts the
respondent Juan T. Lucero has not, and could not have, been
a legal candidate for the office in question, and could not have
been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.
To this complaint the respondent filed a demurrer on
the ground: (a) That the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter in litigation; (b) that the court had no jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendant members of the
extinguished provincial board of canvassers of La Union; and
(c) that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a
cause of action.
The question to be decided in this proceeding is
whether or not the respondent has filed a
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
certificate of candidacy in accordance with the law, and in
case he has not, whether the writ applied for should be issued.
Section 41 of Act No. 3030, amending section
471 of the Election Law, provides that the
provincial board of canvassers or the Governor-General, as
the case may be, shall certify elected for the offices of senator
or member of the House of Representatives and for provincial
officers only those who shall have obtained the highest
number of votes, and filed their certificates of candidacy in
accordance with the provisions of section 404 of this law. And
said section 404, as amended by section 3 of the same Act
No. 3030, provides, that no person shall be eligible for the
office of senator, representative or any provincial office,
unless within the time fixed by the law, he shall file a
certificate of candidacy duly verified. The meaning of the
phrase "a certificate of candidacy duly verified," is explained
by this court in Viola vs. Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur and Adolfo (47 Phil., 849), to the effect that ". . .only when
the corresponding receipt has been issued and the certificate
filed can it be presumed that it has been duly verified and
filed."
In the instant case, according to the allegations of the
petitioner the respondent Juan T. Lucero filed his
certificate of candidacy in the office of the secretary of the
provincial board of La Union on April 15, 1925, the provincial
secretary having issued the proper receipt for the filing of said
certificate, together with a statement of the expenses attached
thereto (Exhibit 2). It, therefore, seems clear that the
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy in accordance
with the Spanish text of section 404 of the Election Law, as
amended by section 3 of Act No. 3030.
But the petitioner argues that section 404 of the
Election Law, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3030, is
mandatory in its terms, and therefore must be complied with
by the provincial board, respondent herein. Granting that the
English text of the law in this case makes clear the Spanish
text "Certificado de candidatura debidamente acreditado"
(certificate of candidacy duly verified), it will be seen that said
section 3 of Act No. 3030 requires the candidate to file a
"certificate of candidacy duly verified," indicating by these two
words that the certificate of candidacy must be sworn to. In
the case before us the certificate of the respondent Juan T.
Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This
irregularity might have justified the elimination of the
name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the
office of provincial governor, if an objection on the part of the
petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time. Yet
we are of the opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate
the election for the fundamental reason that after it was
proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had
obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people
cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his
certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.
This court in the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil.,
521), following authoritative decisions of the United States,
which establish rules ofinterpretation of election laws, said:
"The provisions of the Election Law
declaring that a certain irregularity in an election
procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot
or of the returns, or when the purpose and
spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a
substantial departure from the prescribed
method, are mandatory.
"When the election Law does not provide
that a departure from a prescribed form will be
fatal and such departure has been due to an
honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election
Law on the part of him who was obligated to
observe it, and such departure has not been used
as a means for fraudulent practices or for the
intimidation of voters. and it is clear that there has
been a free and honest expression of the popular
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
will, the law will be held directory and such
departure will be considered a harmless
irregularity."
And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez (39 Phil., 208), this
court laid down the following doctrine:
"It has been announced in many decisions
that the rules and regulations, for the
conduct of elections, are mandatory before the
election, but when it is sought to enforce them
after the election, they are held to be directory
only, if that is possible, especially where, if they
are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be
deprived of their votes without any fault on their
part. The various and numerous provisions of the
Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in
their participation in the affairs of the
government and not to defeat that object. When
the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the
same should not be nullified simply because the
officers appointed under the law to direct the
election and guard the purity ofthe ballot have not
done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by
criminal action, against them. They should be
prosecuted criminally, and the will ofthe honest
voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be
protected and upheld."
We hold that the legal provision here in question is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election
would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan
T. Lucero as candidate. But after the people have expressed
their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated
by the fact that the respondent who was certified by the
provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the
office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his
certificate of candidacy. The situation is somewhat like
that of a voter placing his ballot in the box There are certain
requirements ofthe law, affecting the vote, which have been
considered by this court as of a mandatory character until the
ballot is placed in the ballot box; but we have held that the
validity of the count cannot be questioned, nor the vote
stricken out after the ballots had been placed in the ballot
boxes, simply for non-compliance with such provisions. After
the termination of the election, public interest must be made
to prevail over that of the defeated candidate, and we cannot
declare that the election of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was
illegal, and that he should quit the office for which he was
elected, simply by reason of a defect in his
certificate of candidacy, which defect could have been
corrected before the election, but which cannot be cured after
its termination, and after the result of the election was
published by the provincial board of canvassers, respondent
herein.
Of course the conclusion which we have arrived at
tends to sustain the third ground of the demurrer of the
respondent. We will not enter upon the discussion of the two
first grounds of said demurrer, for it may be seen that they are
clearly untenable.
The demurrer of the respondent is therefore sustained
upon the third ground, and considering that in view of our
ruling upon the only legal question raised in this proceeding,
the complaint cannot be amended, this case is definitely
adjudicated, and the writ of mandamus applied for is denied
with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Ostrand, Johns,
Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J., concurs in the result.
||| (De Guzman v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of La Union,
G.R. No. 24721, [November 3, 1925], 48 PHIL 211-216)
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
2. Jurilla v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 105436. June 2, 1994.]
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA,
BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA,
MELENCIO CASTELO and GODOFREDO
LIBAN, petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON ELEC
TIONS and ANTONIO V.
HERNANDEZ, respondents.
Eugene V . Jurilla in his behalf and other petitioners.
Leonardo B. Palicte III for private-respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; SECTION 39(a) OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; STATEMENT OF
CANDIDATE'S PRECINCT NUMBER AND BARANGAY WHERE
HE IS REGISTERED NOT REQUIRED. — It may be gleaned
from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government
Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically
require that the candidate must state in his certificate of
candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is
registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered
as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should
be within the district where he is running for office.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 69 OF BP BLG. 881 AND RULE 25 OF
THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE NOT APPLICABLE
TO CASE AT BAR. — COMELECreferred to the action taken by
petitioners herein as one to declare private respondent a
"nuisance candidate" and intimating that they should have
instead petitioned COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of private respondent, citing
Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881. . . . Certainly, the holding
of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a
"nuisance candidate" is erroneous because, tested against the
provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can categorize
him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure therein
provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners
herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at any
day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO
NAZAL, REY MEDINA, MELENCIO CASTELO, GODOFREDO
LIBAN and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were among the
candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six
(6) positions of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City.
On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with
the Commission on Elections his certificate of candidacy for one
of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as
his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City."
However, he did not indicate on the space provided in Item No.
12 therein his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay
where he was a registered voter. 1 His biodata submitted together
with his certificate of candidacy gave his address as "Acacia
Street, Mariana, Quezon City," 2 which is part of the Fourth
District of Quezon City. 3 In other words, his certificate of
candidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly
state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he was
a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides: prLL
Sec. 39. Qualifications — (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
In view of the seeming deficiency in the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent, petitioners herein challenged his
qualification before public respondent COMELEC explaining
however that since they became aware of the grounds for private
respondent's qualification only after the elections, they chose to
file their petition under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after
the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation. 4
On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its questioned
resolution denying the petition for disqualification for being filed
outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646, which
pertains to nuisance candidates. 5 Hence the instant petition for
certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC in issuing the assailed
resolution of 2 June 1992. LexLib
It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the
Local Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law
does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his
certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay
where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually
registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote,
which should be within the district where he is running for office.
In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of
candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by him
in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned
a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon
City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for
the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was already a
resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the
Second District of Quezon City.
In his Petition for Inclusion in the Registry of Registered Voters of
Second District, Quezon City, private respondent explained that
—
. . . since 1990, he is a resident of Block 26, Lot 1,
New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol Bliss),
Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City; that he
failed to register as a voter during the general
registration held at Quezon City on March 14 and
15, 1992 because he was sick of Acute
Gastroenteritis as evidenced by the Medical
Certificate duly issued by Dr. Angelito S. Regala,
M.D., of the Family Clinic, Inc.; that he was a
previous registered voter of Manila . . . . that he
would like to transfer and to register as voter in
Quezon City, particularly at Precinct 233-B, New
Capitol Estates, Quezon City because he is now
a resident of Quezon City. 6
Confirming the explanation of private respondent, Barangay
Captain Manuel Laxina testified that he was the Barangay
Captain of New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol Bliss), Barangay
Batasan, Quezon City, since 8 October 1986; that petitioner
(private respondent herein) was a resident of New Capitol Estates
for two (2) years as of the time he testified. LibLex
After due notice and hearing, and without any written opposition,
the petition was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City the dispositive portion of the order stating that —
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
WHEREFORE . . . and it appearing that petitioner
Antonio Viana Hernandez also known as Anthony
Alonzo possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications of a voter plus the fact that
there was no opposition at all, the court resolves
to grant his petition. Accordingly, the Chairman of
the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No.
233-B, New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol
Bliss), Quezon City, is hereby ordered to include
in the official list of voters the name of Antonio
Viana Hernandez also known as Anthony Alonzo
and to allow him to cast his vote in the coming
May 1992 election. Let copy of the Order be
furnished the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 233-B, New Capitol Estates
formerly Capitol Bliss, Quezon City, Election
Registrar, Commission on Elections, Quezon
City, Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
Intramuros, Manila, for their information and
guidance. 7
Consequently, as a registered voter of Precinct Number 233-B,
New Capitol Estates, Quezon City, as judicially confirmed,
the COMELEC had no other recourse but to declare that he was
eligible, hence qualified, to run for the position in question.
COMELEC referred to the action taken by petitioners herein as
one to declare private respondent a "nuisance candidate" and
intimating that they should have instead petitioned COMELEC to
refuse to give due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent, citing Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881, which
provides:
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. —
The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to
give due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery
or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates or by other circumstances
or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate. llcd
Certainly, the holding of COMELEC that private respondent
Hernandez was a "nuisance candidate" is erroneous because,
tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which
we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the
procedure therein provided could not have been properly invoked
by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would require such
petition to be filed at any day after the last day for filing certificates
of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise
that private respondent Hernandez should be treated as a
"nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its
conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the
candidacy of private respondent he being a qualified voter of
Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan
Hills, must be sustained. LexLib
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Commission on Elections in issuing its
questioned resolution of 2 June 1992, the instant petition is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Jurilla v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105436, [June 2,
1994], 302 PHIL 801-807)
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
3. Loreto-Go v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 147741. May 10, 2001.]
REP. MA. CATALINA L. GO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE V.
MONTEJO and ARVIN V. ANTONI, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
The Case
In her petition for certiorari, 1 petitioner seeks to nullify the
resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of
Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates
of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of her
certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty
eight minutes from the deadline. SCHcaT
Forthwith, we issued an order 2 to maintain the status quo ante,
in effect allowing petitioner's certificate of candidacy for governor
in the meantime.
In its Comment, 3 the COMELEC justified its resolution on the
ground that petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it
was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes late at the office of the
municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof
was filed with said office at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the
original copy thereof was actually received by the office of the
municipal election officer of Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day.
The provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at
Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy
for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept
the affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith
because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office
of the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where petitioner
filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
The Facts
Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District,
province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30
June 2001.
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election
officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban
City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province
of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the
provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her
candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte.
However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to
accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to
a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal
election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of
candidacy for mayor.
At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and
considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two
(2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by
fax 4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the
same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28
a.m., 01 March 2001. 5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the
election officer of Baybay, Leyte, received the original of the
affidavit of withdrawal. 6
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
On 05 March 2001, respondent Montejo filed with the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny
due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of
petitioner. 7 Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition to
disqualify petitioner. 8 The petitions were based on the ground
that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions,
namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of
Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.
On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement, referred the
cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department,
on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his prior action
of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal
tendered simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001. 9
In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under
Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without
affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit
responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report
and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc. 10
The report and recommendation reads:
"Submitted for due consideration is the petition
filed by Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V.
Antoni on March 5, 2001, before the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte, seeking to
deny due course and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Catalina L. Go for Governor of Leyte.
"Both petitions which are exactly worded in the
same language allege, as follows:
'This petition is heretofore filed pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 23 of the COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE and Section 15,
as well, of RESOLUTION NO. 3253-A of
the COMELEC EN BANC promulgated on
November 20, 2000. Ditto, this petition is
filed within the reglementary period
following the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy on February 28,
2001. cDHAaT
'Petitioner Atty. Felipe V. Montejo is of
voting age, Filipino, lawyer by profession,
married, and a resident of #50 Juan Luna
Street, Tacloban City, of which locality he
is a registered voter.
'Respondent re. Catalina L. Go, on the
other hand, is likewise of legal age,
married, resident of Baybay, Leyte, of
which locality she is a registered voter, and
the incumbent Member of the House of
Representatives representing the 5th
Congressional District of Leyte.
'Respondent CATALINA L. GO filed a
certificate of candidacy for the office of
Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, Leyte
on February 27, 2001. Without cancelling
or withdrawing the said certificate of
candidacy this time for the office of
Provincial Governor of Leyte on February
28, 2001. However, before the expiration of
the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, respondent indubitably failed to
declare under oath the office for which she
desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office.
'Verily, at the time respondent filed her
certificate of candidacy for Provincial
Governor, she knew fully well that she was
ineligible for the said office, having filed, a
day earlier, a certificate of candidacy for
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. Hence,
respondent falsely represented in her
certificate of candidacy for Provincial
Governor, and under oath, that she is
ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material fact
required by law to be sworn to and
contained in certificates of candidacy. In
fine, respondent likewise falsely
represented in her certificates of
candidacy, under oath, that she will OBEY
THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECREES,
RESOLUTIONS AND REGULATIONS
PROMULGATED AND ISSUED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES; a
material fact required by law to be sworn to
and contained in certificates of candidacy.'
"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to
cancel the said certificate of candidacy is
anchored on Section 73 of the Omnibus Election
Code, quoted hereunder.
'No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
'No person shall be eligible for more than
one office to be filled in the same election,
and if he files his certificate of candidacy
for more than one office, he shall not be
eligible for any of them. However, before
the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, the person who
has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible
and cancel the certificate of candidacy for
the other office or offices.'
"In relation to Section (1) (b) of the Comelec
Resolution No. 3253-A, to wit:
'SECTION 1. Certificate of Candidacy. . . .
(b) No person shall be eligible for more
than one office to be filled in the same
election. If he files a certificate of
candidacy for more than one office he shall
not be eligible for either. However, before
the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificate of candidacy, he may declare
under oath the office for which he desire to
be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the office or offices.'
"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA
LOPEZ LORETO-GO is ineligible to run for either
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte
Province.
"Based on the certified list of candidate for the
provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7, 2001,
the certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez
Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of Leyte
was filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m.
the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and
Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the
affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go,
which was filed on March 01, 2001 at the Office of
the Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte, which she
filed on February 28, 2001.
"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go,
a portion of which reads:
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my
certificate of candidacy for Mayor for the
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE;
"2. That due to political exigency and influence
from my political leaders urging me to run for
Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, Leyte, I have
no other recourse but to follow desire of my
political constituents; DCcHIS
"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the
Municipality of Baybay, Leyte and in it stead I am
formally filing my certificate for Governor of Leyte.
"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina
Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for Governor of
Leyte Province, although filed on the last day of
February 28, 2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on March
1, 2001or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001
deadline. In other word, there are two (2)
certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-
Go, one for governor of Leyte and the other for
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her
affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte,
both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of
Baybay, Leyte and Governor of Leyte were still
subsisting and effective making her liable for filing
two certificates of candidacy on different elective
positions, thus, rendering her ineligible for both
positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of
Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law
Department RECOMMENDS as follows:
"1.) To give due course to the petition of Atty.
Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V. Antonio
against the certificates of candidacy of Catalina
Loreto-Go for Governor of Leyte; and
"2.) To direct the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte and the Election Officer to delete/cancel the
name of CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from
the certified list of candidates for Governor of
Leyte and Mayoralty candidates of Baybay, Leyte,
and to accordingly notify the parties and the
above-named Comelec Officials." 11
On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the
recommendation of the Director, Law Department and adopted
the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of
this decision. 12
Hence, this petition. 13
The Issues
At the oral argument on 07 May 2001, at 3:00 p.m., we defined
the following issues to be addressed by the parties:
I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for
governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay,
Leyte because she filed certificates of
candidacy for both positions?
II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate
of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed
with the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy
was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be
validly filed by fax?
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural
due process of law?
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution
declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of
Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing
of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance
with the requirement of the law. 14 We hold that petitioner's
withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her
certificate of candidacy for governor. 15
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:
"SECTION 73. Certificate of candidacy. — No
person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed herein. ADCETI
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy
may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written
declaration under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one
office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one
office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them. However, before the expiration of the period
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit
of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the
certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be
filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of
the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No.
3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the
withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where
the certificate of candidacy was filed, 16 such requirement is
merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not
mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not
contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a
deficiency in the law. 17 Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit
of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such
candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions
for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the
COMELEC resolution canceling petitioner's certificates of
candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural due
process of law. 18 The petition to cancel her certificate of
candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and
referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila.
On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division, acting on the first
indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his inhibition and required
the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward
his copy of the records of these cases to the Regional Election
Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing. 19 On 18
April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A.
Ibañez issued summons/subpoena to petitioner Go to submit her
consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
including position paper within three (3) days from notice. 20 On
23 April 2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position
paper. 21 On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibañez set the
cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties.
In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC
conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner
an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit
a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her
certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set
the cases for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings
before Director Ibañez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte study of the
cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report
and recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the
COMELEC en banc.
During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena
candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
requires that notice be given to the respondent. Indeed, Section
3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to or
cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:
"Rule 23 — Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
"xxx xxx xxx
"SECTION 3. Summary Proceeding. — The
petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
(emphasis supplied) TIADCc
Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and
recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the petitioner
of procedural due process of law. 22 The COMELEC, acting as a
quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving cases before it. 23
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court
ANNULS COMELEC Resolution No. 3982, adopted on 23 April
2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's certificate of candidacy
for Governor of Leyte. The Chairman, Commission on Elections,
Manila, and the provincial election supervisor of Leyte shall
immediately order the inclusion of petitioner's name in the
certified list of candidates for Governor, province of Leyte, to be
posted in each polling place/voting booth in every precinct
throughout the province of Leyte, in the voters information sheet
to be given to each registered voter therein, in the election
returns, statement of votes by precincts, and certificate of
canvass, and all other election papers.
The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent.
This decision is immediately executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Go v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147741, [May 10,
2001], 410 PHIL 61-77)
4. Luna v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 165983. April 24, 2007.]
JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TOMAS
LAYAO, SOLOMON LALUGAN III, NELIA
LAZAGA, ANTHONY LAYAO, CIPRIANO
LAPEZ, JR., VICTORIA LAYAO, MODERNO
LAPEZ, RODRIGO PARIÑAS, and EUGENIO
CABER DONATO, respondents.
DECISION
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary
injunction or status quo order questioning the 4 June 2004
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First
Division and the 22 November 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in SPA Case No. 04-306. The 4 June 2004
Resolution denied due course to the substitution of petitioner Joy
Chrisma B. Luna (Luna) for Hans Roger Luna (Hans Roger) and
declared the substitution invalid. The 22 November 2004
Resolution denied Luna's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for
the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for
Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the
same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra
removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and
placed the name of Luna. aCASEH
On 20 April 2004, private respondents Tomas Layao, Solomon
Lalugan III, Nelia Lazaga, Anthony Layao, Cipriano Lapez, Jr.,
Victoria Layao, Moderno Lapez, Rodrigo Pariñas, and Eugenio
Caber Donato (private respondents) filed a petition for the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of
Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false
material representation in her certificate of candidacy because
Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered
voter of Bangued, Abra. Private respondents also claimed that
Luna's certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the
substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private
respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on
election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-
mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna. 2
The COMELEC's Ruling
In the 4 June 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC First Division
granted the petition and denied due course to the substitution of
Luna for Hans Roger. The COMELEC First Division ruled that,
while Luna complied with the procedural requirements for
substitution, Hans Roger was not a valid candidate for vice-
mayor. The COMELEC First Division pointed out that Hans
Roger, being underage, 3 did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, Hans Roger was not a valid candidate for
vice-mayor who could be substituted by Luna. The COMELEC
First Division also ruled that Luna was not a registered voter of
Lagayan, Abra and that this was sufficient to disqualify Luna from
running as vice-mayor. HICSTa
On 28 June 2004, Luna filed a motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc. Luna added that the 4 June 2004
Resolution was issued in violation of her right to due process
because she was not given the opportunity to present evidence
on her behalf with the COMELEC First Division.
In the 22 November 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC En
Banc denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed with
modification the 4 June 2004 Resolution. The COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being underage, may
not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC En Bancalso
ruled that Luna's right to due process was not violated because
Luna was notified of the petition and was given the opportunity to
be heard. However, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that Luna was
a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra.
Hence, this petition.
In a Resolution dated 11 January 2005, we required the parties
to maintain the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC resolutions pending the resolution of this
petition. 4
The Issues
Luna raised the following issues:
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that there
was no violation of Luna's right to due
process; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that there
was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans
Roger.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Luna's Right to Due Process was not Violated
Luna contends that her right to due process was violated because
she was not given the opportunity to present her evidence before
the COMELEC First Division. ACcaET
Under Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
shall be heard summarily after due notice. The law mandates that
the candidates must be notified of the petition against them and
should be given the opportunity to present evidence on their
behalf. 5 This is the essence of due process.
In this case, the COMELEC En Banc stated that the records
showed that three days after the petition was filed, the Provincial
Election Supervisor, as hearing officer, with the assistance of the
Philippine National Police Provincial Command, tried to
personally serve a copy of the petition to Luna. But Luna refused
to formally receive the petition. On 26 April 2004, the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor sent the notice via registered mail
and still Luna did not file an answer.
The Court finds that Luna's right to due process was not violated.
The COMELEC notified Luna of the petition filed against her and
Luna was given the opportunity to present evidence on her
behalf. This constitutes compliance with the requirements of due
process. aHATDI
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid
Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of
candidacy and, subsequently, upon Hans Roger's withdrawal of
his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by
Luna.
On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being
under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate
of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate who could
be substituted by Luna.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code)
provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and
acknowledging receipt. — The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or
officer designated by the Commission or the
board of election inspectors under the succeeding
section shall have the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy. CSDTac
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy
on 5 January 2004, 6 the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger's certificate of
candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give
due course to Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy. 7
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of
candidacy. The Election Code allows a person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election
by submitting a written declaration under oath. 8 There is no
provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his
certificate of candidacy before the election. 9
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as
substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code
prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for
any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of
candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. — If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated
by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of election day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the
Commission. TEHDIA
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and
the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the
procedural requirements for a valid substitution, 10 Luna can
validly substitute for Hans Roger.
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger,
being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted
by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper
proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. 11 In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 12 the
Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance
of the COMELEC.
Section 74 13 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of
candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of the
person filing the certificate. Section 78 14 of the Election Code
provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has
committed false material representation, a verified petition to
deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said
person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the
time of filing of the certificate of candidacy. AHSaTI
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date
of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may
only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
Election Code.
In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only
declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to
deny due course to or cancel Luna's certificate of candidacy. In
effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled
Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy and declared the
substitution by Luna invalid.
It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due
course to or cancel Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy. For if
the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy
after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and
there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled and denied due
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
course. 15 However, Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy was
never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC. SAHIaD
Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of
candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid
candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Roger's certificate of
candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance
with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger's certificate of
candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM
the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that there was no violation
of petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna's right to due process. We SET
ASIDE the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that the substitution
by petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna for Hans Roger Luna was
invalid. Petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna validly substituted for
Hans Roger Luna. SHTcDE
SO ORDERED.
||| (Luna v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 165983, [April 24,
2007], 550 PHIL 284-294)
5. Monsale v. Nico
[G.R. No. L-2539. May 28, 1949.]
JOSE P. MONSALE, protestant-appellee, vs.
PAULINO M. NICO, protestee-appellant.
Cirilo Mapa, Jr. and Jose Gaton for appellant.
Felix V. Macalalang for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTION; CANDIDATE'S WITHDRAWAL OF
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; LETTER TO WITHDRAW
THE WITHDRAWAL FEW DAYS BEFORE ELECTION,
EFFECT OF. — There is no question as to the right of a
candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of
candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such
withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-one days
before the election, the protestant ceased to be a candidate
by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of fact the boards of
election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao were duly
notified of his withdrawal. His letter to the Commission on
Elections dated November 6, 1947, which the subscribed and
swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he
withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can
only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which,
having been filed only four days before the election, could not
legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides
that such certificate should be filed at least sixty days before
the election.
2. ID.; FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD; PURPOSE OF THE LAW. — The
evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates
of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable
the voters to know, at least sixty days before a regular
election, the candidates among whom they are to make the
choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the
tabulation of the votes cast; for it the law did not confine the
choice or election by the voters to the duly registered
candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as
there were voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown
or factitious as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
candidate for another office in the same election.
3. ID.; CANDIDATE VOTED FOR WHO HAS NOT
RESENTED A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. — A
candidate voted for who has not presented a certificate of
candidacy has no right to contest the election.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
4. ID.; FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
AFTER EXPIRATION OF TIME LIMIT, WHEN ALLOWED. —
The only instance wherein the law permits the filing of a
certificate of candidacy after the expiration of the time limit for
filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly
filed dies or becomes disqualified.
DECISION
OZAETA, J p:
This is an appeal by the protestee from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo declaring the protestant
elected municipal mayor of Miagao as a result of the general
elections held on November 11, 1947.
It appears that the protestant withdrew his certificate of
candidacy on October 10, 1947, but, on November 7,
attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The
Commission on Elections, however, ruled on November 8 that
the protestant could no longer be a candidate in spite of his
desire to withdraw his withdrawal. A canvass of the election
returns showed that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received
2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao, 126,
votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently
because the votes cast in his favor had not been counted for
the reason that he was not a registered candidate.
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
The pivotal question presented in this appeal is
whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of
candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of
withdrawal or by filing a new certificate of candidacy, after the
deadline provided by law for the filing of such certificate.
Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act
No. 180) provides that "no person shall be eligible
unless. within the time fixed by law, he files a duly signed and
sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at
least sixty days before a regular election, and thirty days at
least before a special election, the . . . certificates of candidacy
for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal secretary,
who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling
places concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board, and
to the Commission on Elections." Section 38 further provides
that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filing certificates
of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly
filed should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified
citizen may file a certificate of candidacy for the office for
which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in
accordance with the preceding sections on or before midday
of the day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and the
midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of inspectors of the political division where he is a
candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the
entire electorate, with the Commission on Elections."
In the present case the protestant withdrew his
certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and requested
the Commission on Elections that it "be considered as though
it has never been filed at all." There is no question as to the
right of a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of
candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such
withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-one days
before the election, the protestant ceased to be a candidate
by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of fact the boards of
election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao were duly
notified of his withdrawal. His letter to the Commission on
Elections dated November 6, 1947, which he subscribed and
swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he
withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can
only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which,
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
having been filed only four days before the election, could not
legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides
that such certificate should be filed at least sixty days before
the election.
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing
of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor
are (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before
a regular election, the candidates among whom ,they are to
make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and
inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law
did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly
registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted
for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for
unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes
in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
The only instance wherein the law permits the filing of
a certificate of candidacy after the expiration of the time limit
for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy
duly filed dies or becomes disqualified.
The Commission on Elections was, therefore, right in
holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a
candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In
the case of Clutario vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No.
L-1704, this court sustained the ruling of said commission
upon similar facts that "by his own voluntary act and deed
petitioner has nullified his certificate of candidacy and in the
light of the election laws such certificate of candidacy has
been definitely withdrawn, hence nonexisting."
Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a
petition contesting the election of a provincial or municipal
officer-elect shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of
the province by any candidate voted for in said election and
who has presented a certificate of candidacy." This clearly
implies that a candidate voted for who has not presented a
certificate of candidacy has no right to contest the election. In
other words, the herein protestant, not being a registered
candidate, has no standing before the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the
protest is ordered dismissed, with costs against the appellee.
So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason,
Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Monsale v. Nico, G.R. No. L-2539, [May 28, 1949], 83 PHIL
758-764)
6. Cipriano v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004.]
ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor
represented by her father ROLANDO
CIPRIANO, (AND OTHER YOUTH OF THE
LAND AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY
SITUATED), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Election Officer
LOPE GAYO, JR., 1st DISTRICT, Pasay City,
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY thru its
Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO of Barangay
38, Pasay City, GREG PAOLO ALCERA in his
capacity as SK Federation President of Pasay
City, EDNA TIBAR — a minor assisted by
parents, KRISTAL GALE BONGGO — a minor
assisted by parents, SK Chairman RUEL
TAYAM DECENA of Barangay 142, Pasay City,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS AND
YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
and THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the
exercise of its power to enforce and administer election laws, look
into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of
candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications
prescribed by law? This is the issue that needs to be resolved in
this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P. Cipriano, the duly
elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu
proprio on the ground that she was not a registered voter in
the barangay where she intended to run.
On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. 1
On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the
Commission's Law Department to deny due course to or cancel
the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK
elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the
findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other
candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters
in the barangay where they intended to run. 2
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK
elections and her name was not deleted from the official list of
candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was
proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly
elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City. 3 She took her
oath of office on August 14, 2002. 4
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No.
5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of
said resolution. She argued that a certificate of candidacy may
only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition
filed by any registered candidate for the same position under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sections
5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner,
the report of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be
considered a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to
or cancel one's certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also claimed
that she was denied due process when her certificate of
candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and
hearing. Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did
not have jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of the
Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended
that she may only be removed by a petition for quo warranto after
her proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman. 5
On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
5781, 6 resolving petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It cited
its previous resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to
Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No.
5584 its policy on proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for
not being registered voters in the place where they were elected.
It explained:
A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the
procedure adopted by the Commission in denying
due course the certificate of candidacy of a
candidate. It reads:
Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801,
Election Officers were given the duty to: (1)
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
verify whether all candidates
for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan positions are registered voters of
the barangay where they filed their
certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine
the entries of the certificates of candidacy
and determine on the basis of said entries
whether the candidate concerned
possesses all the qualifications of a
candidate. CcEHaI
Further, Election Officers are mandated to
report by registered mail and by rush
telegram to the Law Department of this
Commission the names of candidates who
are not registered voters in the place where
they seek to run for public office within
three (3) days from the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy. The names of
these candidates, however, shall still be
included in the certified lists of candidates
until the Commission directs otherwise.
By virtue of the said report, the Law
Department makes a recommendation to
the Commission En Banc, and the latter, by
virtue of an En BancResolution either gives
due course to or denies/cancels the
certificates of candidacy of the said
candidates.
Verily, the administrative inquiry of the
Commission on the eligibility of candidates
starts from the time they filed their
certificates of candidacy. The candidates,
by virtue of the publication of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 on May 25, 2002 in
the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin
are deemed to have constructive notice of
the said administrative inquiry. Thus, the
Commission, by virtue of its administrative
powers, may motu proprio deny/cancel the
certificates of candidacy of candidates who
are found to be not registered voters in the
place where they seek to run for public
office.
Any registered candidate for the same
office may also file a verified petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy pursuant to Section 69
(nuisance candidate) or Sec. 78 (material
misrepresentation in the certificate of
candidacy) of the Omnibus Election Code
either personally or through a duly
authorized representative within five (5)
days from the last day for filing of certificate
of candidacy directly with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor or with the
Office of the Election Officer concerned.
Hence, as long as the Election Officer
reported the alleged ineligibility in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution
No. 4801, or the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy was filed within the
reglementary period, the fact that the
Resolution of this Commission, denying
due course to or canceling the certificate of
candidacy of an ineligible candidate, was
not promulgated or did not arrive prior to or
on the day of the elections is therefore of
no moment. The proclamation of an
ineligible candidate is not a bar to the
exercise of this Commission's power to
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
implement the said Resolution of the
Commission En Banc because it already
acquired the jurisdiction to determine the
ineligibility of the candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy even before
elections by virtue of either the report of the
Election Officer or the petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for
disqualification, the provisions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 are
likewise clear: (1) 'A verified petition to
disqualify a candidate on the ground of
ineligibility or under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code may be filed at
anytime before proclamation of the winning
candidate by any registered voter or any
candidate for the same office,' (2) "All
disqualification cases filed on the ground of
ineligibility shall survive, although the
candidate has already been proclaimed.'
Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted
provisions, the proclamation of a candidate
who is found to be disqualified is also not a
bar to the Commission's power to order a
proclaimed candidate to cease and desist
from taking his oath of office or from
assuming the position to which he was
elected.
By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed
candidates who were found to be ineligible
only after they were elected and
proclaimed, the provisions of Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code are clear:
The remedy of losing candidates is to file a
petition for quo warranto before the
metropolitan or municipal trial court. This is
logical — The Commission did not acquire
jurisdiction over these proclaimed
candidates prior to election (i.e., There was
no report from the Election Officer
regarding their ineligibility and no petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate
of candidacy and/or petition for
disqualification was filed against them.)
Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction
to annul their proclamation on the ground
of ineligibility, except in cases wherein the
proclamation is null and void for being
based on incomplete canvass.
Thus, the Commission ruled:
Premises considered, the Commission,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
establish a policy as follows:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO
BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE
ELECTED.
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate
of candidacy was denied due course to or
cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the
Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did
not arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to
implement the resolution of the Commission
deleting the name of the candidate whose
certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was
ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking
his oath of office or from assuming the position to
which he was elected, unless a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Supreme
Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for
the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected
candidates and correcting the Certificate of
Canvass of Proclamation. 7
The Commission further stated:
Considering that there are queries as to the status
of the proclamation of disqualified candidates as
an offshoot of Resolution No. 5584, the same was
amended by virtue of Resolution No. 5666, the
dispositive portion of which now reads:
Considering the above-quoted provision,
the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to APPROVE the
recommendation of Commissioner Sadain
to amend Resolution No. 5584
promulgated on 10 August 2002 with
modification.
Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall
now read as follows:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND
TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT
REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED . . .
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) . . .
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that
the disqualified candidate is proclaimed
the winner despite his disqualification or
despite the pending disqualification case
filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the
proclamation of said disqualified candidate
is hereby declared void from the beginning,
even if the dispositive portion of the
resolution disqualifying him or canceling
his certificate of candidacy does not
provide for such an annulment. 8
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:
a) To declare illegal and unconstitutional the
COMELEC Resolution No. 5363
promulgated on 15 July 2002 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 5781
promulgated on October 7, 2002 and any
other COMELEC actions and resolutions
which are intended to summarily oust and
remove petitioner as SK Chairman of
Barangay 38, Pasay City without any
notice, inquiry, election protest, petition
for quo warranto, investigation and
hearing, and therefore a clear violation of
due process of law. CAScIH
b) To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC
Resolutions sitting en banc which does not
have authority to decide election related
case, including pre-proclamation
controversies, in the first instance, in
consonance to this Honorable Court's
ruling in the cases of Sarmiento vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308, August 29,
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
1989 and Garvida vs. Sales, G.R. No.
124893, April 18, 1997.
c) To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7
of R.A. 9164 and also to declare the age of
membership and its officers of the KK or
SK organization from 15 to 21 years old in
accordance with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423
(b) and other provisions of R.A.
7160 otherwise known as Local
Government Code of 1991.
d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained
as constitutional to direct all SK Officers
and Members who are now more than 18
years old to cease and desist from
continuously functioning as such SK
Officers and Members and to vacate their
respective SK Officers position, as they are
no longer members of the Sangguniang
Kabataan organization or Katipunan ng
Kabataan organization for being over age
upon attaining the age of 18 years old.
e) To direct respondents to pay the salary,
allowance and other benefits of the
petitioner as SK Chairperson of Barangay
38, Pasay City. 9
Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in this case is the
validity of Resolution No. 5363 of the COMELEC.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due process when the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 canceling her certificate
of candidacy. She claims that the resolution was intended to oust
her from her position as SK Chairman without any appropriate
action and proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its resolution by
invoking its administrative power to enforce and administer
election laws. Thus, in the exercise of such power, it may motu
proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates
who are found to be unqualified for the position they are seeking.
The Commission further contends that the publication of
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the conduct of
the Barangay and SK elections in two newspapers of general
circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates regarding the
Commission's administrative inquiry into their certificates of
candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to
govern the conduct of elections and to ensure that the electoral
process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." 10 As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is
clothed with the three powers of government — executive or
administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the
power to determine the number and location of polling places,
appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections; register political parties, organization or
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute
election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal
or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or
employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its
directive, order or decision. It also has direct control and
supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of
election. 11 Its legislative authority is found in its power to
promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission
is required to enforce and administer. 12 The Constitution has
also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was granted
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. 13
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the
Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in
the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny
due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise
of such authority, however, must be in accordance with the
conditions set by law. EICScD
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its
broad administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate
of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the
Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and
acknowledging receipt. — The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or
officer designated by the Commission or the
board of election inspectors under the succeeding
section shall have the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to
give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. 14 The duty of the COMELEC to give due course
to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in
character. While the Commission may look into patent defects
in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of
said body. 15
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows
any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that
any material representation therein is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the petition
shall be heard summarily after due notice. EHTADa
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must
be notified of the petition against him and he should be given the
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. This is the essence
of due process. Due process demands prior notice and hearing.
Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal shows
substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due
process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce
his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence
should be considered in the adjudication of the case. 16 In a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy,
since the proceedings are required to be summary, the parties
may, after due notice, be required to submit their position papers
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)

together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted with grave
documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When there is a abuse of discretion and therefore void.
need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the
We need not rule on the question raised by petitioner as regards
Commission en banc or Division, the parties may be allowed to
the constitutionality of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No.
cross-examine the affiants. 17
9164 lowering the age of membership in the SK as it is not the lis
Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due mota of this case.
course or cancellation of one's certificate of candidacy is not
IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No. 5363
within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather
promulgated on July 15, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No.
calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative
5781 issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE.
power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental SO ORDERED.
organs. 18 We have earlier enumerated the scope of the
Commission's administrative functions. On the other hand, where ||| (Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 158830,
a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial [August 10, 2004], 479 PHIL 677-692)
nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions
of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial
officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. 19 7. Abcede v. Imperial

[G.R. No. L-13001. March 18, 1958.]

The determination whether a material representation in the
certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination ALFREDO ABCEDE, petitioner, vs. HON.
whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking DOMINGO IMPERIAL, GAUDENCIO GARCIA,
involves a determination of fact where both parties must be and SIXTO BRILLANTES, Commissioners of
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Elections, respondents.
Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of
one's right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one's right
to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate Felipe L. Abel for petitioner.
concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he Dominador D. Dayot for respondents.
be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It
should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC
claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commission's inquiry SYLLABUS
into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but
he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove 1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MINISTERIAL
that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks. DUTY TO RECEIVE CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY;
In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution No. MANDATORY DUTY TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE
5363 and Resolution No. 5781, canceling petitioner's certificate SAME. — When the Revised Election Code imposes upon the
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
Commission on Elections the ministerial duty to receive
certificates of candidacy, it implies thereby that said
certificates should be given due course.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF DECISION LIMITED TO
PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS. — While the
Constitution has given the Commission on Elections the
"exclusive charge" of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative
questions." (Art. X, Sec. 2, Constitution.) It has no authority to
decide matters "involving the right to vote." It may not even
pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party vs.
Commission on Elections, 47 Off. Gaz., 2851). For more
reason, it cannot determine who among those possessing the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have
complied with the procedural requirements relative to the filing
of certificates of candidacy - should be allowed to enjoy the
full benefits intended by law therefor. This is a matter of policy,
not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy
must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative functions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO PREPARE AND
DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY
LIKEWISE MINISTERIAL. — Whether or not the Commission
on Elections should incur the expenses incident to the
preparation and distribution of copies of the certificates of
candidacy of those who, in its opinion, do not have a chance
to get a substantial number of votes, is another question of
policy for Congress, not the Commission, to settle.
Compliance with the provision of law requiring the preparation
and immediate distribution of copies of the certificates of
candidacy is, likewise ministerial. If the Commission believes,
however, that the effect thereof is to unnecessarily impose a
useless burden upon the Government, then the remedy is to
call the attention of Congress thereto, coupled with the
corresponding proposals, recommendations, or suggestions
for such amendments as may be deemed best.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner
Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on Elections, his
certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President of the
Philippines, in connection with the elections to be held on
November 12 of the same year. On or about said
date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the
Commission on Elections to appear before the same on
September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of
candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to
be given due course," with the admonition that their failure to
so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to
consider said certificates of candidacy as not filed in good faith
and not to give due course thereto. After due hearing, at
which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the
Commission issued a resolution dated October 4, 1957,
ordering that the certificates of candidacy of the persons
therein named, including that of said petitioner, "shall not be
given due course." A reconsideration of such resolution
having been denied, Abcede filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, praying that the resolution be
annulled and that his aforementioned certificate of candidacy
be given due course. Upon motion of petitioner herein, this
Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
respondent to refrain and desist from carrying out the
resolution above referred to, pending the final disposition of
the case at bar.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
Insofar as petitioner herein is concerned, the action
taken by the Commission on Elections is based upon the
following facts, set forth in its said resolution, from which we
quote:
"Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for
senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which
his votes were nil. In this election he presents his
candidacy for President of the Philippines, with
the redemption of the Japanese war notes as his
main program of government. It is of record that
the Bureau of Posts, by Fraud Order No. 2, dated
November 2, 1955, banned from the use of the
Philippine mail all matters of whatever class
mailed by, or addressed to, the Japanese War
Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc.,
and its agents and representatives, including
Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede,
which order was based on the findings of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, confirmed
by the Secretary of Justice, that said entity and its
agents and representatives, including
Alfredo Abcede, are engaged in a scheme to
obtain money from the public by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is
convinced that the certificate of candidacy of
Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than
a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number
of votes of the electorate."
In holding that it has, under these facts, the
power not to give due course to petitioner's
certificate of candidacy, the Commission on
Elections gave the following reasons:
"The Commission believes that while
Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes
upon the Commission the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge certificates of
candidacy, the law leaves to the Commission a
measure of discretion on whether to give due
course to a particular certificate of candidacy
should it find said certificate of candidacy to have
been filed not bona fide. We also believe that a
certificate of candidacy is not bona fide when it is
filed, as a matter of caprice or fancy, by a person
who is incapable of understanding the full
meaning of his acts and the true significance of
election and without any political organization or
visible supporters behind him so that he has not
even the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable
indorsement of a substantial portion of the
electorate, or when the one who files the same
exerts no tangible effort, shown by overt acts, to
pursue to a semblance of success his candidacy.
"The law requires the certificate of
candidacy to be under oath in acknowledgment of
its serious character as an indispensable segment
in the process of election, the first step that a
citizen has to take in seeking public trust and in
avoiding service to the common weal. It is a
solemn matter, not to be taken lightly.
"The giving due course to a certificate of
candidacy is a process of no mean proportion,
particularly for the offices of President and Vice
President of the Philippines and Senator which
involve the printing at public expense of around
136,000 copies of each certificate of candidacy;
the printing of the names of the candidates in
several election forms; the mailing, sorting, and
distribution of the copies of said certificates of
candidacy and forms among the 34,000 polling
places throughout the country; the entering of the
names of the candidates by the board of
inspectors in still other forms; etc. Considering all
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
these, the Commission is satisfied with the view
that Congress could not have meant to make as a
ministerial duty of the Commission to give due
course to every certificate of candidacy, no matter
how senseless said certificate of candidacy may
be, thus in effect authorizing a meaningless
expenditure of a considerable amount of public
funds, and in the process put added routinary
burden on the already heavily burdened election
machinery, as well as shear off the election much
of its dignity as a solemn process of democracy.
"Based on existing records of the
Commission and on evidence adduced during the
hearing on the certificates of candidacy
mentioned above, the Commission finds, and so
declares, that the said certificates of candidacy
have not been filed in good faith on grounds
hereunder stated."
Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that
"certificates of candidacy of candidates for President . . . shall
be filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order
the preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all
the election precincts of the Philippines . . . "
It further provides that said certificates shall be
distributed as follows:
". . . the Commission on Elections . . . shall
immediately send copies thereof to the secretary
of the Provincial Board of each province where
the elections will be held, and the latter shall in
turn immediately forward copies to all the polling
places. The Commission on Elections shall
communicate the names of said candidates to the
secretary of the provincial board by telegraph. If
the certificate of candidacy is sent by mail, it
shallbe by registered mail, and the date on which
the package was deposited in the post- office may
be considered as the filing date thereof if
confirmed by a telegram or radiogram addressed
to the Commission on Elections on the same
date."
Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code:
"The Commission on Election, the
secretary of the provincial board, and the
municipal secretary, in their respective cases,
shall have the ministerial duty to receive the
certificates of candidacy referred to in the
preceding section and to immediately
acknowledge receipt thereof."
The foregoing provisions give the Commission no
discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's
certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has,
admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of
candidacy. Of what use would it be to receive it if the certificate
were not to be given due course? We must not assume that
Congress intended to require a useless act — that it would
have imposed a mandatory duty to do something vain, futile
and empty.
Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission
"shall immediately send copies" of said certificates to the
secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of
this requirement, evinced by the imperative character
generally attached to the term "shall", is stressed by the
peremptory connotation of the adverb "immediately."
Again, the Constitution fixes the
qualifications for the office of the highest
magistrate of the land. All possessors of such
qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at
least, to aspire to such office and to run therefor,
provided that they file their respective certificates
of candidacy within the time, at the place and in
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
the manner provided by law, and petitioner herein
has done so.
Lastly, as the branch of the executive department —
although independent of the President — to which the
Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the
"enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions."
(Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) It has no
authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote". It may
not even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista
Party vs. Commission on Elections, * 47 Off. Gaz., [6], 2851).
We do not see, therefore, how it could whether, if so granted
— in the vague, abstract, indeterassert the greater and more
far-reaching authority to determine who — among those
possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution,
who have complied with the procedural requirements relative
to the filing of certificates of candidacy — should be allowed to
enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefor. The question
whether in order to enjoy those benefits — a candidate must
be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and
the true significance of election," and must have — over a
month prior to the elections (when the resolution complained
of was issued) "the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable
indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate," is a
matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the
law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of
specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the
Commission claims to have, it is dubious minate and
undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon
the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must
not be deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive
provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar) —
the legislative enactment would not amount to undue
delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S.
495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)
The case of Ciriaco S. Garcia vs. Imperial, L-12930
(October 22, 1957) cited in respondent's answer is not in
point. That case referred to the certificates of candidacy of
Ciriaco S. Garcia of San Simon, Pampanga, Carlos C. Garcia
of Iloilo City, and Eulogio Palma Garcia of Butuan City, all for
the Office of the President of the Philippines, filed in
September, 1957. The facts therein are set forth in the
pertinent resolution of the Commission on Elections from
which we quote:
"Ciriaco S. Garcia, . . . admitted, . . . that he
had not up to the date of the hearing held any
public meeting relative to his candidacy; had not
posted any handbills or posters or banners
announcing his candidacy; had not established
any national headquarters; and had no line-up for
vice-president, senators, or members of
Congress. In connection with the case of Ciriaco
S. Garcia, counsel for the intervenor presented
documents as exhibits. . . . all showing that Ciriaco
S. Garcia had not shown any active interest in his
candidacy. Relative to the case of Carlos C.
Garcia, counsel for intervenor presented a
witness, Salvador del Rosario, who testified to the
effect that he knows personally said Carlos C.
Garcia as a former dress maker and now
maintains a bar in the city of Iloilo that he has not
done anything to promote his supposed
candidacy; and that he is a brother- in-law of Atty.
Tomas Vargas, a prominent Liberal Party leader
in the province of Iloilo. He also submitted as
evidence the telegram of the provincial
commander of Iloilo reporting that said Carlos C.
Garcia is not a well known person in Iloilo. And as
regards Eulogio Palma Garcia, counsel for
intervenor likewise submitted a telegram of the
provincial commander of Agusan to the effect that
said Eulogio Palma Garcia is an unknown person
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
in Agusan. He further pointed out that the address
of said Eulogio Palma Garcia, as appearing in this
certificate of candidacy, is c/o Tranquilino O. Calo,
Jr., a nephew of ex- congressman Calo,
and official candidate of the Liberal Party for
Senator." (Emphasis ours.)
The findings of the Commission were as follows:
"The Commission is convinced that the
failure of Carlos C. Garcia, a bar tender, and
Eulogio Palma Garcia, a person who has not even
a residence of his own, to appear before the
Commission, notwithstanding the mandatory
statement issued them, which had been received
in their behalf, to the effect that failure to appear
on their part before the Commission as required
would be sufficient for the Commission to
consider their certificates of candidacy, as filed in
bad faith, shows that they are not actually
interested in the outcome of their pretended
candidacy, and/or that they fear that their
personal appearance before the Commission
would not expose too clearly the true motives
behind the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
"As regards Ciriaco S. Garcia, a former
chief of police, with no visible property to his
name, . . . the Commission is likewise satisfied . .
. that his certificate of candidacy was filed without
the least idea of actively pursuing the same,
but simply to prejudice a legitimate and bona fide
candidate, President Carlos P. Garcia.
"Each of said three certificates of
candidacy is a well fitted piece in an overall
conspired scheme to fairly prejudice the
candidacy of President Carlos P. Garcia. Even the
circumstances of geography and of course of
names have been suitably played upon to achieve
in the most of active way the desired objective
of destroying legitimate votes for the bona fide
candidate. Ciriaco S. Garcia hails from Central
Luzon; Carlos C. Garcia is from Central Visayas;
and Eulogio Palma Garcia is from Northern
Mindanao. The names used are such that all
votes for 'Carlos Garcia', 'C. Garcia', 'P. Garcia',
and 'Garcia' would be declared stray. The
mischief aimed to be realized by the plan is too
plain to be missed by any impartial mind. . . ..
"The Commission, . . . is clear in the
conclusion that all said three certificates of
candidacy have been filed not for the purpose of
winning the election or even to obtain a
substantial number of votes for the presidency of
the Philippines but for the purpose of prejudicing
the candidacy of a candidate in good faith by
nullifying the votes cast for the same name and/or
surname of said candidate in good faith.
...
"We reiterate here what the Commission
has already said in the similar case of Re-
Certificate of Candidacy of Eduardo A. Barreto.
(Case No. 179):
'The duty of the Commission under these
circumstances is too plain to be mistaken. The law
could not have intended nor will the Commission
allow itself to be made a party to fraud against
the integrity and purity of election. Election is not
a game of mean political tricks where deceit wins
a premium. It is an honest process, governed by
fair rules of law and good conduct. In election as
well as in any other field of fair
contest, deceit cannot be allowed to clothe itself
in legal technicalities end demand a prize. It must
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
be condemned and never tolerated."' (Emphasis
ours.)
In other words, the candidates in question did not really
aspire to be elected President of the Philippines. Their
certificates of candidacy were filed merely for the purpose of
nullifying, in effect, all votes cast in favor of "Garcia", "C.
Garcia", and "P. Garcia", even if the voters intended to vote
for Carlos P. Garcia, the incumbent of said office. The
objective was, evidently, to prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate. Had the certificates of candidacy
in question been given due course, maintained, whether or
not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid election
inspectors, who would be at a loss as to whom to credit the
votes cast for "Carlos Garcia", "C. Garcia", "P. Garcia", and
"Garcia" or whether said votes should not be counted, as stray
votes. Thus, an opportunity would be created to subject the
election officers throughout the Philippines to complaints,
either by the opponents of the incumbent President, if the
votes were credited to him, or by the Nacionalista Party, if the
votes were counted in favor of either Ciriaco S. Garcia, or
Carlos C. Garcia, or Eulogio Palma Garcia, or considered as
stray votes. What is more, this could have led to, or given an
excuse for, public disorders which may not have been
altogether unlikely, in the light of the conditions then existing.
Worse, still, there would have been no means, under the law,
to ascertain whether the aforementioned votes were intended
for the incumbent President Carlos P. Garcia, or for the
petitioners in said case. The action of the Commission therein
tended, therefore, to insure free, orderly and honest elections,
which is its main concern, under our fundamental law and the
Revised Election Code. Such, however, is not the situation
obtaining in the case at bar.
Whether or not the Commission on Elections should
incur the expenses incident to the preparation and distribution
of copies of the certificates of candidacy of those who, in its
opinion, do not have a chance to get a substantial number of
votes, is another question of policy for Congress, not the
Commission, to settle. When the Revised Election Code
imposes upon the Commission the ministerial duty to receive
those certificates and provides that said Commission shall
immediately prepare and distribute copies thereof to the
offices mentioned in section 36 of said Code, it necessarily
implies that compliance with the latter provision is, likewise,
ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the
effect thereof is to unnecessarily impose a useless burden
upon the Government, then the remedy is to call the attention
of Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding
proposals, recommendations, or suggestions for such
amendments as may be deemed best, consistently with the
democratic nature of our political system.
Needless to say, the vigilant attitude of the Commission
on Elections and the efforts exerted by the same to comply
with what it considers its duty, merit full and unqualified
recognition, as well as commendation of the highest order. In
this particular case, however, the action of the Commission as
regards petitioner's certificate of candidacy is beyond the
bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void.
Wherefore, the aforementioned resolution of the
Commission on Elections is hereby annulled, insofar as
petitioner Alfredo Abcede is concerned, and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued made permanent,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
||| (Abcede v. Imperial, G.R. No. L-13001, [March 18, 1958], 103
PHIL 136-145)
8. Garvida v. Sales
[G.R. No. 124893. April 18, 1997.]
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and
PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI
PIPO, respondents.
Ernesto B. Asuncion for petitioner.
Onofre P. Tejada for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991;
SEC. 532 (a), PROVIDES WHICH LAW SHALL COVER AND
WHICH GOVERNING BODY SHALL, SUPERVISE THE
CONDUCT OF THE SK ELECTIONS. — Section 532 (a) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the
SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall
be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus
Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz;
"Sec. 78, Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before election." In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective
office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on
the ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and
evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC
after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in
Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number
of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not
obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore
the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide
election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission
shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or
petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases,
provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except
in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.
2. ID.; ELECTIONS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURES;
PROVIDES FOR THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF
PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COMELEC. — Formal
requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure: "Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion
and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies.
However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee,
the petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies
of the petition or protest as there are additional respondents or
protestees. Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in
the immediately preceding section must be filed directly with the
proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless
otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter
case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement
as to the number of copies must be complied with. Sec. 3.Form
of pleadings, etc. — All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall
be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper
shall be in English or Filipino. . . ." Every pleading before the
COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal
size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of
the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SANCTION A PLEADING FILED BY
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION. — A facsimile or fax transmission
is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of
each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current
is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an
image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that
produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of
Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is,
at best, in exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be
a sham pleading.
4. ID.; ID.; KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN; SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN (SK); COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF OFFICE.
— The Local Government Code of 1991changed the Kabataang
Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained
the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not
more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed
of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically
becomes ex-officio member of the Sanggunian Barangay. A
member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless
sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently
incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. Membership in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid
down by the Local Government Code of 1991.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS; OF MEMBERS; OF
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS. — Under Section 424 of the Local
Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the
barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21
years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang
Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code
requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan
must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan
ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not
more 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read
and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2824
DEFINED HOW A MEMBER OF THE KATIPUNAN NG
KABATAAN BECOMES A QUALIFIED VOTER AND AN
ELECTIVE OFFICIAL. — For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the
COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined
how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a
qualified voter and an elective official. A member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK
elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21
years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between
May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the
barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing
qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to
read and write.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATIONS; DISTINGUISHED.
— A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a
distinction between the maximum age of a member in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)

official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate
at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the be less than 22 years on election day.
member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand,
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The general
Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK
rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must
official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of
not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The
the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional
only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on
during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to
election day or on the day he registers as member of the
serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not
According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been
be more than 21 years old on the day, of election. The distinction
elected prior to his 21st birthday. Conversely, the SK official must
is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section
qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the
423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at
Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. (Of things
which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of
dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.) The courts may distinguish when
his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore
there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to
intended a distinction or qualification. The requirement that a
Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra
candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public
vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official
policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can
on the day of his election.
be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over
the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. 10. ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATION, A QUESTION OF
The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age ELIGIBILITY; CONSEQUENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE; CASE
requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. The will of AT BAR. — The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number of
of ineligibility. votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. A
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT MORE THAN 21 YEARS OF AGE;
Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has failed to
CONSTRUED. — The provision that an elective official of the SK
prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's
should not be more than 21 years of age on the day, of his
ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the
election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of
intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their
years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is
votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. Neither can this Court
understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first
order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government
day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang
365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. The phrase
Kabataan member who obtained the next higher number of votes
"not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not
in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies when a
beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails
21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because
to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is
that would be more than 21 365-days cycles. "Not more than 21
permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been
years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility.
Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being
legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack
of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the
order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en bancsuspending her proclamation as the duly
elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996.
On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member
and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers,
however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner,
who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824. aisadc
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as
Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos
Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and
voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of Election
Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. 2 The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however,
inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with petitioner. 3
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for
the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a
letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio
F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due
to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC
Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of
respondents and allowed petitioner to run. 6
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to
petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours
to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be
disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of the
COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a
rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed
with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against
petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in
her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the
memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an
order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.
The order reads as follows:
"Acting on the Fax 'Petition for Denial And/Or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy' by
petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the
pertinent allegations of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the said respondent is disqualified to
become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the
reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21)
years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born
on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth
certificate, a copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as Annex 'A';
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as
candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, she made material representation
which is false and as such, she is disqualified; that
her certificate of candidacy should not be given
due course and that said candidacy must be
cancelled;
xxx xxx xxx"
the Commission, it appearing that the petition is
meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of
Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend
the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the
event she garners the highest number of votes for
the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit
immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and to
pay the filing and legal research fees in the
amount of P510.00.
SO ORDERED." 9
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as
against private respondent's votes of 76. 10 In accordance with
the May 2, 1996 order or the COMELEC en banc, the Board of
Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence,
the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The
proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested party." 12 On
July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng
mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
officials of the Pederasyon. 13
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to
deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she
has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of
the SK.
I
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides
that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of
the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election
Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX,
governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, viz:
"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before election." cdrep
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be
filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground
that the candidate has made a false material representation
in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence
received by any official designated by the COMELEC after
which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. 15
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in
Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number
of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not
obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore
the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide
election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. —
The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to
hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary
actions, special actions, special cases,
provisional remedies, contempt and special
proceedings except in accreditation of citizens'
arms of the Commission." 17
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case
to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when
it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the
petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of
pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These
requirements are:
"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading,
motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10)
legible copies. However, when there is more than
one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or
protestant must file additional number of copies of
the petition or protest as there are additional
respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to
in the immediately preceding section must be filed
directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
Commission personally, or, unless otherwise
provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the
latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing
and the requirement as to the number of copies
must be complied with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings
allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond
paper and shall be in English or Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx"
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed
in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly
with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by
registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form.
Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the
COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its
Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile,
not by registered mail.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area
in the proper position and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is
equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed
record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of
Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is,
at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of determining on
its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic
and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in
fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a
facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en
banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order.
The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the
petition filed by registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of
petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created
by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all
residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less
than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to
provide its members a medium to express their views and
opinions and participate in issues of transcendental
importance. 25 Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth
chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were
actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but
less than 18 years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
then the Local Government Code, raised the maximum age of the
Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age"
to "not more than 21 years of age." prcd
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang
Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained
the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not
more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected
by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically
becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A
member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless
sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently
incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific
qualifications laid down by the Local Government Code of
1991, viz:
"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The
katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all
citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the
barangay for at least six (6) months, who are
fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21)
years of age, and who are duly registered in the
list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official
barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary."
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a
candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the
following qualifications:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of
the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of
the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan
ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at
least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-
one (21) years of age on the day of his election,
able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local
dialect, and must not have been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude."
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an
actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but
not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list
of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.
Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the
Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a
qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the
barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age
on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must
not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted
Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official.
Thus:
"Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be
qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections,
a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21)
years of age on election day that is, he must have
been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981,
inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and actually residing in the barangay
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the elections."
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An
elective official of the SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1)
year immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine
language or dialect or English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of
candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal
Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be
final."
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter
in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b)
15 but not-more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the
voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981,
inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK
must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a
resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications
of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a
candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner's age is
admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3
[b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the
scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of
1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the
voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she
was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore
qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
and as candidate for the SK elections. cdpr
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a
distinction between the maximum age of a member in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK
official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age
at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the
member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand,
Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK
official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of
the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on
election day or on the day he registers as member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not
be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction
is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. 31 The
courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances
showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification. 32
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of the election is not provided in
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the
term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective
official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a
"member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code
does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election.
Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra
vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections
at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The
Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days.
When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of
365 days each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is
consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after
his birth — the last day of the year. 35 In computing years, the
first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the
first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins.
On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years
old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21
years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means
on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-
day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year
begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next
365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21
years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does
not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more
than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old,"
contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the
candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the
age qualification of a barangay youth official was expressly stated
as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over but less than eighteen
. . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the youth official must be
at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year
but should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local
Government Code increased the age limit of members of the
youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in
such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22
years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was to include
citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so
expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and
doubt. 37
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal
author of the Local Government Code of 1991 declared that one
of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and
the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not
all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of
age by the time President Aquino assumed power. 38 They were
not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of
1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21
years 39 and the only exception is in the second paragraph of
Section 423 which reads:
"Sec. 423. Creation and Election. — a) . . .;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during
his term of office, shall have passed the age of
twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve
the remaining portion of the term for which he was
elected."
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of
his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the
age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the
Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for
which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth
leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st
birthday. 40 Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21
years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together
with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK
elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election.
The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21
years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it
fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his
election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On
March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6,
1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine
(9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11
months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1,
1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner
may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK
officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was
ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang
Kabataan elections. llcd
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is
founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the
election, he can be declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the
candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the
election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected
will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his
election. 42 The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. 43
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent,
the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the
May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. 44 A defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. 45 Moreover,
despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to prove that
the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility
and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of
misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the
benefit of her rival candidate. 47
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the
Local Government Code petitioner should be succeeded by the
Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest
number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. 48 Section 435
applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, 49 is convicted of a felony,
voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)

removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more 9. Loong v. COMELEC
than three (3) consecutive months."
[G.R. Nos. 107814-107815. May 16, 1996.]
The question of the age qualification is a question of
eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified;
capable of being legally chosen." 51Ineligibility, on the other GOV. TUPAY T. LOONG, BARIK SAMPANG,
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the KARTINI MALDISA, YASSER HASSAN, and
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility HADJA SAPINA RADJAIE, petitioners, vs.
is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
succession of the SK Chairman. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
SULU; MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems OF TALIPAO & ABDUSAKUR
it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member TAN, respondents.
chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves.
The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for [G.R. No. 120826. May 16, 1996.]
the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers
and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said GOV. TUPAY T. LOONG and KIMAR
office. TULAWIE, petitioners, vs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the SULU; ABDUSAKUR TAN and MUNIB
Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as ESTINO, respondents.
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan [G.R. No. 122137. May 16, 1996.]
member voted by simple majority by and from among the
incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of GOV. TUPAY T. LOONG and KIMAR
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, TULAWIE, petitioners, vs.
Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term. casia THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
ABDUSAKUR TAN, and MUNIB
SO ORDERED. ESTINO, respondents.
||| (Garvida v. Sales, Jr., G.R. No. 124893, [April 18, 1997], 338
PHIL 484-506) [G.R. No. 122396. May 16, 1996.]

GOV. TUPAY T. LOONG and KIMAR

TULAWIE, petitioners, vs. HON.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
COMMISSIONER MANOLO B. GOROSPE OF
THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, responden
ts.
Pete Quirino-Quadra for petitioners.
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo and Chua Law Offices for
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 120826 and 122137.
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. for private respondents A. Tan & M. Estimo in
G.R. Nos. 120826 and 122137.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HAS THE
POWER TO ANNUL ELECTIONS. — Under the present state of
our election laws, the COMELEC has been granted precisely the
power to annul elections. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166,
otherwise known as, "The Synchronized ElectionsLaw of 1991,"
provides that the COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority vote of
its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure
of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC may
exercise such power motu proprioor upon a verified petition. The
hearing of the case shall be summary in nature, and
the COMELEC may delegate to its lawyers the power to hear the
case and to receive evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS THAT MUST CONCUR BEFORE
THE COMELEC CAN ACT ON A VERIFIED PETITION
SEEKING TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS. — We
hold that, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must
concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting,
the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and,
second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.
We must add, however, that the cause of such failure of election
should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. This is an important
consideration for, where the propriety of a pre-proclamation
controversy ends, there may begin the realm of a special action
for declaration of failure of elections.
3. ID.; ID.; A PARTY SEEKING TO RAISE ISSUES
RESOLUTION OF WHICH WOULD COMPEL OR
NECESSITATE THE COMELEC TO PIERCE THE VEIL OF
ELECTION RETURNS WHICH ARE PRIMA
FACIE REGULAR ON ITS FACE, HAS HIS PROPER REMEDY
IN A REGULAR PROTEST; REASON. — The policy
consideration underlying the delimitation both of substantive
ground and procedure is the policy to determine as quickly as
possible the result of the election on the basis of canvass. We
categorically rule that, in a pre-proclamation controversy,
the COMELEC is not to look beyond or behind election returns
which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party
seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel or
necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which
are prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a
regular election protest. By their nature, and given the obvious
public interest in the speedy determination of the results
of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in
summary proceedings without the need to present
evidence aliunde and certainly without having to go through
voluminous documents and subjecting them to meticulous
technical examinations which take up considerable time.
4. ID.; ID.; PREVAILING DOCTRINE IN PRE-PROCLAMATION
CASES. — The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction, therefore,
is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look
beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the
casting or the counting of the votes. Corollarily, technical
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
examination of voting paraphernalia involving analysis and
comparison of voters' signatures and thumbprints thereon is
prohibited in pre-proclamation cases which are mandated by law
to be expeditiously resolved without involving
evidence aliunde and examination of voluminous documents
which take up much time and cause delay in defeat of the public
policy underlying the summary nature of pre-proclamation
controversies.
5. ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, TERRORISM, VIOLENCE AND
OTHER ANALOGOUS CAUSES IN ACTIONS FOR
ANNULMENT OF ELECTION RESULTS OR FOR THE
DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF ELECTIONS. — While
the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an
examination of the election returns on their face and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election
irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate
allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other analogous
causes in actions for annulment of election results or for
declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code
denominates the same. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of
actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure
of elections, may conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and
fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had
indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless to say, a pre-
proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections.
6. ID.; ID.; NO LAW PROVIDES FOR A REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO FILE ANNULMENT
OF ELECTIONS WHEN THERE IS AS YET NO
PROCLAMATION. — While the COMELEC acted within its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the private respondents'
petition to annul the election results of or to declare failure
of elections in Parang, Sulu, it committed grave abuse of
discretion when confronted with essentially the same situation in
petitioners' own petition to annul the elections of or to declare
failure of elections in the municipalities of Tapul, Panglima Estino,
Pata, Siasi and Kalinggalang Caluang. The COMELEC arbitrarily
and without valid ground dismissed the said petition respecting
the aforementioned five municipalities. The untimeliness of the
petition is an untenable argument for such dismissal, because, as
Commissioner Regalado Maambong pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, no law provides for a reglementary period within which
to file annulment of elections when there is as yet no
proclamation.
7. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF A PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN A
PROCEEDING WHEN HE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO
NEGATES ALLEGATION OF DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS. — A peripheral issue that also needs to be
addressed is petitioners' claim that they have been denied their
right to due process when they were not given the opportunity to
rebut the results of the technical examination which was
undertaken after the hearing in SPA 95-284 and after said case
was duly submitted for decision. In support of their claim,
petitioners cite Usman vs. Commission on Elections, where we
found that the COMELEC failed to fully recognize and respect
Usman's right to due process when Usman was not allowed by
the COMELEC, without sufficient reasons, to present any
evidence to rebut the findings of its experts regarding the
thumbprints and signatures in the CE Form 1 and their
corresponding CE Form 39. Accordingly, we ordered
the COMELEC in that case to re-open the proceedings and set
the case for hearing to afford Usman his rights. We find, however,
that the circumstances attendant to petitioners' case are distinct
from those characterizing the aforecited case of Usman. For in
the instant case, petitioners admitted in their pleadings that they
were fully aware of the issuance by COMELEC of an order
directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sulu to bring to
the COMELEC office in Manila the election documents to be used
in the technical examination. In fact, petitioners anticipated such
technical examination and filed a pleading before
the COMELEC in which they prayed that they be informed of any
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
subsequent proceedings in the same case. In fine, it is
undeniable that petitioners had the opportunity to participate in
the proceedings respecting the technical examination, aware as
they were of the intent of the COMELEC to conduct the same.
Militating against them is the fact that they did not do so when
they had the opportunity to, especially as public interest in the
speedy disposition of this case will only be further derailed by the
re-opening of the case for the benefit of petitioners who, if they
could after all be this assertive of their due process rights now,
should have asserted the same as early as when the issues were
ripe for debate.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J p:
Under our resolution, dated January 16, 1996, we directed the
consolidation of the following four cases:
(1) G.R. Nos. 107814-107815, entitled, "Gov. Tupay T. Loong,
Barik Sampang, Kartini Maldisa, Yasser Hassan, and Hadja
Sapina Radjaie vs. The Commission on Elections; Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sulu; Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Talipao and Abdusakur Tan";
(2) G.R. No. 120826, entitled, "Gov. Tupay T. Loong and Kimar
Tulawie vs. The Commission on Elections; The Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Sulu; Abdusakur Tan and Munib Estino";
(3) G.R. No. 122137, entitled, "Gov. Tupay T. Loong and Kimar
Tulawie vs. The Commission on Elections, Abdusakur Tan and
Munib Estino"; and
(4) G.R. No. 122396, entitled, "Gov. Tupay
T. Loong and Kimar Tulawie vs. Hon. Commissioner Manolo
Gorospe of the Commission onElections."
As we render judgment upon these consolidated
petitions, the appropriate backgrounder on each of them is in
order.
G.R. NO. 107814-107815
The petition was one for Certiorari seeking to nullify two
resolutions 1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
promulgated in pre-proclamation cases 2 filed by petitioner Tupay
T. Loong who prayed that the proceedings of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Talipao, Sulu, be set aside on the ground that
the certificates of canvass were manufactured, fictitious and
falsified. The COMELEC dismissed the petitions, hence, Loong's
recourse to this Court in a petition for certiorari. In our resolution,
dated January 26, 1993, we affirmed the dismissal because we
found no grave abuse of discretion committed onthe part of the
public respondent in rendering the questioned resolutions. Entry
of judgment as regards that resolution was effected on March 19,
1993. 3
G.R. NO. 120826
This is a petition for Certiorari assailing an Order 4 by
the COMELEC, dated June 16, 1995, suspending the
proclamation of petitioners as winners in the May 8,
1995 elections for Governor and Vice-Governor of the
province of Sulu, for Prohibition praying that COMELEC be
prohibited from conducting a technical comparison of
signatures and thumbmarks affixed in COMELEC CE Forms
1 and 2, and for Mandamus seeking to compel respondent to
reconvene and proclaim petitioners Tupay T. Loong and
Kimar Tulawie as the duly elected Governor and Vice-
Governor, respectively, of Sulu.
Culled from the pleadings in this case are the following
pertinent facts:
In the May 8, 1995 elections held in the Province of
Sulu, petitioner Tupay T. Loong and private respondent
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
Abdusakur Tan ran for the position of Governor, while
petitioner Kimar Tulawie and private respondent Munib Estino
were candidates for the position of Vice-Governor. After the
canvass of the election returns of sixteen (16) of the eighteen
(18) municipalities of Sulu, respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) recommended to the COMELEC a re-
canvass of the election returns of Parang and
Talipao. COMELEC, accordingly, relieved all the regular
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) and
ordered such recanvass by senior lawyers from
the COMELEC office in Manila. During the re-canvass, private
respondents objected to the inclusion in the canvass of the
election returns of Parang. The reconstituted MBC, however,
merely noted said objections and forwarded the same to
respondent PBC for resolution.
Subsequently, the MBC submitted its certificate of
canvass to respondent PBC for canvass on the provincial
level. Respondent PBC, however, denied aforesaid objections
of private respondents, on the ground that only the certificate
of canvass was forwarded to it and that private respondents
allegedly failed to object to the canvass of said certificate. The
canvass of respondent PBC showed petitioners to have
overwhelmingly won in the municipality of Parang.
On June 23, 1995, private respondents appealed to
the COMELEC, and such appeal was docketed as SPC No.
95-310 5 which essentially questioned the aforesaid action by
respondent PBC. However, SPC 95-310, in which private
respondents formally submitted their appeal from the omnibus
ruling of respondent PBC denying their objections to the
election returns and/or certificate of canvass, was dismissed
by the COMELEC in an Order promulgated on October 20,
1995. 6 Significantly, much earlier, that is, on June 9, 1995,
private respondents had already filed a petition docketed as
SPA No. 95-284 7 which prayed that the elections in Parang,
Sulu, be set aside and annulled on the ground that there was
failure of election in said municipality due to massive fraud.
Hearing on SPA No. 95-284 was held on June 28, 1995. 8
After said hearing, the Commission issued an Order, dated July
4, 1995, directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sulu to
bring to the COMELEC central office the CE Form 2 which
pertains to the list of voters with voting records used in the May
8, 1995 elections and the books of voters for all precincts.
Anticipating that the COMELEC would use the said documents to
conduct a technical examination of the signatures and
thumbmarks affixed in the list of voters with voting records (CE
Form 2) and in the registration forms (CE Form 1),
petitioners Loong and Tulawie prayed that the COMELEC inform
them as to whether or not it would conduct a technical
examination of CE Forms 1 and 2, which examination, petitioners
argued in their motion, has been proscribed in pre-proclamation
controversies by this Court in the landmark case
of Dianalan vs. COMELEC, 9 and that, in the alternative, the
same examination be conducted as regards CE Forms 1 and 2 of
the municipalities of Siasi, Panglima Estino, Tapul, Pata and
Kalinggalang Caluang, where private respondents allegedly
committed rampant fraud during the elections.
In an Order, 10 dated July 18, 1995, the COMELEC directed its
Voters Identification Division to verify and examine the list of
voters with the voting records used in the May 8,
1995 elections together with the books of voters of all precincts
for the municipality of Parang, Sulu, and to submit a report
thereon within fifteen (15) days.
On July 21, 1995, petitioners countered by filing with
the COMELEC a Petition to Declare a Failure of Election in the
Municipalities of Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and
Kalinggalang Caluang, on the similar ground of massive fraud
resulting in a statistical improbability in the election results. Said
petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-289, which, however, was
dismissed by the COMELEC in its En Banc Resolution dated
December 13, 1995.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
G.R. No. 122137
This is a petition for Certiorari assailing
two COMELEC En Banc Resolutions, 11 both dated October
9, 1995, issued in the aforecited election cases of SPA No.
95-284 and SPA No. 95-289 which were ordered consolidated
for purposes of disposition, the petitions being that they
involve the same parties and are so closely connected that
resolution of one would necessarily and materially affect the
outcome of the other. The parties in both petitions contend
that no election was ever conducted and no voting took place
in the aforecited municipalities covered by their respective
petitions. The COMELEC disposed of pending incidents in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 95-284 and SPA No. 95-289 in
this wise:
"WHEREFORE, we summarize the Commission's
rulings, considered adopted by unanimous or
majority vote, as follows:
In SPA No. 95-284,
(1) To annul the results of the elections in
the municipality of Parang, Sulu, as to the
positions of Governor and Vice-Governor;
(2) In the meantime, to reserve its
ruling on whether or not to hold
special elections in the said municipality;
(3) To hold in abeyance the
proclamation of the winning candidates for
Governor and Vice-Governor, until further
orders from the Commission;
(4) To relieve the present Chairman
and members of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu, and to appoint to their
respective positions: Atty. Nimia B. Suero,
Chairman; Atty. Alexander A. Villanueva,
Vice-Chairman, and Atty. Teresita C.
Suarez, Member-Secretary, who are
directed to immediately re-convene in
Manila and proclaim the winning
candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the First District of Sulu, on the basis of
the canvass duly conducted.
In SPA No. 95-289,
(1) To set the petition for hearing
and resolve the questions therein
raised on (a) the timeliness of the petition,
and, (b) whether or not to order a technical
examination of CE Forms 1 and 2 used in
the 1995 elections for Governor and Vice-
Governor in the Municipalities of Panglima
Estino, Tapul, Pata, Siasi and
Kalinggalang Caluang, Sulu.
SO ORDERED." 12
In essence, petitioners claim that the assailed resolutions of
the COMELEC were issued with grave abuse of discretion
and without jurisdiction insofar as the COMELEC order, on the
basis of the results of the technical examination of the
thumbmarks of the voters affixed in CE Forms 1 and 2, the
annulment of the elections in Parang, Sulu, respecting the
positions of Governor and Vice-Governor because, petitioners
asseverate, such technical examination has been held by this
Court to be prohibited in pre-proclamation controversies.
Moreover, petitioners charged the COMELEC to have violated
their fundamental right to due process when it annulled
the elections of Parang, Sulu, on the basis of the results of
said technical examination without giving petitioners prior
opportunity to be confronted with and to refute, the said
results.
On December 14, 1995, petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari. 13 Said pleading further
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
assailed another En Banc Resolution 14 issued by
the COMELEC on December 13, 1995, in consolidated cases
SPA No. 95-284 and SPA No. 95-289. In that resolution,
the COMELEC ruled:
"At this late date and using hindsight, one is
inclined to ask, were herein petitioners so
complacent in a pre-determined lead in Parang,
that, given their awareness of the irregularities in
the five (5) municipalities, the alleged lopsided
results therein would not upset their victory?
Faced with the possible undoing of the Parang
election results, would petitioners move to
maintain their lead with a parallel undoing of what
they perceive as pro-Tan-and-Estino results in
other municipalities? In SPA 95-284,
respondents Loong and Tulawie propose to
submit for examination the CE Forms 1 and 2 in
these five municipalities 'in the event' and only
then, a similar examination is conducted on the
Parang documents!
It is urged that parties come to
this Commission with a shared purpose to uphold
the sacredness of an election. Looking to the
Constitution for guidance, we are constrained to
withhold from petitioners in SPA 95-289 the
means which would otherwise be theirs had they
been motivated with the principles of fairness and
integrity in a political rivalry such as the 1995
provincial elections in Sulu. As with the Courts,
one must come to the Commission for
adjudication of his rights with clean hands.
We rule for the annulment of
the elections in Parang, Sulu. We also rule to
dismiss the petition for a declaration of failure
of elections in the municipalities of Panglima
Estino, Kalinggalang Caluang, Pata, Tapul and
Siasi.
One final word on the matter of determining
the provincial winners following the annulment of
a municipal election:
The approach to this issue was varied in
the October 9, 1995 resolution. We have re-
assessed our position and abandoned the option
of a special election. We take cognizance of the
fact that the lists of voters used in the May 8,
1995 elections have been annulled by Republic
Act No. 8046. A registration was conducted in
Sulu, including Parang, last August 19 and 20. If
the new list of voters is to be used, there will be
the legal oddity of using a list which was not in
existence at the time the original election (May 8,
1995) was held. A special election, to be sure, is
a mere continuation of the election first
held. On the other hand, if the voters list in the
May 8, 1995 elections is used, there is the
anomaly of using a nullified list of voters.
Upon these considerations we have
abandoned the alternative of calling a special
election in Parang.
There is really no compulsion for the calling
of a special election. The voters of Parang
constitute only about less than 15% of the entire
Sulu electorate. And there are results from
seventeen out of eighteen municipalities of Sulu.
Excluding the Parang election results, a valid
proclamation can still be had.
xxx xxx xxx
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
We rule then for the outright proclamation
of provincial winners, excluding from the final
canvass the results from Parang.
WHEREFORE, We hereby render
judgment as follows:
1. The Provincial Board of Canvassers for Sulu as
reconstituted in the October 9, 1995 Resolution of
this Commission is hereby directed to reconvene,
complete the canvass, excluding for the purpose
the Certificate of Canvass/election returns of
Parang and proclaim the winning candidates for
Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and
2. Dismiss the petitions of Petitioners
Tupay Loong and Kimar Tulawie in SPA 95-289.
SO ORDERED." 15
We found the supplemental petition for certiorari to be
sufficient in form and substance. We also found therein
compelling reasons to grant the motion for issuance of
temporary restraining order. Thus, on December 18, 1995, a
temporary restraining order 16 was issued effective
immediately ordering the COMELEC and the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Sulu to cease and desist from implementing
and executing the COMELEC En BancResolutions, dated
October 9, 1995 and December 13, 1995, in consolidated
cases SPA No. 95-284 and SPA No. 95-289 and/or from
proclaiming private respondents herein as winners in the May
8, 1995 elections for Governor and Vice-Governor of Sulu.
On December 28, 1995, private respondents filed an
Urgent Petition/Motion to Lift/Dissolve Temporary Restraining
Order. 17 Said petition/motion was noted by the Court in its En
Banc Resolution 18 dated January 23, 1996.
G.R. No. 122396
The petition is one for Prohibition praying to prohibit the
Honorable Commissioner Manolo Gorospe of
the COMELEC from participating in the deliberations and
resolution of the remaining issues in consolidated cases SPA
No. 95-284 and SPA No. 95-289. In an En
Banc Resolution, 19 dated November 21, 1995, we resolved
to dismiss the petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion. On December 18, 1995, petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and for Consolidation of G.R.
Nos. 122137 and 120826. 20 Said motion was denied with
finality in our En Banc Resolution 21 dated January 23, 1996.
Considering that (1) on March 19, 1993, entry of
judgment has already been made in G.R. No. 107814-15; (2)
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of our decision in G.R.
No. 122396 has already been denied with finality in our
resolution dated January 23, 1996; and (3) G.R. No. 120826
has been rendered moot and academic, the technical
examination sought to be restrained therein having already
been undertaken and results thereof having been made basis
by the COMELEC in promulgating its resolutions, dated
October 9, 1995 and December 13, 1995, sought to
be, ongrounds of grave abuse of discretion, annulled and set
aside in G.R. No. 122137, we deem it necessary, for the final
and complete disposition of these consolidated petitions, to
adjudicate upon this remaining sole issue: whether or not
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
correctible in certiorari proceedings when on the one hand, it
assumed jurisdiction over and granted, private respondents'
petition for annulment of the election results in Parang,
Sulu, on the ground of statistical improbability and massive
fraud and other election irregularities in the unraveling of
which COMELEC conducted a technical examination of the
thumbmarks and signatures affixed in the list of voters with
voting records (CE Form 2) and in the registration forms (CE
Form 1), while on the other hand, it dismissed petitioners' own
petition for annulment of election results in the municipalities
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
of Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi, and Kalinggalang
Caluang, even after making a finding that "the same badges
of fraud evident from the results of the election based on the
certificate of canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Parang, Sulu, are also evident in the election results of the
Municipalities of Panglima Estino, Tapul, Pata, Siasi and
Kalinggalang Caluang." 22
While we find that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
the petitions for annulment of election results filed by both
petitioner and private respondents, the grant of the latter's
petition without calling for special elections and the dismissal
of the former's petition upon no valid ground, are actions
tainted with grave abuse of discretion that necessitate
correction in the instant certiorari proceedings.
An analysis of the evolution of our election laws undeniably
shows a paramount concern for conceptualizing and devising the
most effective means of expediting the proclamation of winners
and the resolution of all kinds of post-voting complaints,
controversies and disputes. The reason for this is almost self-
evident; election results are the expression of the will of the
people whose welfare and interests must immediately be served
by those upon whom the people have placed their trust.
Peripherally but not trivially, elections need be consummated with
dispatch because the losers or even those just lagging behind in
the counting, more often than not, file all kinds of protests and
complaints and objections that delay the election process and
threaten to deny the people their representation in government.
Since the Legislature could not plug all loopholes nor yet foresee
all problems that may arise in the electoral process,
our Constitution has always vested in the COMELEC the broad
power to enforce and administer all the laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections 23 as well as the plenary
authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the
question as to the right to vote. 24 While, however, the scope of
these prerogatives may seem boundless and encompassing, we
have, as early as 1949, in the case of Nacionalista
Party vs. Commission on Elections, explained that —
". . . such power is preventive only and not
curative also; that is to say, it is intended to
prevent any and all forms of election fraud or
violation of the Election Law, but if it fails to
accomplish that purpose, it is not
the Commission on Elections that is charged with
the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil but
some other agencies of the Government. We note
from the text that the power to decide questions
involving the right to vote is expressly withheld
from the Commission . . . parallel to the
withholding of such power from the Commission is
the vesting in other agencies of the more inclusive
power to decide all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of Congress, namely, the Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate in the case of the senators
and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives in the case of the members of
the latter . . . ." 25
In view of that disquisition, we held in the case
of Abes vs. Commission on Elections that "nothing in the
foregoing constitutional precept will imply authority
for Comelec to annul an election . . . . The boundaries of the
forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are also
marked by jurisprudence . . . . Comelec is not the proper forum
to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds
and other illegal practices." 26
It must be understood, however, that the aforecited constitutional
provision only disallows a derivation or inference from it of the
power to annul elections on the part of the COMELEC; but said
provision, significantly, does not withhold the vesting in
the COMELEC of that same power if such be deemed by the
Legislature to be necessary in order that the COMELEC be most
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
effective in the performance of its sacred duty of insuring the
conduct of honest and free elections. The COMELEC, therefore,
can attribute to the aforecited constitutional provision the grant
upon it of the power to annul elections, if there be a valid statutory
enactment granting the same.
Under the present state of our election laws, the COMELEC has
been granted precisely the power to annul elections. Section 4
of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as,
"The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991," provides that
the COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority vote of its members
may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election
and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Said Section 6, in turn, provides as
follows:
"SECTION 6. Failure of election. — If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension
of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect."
The COMELEC may exercise such power motu
proprio 27 or upon a verified petition. 28 The hearing of the
case shall be summary in nature, 29 and the COMELEC may
delegate to its lawyers the power to hear the case and to
receive evidence. 30 In the case
of Mitmug vs. Commission on Elections, we held that
before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were
voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect;
and second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the
election. 31 We must add, however, that the cause of such
failure of election should have been any of the following: force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes. This is an important consideration for, where the
propriety of a pre-proclamation controversy ends, there may
begin the realm of a special action for declaration of failure
of elections.
Very few aspects of our law today can match the
dynamism that has characterized the formulation of our
jurisprudential rule on pre-proclamation controversies. The
debate has, however, constantly revolved around whether or
not the COMELEC may go beyond the face of the election
returns in determining their authenticity and genuineness. The
rule first established in illustrative cases like Nacionalista
Party vs. Comelec 32 and Dizon vs. Provincial Board 33 is
that the COMELEC cannot go beyond the election returns in
canvassing the same. This rule, however, was eroded in
subsequent cases since 1966, when in the case
of Lagumbay vs. Comelec, 34 we empowered
the COMELEC to nullify certain contested returns on the
ground of statistical improbability "where the fraud is so
palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give
it prima facie value." 35 And then in the 1971 case of Diaz,
Sr. vs. Commission on Elections, 36 in the light of the
allegations of petitioners therein to the effect that
the elections in question were tainted with fraud, terrorism and
other irregularities, we sanctioned the COMELEC's procedure
of causing the examination by fingerprint and handwriting
experts and analysis of the signatures and fingerprints of the
precinct books of voters and the CE 39's and voting records,
in order to determine whether the reported elections were a
sham amounting to no election at all and accordingly
deny prima facie value to the election returns and reject them
as manufactured or false returns. We reiterated this ruling
in Estaniel vs. Commission on Elections 37 and amplified the
same in Usman vs. Commission on Elections. 38 And in the
case of Olfato vs. Commission on Elections, 39we went as far
as to hold that the statutory enumeration of the grounds
proper for filing a pre-proclamation controversy is not
exclusive.
"To give a strict interpretation of Section 175 . . .
of the 1978 Election Code would be to limit the
grounds in pre-proclamation controversies to
matters purely affecting election returns. WE
believe that to revert to the old doctrine prohibiting
the Comelec from looking behind the election
returns as to the existence of election
irregularities is not consistent with the very
purpose of the law. Clearly, Sections 172, 173
and 174 only speak of irregularities committed in
the preparation of election returns themselves.
WE cannot see any difference however if
the Comelec be allowed to suspend a canvass or
suspend or annul a proclamation of a candidate-
elect on the ground that irregularities or mistakes
in the preparation of returns such as tampering,
altering, falsifying of returns, material defects or
discrepancies of election returns exist and deny
said authority to the Comelec if based on grounds
not apparent on the face of the election returns
but indirectly affecting their integrity. Certainly, it
would be ridiculous to deny the Comelec the
authority to suspend a canvass or suspend or
annul a proclamation if based on grounds of
election irregularities committed during the
election which would necessarily also vitiate or
affect the integrity of the election returns such as
fake voters . . . although not apparent upon the
face. Seemingly genuine returns based on fake
votes are equally spurious as tampered election
returns. To sustain the validity of election returns
despite a prima facie showing of
the commission prior to the voting of election
irregularities independent of the subsequent act of
preparing the election returns is to stamp our
approval on making said election returns as an
impenetrable shield in the perpetration of election
anomalies." 40
In all these aforecited cases, albeit in pre-proclamation cases,
we upheld the propriety of conducting technical examinations
of fingerprints and signatures in voting paraphernalia to
determine the integrity of certain election returns
which, on their face, are regular and seemingly authentic but
the circumstances of whose production are inextricably linked
with fraudulent schemes and other grave electoral
irregularities.
The year 1987 marked the return to the previous rule
that in pre-proclamation controversies, allegations that clean,
regular election returns are in fact sham returns because no
free and honest elections had at all been held due to fraud,
terrorism and other illegal electoral practices, are to be
rejected and held to be inappropriate matters to be raised in
pre-proclamation cases, the same being properly the office of
election contests over which electoral tribunals have sole,
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
exclusive jurisdiction. So we held in the landmark case
of Dianalan vs. Commission on Elections: 41
". . . Diaz v. Commission on Elections, 24 SCRA
426; Estaniel v. Commission on Elections, 42
SCRA 436;
and Usman vs. Commission on Elections, 42
SCRA 667, were decided in 1971,
and Lagumbay v. Climaco and Comelec, 16
SCRA 176, even earlier, in 1966 . . . All these
cases ruled that
the Commission on Elections could investigate
charges of irregularities in the conduct
of elections as an incident of its power to canvass
the votes and proclaim the winners; and this was
possible because its jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation questions was not limited then and
subject to Comelecabuse. Now, it is expressly
limited to, under Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code passed on November 28, 1985 . . .
. A reading of this section will readily show that it
applies only to the specific deficiencies therein
enumerated and that questions relating to alleged
irregularities in the voting such as fraud,
substitution or vote-buying and terrorism are
proper matters for election protests under the sole
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In fact, Olfato is a tombstone of the
absurd consequences of the past
regime Comelec's notorious flip-flopping
resolutions. There, the Comelec inconsistently
took opposite positions by setting aside its
previous denial or dismissal of the petition for
suspension or annulment of proclamation since
the grounds alleged were proper grounds for
election protest and declared the proclamation as
merely 'temporary,' subject to the final outcome of
the petition for annulment of proclamation,
notwithstanding that the duly proclaimed winner
(Olfato) had already assumed office . . . . The
Court sustained the Comelec's volte face therein
. . . . But it is the best proof of how such cavalier
treatment of settled doctrine and rulings designed
to assure the prompt proclamation of the election
results and leave the investigation of alleged
irregularities to a proper election protest could
derail the election process. . . ." 42
The landmark case of Dianalan, promulgated in November,
1987, was definitely a departure from the ruling in Olfato and
its predecessor cases. But as early as August, 1987, in the
case of Sanchez vs. Commission on Elections, 43 we had
held that the scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited
to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code:
". . . The enumeration therein of the issues that
may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is
restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any
clear showing or proof that the election returns
canvassed are incomplete or contain material
defects (Sec. 234), appear to have been
tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress
(Sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the
votes credited to any candidate, the difference of
which affects the result of the election (Sec. 236),
which are the only instances where a pre-
proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted
the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box
and its contents . . . . The complete election
returns whose authenticity is not in question, must
be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of
canvassing the same and proclamation of the
winning candidates.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
. . . To expand the issues beyond those
enumerated under Sec. 243 and allow a
recount/reappreciation of votes in every instance
where a claim of misdeclaration of stray votes is
made would open the floodgates to such claims
and paralyze canvass and proclamation
proceedings, given the propensity of the loser to
demand a recount. The law and public policy
mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies
shall be heard summarily by the Commission after
due notice and hearing and just as summarily
decided . . . ." 44
The policy consideration underlying the delimitation both of
substantive ground and procedure is the policy to determine
as quickly as possible the result of the election on the basis of
canvass. Thus, in the case
of Dipatuan vs. Commission on Elections, 45 we categorically
ruled that in a pre-proclamation controversy, COMELEC is not
to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their
face regular and authentic returns. A party seeking to raise
issues resolution of which would compel
necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns
which are prima facie regular ontheir face, has his proper
remedy in a regular election protest. By their nature, and given
the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the
results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be
resolved in summary proceedings without the need to present
evidence aliunde and certainly without having to go through
voluminous documents and subjecting them to meticulous
technical examinations which take up considerable time.
With the abandonment of the teachings of Olfato and
its predecessor cases, it was not a surprise when petitioners
in the case
of Dimaporo vs. Commission on Elections, 46 promulgated in
June, 1990, asked the Court to re-examine its decision
in Dianalan so as to permit petitioners to subject to
handwriting and fingerprint examination the voter's affidavits
and voting lists and other voting records in the contested
precincts. We responded in this wise:
"We are not persuaded by petitioners'
arguments on this point. It is important to bear in
mind that the nature, scope and ambit of a pre-
proclamation controversy as set out
in Dianalan and Dipatuan and the other cases
there cited are determined by statutory provisions:
Sections 243 . . . 245 . . . and 246 . . . of the
Omnibus Election Code. As pointed out above in
Dipatuan, these statutory provisions reflect a very
definite view of what public policy requires on the
matter. It may well be true that public policy may
occasionally permit the occurrence of 'grab the
proclamation and prolong the protest' situations;
that public policy, however, balances the
possibility of such situations against the
shortening of the period during which no winners
are proclaimed, a period commonly fraught with
tension and danger for the public at large. For
or
those who disagree with that public policy, the
appropriate recourse is not to ask this Court to
abandon case law which merely interprets
faithfully existing statutory norms, to engage in
judicial legislation and in effect to rewrite portions
of the Omnibus Election Code. The appropriate
recourse is, of course, to the Legislative
Department of the Government and to ask that
Department to strike a new and different
equilibrium in the balancing of the public interests
at stake." 47
We have recently reiterated
the Dianalan and Dimaporo rulings in the case
of Alfonso vs. Commission on Elections, 48 promulgated in
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
June, 1994. The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction,
therefore, is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic
and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers
cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of
irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes.
Corollarily, technical examination of voting paraphernalia
involving analysis and comparison of voters' signatures and
thumbprints thereon is prohibited in pre-proclamation cases
which are mandated by law to be expeditiously resolved
without involving evidence aliunde and examination of
voluminous documents which take up much time and cause
delay in defeat of the public policy underlying the summary
nature of pre-proclamation controversies.
While, however, the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-
proclamation cases, to an examination of the election
returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond
or behind them and investigate election irregularities,
the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of
fraud, terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in
actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of
failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code
denominates the same. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of
actions for annulment of election results or declaration of
failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of
election documents and compare and analyze voters'
signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or
not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.
Needless to say, a pre-proclamation controversy is not the
same as an action for annulment of election results or
declaration of failure of elections. 49
In the instant case, private respondents as well as
petitioners filed, not pre-proclamation cases, but actions for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure
of elections over which the COMELEC has statutory
jurisdiction. In this regard, we fully subscribe to the following
opinion of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores:
"The Commission correctly found that the
petitions, although denominated differently where
one is a petition to annul and the other is a petition
to declare a failure of election, are actually of the
same nature. Judging from the grounds relied
upon, both are basically petitions to declare a
failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code . . . .
A failure of election under the law does not arise
from findings of fraud, terrorism, or force
majeure but from the fact that there was a
denigration of the expression of the will of the
people. The two petitions are of this mold. Both
theorize that the election results in the six
municipalities in question are not expressive of
the will of the people primarily because the results
are statistically improbable. Beneath those
neutral assertions, however, are intimations of a
wide scale and massive fraud committed during
the preparation, transmission, custody or canvass
of the election returns.
Thus, in admitting SPA 95-284 as a
justiciable election issue,
the Commission anchored its jurisdiction on Sec.
4 of Republic Act No. 7166 which empowers
the Commission, en banc, to hear and decide by
a majority vote the postponement, declaration of
a failure of election and the calling of special
election. Such specific grant of power to annul an
election is firmly cushioned by the plenary powers
of the Commission granted by the
Constitution pursuant to the same Commission's
duty of ensuring clean, honest, orderly and
peaceful elections.
I am in absolute agreement with the
majority when it ruled and ordered in SPA 95-284
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
for the technical examination of the fingerprints of
voters in Parang, given the incredible election
results therein. The election results, standing
alone, points undoubtedly to a failure of election
in said municipality. The conclusion is clear and
the deduction glaringly obvious. Fraud of such a
massive degree attended the elections held in
Parang that what could have been a democratic
process of ascertaining the will of the electorate
was totally vitiated. Such fraud was the cause
which gave rise to a failure to elect, a ground for
the declaration of a failure of election." 50
The results of the technical examination, upon which
the COMELEC, by a unanimous vote, based its decision to
annul the election results of Parang, Sulu, are chronicled as
follows:
"The election documents which
the Commission directed to be submitted for
examination by the Election Records & Statistics
Department . . . were CE Form 1 and CE Form 2.
CE Form 1 is the Voter's Affidavit (now called
Voters Registration Record), among the contents
of which is the individual voter's signature, and left
and right thumbprints . . . . CE Form 2 is the
computerized 'List of Voters with Voting Records'
for each precinct, which contains . . . signature,
thumbmark . . . .
There were two examinations conducted. One
examination was a comparison of the
thumbmarks to determine whether the voter's
thumbmark in CE Form 2 is identical with either
the right or left thumbmark appearing on CE Form
1. There was also an examination of all the
thumbmarks of the voters in each precinct to
determine which thumbmarks identical to each
other belong to the same person. The other
examination was a comparison of the voter's
signature appearing in CE Form No. 2 with that
appearing in CE Form No. 1.
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the technical examination was
conducted, the Commission already noted certain
badges of fraud just by looking at the election
results of Parang, Sulu.
Based on the Certificate of Canvass of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers,
Tupay Loong garnered a total of 24,741 votes
while Abdusakur Tan was credited with 788 votes.
Kimar Tulawie, the running-mate of Loong, was
not far behind with 24,212 votes while his
opponent for the position or Vice-Governor —
Hadji Munib Estino — was credited with 763
votes.
A physical count of the Voters'
Affidavit/Registration Record (CE Form 1) shows
that there were 25,358 registered voters in 104
precincts of Parang, Sulu. But if the votes
of Loong and Tan are totalled (24,741+788) it
would be 25,529 votes, 171 votes in excess of the
registered voters. Also, 822 voters who had no
Voters' Affidavit/Registration Record (CE Form 1)
were allowed to vote.
. . . The thumbprints found on CE Form No.
2 (Computerized List of Voters with Voting
Records) of each of the fourteen thousand, four
hundred eighty-three (14,483) persons who voted
do not tally with the corresponding thumbprints in
CE Form No. 1 (Voter's Affidavit/Registration
Record). The inescapable conclusion is that the
persons who voted were not the registered voters
themselves. They were impostors.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)

". . . After proclamation, however, there is a
. . . A comparison of thumbprints of all the voters reglementary period to file an election protest or
in each of the 102 precincts, revealed that the annul proclamation, and beyond the time limit, it
thumbprints of groups of voters in each precinct is barred. Thus, if the time has passed, a
came from the same person. Counting the petitioner loses his case even before it is filed.
number of voters with similar thumbprints in all Not in this case.
groupings in all of the 102 precincts examined, the
number reach 10,780. The thumbprints in CE Since there is no reglementary period to file a
Form No. 1 or CE Form No. 2, numbering 9,458 petition for annulment of elections before
voters, were, however, smudged, blurred, or faint, proclamation, there is no legal impediment
making these thumbprints unreadable and against the examination of CE Forms 1 and 2 in
impossible to analyze for lack of sufficient basis the five specified municipalities. The requested
for comparison . . . . technical examination is not the petition proper.
The petition is for annulment of elections. The
These incontrovertible findings in the 14,483 technical examination is but the means to
unidentical thumbmarks are the result of discover or obtain evidence which may or may not
dactyloscopic examination based on the science sustain the petition. Thus, the technical
of fingerprints. In precincts where Tan and Estino examination is not time-barred either.
had zero (0) votes, undoubtedly, all the votes
illegally cast were in favor of Loong and Tulawie. Administration of justice is a difficult
. . . ." 51 process, but it would be in keeping with the
requirements of due process and equal protection
While, however, the COMELEC acted within its of the law, if litigants are treated in an equal
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the private respondents' manner by giving them the same rights under
petition to annul the election results of or to declare failure similar circumstances." 52
of elections in Parang, Sulu, it committed grave abuse of
In the majority opinion penned by Commissioner
discretion when confronted with essentially the same situation
Gorospe, the COMELEC justified its dismissal of petitioners'
in petitioners' own petition to annul the elections of or to
action to annul the election results in the aforecited five
declare failure of elections in the municipalities of Tapul,
municipalities upon the untimeliness thereof as well as its
Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and Kalinggalang Caluang.
having filed allegedly only upon petitioners' realization that
The COMELEC arbitrarily and without valid ground dismissed
their lead in Parang was in danger of being eradicated by the
the said petition respecting the aforementioned five
annulment of the election results thereof. On this point, we
municipalities. The untimeliness of the petition is an untenable
fully agree with Commissioner Flores that —
argument for such dismissal, because as Commissioner
Regalado Maambong pointed out in his own dissenting "xxx xxx xxx
opinion, no law provides for a reglementary period within The majority decision is made more
which to file annulment of elections when there is as yet no beyond comprehension when it turned a blind eye
proclamation.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
to the fundamental precepts of fair play. To bar
the petition of Tulawie and Loong,
the Commission applied the maxim that 'he who
comes to court must come with clean hands.'
However, it committed a grave affront to the
minimum requirements of equal protection when,
without compunction, it discriminatorily applied
such principle against Tulawie and Loong when it
should have first applied it against candidate
Abdusakur Tan in SPA 95-284. That both parties
are similarly situated is amply supported by a
perusal of the petitions. Hence, both must be
accorded equal favor before the law and if the
contrary so warrants, to suffer equally the brunt of
said law. It is doubly hard, therefore, for
the Commission to extricate itself from the
quagmire in which it has buried itself when it
applied the law with a marked bias in favor of one
of the parties. For if it had in mind to punish
candidates evidently at fault yet seek the aid of
the Commission for the rectification of
irregularities allegedly committed against them,
the Commission should have not hesitated to
wave before petitioner Tan the evidence which
preponderates to his guilt and to dismiss his
petition outrightly. Such would have been the
prudent decision because the parties are
apparently in pari delicto.
Thus, it remains inexplicable how
the Commission could have acted in defiance
of the Constitution when it granted Tan's petition
to annul the election in Parang but denied without
any justifiable reason Loong and Tulawie's when
both petitions allege similar grounds and are
circumscribed by almost bisymmetrical factual
circumstances. Tan, upon whom similar
convincing allegations of fraud were imputed and
against whom convincing electoral statistics
pointing to the fraud has been alleged was unduly
favored because the hands that tipped the scales
failed to heed basic doctrines of fairness." 53
The COMELEC, in its resolution, dated October 9, 1995,
already noted that the same badges of fraud were evident in
the election results of the aforecited five municipalities
disputed by petitioners and even declared that "the law must
be enforced in a fair manner. Justice, fairness and equity,
therefore, require that the Commission should conduct a
similar technical examination of CE Form No. 1 . . . and CE
Form No. 2 . . . to determine if voting irregularities in the
Municipality of Parang were similarly perpetrated in these five
municipalities . . . . SPA No. 95-284 and SPA No. 95-289 are
so closely connected that a resolution of one would
necessarily and materially affect the outcome of the other. All
those who disregard the law must be made to equally feel the
wrath of its enforcement." 54 It was, therefore, grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC to have arbitrarily and
whimsically dismissed SPA No. 95-289.
It was also grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC to have, after assuming jurisdiction over SPA
No. 95-284 upon the strength of its statutory grant of power
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166 in relation to Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, disregarded the
mandate of said provisions and did away with the holding of
special elections in Parang, Sulu. While the majority
acknowledged that a decision annulling an election no less
requires a special election in its aftermath, citing the aforecited
legal provisions, the majority considered such provisions
anyway negotiable from which they can deviate by using
"reasonable, practicable and equitable" solutions "to end the
instant election controversy" because "exceptional and
supervening events so preponderate." The dissent of
Commissioner Maambong echoes our own position on the
matter:
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)
"With the annulment of the results of the
election in the Municipality of Parang, no
proclamation of the winners for the contested
positions of Governor and Vice-Governor can be
made unless a special election is held.
Any proclamation made will be null and void
because it would be based on an incomplete
canvass. The only exception is if the election
returns from the elections of Parang will not affect
the results of the provincial election. Based on the
number of registered voters, however, the
exclusion of Parang will affect the results of the
provincial election. . . .
While it is true that an election can be held with
the participation of less than the majority of
registered voters, it can only be valid if the
canvass is complete.
The law is clear on this point, and failure to comply
with it is an election offense . . . .
The Supreme Court has uniformly applied the
legal requirement of a complete canvass for a
proclamation to be valid.
xxx xxx xxx
If the absence of election returns of one
precinct can result in incomplete canvass, how
much more for one municipality like Parang, Sulu.
The number of registered voters of Parang are
definitely much more than the existing lead of
Abdusakur Tan after the annulment of the results
in that municipality . . . even with the broad powers
of the Commission under the Constitution, I do not
believe the Commission should violate the
mandate of the law for whatever reason." 55
Finally, a peripheral issue that also needs to be addressed is
petitioners' claim that they have been denied their right to due
process when they were not given the opportunity to rebut the
results of the technical examination which was undertaken after
the hearing in SPA 95-284 and after said case was duly submitted
for decision. In support of their claim, petitioners
cite Usman vs. Commission on Elections, 56 where we found that
the COMELEC failed to fully recognize and respect Usman's right
to due process when Usman was not allowed by the COMELEC,
without sufficient reasons, to present any evidence to rebut the
findings of its experts regarding the thumbprints and signatures
in the CE Form 1 and their corresponding CE Form 39.
Accordingly, we ordered the COMELEC in that case to re-open
the proceedings and set the case for hearing to afford Usman his
rights.
We find, however, that the circumstances attendant to petitioners'
case are distinct from those characterizing the aforecited case
of Usman. For in the instant case, petitioners admitted in their
pleadings that they were fully aware of the issuance
by COMELEC of an order directing the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Sulu to bring to the COMELEC office in Manila the
election documents to be used in the technical examination. In
fact, petitioners anticipated such technical examination and filed
a pleading before the COMELEC in which they prayed that they
be informed of any subsequent proceedings in the same case. In
fine, it is undeniable that petitioners had the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings respecting the technical
examination, aware as they were of the intent of the COMELEC to
conduct the same. Militating against them is the fact that they did
not do so when they had the opportunity to, especially as public
interest in the speedy disposition of this case will only be further
derailed by the re-opening of the case for the benefit of petitioners
who, if they could after all be this assertive of their due process
rights now, should have asserted the same as early as when the
issues were ripe for debate.
ELEC (CHAPTER 5)

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI in G.R. No. 122137 is
HEREBY GRANTED.
(1) The COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTIONS, dated
OCTOBER 9, 1995 and DECEMBER 13, 1995, are HEREBY
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
(2) The COMELEC is HEREBY ORDERED TO
CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITY
OF PARANG, SULU, and is DIRECTED TO SUPERVISE
THE COUNTING OF THE VOTES AND THE CANVASSING
OF THE RESULTS TO THE END THAT THE WINNING
CANDIDATES FOR GOVERNOR AND VICE-GOVERNOR
FOR THE PROVINCE OF SULU BE PROCLAIMED AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.
(3) The COMELEC is HEREBY ORDERED TO
REINSTATE SPA 95-289 AND TO CONDUCT THE
NECESSARY TECHNICAL EXAMINATION, IF ANY, OF
PERTINENT ELECTION DOCUMENTS THEREIN AND TO
HOLD SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
DISPUTED IN SPA 95-289 IN THE EVENT
the COMELEC ANNULS THE ELECTION RESULTS
THEREIN OR DECLARE THEREAT FAILURE
OF ELECTIONS.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 107814-
107815, 120826, 122137, 122396, [May 16, 1996], 326 PHIL
790-823)