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PART IV collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal

CERTIFICATION ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION ISSUES CB ULP and probationary employees.

A. CERTIFICATION ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION ISSUES By reason of the modern complexity of both employer and union structure, it
frequently becomes difficult to determine from the evidence alone which of several
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT claimant groups form a proper bargaining unit. It then becomes necessary to give
consideration to the express will or desire of the employees. This practice of
1. CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOP VS SECRETARY considering; the employees' will has been, designated as the Globe doctrine. This
doctrine arose in a case where there were four contending labor groups, three
Where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that no claiming to be the proper bargaining units for employees coming within each of their
opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. three separate categories of work, and the fourth claiming the right to be designated
as the bargaining unit for all employees on a plant-wide basis. The National labor
By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, Relations Board, finding that each of the competing units have an equally valid basis
themed arbiter has in effect arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the for their respective claims, decided to hold a series of elections, not for the purpose
employee's to choose their collective bargaining representative. He has in effect of allowing the group receiving an overall majority of votes to represent all
imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority employees, but for the specific purpose of permitting the employees in each of the
representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the several categories of work to select the group which each chose as a bargaining unit.
Union enjoys the blessing of the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the
employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable for refusing to The second factor is perhaps one of the most conclusive in determining the proper
negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has not been legally bargaining unit. Inasmuch, as the basic test of a bargaining unit's acceptability is
established. whether it will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights, industrial experience indicates that the most efficacious bargaining unit is one
While there may be some factual variances, the rationale therein is applicable to the which is comprised of constituents enjoying a community of interest and economic or
present case in the sense that it is not alone sufficient that a union has the support of occupational unity. This community of interest is reflected in groups having
the majority. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space substantial similarity of worlc and duties or similarity of compensation and working
in the bargaining unit concerned. The most effective way of determining which labor conditions.
organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election.
Another important factor is the precedent history of collective bargaining between
the proposed bargaining unit and the employer. When this precedent exists, it may
2. DEMOCRATIC LABOR ASSOCIATION VS. CEBU STEVEDORING COMPANY, be assumed that the court will not disturb the composition of a consolidated
bargaining unit which has an established existence and has, in its past dealings with
INC. ET AL.,
the employer, demonstrated its service to the collective bargaining purposes of the
ISSUE act. However, where the circumstances have been so altered or where the reciprocal
relationship of the employer and the bargaining unit has been so changed that the
How to determine the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be past mutual experience in collective bargaining cannot be reasonably said to establish
appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency. a reliable guide to the present constituency of the bargaining unit, then prior
collective bargaining history cannot be considered a factor in the determination. In
RULING such an event, the determination must be made entirely upon the basis of existing
There are various factors which must be satisfied and considered in determining the facts and with due consideration to all of the remaining factors.
proper constituency of bargaining unit. No particular factor is itself decisive of the
determination. But the most pertinent to the case are: (1) will of employees (Globe The status of employment is another important factor in the determination of which
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity employees shall be included or excluded from a proposed bargaining unit. There are
of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior certain positions and categories of work which, by their very nature, place the
employees in a position wherein a conflict of duties and interest exists. There are
Scroll No. 577 1|LabRel – Part IV-C
several categories of employment which have so far received the special attention of expressly covered and, should the company, at any time, decide not to extend to
congress, the courts and the board, among them supervisory employees, confidential them said benefits, they cannot legally demand their extension to them as they
employees, guards and plant policemen and temporary, seasonal and probationary would have nothing to invoke in support of said demand.
employees. With respect to suck employees, there frequently arises the question of
the right to include or exclude them from bargaining units composed of permanent
employees. It was hold that employees hired on a brief, casual or day to day basis or
for a short, definite term, and who have no reasonable basis for continued or 4. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION vs.
renewed employment for any appreciable substantial time, are considered to have no LAGUESMA
such mutuality of interest with permanent employees as to justify their interest in a
bargaining unit composed of such permanent employees. ISSUES

1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the


company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a
3. ALHAMBRA CIGAR & CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY vs. union. NO
ALHAMBRA EMPLOYEE’S ASSOCIATION (PAFLU) 2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants
constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit. NO
ISSUES
RULING
The first issue to be resolved by the Court concerns the composition of the 1. In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential
appropriate unit. employees merely because they handle "confidential data" as such must first be
The second issue which was raised in this case is whether or not the collective strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under said
bargaining agreement entered into between the company and the FOITAF constitutes restrictions. The information they handle are properly classifiable as technical and
a bar to the instant proceeding. internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no relevance to
negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the interests of a union and the
RULING management are invariably adversarial. Since the employees are not classifiable
under the confidential type, this Court rules that they may appropriately form a
In arriving at the conclusion that all the employees in the administrative, sales, and bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
dispensary departments of the company, with the exception of the supervisors,
security guards, and confidential employees therein, constitute an appropriate 2. An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of a
collective bargaining unit, the lower court considered the fact that said employees given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
are engaged in "an entirely different kind of work" which does not involve production which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
and maintenance, and the additional fact that the places where they work are employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
separate from those of the workers in the other departments of the company. parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law."
Examination of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the
company and FOITAF and the agreements entered subsequent thereto discloses A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial,
beyond doubt that they expressly cover only the workers in the five departments of mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective
the company. In no single instance is the term "employees" mentioned to convey the bargaining.
idea that those in the other three departments, namely, the administrative, sales, and
dispensary departments, are also covered by said agreements.
It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have "community or
mutuality of interests," which is the standard in determining the proper constituency
While it may be true the benefits granted under said agreements were extended to,
of a collective bargaining unit. 26 It is undisputed that they all belong to the Magnolia
and enjoyed by, all the workers in all the eight departments of the company, the fact
Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This means that, although they belong to
remains that those in the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments were not

Scroll No. 577 2|LabRel – Part IV-C


three different plants, they perform work of the same nature, receive the same Whether or not the two (2) bargaining units be treated as one.
wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in concerted
activities. RULING

The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Yes. The existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in
Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive.
immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of
mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed as demonstrated in UP v. Calleja- interests. This is so because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
Ferrer where all non-academic rank and file employee of the University of the acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, Padre Faura, Manila, Los Baños, Laguna and the assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights."
Visayas were allowed to participate in a certification election. We rule that the
distance among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the
the administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another.
likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining representative. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be difference as to the nature of their individual assignments but the
distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.

5. PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. NLRC


PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION
ISSUE
7. ME-SHURN CORPORATION AND SAMMY CHOU, vs. ME-SHURN WORKERS
UNION-FSM AND ROSALINA* CRUZ
WON service engineers, sales representatives and confidential employees of
petitioner are qualified to be part of the existing bargaining unit.
ISSUE/S
RULING
1.) WON the dismissal of the employees of petitioner Meshurn Corporation is
for an authorized cause.
No. All these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales 2.) WON the union can maintain a suit against the corporation.
force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not
seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO- RULING
FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees.
1. NO.
By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to,
or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions Basic is the rule in termination cases that the employer bears the burden of showing
in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the dismissal is
managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them. deemed unjustified. Apropos this responsibility, the corporation should have
presented clear and convincing evidence of imminent economic or business reversals
as a form of affirmative defense in the proceedings before the labor arbiter or, under
justifiable circumstances, even on appeal with the NLRC. However in all the
proceedings before the two quasi-judicial bodies and even before the CA, no
6. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS vs. MAINIT LUMBER
evidence was submitted to show the corporations alleged business losses. It is only
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER now that petitioners have belatedly submitted the corporations’ income tax returns
ISSUE from 1996 to 1999 as proof of alleged continued losses during those years.

Scroll No. 577 3|LabRel – Part IV-C


2. YES. whether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest
governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate
Neither are we prepared to believe petitioners’ argument that respondent union was disposal, and his adverse party must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of
not legitimate. It should be pointed out that on June 29, 1998, it filed a PCE. While another competent agency sitting in another place to overburden the former. This
this Petition was initially dismissed by the med-arbiter, the appeal was granted and being the case, the worker may waive the benefit.
that the Undersecretary ordered the holding of a certification election.
It is not denied that Nestle has its principal office in the National Capital Region. It is
The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union were not a legitimate likewise admitted that the UFE-DFA and six (6) of the individual complainants are
labor organization within the meaning of the Labor Code. Under this Code, in an residents in areas within the National Capital Region. All of the individual private
unorganized establishment, only a legitimate union may file a petition for respondents are members of the UFE-DFA. All are aggrieved by the decision of Nestle
certification election.[34] Hence, while it is not clear from the record whether to dismiss them. Under the afore-quoted rule, the case may be filed with the RAB,
respondent union is a legitimate organization, we are not readily inclined to believe NCR, or with the RAB of either Cagayan de Oro City (Region X) or the RAB of Region
otherwise, especially in the light of the pro-labor policies enshrined in the IV. The application of this rule in this case would be the most logical step to take to
Constitution and the Labor Code. prevent multiplicity of suits which would only delay and render expensive the
settlement of the dispute in violation of the basic rules of construction set forth in
Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own name in order to Section 2, Rule I of the Revised Rules of the NLRC.
challenge the ULP committed by petitioners against it and its members.[36] It would be
an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through formation of
labor associations if thereafter such collective entities would be barred from 9. CRUZVALE, INC., petitioner, vs. LAGUESMA
instituting action in their representative capacity
1. W/N UFW is a legitimate labor organization. YES. The Med-Arbiter found that
private respondent was issued Certificate of Registration and Charter
Certificate.Findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and binding upon
8. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., versus NLRC this Court when supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUE 2. W/N the certification election should cover those employed in the cinema business
W/N the venue was proper. YES. The parties waived the defense of improper venue, and not only the employees at the garment factory. NO. As stated in the questioned
hence the case should go on. Decision the employees at the Cinema operation and those at the garment
manufacturing operation do not share commonality of interest as the former clearly
RULING perform work entirely different from that of the latter. Thus, their separation into two
Petitioners waived the defense of improper venue. Although petitioners invoked the (2) distinct bargaining units is proper.
said ground in their Position Paper, they did not pursue it with the diligence of a party
confidently if not absolutely, certain of the indubitability of his defense. One who is 3. Where should the petition for certification election be filed. In the Regional Office
so would incur no delay in pursuing the defense to end the litigation and prevent which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the Employer.
further waste of precious time and expense. This belated awakening from deep
slumber and deafening silence deserves no sympathy but, rather, condemnation as it The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the venue where the
is a crude legal maneuver, grounded on pure technicality and unfavorable to labor, petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power of
designed to delay the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be
brought.
Paragraph (a), Section 1, Rule V of the NLRC Rules speaks of the
complainant/petitioner’s workplace. It is evident that the rule is intended for the
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant,
exclusive benefit of the worker. The reason for this is not only convenience, it is
petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to
economic as well. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party —
settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer
Scroll No. 577 4|LabRel – Part IV-C
must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in voluntarily unless there is convincing proof to the contrary. It would be otherwise if
another place to the inconvenience of the worker. the withdrawal was made after the filing of the petition for it would then be
presumed that the withdrawal was not free and voluntary.
Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before
certification election before the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon the filing of the petition, the names of employees supporting the petition are
City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is located. supposed to be secret to the opposite party, logically, any such withdrawal or
Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it
certification election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the
offices in Manila. petition; hence the subscription requirement has not been met. When the
withdrawal or retraction is made after the PCE is filed, the employees who are
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where supporting the petition become known to the opposite party since their names are
the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the attached to the petition at the time of filing. Therefore, it would not be unexpected
place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, that the opposite party would use foul means for the subject employees to withdraw
assignment or travel. . . . their support.
With the withdrawal of 31 members of their support prior to the filing of PCE and the
14 union members who are not employees of the company but independent
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision as to when an
contractors, the remainder of 3 out of the 48 alleged to have supported the petition
objection to improper venue may be raised. But the stance of the Med-Arbiter, that
can hardly be said to represent the union.
the question of the venue in representation cases should be raised at the first
hearing, was accepted by respondent Undersecretary. We are not prepared to say
that said administrative Officials have gravely abused their discretion.
11. CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, versus LAGUESMA

ISSUE
WON the 25% subscription requirement applies NO.
10. LA SUERTE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY vs. DIRECTOR OF BLR
RULING
ISSUES Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor organizations
1. WON the 14 dealers are employees or independent contractors. and not to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which
2. WON the withdrawal of 31 union members from the NATU affected the PCE insofar had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
as the 30% requirement is concerned. management. Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must have no certified
bargaining agent.
RULING In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which
1. The 14 dealers are independent contractors. Employment relationship is constitute a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file,
important in the determination of who shall be included in a proposed bargaining have no such agent. Thus they correctly filed a petition for certification election
unit because it is the fundamental and essential condition that a bargaining unit be thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor
composed of employees. Failure to establish this juridical relationship between the organization.
union members and the employer affects the legality of the union itself. It means
ineligibility of the union members to present a PCE as wells as to vote therein. CMC's insistence on the 25% subscription requirement is clearly immaterial. The
Corollarily, when a PCE is supported by 48 signatories in a bargaining unit composed same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is
of 60 salesmen, but 14 of the 48 lacks employee status, the petition is vitiated presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with existing
thereby. bargaining agents.

2. YES. It appearing that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the
PCE before the filing of the PCE, the presumption is the withdrawal was made 12. NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION vs. LUNA

Scroll No. 577 5|LabRel – Part IV-C


It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most
tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification election. This must not be so for
13. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT versus the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The
LAGUESMA employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a
bystander.
ISSUE
WON the denial of Med-Arbiter and public respondent to thepetitioner's request for 15. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES-UNIFIED FILIPINO
the suspension of proceedings in the certification election case constituted a grave SERVICE WORKERS vs LAGUESMA
abuse of discretion? YES
Yes. A "deadlock" is . . . the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; . . . .
RULING There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the
action of equal and opposed forces . . . . The word is synonymous with the word
The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized establishments, a petition impasse, which . . "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which,
for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties."

In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioner's prayer Although there is no "deadlock" in its strict sense as there is no "counteraction" of
that the former look into the legitimacy of the respondent. Union by a sweeping forces present in this case nor "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining," such can
declaration that the union was in the possession of a charter certificate so that "for be attributed to CMC's fault as the bargaining proposals of respondent union were
all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate never answered by CMC. In fact, what happened in this case is worse than a
labor organization." bargaining deadlock for CMC employed all legal means to block the certification of
respondent union as the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file; and use it as its
leverage for its failure to bargain with respondent union. Thus, we can only conclude
The grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance with Article 239 of
that CMC was unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with respondent union.
the Labor Code constitute a grave challenge to the right of respondent Union to ask
CMC has not at any instance shown willingness to discuss the economic proposals
for certification election. The Med-Arbiter should have looked into the merits of the
given by respondent union.
petition for cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification election.
Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no
legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is a bargaining
to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more reason should it not be
a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the right to ask for conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer to the negotiation table by the
certification election in a bargaining unit "no reasonable effort in good faith" on the employer certified bargaining agent, there
was to bargain collectively.

14. R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. LAGUESMA Respondent union had taken an action to legally coerce the employer to comply with
its statutory duty to bargain collectively, i.e., charging the employer with unfair labor
The phrase "final certification election result" means that there was an actual practice and conducting a strike in protest against the employer's refusal to
conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes. bargain. It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be
considered as similar in nature to a "bargaining deadlock" when no certification
election could be held. This is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for
In this case, there was no certification election conducted precisely because the first
the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous employers to prevent any certified
petition was dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not include all
bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA.
the employees who should be properly included in the collective bargaining unit.

Scroll No. 577 6|LabRel – Part IV-C


16. KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO vs. TRAJANO
The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 — when NAFLU was
ISSUES proclaimed the exclusive bargaining representative of all VIRON employees — to April
1. WON the prohibition on the holding of a certification election “within one 11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election or a period of
year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election more than four (4) years, no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and
result” no deadlock ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in
2. WON KAMPIL's PCE is barred because, before its filing, a bargaining deadlock conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.
between VIRON and NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent, had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid Obviously, however, these activities took place after the initiation of the certification
notice of strike or lockout, in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them
the Omnibus Rules above quoted. as precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed for.

RULING WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election
set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of
1. NO. discretion to have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of the respondent
It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification Director the case is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final
certification election result' — in this case, from February 27, 1981, the date of the 17. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) vs. CALLEJA
Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file
workers of VIRON — can have no application to the case at bar.
ISSUE
That one-year period-known as the "certification year" during which the certified
W/N the collective bargaining agreement is defective. YES.
union is required to negotiate with the employer, and certification election is
prohibited 2 — has long since expired.
RULING
2. NO.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this A careful consideration of the facts culled from the records of this case, especially the
case, there was no such "bargaining deadlock ... (which) had been submitted to allegations of petitioner itself as hereinabove quoted, yields the conclusion that the
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective hence unproductive
lockout." of the legal effects attributed to it by the former director in his decision which was
subsequently and properly reversed.
To be sure, there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring
VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's We have previously held that the mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion
recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; 3 but there is no proof only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1)
that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty possession of the status of majority representation by the employees' representative
to bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it in accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by
did not. the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain
under Article 251, paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code. 4 In the present case, the
It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain standing of petitioner as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious, to say
collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by NAFLU, too, the least. It may be recalled that respondent company, in a letter dated May 12, 1986
that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to and addressed to petitioner, merely indicated that it was "not against the desire of
the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there (its) workers" and required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by the
is no adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the majority thereof in a meeting to be held on the same date. 5 The only express
bargaining process between it and VIRON. recognition of petitioner as said employees' bargaining representative that We see in
Scroll No. 577 7|LabRel – Part IV-C
the records is in the collective bargaining agreement entered into two days where respondent company required petitioner union to present proof of its support
thereafter. 6 Evidently, there was precipitate haste on the part of respondent by the employees, the company already suggested that petitioner ALU at the same
company in recognizing petitioner union, which recognition appears to have been time submit the proposals that it intended to embody in the projected agreement.
based on the self-serving claim of the latter that it had the support of the majority This was on May 12, 1986, and prompltly on thre following day the negoltiation
of the employees in the bargaining unit. Furthermore, at the time of the supposed panel; furnish respondent company final copies of the desired agreement whcih, with
recognition, the employer was obviously aware that there were other unions existing equal dispatch, was signed on May 15, 1986.
in the unit. As earlier stated, respondent company's letter is dated May 12, 1986
while the two other unions, Southern Philippine Federation of Labor (hereafter, SPFL Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective bargaining is the finding
and Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU, for short), went on strike earlier on of respondent director that one hundred eighty-one( 181) of the two hundred
May 9, 1986. The unusual promptitude in the recognition of petitioner union by eighty-one (281) workers who "ratified" the same now " strongly and vehemently
respondent company as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and ratification of the CBA.
GAW Trading, Inc. under the fluid and amorphous circumstances then obtaining, " 10 Although petitioner claims that only sev en (7) of the repudiating group of
was decidedly unwarranted and improvident. workers belong to the total number who allegedly ratified the agreement,
nevertheless such substantiated contention weighed against the factujal that the
It bears mention that even in cases where it was the then Minister of Labor himself controverted contract will not promote industrial stability . The Court has long since
who directly certified the union as the bargaining representative, this Court voided declared that:
such certification where there was a failure to properly determine with legal certainty
whether the union enjoyed a majority representation. In such a case, the holding of a ... Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select
certification election at a proper time would not necessarily be a mere formality as representatives can be justified only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted
there was a compelling reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union. 7 from the contract which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the
identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts
An additional infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement involved was the must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does nto
failure to post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the establishment establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law. 11
at least five days before its ratification. 8 Petitioners rationalization was that
"(b)ecause of the real existence of the illegal strike staged by SPFL in all the stores of At this juncture, petitioner should be reminded that the technical rules of rpocedure
GAW Trading, Inc. it had become impossible to comply with the posting requirement do not strictly apply in the adjudication of labor disputes. 12 Consequently, its
in so far as the realization of tits purpose is concerned as there were no impartial objection that the evidence with respect to the aforesaid repudiiation of the
members of the unit who could be appraised of the CBA's contents. " 9 This supposed collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered for the first time on
justification is puerile and unacceptable. appeal on the Bureau of Labor Relations should be disregarded, especially
considering the weighty significance thereof.
In the first place, the posting of copies of the collective bargaining agreement is the
responsibility of the employer which can easily comply with the requirement through Both petitioner and private respondent GAW Trading, Inc. allege that the employees
a mere mechanical act. The fact that there were "no impartial members of the unit" is of the latter are now enjoying the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement
immaterial. The purpose of the requirement is precisely to inform the employees in that both parties had forged. However, We cannot find sufficient evidence of record
the bargaining unit of the contents of said agreement so that they could intelligently to support this contention. The only evidence cited by petitioner is supposed
decide whether to accept the same or not. The assembly of the members of ALU payment of union fees by said employees, a premise too tenuous to sustain the
wherein the agreement in question was allegedly explained does not cure the defect. desired conclusion. Even the actual number of workers in the respondent company is
The contract is intended for all employees and not only for the members of the not clear from the records. Said private respondent claims that it is two hundred
purpoted representative alone. It may even be said the the need to inform the non- eighty-one (281) 13 but petitioner suggests that it is more than that number. The said
members of the terms thereof is more exigent and compelling since, in all likehood, parties should be aware that this Court is not an adjudicator of facts. Worse, to
their contact with the persons who are supposed to represent them is limited. borrow a trite but apt phrase, they would heap the Ossa of confusion upon the Pelion
Moreover, to repeat, there was an apparent and suspicious hurry in the formulation of uncertainty and still expect a definitive ruling on the matter thus confounded.
and finalization of said collective bargaining accord. In the sforementioned letter

Scroll No. 577 8|LabRel – Part IV-C


Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the existence of
fact that when the disputed agreement was filed before the Labor Regional Office on such a relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the certification election
May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already been filed on May 19, case.9 As the authority to determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary
1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of thirty percent and indispensable in the exercise of jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding
(30%) of the workers in the bargaining unit, the same was enough to initiate said thereon may only be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises
certification election. appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, which
provides ––
18. M.Y. SAN BISCUITS, INC. vs. LAGUESMA
Art. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. — Any party to an election may
ISSUE appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the rules and
Whether or not the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor and Employment has the regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between for the conduct of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided
the parties in a petition for certification election. YES. The Secretary of Labor was within fifteen (15) calendar days.
correct in denying the petition awaiting the resolution of the NLRC as to the finding
of the existence of employer-employee relationship. When as in this case Secretary Drilon of DOLE rendered a resolution dated December
15, 1989 reversing the order of the med-arbiter dated August 25, 1989 by declaring
RULING the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, such
finding cannot be rendered nugatory by a contrary finding of the labor arbiter in a
separate dispute for money claims between same parties.
Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), of which the med-arbiter is an officer, has the following jurisdiction ––
It is absurd to suggest that the med-arbiter and Secretary of Labor cannot make their
own independent finding as to the sentence of such relationship and must have to
Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. –– The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
rely and wait for such a determination by the labor arbiter or NLRC in a separate
Relations divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have
proceeding. For then, given a situation where there is no separate complaint filed
original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of
with the labor arbiter, the med-arbiter and/or the Secretary of Labor can never
either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
decide a certification election case or any labor-management dispute properly
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
brought before them as they have no authority to determine the existence of an
work places whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
employer-employee relationship. Such a proposition is, to say the least, anomalous.
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be
the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
Correctly indeed, the Secretary of Labor denied the prayer in the manifestation of
petitioner to await the resolution of the NLRC as to the existence of such employer-
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it,
employee relationship.
subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court reproduces with approval the findings and conclusions of the Secretary in
From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia,
the said resolution dated December 15, 1989.
decide all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-
management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural.
Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction over labor-management relations, the The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there exists an employer-employee
med-arbiter has the authority, original and exclusive, to determine the existence of relationship between members of petitioning union and the company.
an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find for the appellant.

Scroll No. 577 9|LabRel – Part IV-C


It has been well settled in jurisprudence that the factors to be considered in RULING
determining the existence of employer-employee relationship are as follows: (a) 1. YES. A local or chapter need not be independently registered to acquire legal
selection and engagement of the employees; (b) the payment of wages; (e) the personality.
process [sic] of dismissal; and, (d) the employer's power to control the employee with Sec.3 Rule VI of IRR of Book V as amended by DO No. 9 states: A local/chapter shall
respect to the means and methods [with] which the work is to be accomplished. acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents
enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all documentary requirements, the
On the first factor, (selection and engagement of the employer), [sic] it is very Regional Office shall issue in favour of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it
apparent from the records that the personnel of M.Y. San Biscuits are the one is included in the roster of LLOs.
responsible for hiring of employees. Assuming, it is the salesman that engages his The Regional Office has determined that the union complied with the requirements
own driver, it could be inferred however that such authority emanates from the under the law, it therefore, declared that the union has acquired legal personality as
respondent. a labor organization.
2. NO. The legal personality may not be collaterally attacked but only through a
On the second factor (payment of wages), while the respondent tried to impress separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it.
upon us that the drivers/helpers are not in the payroll of the company and, therefore, Sec.5 Rule V of IRR of Book V states: Effect of registration. The labor organization or
not receiving salaries from it, this at best is but an administrative arrangement in workers association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on
order to save the respondent from the burden of keeping records and other indirect the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot
cost. thereafter be subject to collateral attack but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
The legal personality of a union cannot be subject of collateral attack in a PCE, but
On the third factor, (the power of dismissal), it is very clear that herein respondent is
may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation of union
the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring drivers. This alone
registration.
proves that it wields disciplinary authority over the drivers/helpers.
Sec. 11 Paragraph II Rule IX of D.O 9 provides: for the dismissal of PCE based on the
lack of legal personality of LO only in following instances:
Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent
gives daily instructions to the drivers on how to go about their work is sufficient 1. union is not listed by the Regional Office or the BLR in its registry of LLOs,
indication that it exercises control over the movements of the drivers/helpers. The 2. Union’s legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality,
drivers are instructed as to what time they are supposed to report to the office and
what time they are supposed to return. Since the union is listed in the registry of LLOs, and its legitimacy has not been
revoked or cancelled with finality, the granting of its petition for certification election
Viewed from the above circumstances, it is every clear that the herein respondent is is proper.
the real employer of the drivers/helpers. They are in truth and in fact the employees 3. NO. The choice of collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees.
of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on its salesmen as the ostensible The only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the PCE pursuant to
employer of the drivers/helpers was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive Article 258 LC because it was requested to bargain collectively which exception finds
drivers/helpers their right to self-organization. no application in this case. The role of the employer in the PCE is a mere bystander.

20. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS versus SECRETARY OF


19. LAGUNA AUTOPARTS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. OFFICE OF THE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
SECRETARY
ISSUE
ISSUES
WON the the representation case was rendered moot and academic by the
1. WON the union is a LLO.
subsequent collective bargaining agreement of the company and the new EBR
2. WON a chapter’s legal personality may be collaterally attacked in a PCE.
WON the union had validly complied with the requirements for registration
3. WON the company as employer has the legal standing to oppose the PCE.
Scroll No. 577 10|LabRel – Part IV-C
No. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees
RULING affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the
contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to
I all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor
First, The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med-Arbiter is flawed, organization or not. As held in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: 9
proceeding as it does from a wrong premise. Firstly, it must be underscored that
petitioner is an independently registered labor union as evidenced by a Certificate of In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining
Registration issued by the DOLE. As a legitimate labor organization, petitioner's right unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code
to file apetition for certification election on its own is beyond question. which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of
Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU cannot the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative
affect its right to file said petition for certification election as an independent union. of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective
At the most, petitioner's failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with NAFLU- bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA
KMU. Still, however, it can pursue its petition for certification election as an negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence,
independent union. In our rulings, we have stressed that despite affiliation, the local all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in
union remains the basic unit free to serve the common interest of all its members the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to
and pursue its own interests independently of the federation. their employment for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in
Public respondent's ruling is anchored on his finding that there exists no pending the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to
representation case since the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner the "bargaining unit".
was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter.
We reject public respondent's ruling. The order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to
petitioner's petition for certification election was seasonably appealed. The appeal vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in
stopped the holding of any certification election. Section 10, Rule V of the the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code is crystal clear and hardly needs any form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law,
interpretation. administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by
II reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In
Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the time the CBA was denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious
entered between FWU and private respondent. Following Section 4, Rule V of the grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically,
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, such CBA cannot and will not capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.
prejudice petitioner's pending representation case or render the same moot.
Time and again, we have emphasized that when a petition for certification election is
filed by a legitimate labor organization, it is good policy for the employer not to have
any participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining representative. 22. CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs. HON. STO. TOMAS
While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature,
they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with an inalienable right to ISSUE
oppose it.
(1) Is a motion for reconsideration necessary before a party can file a petition for
certiorari from the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment? NO
21. ALEXANDER REYES vs. TRAJANO
RULING
ISSUE
WON the members of the INC should not be allowed to vote “because they refused It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing
to participate in the previous certification elections.” of a special civil action for certiorari to give the lower court the opportunity to correct
itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when a motion for
RULING reconsideration would be useless under the circumstances.
Scroll No. 577 11|LabRel – Part IV-C
Under Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, the decision of the Ruling: The matter has been resolved with finality by the Secretary of Labor and
Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be final and executory after ten days from Employment. Petitioner did not appeal this factual finding, it may be considered as
receipt thereof by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for the final resolution of such issue. To reiterate, "conclusiveness of judgment" has the
reconsideration. effect of preclusion of issues.

In this case, the Decision dated January 18, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment was received by petitioner on January 25, 2005. It would have 23. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED
become final and executory on February 4, 2005, the tenth day from petitioner’s INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER, - versus – SECRETARY OF
receipt of the decision. However, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
Court of Appeals on even date. Clearly, petitioner availed of the proper remedy since
Department Order No. 40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a motion for ISSUE
reconsideration. Such motion becomes dispensable and not at all necessary.
WON employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections be
(2) Is the case barred by res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment? NO allowed to vote?

Ruling: The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new RULING
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case YES. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and counted. In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This
principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor
In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the presence of the first three organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
elements of res judicata. The Resolution dated December 27, 2002 of the Secretary of appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in
Labor and Employment on the first petition for certification election became final and such unit for purposes of collective bargaining."
executory. It was rendered on the merits and the Secretary of Labor and Employment
had jurisdiction over the case. Is the fourth element – identity of parties, subject Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant
matter, and causes of action between the first and third petitions for certification CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit.
election – present? We hold in the negative. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial
interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no
The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the
filed outside the 60-day freedom period. At that time, the union has no cause of petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the
action since they are not yet legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGC-SUPER bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the
as the EBR of the bargaining unit. Such dismissal, however, has no bearing in the "bargaining unit."
instant case since the third petition for certification election was filed well within the
60-day freedom period. Otherwise stated, there is no identity of causes of action to The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot
speak of since in the first petition, the union has no cause of action while in the third, override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well
a cause of action already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification
challenge the status of SMCGC-SUPER as exclusive bargaining representative. elections and jurisprudence thereon. A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract.
Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good
(3) Is there an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the union customs, public order or public policy.
members. YES
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be
included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which
Scroll No. 577 12|LabRel – Part IV-C
it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining
be excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's request
ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory
months before the election
arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and attitude-stalling the
negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted,
B. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF AGREEMENT and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion
except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.
The moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company were in total derogation of
24. KIOK LOY, vs. NLRC the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting
settlement of economic disputes.

ISSUE
WON the NLRC is correct in declaring the Company guilty of unfair labor practice. 25. LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS vs. MARCELO
ENTERPRISES
HELD
Yes. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective Brief facts: the CBA expired, there were actually 3 bargaining units here who were in
agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, dispute to be the sole bargaining agent. On different occasions, the 3 bargaining units
designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a requested with the management to sit down with them for purposes of collective
climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the bargaining. The latter refused. Hence this petition.
employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that
Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an ISSUE
employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith WON the management is justified in refusing to bargain with the 3 bargaining units
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, which would constitute as an unfair labor practice.
and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting
any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract HELD
incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.  The present controversy is a three-sided conflict, although focus has been
The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following greatly placed upon an alleged labor dispute between complainant LAKAS
jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of and the respondent Marcelo Companies.
majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of  It would bear emphasizing, however, that what had been patently
the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of disregarded by the respondent industrial court and the parties alike, is the
majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of fact that LAKAS had never been the bargaining representative of any and an
the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the of the local unions then existing in the respondent Marcelo Companies.
instant case.  Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the respondent Marcelo
The petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. Respondent Union made a Companies did not ignore the demand for collective bargaining contained in
definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective its letter of June 20, 1967.
Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left  Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did was to apprise
unanswered and unacted upon. The Company made no counter proposal whatsoever LAKAS of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining
all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. A Company's representative in the appropriate units involved, and suggested the

Scroll No. 577 13|LabRel – Part IV-C


settlement of the issue by means of the filing of a petition for certification  The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indusputably show that a
election before the Court of Industrial Relations. legitimate representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo
 This was not only the legally approved procedure but was dictated by the Companies. In the face of these facts and in conformity with the existing
fact that there was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with jurisprudence.
whom the existing CBAs were entered into, was demanding of respondent We hold that there existed no duty to bargain collectively with LAKAS on the part of
companies to collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA, said companies
J.C. Espinas& Associates for MACATIFU and the MFWU, and the complainant
LAKAS for MULU which we understand is the aggrupation of MACATIFU,
MFWU and UNWU. 26. DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. The Bureau of Labor
Relations: ISSUE
..., in a situation like this where the issue of legitimate representation in dispute WON there was good faith in collective bargaining.NO!!!
is viewed for not only by one legitimate labor organization but two or more,
there is every equitable ground warranting the holding of a certification election. HELD
In this way, the issue as to who is really the true bargaining representative of all A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a
the employees may be firmly settled by the simple expedient of an election. state of inaction or of neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of
factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill." 21 There is a deadlock when
 The above-cited case gives the reason for the need of determining once and there is a "complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
for all the true choice of membership as to who should be their bargaining opposed forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or legislature." 22 The word is synonymous
representative, which is that, "(E)xperience teaches us, one of the root with the word impasse 23 which, within the meaning of the American federal labor
causes of labor or industrial disputes is the problem arising from a laws, "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble
questionable bargaining representative entering into CBA concerning terms intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties." 24
and conditions of employment. "
 It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to represent the A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good
employees that it be the delegate of a majority of the employees and, faith bargaining" specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude
conversely, an employer is under duty to bargain collectively only when the towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive
bargaining agent is representative of the majority of the employees. at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only
 A natural consequence of these principles is that the employer has the right by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no "counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak
to demand of the asserted bargaining agent proof of its representation of its of. While collective bargaining should be initiated by the union, there is a
employees. corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some manner
 Having the right to demonstration of this fact, it is not an 'unfair labor to such acts. This is clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art. 250(a) of which
practice' for an employer to refuse to negotiate until the asserted bargaining states:
agent has presented reasonable proof of majority representation.
 It is necessary however, that such demand be made in good faith and not "ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. — The following procedures shall be
merely as a pretext or device for delay or evasion. The employer's right is observed in collective bargaining:
however to reasonable proof.

Scroll No. 577 14|LabRel – Part IV-C


(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice motion the machinery for collective bargaining, as in fact, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a ALU submitted its collective bargaining proposals.
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may an impasse in the collective bargaining process. As the Court earlier observed, there
request for a conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from has not been a "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" on the part of the
the date of request. University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of
an agreement, the record is replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance and
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly certified bargaining agent, such that
both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation the inescapable conclusion is that the University evidently had no intention of
meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically, the University
attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to has the right to file the petition for certification election as there was no bargaining
participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call; deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein assailed Orders be annulled
would put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from
doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact that an hour
before the start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed the petition
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the for certification election. And yet during said conference, it committed itself to "sit
parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator." down" with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference
which would have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification
Considering the procedure outlined above, the Court cannot help but notice that election. In so doing, the University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the
the DWUEU was not entirely blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining Labor Code which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the
process. While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985, said union had submitted its performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by the DWUEU expeditiously in good faith." Moreover, by filing the petition for certification election
Vice-President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same proposals while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University violated the mandate
could be considered as subsisting, the fact remains that said union remained passive of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that" (e)very person must, in the exercise of his rights and
for three years. The records do not show that during this three-year period, it in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining as a means of attaining better honesty and good faith."
terms of employment.
Moreover, the University’s unscrupulous attitude towards the DWUEU-ALU is also
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same union, through the ALU betrayed by its belated questioning of the status of the said union. The
Director for Operations, requested an "initial conference" for the purpose of communications between them afforded the University ample opportunity to raise
collective bargaining. That the DWUEU abandoned its collective bargaining proposals the issue of representation if indeed it was doubtful of the DWUEU-ALU’s status as a
prior to its affiliation with ALU is further confirmed by the fact that in the majority union, but it failed to do so. On the other hand, in the agreement of May 10,
aforequoted May 10, 1988 agreement with the University, said Union bound itself to 1988, the University even agreed "to sit down and determine the number of
submit a new set of proposals on May 13, 1988. Under the circumstances, the employees that will represent their bargaining unit." This clearly indicates that the
agreement of May 10, 1988 may as well be considered the written notice to bargain University recognized the DWUEU-ALU as the bargaining representative of the
referred to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code, which thereby set into

Scroll No. 577 15|LabRel – Part IV-C


employees and is, therefore, estopped from questioning the majority status of the HELD
said union.
With respect to the first issue, petitioner union anchors its arguments on the alleged
Hence, petitioner’s contention that the DWUEU-ALU’s proposals may not be commitment of private respondent to grant an automatic across-the-board wage
unilaterally imposed on it on the ground that a collective bargaining agreement is a increase in the event that a statutory or legislated wage increase is promulgated. It
contract wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit. A cites as basis therefor, the aforequoted portion of the Minutes of the collective
similar argument had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 26 bargaining negotiation on February 27, 1990 regarding wages, arguing additionally
where we upheld the order of the NLRC declaring the union’s draft CBA proposal as that said Minutes forms part of the entire agreement between the parties.
the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the parties.
Kiok Loy v. NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the facts therein The basic premise of this argument is definitely untenable. To start with, if there was
have also been indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of private respondent to obligate itself
the duly certified bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain and to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase, petitioner union should have
submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no counter requested or demanded that such "promise or undertaking" be incorporated in the
proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy," [a] company’s refusal to make counter CBA. After all, petitioner union has the means under the law to compel private
proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad respondent to incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. It could have
faith and this is especially true where the Union’s request for a counter proposal is invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty
left unanswered." 27 Moreover, the Court added in the same case that "it is not includes "executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either
obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to party." Petitioner union's assertion that it had insisted on the incorporation of the
the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed same proposal may have a factual basis considering the allegations in the
with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty aforementioned joint affidavit of its members. However, Article 252 also states that
gestures." the duty to bargain "does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or make any
concession." Thus, petitioner union may not validly claim that the proposal
That being the case, the petitioner may not validly assert that its consent should be a embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it finally
primordial consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its entered into with private respondent.
inaction which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it could have
asserted as an employer. We, therefore, find it superfluous to discuss the two other The CBA is the law between the contracting parties 10 — the collective bargaining
contentions in its petition. representative and the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by
the expressed policy to give protection to labor. 11 In the same vein, CBA provisions
should be "construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts
27. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to
WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NLRC the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to
serve." 12 This is founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one
ISSUE impressed with public interest. 13 It goes without saying, however, that only
provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a
Whether or not private respondent committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, 14 it is not a part
to grant across-the-board wage increases in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.
02.NO!!!

Scroll No. 577 16|LabRel – Part IV-C


Hence, petitioner union's contention that the Minutes of the collective bargaining We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that no benefits or privileges
negotiation meeting forms part of the entire agreement is pointless. The Minutes previously enjoyed by petitioner union and the other employees were withdrawn
reflects the proceedings and discussions undertaken in the process of bargaining for as a result of the manner by which private respondent implemented the wage
worker benefits in the same way that the minutes of court proceedings show what orders. Granted that private respondent had granted an across-the-board increase
transpired therein. 15 At the negotiations, it is but natural for both management and pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727, that single instance may not be considered an
labor to adopt positions or make demands and offer proposals and counter- established company practice. Petitioner union's argument in this regard is actually
proposals. However, nothing is considered final until the parties have reached an tied up with its claim that the implementation of Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 by
agreement. In fact, one of management's usual negotiation strategies is to ". . . agree private respondent resulted in wage distortion.
tentatively as you go along with the understanding that nothing is binding until the
entire agreement is reached." 16 If indeed private respondent promised to continue
with the practice of granting across-the-board salary increases ordered by the 28. UNION OF FILIPINO EMPLOYEES- DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
government, such promise could only be demandable in law if incorporated in the UNION- KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU) VS. NESTLE PHILIPPINES
CBA. INCORPORATED

Moreover, by making such promise, private respondent may not be considered in bad
ISSUES
faith or at the very least, resorting to the scheme of feigning to undertake the
1. WON Nestle was guilty of ULP.
negotiation proceedings through empty promises. As earlier stated, petitioner union
2. WON retirement plan is a valid issue to be tackled during the CBA
had, under the law, the right and the opportunity to insist on
negotiation.
the foreseeable fulfillment of the private respondent's promise by demanding its
incorporation in the CBA. Because the proposal was never embodied in the CBA, the HELD
promise has remained just that, a promise, the implementation of which cannot be 1. NO.
validly demanded under the law. The duty to bargain collectively is mandated by Article 252 and 253 of the Labor
Code.The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement
The Court likewise finds unmeritorious petitioner union's contention that by its resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an
failure to grant across-the-board wage increases, private respondent violated the agreement after negotiations have continue for a reasonable period does not
provisions of Section 5, Article VII of the existing CBA 26 as well as Article 100 of the establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective
Labor Code. The CBA provision states: bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not
include the obligation to reach an agreement.
Sec. 5. The COMPANY agrees to comply with all the applicable provisions of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and all other laws, decrees, orders, instructions, There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. The effect of an employer’s or
jurisprudence, rules and regulations affecting labor. a union’s individual actions is not the test of good faith bargaining, but the
impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole. For a charge of
Art. 100 of the Labor Code on prohibition against elimination or diminution of ULP to prosper, it must be shown that Nestle was motivated by ill will, bad faith,
benefits provides that "(n)othing in this Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any or fraud, or was oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals,
way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the time of good customs or public policy. All the law contemplates is that both parties
promulgation of this Code." should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort
to reach a common ground of agreement.

Scroll No. 577 17|LabRel – Part IV-C


The counter-proposal of Nestle is not tantamount to refusal to bargain. In HELD
thinking to exclude the issue of retirement plan from CBA negotiations, Nestle
cannot be faulted for considering the same benefits as unilaterally granted, 1. YES. Petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to
considering that 8 out of 9 bargaining units have agreed to treat the Retirement bargain in good faith with respondent union. Article 252 of the Labor Code defines
plan as unilaterally granted benefit. Nestle’s desire to settle the dispute and the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively," as follows:
proceed with the negotiation being evident in its cry for compulsory arbitration
is proof enough of its exertion of reasonable effort at good faith bargaining. An Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively
employer’s steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive provision is means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
no different from a bargaining representative’s perseverance to include one expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect
that they deem of absolute necessity. It is but natural that at negotiations, to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including
management and labor adopt positions or make demands and offer proposals proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and
and counter-proposals. executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but
such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
2. YES concession.
The retirement plan is a valid issue in the collective bargaining negotiation
between the union and Nestle. But the parties are not directed to negotiate by Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the
themselves the tenor of the retirement plant; since the SOLE had already performance of the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute, the issue concerning the retirement expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
benefits must be remanded back to him for proper disposition. SOLE has been Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL)
explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) LC the authority to assume jurisdiction over (hereinafter, "union") lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the
a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry CBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways
indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. It and means in order to prevent the negotiation.
includes questions incidental to the labor dispute, that is, issues that are
necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and not just to that ascribed in the Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure
Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month
after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any
29. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file
FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble
explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as
ISSUES its excuse for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor
Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining, to wit:
(1) WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the
union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures shall be
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for certification observed in collective bargaining:
has been filed by another legitimate labor organization?
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
(2) WON the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the upon the other party with a statement of its proposals.The other party shall make a
employees' right to self-organization? reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice. 4x x x

Scroll No. 577 18|LabRel – Part IV-C


Moreover, the series of events that transpired after the filing of the first notice of with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996. Clearly,
strike in January 1996 show petitioner's resort to delaying tactics to ensure that the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof
negotiation would not push through. Thus, on February 15, 1996, or barely a few days was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement.
after the union proposals for the new CBA were submitted, the union president was Consequently, there is no legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of
informed by her superior that her work schedule was being changed from Mondays the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing
to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. A request from the union president that the negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by petitioner of the ruling inLakas Ng
issue be submitted to a grievance machinery was subsequently denied. Thereafter, Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprisesis misplaced since that case
the petitioner and the union met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground rules for involved a legitimate representation issue which is not present in the case at bar.
negotiation. However, just two days later, or on March 29, 1996, petitioner dismissed
the union president for alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the 2. The dismissal was effected in violation of the employees' right to self-
bargaining process, petitioner suspended the negotiation on the ground that it organization.
allegedly received information that a new group of employees called the Association
of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition for certification The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion
election. Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its duty to bargain collectively. that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the
right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas, at the time of her
Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the dismissal, had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she
filing of the petition for certification election the issue on majority representation of was a recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10) years her working
the employees has arose. Petitioner asserts quoting Lakas Ng Manggagawang schedule was from Monday to Friday. However, things began to change when she
Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises that in view of the pendency of the petition for was elected as union president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA.
certification election, it had no duty to bargain collectively with the union. Thus, it was when she was the union president and during the period of tense and
difficult negotiations when her work schedule was altered from Mondays to Fridays
We disagree. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did not budge, although her schedule was
there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate changed, she was outrightly dismissed for alleged insubordination.
representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election
does notipso factojustify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for
must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. insubordination.But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere
Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the sixty-day with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is
freedom period. No petition for certification election for any representation issue therefore a prohibited act.The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed to
may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended frustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective
until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of of the true wishes and aspirations of the Union members.
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new
CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.The 30. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE) vs. CONFESOR
purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the company by
ISSUE
preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good
WON either of Union or the Bank violated its duty to bargain hence, ULP is committed
faith and for the stipulated original period.11

HELD
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994.The petition
NO. The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence,
for certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed
committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. It alleged
Scroll No. 577 19|LabRel – Part IV-C
that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic
reaching an agreement, as evident in the Bank’s counter-proposals. It explained that proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits
of the 34 economic provisions it made, the Bank only made 6 economic received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the
counterproposals. Further, as borne by the minutes of the meetings, the Bank, after Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.
indicating the economic provisions it had rejected, accepted, retained or were open
for discussion, refused to make a list of items it agreed to include in the economic 31. ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS (ATU) vs. TRAJANO
package.
Surface bargaining is defined as "going through the motions of negotiating" without ISSUE
any legal intent to reach an agreement. The resolution of surface bargaining WON the petition for certification of election is defective because a new collective
allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether a party has bargaining agreement had been entered into by ATU and the Company? NO
engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at
bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can HELD
only be inferred from the totality of the challenged party’s conduct both at and away
from the bargaining table. It involves the question of whether an employer’s conduct Insofar as the first issue is concerned has become at best only academic now. The
demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining. reason is that the 30% consent required under then Section 258 of the Labor Code is
The minutes of meetings from March 12, 1993 to June 15, 1993 do not show that the no longer in force owing to the amendment of this section by Executive Order No.
Bank had any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union. Records show 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987.
that after the Union sent its proposal to the Bank on February 17, 1993, the latter
replied with a list of its counter-proposals on February 24, 1993. Thereafter, meetings The applicable provision in the case at bar is Article 256 because Baliwag transit, Inc.
were set for the settlement of their differences. The minutes of the meetings show is an organized establishment. Under this provision, the petition for certification
that both the Bank and the Union exchanged economic and non-economic proposals election need no longer carry the signatures of the 30% of the workers consenting to
and counter-proposals. such petition as originally required under Article 258. The present rule provides that
The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away as long as the petition contains the matters 7 required in Section 2, Rule 5, Book V of
from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an the Implementing Rules and Regulations, as amended by Section 6, Implementing
agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. Rules of E.O. No. 111, the med-arbiter "shall automatically order" an election by
Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is secret ballot "to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
herein emphasized that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to unit." The consent requirement is now applied only to unorganized establishments
a proposal or require the making of a concession."53 Hence, the parties’ failure to under Article 257, and at that, significantly, has been reduced to only 20%.
agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.
We can hardly dispute this finding, for it finds support in the evidence. The inference The petition must also fail on the second issue which is based on the contract-bar rule
that respondents did not refuse to bargain collectively with the complaining union under Section 3, Rule 5, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. This rule
because they accepted some of the demands while they refused the others even simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention
leaving open other demands for future discussion is correct, especially so when those can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing
demands were discussed at a meeting called by respondents themselves precisely in collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a
view of the letter sent by the union on April 29, 1960. petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining
The court , likewise, do not agree that the Union is guilty of ULP for engaging in blue- agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement
sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals. The Bank failed to is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of
show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any

Scroll No. 577 20|LabRel – Part IV-C


collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the supplemented should be left undisturbed. Its terms call for strict compliance.
stipulated original period. This mode of assuring that the cause of labor suffers no injury from the struggle
between contending labor organization follows the doctrine announced in the
ATU insists that its collective bargaining agreement concluded by it with Baliwag recent case of Vassar Industries Employees v. Estrella (L-46562, March 31, 1978).
Transit, Inc, on April 1, 1986, should bar the certification election sought by TUPAS as To quote from the opinion. "In the meanwhile, if as contended by private
this would disturb the said new agreement. Moreover, the agreement had been respondent labor union the interim collective bargaining agreement which it
ratified on April 3, 1986, by a majority of the workers and is plainly beneficial to them engineered and entered into on September 26, 1977 has, much more favorable
because of the many generous concessions made by the management. terms for the workers of private respondent Vassar Industries, then it should
continue in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining representative is
TUPAS contends that the said agreement suffers from certain fatal procedural flaws. chosen and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement thereafter
Specifically, the CBA was not posted for at least five days in two conspicuous places in concluded."
the establishment before ratification, to enable the workers to clearly inform
themselves of its provisions. Moreover, the CBA submitted to the MOLE did not carry
the sworn statement of the union secretary, attested by the union president, that the 32. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) vs. CALLEJA
CBA had been duly posted and ratified, as required by Section 1, Rule 9, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. These requirements being mandatory, non- ISSUE
compliance therewith rendered the said CBA ineffective.
WON the CBA is defective for non-posting in at least 2 most conspicuous places in the
The Court will not rule on the merits and/or defects of the new CBA and shall only establishment
consider the fact that it was entered into at a time when the petition for certification
election had already been filed by TUPAS and was then pending resolution. The said HELD
CBA cannot be deemed permanent, precluding the commencement of negotiations
by another union with the management. In the meantime however, so as not to YES. An infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement involved was the failure to
deprive the workers of the benefits of the said agreement, it shall be recognized and post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the establishment at least five
given effect on a temporary basis, subject to the results of the certification election. days before its ratification. 8 Petitioners rationalization was that "because of the real
The agreement may be continued in force if ATU is certified as the exclusive existence of the illegal strike staged by SPFL in all the stores of GAW Trading, Inc. it
bargaining representative of the workers or may be rejected and replaced in the had become impossible to comply with the posting requirement in so far as the
event that TUPAS emerges as the winner. realization of tits purpose is concerned as there were no impartial members of the
unit who could be appraised of the CBA's contents. " 9 This justification is puerile and
This ruling is consistent with our earlier decisions on interim arrangements of this unacceptable.
kind where we declared:
In the first place, the posting of copies of the collective bargaining agreement is the
... we are not unmindful that the supplemental collective bargaining contract, responsibility of the employer which can easily comply with the requirement through
entered into in the meanwhile between management and respondent Union a mere mechanical act. The fact that there were "no impartial members of the unit" is
contains provisions beneficial to labor. So as not to prejudice the workers immaterial. The purpose of the requirement is precisely to inform the employees in
involved, it must be made clear that until the conclusion of a new collective the bargaining unit of the contents of said agreement so that they could intelligently
bargaining contract entered into by it and whatever labor organization may be decide whether to accept the same or not. The assembly of the members of ALU
chosen after the certification election, the existing labor contract as thus wherein the agreement in question was allegedly explained does not cure the defect.

Scroll No. 577 21|LabRel – Part IV-C


The contract is intended for all employees and not only for the members of the retrenchment. There was no singling out of the complainants and intervenors-
purported representative alone. It may even be said the need to inform the non- complainants.
members of the terms thereof is more exigent and compelling since, in all likehood, Under Article 231 of the Labor Code and Sec. 1, Rule IX, Book V of the Implementing
their contact with the persons who are supposed to represent them is limited. Rules, the parties to a collective agreement are required to furnish copies to the
Moreover, to repeat, there was an apparent and suspicious hurry in the appropriate Regional Office with accompanying proof of ratification by the majority
formulation and finalization of said collective bargaining accord. of all the workers in the bargaining unit. This was not done in the case at bar. But we
do not declare the 1984-1987 CBA invalid or void considering that the employees
Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective bargaining is the finding have enjoyed benefits from it. They cannot receive benefits under provisions
of respondent director that one hundred eighty-one( 181) of the two hundred eighty- favorable to them and later insist that the CBA is void simply because other
one (281) workers who "ratified" the same, “now strongly and vehemently deny provisions turn out not to the liking of certain employees. Moreover, the two CBAs
and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and ratification of the CBA.” Although prior to the 1984-1987 CBA were not also formally ratified, yet the employees are
petitioner claims that only seven (7) of the repudiating group of workers belong to basing their present claims on these CBAs. It is inequitous to receive benefits from a
the total number who allegedly ratified the agreement, nevertheless such CBA and later on disclaim its validity.
substantiated contention weighed against the factual that the controverted contract There is nothing in the records showed that PPI was guilty of unfair labor practice.
will not promote industrial stability.

34. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,


33. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., vs. NLRC
ISSUE
ISSUE WON GMC is guilty of ULP for violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or
WON PPI was guilty of unfair labor practice when the RPP is unilaterally amended interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization, and imposing upon
GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from the expiration
HELD of the original CBA.
No. Article 248 of the Labor Code provides inter alia that:
... Unfair labor practices of employers, It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit HELD
any of the following unfair labor practice.
xxxxxxxxx RE:TERMS OF A CBA
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,
The questioned provision in the 1984-87 Collective Bargaining Agreement limited the states:
application of the termination allowance only to those separated from the service
due to disability. The prior CBAs from 1975 upwards granted a termination allowance, ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining
upon the employee's separation, of at least three (3) weeks to one (1) month's pay Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect
for each year of service depending upon the total years of service. is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority
There was allegedly bad faith in limiting the application of the termination allowance status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification
as the company already had plans to retrench the workers. election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of
Bad faith in the negotiations was not present considering that the provision on the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of
termination allowance was made to apply to everybody including those subsequently the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
retrenched or retired after the complainants' and complainants- intervenors' Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution....

Scroll No. 577 22|LabRel – Part IV-C


The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five RE: PROCEDURE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is
last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial
for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was peace. Thus:
still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking
said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be
December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3- observed in collective bargaining:
year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an
GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is
unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code, which provides that:
indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it
felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
to be utterly baseless.
commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
...
We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-proposal to the unions’ proposal
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even
bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase duty to bargain
evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.
collectively, thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions
means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement....
labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the
statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.
case. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an
inference to be drawn from the facts. The effect of an employers or a unions actions DID GMC INTERFERE WITH THE EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION?
individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such
occasions or actions, considered as a whole.[11] The letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their
resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its
Both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of
agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor
new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the
GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by union. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from
questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees
any negotiation. to self-organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit grave

Scroll No. 577 23|LabRel – Part IV-C


abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of the NLRC as to the reasonableness
the right of its employees to self-organization. of the draft CBA proposed by the union should not be disturbed since they are
Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the supported by substantial evidence.
draft CBA proposed by the union for two years commencing from the expiration of
the original CBA?
The Code provides: 35. ABARIA v. NLRC December 2011

ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining ISSUE
agreement. ....It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing WON MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice. NO!!!
agreement during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. (Underscoring supplied.) HELD

The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in
Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it an unfair labor practice for an
the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The
employer "[t]o violate the duty to bargain collectively" as prescribed by the Code. The
general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern
applicable provision in this case is Art. 253 which provides:
the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule
necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by
agreement. – When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain
purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such
warranted.
agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to
terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date.
It would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions
It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs employees for the
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
remaining two (2) years of the CBAs duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent
negotiations.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged MCCHI with refusal to bargain collectively when the latter
refused to meet and convene for purposes of collective bargaining, or at least give a
Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively, based on Kiok
counter-proposal to the proposed CBA the union had submitted and which was
Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate
ratified by a majority of the union membership. MCCHI, on its part, deferred any
or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
negotiations until the local union’s dispute with the national union federation (NFL) is
resolved considering that the latter is the exclusive bargaining agent which
We carefully note, however, that as strictly distinguished from the facts of this
represented the rank-and-file hospital employees in CBA negotiations since 1987.
case, there was no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok Loy and Divine Word
University of Tacloban. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this case the
We rule for MCCHI.
rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule otherwise would be to allow
GMC to have its cake and eat it too.
Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had not
registered as a labor organization, having submitted only its charter certificate as an

Scroll No. 577 24|LabRel – Part IV-C


affiliate or local chapter of NFL.37 Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMA- By-Laws, and if found guilty to expel such members.42 MCCHI therefore cannot be
MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor organization faulted for deferring action on the CBA proposal submitted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL in
under Art. 242, specifically: view of the union leadership’s conflict with the national federation. We have held
that the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute43 which must be resolved in a
(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the federation and the
bargaining; local union or a rival labor organization, not the employer. 44

(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an Not being a legitimate labor organization nor the certified exclusive bargaining
appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining; representative of MCCHI’s rank-and-file employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot
demand from MCCHI the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.45 Hence,
Aside from the registration requirement, it is only the labor organization designated MCCHI’s refusal to bargain then with NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot be considered an
or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unfair labor practice to justify the staging of the strike.
unit which is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining, as provided in Art. 255.38 NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not
the labor organization certified or designated by the majority of the rank-and-file
hospital employees to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the NFL, as 36. SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994. While it is true that a local SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION
union has the right to disaffiliate from the national federation, NAMA-MCCH-NFL has
ISSUE
not done so as there was no any effort on its part to comply with the legal requisites
Did the Ca departed from jurisprudence when it expanded the scope of the
for a valid disaffiliation during the "freedom period"39 or the last 60 days of the last
bargaining unit defined by the Court’s ruling in G.R. no. 110399
year of the CBA, through a majority vote in a secret balloting in accordance with Art.
241 (d).40 Nava and her group simply demanded that MCCHI directly negotiate with
HELD
the local union which has not even registered as one.
NO. In G.R. No. 110399, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis
To prove majority support of the employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL presented the CBA
constitute a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, one-
proposal allegedly signed by 153 union members. However, the petition signed by
union policy. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a
said members showed that the signatories endorsed the proposed terms and
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
conditions without stating that they were likewise voting for or designating the
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
NAMA-MCCH-NFL as their exclusive bargaining representative. In any case, NAMA-
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
MCCH-NFL at the time of submission of said proposals was not a duly registered labor
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
organization, hence it cannot legally represent MCCHI’s rank-and-file employees for
The employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis25 of Magnolia Poultry Products
purposes of collective bargaining. Hence, even assuming that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had
Plant involved in "dressed" chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged
validly disaffiliated from its mother union, NFL, it still did not possess the legal
in "live" chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working
personality to enter into CBA negotiations. A local union which is not independently
conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions
registered cannot, upon disaffiliation from the federation, exercise the rights and
do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. Although they seem separate
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations; thus, it cannot file a
and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually
petition for certification election.41 Besides, the NFL as the mother union has the right
interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a
to investigate members of its local chapter under the federation’s Constitution and
single bargaining unit.
Scroll No. 577 25|LabRel – Part IV-C
37. MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE 38. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, vs. CASIO,
WORKERS CHAPTER VS. MANILA MINING CORP. (MMC)
ISSUES
ISSUE
WON MMC is guilty of ULP.
1. WON a closed shop provision in a CBA is valid.

HELD
2. WON the the termination of Casio, et al. pursuant to the closed shop provision of
NO. The lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be considered as ULP.
the CBA was valid.
Despite all efforts exerted by MMC, it did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the
residents of the community where the tailing pond would operate, one of the
HELD
conditions imposed by DENR in granting its application for permanent permit.
Suspension of MMC’s mining operations was not due to its fault but was brought
1. YES. a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal
about by the non-issuance of a permit for the continued operation.
import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since "a CBA is
Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since as ruled by the CA, the call of
the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated
MMC for suspension of the CBA negotiation cannot be equated to “refusal to
by the express policy to give protection to labor."
bargain”.
(See Article 252 Meaning of duty to bargain collectively)
2. NO. The dismissal was invalid.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer
was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security
must have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy
clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security
causing social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety. While the law makes it
clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union
an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each
security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the
other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or
decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites
agree to the proposal of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should
constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security
approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a
provision of the CBA.
common ground of agreement.
It cannot be said the MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought the
It is the third requisite – that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of
suspension and in fact, even expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining
IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. – which appears to be lacking in this case. It is
operations resume. There was valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations
apparent that GMC terminated the employment of Casio, et al. relying upon the
for the suspension, in turn, of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad
Resolution of Pino, et al. expelling Casio, et al. from IBM-Local 31; on Gabiana’s
faith in MMC’s actuations.
Letters demanding that GMC terminate the employment of Casio, et al. on the basis
As to the issue of lay-off, it was also valid but such does not excuse the MMC from
of the closed shop clause in the CBA; and the threat of being sued by IBM-Local 31 for
paying the laid-off workers with separation pay.
unfair labor practice. The letter made no mention at all of the evidence supporting
the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. from the union. GMC never alleged
nor attempted to prove that the company actually looked into the evidence of IBM-
Local 31 for expelling Casio, et al. and made a determination on the sufficiency
thereof. Without such a determination, GMC cannot claim that it had terminated the
employment of Casio, et al. for just cause.

Scroll No. 577 26|LabRel – Part IV-C


The failure of GMC to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence supporting Department of Labor as in substantial compliance with the minimum standards set
the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. is a direct consequence of the non- forth in LOI No. 174 if:
observance by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees. (a) they conform with at least the minimum allowances scales specified in the
immediately preceding Section; and
As a defense, GMC contends that as an employer, its only duty was to ascertain that (b) they are given in response to the appeal of the President in his speech on 4
IBM-Local 31 accorded Casio, et al. due process; and, it is the finding of the company January 1974, or to countervail the quantum jump in the cost of living as a result of
that IBM-Local 31 did give Casio, et al. the opportunity to answer the charges against the energy crisis starting in November 1973, or pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
them, but they refused to avail themselves of such opportunity. 390; Provided, That the payment is retroactive to 18 February 1974 or earlier.
The allowances and other benefits may be granted unilaterally by the employer or
This argument is without basis. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations through collective bargaining, and may be paid at the same time as the regular wages
must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not of the employees.
evidence. In illegal dismissal cases like the present one, the onus of proving that the Allowances and other benefits which are not given in substantial compliance with the
employee was not dismissed or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, rests LOI as interpreted herein shall not be treated by the Department of Labor as
on the employer and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is emergency allowances in the contemplation of the LOI unless otherwise shown by
not justified and therefore illegal. Thus, petitioners must not only rely on the sufficient proof. Thus, without such proof, escalation clauses in collective bargaining
weakness of respondents’ evidence but must stand on the merits of their own agreements concluded before the appeal of the President providing for automatic or
defense. A party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial periodic wage increases shall not be considered allowances for purposes of the LOI.
evidence for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will The "immediately preceding section" referred to above states:
offend due process. SEC. 5.Determination of Amount of Allowances. — In determining the amount of
allowances that should be given by employers to meet the recommended minimum
In sum, the Court finds that GMC illegally dismissed Casio, et al. because not only did standards, the LOI has classified employers into three general categories. As an
GMC fail to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence to support the implementation policy, the Department of Labor shall consider as sufficient
decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al., but also to accord the expelled union compliance with the scales of allowances recommended by the LOI if the following
members procedural due process, i.e., notice and hearing, prior to the termination of monthly allowances are given by employers:
their employment. (a) P50.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the
total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P 1 million;
(b) P 30.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the
total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000.00 but not
39. LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS EMPLOYEES, vs. LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS, INC. more than P1million; and
(c) P15.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock or total assets, as the case
ISSUE
may be, is less than P100,000.00.
WON such allowances are indeed absorbed by the wage increases required under the
It is not denied that the company falls under paragraph (a), as it has a capitalization of
agreement.
more than P l million, 10and so must pay a minimum allowance of P50.00 a month.
This amount is clearly covered by the increases prescribed in the CBA, which required
HELD
a monthly increase (on the basis of 30 days) of P60.00 for 1974, to be increased by
YES. This is because Section 6 of the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174
P30.00 in 1975 (to P90.00) and another P 30.00 in 1976 (to P120.00). The first
specifically provides:
increase in 1974 was already above the minimum allowance of P50.00, which was
Sec. 6.Allowances under LOI. — -All allowances, bonuses, wage adjustments and
exceeded even more with the increases of Pl.00 for each of the next two years.
other benefits given by employers to their employees shall be treated by the
Scroll No. 577 27|LabRel – Part IV-C
In fact, the company agreed to grant the emergency allowance even before the hotel to dismiss Beloncio as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with the
obligation was imposed by the government. What the petitioners claim they are Ministry of Labor and Employment on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair labor
being made to waive is the additional P50.00 allowance but the truth is that they are practice. The hotel was then compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and to stop
not entitled to this because they are already enjoying the stipulated increases. There payment of her salary from September 1, 1984.
is no waiver of these increases. Furthermore, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement between the
Moreover, Section 2 provides that the wage increase shall be considered payment of petitioner-the Union and the Manila Mandarin Hotel "the Union shall hold the
any statutory increase of the minimum wage "as far as it will go," which means that Company free and blameless from any and all liabilities that may arise" should the
any amount not covered by such wage increase will have to be made good by the employee question the dismissal, as has happened in the case at bar.
company. In short, the difference between the stipulated wage increase and the The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union security clause — a
statutory minimum wage will have to be paid by the company notwithstanding and, closed-shop agreement.
indeed, pursuant to the said article. A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire
only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in
good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism." It
40. MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NLRC adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise
of employment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity. (National Labor Union vs.
Aguinaldo's Echague, Inc., 97 Phil. 184). It is a very effective form of union security
ISSUE
agreement.
WON the petitioners committed ULP Hence Beloncio was not properly dismissed
This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and such a
HELD
provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of
YES.
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. vs.
Article 250 of the Labor Code provides the following:
Blanco, 109 SCRA 87; Manalang vs. Artex Development Company, Inc., 21 SCRA 561).
Art. 250. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. — It shall be unfair labor
The Court stresses, however, that union security clauses are also governed by law and
practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:
by principles of justice, fair play, and legality. Union security clauses cannot be used
xxxxxxxxx
by union officials against an employer, much less their own members, except with a
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness.
including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in
A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her
such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other
job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop
than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of
agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.
membership is made available to other members. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 217 of the Labor Code also provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission — (a) The Labor Arbiters
41. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner vs. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ... the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural;
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
ISSUE
xxxxxxxxx
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
WON the former FEBTC employees should be considered new employees of BPI for
by Labor Arbiters. (Rollo, pp. 155-157.)
purposes of applying the Union Shop Clause of the CBA
The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave were it not for
the union's insistence and demand to the extent that because of the failure of the
Scroll No. 577 28|LabRel – Part IV-C
HELD Without the union shop clause or with the restrictive interpretation, the company can
jeopardize the majority status of the certified union by excluding from union
YES. membership all new regular employees whom the Company will absorb in future
mergers and all new regular employees whom the Company hires as regular from the
The absorbed FEBTC employees are covered by the Union Shop Clause. It is beginning of their employment without undergoing a probationary period. In this
indubitable from the Union Shop Clause is that upon the effectivity of the CBA, manner, the Company can increase the number of members of the collective
petitioner's new regular employees (regardless of the manner by which they became bargaining unit and if this increase is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in
employees of BPI) are required to join the Union as a condition of their continued union membership, the certified union may lose its majority status and render it
employment. vulnerable to attack by another union who wishes to represent the same bargaining
unit.
No Substantial Distinction Under the CBA Between Regular Employees Hired After
Probationary Status and Regular Employees Hired After the Merger

Verily, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there are no substantial differences 42. ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, vs. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME
between a newly hired non-regular employee who was regularized weeks or months
after his hiring and a new employee who was absorbed from another bank as a ISSUE
regular employee pursuant to a merger, for purposes of applying the Union Shop WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case
Clause. Both employees were hired/employed only after the CBA was signed. At the
time they are being required to join the Union, they are both already regular rank and HELD
file employees of BPI. They belong to the same bargaining unit being represented by NO. Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise
the Union. known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction
on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the
Non-Application of Union Shop Clause Contrary to the Policy of the Labor Code and interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas
Inimical to Industrial Peace Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article
217 (c) of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary
It is but fair that similarly situated employees who enjoy the same privileges of a CBA arbitrators over interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
should be likewise subject to the same obligations the CBA imposes upon them. A agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
contrary interpretation of the Union Shop Clause will be inimical to industrial peace
and workers solidarity. SEC. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
The union shop clause offers protection to the certified bargaining agent by ensuring original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
that future regular employees who (a) enter the employ of the company during the after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
life of the CBA; (b) are deemed part of the collective bargaining unit; and (c) whose relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
number will affect the number of members of the collective bargaining unit will be deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
compelled to join the union. Such compulsion has legal effect, precisely because the damages.
employer by voluntarily entering in to a union shop clause in a CBA with the certified
bargaining agent takes on the responsibility of dismissing the new regular employee Article 217(c) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, states that:
who does not join the union.

Scroll No. 577 29|LabRel – Part IV-C


x xxx jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed by the Labor interpretation or implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special
Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary provisions of the Labor Code govern.
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the
On their part, respondents insist that in the present case, Article 217, paragraph (c) as interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or
well as Article 261 of the Labor Code remain to be the governing provisions of law enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation,
with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The Company and the Union further agree that
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Under these provisions of law, they will use their best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed,
jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators. resolved and settled amicably by the parties hereof within ninety (90) days from the
date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of failure to settle thereof any of
Article 261 of the Labor Code reads, thus: the parties retain their freedom to take appropriate action
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really intended to
ARTICLE 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective In the same manner, Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions
Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels,
treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of provides as follows:
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures. − In cases of claims and disputes arising
from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement
It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
a careful reading of this special law would readily show that there is no specific voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved
grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of
R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of "claims arising out 43. KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA AT KAWANI SA MWC-
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving EAST ZONE UNION versus MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC.,
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages." On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 ISSUE
of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have WON the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in awarding ten percent (10%) attorneys
fees to the petitioners.

Scroll No. 577 30|LabRel – Part IV-C


merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the employer acted
HELD maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages.
Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs the grant of attorneys fees in
labor cases: In the present case, we find it undisputed that the union members are entitled to
their AA benefits and that these benefits were not paid by the Company. That the
Art. 111. Attorneys fees.- (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable Company had no funds is not a defense as this was not an insuperable cause that was
party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of cited and properly invoked. As a consequence, the union members represented by
wages recovered. the Union were compelled to litigate and incur legal expenses. On these bases, we
find no difficulty in upholding the NLRCs award of ten percent (10%) attorneys fees.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorneys fees which exceed The more significant issue in this case is the effect of the MOA provision that
ten percent of the amount of wages recovered. attorneys fees shall be deducted from the AA and CBA receivables. In this regard, the
CA held that the additional grant of 10% attorneys fees by the NLRC violates Article
Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its Implementing Rules also provides, viz.: 111 of the Labor Code, considering that the MOA between the parties already
ensured the payment of 10% attorneys fees deductible from the AA and CBA
Section 8. Attorneys fees. Attorneys fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings receivables of the Unions members. In addition, the Company also argues that
for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may the Unions demand, together with the NLRC award, is unconscionable as it represents
be deducted from the total amount due the winning party. 20% of the amount due or about P21.4 million.

We explained in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations In the present case, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC on
Commissionthat there are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneysfeesthe the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code accrue to the Unions members as
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable indemnity for damages and not to the Unions counsel as compensation for his legal
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former renders; services, unless, they agreed that the award shall be given to their counsel as
compensation is paid for the cost and/or results of legal services per agreement or as additional or part of his compensation; in this case the Union bound itself to pay
may be assessed. 10% attorneys fees to its counsel under the MOA and also gave up the attorneys fees
awarded to the Unions members in favor of their counsel. This is supported by
In its extraordinary concept, attorneys fees are deemed indemnity for damages Borelas affidavit which stated that [t]he 10% attorneys fees paid by the
ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party to the winning party. The members/employees is separate and distinct from the obligation of the company to
instances when these may be awarded are enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil pay the 10% awarded attorneys fees which we also gave to our counsel as part of our
Code, specifically in its paragraph 7 on actions for recovery of wages, and is payable contingent fee agreement.[43] The limit to this agreement is that the indemnity for
not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the client and his lawyer have agreed that damages imposed by the NLRC on the losing party (i.e., the Company) cannot
the award shall accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of compensation. exceed ten percent (10%).

We also held in PCL Shipping that Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, Properly viewed from this perspective, the award cannot be taken to mean
contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees and that Article 111 is an an additional grant of attorneys fees, in violation of the ten percent (10%) limit under
exception to the declared policy of strict construction in the award of attorneys Article 111 of the Labor Code since it rests on an entirely different legal obligation
fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the than the one contracted under the MOA. Simply stated, the attorneys fees
contracted under the MOA do not refer to the amount of attorneys fees awarded

Scroll No. 577 31|LabRel – Part IV-C


by the NLRC; the MOA provision on attorneys fees does not have any bearing at all Furthermore, at the time of the supposed recognition, the employer was obviously
to the attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC under Article 111 of the Labor aware that there were other unions existing in the unit. As earlier stated, respondent
Code. Based on these considerations, it is clear that the CA erred in ruling that the company's letter is dated May 12, 1986 while the two other unions, Southern
LAs award of attorneys fees violated the maximum limit of ten percent (10%) fixed by Philippine Federation of Labor (hereafter, SPFL and Philippine Social Security Labor
Article 111 of the Labor Code. Union (PSSLU, for short), went on strike earlier on May 9, 1986. The unusual
promptitude in the recognition of petitioner union by respondent company as the
Under this interpretation, the Companys argument that the attorneys fees exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in GAW Trading, Inc. under the
are unconscionable as they represent 20% of the amount due or about P21.4 million fluid and amorphous circumstances then obtaining, was decidedly unwarranted and
is more apparent than real. Since the attorneys fees awarded by the LA pertained to improvident.
the Unions members as indemnity for damages, it was totally within their right to
waive the amount and give it to their counsel as part of their contingent fee 45. GENERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES' UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES
agreement. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111 of the Labor Code, such as between vs. SOUTH SEA SHIPPING LINE, ET AL.
the lawyer and the client, the attorneys fees may exceed ten percent (10%) on the
basis of quantum meruit, as in the present case. ISSUES

1. WON it is mandatory on the court to order the conduct of CE upon the written
44. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) v. CALLEJA, request of 10% members in the ABU
2. WON a new CE shall be conducted
ISSUE
WON the collective bargaining agreement is defective
I. NO

HELD
In a subsequent case, Acoje Mines and Acoje United Workers Union vs. Acoje Labor
YES. The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the
Union and Acoje Mining Co. Inc., 105 Phil., 814; 56 Off. Gaz. (6) 1157, on the issue of
following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the
whether or not upon submission of a petition for certification election by at least 10%
status of majority representation by the employees' representative in accordance
of all the workers in a bargaining union, it is mandatory for the CIR to order a
with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor
certification election — with no exceptions, pursuant to Section 12 (c), Republic Act
Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article
No. 875, through the same Justice, we made the following statement:
251, paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code. 4
In the present case, the standing of petitioner as an exclusive bargaining
The above command of the Court is not so absolute as it may appear at first
representative is dubious, to say the least. It may be recalled that respondent
glance. The statute itself expressly recognizes one exception: When a
company, in a letter dated May 12, 1986 and addressed to petitioner, merely
certification election had occured within one year. And the judicial
indicated that it was "not against the desire of (its) workers" and required petitioner
administrative agencies have found two exceptions: where there is an
to present proof that it was supported by the majority thereof in a meeting to be held
unexpired bargaining agreement not exceeding two years and when there is
on the same date. 5 The only express recognition of petitioner as said employees'
a pending charge of company domination of one of the labor unions
bargaining representative that.In the records is in the collective bargaining
intending to participate in the election.
agreement entered into two days thereafter. 6 Evidently, there was precipitate haste
on the part of respondent company in recognizing petitioner union, which
II. YES
recognition appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of the latter that it
had the support of the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Scroll No. 577 32|LabRel – Part IV-C
On September 15, 1959, while this case was still pending in this Tribunal, petitioner applied only to unorganized establishment under Article 257, and that significantly
filed a manifestation to the effect that the contract between the USUP and the has been reduced to only 20%.
Shipping Line had expired on June 28, 1959, and that the same had not been
renewed. We asked for the comment of the other party. the respondent United 2. No.
Seamen's Union in its counter manifestation dated July 6, 1960, stated that the
collective bargaining agreement involved, executed on July 28, 1957, was The contract-bar rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a
automatically renewed for a period of two years from July 28, 1959 to July 28 1961, motion for intervention can only be entertained within the freedom period or 60 days
pursuant to the automatic renewal clause, for the reason that neither party notified prior to the expiry date of an existing CBA. The rule prohibits the filing of PCE during
the other in writing not less than sixty days prior to the expiration date, of its desire the existence of a CBA except within the freedom period. The purpose is to ensure
to terminate the agreement. So, it would appear that the contract will still be stability in the relationship of the workers and the management by preventing
effective up to July 28, 1961, that is to say, about a year from today. frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith and for
the stipulated original period.
In view of the foregoing, we believe and hold that the appealed order of the CIR The CBA entered into by ATU and the company on April 1, 1986 had been ratified on
dismissing the petition for certification election and refusing to allow the selection of April 3, 1986 by a majority of the workers and is plainly beneficial to them because of
a new bargaining agent, was valid under the circumstances obtaining at the time. the many generous concessions made by the management. TUPAs alleged defects on
However, inasmuch as there has been a renewal of the bargaining agreement for the CBA such as it was not posted for at least 5 days in 2 conspicuous places in the
another two years and because it seems that the present agreement is but a renewal establishment before ratification and that it does not carry the sworn statement of
of the one entered into way back in 1955, so that until the expiration of the present the union secretary and attested by the union president.
agreement, about six years shall have passed, it is advisable that a new certification However, the Court did not rule on the defects of the CBA and only considered the
election be held. fact that it was entered into at a time when the PCE had already been filed by TUPAS
and was pending resolution. The CBA cannot be deemed permanent, precluding the
commencement of negotiations by another union with the management.
In the meantime, however, so as not to deprive the workers of the benefits of the
46. ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS (ATU) VS. HON. TRAJANO said agreement, it shall be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis, subject
to the results of the CE. The agreement may be continued in force if ATU is certified
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers or may be rejected and
ISSUES replaced in the event that TUPAS emerges as the winner.
1. WON 30% consent requirement is necessary. Therefore, certification election is allowed in the case at bar, the Court reiterates that
2. WON PCE is barred by the CBA entered into between ATU and company CE is the most democratic forum for the articulation by the workers of their choice of
subsequent to the filing of PCE. the union that shall represent them in the negotiation of a CBA with their employer.
Hence, rather than being inhibited and delayed, the CE should be given every
HELD
encouragement under the law, that the will of the workers may be discovered and
1. NO.
through their freely chosen representatives, pursued and realized.
The first issue is now moot and academic since the 30% consent required under
Section 258 of LC is no longer in force owing to the amendment of E.O. No. 111
effective on March 4, 1987. The applicable provision in the case is Article 256 of LC
because the company is an organized establishment. The consent requirement is now

Scroll No. 577 33|LabRel – Part IV-C


47. ME-SHURN CORPORATION AND SAMMY CHOU vs. ME-SHURN WORKERS Third, as a condition for the rehiring of the employees, the union officers were made
UNION-FSM to sign an agreement that they would not form any union upon their return to work.
This move was contrary to law.
ISSUES
Fourth, notwithstanding the Petition for Certification Election filed by respondents
(1) WON the dismissal of the employees of petitioner Meshurn Corporation is for an and despite knowledge of the pendency thereof, petitioners recognized a newly
authorized cause, and formed union and hastily signed with it an alleged Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Their preference for the new union was at the expense of respondent
(2) WON respondents can maintain a suit against petitioners. union.Moncada Bijon Factory v. CIR29held that an employer could be held guilty of
discrimination, even if the preferred union was not company-dominated.
HELD
Fifth, petitioners were not able to prove their allegation that some of the employees’
1. NO. Basic is the rule in termination cases that the employer bears the burden of contracts had expired even before the cessation of operations. We find this claim
showing that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the inconsistent with their position that all 342 employees of the corporation were paid
dismissal is deemed unjustified. Apropos this responsibility, petitioner corporation their separation pay plus accrued benefits in August 1998.
should have presented clear and convincing evidence 24of imminent economic or
business reversals as a form of affirmative defense in the proceedings before the Sixth, proper written notices of the closure were not sent to the DOLE and the
labor arbiter or, under justifiable circumstances, even on appeal with the NLRC. employees at least one month before the effectivity date of the termination, as
required under the Labor Code. Notice to the DOLE is mandatory to enable the
However, as previously stated, in all the proceedings before the two quasi-judicial proper authorities to ascertain whether the closure and/or dismissals were being
bodies and even before the CA, no evidence was submitted to show the corporation’s done in good faith and not just as a pretext for evading compliance with the
alleged business losses. It is only now that petitioners have belatedly submitted the employer’s just obligations to the affected employees.30This requirement is intended
corporation’s income tax returns from 1996 to 1999 as proof of alleged continued to protect the workers’ right to security of tenure. The absence of such requirement
losses during those years. taints the dismissal.

At any rate, even if we admit these additional pieces of evidence, the circumstances All these factors strongly give credence to the contention of respondents that the real
surrounding the cessation of operations of the corporation reveal the doubtful reason behind the shutdown of the corporation was the formation of their union.
character of its supposed financial reason. Note that, to constitute an unfair labor practice, the dismissal need not entirely and
exclusively be motivated by the union’s activities or affiliations. It is enough that the
First, the claim of petitioners that they were compelled to close down the company discrimination was a contributing factor.31If the basic inspiration for the act of the
to prevent further losses is belied by their resumption of operations barely a month employer is derived from the affiliation or activities of the union, the former’s
after the corporation supposedly folded up. assignment of another reason, no matter how seemingly valid, is unavailing.

Second, the Statements of Income and Deficit for the years 1996 and 1997 show that 2. YES. Neither are we prepared to believe petitioners’ argument that respondent
at the beginning of 1996, the corporation had a deficit ofP2,474,505. Yet, the closure union was not legitimate. It should be pointed out that on June 29, 1998, it filed a
was effected only after more than a year from such year-end deficit; that is, in the Petition for Certification Election. While this Petition was initially dismissed by the
middle of 1998, shortly after the formation of the union. med-arbiter on the basis of a supposed retraction, note that the appeal was granted

Scroll No. 577 34|LabRel – Part IV-C


and that Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz ordered the holding of a certification have reference to the employee's right to self-organization and collective bargaining,
election. because the element of unfair labor practice is interference in such right. It would be
redundant to repeat "under this Act" after each enumeration connected by the
disjunctive conjunction "or."
The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union were not a legitimate
labor organization within the meaning of the Labor Code. Under this Code, in an
As the respondent's dismissal has no relation to union activities and the charges filed
unorganized establishment, only a legitimate union may file a petition for by her against the petitioner had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union
certification election. Hence, while it is not clear from the record whether respondent activities, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and the directive for the
union is a legitimate organization, we are not readily inclined to believe otherwise, respondent's reinstatement with backpay revoked.
especially in the light of the pro-labor policies enshrined in the Constitution and the
Labor Code.

Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own name in order to 2. WISE AND CO., INC., versus. WISE & CO., INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU
challenge the unfair labor practice committed by petitioners against it and its AND HONORABLE LAGUESMA
members."It would be an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization
The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate, according to its
through formation of labor associations if thereafter such collective entities would be
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. This flows from the established
barred from instituting action in their representative capacity." rule that labor law does not authorize the of the employer in the conduct of its
business. 6 such management prerogative may be availed of without fear of any
Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed by petitioners against liability so long as it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers'
respondent union prior to the holding of the certification election on September 27, interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
2000 -- acts that included their immediate grant of exclusive recognition to another employees under special laws or valid agreement and are not exercised in a
union as a bargaining agent despite the pending Petition for certification election -- malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite. 7
the results of that election cannot be said to constitute a repudiation by the affected
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the
employees of the union’s right to represent them in the present case.
"bargaining unit" falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to
have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. More so when as in this
case there is a clause in the CBA where the employees are classified into those who
C. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES are members of the union and those who are not. In the case of the union members,
they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which
1. MARIANO, versus. THE ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES constitute the law between the contracting parties. 8 Both the employer and the
union members are bound by such agreement.
Despite the employees' right to self-organization, the employer therefore still retains
his inherent right to discipline his employees, his normal prerogative to hire or 3. DABUET versus. ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., ERIC MENTHA,
dismiss them. The prohibition is directed only against the use of the right to employ REYNALDO FORMELOZA, and the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
or discharge as an instrument of discrimination, interference or oppression because
of one's labor or union activities. Even from a liberal and grammatical point of view, In Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 7 where the dismissed employees had written a
the provision in dispute has to be interpreted in the sense that the charges, the filing, letter decried by the Bank as patently libelous for alleging immorality, nepotism and
of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his right to favoritism on the part of the Bank president, thus amounting to behavior
self-organization, in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on the part of the necessitating their dismissal, the Court declared:
employer. (Under subsection 5 of section 4(a), the employee's (1) having filed charges
or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by ... Assuming that the workers acted in their individual capacities when they
"under this Act" appearing after the last item. In other words, the three acts must wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were
Scroll No. 577 35|LabRel – Part IV-C
engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 5. CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION, vs. NLRC, and GOCHANGCO,
4(a) (1). As has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even INC.
by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is
a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary Respondent company is guilty of an unfair labor practice. It is no coincidence that at
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. the time said respondent issued its suspension and termination orders, the
petitioners were in the midst of a certification election preliminary to a labor
We, thus, hold that respondent company's act in dismissing the Petitioners, who then management conference, purportedly, "to normalize employer-employee
constituted the remaining and entire officialdom of the Roche Products Labor Union, relations." 5 It was within the legal right of the petitioners to do so, the exercise of
after the union's president and vice-president had been earlier dismiss and when the which was their sole prerogative, and in which management may not as a rule
collective bargaining agreement in the company was about to be renegotiated, was interfere.
an unfair labor practice under Sec. 4(a) (1) of the Industrial Peace Act. Their dismissal,
under the circumstances, amounted to interference with, and restraint or coercion Before Batas Blg. 70 29 was enacted into law, unfair labor practices were considered
of, the petitioners in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activities for administrative offenses, 30 and have been held akin to tort, 31 wherein damages are
their mutual aid and protection payable. We therefore not only order herein the reinstatement of the petitioners and
the payment of backwages (including cost-of-living allowances) to them, but impose
As the respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice, reinstatement of the as well moral and exemplary damages. With respect to backwages, we hold the
dismissed employees should follow as a matter of right. It is an established rule that respondent e.g. Gochangco, Inc. liable, in line with the recommendation of the
an employer who commits an unfair labor practice may be required to reinstate, with Solicitor General and in accordance with accepted practice, for backwages equivalent
full back wages, the workers affected by such act, the amount not to exceed back to three (3) years without qualification or deduction. 32
wages for three (3) years.
If only for emphasis, the new Constitution considers "labor as a primary social
economic force." 34 As the conscience of the government, it is this Court's sworn duty
to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.
4. JUDRIC CANNING CORPORATION, vs. INCIONG

Under Article 248(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, "to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in their exercise of the right to self-organization" is an unfair 6. CARLOS CRUZ vs. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU)
labor practice on the part of the employer. Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers
it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise Thus: "But a buyer should not be allowed to reap and enjoy all the profits of a sale
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the without the corresponding responsibilities that are attached to the industrial
giving of financial or other support to it. In this particular case, the private enterprise, specially so when the sale was executed under dubious circumstances. If it
respondents were dismissed or their services were terminated, because they were is so the convenience of ridding the management of any labor problem is easily
soliciting signatures in order to form a union within the plant. facilitated by simulating a sale everytime the laboring elements agitate the protection
of their rights. That is why under the present condition, responsibility should be
The error of the Regional Director in stating that the dismissal of the private shared by both the buyer and the seller otherwise the efforts of the workers would
respondents was without just cause in view of the absence of prior clearance from have been futile and fruitless, since they would naturally face a blank wall after the
the Ministry of Labor is, thus, not sufficient to warrant a reversal of the questioned sale.
order. Prior clearance with the Ministry of Labor for the termination of the private
respondents is not necessary in this case since the private respondents have been There is likewise an error assigned by petitioner Cruz that labor contracts being in
employed with the petitioner corporation for less than one (1) year. Section 1, Rule personam are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, there being no
XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. previous employer-employee relationship existing between the new owner and the
Scroll No. 577 36|LabRel – Part IV-C
complaining employees. It suffices to state that petitioner Cruz is in the position of a circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular
tort-feasor having been a party likewise responsible for the damage inflicted on the employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection
members of respondent Union and therefore cannot justly escape liability. with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference.

So there is unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the
Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal
7. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of
vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's
M. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by
them."
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective
bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the
individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and
prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in
is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the another mill, which was imperfectly organized.
employees' bargaining representative.
Section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untrammeled exercise by
When the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact
with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any
"work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well
they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of
and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected
attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a
employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on
thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to
returning to work would be. union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of
management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within protected by the Constitution.
the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not
employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be affect or diminish the right to strike. Some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any
direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with
of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the
of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket
bargaining. line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the
contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
"Totality of conduct doctrine," nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of
the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated
the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act
not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised
would indeed be illusory.
against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances.
Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though
innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the
Scroll No. 577 37|LabRel – Part IV-C
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union transferring the business of Complex. At the time the labor dispute arose at Complex,
activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or Ionics was already existing as an independent company. As earlier mentioned, it has
coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join been in existence since July 5, 1984. It cannot, therefore, be said that the temporary
unions as to constitute unfair labor practice. The information obtained by means of closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of business to Ionics was for anti-
espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to union purposes. The Union failed to show that the primary reason for the closure of
break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is the establishment was due to the union activities of the employees.
carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory
employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all
of the employer, or an ex-employee. of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding
the separate corporate personality. Ionics may be engaged in the same business as
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or that of Complex, but this fact alone is not enough reason to pierce the veil of
where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the corporate fiction of the corporation. Well-settled is the rule that a corporation has a
employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders. This
employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no fiction of corporate entity can only be disregarded in certain cases such as when it is
job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if crime. 19 To disregard said separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. 20
position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all
the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement We, likewise, disagree with the Union that there was in this case an illegal
employees wherever necessary; lockout/illegal dismissal. Lockout is the temporary refusal of employer to furnish
work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 21 It may be manifested by the
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or employer's act of excluding employees who are union members. 22 In the present
not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of case, there was a complete cessation of the business operations at Complex not
disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to because of the labor dispute. It should be recalled that, before the labor dispute,
put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or Complex had already informed the employees that they would be closing the Lite-On
neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is Line.
settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him
is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act At first glance after reading the decision a quo, it would seem that the closure of
upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity respondent's operation is not justified. However, a deeper examination of the
inimical to the employer's interest. records along with the evidence, would show that the closure, although it was done
abruptly as there was no compliance with the 30-day prior notice requirement, said
closure was not intended to circumvent the provisions of the Labor Code on
termination of employment. The closure of operation by Complex was not without
8. COMPLEX ELECTRONICS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CEEA) vs. NLRC valid reasons. Customers of respondent alarmed by the pending labor dispute and
the imminent strike to be foisted by the union, as shown by their strike vote, directed
A "runaway shop" is defined as an industrial plant moved by its owners from one respondent Complex to pull-out its equipment, machinery and materials to other safe
location to another to escape union labor regulations or state laws, but the term is bonded warehouse. Respondent being mere consignees of the equipment, machinery
also used to describe a plant removed to a new location in order to discriminate and materials were without any recourse but to oblige the customers' directive. The
against employees at the old plant because of their union determination to cease operation is a prerogative of management that is usually not
activities. 14 It is one wherein the employer moves its business to another location or interfered with by the State as no employer can be required to continue operating at
it temporarily closes its business for anti-union purposes. 15 A "runaway shop" in this a loss simply to maintain the workers in employment. That would be taking of
sense, is a relocation motivated by anti-union animus rather than for business property without due process of law which the employer has the right to resist.
reasons. In this case, however, Ionics was not set up merely for the purpose of (Columbia Development Corp. vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 146 SCRA 42).

Scroll No. 577 38|LabRel – Part IV-C


In any case, Article 283 of the Labor Code is clear that an employer may close or their ignorance of,nor their dissatisfaction with, its terms and condition would justify
cease his business operations or undertaking even if he is not suffering from serious breach thereof or the formation by them of a union of their own.As has been aptly
business losses or financial reverses, as long as he pays his employees their said the collective bargaining agreement entered into by officers of a union as agent
termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. It would of the member,and an employer,gives rise to valid inforcible contractual relation
indeed, be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if we were to unjustly interfere against the individual union members in matters that affect the entire membership or
in management's prerogative to close or cease its business operations just because large classes of its member who employed under an agreement between the union
said business operations or undertaking is not suffering from any loss. and his employer is bound by the provision thereof,since it is a joint and several
contract of the members of the union and entered into by the union as their agent.
It is settled that in case of closures or cessation of operation of business
establishments not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, 31 the But the fact that the CBA had expired on June 30, 1982 and the BLR, because of such
employees are always given separation benefits. supervening event, ordered the holding of a certification election could not and did
not wipe out or cleanse private respondents from the acts of disloyalty committed
when they organized KAMPIL's local chapter in TDI while still members of TDLU. The
ineluctable fact is that private respondents committed acts of disloyalty against TDLU
9. TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION vs. NLRC while the CBA was in force and existing for which they have to face the necessary
sanctions lawfully imposed by TDLU. In Villar v. Inciong, we held that "petitioners,
although entitled to disaffiliation from their union and to form a new organization of
We enforce basic principles essential to a strong and dynamic labor movement. An
their own must however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union
established postulate in labor relations firmly rooted in this jurisdiction is that the
under the security clause of the CBA.
dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in accordance
with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and
privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the
right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow
the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the
Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed shop
disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they belong; they
arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop, the
thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union which they
maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance of
seek to destroy.
treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and
strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the
freedom of association clause of the Constitution.

Another reason for enforcing the closed-shop agreement is the principle of sanctity 10. CONFEDERATED SONS OF LABOR vs. ANAKAN LUMBER COMPANY, UNITED
or inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. Having ratified tha CBA WORKERS' UNION
and being then members of the TDLU, the private respondents owe fealty and are
required under the Union Security Clause to maintain their membership in good A "closed shop" may be defined as an enterprise in which, agreement between the
standing with it during the term thereof, a requirement which ceases to be binding employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in
only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes,
CBA. When the private respondents organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and, for duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing for a union
and filed the corresponding petition for certification election in November 1980, entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.
there was no freedom period to speak of yet.
Inasmuch as Article II does not provide that employees "must continue to remain
Finally, even if we assume,that the petition were unaware of the stipulation set forth members in good standing" of respondent union "to keep their jobs," the collective
in the collective bargaining agreement since their membership in the BBLU prior to t bargain-agreement between them does not establish a 'closed shop," except in a very
the expulsion thereform is undenied there can be no question that as long as the limited sense, namely, that the laborers, employees and workers engaged by the
agreement with closed-shop provision was in force they were bound by it. Neither company after the signing of the agreement on January 23, 1955, must be members
Scroll No. 577 39|LabRel – Part IV-C
of respondent union. The agreement does not affect the right of the company to It is settled that in termination cases the employer bears the burden of proof to show
retain those already working therefor on or before said date, or those hired or that the dismissal is for just cause, the failure of which would mean that the dismissal
employed subsequently thereto, while they were members of respondent union, but is not justified and the employee is entitled to reinstatement. 14 Loss of confidence as
who, thereafter, resign or are expelled therefrom. a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank
check for terminating their employees. It should ideally apply only to cases involving
In order that an employer may be deemed bound, under a collective bargaining employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where
agreement, to dismiss employees for non-union membership, the stipulation to this the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's
effect must be so clear and unequivocal as to leave no room for doubt thereon. An money or property.
undertaking of this nature is so harsh that it must be strictly construed, and doubts
must be resolved against the existence of "closed shop." If the parties to the The act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer
agreement intended to establish a "closed shop", in the strict sense of the phrase, observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with
they would have inserted in said Article III-a, among the grounds for dismissal by the the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's
company therein specified the discontinuance of membership in respondent union. scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of
Their failure to make such insertion strongly indicates that said discontinuance of the hotel's workers to seek better terms and conditions of employment through
membership was not understood to be a ground for dismissal. concerted action. This actuation is analogous to the situation envisaged in paragraph
(f) of Article 248 of the Labor Code" which distinctly makes it an unfair labor practice
"to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for
having given or being about to give testimony" 25 under the Labor Code. For in not
11. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA NG ALAK (NAFLU) vs.HAMILTON giving positive testimony in favor of her employer, petitioner had reserved not only
DISTILLERY COMPANY, CO BON BENG, MARIANO ANG ENG and HAMILTON her right to dispute the claim and proffer evidence in support thereof but also to
WORKERS' UNION work for better terms and conditions of employment.

In this connection, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in the absence of a


manifest intent to the contrary, "closed shop" provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement "apply only to persons to be hired or to employees who are not 13. PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED vs. RICARDO DEQUILLA
yet members of any labor organization" and that said provisions of the agreement are
"not applicable to those already in the service at the time of its execution." "Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed
shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership," or any other form of agreement
The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4, subsec. a(4) of the Industrial which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership
Peace Act above quoted should however, apply only to persons to be hired or to as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular
employees who are not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for
those already in the service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise, their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when
i.e., that the employees in a company who are members of a minority union may be employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or
compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union, who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition
would render nugatory the right of all employees to self organization and to form, for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing, a right guaranteed by the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand,
Industrial Peace Act (sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and
sec. 1[6]). his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain
agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the
duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely
comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.13
12. NORMA MABEZA vs. NLRC

Scroll No. 577 40|LabRel – Part IV-C


When an employer exercises its power to terminate an employee by enforcing the Time and again, we have ruled that we adhere to the policy of enhancing the welfare
union security clause, it needs to determine and prove the following: (1) the union of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining
security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the representative is of paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a
union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the bargaining representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as long as the
decision of the union to expel the employee from the union.14 petition for certification election was filed within the freedom period. What is
imperative is that by such a petition for certification election the employees are given
PICOP failed to show in detail how private respondents campaigned and supported the opportunity to make known of who shall have the right to represent them
FFW. Their mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification election thereafter. Not only some, but all of them should have the right to do so. What is
before the freedom period does not necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty per se equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit
considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the concerned.
freedom period. Moreover, the records are bereft of proof of any contemporaneous
acts of resignation or withdrawal of union membership or non-payment of union
dues. Neither is there proof that private respondents joined FFW. The fact is, private
respondents remained in good standing with their union. 14. PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI), vs. ANACLETO L. TAÑECA,

Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security
outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case. If at all, the clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause
signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security
the filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents’ right provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of
to self-organization.16 the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just
cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the
While it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of CBA.16
the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they
could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, However, as to the third requisite, we find that there is no sufficient evidence to
with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by support the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the respondents.
management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union
may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification
provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was Election of FFW before the "freedom period," is not sufficient ground to terminate
filed during the freedom period. the employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed
during the freedom period. Nothing in the records would show that respondents
Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did
pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong.
representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW. An
of a petition for certification election. When there is a representational issue, "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an
the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new actual "Petition for Certification Election." If at all, the signing of the authorization to
agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for
union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security certification election, or an exercise of respondents’ right to self-organization.
clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a
petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of We will emphasize anew that the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the
disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The employer. This, however, is not without limitations. The employer is bound to
holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is
circumvented, or compromised. made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be
Scroll No. 577 41|LabRel – Part IV-C
observed in dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his position but also affiliated with a national federation -- are material facts likely to
his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore, respect and protect the rights influence the election results. This principle finds application in
of their employees, which include the right to labor.25 the present case in which the majority of the employees clearly
wanted an independent union to represent them. Thus, after the
An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages
members learned of the misrepresentation, and after a majority of
and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to the
employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of them disaffiliated themselves from the union and formed another
reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for one, a new certification election should be held to enable them to
every year of service. Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees who are illegally express their true will.
dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits,
or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation The late filing of the Petition for a new election can be
was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. But if excused under the peculiar facts of this case, considering that the
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time employees concerned did not sleep on their rights, but promptly
of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Moreover, respondents, acted to protect their prerogatives. Petitioner should not be
having been compelled to litigate in order to seek redress for their illegal dismissal, permitted to use legal technicalities to perpetrate the betrayal
are entitled to the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary foisted by its officers upon the majority of the
award.26 employees.Procedural technicalities should not be allowed to
suppress the welfare of labor.

THIRD DIVISION The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the


[G.R. No. 152094. July 22, 2004] Rules of Court, seeking to annul the December 17,
1999 Decision[2] and the January 30, 2002 Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53270. The assailed
DHL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION UNITED RANK Decision disposed as follows:
AND FILE ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due
FREE WORKERS (DHL-URFA- course. Accordingly, the decision of Rosalinda Dimapilis-
FFW), petitioner, vs. BUKLOD NG [B]aldoz, Undersecretary of Labor, in behalf of [the] Secretary
MANGGAGAWA NG DHL PHILIPPINES of Labor and Employment, is hereby ANNULED and SET
CORPORATION, respondent. ASIDE and DECLARED to have NO EFFECT whatsoever.
DECISION Public respondent and its representatives are hereby enjoined to
PANGANIBAN, J.: refrain and desist from implementing the said decision. [4]

False statements made by union officers before and during a The challenged Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
certification election -- that the union is independent and not Reconsideration.
Scroll No. 577 42|LabRel – Part IV-C
The Facts in favor of petitioner, and that no petitions for certification election
would be entertained within one year from the time the election
officer had issued the Certification Order.
On November 25, 1997, a certification election was
conducted among the regular rank and file employees in the main
office and the regional branches of DHL Philippines
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Corporation. The contending choices were petitioner and no
union.
The CA held that the withdrawal of a great majority of the
On January 19, 1998, on the basis of the results of the
members of petitioner -- 704 out of 894 of them -- provided a
certification election, with petitioner receiving 546 votes and no
compelling reason to conduct a certification election anew in
union garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the former
order to determine, once and for all, which union reflected their
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
choice. Under the circumstances, the issue of representation was
employees of the corporation.[5]
not put to rest by the mere issuance of a Certification Order by
Meanwhile, on December 19, 1997, Respondent Buklod ng the election officer.
Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation (BUKLOD) filed
According to the appellate court, broader considerations
with the Industrial Relations Division of the Department of Labor
should be accorded the disaffiliating member-employees and a
and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for the nullification of the
new election held to finally ascertain their will, consistent with the
certification election. The officers of petitioner were charged with
constitutional and labor law policy of according full protection to
committing fraud and deceit in the election proceedings,
labors right to self-organization. The CA added that the best
particularly by misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was
forum to determine the veracity of the withdrawal or retraction of
an independent union, when it was in fact an affiliate of the
petitioners former members was another certification election.
Federation of Free Workers (FFW).
The appellate court also held that the election officers
This misrepresentation was supposedly the basis for their
issuance of a Certification Order on January 19, 1998 was
selection of petitioner in the certification election. Allegedly
precipitate because, prior thereto, respondent had filed with the
supporting this claim was the fact that those whom it had misled
med-arbiter a Petition for nullification of the election. Furthermore,
allegedly withdrew their membership from it and subsequently
the Certification was not in accordance with Department Order
formed themselves into an independent union. The latter union,
No. 9 (DO 9), Series of 1997. The charges of fraud and deceit,
BUKLOD, was issued a Certificate of Registration by DOLE
lodged immediately after the election by petitioners former
on December 23, 1997.
members against their officers, should have been treated as
On May 18, 1998, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin nullified protests or issues of eligibility within the meaning of Section 13 of
the November 25, 1997 certification election and ordered the DO 9.
holding of another one with the following contending
Hence, this Petition.[6]
choices: petitioner, respondent, and no choice.
Setting aside the Decision of Med-Arbiter Falconitin, DOLE
Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz held on appeal that Issues
the issue of representation had already been settled with finality

Scroll No. 577 43|LabRel – Part IV-C


In its Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues one (1) year from the time the Election Officer issued the
for our consideration: Certification Order.
I
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and
excess of jurisdiction when it annul[l]ed, set aside, and declared committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack and/or
to have no effect whatsoever, the Decision of Undersecretary excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Decision
Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, which in effect, reinstated and promulgated on December 17, 1999, as the same was rendered
affirmed the Decision of the Med-Arbiter, nullifying the result without the [Office of the] Solicitor General having filed its
of the certification election as well as ordering the conduct of a comment on the Petition a quo, despite having filed a
new certification election at DHL Philippines Corporation, Manifestation with Motion to the effect of not having received
considering that: the Petition filed by petitioner a quo, which [h]as remained
unacted upon; as well as the Resolution promulgated on January
(A) The Court of Appeals, as well as the Med-Arbiter, ignored 30, 2002, which denied herein petitioners Motion for
the undisputed fact that petitioner a quo (herein respondent) has Reconsideration, which was rendered without the required
not yet existed before, during and shortly after the conduct of comment thereon by the Petitioner a quo, thus, due process was
certification election on November 25, 1997, and not yet even violated.
registered at the time of the filing of its Petition a quo on
III
December 19, 1997, therefore, has no legal personality to
institute an action. Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
(B) The Court of Appeals, as well as the Med-Arbiter ignored
excess of jurisdiction in holding that the resignation,
and unjustifiably refused to apply Section 13, Rule XII of
withdrawal, retraction of the great majority of the former
Department Order No. 9, there being no protest nor challenge
members of United DHL should be treated as disaffiliation from
raised before, during and even after five (5) days have lapsed
such union.
from the conduct of the certification election on November 25,
1997, as the Petition a quo was only filed on December 19, IV
1997 a week before herein respondent was able to obtain its
Certificate of Registration. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals seriously erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
(C) The Court of Appeals ignored and unjustifiably refused to excess of jurisdiction in declaring that x x x while in the
apply Section 3, Rule V of Department Order No. 9, or February 28, 1996 x x x decision of Med-Arbiter Tomas
commonly know[n] as the Certification-Year Rule, which Falconitin provides for a certification election among two (2)
means that no certification election should be entertained within
Scroll No. 577 44|LabRel – Part IV-C
specific choices: the private respondent (then as petitioner), and The applicable provision is Section 8 of Rule 65 of the Rules
No Union as the contending choices, what was conducted on of Court, which provides:
November 25, 1996 (sic) was a referendum on a choice of yes
or no and not certification order of the Election Officer SECTION 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. -- After the
reflecting the results in the number of yes votes and no votes, comment or other pleadings required by the court are filed, or
without indicating the name of the contending choices. the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the
case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such
V hearing or submission of memoranda or the expiration of the
period for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations of
Whether or not the Court of Appeals placed both parties in the petition are true, it shall render judgment for the relief
Limbo, as the dispositive portion of the Decision or prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled. x x x. (Italics
the fallo, which x x x actually constitutes the judgment or supplied)
resolution of the court, failed to specify what should be done by
the parties after the rendition of the said Decision and From the foregoing provision, it is clear that the Petition may
Resolution, thus, there can be no subject of execution. [7] be resolved, notwithstanding the failure of the adverse party to
file a comment. Its failure to do so despite due notice is its own
In simpler terms, the issues being raised are as follows: 1) lookout. Indeed, when a respondent fails to file its comment
the validity of the CA Decision and Resolution; and 2) the validity within the given period, the court may decide the case on the
of the certification election. basis of the records before it, specifically the petition and its
attachments.[8]
Petitioner insists that the failure of the OSG to receive a copy
The Courts Ruling of the Petition filed before the CA was the reason for the OSGs
failure to file a Comment thereon. Be that as it may, as correctly
pointed out by respondent, petitioner is not the proper party to
The Petition lacks merit.
invoke such failure.
At any rate, it is the duty of petitioner to defend its position, as
First Issue: well as those that upheld it -- the tribunal, the board and the
Validity of the CA Decision and Resolution officer -- because it is the party that is ultimately interested in
sustaining the correctness of the disposition or the validity of the
proceedings.[9]
Petitioner assails the validity of the CA Decision for having
been rendered without receipt of the required comment of the Petitioner further assails the validity of the CA Decision, on
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on respondents Petition; the ground that its dispositive portion or fallo failed to specify
and the CA Resolution for having been issued without receipt of what should be done by the parties after its promulgation.
respondents comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
All that the law requires is that the judgment must be
This contention is untenable. definitive. That is, the rights of the parties must be stated with

Scroll No. 577 45|LabRel – Part IV-C


finality by the decision itself, which must thus specifically deny or hear and decide representation cases.[14]Consequently, the
grant the remedy sought by the action.[10] For review by the CA decision whether to certify the results of an election or to set them
was Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldozs Resolution reversing the aside due to incidents occurring during the campaign is within the
Decision of Med-Arbiter Falconitin. med-arbiters discretion.
Parenthetically, the ultimate question presented before the Petitioner argues that the CA gravely erred in rendering its
appellate court was whether a new certification election should be assailed Decision, considering that no protest or challenge had
conducted among the employees of DHL Philippines been formalized within five days, or raised during the election
Corporation. As correctly pointed out by respondent, in reversing proceedings and entered in the minutes thereof. Petitioner adds
the undersecretarys Resolution, the CA necessarily reinstated the that respondent did not file any protest, either, against the alleged
med-arbiters earlier Decision to conduct a new certification fraud and misrepresentation by the formers officers during the
election. election.
A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the We disagree. When the med-arbiter admitted and gave due
decision; it encompasses matters necessarily included in or are course to respondents Petition for nullification of the election
necessary to such judgment.[11] The Decision of Med-Arbiter proceedings, the election officer should have deferred issuing the
Falconitin and Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz should be read in Certification of the results thereof. Section 13 of the Implementing
the context of and in relation to the assailed Decision of the Rules cannot strictly be applied to the present case.
CA. The setting aside of the undersecretarys Resolution
Respondents contention is that a number of employees were
necessarily implies the holding of a new certification election by
lured by their officers into believing that petitioner was an
the med-arbiter upon receipt of the records of the case and the
independent union. Since the employees had long desired to
motion of the interested party.
have an independent union that would represent them in
collective bargaining, they voted yes in favor of petitioner. Having
been misled, a majority of them eventually disaffiliated
Second Issue: themselves from it and formed an independent union, respondent
Validity of the Certification Election herein, which thereafter protested the conduct of the
election. Having been formed just after such exercise by the
Under Section 13 of the Rules Implementing Book V (Labor defrauded employees who were former members of petitioner,
Relations) of the Labor Code,[12] as amended, the election officers respondent could not have reasonably filed its protest within five
authority to certify the results of the election is limited to situations days from the close of the election proceedings.
in which there has been no protest filed; or if there has been any, Notably, after it had applied for registration with the Bureau of
it has not been perfected or formalized within five days from the Labor Relations (BLR), respondent filed its Petition to nullify the
close of the election proceedings. certification election. Petitioner insistently opposed the Petition,
Further, Section 14 of the same Rules provides that when a as respondent had not yet been issued a certificate of registration
protest has been perfected, only the med-arbiter can proclaim at the time. Because such certificate was issued in favor of the
and certify the winner. Clearly, this rule is based on the election latter four days after the filing of the Petition, on December 23,
officers function, which is merely to conduct and supervise 1997, the misgivings of the former were brushed aside by the
certification elections.[13] It is the med-arbiter who is authorized to med-arbiter. Indeed, the fact that respondent was not yet a duly

Scroll No. 577 46|LabRel – Part IV-C


registered labor organization when the Petition was filed is of no petitioner and organized themselves into an independent union.
moment, absent any fatal defect in its application for registration. Additionally, the misrepresentation came from petitioners
recognized representative, who was clearly in a position to hold
The circumstances in the present case show that the
himself out as a person who had special knowledge and was in
employees did not sleep on their rights. Hence, their failure to
an authoritative position to know the true facts.
follow strictly the procedural technicalities regarding the period for
filing their protest should not be taken against them. Mere We are not easily persuaded by the argument of petitioner
technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the welfare of that the employees had sufficient time between the
the workers.[15] What is essential is that they be accorded an misrepresentation and the election to check the truth of its
opportunity to determine freely and intelligently which labor claims. They could hardly be expected to verify the accuracy of
organization shall act on their behalf.[16] Having been denied this any statement regarding petitioner, made to them by its
opportunity by the betrayal committed by petitioners officers in officers. No less than its president stated that it was an
the present case, the employees were prevented from making an independent union. At the time, the employees had no reason to
intelligent and independent choice. doubt him.
We sustain the following findings of Med-Arbiter Falconitin:
False Statements of Union Officers
x x x It must be noted at the outset that [respondent] has charged
[petitioners] officers, agents and representative with fraud or
The making of false statements or misrepresentations that deception in encouraging its members to form or join and vote
interfere with the free choice of the employees is a valid ground for DHL Philippines Corporation United Rank-and-File
for protest. A certification election may be set aside for
Association which they represented as an independent labor
misstatements made during the campaign, where 1) a material
fact has been misrepresented in the campaign; 2) an opportunity union not affiliated with any labor federation or national
for reply has been lacking; and 3) the misrepresentation has had union. Such serious allegations, supported with affidavits under
an impact on the free choice of the employees participating in the oath executed by no less than seven hundred four (704) DHL
election.[17] A misrepresentation is likely to have an impact on their Philippines Corporations employees nationwide, cannot just be
free choice, if it comes from a party who has special knowledge ignored.
or is in an authoritative position to know the true facts. This
principle holds true, especially when the employees are unable to xxxxxxxxx
evaluate the truth or the falsity of the assertions.[18]
The fact that the officers of petitioner especially its president, Notwithstanding the fact that [petitioner] union was duly
misrepresented it to the voting employees as an independent furnished copy of the petition and the affidavits as its
union constituted a substantial misrepresentation of material facts attachments, it surprisingly failed to question, much less contest,
of vital concern to those employees. The materiality of such the veracity of the allegations contained in such affidavits, more
misrepresentation is self-evident. The employees wanted an than just harping in general terms that the allegations are simply
independent union to represent them in collective bargaining, free
incredible and [interposing] vehement denial. Being unassailed
from outside interference. Thus, upon knowing that petitioner was
in fact an affiliate of the FFW, the members disaffiliated from and unrefuted, the allegations in the
Scroll No. 577 47|LabRel – Part IV-C
affidavits which are considered as x x Once disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, a
x official documents must be given weight and consideration by certification election is the most expeditious way of determining
this Office. Furthermore, with the failure of [petitioner] to rebut which union should be the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees.[23]
the affidavits, more than just denying the allegations, they give
rise to the presumption that [petitioner] has admitted such WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
allegations in the affidavit and with the admission, it is Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
inescapable that indeed there was fraud or machination SO ORDERED.
committed by the [petitioner] that seriously affected the validity
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
and legitimacy of the certification election conducted on Corona, J., on leave.
November 25, 1997 which gives rise to a ground to annul or
void the said election, having been marred by fraud, deceptions
and machinations. [19]

This finding of fact of a quasi-judicial agency of DOLE is


persuasive upon the courts.[20]
Although petitioner won in the election, it is now clear that it G.R. No. 179146 July 23, 2013
does not represent the majority of the bargaining employees,
owing to the affiliation of its members with respondent. The HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Petitioner,
present uncertainty as to which union has their support to vs.
represent them for collective bargaining purposes is a salient HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity as
factor that this Court has seriously considered. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and
PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG ANAKPAWIS – HOLY
The bargaining agent must be truly representative of the CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES
employees.[21] At the time of the filing by respondent of the Petition LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS), Respondents.
for nullification, allegiances and loyalties of the employees were
like shifting sands that radically affected their choice of an DECISION
appropriate bargaining representative. The polarization of a good
number of them followed their discovery of the fraud committed PERALTA, J.:
by the officers of petitioner. At any rate, the claim that 704 of the
employees are affiliated with respondent is not sufficiently Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
rebutted by any evidence on record. Rules of Civil Procedure are the April 18, 2007 Decision1 and July
The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain 31, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
the majority of the employees choice of an appropriate bargaining 76175, which affirmed the December 27, 2002 Decision3 and
February 13, 2003 Resolution4 of the Secretary of the Department of
unit -- to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and,
Labor and Employment (SOLE) that set aside the August 10, 2002
in the affirmative case, by which one.[22]
Decision5 of the Med-Arbiter denying private respondent’s petition
for certification election.

Scroll No. 577 48|LabRel – Part IV-C


The factual antecedents are as follows: or mutuality of interest, as ruled in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment12 and De La Salle University
On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by Medical Center and College of Medicine v. Laguesma.13
private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy
Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union Private respondent, however, countered that petitioner failed to
(HCCS-TELUPIGLAS), alleging that: PIGLAS is a legitimate labor substantiate its claim that some of the employees included in the
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and petition for certification election holds managerial and supervisory
Employment (DOLE) representing HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS; HCCS is a positions.14 Assuming it to be true, it argued that Section 11
private educational institution duly registered and operating under (II),15 Rule XI of DOLE Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, Series of
Philippine laws; there are approximately one hundred twenty (120) 1997, provided for specific instances in which a petition filed by a
teachers and employees comprising the proposed appropriate legitimate organization shall be dismissed by the Med-Arbiter and
bargaining unit; and HCCS is unorganized, there is no collective that "mixture of employees" is not one of those enumerated. Private
bargaining agreement or a duly certified bargaining agent or a labor respondent pointed out that questions pertaining to qualifications of
organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of employees may be threshed out in the inclusion-exclusion
the proposed bargaining unit within one year prior to the filing of the proceedings prior to the conduct of the certification election,
petition.6 Among the documents attached to the petition were the pursuant to Section 2,16 Rule XII of D.O. No. 9. Lastly, similar to the
certificate of affiliation with Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis ruling in In Re: Globe Machine and Stamping Company,17 it
Kristiyanong Alyansa ng Makabayang Obrero (PIGLAS-KAMAO) contended that the will of petitioner’s employees should be
issued by the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), charter certificate respected as they had manifested their desire to be represented by
issued by PIGLASKAMAO, and certificate of registration of HCCS- only one bargaining unit. To back up the formation of a single
TELU as a legitimate labor organization issued by the DOLE.7 employer unit, private respondent asserted that even if the teachers
may receive additional pay for an advisory class and for holding
In its Comment8 and Position Paper,9 petitioner HCCS consistently additional loads, petitioner’s academic and non-academic personnel
noted that it is a parochial school with a total of 156 employees as of have similar working conditions. It cited Laguna College v. Court of
June 28, 2002, broken down as follows: ninety-eight (98) teaching Industrial Relations,18 as well as the case of a union in West Negros
personnel, twenty-five (25) non-teaching academic employees, and College in Bacolod City, which allegedly represented both academic
thirty-three (33) non-teaching non-academic workers. It averred that and non-academic employees.
of the employees who signed to support the petition, fourteen (14)
already resigned and six (6) signed twice. Petitioner raised that On August 10, 2002, Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan denied
members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is the petition for certification election on the ground that the unit which
not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file private respondent sought to represent is inappropriate. She
employees – as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department resolved:
head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators – but also a
combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty- A certification election proceeding directly involves two (2) issues
seven (27) are non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being namely: (a) the proper composition and constituency of the
in accord with Article 24510 of the Labor Code, private respondent is bargaining unit; and (b) the validity of majority representation claims.
an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a It is therefore incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to rule on the
petition for certification election, as held in Toyota Motor Philippines appropriateness of the bargaining unit once its composition and
Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor constituency is questioned.
Union;11 and an inappropriate bargaining unit for want of community

Scroll No. 577 49|LabRel – Part IV-C


Section 1 (q), Rule I, Book V of the Omnibus Rules defines a "inappropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be represented is
"bargaining unit" as a group of employees sharing mutual interests not a ground for the dismissal of the petition." In fact, in the cited
within a given employer unit comprised of all or less than all of the case of University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra, the
entire body of employees in the employer unit or any specific Supreme Court did not order the dismissal of the petition but
occupational or geographical grouping within such employer unit. ordered the conduct of a certification election, limiting the same
This definition has provided the "community or mutuality of interest" among the non-academic personnel of the University of the
test as the standard in determining the constituency of a collective Philippines.
bargaining unit. This is so because the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally It will be recalled that in the U.P. case, there were two contending
the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise unions, the Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of U.P.
of their collective bargaining rights. The application of this test may (ONAPUP) and All U.P. Workers Union composed of both academic
either result in the formation of an employer unit or in the and nonacademic personnel of U.P. ONAPUP sought the conduct of
fragmentation of an employer unit. certification election among the rank-and-file non-academic
personnel only while the all U.P. Workers Union sought the conduct
In the case at bar, the employees of petitioner, may, as already of certification election among all of U.P.’s rank-and-file employees
suggested, quite easily be categorized into (2) general classes: one, covering academic and nonacademic personnel. While the Supreme
the teaching staff; and two, the non-teaching-staff. Not much Court ordered a separate bargaining unit for the U.P. academic
reflection is needed to perceive that the community or mutuality of personnel, the Court, however, did not order them to organize a
interest is wanting between the teaching and the non-teaching staff. separate labor organization among themselves. The All U.P.
It would seem obvious that the teaching staff would find very little in Workers Union was not directed to divest itself of its academic
common with the non-teaching staff as regards responsibilities and personnel members and in fact, we take administrative notice that
function, working conditions, compensation rates, social life and the All U.P. Workers Union continue to exist with a combined
interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, etc. These are plain and membership of U.P. academic and non-academic personnel
patent realities which cannot be ignored. These dictate the although separate bargaining agreements is sought for the two
separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of bargaining units. Corollary, private respondent can continue to exist
collective bargaining. (University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer- as a legitimate labor organization with the combined teaching and
Calleja, 211 SCRA 451)19 non-teaching personnel in its membership and representing both
classes of employees in separate bargaining negotiations and
Private respondent appealed before the SOLE, who, on December agreements.
27, 2002, ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the
conduct of two separate certification elections for the teaching and WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 10 August
the non-teaching personnel, thus: 2002 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new
order is hereby issued directing the conduct of two certification
We agree with the Med-Arbiter that there are differences in the elections, one among the non-teaching personnel of Holy Child
nature of work, hours and conditions of work and salary Catholic School, and the other, among the teaching personnel of the
determination between the teaching and non-teaching personnel of same school, subject to the usual pre-election conferences and
petitioner. These differences were pointed out by petitioner in its inclusion-exclusion proceedings, with the following choices:
position paper. We do not, however, agree with the Med-Arbiter that
these differences are substantial enough to warrant the dismissal of A. Certification Election Among Petitioner’s Teaching
the petition. First, as pointed out by private respondent, Personnel:

Scroll No. 577 50|LabRel – Part IV-C


1. Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and on November 21, 200329 and, upon motion of petitioner,30 granted
Employees Labor Union; and the preliminary injunction on April 21, 2005.31 Thereafter, both
parties filed their respective Memorandum.32
2. No Union.
On April 18, 2007, the CA eventually dismissed the petition. As to
B. Certification Election Among Petitioner’s Non-Teaching the purported commingling of managerial, supervisory, and rank-
Personnel: and-file employees in private respondent’s membership, it held that
the Toyota ruling is inapplicable because the vice-principals,
1. Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and department head, and coordinators are neither supervisory nor
Employees Labor Union; and managerial employees. It reasoned:

2. No Union. x x x While it may be true that they wield power over other
subordinate employees of the petitioner, it must be stressed,
Petitioner is hereby directed to submit to the Regional Office of however, that their functions are not confined with policy-
origin within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision, a certified determining such as hiring, firing, and disciplining of employees,
separate list of its teaching and non-teaching personnel or when salaries, teaching/working hours, other monetary and non-monetary
necessary a separate copy of their payroll for the last three (3) benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. Further,
months prior to the issuance of this Decision.20 while they may formulate policies or guidelines, nonetheless, such is
merely recommendatory in nature, and still subject to review and
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration21 which, per Resolution evaluation by the higher executives, i.e., the principals or executive
dated February 13, 2003, was denied. Consequently, petitioner filed officers of the petitioner. It cannot also be denied that in institutions
before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary like the petitioner, company policies have already been pre-
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.22 The CA resolved to formulated by the higher executives and all that the mentioned
defer action on the prayer for TRO pending the filing of private employees have to do is carry out these company policies and
respondent’s Comment.23 Later, private respondent and petitioner standards. Such being the case, it is crystal clear that there is no
filed their Comment24 and Reply,25respectively. improper commingling of members in the private respondent union
as to preclude its petition for certification of (sic) election.33
On July 23, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for immediate issuance of
a TRO, alleging that Hon. Helen F. Dacanay of the Industrial Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel,
Relations Division of the DOLE was set to implement the SOLE the CA agreed with petitioner that the nature of the former’s work
Decision when it received a summons and was directed to submit a does not coincide with that of the latter. Nevertheless, it ruled that
certified list of teaching and non-teaching personnel for the last three the SOLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
months prior to the issuance of the assailed Decision.26 Acting the petition for certification election, since it directed the conduct of
thereon, on August 5, 2003, the CA issued the TRO and ordered two separate certification elections based on Our ruling in University
private respondent to show cause why the writ of preliminary of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja.34
injunction should not be granted.27 Subsequently, a Manifestation
and Motion28 was filed by private respondent, stating that it repleads A motion for reconsideration35 was filed by petitioner, but the CA
by reference the arguments raised in its Comment and that it prays denied the same;36 hence, this petition assigning the alleged errors
for the immediate lifting of the TRO and the denial of the preliminary as follows:
injunction. The CA, however, denied the manifestation and motion
Scroll No. 577 51|LabRel – Part IV-C
I. objectively assess and evaluate the performances of teachers under
them if they would be allowed to be members of the same labor
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING union.
THAT THE RULING IN THE CASE OF TOYOTA MOTOR
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. TOYOTA MOTOR On the other hand, aside from reiterating its previous submissions,
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION (268 SCRA 573) private respondent cites Sections 9 and 1238of Republic Act (R.A.)
DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR DESPITE THE No. 9481 to buttress its contention that petitioner has no standing to
[COMMINGLING] OF BOTH SUPERVISORY OR MANAGERIAL oppose the petition for certification election. On the basis of the
AND RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES IN THE RESPONDENT statutory provisions, it reasons that an employer is not a party-in-
UNION; interest in a certification election; thus, petitioner does not have the
requisite right to protect even by way of restraining order or
II injunction.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS First off, We cannot agree with private respondent’s invocation of
CONFLICTING RULING ALLOWING THE CONDUCT OF R.A. No. 9481. Said law took effect only on June 14, 2007; hence,
CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY UPHOLDING THAT THE its applicability is limited to labor representation cases filed on or
RESPONDENT UNION REPRESENTED A BARGAINING UNIT after said date.39 Instead, the law and rules in force at the time
DESPITE ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT THERE IS NO MUTUALITY private respondent filed its petition for certification election on May
OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF RESPONDENT 31, 2002 are R.A. No. 6715, which amended Book V of Presidential
UNION APPLYING THE TEST LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (the Labor Code), as amended, and the
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FERRER-CALLEJA (211 Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715, as amended by
SCRA 451).37 D.O. No. 9, which was dated May 1, 1997 but took effect on June
21, 1997.40
We deny.
However, note must be taken that even without the express
Petitioner claims that the CA contradicted the very definition of provision of Section 12 of RA No. 9481, the "Bystander Rule" is
managerial and supervisory employees under existing law and already well entrenched in this jurisdiction. It has been consistently
jurisprudence when it did not classify the vice-principals, department held in a number of cases that a certification election is the sole
head, and coordinators as managerial or supervisory employees concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file
merely because the policies and guidelines they formulate are still the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended,
subject to the review and evaluation of the principal or executive but even after such filing its role in the certification process ceases
officers of petitioner. It points out that the duties of the vice- and becomes merely a bystander.41 The employer clearly lacks the
principals, department head, and coordinators include the evaluation personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all
and assessment of the effectiveness and capability of the teachers therein.42 This is so since any uncalled-for concern on the part of the
under them; that such evaluation and assessment is independently employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a
made without the participation of the higher Administration of company union.43 Indeed, the demand of the law and policy for an
petitioner; that the fact that their recommendation undergoes the employer to take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections is
approval of the higher Administration does not take away the based on the rationale that the employees’ bargaining
independent nature of their judgment; and that it would be difficult representative should be chosen free from any extraneous influence
for the vice-principals, department head, and coordinators to of the management; that, to be effective, the bargaining

Scroll No. 577 52|LabRel – Part IV-C


representative must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no It may be observed that nothing is said of the effect of such
other.44 ineligibility upon the union itself or on the status of the other qualified
members thereof should such prohibition be disregarded.
Now, going back to petitioner’s contention, the issue of whether a Considering that the law is specific where it intends to divest a
petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the legitimate labor union of any of the rights and privileges granted to it
labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory by law, the absence of any provision on the effect of the
and rank-and-file employees is actually not a novel one. In the 2008 disqualification of one of its organizers upon the legality of the union,
case of Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, may be construed to confine the effect of such ineligibility only upon
Inc.,45wherein the employer-company moved to dismiss the petition the membership of the supervisor. In other words, the invalidity of
for certification election on the ground inter alia that the union membership of one of the organizers does not make the union
membership is a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory illegal, where the requirements of the law for the organization
employees, this Court had conscientiously discussed the thereof are, nevertheless, satisfied and met. (Emphasis supplied)
applicability of Toyota and Dunlop in the context of R.A. No. 6715
and D.O. No. 9, viz.: Then the Labor Code was enacted in 1974 without reproducing Sec.
3 of R.A. No. 875. The provision in the Labor Code closest to Sec. 3
It was in R.A. No. 875, under Section 3, that such questioned is Article 290, which is deafeningly silent on the prohibition against
mingling was first prohibited, to wit: supervisory employees mingling with rank-and-file employees in one
labor organization. Even the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization. - Employees shall of the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules) merely provides in Section 11,
have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor Rule II, thus:
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to Sec. 11. Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective operation. - All existing supervisory unions and unions of security
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Individuals employed guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as
as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor such and their registration certificates shall be deemed automatically
organization of employees under their supervision but may form cancelled. However, existing collective agreements with such
separate organizations of their own. (Emphasis supplied) unions, the life of which extends beyond the date of effectivity of the
Code shall be respected until their expiry date insofar as the
Nothing in R.A. No. 875, however, tells of how the questioned economic benefits granted therein are concerned.
mingling can affect the legitimacy of the labor organization. Under
Section 15, the only instance when a labor organization loses its Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition
legitimacy is when it violates its duty to bargain collectively; but there of managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the
is no word on whether such mingling would also result in loss of rank and file organization. The determination of who are managerial
legitimacy. Thus, when the issue of whether the membership of two employees and who are not shall be the subject of negotiation
supervisory employees impairs the legitimacy of a rank-and-file between representatives of supervisory union and the employer. If
labor organization came before the Court En Banc in Lopez v. no agreement s reached between the parties, either or both of them
Chronicle Publication Employees Association, the majority may bring the issue to the nearest Regional Office for determination.
pronounced: (Emphasis supplied)

Scroll No. 577 53|LabRel – Part IV-C


The obvious repeal of the last clause of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 875 bargaining unit, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, shall
prompted the Court to declare in Bulletin v. Sanchez that remain in that unit x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
supervisory employees who do not fall under the category of
managerial employees may join or assist in the formation of a labor and Rule V (Representation Cases and Internal-Union Conflicts) of
organization for rank-and-file employees, but they may not form their the Omnibus Rules, viz.;
own labor organization.
Sec. 1. Where to file. - A petition for certification election may be
While amending certain provisions of Book V of the Labor Code, filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal
E.O. No. 111 and its implementing rules continued to recognize the office of the employer. The petition shall be in writing and under
right of supervisory employees, who do not fall under the category of oath.
managerial employees, to join a rank- and-file labor organization.
Sec. 2. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization or the
Effective 1989, R.A. No. 6715 restored the prohibition against the employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the
questioned mingling in one labor organization, viz.: petition.

Sec. 18. Article 245 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall
further amended to read as follows: contain, among others:

Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor xxxx


organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees
are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. (c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a unit unless circumstances otherwise require; and provided further,
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own (Emphasis shall not include supervisory employees and/or security guards.
supplied) (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, just like R.A. No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise
specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition would legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its
bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization. right to file a petition for certification election.

It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the
Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by fore in Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as
introducing the following amendment to Rule II (Registration of amended by R.A. No. 6715, held:
Unions):
Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of
Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory employees and both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor
security guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which
form separate labor organizations of their own; Provided, that those carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot
supervisory employees who are included in an existing rank-and-file possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including
Scroll No. 577 54|LabRel – Part IV-C
the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of Rule XI
collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to Certification Elections
the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire
into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status xxxx
of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of
the Labor Code. Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in
writing and under oath and shall contain, among others, the
xxxx following: x x x (c) The description of the bargaining unit."

In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list contains In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion to
the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in uphold the validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, although
Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its the specific provision involved therein was only Sec. 1, Rule VI, to
supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate wit:
labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite
personality to file a petition for certification election. (Emphasis Sec. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly registered
supplied) federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by
submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for the following: a) a charter certificate issued by the federation or
certification election was one for supervisory employees, but in national union indicating the creation or establishment of the
which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court local/chapter; (b) the names of the local/chapter's officers, their
reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to file a addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and (c) the
certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of local/ chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided that where the
supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file employees among local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the
its members. federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under
involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and
and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was attested to by its President.
applied in both cases.
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a local
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was or chapter submit a list of its members.
further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997
Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay
2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules - that the petition for Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO in which the core issue was
certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and
employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees - was its right to file a petition for certification election. This time, given the
removed. Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and
is a plain description of the bargaining unit, thus: Dunlop and reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there
is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not
Scroll No. 577 55|LabRel – Part IV-C
provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate
organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and labor organization.48
privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot Indeed, Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold true under the law and
affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for rules governing the instant case. The petitions for certification
cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26,
about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules
239 of the Labor Code. and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Amended
Omnibus Rules) was applied. In contrast, D.O. No. 9 is applicable in
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. the petition for certification election of private respondent as it was
Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products- filed on May 31, 2002.
San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court
explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super, it
require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be must be stressed that petitioner cannot collaterally attack the
improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter legitimacy of private respondent by praying for the dismissal of the
on account of any question pertaining to its individual members. petition for certification election:

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a
Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of union mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such
registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the
labor organization on the ground of mixed membership: the Court purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the
therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The
in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein;
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a
(a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation
that some employees participating in a petition for certification
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer
Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's
Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.
for it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered
state of the law and the rules.46 The amendments to the Labor Code and its implementing rules
have buttressed that policy even more.49
When a similar issue confronted this Court close to three years later,
the above ruling was substantially quoted in Samahang Further, the determination of whether union membership comprises
Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the managerial and/or supervisory employees is a factual issue that is
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCC-Super) v. best left for resolution in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, which
Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation.47 In unequivocal terms, has not yet happened in this case so still premature to pass upon.
We reiterated that the alleged inclusionof supervisory employees in We could only emphasize the rule that factual findings of labor
a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank- officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
Scroll No. 577 56|LabRel – Part IV-C
within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only with respect to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as
evidence.50 Also, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought amended.54 To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly
before it from the CA via Rule 45 is generally limited to reviewing issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having
errors of law or jurisdiction. The findings of fact of the CA are acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
conclusive and binding. Except in certain recognized instances,51We
do not entertain factual issues as it is not Our function to analyze or On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group
weigh evidence all over again; the evaluation of facts is best left to of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of
the lower courts and administrative agencies/quasi-judicial bodies the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the
which are better equipped for the task.52 employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be
best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
Turning now to the second and last issue, petitioner argues that, in the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 55 In determining the
view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate
personnel in private respondent due to the absence of mutuality of to be the collective bargaining agency, the Court, in the seminal
interest among its members, the petition for certification election case of Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring
should have been dismissed on the ground that private respondent Company, Inc.,56 mentioned several factors that should be
is not qualified to file such petition for its failure to qualify as a considered, to wit: (1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity
legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of which is the and unity of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of
representation of an appropriate bargaining unit. work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
We disagree. employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees. We stressed, however, that the test of the grouping is
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are community or mutuality of interest, because "the basic test of an
different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit: asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights."57
"any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in
part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with As the SOLE correctly observed, petitioner failed to comprehend the
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." Upon full import of Our ruling in U.P. It suffices to quote with approval the
compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional apt disposition of the SOLE when she denied petitioner’s motion for
Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor reconsideration:
organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall Petitioner likewise claimed that we erred in interpreting the decision
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and of the Supreme Court in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra. According to
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon petitioner, the Supreme Court stated that the non-academic rank-
issuance of the certificate of registration.53 andfile employees of the University of the Philippines shall constitute
a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of the
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the institution. Hence, petitioner argues, it sought the creation of
proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a separate bargaining units, namely: (1) petitioner’s teaching
petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due personnel to the exclusion of non-teaching personnel; and (2)

Scroll No. 577 57|LabRel – Part IV-C


petitioner’s non-teaching personnel to the exclusion of teaching respondent union sought the conduct of a certification election
personnel. among all the rank-and-file personnel of petitioner school. Since the
decision of the Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us from
Petitioner appears to have confused the concepts of membership in commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining
a bargaining unit and membership in a union. In emphasizing the unit, they have to be separated into two separate bargaining units
phrase "to the exclusion of academic employees" stated in U.P. v. with two separate certification elections to determine whether the
Ferrer-Calleja, petitioner believed that the petitioning union could not employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be
admit academic employees of the university to its membership. But represented by private respondent. In the U.P. case, only one
such was not the intention of the Supreme Court. certification election among the non-academic personnel was
ordered, because ONAPUP sought to represent that bargaining unit
A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented only. No petition for certification election among the academic
by a petitioning union. Such employees need not be members of a personnel was instituted by All U.P. Workers Union in the said case;
union seeking the conduct of a certification election. A union certified thus, no certification election pertaining to its intended bargaining
as an exclusive bargaining agent represents not only its members unit was ordered by the Court.58
but also other employees who are not union members. As pointed
out in our assailed Decision, there were two contending unions in Indeed, the purpose of a certification election is precisely to
the U.P. case, namely, the Organization of Non-Academic ascertain the majority of the employees’ choice of an appropriate
Personnel of U.P. (ONAPUP) and the All U.P. Worker’s Union bargaining unit – to be or not to be represented by a labor
composed of both U.P. academic and non-academic personnel. organization and, if in the affirmative case, by which one.59
ONAPUP sought the conduct of a certification election among the
rank-and-file non-academic personnel only, while the All U.P. At this point, it is not amiss to stress once more that, as a rule, only
Workers Union intended to cover all U.P. rank-and-file employees, questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In Montoya v.
involving both academic and non-academic personnel. Transmed Manila Corporation,60 the Court discussed the particular
parameters of a Rule 45 appeal from the CA’s Rule 65 decision on a
The Supreme Court ordered the "non-academic rank-and-file labor case, as follows:
employees of U.P. to constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of
the academic employees of the institution", but did not order them to x x x In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the
organize a separate labor organization. In the U.P. case, the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional
Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition and affirmed the order error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits
for the conduct of a certification election among the non-academic us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
personnel of U.P., without prejudice to the right of the academic decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA
personnel to constitute a separate bargaining unit for themselves decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
and for the All U.P. Workers Union to institute a petition for upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from
certification election. the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it,
In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel of not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the
petitioner school must form separate bargaining units. Thus, the
1âw phi1
case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that
order for the conduct of two separate certification elections, one the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the
involving teaching personnel and the other involving non-teaching NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that
personnel. It should be stressed that in the subject petition, private should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In

Scroll No. 577 58|LabRel – Part IV-C


question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine STA. LUCIA EAST G.R. No. 162355
whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on COMMERCIAL
the case?61
CORPORATION,
Our review is, therefore, limited to the determination of whether the Petitioner, Present:
CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the decision of the SOLE, not on the basis of whether - versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
the latter's decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct. CARPIO,
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion is not what is CORONA,
ruled upon but whether it correctly determined the existence or want *
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SOLE. HON. SECRETARY OF CHICO-NAZARIO, and
LABOR AND LEONARDO-DE
WHEREFORE, the pet1t1on is DENIED. The April 18, 2007 EMPLOYMENT and CASTRO, JJ.
Decision and July 31, 2007, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in STA. LUCIA EAST
CA-G.R. SP No. 76175, which affirmed the December 27, 2002
Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and COMMERCIAL
Employment that set aside the CORPORATION WORKERS Promulgated:
ASSOCIATION (CLUP
August 10, 2002 Decision of the Med-Arbiter denying private LOCAL CHAPTER), August 14, 2009
respondent's petition for certification election are hereby Respondents.
AFFIRMED.
x-----------------------------------------
SO ORDERED. ---------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1]assailing the


Decision[2]promulgated on 14 August 2003 as well as the
Resolution[3]promulgated on 24 February 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77015. The

Scroll No. 577 59|LabRel – Part IV-C


appellate court denied Sta. Lucia East Commercial inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. CLUP-
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its
Corporations (SLECC) petition for certiorari with prayer for Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order of
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining dismissal to this Office on 14 September 2001. On
order. The appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of 20 November 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates
Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct when she
Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a Workers Union] moved for the withdrawal of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC appeal. On 31 January 2002, this Office granted
with Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial the motion and affirmed the dismissal of the
petition.
(SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation Workers Associations (SLECCWA) petition for In the meantime, on 10 October 2001, [CLUP-
direct certification. SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union]
reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta.
Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA),
The Facts limiting its membership to the rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
The Secretary narrated the facts as follows: Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation
On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004.
of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its
chartered local, instituted a petition for On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the
certification election among the regular rank-and- instant petition. It alleged that [SLECC] employs
file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial about 115 employees and that more than 20% of
Corporation and its Affiliates, docketed as Case employees belonging to the rank-and-file category
No. RO400-0202-RU-007. The affiliate companies are its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that
included in the petition were SLE Commercial, no certification election has been held among them
SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East within the last 12 months prior to the filing of the
Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home petition, and while there is another union
Gallery and Essentials. registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on
22 June 2001 covering the same employees,
On 21 August 2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered namely [SMSLEC], it has not been recognized as
the dismissal of the petition due to
Scroll No. 577 60|LabRel – Part IV-C
the exclusive bargaining agent of [SLECCs] voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of
employees. another labor organization in the same bargaining
unit. It pointed out that the time of the voluntary
On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to recognition on 20 July 2001, appellants
dismiss the petition. It averred that it has registration as [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 Workers Union], which covers the same group of
as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular employees covered by Samahang Manggagawa sa
rank-and-file employees, and that collective Sta. Lucia East Commercial, was existing and has
bargaining negotiations already commenced neither been cancelled or abandoned. [CLUP-
between them. SLECC argued that the petition SLECCWA] also accused Med-Arbiter Bactin of
should be dismissed for violating the one year and malice, collusion and conspiracy with appellee
negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), company when he dismissed the petition for
Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus certification election filed by [SMSLEC] for being
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. moot and academic because of its voluntary
recognition, when he was fully aware of the
On 29 November 2001, a CBA between pendency of [CLUP-SLECCWAs] earlier petition
[SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank- for certification election.
and-file employees and registered with DOLE-
Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002. Subsequent pleadings filed by [CLUP-
SLECCWA] and [SLECC] reiterated their
In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP- respective positions on the validity and invalidity
SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to of the voluntary recognition. On 29 July 2002,
[SLECCS] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the Med-Arbiter Bactin issued the assailed Order.[4]
validity of the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC]
by [SLECC] and their consequent negotiations and
execution of a CBA. According to [CLUP-
SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice, The Med-Arbiters Ruling
collusion and conspiracy involving some officials
of the Regional Office. Appellant contended that
Chief LEO Raymundo Agravante, DOLE Regional
In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L.
Office No. IV, Labor Relations Division should
Bactin dismissed CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for direct
have not approved and recorded the voluntary
recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] because it certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior
violated one of the major requirements for voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between
SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWAs
Scroll No. 577 61|LabRel – Part IV-C
petition for direct certification. SMSLEC is entitled to enjoy 1. Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation
the rights, privileges, and obligations of an exclusive Workers Association CLUP Local Chapter;
bargaining representative from the time of the recording of 2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East
the voluntary recognition. Moreover, the duly registered CBA Commercial; and
bars the filing of the petition for direct certification. 3. No Union.

CLUP-SLECCWA filed a Memorandum of Appeal of the Med-Arbiters Order before the


Secretary.

The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and Employment

Pursuant to Rule XI, Section II.1 of Department


Order No. 9, appellee corporation is hereby
In her Decision promulgated on 27 December 2002, the directed to submit to the office of origin, within
Secretary found merit in CLUP-SLECCWAs appeal. The ten (10) days from receipt hereof, the certified list
Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and of its employees in the bargaining unit or when
registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC necessary a copy of its payroll covering the same
could not bar CLUP-SLECCWAs petition. CLUP-SLECC employees for the last three (3) months preceding
and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor the issuance of this Decision.
organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC. The dispositive portion of the Secretarys Decision Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
reads: Bureau of Labor Relations and Labor Relations
Division of Regional Office No. IV for the
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED cancellation of the recording of voluntary
and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 29 July recognition in favor of Samahang Manggagawa sa
2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Sta. Lucia East Commercial and the appropriate
Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be annotation of re-registration of CLUP-Sta. Lucia
remanded to the Regional Office of origin for the East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates
immediate conduct of a certification election, Workers Union to Sta. Lucia East Commercial
subject to the usual pre-election conference, Corporation Workers Association-CLUP Local
among the regular rank-and-file employees of Chapter.
[SLECC], with the following choices:
SO DECIDED.[5]
Scroll No. 577 62|LabRel – Part IV-C
The Ruling of the Court
SLECC filed a motion for reconsideration which the
Secretary denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 27 The petition has no merit. We see no reason to overturn the
rulings of the Secretary and of the appellate court.
March 2003. SLECC then filed a petition for certiorari before
the appellate court.
Legitimate Labor Organization

Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as


The Ruling of the Appellate Court any union or association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary and with employers concerning terms and conditions of
quoted extensively from the Secretarys decision. The employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary
appellate court agreed with the Secretarys finding that the requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor
workers sought to be represented by CLUP-SLECC and its of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it
Affiliates Workers Union included the same workers in the is included in the roster of legitimate labor
bargaining unit represented by SMSLEC. SMSLEC was not organizations.[6] Any applicant labor organization shall acquire
the only legitimate labor organization operating in the subject legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
bargaining unit at the time of SMSLECs voluntary granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance
recognition on 20 July 2001. Thus, SMSLECs voluntary of the certificate of registration.[7]
recognition was void and could not bar CLUP-SLECCWAs Bargaining Unit
petition for certification election. The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization
are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining
unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San
Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma,[8]where we stated that:
The Issue
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a
SLECC raised only one issue in its petition. SLECC asserted given employer, comprised of all or less than all of
that the appellate court commited a reversible error when it the entire body of employees, consistent with
affirmed the Secretarys finding that SLECCs voluntary equity to the employer, indicated to be the best
recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
organization was in existence in the bargaining unit. the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.

Scroll No. 577 63|LabRel – Part IV-C


themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
The fundamental factors in determining the Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not
affinity and unity of the employees interest, such among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
similarity of compensation and working conditions under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior Article 239 of the Labor Code.[10] THUS, CLUP-SLECC AND
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION, HAVING BEEN
employment status. VALIDLY ISSUED A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION,
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING ACQUIRED
Contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court has JURIDICAL PERSONALITY WHICH MAY NOT BE
categorically ruled that the existence of a prior ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. THE PROPER PROCEDURE
collective bargaining history is neither decisive FOR SLECC IS TO FILE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
nor conclusive in the determination of what OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION[11]OF CLUP-SLECC
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION AND NOT TO
IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a PROCEEDINGS WITH SMSLEC.
single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two
SLECCs Voluntary Recognition of SMSLEC
corporations are related.[9]

A Legitimate Labor Organization Representing The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation
status of a union in unorganized establishments.[12] SLECC
An Inappropriate Bargaining Unit
WAS NOT AN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT WHEN IT
VOLUNTARILY RECOGNIZED SMSLEC AS ITS EXCLUSIVE
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Unions initial BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE ON 20 JULY 2001. CLUP-
problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION FILED A
organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION ON 27
unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union FEBRUARY 2001 AND THIS PETITION REMAINED
subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its PENDING AS OF 20 JULY 2001. THUS, SLECCS
members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF SMSLEC ON 20 JULY
that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a 2001, THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND
legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary RESULTING REGISTRATION OF A CBA EXECUTED BY
recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by SLECC AND SMSLEC ARE VOID AND CANNOT BAR CLUP-
Scroll No. 577 64|LabRel – Part IV-C
SLECCWAS PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a contract entered into
ELECTION. by an employer and a legitimate labor organization concerning the
terms and conditions of employment.1 Like any other contract, it has
EMPLOYERS PARTICIPATION IN A PETITION FOR the force of law between the parties and, thus, should be complied
CERTIFICATION ELECTION with in good faith.2 Unilateral changes or suspensions in the
implementation of the provisions of the CBA, therefore, cannot be
allowed without the consent of both parties.
We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a
motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for certification This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is a Court assails the September 25, 2007 Decision4 and the February 5,
2008 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the 97053.
Med-Arbiters decision. The exception to this rule, which
happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, Factual Antecedents
is not present in the case before us.[13]
Petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines is a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the the Philippines.6 Respondent Wesleyan University-Philippines
Decision promulgated on 14 August 2003 as well as the Faculty and Staff Association, on the other hand, is a duly registered
labor organization7 acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
Resolution promulgated on 24 February 2004 of the Court of of all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner.8
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77015.
In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA9 effective June
SO ORDERED. 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008.10

On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its President, Atty.


Guillermo T. Maglaya (Atty. Maglaya), issued a
Memorandum11 providing guidelines on the implementation of
vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave
commutation. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
G.R. No. 181806 March 12, 2014
1. VACATION AND SICK LEAVE CREDITS
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. Vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic. They have
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES FACULTY and STAFF to be earned. Monthly, a qualified employee earns an
ASSOCIATION, Respondent. equivalent of 1.25 days credit each for VL and SL. Vacation
Leave and Sick Leave credits of 15 days become complete
DECISION at the cut off date of May 31 of each year. (Example, only a
total of 5 days credit will be given to an employee for each of
DEL CASTILLO, J.: sick leave [or] vacation leave, as of month end September,
Scroll No. 577 65|LabRel – Part IV-C
that is, 4 months from June to September multiplied by 1.25 plan of implementing a one-retirement policy,18 which was
days). An employee, therefore, who takes VL or SL beyond unacceptable to respondent.
his leave credits as of date will have to file leave without pay
for leaves beyond his credit. Ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator

2. VACATION LEAVE COMMUTATION Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level, the parties
referred the matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator. During the hearing,
Only vacation leave is commuted or monetized to cash. respondent submitted affidavits to prove that there is an established
Vacation leave commutation is effected after the second year practice of giving two retirement benefits, one from the Private
of continuous service of an employee. Hence, an employee Education Retirement Annuity Association (PERAA) Plan and
who started working June 1, 2005 will get his commutation another from the CBA Retirement Plan. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
on May 31, 2007 or thereabout.12 Article XVI of the CBA provide:

On August 25, 2005, respondent’s President, Cynthia L. De Lara ARTICLE XVI


(De Lara) wrote a letter13 to Atty. Maglaya informing him that SEPARATION, DISABILITY AND RETIREMENT PAY
respondent is not amenable to the unilateral changes made by
petitioner.14 De Lara questioned the guidelines for being violative of SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP - Membership in the
existing practices and the CBA,15 specifically Sections 1 and 2, Plan shall be automatic for all full-time, regular staff and tenured
Article XII of the CBA, to wit: faculty of the University, except the University President.
Membership in the Plan shall commence on the first day of the
ARTICLE XII month coincident with or next following his statement of
VACATION LEAVE AND SICK LEAVE Regular/Tenured Employment Status.

SECTION 1. VACATION LEAVE - All regular and non-tenured rank- SECTION 2. COMPULSORY RETIREMENT DATE - The
and-file faculty and staff who are entitled to receive shall enjoy compulsory retirement date of each Member shall be as follows:
fifteen (15) days vacation leave with pay annually.
a. Faculty – The last day of the School Year, coincident with
1.1 All unused vacation leave after the second year of service shall his attainment of age sixty (60) with at least five (years) of
be converted into cash and be paid to the entitled employee at the unbroken, credited service.
end of each school year to be given not later than August 30 of each
year. b. Staff – Upon reaching the age of sixty (60) with at least
five (5) years of unbroken, credited service.
SECTION 2. SICK LEAVE - All regular and non-tenured rank-and-
file faculty and staff shall enjoy fifteen (15) days sick leave with pay SECTION 3. OPTIONAL RETIREMENT DATE - A Member may opt
annually.16 for an optional retirement prior to his compulsory retirement. His
number of years of service in the University shall be the basis of
On February 8, 2006, a Labor Management Committee (LMC) computing x x x his retirement benefits regardless of his
Meeting was held during which petitioner advised respondent to file chronological age.
a grievance complaint on the implementation of the vacation and
sick leave policy.17 In the same meeting, petitioner announced its
Scroll No. 577 66|LabRel – Part IV-C
SECTION 4. RETIREMENT BENEFIT - The retirement benefit shall unilaterally amended the CBA without the consent of
be a sum equivalent to 100% of the member’s final monthly salary respondent.23Thus:
for compulsory retirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
For optional retirement, the vesting schedule shall be:
SO ORDERED.24
x x x x19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by
On November 2, 2006, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a the CA in its February 5, 2008 Resolution.25
Decision20 declaring the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum
dated August 16, 2005 contrary to law. The dispositive portion of the Issues
Decision reads:
Hence, this recourse by petitioner raising the following issues:
WHEREFORE, the following award is hereby made:
a.
1. The assailed University guidelines on the availment of
vacation and sick leave credits and vacation leave Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
commutation are contrary to law. The University is sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrator’s ruling that the Affidavits
consequently ordered to reinstate the earlier scheme, submitted by Respondent WU-PFSA are substantial evidence as
practice or policy in effect before the issuance of the said defined by the rules and jurisprudence that would substantiate that
guidelines on August 16, 2005; Petitioner WU-P has long been in the practice of granting its
employees two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits.
2. The "one retirement" policy is contrary to law and is hereby
revoked and rescinded. The University is ordered x x x to b.
resume and proceed with the established practice of
extending to qualified employees retirement benefits under Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
both the CBA and the PERAA Plan. sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrator’s ruling that a university practice
of granting its employees two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits had
3. The other money claims are denied.21 already been established as defined by the law and jurisprudence
especially in light of the illegality and lack of authority of such
Ruling of the Court of Appeals alleged grant.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA via a Petition for c.


Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
On September 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision22 finding the sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrator’s ruling that it is incumbent upon
rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner WU-P to show proof that no Board Resolution was issued
It also affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement policy and the granting two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits.
Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 on the ground that these
d.
Scroll No. 577 67|LabRel – Part IV-C
Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in The Petition is bereft of merit.
revoking the 16 August 2005 Memorandum of Petitioner WU-P for
being contrary to extant policy.26 The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 10039 of the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the
Petitioner’s Arguments benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies
only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract,
Petitioner argues that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA or has ripened into a practice.40 To be considered a practice, it must
Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same.27 It be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long
maintains that there is no established company practice or policy of period of time.41
giving two retirement benefits to its employees.28 Assuming, without
admitting, that two retirement benefits were released,29 petitioner An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in the
insists that these were done by mere oversight or mistake as there construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of
is no Board Resolution authorizing their release.30 And since these law."42 The error, however, must be corrected immediately after its
benefits are unauthorized and irregular, these cannot ripen into a discovery;43 otherwise, the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits would
company practice or policy.31 As to the affidavits submitted by still apply.
respondent, petitioner claims that these are self-serving
declarations,32and thus, should not be given weight and credence.33 The practice of giving two retirement
benefits to petitioner’s employees is
In addition, petitioner claims that the Memorandum dated August 16, supported by substantial evidence.
2005, which provides for the guidelines on the implementation of
vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave In this case, respondent was able to present substantial evidence in
commutation, is valid because it is in full accord with existing the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two
policy.34 retirement plans. Based on the affidavits, petitioner has been giving
two retirement benefits as early as 1997.44 Petitioner, on the other
Respondent’s Arguments hand, failed to present any evidence to refute the veracity of these
affidavits. Petitioner’s contention that these affidavits are self-serving
Respondent belies the claims of petitioner and asserts that there are holds no water. The retired employees of petitioner have nothing to
two retirement plans as the PERAA Retirement Plan, which has lose or gain in this case as they have already received their
been implemented for more than 30 years, is different from the CBA retirement benefits. Thus, they have no reason to perjure
Retirement Plan.35 Respondent further avers that it has always been themselves. Obviously, the only reason they executed those
a practice of petitioner to give two retirement benefits36and that this affidavits is to bring out the truth. As we see it then, their affidavits,
practice was established by substantial evidence as found by both corroborated by the affidavits of incumbent employees, are more
the Voluntary Arbitrator and the CA.37 than sufficient to show that the granting of two retirement benefits to
retiring employees had already ripened into a consistent and
As to the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, respondent asserts deliberate practice.
that it is arbitrary and contrary to the CBA and existing practices as it
added qualifications or limitations which were not agreed upon by Moreover, petitioner’s assertion that there is only one retirement
the parties.38 plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and
the same is not supported by any evidence. There is nothing in
Our Ruling Article XVI of the CBA to indicate or even suggest that the "Plan"
Scroll No. 577 68|LabRel – Part IV-C
referred to in the CBA is the PERAA Plan. Besides, any doubt in the all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the
interpretation of the provisions of the CBA should be resolved in employee at the end of each school year, not later than August 30 of
favor of respondent. In fact, petitioner’s assertion is negated by the each year.
announcement it made during the LMC Meeting on February 8,
2006 regarding its plan of implementing a "one-retirement plan." For The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that
if it were true that petitioner was already implementing a one- vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits
retirement policy, there would have been no need for such would be earned on a month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits
announcement. Equally damaging is the letter-memorandum45 dated the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school
May 11, 2006, entitled "Suggestions on the defenses we can year. For example, for the first four months of the school year or
introduce to justify the abolition of double retirement policy," from June to September, an employee is only entitled to five days
prepared by the petitioner’s legal counsel. vacation leave and five days sick leave.46 Considering that the
Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a limitation not
These circumstances, taken together, bolster the finding that the agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA, we agree with the
two-retirement policy is a practice. Thus, petitioner cannot, without
1âw phi1 CA that it must be struck down.
the consent of respondent, eliminate the two-retirement policy and
implement a one-retirement policy as this would violate the rule on In closing, it may not be amiss to mention that when the provision of
non-diminution of benefits. the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties, the
literal meaning of the stipulation shall govem.47
As a last ditch effort to abolish the two-retirement policy, petitioner
contends that such practice is illegal or unauthorized and that the However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it should be resolved
benefits were erroneously given by the previous administration. No in favor of labor,48 as this is mandated by no less than the
evidence, however, was presented by petitioner to substantiate its Constitution.49
allegations.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Considering the foregoing disquisition, we agree with the findings of September 25, 2007 Decision and the February 5, 2008 Resolution
the Voluntary Arbitrator, as affirmed by the CA, that there is of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97053 are hereby
substantial evidence to prove that there is an existing practice of AFFIRMED.
giving two retirement benefits, one under the PERAA Plan and
another under the CBA Retirement Plan. SO ORDERED.

The Memorandum dated August 16,


2005 is contrary to the existing CBA.

Neither do we find any reason to disturb the findings of the CA that


the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 is contrary to the existing De la Salle University, Petitioner, v. De la Salle
CBA. University Employees Association, Respondent.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
employees are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation
leave with pay every year and that after the second year of service,
Scroll No. 577 69|LabRel – Part IV-C
FACTS: labor practice.

On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University Subsequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to DLSU
Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) members requesting for the renegotiation of the economic terms
headed by Belen Aliazas (the Aliazas faction) filed a for the fourth and fifth years of the then current CBA.
petition for the election of union officers in the Bureau of DLSU denied the request prompting DLSUEA-NAFTEU
Labor Relations (BLR). They alleged therein that there to file a notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor
has been no election for DLSUEA-NAFTEU’s officers assumed jurisdiction and found DLSU guilty of unfair
since 1992 in supposed violation of the union’s labor practice.
constitution and by-laws which provided for an election
of officers every three years. It would appear that Consequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU reiterated its demand
DLSUEA-NAFTEU repeatedly voted to approve the on DLSU to bargain collectively pursuant to the
hold-over of the previously elected officers led by aforementioned Decision of the Secretary of Labor.
Baylon Bañez (Bañez faction). Again, DLSU declined the request. Thus, DLSUEA-
NAFTEU filed another notice of strike. The Secretary of
When the matter was eventually elevated to the BLR Labor cited his earlier decision and ruled that DLSU is
Director, the latter ruled that the Bañez faction’s tenure guilty of unfair labor practice. In accordance with the
in office is valid and subsisting until their successors said decision, DLSU turned over to DLSUEA-NAFTEU
have been duly elected and qualified. the collected union dues and agency fees from
employees which were previously placed in escrow.
Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year
CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU). The Aliazas Aggrieved, DLSU appealed to the Court of Appeals
faction wrote a letter to DLSU requesting it to place in (CA). The CA dismissed the petition. When the matter
escrow the union dues and other fees deducted from was elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed
the salaries of employees pending the resolution of the the CA. DLSU moved to reconsider but the Court
intra-union conflict. DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed a complaint denied the same. Thus, the decision attained finality.
for unfair labor practice in the NLRC alleging that DLSU Meanwhile, DLSUEA-NAFTEU was ordered to file a
violated Article 248(a) and (g) of the Labor Code. comment, and, subsequently, this petition was given
DLSUEA-NAFTEU asserted that that the creation of due course.
escrow accounts was not an act of neutrality as it was
influenced by the Aliazas factions’s letter and was an ISSUE: Whether or not DLSU is guilty of unfair labor
act of interference with the internal affairs of the union. practice when it refused to bargain collectively with
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair DLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union dispute
Scroll No. 577 70|LabRel – Part IV-C
between DLSUEA-NAFTEU two opposing factions? collectively bargain with respondent union without valid
reason.
HELD: The petition is denied.
Petition is DENIED.
Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek only
one relief, that is, to absolve petitioner from
respondent’s charge of committing an unfair labor
practice, or specifically, a violation of Article 248(g) in FVC LABOR UNION- G.R. No. 176249
relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. In other words, PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
our previous affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ finding GENERAL WORKERS Present:
– that petitioner erred in suspending collective ORGANIZATION (FVCLU-
bargaining negotiations with the union and in placing the PTGWO), CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
union funds in escrow considering that the intra-union Petitioner, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
dispute between the Aliazas and Bañez factions was BRION,
not a justification therefor — is binding herein. DEL CASTILLO, and
- versus - ABAD, JJ.
The law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule SAMA-SAMANG
or decision between the same parties in the same case NAGKAKAISANG
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on MANGGAGAWA SA FVC-
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which SOLIDARITY OF Promulgated:
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of INDEPENDENT AND GENERAL
the case before the court. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS November 27, 2009
(SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO),
Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as Respondent.
early as November 2003 it had already released the x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized DECISION
relations with the latter. The fact remains that from its
receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of BRION, J.:
Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the
November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor
in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty to
Scroll No. 577 71|LabRel – Part IV-C
We pass upon the petition for review on certiorari under Rule extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4)
45 of the Rules of Court[1] filed by FVC Labor months.
UnionPhilippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) to challenge the Court of On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30,
Appeals (CA) decision of July 25, 2006[2] and its resolution 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term
rendered on January 15, 2007[3] in C.A. G.R. SP No. 83292.[4] (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the
THE ANTECEDENTS expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent
Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity
The facts are undisputed and are summarized below. of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-
SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and
On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO the Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election for
recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO
of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated (company) signed a CBA. FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the
five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside
company. The five-year CBA period was from February 1, the freedom period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the
1998 to January 30, 2003.[5] At the end of the 3rd year of the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
five-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO
and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA
Action on the Petition and Related Incidents
and modified, among other provisions, the CBAs
duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA
On June 17, 2003, Med-Arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco dismissed
provides that this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect
the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the 60-day
beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31, 2003 thus
period counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date of the
Scroll No. 577 72|LabRel – Part IV-C
amended CBA.[6] SANAMA-SIGLO appealed the Med- rationalized that they also accepted the extended term of the
Arbiters Order to the DOLE Secretary, contending that the CBA and cannot now file a petition for certification election
filing of the petition on January 21, 2003 was within 60- based on the original CBA expiration date.
days from the January 30, 2003 expiration of the original
CBA term.

DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas sustained SANAMA-SIGLO moved for the reconsideration of
SANAMA-SIGLOs position, thereby setting aside the the Acting Secretarys Order, but Secretary Sto. Tomas denied
decision of the Med-Arbiter.[7] She ordered the conduct of a the motion in her Order of January 30, 2004.[9]
certification election in the company. FVCLU-PTGWO
moved for the reconsideration of the Secretarys decision. SANAMA-SIGLO sought relief from the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
On November 6, 2003, DOLE Acting Secretary based on the grave abuse of discretion the Labor Secretary
Manuel G. Imson granted the motion; he set aside the August committed when she reversed her earlier decision calling for
6, 2003 DOLE decision and dismissed the petition as the a certification election. SANAMA-SIGLO pointed out that
Med-Arbiters Order of June 17, 2003 did.[8] The Acting the Secretarys new ruling is patently contrary to the express
Secretary held that the amended CBA (which extended the provision of the law and established jurisprudence.
representation aspect of the original CBA by four [4] months)
had been ratified by members of the bargaining unit some of THE CA DECISION
whom later organized themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the
certification election applicant. Since these SANAMA- The CA found SANAMA-SIGLOs petition meritorious on
SIGLO members fully accepted and in fact received the the basis of the applicable law[10] and the rules,[11] as
benefits arising from the amendments, the Acting Secretary interpreted in the congressional debates. It set aside the
Scroll No. 577 73|LabRel – Part IV-C
challenged DOLE Secretary decisions and reinstated her February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003 CBA that it
earlier ruling calling for a certification election. The appellate renegotiated with the company. The renegotiated CBA
court declared: changed the CBAs remaining term from February 1, 2001 to

It is clear from the foregoing that while the parties may


May 31, 2003. To FVCLU-PTGWO, this extension of the
renegotiate the other provisions (economic and non- CBA term also changed the unions exclusive bargaining
economic) of the CBA, this should not affect the five-
year representation aspect of the original CBA. If the representation status and effectively moved the reckoning
duration of the renegotiated agreement does not coincide
with but rather exceeds the original five-year term, the point of the 60-day freedom period from January 30, 2003 to
same will not adversely affect the right of another union May 30, 2003. FVCLU-PTGWO thus moved to dismiss the
to challenge the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent within sixty (60) days before the lapse petition for certification election filed on January 21, 2003 (9
of the original five (5) year term of the CBA. In the event
a new union wins in the certification election, such union days before the expiry date on January 30, 2003 of the
is required to honor and administer the renegotiated CBA original CBA) by SANAMA-SIGLO on the ground that the
throughout the excess period.
petition was filed outside the authorized 60-day freedom
FVCLU-PTGWO moved to reconsider the CA decision
period.
but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of January 15,
2007.[12] With this denial, FVCLU-PTGWO now comes
It also submits in its petition that the SANAMA-
before us to challenge the CA rulings.[13] It argues that in light
SIGLO is estopped from questioning the extension of the
of the peculiar attendant circumstances of the case, the CA
CBA term under the amendments because its members are the
erred in strictly applying Section 11 (11b), Rule XI, Book V
very same ones who approved the amendments, including the
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
expiration date of the CBA, and who benefited from these
amended by Department Order No. 9, s. 1997.[14]
amendments.

Apparently, the peculiar circumstances the FVCLU-PTGWO


Lastly, FVCLU-PTGWO posits that the representation
referred to relate to the economic and other provisions of the
petition had been rendered moot by a new CBA it entered into
Scroll No. 577 74|LabRel – Part IV-C
with the company covering the period June 1, 2003 to May case. We granted the request for relief and dispensed with the
31, 2008.[15] filing of a comment.[19]

THE COURTS RULING

Required to comment by the Court[16] and to show


While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of
cause for its failure to comply,[17] SANAMA-SIGLO
its challenge to the exclusive bargaining representation status
manifested on October 10, 2007 that: since the promulgation
of FVCLU-PTGWO, we deem it necessary in the exercise of
of the CA decision on July 25, 2006 or three years after the
our discretion to resolve the question of law raised since this
petition for certification election was filed, the local leaders of
exclusive representation status issue will inevitably recur in
SANAMA-SIGLO had stopped reporting to the federation
the future as workplace parties avail of opportunities to
office or attending meetings of the council of local leaders;
prolong workplace harmony by extending the term of CBAs
the SANAMA-SIGLO counsel, who is also the SIGLO
already in place.[20]
national president, is no longer in the position to pursue the
present case because the local union and its leadership, who
The legal question before us centers on the effect of the
are principals of SIGLO, had given up and abandoned their
amended or extended term of the CBA on the exclusive
desire to contest the representative status of FVCLU-
representation status of the collective bargaining agent and
PTGWO; and a new CBA had already been signed by
the right of another union to ask for certification as exclusive
FVCLU-PTGWO and the company.[18] Under these
bargaining agent. The question arises because the law allows
circumstances, SANAMA-SIGLO contends that pursuing the
a challenge to the exclusive representation status of a
case has become futile, and accordingly simply adopted the
collective bargaining agent through the filing of a
CA decision of July 25, 2006 as its position; its counsel
likewise asked to be relieved from filing a comment in the
Scroll No. 577 75|LabRel – Part IV-C
certification election petition only within 60 days from the This Labor Code provision is implemented through
expiration of the five-year CBA. Book V, Rule VIII of the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code[21] which states:
Article 253-A of the Labor Code covers this situation and it
Sec. 14. Denial of the petition; grounds. The
provides: Med-Arbiter may dismiss the petition on any of the
following grounds:
Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any
Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may xxxx
enter into, shall, insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition (b) the petition was filed before or after the
questioning the majority status of the incumbent freedom period of a duly registered collective
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification bargaining agreement; provided that the sixty-
election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor day period based on the original collective
and Employment outside of the sixty day period bargaining agreement shall not be affected by
immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year any amendment, extension or renewal of the
term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other collective bargaining
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall agreement (underscoring supplied).
be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. xxxx

Any agreement on such other provisions of the


Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six
(6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such
The root of the controversy can be traced to a
other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining misunderstanding of the interaction between a unions
Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately
following such date. If any such agreement is entered exclusive bargaining representation status in a CBA and the
into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the
duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in term or effective period of the CBA.
the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement,
the parties may exercise their rights under this Code.
FVCLU-PTGWO has taken the view that its exclusive
representation status should fully be in step with the term of
the CBA and that this status can be challenged only within 60

Scroll No. 577 76|LabRel – Part IV-C


days before the expiration of this term. Thus, when the term we said in San Miguel Corp. Employees UnionPTGWO, et al.
of the CBA was extended, its exclusive bargaining status was v. Confesor, San Miguel Corp., Magnolia Corp. and San
similarly extended so that the freedom period for the filing of Miguel Foods, Inc.,[22] where we cited the Memorandum of
a petition for certification election should be counted back the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated February 24,
from the expiration of the amended CBA term. 1994:

In the event however, that the parties, by mutual


We hold this FVCLU-PTGWO position to be correct, agreement, enter into a renegotiated contract with a term
of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with
but only with respect to the original five-year term of the the said five-year term and said agreement is ratified by
majority of the members in the bargaining unit, the
CBA which, by law, is also the effective period of the unions subject contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds
exclusive bargaining representation status. While the parties the contracting parties. The same will however not
adversely affect the right of another union to challenge
may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
within sixty (60) days before the lapse of the original
together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment five (5) year term of the CBA.
or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change
in the unions exclusive collective bargaining status. By In the present case, the CBA was originally signed for

express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the a period of five years, i.e., from February 1, 1998 to January

exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and 30, 2003, with a provision for the renegotiation of the CBAs

the representation status is a legal matter not for the other provisions at the end of the 3rd year of the five-year

workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an CBA term. Thus, prior to January 30, 2001 the workplace

agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, parties sat down for renegotiation but instead of confining

either as an original provision or by amendment, the themselves to the economic and non-economic CBA

bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective provisions, also extended the life of the CBA for another four

only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) months, i.e., from the original expiry date on January 30,

days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years. As 2003 to May 30, 2003.
Scroll No. 577 77|LabRel – Part IV-C
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
As discussed above, this negotiated extension of the we AFFIRM the correctness of the challenged Decision and
CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWOs Resolution of the Court of Appeals and
exclusive bargaining representation status which remained accordingly DISMISS the petition, but
effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date nevertheless DECLARE that no certification election,
of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this date, or pursuant to the underlying petition for certification election
starting December 2, 2002, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly filed with the Department of Labor and Employment, can be
file a petition for certification election. Its petition, filed on enforced as this petition has effectively been abandoned.
January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the expiration of the
SO ORDERED.
CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining status,
was seasonably filed.

MALAYAN EMPLOYEES G.R. No. 181357


We thus find no error in the appellate courts ruling ASSOCIATION-FFW and
reinstating the DOLE order for the conduct of a certification RODOLFO MANGALINO, Present:
Petitioners,
election. If this ruling cannot now be given effect, the only
CARPIO, J., Chairperson
reason is SANAMA-SIGLOs own desistance; we cannot CORONA,*
disregard its manifestation that the members of SANAMA VELASCO,**
- versus - BRION, and
themselves are no longer interested in contesting the PEREZ, JJ.
exclusive collective bargaining agent status of FVCLU-
PTGWO. This recognition is fully in accord with the Labor MALAYAN INSURANCE Promulgated:
COMPANY, INC., February 2, 2010
Codes intent to foster industrial peace and harmony in the
Respondent.
workplace.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Scroll No. 577 78|LabRel – Part IV-C


DECISION
The company issued a rule in November 2002 requiring not
only the prior notice that the CBA expressly requires, but
BRION, J.: prior approval by the department head before the union and
its members can avail of union leaves. The rule was placed
The petitioner Malayan Employees Association-FFW into effect in November 2002 without any objection from the
(union) asks us in this petition for certiorari,[1] to set aside union until a union officer, Mangalino, filed union leave
the June 26, 2007 decision[2] and the November 29, applications in January and February, 2004. His department
2007resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP head disapproved the applications because the department
No. 80691, ruling that the suspension imposed by the was undermanned at that time.
respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (company) on Despite the disapproval, Mangalino proceeded to take
union member Rodolfo Mangalino (Mangalino) is the union leave. He said he believed in good faith that he had
valid. Mangalino was suspended for taking a union leave complied with the existing company practice and with the
without the prior authority of his department head and despite procedure set forth in the CBA. The company responded by
a previous disapproval of the requested leave. suspending him for one week and, thereafter, for a month, for
BACKGROUND FACTS his second offense in February 2004.

The union is the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank- The union raised the suspensions as a grievance issue and
and-file employees of the company. A provision in the unions went through all the grievance processes, including the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company referral of the matter to the companys president, Yvonne
allows union officials to avail of union leaves with pay for a Yuchengco. After all internal remedies failed, the union went
total of ninety-man days per year for the purpose of attending to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for
grievance meetings, Labor-Management Committee preventive mediation. When this recourse also failed, the
meetings, annual National Labor Management Conferences, parties submitted the dispute to voluntary arbitration[4] on the
labor education programs and seminars, and other union following issues:
activities.

Scroll No. 577 79|LabRel – Part IV-C


1. whether or not Mangalinos suspensions were valid;
Parties are hereby enjoined to comply in this
and Award as provided in the submission Agreement.
2. whether or not Mangalino should be paid
backwages for the duration of the suspensions. SO ORDERED.

The Voluntary Arbitrators decided the submitted Notably, the decision was not unanimous. Voluntary
dispute on November 26, 2004,[5] ruling as follows: Arbitrator dela Fuente submitted the following dissent:[6]
The act of any employee that can only be
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, interpreted to be an open and utter display of
this Honorable Office adjudged the suspension of arrogance and unconcern for the welfare of his
Mr. Rodolfo Mangalinos on first availment of Company thru the use of what he pretends to
union leave invalid while the second suspension believe to be an unbridled political right cannot be
valid but illicit in terms of penalty of thirty (30) allowed to pass without sanction lest the employer
days suspension. We consider the honesty of the desires anarchy and chaos to reign in its midst.
same as mitigating circumstances, for the
Chairman of this panel of Arbitrators attested that Hence, having failed to comply with the
complainant attended labor matter in the Office of requirements for availment of union leaves and for
Voluntary Arbitrator last January 19, 2004 and going on such leave despite the express
February 5, 2004. However, it is good to note the disapproval of his superior, Mr. Mangalinos two
wisdom of Justice Narvasa in the aforecited suspensions are valid and he is not entitled to any
Supreme Court Ruling of obey first before you backwages for the duration of his suspensions.
complain. The company appealed the decision to the CA on May 12,
In view thereof, this Honorable Office 2005 through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
reduced the suspension from thirty seven (37) days of Court (Rules). In a decision promulgated on June 26, 2007,
to ten (10) days only. Henceforth, the Complainant the CA granted the companys petition and upheld the validity
is entitled to twenty seven (27) days backwages.
of Mangalinos suspension on the basis of the companys
Proof of payment of backwages should be prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules to regulate the use of
submitted to the chairman of this Panel of union leaves.[7]
Arbitrators within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
Scroll No. 577 80|LabRel – Part IV-C
The union moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision to question the CA decision, when the appropriate remedy is a
and received the CAs denial (through its resolution petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The company
of November 29, 2007) on December 8, 2007.[8] also asserted that the union violated Section 2, Rule 45 when
it failed to attach the material portions of the record as would
THE PETITION support its petition, such as the companys pleadings and the
entirety of the companys evidence. More importantly, it
The union seeks relief from this Court against the CA posited that the petition is barred by time limitation and has
decision through its Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed lapsed to finality as it was filed sixty-two (62) days after the
on February 6, 2008.[9] It alleged that the CA committed unions receipt of the CA decision.
grave abuse of discretion when, despite the clear terms of the
CBA grant of union leaves, it disregarded the evidence on On the substantive aspect, the company mainly
record and recognized that the companys use of its contended that the regulation of the use of union leaves is
management prerogative as justification was proper. within the companys management prerogative, and the
company was simply exercising its management prerogative
In our Resolution of March 5, 2008, we resolved to when it required its employees to first obtain the approval of
treat the Rule 65 petition as a petition for review either the department head or the human resource manager
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, and required the before making use of any union leave. Thus, Mangalino
respondent company to comment.[10] After comment, we committed acts of insubordination when he insisted on going
required the union to file its reply.[11] Thereafter, the parties on leave despite the disapproval of his leave applications.
submitted their respective memoranda.[12]
In its reply and subsequent memorandum, the union
In its comment, the company raised both procedural presented its justification for the technical deficiencies the
and substantive objections. company cited (quoted below), and maintained as well that
the use of management prerogative was improper because the
It questioned the petitions compliance with the Rules, CBA grant of the union leave benefit did not require prior
particularly the use of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 company approval as a condition; any change in the CBA

Scroll No. 577 81|LabRel – Part IV-C


grant requires union conformity. The union posited as well Complementing this Rule is Section 1, Rule 65 which
that any unilateral change in the CBA terms violates Article provides that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
255 of the Labor Code, which guarantees the right of 65 lies only when "there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and
employees to participate in the companys policy and decision- adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." From this
making processes on matters directly affecting their interests. Rule proceeds the established jurisprudential ruling that a
It argued against the company position that it had not objected petition for certiorari cannot be allowed when a party fails to
to the company rule and is now in estoppel. appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,
as certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.[13]

THE COURTS RULING In our Resolution of March 5, 2008, we opted to


liberally apply the rules and to treat the petition as a petition
We deny the petition for lack of merit. for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in order to have a total
The company position that the union should have filed view of the merits of the petition in light of the importance of
an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules and not a petition a ruling on the presented issues. The union which did not
for certiorari is correct. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules states present any justification at the outset for the petitions
that: deficiencies, particularly for the late filing had this to say:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with 9) In a resolution dated 05 March 2008, this


Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal Honorable Court resolved to treat the petition in
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or the above-captioned case as a petition for review
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other Procedure. All along the petitioner thought that the
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
the Supreme Court a verified petition for appropriate considering that the ground raised is
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only grave abuse of discretion by the Honorable Court
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. of Appeals for reversing the decision of the
[Emphasis supplied.] majority decision of the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitration in arbitrary and whimsical manner.

Scroll No. 577 82|LabRel – Part IV-C


10) For having treated this petition under considering the mode of review of lower court decisions (and
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner
humbly admits that delay was incurred in the filing even in the contents of the petition which the company insists
thereof, such delay was caused by several factors are deficient), we cannot do the same with respect to the time
beyond control such as the transfer of handling requirements that govern the finality of these decisions. A
legal assistant to another office and the
final judgment can no longer be disturbed under the combined
undersigned had to reassign the case for the
preparation of the petition. Furthermore, the application of the principles of immutability of final
undersigned counsel, other than being the Chief judgments[14] and res judicata,[15] subject only to very
of FFW LEGAL CENTER is also the Vice exceptional circumstances not at all present in this case.[16]
President of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), who has to attend similar and urgent
pressing problems of local affiliates arising from Under Rule 45, a petition for review
the effects of contracting out and closure of on certiorari should be filed within 15 days from notice of
companies.
judgment, extendible in meritorious cases for a total of
11) Considering the issue to be resolved another 30 days.[17] Given that a Rule 45 petition is
requires only two CBA provisions (1) the appropriate in the present case, the period of 60 days after
recognition of management prerogative (Section 1, notice of judgment is way past the deadline allowed, so that
Article III of the CBA), and union leave (Section
3, Article XV of the CBA) to guide the Honorable the CA decision had lapsed to finality by the time the petition
Court reached (sic) a decision, petitioner honestly with us was filed. This reason alone even without considering
thought that the other pleadings referred to by the companys other technical objection based on the unions
respondent are not relevant.
failure to attach relevant documents in support of the petition
amply supports the denial of the petition.
With this kind and tenor of justification, we appear to
have acted with extreme liberality in recognizing the petition
The lack of merit of the petition likewise precludes us
as a Rule 45 petition and in giving it due course. We cannot
from resolving it in the unions favor. In short, we see no
extend the same liberality, however, with respect to the
reversible error in the CAs ruling.
unions violation of the established rules on timelines in the
filing of petitions, which violations the company has kept
alive by its continuing objection. While we can be liberal in
Scroll No. 577 83|LabRel – Part IV-C
While it is true that the union and its members have the unilateral change in policy or any request for a meeting to
been granted union leave privileges under the CBA, the grant discuss this policy appears on record. The union and its
cannot be considered separately from the other provisions of members have willingly applied for approval as the rule
the CBA, particularly the provision on management requires.[20] Even Mangalino himself, in the past, had filed
prerogatives where the CBA reserved for the company the applications for union leave with his department manager,
full and complete authority in managing and running its and willingly complied with the disapproval without protest
business.[18] We see nothing in the wordings of the union of any kind.[21] Thus, when Mangalino asserted his right to
leave provision that removes from the company the right to take a leave without prior approval, the requirement for prior
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to govern the approval was already in place and established, and could no
manner of availing of union leaves, particularly the longer be removed except with the companys consent or by
prerogative to require prior approval. Precisely, prior notice negotiation and express agreement in future CBAs.
is expressly required under the CBA so that the company can The prior approval policy fully supported the validity
appropriately respond to the request for leave. In this sense, of the suspensions the company imposed on Mangalino. We
the rule requiring prior approval only made express what is point out additionally that as an employee, Mangalino had the
implied in the terms of the CBA. clear obligation to comply with the management disapproval
In any event, any doubt in resolving any interpretative of his requested leave while at the same time registering his
conflict is settled by subsequent developments in the course objection to the company regulation and action. That he still
of the parties implementation of the CBA, specifically, by the went on leave, in open disregard of his superiors orders,
establishment of the company regulation in November 2002 rendered Mangalino open to the charge of insubordination,
requiring prior approval before the union leave can be used. separately from his
The union accepted this regulation without objection since its absence without official leave.[22] This charge, of course, can
promulgation (or more than a year before the present dispute no longer prosper even if laid today, given the lapse of time
arose), and the rule on its face is not unreasonable, that has since transpired.
oppressive, nor violative of CBA terms.Ample evidence
exists in the records indicating the unions acquiescence to the In light of the petitions procedural infirmities,
rule.[19] Notably, no letter from the union complaining about particularly its late filing that rendered the CA decision final,

Scroll No. 577 84|LabRel – Part IV-C


and the petitions lack of substantive merit, denial of the DECISION
petition necessarily follows.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the Petitioner Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners, all
petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. employees of respondent International Copra Export Corp-
oration (INTERCO), filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation
SO ORDERED. with the Department of Labor and Employment National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Branch
No. XI, Davao City against respondent, for violation of
JUANITO TABIGUE, ALEX BIBAT, G.R. No. 183335 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on
JECHRIS DASALLA, ANTONIO
the grievance conference/meeting.[1]
TANGON, ROLANDO PEDRIGAL, Present:
DANTE MAUL, ALFREDO IDUL,
EDGAR RAMOS, RODERICK PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the
JAVIER, NOEL PONAYO, ROMEL CARPIO MORALES,NCMB, petitioners requested to elevate the case to voluntary
ORAPA, REY JONE, ALMA PATAY, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
arbitration. The NCMB thus set a date for the parties to agree
JERIC BANDIGAN, DANILO BERSAMIN, and
JAYME, ELENITA S. BELLEZA, VILLARAMA, JR., on JJ.a Voluntary Arbitrator.
JOSEPHINE COTANDA, RENE DEL
MUNDO, PONCIANO ROBUCA, and Before the parties could finally meet, respondent
MARLON MADICLUM, Promulgated:
presented before the NCMB a letter[2] of Genaro Tan (Tan),
Petitioners, December 23, 2009
president of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union (the
- versus - union) of which petitioners are members, addressed to
respondents plant manager Engr. Paterno C. Tangente
INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT
(Tangente), stating that petitioners are not duly authorized by
CORPORATION (INTERCO),
Respondent. [the] board or the officers to represent the union, [hence] . . .
x----------------------------------------- all actions, representations or agreements made by these
---------x people with the management will not be honored or

Scroll No. 577 85|LabRel – Part IV-C


recognized by the union. Respondent thus moved to dismiss
petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction.[3] On petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,[8] the
NCMB Director, by letter of April 11, 2007 to petitioners
Petitioners soon sent union president Tan and counsel, stated that the NCMB has no rule-making power to
respondents plant manager Tangente a Notice to Arbitrate, decide on issues [as it] only facilitates settlement among the
citing the Revised Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary parties to . . . labor disputes.
Arbitration Procedure vis a vis Section 3, Article XII of the
CBA, furnishing the NCMB with a copy[4] thereof, which Petitioners thus assailed the NCMB Directors decision
notice respondent opposed.[5] via Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals[9] which
dismissed it by Resolution[10] of October 24, 2007 in this wise:
The parties having failed to arrive at a
settlement,[6] NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote xxxx
petitioner Alex Bibat and respondents plant manager Considering that NCMB is not a quasi-
Tangente of the lack of willingness of both parties to submit judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial
to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite functions but merely a conciliatory body for the
purpose of facilitating settlement of disputes
to submit the case thereto; and that under the CBA forged by
between parties, its decisions or that of its
the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary authorized officer cannot be appealed either
arbitration but that since Tan informed respondent that the through a petition for review under Rule 43 or
union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it would under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration. Further perusal of the petition reveals the
following infirmities:
The NCMB Director thus concluded that the demand of
1. Payment of the docket fees and other
[petitioners] to submit the issues . . . to voluntary arbitration
legal fees is short by One Thousand
CAN NOT BE GRANTED. He thus advised petitioners to Pesos (Php 1,000.00);
avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their
rights.[7] 2. Copy of the assailed Decision of the
Regional Director of the National
Scroll No. 577 86|LabRel – Part IV-C
Conciliation and Mediation Board INSTRUMENTALITIES,
has not been properly certified as the ARE APPEALABLE BY PETITION FOR
name and designation of the certifying REVIEW TO THE COURT OF
[17]
officer thereto are not indicated; and APPEALS. (emphasis in the original)

3. Not all of the petitioners named in the LABOR CASES, AS A GENERAL RULE,
petition signed the verification and ARE NEVER RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF
non-forum shopping.[11] (emphasis and TECHNICALITY ESPECIALLY SO WHEN
underscoring supplied) SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
ARE AFFECTED.[18] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration[12] having been
denied,[13] petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on
The petition fails.
Certiorari,[14] raising the following arguments:

THIS PARTICULAR CASE XXX FALLS Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that
SQUARELY WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF SECTION 6, RULE IV, IN RELATION TO [t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with
PARAGRAPH 3, SUB-PARAGRAPH 3.2, any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
SECTION 4, RULE IV, ALL OF THE REVISED payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES IN THE deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION and the contents of and the documents which
PROCEEDINGS.[15] should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. (underscoring
THE NCMB, WHEN EXERCISING and emphasis supplied)
ADJUDICATIVE POWERS, ACTS AS A Petitioners claim that they had completed the payment of the
QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.[16]
appellate docket fee and other legal fees when they filed their
FINAL JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, motion for reconsideration before the Court of
RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS, OR AWARDS OF Appeals.[19] While the Court has, in the interest of justice,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AND QUASI-
given due course to appeals despite the belated payment of
JUDICIAL BOARDS, LIKE THE NCMB,
COMMISSIONS, AGENCIES, those fees,[20] petitioners have not proffered any reason to call
Scroll No. 577 87|LabRel – Part IV-C
for a relaxation of the above-quoted rule. On this score alone, them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial
the dismissal by the appellate court of petitioners petition is in [24]
nature. (underscoring supplied)
order.
Given NCMBs following functions, as enumerated in Section
But even if the above-quoted rule were relaxed, the 22 of Executive Order No. 126 (the Reorganization Act of the
appellate courts dismissal would just the same be Ministry of Labor and Employment), viz:
sustained. Under Section 9 (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980,[21] the Court of Appeals exercises exclusive (a) Formulate policies, programs, standards,
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, procedures, manuals of operation and
guidelines pertaining to effective mediation
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and conciliation of labor disputes;
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions. (b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation
functions;

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court under which petitioners (c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other
filed their petition before the Court of Appeals[22] applies to sectors or institutions, and other government
authorities concerned with matters relative to
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
the prevention and settlement of labor
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi- disputes;
judicial functions.[23]
(d) Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards,
A[n agency] is said to be exercising judicial procedures, manuals of operation and
function where [it] has the power to determine guidelines pertaining to the promotion of
what the law is and what the legal rights of the cooperative and non-adversarial schemes,
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the other voluntary modes of dispute settlement;
parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which
applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public (e) Administer the voluntary arbitration program;
administrative officers or bodies, who are required maintain/update a list of voluntary
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of arbitrations; compile arbitration awards and
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from decisions;
Scroll No. 577 88|LabRel – Part IV-C
the UNION and the COMPANY agree to submit
(f) Provide counseling and preventive mediation the issue to Voluntary Arbitration. Selection of the
assistance particularly in the administration of arbitrator shall be made within seven (7) days from
collective agreements; the date of notification by the aggrieved party. The
Arbitrator shall be selected by lottery from four (4)
(g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision qualified individuals nominated by in equal
over the Board programs being implemented numbers by both parties taken from the list of
in the regional offices; and Arbitrators prepared by the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB). If the Company
(h) Perform such other functions as may be and the Union representatives within ten (10) days
provided by law or assigned by the Minister, fail to agree on the Arbitrator, the NCMB shall
name the Arbitrator. The decision of the Arbitrator
shall be final and binding upon the
parties. However, the Arbitrator shall not have the
it can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency. authority to change any provisions of the
Agreement. The cost of arbitration shall be borne
equally by the parties.[25] (capitalization in the
Respecting petitioners thesis that unsettled grievances
original, underscoring supplied)
should be referred to voluntary arbitration as called for in the
CBA, the same does not lie. The pertinent portion of the CBA
reads: Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to
represent the union. Apropos is this Courts pronouncement
In case of any dispute arising from the
in Atlas Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
interpretation or implementation of this Agreement
or any matter affecting the relations of Labor and Commission,[26] viz:
Management, the UNION and the COMPANY
agree to exhaust all possibilities of conciliation x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor
through the grievance machinery. The committee Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate
shall resolve all problems submitted to it within their respective representatives to the grievance
fifteen (15) days after the problems ha[ve] been machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that
discussed by the members. If the dispute or level, it shall automatically be referred to the
grievance cannot be settled by the Committee, or if voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by
the committee failed to act on the matter within the parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes
period of fifteen (15) days herein stipulated, involving the union and the company shall be
Scroll No. 577 89|LabRel – Part IV-C
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary SO ORDERED.
arbitrators.[27] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Clutching at straws, petitioners invoke the first


paragraph of Article 255 of the Labor Code which states:

Art. 255. The labor organization designated


or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. However, an individual employee or
group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer.
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

To petitioners, the immediately quoted provision is meant to


be an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role
of the labor organization/union.[28]

This Court is not persuaded. The right of any employee


or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to
the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Scroll No. 577 90|LabRel – Part IV-C