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DIGESTS FOR TORTS AND DAMAGES UA&P LAW 2018

Wright v. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.


No. 35283, 5 November 1932

FACTS:

 The plaintiff’s residence fronts on the street along which defendant-company’s tracks run, so that to
enter his premises from the street, plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant’s tracks.
 One night, the plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse
stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails with great force. The fall
of the horse and the collision of the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from
the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of.
 It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the
rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above
the level of the street.
 It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended
that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the
accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary
cause of the accident.
 Thereafter, plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries sustained.
 Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as
defendant’s. Hence, the court apportioned the damages. Both parties appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court was correct in apportioning the damages. NO, only defendant is liable.

RATIO:

 A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads us to the conclusion that there is nothing in the
opinion which sustains the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the
accident which is the basis of this action. Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with, the other
evidence tending to prove negligence.
 It is the general rule that It is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or
prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an
intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
 As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the
plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not
warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the
vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a
portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a
person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances,
a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the
realm of speculation and guesswork.