covers only civil cases that are not criminal under the Military Bases Agreement.
Ergo, the
USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at
bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which
it has not consented.
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 76607 (U.S.A et. al vs. Guinto et. al. Feb. 26, 1990), the private
respondents sued several officers of the US Air Force regarding a bidding for barbering
services contract. A bid from Okinawa Area Exchange was solicited through James Shaw,
a contracting officer. Private respondents and concessionaires inside the Clark Air Base,
Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao and Pablo C. del Pilar, were among the
bidders, however, Ramon Dizon won the bidding. The private respondents complained
with the contention that Dizon also bid for the Civil Engineering (CE) area which was not
included in the bidding invitation. PHAX or the Philippine Area Exchange, to whom the
respondents complained to, represented by petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederick
Smouse clarified that the CE area is yet to be awarded to Dizon because of a previous
solicitation. Dizon was already operating the NCO club concession, however, and the
contract expiry of the CE barbershop was extended only until the end of June 1986. Hence,
the respondents filed a petition, with a prayer to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to revoke the award to Dizon, and conduct a rebidding to allow the private
respondents to continue operating their concessions by a writ of preliminary injunction
pending litigation. To maintain status quo, Respondent court issued an ex parte order to
the petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion for dismissal and petition to oppose the
preliminary injunction. They contended that the action was in effect a suit against the US
Force. Both were denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition for
preliminary injunction were filed before the Supreme Court and a TRO was issued.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Crtalla and Peter Orascion for his
dismissal as a cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion
testified that Genova poured urine into the soup stock that was served to customers.
Lamachia suspended him and referred the case to a board of arbitrators who found
Genove guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove then filed an MS complaint in the
RTC of Baguio against the individual petitioners, who moved to dismiss the case in the basis
that Lamachia was immune from suit as per acts done in his official capacity as an officer
of the US Air Force. The motion was denied by the RTC, so the petitioners filed a petition for
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 80018, the respondent, Louis Bautista, was arrested pursuant to RA
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) in a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners, Tomi J.
King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, who were officers and special agents of the US
Air Force and Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He was charged before the RTC
which caused his dismissal as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air
base. Bautista then filed a complaint against the petitioners. The petitioners, in defense,
filed a motion to dismiss the case with the contention that they were acting in official
capacity when the acts were committed, hence the suit against them is, in effect, a suit
against the US. The motion was denied by the judge, with the contention that the immunity
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition for preliminary injunction. A TRO was
issued.
In G.R. No. 80258, the private respondents, Ricky Sanchez, et. al., filed a
complaint for damages against the respondents, Major General Michael Carns, et. al., for
the extensive injuries allegedly sustained by the petitioners, who beat them up,
handcuffed and unleashed dogs on them who bit them. The petitioners denied the
accusation and instead said that the respondents were bitten by dogs because they
resisted arrest when they committed theft, and they were brought to the medical center
for treatment thereafter. The petitioners, USA together with Carns et. al., contended that
they are immune against this suit, invoking their right under the RP-US Bases Treaty, as they
acted in the performance of their official functions. The matter was brought before the
Supreme Court after their motion was denied, wherein they filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.
SHORTER:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the
invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after
investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty
and recommended his dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air
Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified
against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He
then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latter’s acts
that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
 A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US
military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them
up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim
that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
1. In , the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining
order was LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No.79470, the petition is GRANTED and the Civil Case
No.0829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No80018, the petition is GRANTED and the Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary
restraining order was LIFTED.
Reason: Under Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, “The State may not be sued
without its consent.” However, this does not mean that at all times, the State may not be
sued. There needs to be a consideration on if they were indeed acting within the capacity
of their duties, or if they enter into a contract with a private party.
In G.R. No. 76607, the barbershops, subject of the bidding awarded were
commercial enterprises, operated by private persons, therefore they are not agencies of
the US Armed Forces nor part of their facilities. Although the barbershops provide service to
the military, they were for a fee. State Immunity cannot be invoked by the petitioners for
the fact that they entered into a contract with a private party, commercial in nature. In
G.R. No. 79470, it is in the same principle as in the first case. The petitioner, Lamachia, is a
manager of a privately operated service which generate an income. The court assumed
that they are an individual entity, and the service they offer partake the nature of a
business entered by US in its proprietary capacity. Despite this, the court ruled in favor of
the petitioners as the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of evidence
before the court. It ruled that the dismissal of the private respondent was justifiable under
the circumstance. Further, the Supreme Court declared that the petitioners in the other
cases above, stating that they acted in performance of their duties, need evidence. The
SC was able to make certain that the petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were indeed acting in
their official capacity, as the state they represent, USA, has not given its consent to be
sued. As such, they cannot be sued for acts imputable to their state. However in G.R. No.
80258, more evidence is needed as the factual allegations were contradictory. There
needs to be clear, and sufficient evidence that they were in the vestige of their duty, and
did not exceed it. In the foregoing, the Supreme Court had decided to make the case be
investigated further by the lower court before proceeding and the final judgment can be
rendered.
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our
land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the
law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the
USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may
the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely
because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official
functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver
may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions
granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in
USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly,
this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
 In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its
proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still
dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary
about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly
in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter
testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer

study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their
authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower
court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:

1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN
THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS
INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)

Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No

implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)